OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2

Novembro 2023-Abril 2024/November 2023-April 2024

Vol 14, Nº. 2 – Novembro 2023-Abril 2024/November 2023-April 2024

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2

ARTIGOS/ARTICLES

China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia – Carlos Gaspar – pp 1-10

A China, a Rússia e a reinvenção da Eurásia – Carlos Gaspar – pp 11-21

New Cold Wars in the High Norte? Russia and the progressive militarization of the Artic -

Armando Marques Guedes, Isidro de Morais Pereira – pp 22-49

Novas Cold Wars no High North. A Rússia e a progressiva militarização do Ártico -

Armando Marques Guedes, Isidro de Morais Pereira - pp 50-77

Ukraine Effect: are we Groping for a New World Order? - Roopinder Oberoi, Francisco José

Leandro – pp 78-97

Interpreting Indonesian Netizen Response Towards Putin’s Masculinities in the Russian

Invasion from a Gender Perspective - Dias Pabyantara Swandita Mahayasa, Bimantoro

Kushari Pramono – pp 98-116

Artificial intelligence in drones and robots for war purposes: a biolegal problem – César

Oliveros-Aya – pp 117-129

A guerra aérea autónoma e a transformação do poder aéreo – João Paulo Nunes Vicente –

pp 130-157

Security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea: the case of illegal, unreported and unregulated

fishing – António Gonçalves Alexandre – pp 158-173

Os desafios da segurança no Golfo da Guiné: o caso da pesca ilegal, não declarada

e não regulamentada – António Gonçalves Alexandre – pp 174-191

Intelligence system and national security in Nigeria: the challenges of data gathering -

Olagoke Oluwafemi Awotayo, Adetola Omitola, Bolaji Omitola, Segun Lakin Oderinde – pp

192-210

India’s Arctic Policy: Deterrent Against China’s Belt and Road Initiative? - Ferhat Cagri

Aras; Yucel Bulut – pp 211-230

Política externa do Canadá para a nova rota Ártica. Ameaças e oportunidades na estratégia

marítima – Luis António Cuco de Jesus – pp 231-244

Entrepreneurship Development- Is Financial Literacy Matter? A Literature Review - Mohsen

Mohammadi Khyareh, Amineh Zivari – pp 245-264

A (ir)relevância de Portugal para os requerentes e beneficiários de proteção internacional

– Carolina Stungari – pp 265-286

Na impossibilidade do Estado Social. Regimes de bem-estar na América Latina: uma

resenha – Bruno Bernardes – pp 287-301

Problems and conflicts related to measures to ensure the right to a fair trial in accordance

with the European Convention on Human Rights - Ganna Sobko, Galyna Muliar, Ivan

Draliuk, Myroslav Hryhorchuk, Oleksandr Holovko, Ielyzaveta Lvova – pp 302-321

Um modelo de cooperação avant la lettre para uma Europa unida. As premissas e a

evolução da pequena entente (1933) – Mircea Iliescu – pp 322-340

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, n.º 2

Novembro 2023-Abril 2024/November 2023-April 2024

Índice/Index

Seen but overlooked? The Emergence of Regional Leadership in Polycentric Climate

Governance after Paris - Ana Raquel Almeida Dias e Sandrina Antunes – pp 341-357

Poderemos falar de resiliência ontológica? Do Relatório Brundtland à retórica da

sustentabilidade: uma análise conceptual e sistémica no contexto da crise climática – José

Carlos Amaro – pp 358-371

The Role of Water Diplomacy as a Changing Concept in Regional Cooperation: A theoretical

framework - Nukhet Guntay – pp 372-388

NOTAS/NOTES

Legal Framework of Non-Fungible Tokens – Legal Repercussions & Challenges Ahead -

Aditya Mehrotra – pp 389-396

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept 2022 –

Celine Rodrigues – pp 397-406

Notas sob a utilização das cripto moedas na América Latina, com a breve resenha do caso

El Salvador – Rosa Rodrigues de Abreu - pp 407-414

RECENSÕES CRÍTICAS/CRITICAL REVIEW

Aguirre, Mariano (2023). Guerra Fria 2.0. Barcelona: Icaría. ISBN 978-84-19200-76-1 -

Paula Alfaiate da Luz – pp 415-422

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024)

CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE REINVENTION OF EURASIA

CARLOS GASPAR

cemedeiros@autonoma.pt

Senior researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations of Universidade NOVA de

Lisboa (Portugal). Invited Full Professor at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL) and Associate

Researcher at OBSERVARE, Observatory of Foreign Relations. Advisor to the Board of Directors of

Fundação Oriente. Advisor to the National Defense Institute. Member of the European Council on

Foreign Relations. Member of the Board of Advisors of the Royal Elcano Institute. Member of the

Portuguese Association of Political Science. Author of O Pós-Guerra Fria (2016); A Balança da

Europa (2017); Raymond Aron e a Guerra Fria (2018); O Regresso da Anarquia (2019); O Mundo

de Amanhã (2020); O Fim da Europa (2022).

Abstract

In the post-Cold War era, the transformation of relations between Russia and China is

inseparable from the reinvention of Eurasia, which is at the heart of the new alliance between

the two major continental powers. The revisionist strategies of Putin's Russia and Xi Jinping's

China depend on Sino-Russian convergence. Moscow and Beijing have begun to build an

alternative order based on the multilateral organization of the Eurasian space, whose

counterpoint is the United States' strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This process paves the way for

China's emergence as the leading Eurasian power for the first time in international history.

Keywords

Eurasia, China, Russia, World Order, Belt and Road Initiative

Resumo

No post-Guerra Fria, a transformação das relações entre a Rússia e a China é inseparável da

reinvenção da Eurásia, que está no centro da nova aliança entre as duas principais potências

continentais. As estratégias revisionistas da Rússia de Putin e da China de Xi Jinping

dependem da convergência sino-russa. Moscovo e Pequim começaram a construir uma ordem

alternativa a partir da organização multilateral do espaço euroasiático, cujo contraponto é a

estratégia dos Estados Unidos no Indo-Pacifico. Esse processo abre caminho à emergência da

China como a principal potência euroasiática, pela primeira vez na história internacional.

Palavras-chave

Eurásia, China, Rússia, Ordem mundial, Belt and Road Initiative

How to cite this article

Gaspar, Carlos (2023). China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations, Vol14 N2, November 2023-April 2024. Consulted [online] on date of last

visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2.1

Article received on September 1

, 2023, and accepted for publication on September 5

2023

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 1-10

China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

CHINA, RUSSIA, AND THE REINVENTION OF EURASIA

CARLOS GASPAR

On May 16

, Ambassador Li Hui, Special Representative for Eurasia, began his diplomatic

contacts in Kyiv to discuss the "political resolution of the Ukrainian crisis", as announced

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. After passing through Warsaw, Berlin, Paris

and Brussels, his mission ended in Moscow, where Li Hui was Ambassador of the People's

Republic of China between 2009 and 2019, a crucial decade for the consolidation of the

alliance between the two major continental powers.

China – the new China or the old Middle Kingdom – is not known to have ever appointed

a "Special Representative for Eurasian affairs". The organizational structure of the

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have any department for Eurasia, although

there is a Department for Central Asia and Europe. Nor it is known that Eurasia has

become a current term in the Chinese political debate, just as Eurasia as a geopolitical

concept is not a typical reference in strategic and international relations studies in China.

And yet there is Beijing's special envoy for Eurasia, who has included Russia, Germany,

France, Poland and Ukraine in his perimeter: only post-Soviet Russia assumes its

Eurasian identity, which is alien to the other four European states visited by the Chinese

representative for Eurasian affairs.

This novelty of Chinese diplomacy – a rare thing in itself – has its origins in the

reinvention of Eurasia in the evolution of relations between China and Russia since the

end of the Cold War. The decomposition of the Soviet Union was the starting point for

the reconstruction of Eurasia, the leitmotiv of the old pan-Slavic theories that

hibernated during the decades of Russian communist rule, even when Stalin and Mao

Zedong achieved Eurasian unity with the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty in

1950.

The end of the Soviet empire was both an ideological catastrophe for the Chinese

communist regime and a strategic blessing for China's security equation, which was no

longer focused on the Soviet threat and was able to fully implement Deng Xiaoping's

program of reforms and international openness. The reformist strategy translated into

the "Asianization" of the new China, which ensured the process of accelerated

modernization and the resurgence of the old empire as a major international power.

In this sense, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant a shift in China's strategic centre

of gravity, which moved from the continental hinterland to the coastal regions where

most of its industrial economy is concentrated. On the other hand, Russia's decline paved

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 1-10

China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

the way for the normalization of bilateral relations between Moscow and Beijing, with the

completion of the process of defining the borders between the two states in 1994 and

the formalization of the first version of the "strategic partnership" between China and

Russia at the summit bringing together President Jiang Zemin and President Boris Yeltsin

two years later. Finally, the breakdown of the Soviet empire meant that the People's

Republic of China has now three new contiguous states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan, three of the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia, which Beijing

recognized in 1992.

China’s priority became to complete the talks on territorial demarcation that it began

with the Soviet Union. In this context, it resumed the process with the three New

Independent States, with which it concluded separate border agreements between 1994

and 1996, extending the territory of the People's Republic of China in Central Asia

China then brought together Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Shanghai

to establish a framework for multilateral consultation to ensure political stability in its

continental rearguard

. In 2001, the Shanghai Five established the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also included Uzbekistan. The SCO's priorities

focus on the security domain, including the neutralization of pan-Islamist movements

and Islamic terrorist networks, notably the East Turkestan Independence Movement

(ETIM), which organizes the Uyghur opposition in Xinjiang. At the same time, Russia

guarantees the security of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are members

of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) since 1992.

The SCO is the first multilateral security institution created by China in the post-Cold War

era, which confirms a relevant convergence between Beijing and Moscow, both

committed to defining a framework of political stability in Central Asia, which has been

the regional "separator" between the two great continental powers since the 19

century

, and the first Eurasian institution, formed at a time when Russia wanted to

return to Europe and China has become the hegemonic power in East Asia.

This dynamic did not change in the following years. While the United States (US), after

9/11, focused on the "Greater Middle East", including Afghanistan and Central Asia – US

troops set up temporary military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to

support their operations against the Taliban – Russia and China maintained their

"strategic partnership" and continued to turn their backs, one turned to "Europe from

Lisbon to Vladivostok", the other towards maritime Asia.

Everything changed ten years later, when it became clear that China was no longer an

emerging regional power, but a challenger that can challenge the international

preeminence of the USA, called into question by the division of the Western coalition in

the Iraq War, the debacle of the military occupation of Iraq and the international

financial crisis.

China obtained 16.000,00 km

of territory in the redrawing of the borders with the three new Central Asian

republics. Jeffrey Mankoff (2023). "The War in Ukraine and Eurasia's New Imperial Moment". Washington

Quarterly 45 (2): 138. Jeffrey Mankoff (2022). Empires of Eurasia. How Imperial Legacies Shape

International Security. New Haven: Yale University Press. See also Daniel Markey (2020). China's Western

Horizon. Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yuan Jingdong (2010). "China's Role in the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization".

Journal of Contemporary China 19 (67): 855-869. Alyson Bailes et al (2007). The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization. SIPRI Policy Paper 17.

David Dallin (1949). The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

The responses of Russia and the US to China's "peaceful rise" are symmetrical and

opposite. In Moscow, President Vladimir Putin recogniseD that the centre of gravity of

international politics has shifted to Asia and advocated Russia's "pivot to the East"

consolidate the alliance with China and, at the same time, to integrate it into a “Greater

Eurasia”, which made it a priority to reintegrate the post-Soviet space into the framework

of a Eurasian Union, including a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) that excluded the

leading Asian power

Russia's response to China's resurgence was the reinvention of Eurasia, the center of

which has shifted from Moscow to Beijing, as Russian strategists aligned witht the

Kremlin, including Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, recognized

. The reference

to Eurasia is natural, since this concept has been an integral part of Russian strategic

culture since the 19

century and, additionally, this vision evokes the Russian imperial

project, without having to align with the radical ideology of the new Russian pan-Slavists,

represented by Alexander Dugin

In Washington, President Barack Obama recognized that the center of gravity of

international politics has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the "Greater

Middle East" to "Greater Asia". In this context, he defended the "pivot to Asia" of US

strategy to contain the rise of China and, at the same time, to integrate it into the

international order, namely in the G20, as a "responsible stakeholder". This historic

turning point made it a priority to reorganize its alliances and partnerships in the Asia-

Pacific with the formation of the new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which excluded the

main Asian power

The US response to China's resurgence is the reinvention of the Pacific, which was

enlarged to become the Indo-Pacific – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's original formula that

united Japan, Australia and India with the leading maritime power to prevent the

emergence of a "unipolar Asia"

. The transoceanic reference is natural in the strategic

culture of the main maritime power, which organized the defeat of the Soviet Union from

the transatlantic alliance and the US reproduced this model in the quadrilateral coalition

of the Indo-Pacific

Jeffrey Mankoff. Russia's Asia Pivot. Confrontation or Cooperation? CSIS, February 2

, 2015. Mikhail

Troitskiy (2014). The Sino-Russian Pivot and American Power. MGIMO, Pin Points 40. Ekaterina Kuznetsova,

Vladimir Inozemtsev (2013). "Russia's Pacific Destiny". American Interest, October 10

, 2013. Fiona Hill,

Bobo Lo. "Putin's Pivot. Why Russia is Looking to the East". Foreign Affairs, July 31

,2013. Kadri Liik, editor

(2014). Russia's Pivot to Eurasia. ECFR.

Putin defines the EEU as a "supranational association" that should be a pole and a bridge between Europe

and Asia-Pacific. Jeffrey Mankoff (2023): 140. See also Vladimir Putin. "A New Integration Project for

Eurasia. The Future in the Making." Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union,

October 3

, 2011.

Sergei Karaganov. "From East to West, or Greater Eurasia". Global Affairs, October 25

, 2016. Sergei

Karaganov, Timofei Bordachev (2017). The Turn to The East to Greater Eurasia. Valdai Report. Toward the

Great Ocean 5.

Marlene Laruelle (2015). Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasia Union. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 336. Marlene

Laruelle (1999). L'idéologie eurasiste or comment penser l'empire. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Jeffrey Bader (2013). Obama and China's Rise. An Insider's Account. New York: Brookings Institution.

Hillary Clinton (2014). Hard Choices. The Memoir. New York: Simon and Schuster. Aaron Friedberg (2022).

Getting China Wrong. Cambridge: Polity Press. Andrew Small (2022). No Limits. The Inside Story of China's

War with the West. London: Melville House.

Gudrun Wacker, Felix Heiduk (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Significance, Implementation, and

Changes. SWP Research Paper 9.

Rory Medcalf (2020). Indo-Pacific Empire. China, America, and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region.

Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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In Beijing, during the process of choosing the new General Secretary of the Communist

Party of China, which ended with the appointment of Xi Jinping in September 2012, the

strategic debate opposed the supporters of strategic patience, who defended a line of

continuity to avoid a premature confrontation with the USA – the fatal mistake of the

Soviet Union, according to Deng Xiaoping – and the supporters of strategic voluntarism,

who wanted to reveal | China | as a great international power and confront USA

hegemony. Two formulas identify the divergent choices – the reformist old guard wanted

to "hide China's strength and avoid pretensions to hegemony" (Tao Guang Yang Hui),

while the revisionist vanguard wanted a dynamic strategy to mobilize China's strength

and "achieve results" in international politics (Fen Fa You Wei)

The defensive line advocated the "March to the West" – a Chinese version of Karl

Haushofer's "Drang nach Osten" that evoked the dilemmas of Germany's continentalist

strategies

, implicitly in Wang Jisi's version, explicitly in General Liu Yazhou's version.

For Wang Jisi, if the US is going to focus on the Asia-Pacific, the only way to avoid direct

confrontation between the two great powers is for China to focus on its "Drang nach

Westen" along an axis that should unite Shanghai and London – the symbols of old and

new globalization

. For Liu Yazhou, the defence of land borders and stability in Central

Asia is more important than the conquest of Taiwan: Xinjiang must be recognised as a

central position, decisive both to ensure a secure land connection to the energy resources

concentrated in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, and to link China with South Asia, the

Middle East and Turkey

The offensive line advocated the transformation of China into a major maritime power to

confront the US in Taiwan and the adjacent seas, and global competition with the

hegemonic power entails forming an alternative order to the liberal order. Central Asia is

a rearguard with no decisive strategic value as long as the USA and its allies can be

excluded from this secondary area: the multilateral concert in the SCO ensures the

withdrawal of US troops stationed in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the

gradual withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the US from

Afghanistan confirmed this calculation. Yan Xuetong considered that there are only two

great international powers – the US and China – and that the inevitability of a new bipolar

division requires that the rising power can have its own normative model to create a new

world order

In 2013, President Xi Jinping announced the "Land Silk Road" in Nur-Sultan (Astana),

Kazakhstan, and the "Maritime Silk Road" in Djakarta, Indonesia

. The new strategy –

the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in its official name – anticipated the reorganization

Yan Xuetong (2014). "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement". Chinese Journal of

International Politics 7(2): 153-184.

Michel Korinman (1990). Quand l'Allemagne pensait le Mmnde. Paris: Fayard.

Wang Jisi. Marching Westwards. The Rebalancing of China's Geostrategy. Beijing: Center of International

and Strategic Studies Report, 7 October of 2012.

The text is written shortly after a period of political and social tensions in Urumqi. Lu Yazhou. On Advance

Toward the West, August 8, 2010. See also Yun Sun. March West. China's Response to U.S. Rebalancing.

Brookings Institution, January 31, 2013. Michael Clarke (2016). "Beijing's March West. Opportunities and

Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot". Orbis 62 (2): 296-313.

Yan Xuetong (2019). Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The choice of the name refers to a previous initiative of the United States - the New Silk Road Initiative

announced in 2011 by Robert Hormats, Under Secretary of State for Economy, Agriculture and Energy, who

wanted to build telecommunications networks, roads and railways to ensure Afghanistan's regional

integration. Robert Hormats. The United States "New Silk Road" Strategy. U.S. Department of State,

September 29

, 2011.

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of Eurasia as a space integrated by digital, energy, rail and financial networks of

continental connectivity along three land corridors – in the South, in the Centre and in

the North – and a sea route that encircles Asia to the Mediterranean

. For the first time

since the beginning of the reform period, the new strategy presents China as an

alternative model of political and economic development to the liberal model

The Belt and Road Initiative, the pillar of the Sinocentric "Community of Common

Destiny" announced first by Hu Jintao and then by Xi Jinping

, will be open to all states

– except the US, by definition excluded from the Chinese order – and more than 140

states, including Italy and Portugal, will sign bilateral agreements with China within this

framework. The new Chinese "Silk Routes" replace the old European "Silk Routes" of

Marco Polo and Vasco da Gama and herald the end of the long cycle of Westernization.

The Belt and Road Initiative is China's response to the strategic shift of the US and

Russia. Xi Jinping advocated China's "Eurasian pivot" to consolidate the alliance, or quasi-

alliance, with Russia

, needed to counterbalance US hegemony. But Xi Jinping's strategy

heralds an offensive turn: China needs a secure ally in the continental rearguard to be

able to concentrate its forces on the transition of power and replace the declining

hegemonic power, just as it needs to become a maritime power to fight against the US,

starting with the Taiwan Straits and the adjacent seas that it wants to integrate into its

sovereign territory

. In this context, Xi's China needs Putin's Russia more than Putin's

Russia needs Xi's China.

International politics is now dominated by the bipolarization between the US, on the one

hand, and China and Russia, on the other. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea tested the

cohesion of the coalition between the two revisionist continental great powers.

Xi's decision forced Putin to shape the Eurasian Union. In 2013, Moscow decided to create

a Eurasian Economic Union, whose credibility demanded the integration of Ukraine. But

Kyiv had been preparing to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union,

which was incompatible, in its own terms, with membership of the Eurasian Economic

Union

. Putin forced President Viktor Yanukovych to choose Moscow, but the break with

Brussels provoked an uprising of Ukrainian nationalist currents, which occupied the

center of Kyiv during the winter months. The Maidan movement ultimately prevailed

against President Yanukovych, who fled to Russia as the Russian military intervention in

Crimea began on February 28, 2014

. Three weeks earlier, on February 6, the eve of

Nadège Rolland (2017). Drivers of the Belt and Road Initiative in National Bureau of Asian Research. China's

Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative: 93-120. William

Callahan (2016). "China's 'Asia Dream'. The Belt and Road Initiative and the new regional order". Journal

of Asian Comparative Politics: 1-18.

Francis Fukuyama. "Exporting the Chinese Model", January 12

, 2016.

The "Community of Common Destiny", presented by Xi Jinping at the Forum of Belt and Road Initiative in

2017, is a modern version of the Tianxia, the Chinese imperial order. His predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the

first to use the formula. Jeffrey Mankoff (2022). See also Wang Gungwu. On Tianxia. The China Story,

August 6

, 2013.

Chen Xiaotong, Marlen Belgibayev (2014). China's Eurasian Pivot. Asan Forum, 1 December of 2014. Bobo

Lo (2019). Greater Eurasia. The Emperor's New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come? Paris: IFRI

Russia NEI Reports.

Rush Doshi (2021). The Long Game. China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Anders Aslund. Ukraine's Choice. European Association Agreement or Eurasian Union? Peterson Institute

for International Economics Policy Brief, September, 2013.

Serhii Plokhy (2017). The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine. New York: Basic Books.

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China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

the opening of the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Xi met with Putin, but no one, at least

publicly, took any notice of the meeting

The annexation of Crimea and the armed insurrection of Russian militias in the Donbas,

which is at the origin of the "hybrid war" in Eastern Ukraine, confirmed Putin's strategy

focused on breaking with the international order and realigning with China. The People's

Republic of China did not recognize the annexation of Crimea, nor did it condemn Russia,

and in May, the annual summit between Xi and Putin in Shanghai consolidated the

revisionist Entente and guaranteed China's access to Siberia's strategic hydrocarbon

reserves with the construction of a new gas pipeline, the Power of Siberia.

In June, Ukraine finally signed the Association Agreement with the European Union that

marks the border with the Eurasian Economic Union, founded by Russia, Belarus, Armenia

and Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan will join later. The tensions between the Eurasian Economic

Union and the Belt and Road Initiative's partnerships in Central Asia are evident from

the outset, which justifies the decision by Xi and Putin to declare the two complementary

projects the following year

Kazakhstan, where China built the Khurgos dry port, is crucial in the rail connection

linking Xian, Moscow and Duisburg in the northern corridor, as well as in the energy

connection of the gas pipelines linking Turkmenistan to China in the central corridor of

the new "Silk Roads". The southern corridor connects Xinjiang directly to Pakistan – the

"China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" – and ends at the port of Gwadar in the Indian

Ocean. At this juncture, the division of labour that prevails in post-Soviet Central Asia

enhances Russia's decisive position in the security dimension and China's in the economic

dimension and guarantees the co-existence of the two great powers in "Central Eurasia".

In the same vein, the Sino-Russian convergence set the framework for successive

enlargements of the SCO. In 2017, India entered by the hand of Russia, which wanted

to counterbalance China's tendentially hegemonic position in the construction of "Greater

Eurasia"; Pakistan entered by the hand of China, to maintain the balance between the

two nuclear powers of South Asia; and Iran, aligned with Russia in Syria's civil war and

with China to resist US-imposed isolation and international sanctions, completed the

accession process as a permanent member in 2022; Afghanistan, Mongolia and Belarus

have observer status; and Turkey announced its candidacy for 2024 – it would be the

first NATO member state to enter the multilateral institution that shapes the "Greater

Eurasia" and is a fundamental pillar of the neo-imperial order that the powers of the

Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis defend as an alternative to the international order of the

United Nations

"Meeting with President of China Xi Jinping", President of Russia, February 6

, 2014. "Xi Jinping Meets with

President of Russia, Vladimir Putin", PRC Consulate-General, Toronto, December 6

,2015. February of 2014.

Alexander Gabuev. "Eurasian Silk Road Union. Towards a Russia-China Consensus?" Diplomat, June 5

2015. Martin Kaczmarski, Witold Rodkiewicz. Russia's Greater Eurasia and China's New Silk Road:

adaptation instead of competition. OSW Center for Eastern Studies OSW Commentary, July 21

, 2016. See

also "Russia, China, agree on integration of Eurasian Economic Union, Silk Road Projects", TASS, May 8

2015. "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Vladimir Putin of Russia". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

People's Republic of China, May 8

, 2015.

Yuan Jing-dong. "Forging a New Security Order in Eurasia. China, the SCO, and the Impacts on Regional

Governance". Chinese Political Science Review, June 20

, 2022. See also Andrei Kortunov (2017). SCO:

The Cornerstone Rejected by the Builder of a New Eurasia? Moscow: Russian Institute of International

Affairs. Alexander Lukin (2021). "Sino-Russian Rapprochement and Greater Eurasia. From Geopolitical Pole

to International Society?" Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(1): 28-45.

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China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

In 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and, above all, the prolongation of the Russian-

Ukrainian War after the initial failure of the Russian offensive, confirmed the Sino-Russian

alliance – the most dangerous geopolitical scenario for the US, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's

prediction

– and transformed the balance between the two main revisionist powers.

As in 2014, the Russian offensive was preceded by a summit between Xi and Putin on

the eve of the Winter Olympics, this time in Beijing. But in 2022, no one could ignore the

decisive importance of the meeting between the two Presidents on the eve of the invasion

of Ukraine. Xi and Putin approved a Joint Declaration that marked Russia's convergence

with China on major issues of international politics and described the bilateral

relationship, for the first time, as a "friendship without limits"

. The summit meeting on

February 4

, 2022 marked the end of the old international order

and the invasion of

Ukraine confirmed the escalation in the power struggle between the major powers and

the irreversible split between the "wider West" and the Eastern coalition.

The Russian-Ukrainian War – the coup d'état that was supposed to decapitate the

Ukrainian state turned into a protracted war – revealed Russia's vulnerabilities, which

justifyied the perception of both Chinese and US elites about Russian decadence. The

alliance between the two continental powers was not questioned – Chinese neutrality is

a fraud from the outset and the Eurasian mission of Ambassador Li Hui confirmed the

fundamental alignment between Beijing and Moscow. But the revisionist coalition is now

led by China, which, for the first time in international history, became the leading

continental power in Eurasia

References

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Union? Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief.

Bader, Jeffrey (2013). Obama and China's Rise. An Insider's Account. New York:

Brookings Institution.

Bailes, Alyson et al (2007). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. SIPRI Policy Paper

17.

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regional order". Journal of Asian Comparative Politics: 1-18.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, 2002). The Grand Chessboard: 55. New York: Basic Books. See also Hal Brands

(2022). "The Eurasian Nightmare. Chinese-Russian Convergence and the Future of American Order".

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2022.

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the Context of the Crisis in Europe: 4. Valdai Discussion Club Report.

Odd Arne Westad. "The Next Sino-Russian Split?" Foreign Affairs, April 5

, 2022. Bobo Lo (2022). Turning

Point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Lowy Institute. Alexander Gabuev. "China's New

Vassal". Foreign Affairs, August 8

, 2022. Ryan Haas. Fatalism in not an option for addressing China-Russia

relations. Brookings Institution, March 17

, 2023.

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China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

Clinton, Hillary (2014). Hard Choices. A Memoir. Nova York: Simon and Schuster.

Dallin, David (1949). The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Doshi, Rush (2021). The Long Game. China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.

New York: Oxford University Press.

Friedberg, Aaron (2022). Getting China Wrong. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gabuev, Alexander. "China's New Vassal". Foreign Affairs, August 28, 022.

Godement, François (2022). L'invasion de l'Ukraine. La Chine pèse ses interêts. Institut

Montaigne.

Haas, Ryan. Fatalism in not an option for addressing China-Russia relations. Brookings

Institution, March 17, 2023.

Hill, Fiona; Lo, Bobo. "Putin's Pivot. Why Russia is Looking to the East". Foreign Affairs,

July 31, 2013.

Hormats, Robert (2011). The United States "New Silk Road" Strategy. U.S. Department

of State, September 29, 2011.

Jingdong, Yuan (2010). "China's Role in the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization". Journal of Contemporary China 19 (67): 855-869.

Jisi, Wang. Marching Westwards. The Rebalancing of China's Geostrategy. Pequim:

Center for International and Strategic Studies Report, October 7, 2012.

Karaganov, Sergei. "From East to West, or Greater Eurasia". Global Affairs, October 25,

2017.

Karaganov, Sergei; Bordachev, Timofei (2017). The Turn To The East To Greater Eurasia.

Valdai Report. Toward the Great Ocean 5.

Korinman, Michel (1990). Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde. Paris: Fayard.

Kuznetsova, Ekaterina; Inozemtsev, Vladimir. "Russia's Pacific Destiny". American

Interest, October 10, 2013.

Laruelle, Marlene (1999). L'idéologie eurasiste ou comment penser l'empire. Paris:

L'Harmattan.

Laruelle, Marlene (2015). Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasia Union. PONARS Eurasia Policy

Memo 336.

Liik, Kadri (ed) (2014). Russia's Pivot to Eurasia. ECFR.

Lo, Bobo (2019). Greater Eurasia. The Emperor's New Clothes or an Idea whose Time

Has Come? Paris: IFRI Russia NEI Reports.

Lo, Bobo (2022). Turning Point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Lowy

Institute.

Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russia's Asia Pivot. Confrontation or Cooperation? CSIS, February 2,

2015.

Mankoff, Jeffrey (2022). Empires of Eurasia. How Imperial Legacies Shape International

Security. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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China, Russia, and the reinvention of Eurasia

Carlos Gaspar

Mankoff, Jeffrey (2023). "The War in Ukraine and Eurasia's New Imperial Moment".

Washington Quarterly 45 (2).

Markey, Daniel (2020). China's Western Horizon. Beijing and the New Geopolitics of

Eurasia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Medcalf, Rory (2020). Indo-Pacific Empire. China, America, and the Contest for the

World's Pivotal Region. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Plokhy, Serhii (2017). The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine. Nova York: Basic Books.

Putin, Vladimir. "A New Integration Project for Eurasia. The Future in the Making"

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, October 3, 2011.

Small, Andrew (2022). No Limits. The Inside Story of China's War with the West. Londres:

Melville House.

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2014). The Sino-Russian Pivot and American Power. MGIMO, Pin Points

40.

Wacker, Gudrun; Heiduk, Felix (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Significance,

Implementation, and Changes. SWP Research Paper 9

Westad, Odd Arne (2022). "The Next Sino-Russian Split?" Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2022.

Xuetong, Yan (2014). "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement". Chinese

Journal of International Politics 7 (2): 153-184.

Xuetong, Yan (2019). Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers. Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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A CHINA, A RÚSSIA E A REINVENÇÃO DA EURÁSIA

CARLOS GASPAR

cemedeiros@autonoma.pt

Investigador integrado do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nova

de Lisboa (Portugal). Professor Catedrático Convidado, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e

Investigador Associado no OBSERVARE, Observatório de Relações Exteriores. Assessor do

Conselho de Administração da Fundação Oriente. Assessor do Instituto de Defesa Nacional.

Membro do European Council on Foreign Relations. Membro do Conselho de Assessores do Real

Instituto Elcano. Membro da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política. Autor de O Pós-Guerra

Fria (2016); A Balança da Europa (2017); Raymond Aron e a Guerra Fria (2018); O Regresso da

Anarquia (2019); O Mundo de Amanhã (2020); O Fim da Europa (2022).

Resumo

No post-Guerra Fria, a transformação das relações entre a Rússia e a China é inseparável da

reinvenção da Eurásia, que está no centro da nova aliança entre as duas principais potências

continentais. As estratégias revisionistas da Rússia de Putin e da China de Xi Jinping

dependem da convergência sino-russa. Moscovo e Pequim começaram a construir uma ordem

alternativa a partir da organização multilateral do espaço euroasiático, cujo contraponto é a

estratégia dos Estados Unidos no Indo-Pacifico. Esse processo abre caminho à emergência da

China como a principal potência euroasiática, pela primeira vez na história internacional.

Palavras-chave

Eurásia, China, Rússia, Ordem mundial, Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

In the post-Cold War, the transformation of relations between Russia and China is inseparable

from the reinvention of Eurasia, which is at the centre of the new alliance between the two

main continental powers. The revisionist strategies of Putin's Russia and Xi Jinping's China

depend on Sino-Russian convergence. Moscow and Beijing have begun to build an alternative

order based on the multilateral organisation of the Eurasian space, the counterpoint to which

is the US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. This process is paving the way for China to emerge as

the leading Eurasian power for the first time in international history.

Keywords

Eurasia, China, Russia, World order, Belt and Road Initiative

Como citar este artigo

Gaspar, Carlos (2023). A China, a Rússia e a reinvenção da Eurásia. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations, Vol14 N2, Novembro 2023-Abril 2024. Consultado [em linha] em data da

última consulta, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2.1

Artigo recebido em 1 de Setembro de 2023 e aceite para publicação em 5 de Setembro

de 2023

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A China, a Rússia e a reinvenção da Eurásia

Carlos Gaspar

A CHINA, A RÚSSIA E A REINVENÇÃO DA EURÁSIA

CARLOS GASPAR

No dia 16 de Maio, o Embaixador Li Hui, Representante especial para a Eurásia, iniciou

em Kyiv os seus contactos diplomáticos para discutir a "resolução política da crise

ucraniana", nos termos do anúncio feito pelo Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros em

Pequim. Depois de passar por Varsóvia, Berlim, Paris e Bruxelas, a sua missão terminou

em Moscovo, onde Li Hui foi o Embaixador da República Popular da China entre 2009 e

2019, uma década crucial para a consolidação da aliança entre as duas grandes potências

continentais.

Não há notícia de que a China - a nova China ou o velho Império do Meio - tenha jamais

nomeado um "Representante especial para os assuntos euroasiáticos". A estrutura

organizativa do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês não tem nenhum

departamento para a Eurásia, embora exista um Departamento da Ásia Central e da

Europa. Também não há notícia de que a Eurásia tenha passado a ser um termo corrente

no debate político chinês, tal como a Eurásia como conceito geopolítico não é uma

referência típica nos estudos de estratégia e de relações internacionais na China. E,

todavia, existe um enviado especial de Pequim para a Eurásia, que incluiu no seu

perímetro a Rússia, a Alemanha, a França, a Polónia e a Ucrânia: só a Rússia post-

soviética assume a sua identidade euro-asiática, que é estranha aos outros quatro

Estados europeus visitados pelo representante chinês para os assuntos euroasiáticos.

A novidade da diplomacia chinesa - uma coisa rara em si mesma - tem as suas origens

na reinvenção da Eurásia na evolução das relações entre a China e a Rússia desde o fim

da Guerra Fria. A decomposição da União Soviética é o ponto de partida para a

reconstrução da Eurásia, o leit-motiv das velhas teorias pan-eslavistas que hibernaram

durante as décadas do regime comunista russo, mesmo quando Stalin e Mao Tsetung

decidiram concretizar a unidade euroasiática com a assinatura do tratado de aliança sino-

soviético em 1950.

O fim do império soviético foi, ao mesmo tempo, uma catástrofe ideológica para o regime

comunista chinês e uma benção estratégica para a equação de segurança da China, que

deixou de estar concentrada na ameaça soviética e pôde realizar plenamente o programa

de reformas e de abertura internacional de Deng Xiaoping. A estratégia reformista

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Carlos Gaspar

traduziu-se na "asianização" da nova China, que assegurou o processo de modernização

acelerada e a ressurgência do velho império como uma grande potência internacional.

Nesse sentido, a ruína da União Soviética significa, desde logo, uma mudança do centro

de gravidade estratégica da China, que se desloca do hinterland continental para a faixa

costeira, onde se concentra a melhor parte da sua economia industrial. Por outro lado, o

declínio da Rússia abre caminho para a normalização das relações bilaterais entre

Moscovo e Pequim, com a conclusão do processo de definição das fronteiras entre os dois

Estados, em 1994, e a formalização da primeira versão da "parceria estratégica" entre a

China e a Rússia, na cimeira que reúne o Presidente Jiang Zemin e o Presidente Boris

Yeltsin, dois anos depois. Por último, a decomposição do império soviético significa que

a República Popular da China passa a ter três novos Estados contíguos - o Kazaquistão,

a Kirguizia e o Tajiquistão, três das cinco ex-Repúblicas soviéticas da Ásia Central, que

Pequim reconhece desde 1992.

A prioridade para a China é completar as conversações sobre a demarcação territorial

que iniciou ainda com a União Soviética. Nesse quadro, retoma o processo com os três

Novos Estados Independentes, com os quais conclui acordos de fronteiras separados

entre 1994 e 1996, que alargam o território da República Popular da China na Ásia

Central

Acto contínuo, a China reúne a Rússia, o Kazaquistão, o Kirguistão e o Tajiquistão em

Shanghai para estabelecer um quadro de concertação multilateral que possa assegurar

a estabilidade política na sua rectaguarda continental

. Em 2001, os "Shanghai Five"

instituem a Organização de Cooperação de Shanghai (SCO), que inclui também o

Uzbequistão. As prioridades da SCO concentram-se no domínio securitário, incluindo a

neutralização dos movimentos pan-islamistas e das redes terroristas islâmicas,

nomeadamente o Movimento para a Independência do Turquestão Oriental (ETIM), que

organiza a oposição dos Uyghurs no Xinjiang. Paralelamente, a Rússia garante a

segurança do Kazaquistão, do Kirguistão e do Tajiquistão, que são membros do Tratado

de Segurança Colectiva (CSTO) desde 1992.

A SCO é a primeira instituição multilateral de segurança criada pela China no post-Guerra

Fria, que confirma uma convergência relevante entre Pequim e Moscovo, empenhados

ambos em definir um quadro de estabilidade política na Ásia Central, que é o "separador"

regional entre as duas grandes potências continentais desde o século XIX

. É também,

avant la lettre, a primeira instituição euro-asiática, formada num momento em que a

Rússia quer regressar à Europa e a China se está a tornar a potência hegemónica da Asia

Oriental.

A China obteve 16 mil km2 de território na redefinição das fronteiras com as três novas Repúblicas da Ásia

Central. Jeffrey Mankoff (2023). "The War in Ukraine and Eurasia's New Imperial Moment". Washington

Quarterly 45 (2): 138. Jeffrey Mankoff (2022). Empires of Eurasia. How Imperial Legacies Shape

International Security. New Haven: Yale University Press. Ver também Daniel Markey (2020). China's

Western Horizon. Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yuan Jingdong (2010). "China's Role in the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization".

Journal of Contemporary China 19 (67): 855-869. Alyson Bailes et al (2007). The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization. SIPRI Policy Paper 17.

David Dallin (1949). The Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Essa dinâmica não se vai alterar nos anos seguintes. Enquanto os Estados Unidos, depois

do "11 de Setembro", se concentram no "Grande Médio Oriente", incluindo o Afeganistão

e a Ásia Central - as tropas norte-americanas instalam bases militares temporárias no

Kirguistão, no Tajiquistão e no Uzbequistão para apoiar as suas operações contra os

Taleban -, a Rússia e a China mantêm a sua "parceria estratégica" e continuam de

costas voltadas, uma virada para a "Europa de Lisboa a Vladivostok", a outra para a Ásia

marítima.

Tudo muda dez anos depois, quando se torna evidente que a China deixou de ser uma

potência regional emergente e passou a ser um challenger que pode desafiar a

preeminência internacional dos Estados Unidos, posta em causa pela divisão da coligação

ocidental na Guerra do Iraque, pela débâcle da ocupação militar do Iraque e pela crise

financeira internacional.

As respostas da Rússia e dos Estados Unidos à "ascensão pacifica" da China são

simétricas e opostas. Em Moscovo, o Presidente Vladimir Putin reconhece que o centro

de gravidade da política internacional se deslocou para a Ásia e defende o "pivot oriental"

da Rússia

para consolidar a aliança com a China e, simultaneamente, para a integrar

numa "Grande Eurásia", o que torna prioritário reintegrar o espaço post-soviético no

quadro de uma União Euroasiática, incluindo uma União Económica Euroasiática (EEU)

que exclui a principal potência asiática

A resposta da Rússia à ressurgência da China é a reinvenção da Eurásia, cujo centro se

deslocou de Moscovo para Pequim, como reconhecem os estrategas russos alinhados

com o Kremlin, incluindo Sergei Karaganov e Timofei Bordachev

. A referência à Eurásia

é natural, uma vez que esse conceito é parte integrante da cultura estratégica russa

desde o século XIX e, adicionalmente, essa visão evoca o projecto imperial russo, sem

ter de se alinhar com a ideologia radical dos novos pan-eslavistas russos, representada

por Alexander Dugin

Em Washington, o Presidente Barack Obama reconhece que o centro da gravidade da

política internacional se deslocou do Atlântico para o Pacífico e do "Grande Médio Oriente"

para a "Grande Ásia". Nesse quadro, defende o "pivot asiático" da estratégia norte-

americana para conter a ascensão da China e, simultaneamente, para a integrar na

ordem internacional, nomeadamente no G20, como um "responsible stakeholder".

Essa viragem histórica torna prioritário reorganizar as suas alianças e as suas parcerias

Jeffrey Mankoff. Russia's Asia Pivot. Confrontation or Cooperation? CSIS, 2 de Fevereiro de 2015. Mikhail

Troitskiy (2014). The Sino-Russian Pivot and American Power. MGIMO, Pin Points 40. Ekaterina Kuznetsova,

Vladimir Inozemtsev (2013). "Russia's Pacific Destiny". American Interest, 10 de Outubro de 2013. Fiona

Hill, Bobo Lo. "Putin's Pivot. Why Russia is Looking to the East". Foreign Affairs, 31 de Julho de 2013. Kadri

Liik, editor (2014). Russia's Pivot to Eurasia. ECFR.

Putin define a EEU como uma "associação supranacional" que deve ser um pólo internacional e uma ponte

entre a Europa e a Ásia-Pacifico. Jeffrey Mankoff (2023): 140. Ver também Vladimir Putin. "A New

Integration Project for Eurasia. The Future in the Making." Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to

the European Union, 3 de Outubro de 2011.

Sergei Karaganov. "From East to West, or Greater Eurasia". Global Affairs, 25 de Outubro de 2016. Sergei

Karaganov, Timofei Bordachev (2017). The Turn To The East To Greater Eurasia. Valdai Report. Toward the

Great Ocean 5.

Marlene Laruelle (2015). Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasia Union. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 336. Marlene

Laruelle (1999). L'idéologie eurasiste ou comment penser l'empire. Paris: L'Harmattan.

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Carlos Gaspar

na Ásia-Pacífico com a formação da nova Parceria do Trans-Pacifico (TPP), que exclui a

principal potência asiática

A resposta dos Estados Unidos à ressurgência da China é a reinvenção do Pacífico, que

se alarga para passar a ser o Indo-Pacifico - a fórmula original do Primeiro-Ministro

Shinzo Abe que une o Japão, a Austrália e a Índia à principal potência marítima para

impedir a emergência de uma "Ásia unipolar"

. A referência transoceânica é natural na

cultura estratégica da principal potência marítima, que organizou a derrota da União

Soviética a partir da aliança transatlântica e os Estados Unidos reproduzem esse modelo

na coligação quadrilateral do Indo-Pacífico

Em Pequim, durante o processo de escolha do novo Secretário-Geral do Partido

Comunista da China que termina com a nomeação de Xi Jinping em Setembro de 2012,

o debate estratégico opõe os partidários da paciência estratégica, que defendem uma

linha de continuidade para evitar um afrontamento prematuro com os Estados Unidos -

o erro fatal da União Soviética, segundo Deng Xiaoping -, e os partidários do voluntarismo

estratégico, que querem revelar a China como uma grande potência internacional e

enfrentar a hegemonia norte-americana. Duas fórmulas identificam as escolhas

divergentes - a velha guarda reformista quer "esconder a força da China e evitar

pretensões à hegemonia" (Tao Guang Yang Hui), enquanto a vanguarda revisionista

quer uma estratégia dinâmica para mobilizar a força da China e "alcançar resultados" na

política internacional (Fen Fa You Wei)

A linha defensiva defende a "Marcha para Ocidente"- uma versão chinesa do "Drang

nach Osten" de Karl Haushofer que evoca os dilemas das estratégias continentalistas

da Alemanha

, implicitamente na versão de Wang Jisi, explicitamente na versão do

General Liu Yazhou. Para Wang Jisi, se os Estados Unidos se vão concentrar na Ásia-

Pacifico, a única maneira de evitar o afrontamento directo entre as duas grandes

potências é a China concentrar-se no seu "Drang nach Westen" ao longo de um eixo

que deve unir Shanghai a Londres - os símbolos da velha e da nova globalização

. Para

Liu Yazhou, a defesa das fronteiras terrestres e da estabilidade na Ásia Central é mais

importante do que a conquista de Taiwan: o Xinjiang deve ser reconhecido como uma

posição central, decisiva tanto para assegurar uma ligação terrestre segura aos recursos

energéticos concentrados na Ásia Central e no Golfo Pérsico, como para ligar a China à

Asia do Sul, ao Médio Oriente e à Turquia

Jeffrey Bader (2013). Obama and China's Rise. An Insider's Account. Nova York: Brookings Institution.

Hillary Clinton (2014). Hard Choices. A Memoir. Nova York: Simon and Schuster. Aaron Friedberg (2022).

Getting China Wrong. Cambridge: Polity Press. Andrew Small (2022). No Limits. The Inside Story of China's

War with the West. Londres: Melville House.

Gudrun Wacker, Felix Heiduk (2020). From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. Significance, Implementation, and

Changes. SWP Research Paper 9.

Rory Medcalf (2020). Indo-Pacific Empire. China, America, and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region.

Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Yan Xuetong (2014). "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement". Chinese Journal of

International Politics 7 (2): 153-184.

Michel Korinman (1990). Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde. Paris: Fayard.

Wang Jisi. Marching Westwards. The Rebalancing of China's Geostrategy. Pequim: Center for International

and Strategic Studies Report, 7 de Outubro de 2012.

O texto é escrito pouco depois de um período de tensões políticas e sociais em Urumqi. Lu Yazhou. On

Advance Toward the West, 8 de Agosto de 2010. Ver também Yun Sun. March West. China's Response to

U.S. Rebalancing. Brookings Institution, 31 de Janeiro de 2013. Michael Clarke (2016). "Beijing's March

West. Opportunities and Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot". Orbis 62 (2): 296-313.

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A linha ofensiva defende a transformação da China numa grande potência marítima para

enfrentar os Estados Unidos em Taiwan e nos mares adjacentes e a competição global

com a potência hegemónica implica formar uma ordem alternativa à ordem liberal. A

Ásia Central é uma rectaguarda sem valor estratégico decisivo desde que se possam

excluir os Estados Unidos e os seus aliados desse espaço secundário: a concertação na

SCO assegura a retirada das tropas norte-americanas estacionadas no Uzbequistão, no

Tajiquistão e no Kirguizistão e a retirada gradual da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico

Norte (NATO) e dos Estados Unidos do Afeganistão confirma esse cálculo. Yan Xuetong

considera que só existem duas grandes potências internacionais - os Estados Unidos e a

China - e que a inevitabilidade de uma nova divisão bipolar exige que a potência

ascendente possa ter um modelo normativo próprio para criar uma nova ordem

mundial

Em 2013, o Presidente Xi Jinping anuncia a "Rota da Seda Terrestre" em Nur-Sultan

(Astana), no Kazaquistão, e a "Rota da Seda Marítima" em Djakarta, na Indonésia

. A

nova estratégia - a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) na sua denominação oficial,

traduzido em português pela Xinhua como a iniciativa "Cinturão e Rota" - antecipa a

reorganização da Eurásia como um espaço integrado por redes digitais, energéticas,

ferroviárias e financeiras de conectividade continental ao longo de três corredores

terrestres - no Sul, no centro e no Norte - e de uma rota marítima que circunda a Ásia

até ao Mediterrâneo

. Pela primeira vez desde o início do período das reformas, a nova

estratégia apresenta a China como um modelo de desenvolvimento político e económico

alternativo ao modelo liberal

A Belt and Road Initiative, pilar da "Comunidade de Destino Comum" sinocêntrica

anunciada primeiro por Hu Jintao e depois por Xi Jinping

, vai estar aberta a todos os

Estados - excepto os Estados Unidos, por definição excluídos da ordem chinesa - e mais

de 140 Estados, incluindo a Itália e Portugal, vão assinar acordos bilaterais com a China

nesse quadro. As novas "Rotas da Seda" chinesas substituem as antigas "Rotas da Seda"

europeias de Marco Polo e de Vasco da Gama e anunciam o fim do longo ciclo de

ocidentalização.

A Belt and Road Initiative é a resposta da China à viragem estratégica dos Estados

Unidos e da Rússia. Xi Jinping defende o "pivot euroasiático" da China para consolidar a

aliança, ou a quase-aliança, com a Rússia

, necessária para contrabalançar a hegemonia

Yan Xuetong (2019). Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A escolha do nome remete para uma iniciativa anterior dos Estados Unidos - a New Silk Road Initiative

anunciada em 2011 por Robert Hormats, Subsecretário de Estado para a Economia, a Agricultura e a

Energia, que queria construir redes de telecomunicações, estradas e caminhos-de-ferro para garantir a

integração regional do Afeganistão. Robert Hormats. The United States "New Silk Road" Strategy. U.S.

Department of State, 29 de Setembro de 2011.

Nadège Rolland (2017). Drivers of the Belt and Road Initiative in National Bureau of Asian Research. China's

Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative: 93-120. William

Callahan (2016). "China's 'Asia Dream'. The Belt and Road Initiative and the new regional order". Journal

of Asian Comparative Politics: 1-18.

Francis Fukuyama. "Exporting the Chinese Model", 12 de Janeiro de 2016.

A "Comunidade de Destino Comum", apresentada Xi Jinping no Forum da Belt and Road Initiative em 2017,

é uma versão moderna do Tianxia, a ordem imperial chinesa. O seu antecessor, Hu Jintao, foi o primeiro a

usar a fórmula. Jeffrey Mankoff (2022). Ver também Wang Gungwu. On Tianxia. The China Story, 6 de

Agosto de 2013.

Chen Xiaotong, Marlen Belgibayev (2014). China's Eurasian Pivot. Asan Forum, 1 de Dezembro de 2014.

Bobo Lo (2019). Greater Eurasia. The Emperor's New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come? Paris: IFRI

Russia NEI Reports.

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A China, a Rússia e a reinvenção da Eurásia

Carlos Gaspar

norte-americana. Mas a estratégia de Xi Jinping anuncia uma viragem ofensiva: a China

precisa de um aliado seguro na rectaguarda continental para poder concentrar as suas

forças na transição de poder e substituir a potência hegemónica em declínio, tal como

precisa de se transformar numa potência marítima para lutar contra os Estados Unidos,

desde logo nos estreitos da Formosa e nos mares adjacentes que quer integrar no seu

espaço de soberania

. Nesse contexto, a China de Xi precisa mais da Rússia de Putin do

que a Rússia de Putin precisa da China de Xi.

A política internacional passa a ser dominada pela bipolarização entre os Estados Unidos,

por um lado, e a China e a Rússia, por outro lado. Em 2014, a anexação da Crimeia vai

pôr à prova a coesão da coligação entre as duas grandes potências continentais

revisionistas.

A decisão de Xi força Putin a dar forma à União Euroasiática. Em 2013, Moscovo decide

criar uma União Económica Euroasiática, cuja credibilidade reclama a integração da

Ucrânia. Mas Kyiv prepara-se para assinar um Acordo de Associação com a União

Europeia, que é incompatível, nos seus próprios termos, com a adesão à União Económica

Euroasiática

. Putin obriga o Presidente Viktor Yanukovych a escolher Moscovo, mas a

ruptura com Bruxelas provoca um levantamento das correntes nacionalistas ucranianas,

que ocupam o centro de Kyiv durante os meses de Inverno. O movimento Maidan acaba

por prevalecer contra o Presidente Yanukovych, que foge para a Rússia quando se vai

iniciar a intervenção militar russa na Crimeia, em 28 de Fevereiro de 2014

. Três

semanas antes, no dia 6 de Fevereiro, véspera da abertura dos Jogos Olímpicos de

Inverno em Sochi, Xi encontra-se com Putin, mas ninguém dá. pelo menos publicamente,

importância a essa reunião

A anexação da Crimeia e a insurreição armada das milícias russas no Donbas, que está

na origem da "guerra híbrida" na Ucrânia Oriental, confirmam a estratégia de Putin

centrada na ruptura com a ordem internacional e no realinhamento com a China. A

República Popular da China não reconhece a anexação da Crimeia, nem condena a Rússia

e, em Maio, a cimeira anual entre Xi e Putin em Shanghai consolida a Entente

revisionista e garante o acesso da China às reservas estratégicas de hidrocarbonetos da

Sibéria com a construção de um novo gasoduto, o Power of Siberia.

Em Junho, a Ucrânia acaba por assinar o Acordo de Associação com a União Europeia

que marca a fronteira com a União Económica Euroasiática, fundada pela Rússia, pela

Bielorússia, pela Arménia e pelo Kazaquistão - o Kirguistão vai entrar mais tarde. As

tensões entre a União Económica Euroasiática e as parcerias da Belt and Road

Initiative na Ásia Central são evidentes desde a primeira hora, o que justifica a decisão

de Xi e Putin de declarar os dois projectos complementares, logo no ano seguinte

Rush Doshi (2021). The Long Game. China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. Nova York: Oxford

University Press.

Anders Aslund. Ukraine's Choice. European Association Agreement or Eurasian Union? Peterson Institute

for International Economics Policy Brief, Setembro de 2013.

Serhii Plokhy (2017). The Gates of Europe. A History of Ukraine. Nova York: Basic Books.

"Meeting with President of China Xi Jinping", President of Russia, 6 de Fevereiro de 2014. "Xi Jinping Meets

with President of Russia, Vladimir Putin", PRC Consulate-General, Toronto, 6 de Fevereiro de 2014.

Alexander Gabuev. "Eurasian Silk Road Union. Towards a Russia-China Consensus?" Diplomat, 5 de Junho

de 2015. Martin Kaczmarski, Witold Rodkiewicz. Russia's Greater Eurasia and China's New Silk Road:

adaptation instead of competition. OSW Center for Eastern Studies OSW Commentary, 21 de Julho de 2016.

Ver também "Russia, China, agree on integration of Eurasian Economic Union, Silk Road Projects", TASS, 8

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Carlos Gaspar

O Kazaquistão, onde a China constrói o porto-seco de Khorgos, é crucial na conexão

ferroviária que liga Xian, Moscovo e Duisburg no corredor norte, assim como na conexão

energética dos gasodutos que ligam o Turquemenistão à China, no corredor central das

novas "Rotas da Seda". O corredor sul liga o Xinjiang directamente ao Paquistão - o

"Corredor Económico China-Paquistão - e termina no porto de Gwadar, no Indico. Na

conjuntura, a divisão do trabalho que prevalece na Ásia Central post-soviética valoriza a

posição decisiva da Rússia na dimensão securitária e a da China na dimensão económica

e garante a co-existência das duas grandes potências na "Eurásia Central".

No mesmo sentido, a convergência sino-russa define o quadro dos alargamentos

sucessivos da SCO. Em 2017, a India entra pela mão da Rússia, que quer contrabalançar

a posição tendencialmente hegemónica da China na construção da "Grande Eurásia"; o

Paquistão entra pela mão da China, para manter a balança entre as duas potências

nucleares da Ásia do Sul; e o Irão, alinhado com a Rússia na guerra civil da Síria e com

a China para resistir ao isolamento imposto pelos Estados Unidos e às sanções

internacionais, completa o processo de adesão como membro permanente em 2022; o

Afeganistão, a Mongólia e a Bielorússia têm o estatuto de observadores; e a Turquia

anuncia a sua candidatura para 2024 - seria o primeiro Estado membro da NATO a entrar

na instituição multilateral que dá forma à "Grande Eurásia" e é um pilar fundamental da

ordem neo-imperial que as potências do eixo Moscovo-Pequim-Teerão defendem como

alternativa à ordem internacional das Nações Unidas

Em 2022, a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia e, sobretudo, o prolongamento da Guerra

Russo-Ucraniana depois do fracasso inicial da ofensiva russa, vai confirmar a aliança

sino-russa - o cenário geopolítico mais perigoso para os Estados Unidos, na previsão de

Zbigniew Brzezinski

- e transformar a balança entre as duas principais potências

revisionistas.

Tal como em 2014, a ofensiva russa é precedida por uma cimeira entre Xi e Putin, na

véspera dos Jogos Olímpicos de Inverno, desta vez em Pequim. Mas, em 2022, ninguém

pode ignorar a importância decisiva da reunião entre os dois Presidentes nas vésperas

da invasão da Ucrânia. Xi e Putin aprovam uma Declaração Conjunta que marca a

convergência da Rússia com a China nas principais questões da política internacional e

qualifica a relação bilateral, pela primeira vez, como uma "amizade sem limites"

. A

reunião cimeira de 4 de Fevereiro de 2022 marca o fim da velha ordem internacional

a invasão da Ucrânia confirma a escalada na luta pelo poder entre as principais potências

e a divisão irreversível entre o "Ocidente alargado" e a coligação oriental.

de Maio de 2015. "Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Vladimir Putin of Russia". Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of the People's Republic of China, 8 de Maio de 2015.

Yuan Jing-dong. "Forging a New Security Order in Eurasia. China, the SCO, and the Impacts on Regional

Governance". Chinese Political Science Review, 20 de Junho de 2022. Ver também Andrei Kortunov (2017).

SCO: The Cornerstone Rejected by the Builder of a New Eurasia? Moscovo: Russian Institute of International

Affairs. Alexander Lukin (2021). "Sino-Russian Rapprochement and Greater Eurasia. From Geopolitical Pole

to International Society?" Journal of Eurasian Studies 12 (1): 28-45.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, 2002). The Grand Chessboard: 55. Nova York: Basic Books. Ver também Hal

Brands (2022). "The Eurasian Nightmare. Chinese-Russian Convergence and the Future of American Order".

Foreign Affairs, 25 de Fevereiro de 2022.

François Godement. L'invasion de l'Ukraine. La Chine pèse ses interêts. Institut Montaigne, 15 de Março de

2022.

Timofei Bordachev. Introduction in Timofei Bordachev et al (2022). Russia-China Strategic Partnership in

the Context of the Crisis in Europe: 4. Valdai Discussion Club Report.

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Carlos Gaspar

A Guerra Russo-Ucraniana - o golpe-de-mão que devia decapitar o Estado ucraniano

transforma-se numa guerra prolongada - vai revelar as vulnerabilidades da Rússia, que

justificam a percepção quer das elites chinesas, quer das elites norte-americanas, sobre

a decadência russa. A aliança entre as duas potências continentais não é posta em causa

- a neutralidade chinesa é uma fraude, desde a primeira hora e a missão euroasiática do

Embaixador Li Hui confirma o alinhamento fundamental entre Pequim e Moscovo. Mas a

coligação revisionista passa a ser dirigida pela China que, pela primeira vez na história

internacional, passa a ser a principal potência continental na Eurásia

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024)

NEW COLD WARS IN THE HIGH NORTH?

RUSSIA AND THE PROGRESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC

ARMANDO MARQUES GUEDES

amarquesguedes@gmail.com

Full Professor (ret.), NOVA School of Law, UNL, where he was elected Director of the Faculty’s

research center (CEDIS, Portugal). Holds a Bachelors’ in Government at ISCSP, University of

Lisbon, a BSc and an MPhil at the LSE, London, a Diplôme de l'École at EHESS, Paris, all in Social

Anthropology, and a PhD at FCSH, UNL. Aggregation in Law, NSL, UNL. Was Portuguese Cultural

Counsellor at the Portuguese Embassy in Luanda, Angola, and later President of the Portuguese

Diplomatic Institute, Portuguese MFA. Was also founder and President of the Board of the

Portuguese Society of International Law (SPDI).

ISIDRO DE MORAIS PEREIRA

isidromoraispereira@gmail.com

Major General Portuguese Army (ret, Portugal). Has a Masters's Degree in Military Sciences.

Currently, a Doctoral Student at ISCSP/University of Lisbon. With national and international

military background to include NATO positions and operations. Served as Sub-Director at the

Joint Command and Staff College (IESM). And was Defense Attaché in Washington D.C., USA and

in Ottawa, Canada. ORCID: 0009-0006-0650-1107

Abstract

We consider the Arctic Basin as an emerging focal point patent in the political and strategic

conjuncture in the global framework. If observed in a “quasi-equidistant azimuthal projection”,

this basin borders five riparian States, although it includes many others that interact with

these five. A formal international organization, the Arctic Council, was created to try to

regulate the multiple interests that converge on it. International law has not been sufficient

to carry it out, if only because security matters are not part of its purview. On the other hand,

the mere fact that it is an area related to a maritime basin, which bears many of the traits of

“a lake”, raises unexpected difficulties, and is often poorly understood, in terms of the

emergence of its centrality. Unlike other “area studies” that we know better, we often tend to

have little awareness of its growing importance. In this study, I try to define relational

moments in the growing tensions that make this region a crucial region. It should be noted

that, in this regional area, cooperation and competition links are growing more and more

evident. Of the five riparian states (Denmark-Greenland, Canada, USA-Alaska, Russian

Federation, and Norway), four belong to the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the accession of

Finland and Sweden (both since their inception full members of an Arctic Council which has

no security competences) into the Atlantic Alliance in the High North, which shall tilt the

balance by leaving Russia as the sole non-NATO in that region. In the current situation,

tensions are becoming more acute due to the convergence of many other states that are

aligning with the previous ones. I will argue, as it seems obvious to us, the regional rising

tensions and the militarization associated with them, take place in moments and phases linked

to intervals of a Russia that regards itself as ever-expanding, and its potential northern

surpassing by China. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that most facets of this

temporal iteration in the adversarial tension processes have guided the recent historical

evolution regarding the militarization of this basin. Albeit its’ variable geometry, clearly, the

Wider Arctic Basin justifies its treatment in terms of an Area subject to a geopolitical analysis.

Keywords

Arctic Basin, Russian Federation, Polar Silk Road, expansionism, militarization, tensions.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 22-49

New Cold Wars in the High North? Russia and the progressive militarization of the Arctic

Armando Marques Guedes, Isidro de Morais Pereira

Resumo

A Bacia do Ártico pode ser hoje considerada como um ponto focal emergente na conjuntura

política e estratégica patente no quadro global. Se observado numa “projeção azimutal quási-

equidistante”, esta bacia confina com cinco Estados ribeirinhos, embora inclua muitos outros

que com estes cinco interagem. Uma organização internacional formal, o Conselho do Ártico,

foi criada para tentar regular os múltiplos interesses que sobre ela convergem. O Direito

Internacional não tem sido suficiente para a levar a cabo, entre outras razões porque o

Conselho não tem competências no âmbito da segurança e defesa. Por outro lado, o mero

facto de se tratar de uma área relativa a uma bacia marítima com muitas das características

de “um lago”, cria dificuldades inesperadas, e muitas vezes mal conhecidas no que à

emergência da sua centralidade diz respeito. Ao contrário de outras regiões do globo,

tendemos por isso a ter pouca consciência da sua importância crescente. É de notar que,

nesta área regional de geometria variável, crescem ligações de cooperação e competição cada

vez mais evidentes. Dos cinco Estados ribeirinhos (Dinamarca-Gronelândia, Canadá, EUA-

Alasca, Federação Russa e Noruega), quatro pertencem à Aliança Atlântica, bem como a

adesão da Finlândia e da Suécia, à Aliança Atlântica (ambas desde a sua criação membros de

pleno direito do Conselho do Ártico), uma entidade sem competências no domínio da

segurança. O que poderá desequilibrar o equilíbrio ao deixar a Rússia como o único país dessa

região não pertencente à NATO. Na conjuntura atual as tensões agudizam-se por via da

convergência de muitos outros Estados que com os anteriores se vão alinhando.

Argumentaremos, por nos parecer evidente, que as crescentes tensões e a militarização

regional a elas associada têm lugar em momentos e fases ligados a intervalos de uma Rússia

que se quer ver como em constante expansão, e a potencial ultrapassagem pela China a

norte. A finalidade deste artigo é demonstrar as principais dimensões desta iteração temporal

nos processos de tensão aguda que têm pautado a evolução histórica recente no que toca à

militarização desta bacia. Embora a sua geometria seja variável, manifestamente a Bacia

Alargada do Ártico justifica o seu tratamento como um todo coerente sob o ponto de vista

geopolítico.

Palavras-chave

Bacia do Ártico, Federação Russa, Rota Polar da Seda, expansionismo, militarização, tensões.

How to cite this article

Guedes, Armando Marques; Pereira, Isidro de Morais (2023). New Cold Wars in the High North?

Russia and the progressive militarization of the Arctic. Janus.net, e-journal of international

relations, Vol14 N2, Novembro 2023-Abril 2024. Consultado [em linha] em data da última consulta,

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2.2

Article received on October 27, 2023 and accepted on October 30, 2023

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 22-49

New Cold Wars in the High North? Russia and the progressive militarization of the Arctic

Armando Marques Guedes, Isidro de Morais Pereira

NEW COLD WARS IN THE HIGH NORTH?

RUSSIA AND THE PROGRESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC

ARMANDO MARQUES GUEDES

ISIDRO DE MORAIS PEREIRA

Introduction

The relevance and the topicality of this article are both essentially anchored on the

growing importance that the Russian Federation has been attaching to this region of the

globe in political, economic, strategic, military, and geopolitical terms. This is likely to

lead to conflicts of interest with all the five other states bordering the Arctic Basin plus

two who do not – namely Sweden and Finland, given that they are NATO Member-States;

Sweden is still waiting for adhesion, but it appears to be well on its way to join the

Alliance. On the other hand, the motivation that led us to address this issue is intrinsically

related to the growing importance that has been attributed to this entire basin. This goes

beyond the riches that its maritime subsoil contains, from hydrocarbons to many others,

and also given the marked melting of the polar ice cap, which opens up a new and much

shorter trade route – the so-called Northern Maritime Route between the Far East and

the entire consuming West, which, although seasonal, almost cuts the distance to be

traveled in half, with all the advantages that this offers.

Indeed, most of the questions we raise here are framed by the increasing accessibility

that ongoing climate change makes possible and signifies – focusing in particular on the

seasonal opening of the Northern Sea Route. This core issue is linked to a sheer politico-

geographical reality: the Arctic Basin brings together an unspecified group of Atlantic

Alliance member states, all standing in close proximity to the Russian Federation, which

depicts the region as a potential stage, or perhaps better an arena, for conflicts of various

kinds. Among them, as we shall emphasize, the rise of at least potential tensions between

China and Russia, as well as between the former and the North Atlantic states, the so-

called West, is apparent

We have strived to scrutinize what follows under the light of a few pivotal objectives: (i)

to list the various moments of the increasingly expressive militarization that Russia has

been carrying out, (especially in the periods when it has not been involved in military

operations in its near abroad) and which are reflected above all in the conduct of joint

military exercises that are spiraling – and on the consequent responses to these exercises

carried out jointly with many other states concerned with the Arctic, both before and

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after the announcement in 2022 of the possible accession of Finland and Sweden to the

Atlantic Alliance; (ii) to highlight, if not specifically the evolution of the territorial claims

that the littoral states have institutionally presented in organizations such as the Arctic

Council and at the United Nations within the framework of the Montego Bay Accords

(which in themselves would fit into another article), as well as the underlying political-

strategic tensions associated with this legal framework; (iii) to highlight the growing

difficulties and operational limits being experienced both in the Arctic Council and in the

UN, especially those that have come to light since 2022 and as a result of the invasion

of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and by the recent NATO's enlargement at its north;

(iv) lastly, we try to touch on a few of the more complex and surreptitious issues relating

to the position taken by a China whose interest has been both manifest and cautious –

engaged, as it is, in a process we believe could result in Beijing's already expressed

attempt to create "a Northern Road and Belt"; one which would allow it, if it takes place,

more direct access to the North Atlantic – with the foreseeable resistance which the

Middle Kingdom may then have to strive. All these points raise further specific questions

that we attempt to at least frame.

In order to do this always in most of its manifold contexts as we look at the accelerated

processes of militarization of this increasingly ever more vital area of study, without

neglecting the importance of hydrocarbons and other natural resources in the region

often referred to as the High North. We will articulate them with the policies of the

different states interested in them, with an eye on their eventual attempts to fashion and

transform extant International Organizations, especially the Arctic Council and NATO. We

will do so in some detail with regard to their wider frameworks, namely by considering

the limitations of this Council and the Atlantic Alliance – since the former, the Council

programmatically does not take into account the security dimensions that have been

emerging in this area; whilst the latter, NATO, sees them as central. Here goes how the

central questions we are asking here unfold: how far do the growing initiatives of the

Russian Federation, supported by China, continue focusing on the political, economic,

strategic, military, and geopolitical domains; and, also, on whether or not they will churn

out a Russian hegemonic position in this part of the world in the short or medium term.

From a theoretical point of view, we cast our perspective within a framework that

International Relations theory usually labels as liberal institutionalist. Our theoretical

framework is focused on the importance we attach to a few pertinent extant international

organizations, both formal and informal, while also considering both international law

and the so-called rule of law. Our position is thus similar to that of all the Arctic Basin

states – with the exception of a Russia which has been asserting itself as a revisionist

power, in the context of an expansionist 'offensive realism' that we deem as rather unique

up North. Furthermore, we emphasize that our perspective will be mostly restricted to

political, politico-diplomatic, and geopolitical issues – without looking too hard to other

perhaps relevant dimensions which we believe could be better dissected in articles rather

than this one, given the economy of the short text we are now putting forth.

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1. Between ambition and reality

In approaching the Arctic and its delimitation, we focus on the maritime basin itself, as

well as on its geographical extensions, its accesses and obstacles, and its neighborhoods,

both near and far. Given our purpose in this work, however, it is important to begin with

one of the frameworks that we consider to be the largest – the institutional one, in this

case, the so-called Arctic Council, the most important international organization that has

focused on this polar region. And NATO, which has been increasingly important for almost

two years now.

From an overall perspective, it can be said that the Russian Federation's 2020-2023

chairmanship of the Arctic Council has had unreasonable ambitions from the very outset

As we will be able to comment in detail throughout, Russia's pretensions in the Arctic

region have increasingly alerted the West, especially as climate change has opened up,

and continues to open up, previously unviable opportunities in the region, both in terms

of navigation and the exploitation of its many riches. As might be expected given the

expansionist affectations it has displayed throughout its history, Moscow is looking with

the necessary caution at what it perceives (or pragmatically claims to read) as a challenge

from the United States and NATO to its “natural historical ambitions” in this region

. The

Russian government's narrative about the "Western invasion" has become much louder

and more assertive in recent years. That was due to its military posture and its economic

and infrastructural projects, especially given the role taken on by NATO (and to a much

A brief preliminary note. Our general framework underlines and dismantles, step by step, what Moscow has

proposed, in an idealized manner and with a supposed foreknowledge in the appropriate drawing up of

Russian priorities in the text they entitled Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023, published by The Arctic

Institute. For more realism, see the article published by Nurman Aliyev (2021), "Russia's Arctic Council

Chairmanship in 2021-2023", published in Germany by the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in March of that year.

It is also worth looking at the excellent article by Chen Chuan (2023), "China-Russia Arctic Cooperation in

the Context of a Divided Arctic", The Arctic Institute, in its Centre for Circumpolar Security Studies, 4 April.

Unfortunately, albeit as might be expected, "pragmatic" opportunism is also emerging on many of the sides

aligned with it and, perhaps more interestingly, even from some of the "Allies" of the so-called Wider West

who oppose it. This should come as no surprise, as it is the norm in all conflicts. Inverting a Clausewitzian

expression, we consider that often "politics is also an extension of war by other means".

Russian interest in the Arctic is rooted in historically well-known strains that can be traced back to the 16th

century with the conquest of Siberia, driven by the uninterrupted search for more resources and safe trade

routes. Russia's current stance in the Arctic should be regarded as a component of its wider confrontation

with the West, where Europe can be seen as a privileged stage. The Kremlin's disputes in the Arctic and its

frightening narratives are leveraged by multiple factors: preparations for an unlikely but potentially

catastrophic eventuality of a new generalized war on the European Continent, the need to secure its

retaliatory nuclear capabilities (most of which are located around the Kola Peninsula in Severomorsk, the

HQs of the Northern Fleet, just below Murmansk, close to the northern border of Norway, in Kirkenes,

Finnmark), and the incessant search for more resources to finance the huge expenses involved in the

maintenance and development of a war capability that is at least reminiscent of the military power of the

former USSR. The clear stance of confrontation and the constant competition with the West does not seem

to show any signs of diminishing. Quite the opposite in fact. Of course, the pretensions of great powers and

the commercial interests of powerful bureaucratic elites will have to be taken into account. On this last

point, we can only emphasize the non-linearity of the positions taken by all the parties involved. Since

pretensions and interests are not confined to Russia, of course.

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lesser extent the European Union) since the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine on 24

February 2022

Finland's proposed entry into the Atlantic Alliance in 2023, and Sweden's possible

accession to the latter, were perceived by the Kremlin as an added threat to its aims. As

expected, both the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Kremlin spokeswoman reacted on

30 November 2022:

"Russia's foreign ministry said on Wednesday that Sweden and Finland joining

NATO could accelerate the militarization of the Arctic region. Responding to a

question about how the two countries joining the alliance would affect the

Arctic Council – an intergovernmental group which promotes cooperation in

the Arctic – spokeswoman Maria Zakharova noted that Russia would be the

only non-NATO member of the group”.

She added that "(i)t cannot be ignored that once these countries join the alliance, all

member states of the Arctic Council apart from Russia will be members of the North

Atlantic bloc," as she put it. She stated too that "(t)his could lead to increased

militarisation of the Arctic region but in turn, it would mean a significant increase in

tensions over high latitude security risks"

. A point that we shall address in some detail

below.

It will certainly be important to know whether Moscow will succeed in achieving her aims.

Moscow's naval, nuclear, and even conventional power in north-west Russia is

increasingly susceptible to NATO's long-range precision vectors. It is not yet clear

whether the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along Russia's northern coast

will translate into a crucial shipping route between Europe and Asia. Nor whether the

commercial projects that are intrinsically linked to it are in fact bearable, in view of the

very high costs and the vast logistical complexity potentially limiting their operation,

which is partly conditioned by the extreme weather imperatives faced. There is no doubt

that this poses many difficulties, given the limits imposed by limited infrastructure, the

increased commercial competition from other countries, uncertainty as concerns the

sustained demand for hydrocarbons since the world moves towards green technologies,

And also the very possibility of additional Western sanctions

Indeed, these are all points to which we shall return, as it is to precisely these types of

questions that our study aims to provide some answers – ones that we believe are

For more historical detail, it is useful to read and analyze the extensive and cautious report provided by

Eugene Rumer, et al. (2021), Russia in Arctic. Implications for the United States and NATO, published by

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Reuters, (Nov. 30, 2022), "Russia says Sweden and Finland joining NATO could accelerate militarisation of

Arctic region", Arctic Today. Business Journal. For a forward-looking stance that expresses less conjunctural

concern, see Bekkevold, Jo Inge and Paul Siguld Hilde (Jul. 28, 2023), "Europe's Northern Flank Is More Stable

Than You Think", Foreign Policy, which we will discuss below.

This is without even going into the possibility of reversing the process of the polar ice cap shrinking if the

process of decarbonizing the planet accelerates markedly. We will see where it takes us, i.e., if the COPs

make progress as regards the mass production of green hydrogen, on the production of electricity from

photovoltaic technologies and, perhaps, with the development of increasingly safe nuclear power stations.

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plausible, and ones that we support in what concerns many of the decisions taken in

various international fora.

2. The Arctic Council and the prospects of a gradual robustness offered

to the "Peoples of the Arctic"

For formal reasons, we will begin with the role of the Arctic Council, focusing on the

Russian Federation's last Presidency of the Council, which lasted from 11 May 2020 to

11 May 2023. The Russian Presidency pledged to continue establishing the Arctic Council

as the main instrument for international co-operation in this region, allegedly by

improving its efforts. The stated intentions aimed to promote the effectiveness of

Working Groups and of areas of expertise, as well as the Secretariat’s, and to outline

mechanisms for financing the Council's activities. The expectation was of thus fostering

the promotion of deliberations and recommendations by stimulating dialogue and greater

interaction with the increasingly numerous Observer States. All this in order to provide

adequate involvement in the Council's general activities. It should be stressed that this

Council, as it stands, does not have any competencies in the area of security and defense.

When Norway took over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council on 12 May 2023, she set

out to intensify the Arctic Council's collaboration, in general, that is, with its Economic

Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and with its’ University. Among the priorities of

the Russian Presidency a place was held, ab initio, for the promotion of international

scientific co-operation; in particular with regard to the possibility of conducting a Council

scientific expedition that would cover in-depth studies of the Arctic Ocean as a whole.

What was at stake was "sustainability", expressed in general terms by a Kremlin that

was well aware of the fact that we emphasized, that the Arctic Council had and has no

powers whatsoever in terms of security

In truth, none of this actually peaked in any meaningful sense, given the constraints

imposed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Sustainable progress,

in essence aimed at embodying the "development of the Arctic region" – an objective

naturally partly guided by the quality of its human capital – quickly fizzled out. The

intentions did seem good and sensible. The focus of the Russian Presidency, which lasted

from 2020 to 2023, was (or was intended to be) on increasing sustainability, on measures

to adjust to climate change, on improving the well-being, health, education, quality of

life of the Arctic inhabitants, and the resilience and viability of their communities,

including that of the "indigenous peoples"

. As well as on guaranteeing socio-

As is the case with the Antarctic Treaty, and unlike the Black Sea. In fact, the international organization

that oversees the Black Sea is the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), which includes a subsidiary

entity called the International Centre for Black Sea Security (ICBSS), based in Athens, and created there in

order to (i) minimize centrality by placing its headquarters in a state linked to the Black Sea, but not

bordering it, and (ii) at the same time guarantee some exemption. The formula did not work: after the

Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and its partition, the ICBSS was reduced by Moscow to an entity

merely concerned with ecology, regional economy and the creation of roads and railways around it. As

concerns the Arctic, in this regard, it is apposite to carefully analyze a report proposed by Michael Paul and

Göran Swistek (2022), "Russia in the Arctic. Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention",

SWP, Research Paper 3, published in Berlin.

The indigenous peoples of the Arctic include, for example, the Saami who live in the circumpolar areas of

Finland, Sweden, Norway and the north-west of the Russian Federation. Added to these are the Nenets,

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environmental sustainability and, in turn, as an outcome, generating a greater economic

development of the region. The promotion of scientific, educational and cultural

exchanges, tourism and contacts between peoples and regions would also be high on its

agenda. In the approved document, special attention was paid to "preserving the

linguistic and cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic", as well as to

"cross-border youth co-operation"

We shall see if the seeds planted last, given the unpredictability of the war on Ukraine

unleashed by Putin's Russia, and taking into account the crumbling of these resulting

cooperation plans that were stopped early on.

3. Russia and the invasion of Ukraine: consequences for the United

States, NATO – and, less centrally, the EU

Russia's concept of its security requirements and, on the other hand, NATO's

commitments to mutual defense and deterrence have resulted in a stalemate and even

some very visible tension on the Alliance's northern flank – given that its forces operate

in too close a proximity. It should be noted that the Arctic, when viewed from an

azimuthal projection, has many of the characteristics of "a lake". It is, in fact, a circular

area, flanked by five states and with only two outlets. The image of a "lake" for this basin

seems useful for reaching a better understanding of the political and military dynamics

here at play. One of them borders the North Atlantic and forms a strait, a chokepoint, a

bottleneck that has been nicknamed GIUK (an acronym for Greenland, Iceland, and the

United Kingdom). The other, the Bering Strait, is very narrow, less than one hundred

kilometers long, linking the Arctic Sea to the north Pacific. The littoral states are therefore

much closer to each other than it at first might seem – seen from above, they stand, so

to speak, all spread across a round and not very large "pond". This great proximity

between a couple of major powers and a set of very rich ones has rather interestingly

led to growing tensions. It is clear that both competition and cooperation are evident up

in the High North.

As tempting as it is to view the Arctic through the prism of competition between Great

Powers – which would undoubtedly fit in with Russia's quest for recognition as a great

power – there is little to suggest that there is anything substantially different about its

military posture. Instead, the Kremlin is announcing a return to a new posture that clearly

takes us back to the days of a Cold War focused on the old tasks of preserving the

sanctuaries of its fleet of ballistic missile submarines and now cruise missiles too; as well

as the necessary military operations taking place in the North Atlantic – posed in a

preventive posture, accounting for the tragedy of the possible outbreak of a generalized

Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi also in Russia, and the Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska, the Inuit

(Inuvialuit) in Canada and the Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland. The Inuit were the people who for centuries

were nicknamed the Eskimos. In Russia alone, there are 4 million people living on this northern edge of the

Federation, one million of whom are indigenous peoples.

With Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that have made many forms of cooperation impossible,

little or none of this has been achieved. Existing cooperation has been limited to collaboration centered on

search and rescue efforts and on fishing activities in the Basin. We shall see if Norway, now at the helm of

the Arctic Council, will be more successful in these areas.

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war in Europe, in some ways repeating the precautions it took during the Cold War. But

a meaningful balance does not seem very likely: no matter how loud she is, Russia is

resuming its northern military missions with far fewer resources and facing a much more

complex and sophisticated panoply of rival capabilities than during the Soviet Union.

In truth, Russia's contemporary actions in the Arctic, namely its aggressive rhetorical

stance combined with its long-standing territorial claims, have done very little to change

the face of its diplomatic position with regard to the other Arctic states, only alienating

and antagonizing them in an ever-growing accentuated aggressive posture. Its only

partner of choice as relates to its scientific research and economic demands for the Arctic,

has increasingly been China. A China that, with Moscow's consent, appears to be keen

on asserting itself as "a state close to the Arctic" – a claim and status rejected outright

by the United States of America, naturally viewed with strangeness and fear by the other

states bordering this glacial ocean

In an ideal world, in terms of diplomacy – although Russia may not be very receptive to

bilateral or multilateral niceties – the United States of America, the European Union and

NATO should ideally raise and encourage topics of cooperation where there is a clear

convergence of interests. She should, as well, be proposing the implementation of transit

rules similar to those that existed during most of the long years of the Cold War, in order

to reduce tensions – avoiding or managing crises that may arise or, at the very least,

trying to mitigate potential risks of conflict triggered by fortuitous accidents or even

simple miscalculations. Thus, ideally, aiming at promoting a much-needed deterrence,

through which the US and NATO would gain by making a serious commitment to improve

their defense mechanisms in order to deter Russia from conflating its aircraft, military

and commercial vessels in and around the Arctic. And to ensure that the Alliance

continues to be able to maintain the capacity to carry out its military reinforcement plans

for the northern and eastern flanks. Unfortunately, since the invasion of Ukraine, this has

not been as effective as it could otherwise have been. None of the sides, the US/NATO

and the Russian Federation, is relenting.

It would be good, however, that this was not the case. In seeking not to hand over the

Arctic Basin to Russia, the Alliance will have to remain aligned with the obvious objectives

of continuing to manage the competition with the Russian Federation through a judicious

and strategic combination of joint de-escalation actions. That would entail making a

series of adjustments that display a resolute commitment on the one hand and some

moderation on the other. That would mean having Washington and the Alliance improving

and demonstrating real defense and deterrence capabilities – without, however, taking

unnecessary risks in the face of some actions of mere rhetorical defiance on Moscow's

part. To this end, a high level of cohesion, interoperability and the capacity for a dialogue

that is tenuous at times but always indispensable as parts try to attain a stable balance

between the determination to show willingness to use force. And, at the same time, via

a constant willingness to negotiate on precise and fair terms, promoting the peaceful

coexistence of all stakeholders. Unambiguously and without concessions, of course,

A point emphasized by Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolski, Paul Stronski (2021), ibid. CH PAUSNSKI

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which would require clearly conveying to Russia where the interests, objectives and red

lines of the Allies – both those of the European Union and, above all, those of NATO.

The Russian Federation would also have to do the same, and we do not think this is by

any means a foregone conclusion. It should always be borne in mind that both the US,

its Allies and Russia have been in these unusual situations of an apparent quasi-

rapprochement before. And they somehow managed to survive even when subjected to

stout strains

4. Moscow's political and economic angles in the development of the

part of the Arctic that it claims as its own

Despite the plans of the Russian government and large corporations to attract foreign

investors in order to facilitate the realization of their plans for the economic exploitation

of the Arctic, the prospects of success are far from certain. The current climate has not

at all favored it since at least 2007. Oil and gas, which have always been the focus of

attention of these plans, are being unearthed in large quantities in other regions that are

more accessible and less hostile in terms of climatic condition

. Russia's track record in

carrying out ambitious programs, even those personally sponsored by Vladimir Putin, is

far from a good bet. Large corporations with close ties to the Russian executive, such as

Rosatom, Gazprom or Rosneft, can be substantially subsidized by the Kremlin. However,

many projects that need direct political leverage remain without available funding, and

so much of what had been projected remains unrealized.

Although, as we shall see, the conjuncture is quickly changing. Russia's own ambition to

expand its exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asian markets – even with regard to

a China that in recent years has grown closer to Moscow – faces a high degree of

uncertainty, a point we shall expand on later below. Thus far, the combination of the high

cost of LNG, the cyclical timings and challenging conditions of the Northern Route. So the

risk of further US sanctions and the tough and inflexible stance of Chinese state

negotiators are significant challenges that need to be overcome in order to turn some of

Russia's ambition into a concrete reality.

Most of the reasons for this are easy to understand. The size, scale, emptiness and

conditions of Russia's Arctic regions do represent a challenge of gigantic dimensions for

the goal of developing an entire support infrastructure that could otherwise be the engine

To get an idea of the scale of the tensions that existed before the invasion of Ukraine and the announced

accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO, see the much-cited article/commentary by a University of

Calgary professor, Rob Huebert (2019), "A new Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended!", Arctic

Year Book 2019. Below, we will discuss some of the potential changes that have taken place since these

fundamental changes, especially with regard to the Alliance.

It should be noted that the melting of ice in the High North, as in Antarctica, far exceeds the amount and

speed of the rest of the planet. It should also be emphasized that 1/3 of the expected new hydrocarbon

deposits will be located in the Arctic. The data was estimated in 2008 by the US Geological Survey (2008),

Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, USG

Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey. According to the USGS prospective survey, the sum of

the mean estimates for each province indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of

natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic, of which

approximately 84 percent is expected to occur in offshore areas". These numbers still stand.

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of a truly flourishing political and economic activity in these inhospitable parts. So far,

however, the Northern Maritime Route faces an uncertain future in terms of the role it

could play – that of becoming an important transport link between Europe and Asia,

idealized by those who love the Russian Arctic. However, the insurance premiums for

maritime operations in polar waters are still extremely high. As, indeed, are all the

available means for securely breaking the ice

. But since the unexpected speed of the

seasonal melting of the polar ice cap has changed circumstances, so things could

change... It should be emphasized that the possibility of crossing the Northern Maritime

Route (NMR) has many advantages, especially from a commercial point of view, as it

drastically reduces the distances to be traveled in summer. The traditional route through

the Suez Canal from the port of Yokuhama in Japan to Rotterdam in the Netherlands is

11,200 nautical miles, while traveling via the Northern Route reduces the trip to a mere

6,500 nautical miles, almost halving the distance to link both

. A difference that makes

all the difference.

It should be stressed, however, that until the early 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Russian

Federation had to put aside the possibility of raising a second military brigade specially

prepared for operations in the Arctic, even though she wanted to do that so as to improve

its northern coastal defense. Now, given its current dire economic woes, it is hard to

fathom Moscow can still less afford to carry out any such reinforcement, unless a decision

is taken to switch into a war economy. Given the ongoing hardships, the Kremlin faces

such an enhancement of its northernmost forces will not be easy – given that at the same

time, as concerns its Navy, the Northern Fleet in its latest iteration does face other pretty

significant limitations. Above all with regard to the number and operability of icebreakers

and other ships capable of navigating in waters where significant ice floes abound, and

the high demands of its troop transport capacities aerial refueling and the operability of

patrol aircraft in this other frontline. In other words, if the new Russian Northern Fleet

must be increasingly strengthened in order to be able to carry out the wide range of

missions and essential operations it needs, clearly requires major investments to correct

the current limitations for its full operability. Given the current circumstances, this will

certainly not be easy to achieve, given that Russia is already economically overstretched.

Ultimately, even if Moscow feels it imperative to increase her ability to succeed in

dominating and taking control in an Arctic open conflict with NATO, guaranteeing that will

be hardly unfeasible. If worse comes to worse, no matter how much the Kremlin feels

that a full military sovereignty and control over control of her Arctic is a crucial or even

existential, issue, it is unlikely it will be able to guarantee its capacity to fulfil those

aspirations.

One example will suffice: in 2020, 331 ships travelled along part of the Route, but only 62 completed the

entire journey, carrying only 26 million tons - a figure far below Moscow's stated goal of promoting the

transport of 80 million tons by 2024. Eugene Rumer, et al. (2021), op cit. For a detailed overview of these

issues, it is useful to read the paper presented at the General Officer Promotion Course by then Colonel

Eduardo Mendes Ferrão (2013), now a full General, A abertura da rota do Ártico (Northern Passage).

Political, Diplomatic and Commercial Implications, a work that was then published as a book by the

Portuguese Military University Institute.

A far greater reduction than that offered by the Panama Canal, which only reduces the journey from

Rotterdam to Seattle, in the United States, from 9,000 to 7,000 nautical miles if you travel along the other

polar pathway, the Northwest Route, which is also now traversable during a part of the year.

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5. The first stages of the militarization of the Artic by the Russian

Federation

In what concerns the topic of Russian militarization of the Arctic, we will confine ourselves

here to merely describing a series of steps indicative of the early stages of the Putin

period. These are stages that are evolved quickly, that are different among them,

complex, and in many ways still in gestation. We shall try to draw a brief sketch, while

simply endeavoring to lightly, in general terms and obviously following a chronological

order.

At first, certainly as a rejoinder to considerations tied to the new and wide-spanning

security doctrines embraced by Vladimir Putin after the two Chechen Wars, on 2 August

2007, in an operation dubbed Arktika 2007, two mini-submarines deposited a titanium

Russian flag in the sediment of the Lomonosov Shelf. A rich shelf which Moscow claimed

was an extension of its continental shelf and that therefore, according to the Montego

Bay agreements, a part of its own maritime territory. Symbolically, on each of the two

bathyscaphes that went to the seabed included in its “crew” a member of the State Duma,

the parliament of the Russian Federation. The images of both the two crafts and the

titanium Russian flag were made available by the Kremlin to the world and led to

understandable widespread criticisms.

A second harsher retort was bound to rise, given that the Kremlin added to its symbolic

gesture. Canada's reaction came quickly, with Operation Nanook – a military exercise

that took place in the state of Nunavut, Canada's largest state, near Greenland, and

involved military, air and naval forces, including Ottawa’s Coast Guard and part of its

Navy, and a nuclear-powered submarine. An exercise that also included land forces, in

the latter case involving forces of various kinds, from the regular Army to its National

Guard, to reservist troops and the Canadian Rangers. These 2008 military exercises were

the largest in Canada’s history. Since then, Canada has repeated these exercises every

year, since then with the participation of other states, namely the US and Greenland

(Denmark). Canada’s polar coast is the second largest in the Arctic “lake”, Russia’s being

the first.

Truly, 2008 was truly an annus horribilis. On 8 August of that very year, the Russian

Federation invaded Georgia "in response to Georgian attacks on Russian peacekeepers

stationed in South Ossetia”

, causing their deaths. A “five-day war” ensued, leading to

the occupation and unilateral "declaration of independence" of two Georgian regions,

North Ossetia and Abkhazia. Many analysts, both Western and Russian, saw Putin's

actions as a response to the North Atlantic Council, which met at a NATO summit in

Bucharest, Romania, from 2 to 4 April of the same year – and on 3 April it was stated

that, on an unspecified date, both Georgia and Ukraine would join the Atlantic Alliance

under an Open-Door Policy approved at the time by the Alliance's Heads of State and

Government. At the same time lapse an invitation was sent to Albania and Croatia to

begin the necessary steps for "rapid" membership of this Organization

. Through the

Armando Marques Guedes (2009), A Guerra dos Cinco Dias. The invasion of Georgia by the Russian

Federation, Preface, IESM.

NATO/OTAN (2008), NATO invites Albania and Croatia to accession talks, Washington.

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MAP (Membership Action Plan), the latter two would join the then 26 member states of

the defensive security organization, NATO.

The dies had been cast. From then onwards, Canadian-led Arctic exercises, became larger

and more multinational, namely including the United States of America and Denmark.

Soon after, from the spring of 2009 onward, once the situation had stabilized in Georgia

in the face of a notorious inability of NATO and European Union member states to react

effectively to the invasion, the Russian Federation began sending troops to the Arctic.

This meant rehabilitating old Soviet bases, creating new land, sea and air bases in the

region and starting to build ships and icebreakers suited to local climatic conditions.

These first and second processes of accelerated Russian militarization largely continued

until 2013

After a brief hiatus in 2014, occupied as it was with the invasion and occupation of Donbas

and Crimea, the process was restarted in earnest in 2015. The Vostok 2018, Vostok 2019

and Vostok 2022 exercises stand out for their unusual scale – both in quantitative terms

and in terms of co-opting China and Mongolia, which took part, as well as several others.

It is also worth mentioning that in the central and eastern Siberian regions, in 2019, a

major exercise, entitled "Centre 2019" (in Russian "Tzenter") took place. These “war

games” included Russia, China and India held joint anti-terrorism exercises with Pakistan

and four Central Asian republics, and they involved 128,000 troops from seven of these

eight countries. These games were conducted under Russian auspices from September

16 to September 21, 2019, and then they included 600 aircraft and around 450 field

artillery systems

A fourth process of militarization of the High North took place, with a series of peaks that

would continue until 2020-2021. New troop deployments, new bases in the Arctic Basin

and joint military exercises of various kinds in the region. Worth highlighting here is

NATO's large-scale joint exercise, Trident Juncture 2018, whose host country was

Norway. Around 50,000 military personnel from NATO states and partners took part,

along with 250 aircraft, 65 ships and 10,000 vehicles of all kinds. The exercise took place

in northern Norway, the Baltic and the north Atlantic, from 25 October to 7 November

2018. It involved all forces and, innovatively, included a cyber dimension

In the chronological period that followed, largely given the emergence of the pandemic

and its virulence, both unexpected events. If they did not put a stop to the process, they

It should be emphasized that all but two of the European Union's member states are members of the Arctic

Council: Norway and Canada; and all are members of the Atlantic Alliance. For a prescient reading of the

EU's role, I suggest the article by Sandra Balão (2015), "Globalisation, the Geopolitics of the European

Union Arctic Strategy and [some of] the New Challenges for the 21st Century". September 2015. The most

recent article by Ionela Ciolan (2022), "The EU's geopolitical awakening in the Arctic", published by the

European Union, confirmed, not alluding to the paper the Portuguese academic, Sandra Balão, had

presented seven years earlier.

In this case, it is useful to consult the work of Mathieu Boulège (2018), "Russia's Vostok Exercises were

both Serious Planning and a Show", Chatam House. The title of the article spells it all. It remains to be

added that 300,000 Russian troops took part, joined by 30,000 Chinese and thousands of infantrymen from

Mongolia. Turkey was invited by Moscow to take part, but from Ankara, Erdogan, "politely" according to

Boulège, declined.

NATO/OTAN (2018), Trident Juncture 2018. It is happening in the air, on land, at sea and in cyberspace.

The mutual defense alliance’s message was loud and clear: under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, “we

will defend our populations and territories”, and “we will protect our partners, with whom we will work”.

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surely least slowed it down. In 2022, when Russia was acting militarily elsewhere, Putin,

unlike before, nevertheless made a point of carrying out strong symbolic expressions,

which took place, in the first instance, from May 2020 on, as soon as he took over the

three-year presidency of the Arctic Council. Followed, in a second phase, by conventional

and unconventional shows of force in its High North – from Vladivostok to the Kola

Peninsula, via the island of Novaya Zemlya where the Kremlin had once (as the USSR)

maintained intense military activities. In the last couple of years, this has included the

stationing of nuclear submarines in the Arctic

Not surprisingly, in 2022 Norway led equally but larger NATO military exercises, dubbed

Cold Response, in its north, involving 27 countries, with the stated aim of "helping Allies

and partners practice together so they can be prepared for any situation"

6. Latest steps in Russian militarization of the Arctic

The level of mutual accusations and warnings between the US, NATO and even the EU,

on the one hand, and Russia on the other, concerning the threat they pose to each other,

seems to have given rise to a "security dilemma" that is difficult to attune and calibrate.

We may be facing a kind of spiral that certainly does not exclude risks associated with

possible uncontrolled escalations that we must always take them into account, even if

we consider them unlikely. Let us hope no catastrophic incidents arise, in an already

precarious set of conjunctures.

Focusing on the Atlantic Alliance, we must ensure the intrinsic commitment of NATO

members to their own security and Moscow's acrimonious view of its own demands in

this polar area, standing ready for a situation of potential conflict along our northernmost

flank, now that we can count with Finland and Sweden up north. Threats, mostly veiled,

are being made by the Kremlin in these last few months of 2023, namely by Moscow’s

revocation of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

signed in 1996. In fact, a week after this revocation, on November 5, 2023, the Russian

Federation actually tested and heavily publicized the launch of a strategic cruise missile

in the White Sea, released from a submarine stationed to the western coast of its own

large island of Novaya Zemlya and from there successfully targeting its own Kamchatka

region, 6,000 kilometers away

. Pure posturing, with some affinities with what North

Korea has been doing for years.

Wall, Colin and Njord Wegge (2023), "The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War", Centre

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 25 January.

The land, naval and air exercises took place in March and April 2022 and involved around 30,000 military

personnel from 27 countries, including Portugal. See NATO/OTAN (Mar. 7, 2022), "Exercise Cold Response

2022–NATO and partner forces face the freeze in Norway".

Associated Press (Nov. 5, 2023), "Russia says it test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile from a new

nuclear submarine", Politico. According to Politico, "(t)he Imperator Alexander III is one of the new Borei-

class nuclear submarines that carry 16 Bulava missiles each and are intended to serve as the core naval

component of the nation's nuclear forces in the coming decades. According to the Defense Ministry,

launching a ballistic missile is the final test for the vessel, after which a decision should be made on its

induction into the fleet. The Russian navy currently has three Borei-class submarines in service, one more

is finishing tests and three others are under construction, the Defense Ministry said". It is hard to consider

this without due concern.

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Following up on what we signaled above, it should be emphasized that any direct military

conflict in the Arctic region would possibly not be limited to the region alone. And that

could mean severe impacts on both parties. All the actors engaged there have an obvious

interest in preventing a potentially devastating outcome, as a result of escalation whether

it is intentional or not. The level of risk is likely to increase as the opposing forces continue

to operate in force from their respective areas. Past experience does not bode well for

this. As has been the case in recent years, in a much leaner bipolar international order,

even when faced with the possibility of escalation, none of the parties showed any

willingness to back down or were prepared to make any compromises until the very last

moments

True, today much seems to have changed. Russia is facing the West in very peculiar

circumstances and from a position that we could characterize as one of cyclical weakness.

Its economy is stagnating and tending to decline, its population is also shrinking at a

rapid pace, and the Federation finds itself increasingly isolated in political and diplomatic

terms in Europe and, therefore, also among the states bordering the Arctic. Especially

since Vladimir Putin came to power the Kremlin has been rebuilding and somewhat

modernizing its military capabilities after a long phase of corruption, neglect and

consequent decline. Thus, even Russia's clearly specified national priorities are faced with

severe budgetary constraints and numerous technological challenges. Woes that are now

accentuated by the Wider West external application of economic, financial, and

technological sanctions as a result of the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. As we stressed,

in the years to come, Russia's posture in the Arctic will most likely be affected by concerns

about the Kremlin’s real ability to stand up to a surprisingly cohesive West, perhaps

especially after the announcement of Finland's entry and Sweden's expected entry, into

the Atlantic Alliance

Faced with this position of identified weaknesses and growing regional and global risks,

instead of considering the region as the next stage of the competition with the Russian

Federation, the United States and the other NATO members could take advantage of this

moment of strategic fragility in the Arctic to opt – hopefully – for a dual-track strategy of

diplomacy and deterrence. It is always easier to impose conditions on weaker

adversaries, whether strategically or otherwise. But being prepared for some kind of

surprise, in the form of a Russian threat that may be greater than expected, should

always be an integral part of good strategic and operational planning. The reason is clear.

Murphy's Law: planning for the adversary's most likely possibility, while always guarding

NATO's aim is to preserve the necessary credibility of its commitment to the "defensive mutual defense"

clause reflected in its famous Article 5. For the Russian Federation, its "main adversary" has come too close

to the borders and areas of influence of the "Motherland", so what it says is at stake is guaranteeing

geopolitical and economic security requirements, which it feels are rightfully its. The growing tensions in no

way reflect the result of possible misunderstandings. The actions of each of the parties are intentional and

reflect nothing more than clearly conflicting interests.

See, for example, the article published last year by Iris Thatcher (Aug. 8, 2022), "Seven to one: The impact

of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership on Arctic security", Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, in which

she wrote that "their membership will help NATO develop a strategy for the Arctic. Until now, NATO has

largely avoided engagement in the far north, despite the rise of Russian and Chinese activity. Some reasons

that explain this include the sheer diversity of member state interest in executing a coherent NATO strategy

for the Arctic and the absence of an explicit military threat within the region. Norway has brought an Arctic

dimension to the alliance (...) suggesting that NATO will shift its focus in the future towards the Arctic". As

we shall show, this is underway, with annual joint military exercises and other developments.

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against the most dangerous one, is an integral part of the basic principles of effective

political and strategic planning.

However, in this particular case of the Arctic and in the current circumstances, by trying

to pursue the pure and hard objective of triumphing in a deliberate ever-harsher

competition of Great Powers, Russia, perhaps with some support from China, will most

likely be a disrupter of other priority activities – whether for the Wider West, NATO or the

US. The Atlantic Alliance must act with restraint, realism and moderation in protecting its

core interests in the Arctic. This is already underway. The West's care is seen, for

example, in the careful administration and management of its competition with Russia,

in order to try to avoid consequences that lead to imbalances and with (sometimes

excessive) care about crossing any "red lines", especially since the invasion of Ukraine in

2022.

These points were made early on in an article by Christian Perez, published in the

prestigious Foreign Policy. According to him, Russia's supremacy of what we call the

"Arctic Lake", Russia's acceleration of their militarization processes, and China's actions

that could benefit Russia – namely by bringing in the huge investments that the Middle

Kingdom has been making in Greenland and Iceland – were generally pointed out as

being problematic. We do believe we can, and should, go further. In fact, although the

disparities in the correlation of forces between the NATO states in the Arctic and the

Russian Federation are large and favorable to NATO, they are becoming less so at this

regional level. As Perez emphasized,

"(t)oday, the Arctic is the only region where Russia has military and strategic

supremacy, and as the ongoing crisis in Ukraine escalates, it brings with it

increased risk for conflict in the Arctic. Since 2014, Russia has built over 475

new structures across its Arctic military strongholds and has conducted

extensive military exercises, most recently in January 2022"

This military leap was followed by several exercises led by the Russian Federation, that

took place in mid-April 2023, namely the Arctic Rescue Exercise, in which 13 states took

part, with a total of 39 observers, from, for example, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia

. It

was trailed by an exercise that the Kremlin called Secure Arctic 2023

. It included 16

scenarios and took place in 9 Russian Arctic regions, from Murmansk in the west to

Chukotka in eastern Siberia. More than 60,000 military personnel were engaged in

training activities, according to information from the Russian Emergency Ministry

(Emercom). Interestingly, the training exercises ended on 12 May 2023, just two weeks

after Russia completed its two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Again, a clear

message was sent to us by Moscow.

Perez, Christian (2022), "How Russia's Future with NATO will Impact the Arctic. Three critical ways the crisis

in Ukraine will determine the region's future", Foreign Policy.

Atle Staalesen (Apr. 11, 2023), "Russia's big Arctic rescue exercise was attended by observers from Iran

and Saudi Arabia", The Barents Observer.

Thomas Nilsen (Sept. 19, 2023), "Russia kicks off trans-Arctic navy exercise", The Barents Observer.

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Worse still, Moscow made sure it did not stop there: on 19 September 2023, it launched

the Finval-2023 exercises, with operations by its forces and troops (involving 1,800

soldiers, "15 warships, submarines, support vessels, aircraft and coastal units are

involved as the Northern Fleet starts an exercise that stretches all along Russia's Arctic,

from the Barents Sea in the West to the East Siberian Sea")

. A new message. As we

noted, the aforementioned missile launch, which covered the 6,000 kilometers from the

White Sea to Kamchatka, took place in the first week of this very November. As stressed

above, this amounted to another performative step in the narrative that the Federation

is composing in multiple domains – not only in the Arctic but also in all the many theatres

in which it is now once again involved. Complementary figures and disparities of this kind

do not spell anything good for the future of this enormous area. With this in mind, and

given Russia's posture in the Arctic, it seems imperative that the United States, NATO,

the members of the Arctic Council and the Arctic 7 base any plans on realistic analyses

and clear assessments of the postures we want to uphold and maintain in the High North.

In fact, for the Kremlin, as seductive as it is to look at the Arctic through the prism of

rivalry between the Great Powers – which would undoubtedly fit in with the Russian

Federation's current yearnings for renewed recognition as a great power – there is very

little to suggest that its military posture ‘up there’ can actually, once everything is well

thought out, continue to prove feasible. We do not think it can. In fact, it signals a return

to a variant of the traditional Cold War-era posture focused on long-standing tasks, such

as protecting the sanctuaries of its fleet of ballistic and/or cruise missile submarines in

operations carried out in the North Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. There has

been a clear change, and it is one that does not benefit Moscow. The Russian military

has been happy to resume their missions of old, but now with patent fewer resources

and facing a much wider range of adversary capabilities than they did during the Cold

War

Will the fact that Russia is opening up other fronts, mobilizing allies as unlikely as they

are dangerous spell intractable risks? It is surely too early to advance an answer.

However, although the rigid stalemate continued after the invasion of Ukraine and what

followed from it, perhaps some kind of cooperation between Russia and the other seven

Arctic states, especially in more practical areas devoid of harsh political dimensions, could

be desirable and may even seem possible. Let us see if that is possible. That includes

fronts such as combating climate change, search and rescue operations, and even some

co-operative scientific research activities. In an ideal world, such areas of cooperation

could and should be opened up, as they translate into issues of common interest, such

as navigational safety, environmental protection, safeguarding fish stocks and even

simple incident management. Unfortunately, hardly any of that has happened. While it is

A side comment seems apposite here. Vladimir Putin clearly failed to grasp, and thus to predict, the outcome

of his messianic expansionist dreams. Not wanting to delve into details, it is manifest the Russian President

did not expect his Ukrainian ‘war of choice’ would result in a major series of domestic disasters, not only

militarily but also economically and reputationally – veering towards a potential national fragmentation that

could be tragic, albeit we repute this as not too likely, particularly after the rather strange ‘Wagner Group

event’, that threatened his rule. Internationally, the now evermore indigent Federation counts with only a

handful of supporters, in spite of Putin’s attempts at swaping an international order that, ultimately, became

more solid.

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certain that it would be good for the NATO allies to find potential diplomatic ways to

contain the impasse, we should manage things firmly and doing so while taking a firm

stance so that rules of conduct emerge that aim to mitigate the risks of crises or incidents,

so as not to lead to a potentially disastrous escalation that would hurt us all. Looking

back, in the case of the Arctic, our position has been very carefully calibrated. This has

been achieved without much fuss on the part of an Enlarged West that has been letting

Russia spend resources on its High North that we know Moscow does not really have. So

far, this has apparently produced some good results. But our careful management has

also raised some risks.

Indeed, some impasse has been created with the abandonment of the eight-state model

(the Arctic 8) and with the much-welcomed entry of Finland and the expected entry of

Sweden into the Atlantic Alliance in the short term. It should be noted however that

following Norway's assumption of the Arctic Council on 11 May 2023, the climate for

cooperation remains icy

7. China’s presence on some of the new Arctic stages. A prospective

scenario and its potential effects

It is surely worth remembering that for almost three decades the Arctic Council has been

held up as a good example of cooperation in the post-Cold War period. The five littoral

Member-States, including Russia and the United States, worked together on research

into climate change and social development throughout the ecologically sensitive region.

Now, almost two years on, the Council members have stopped working with Russia, partly

as a result of its invasion of Ukraine and having to deal with Moscow’s also reactive stance

towards NATO enlargements east and north and what this could mean for the Kremlin.

With Norway currently chairing an almost inert Council

, experts will certainly be

wondering whether the viability of this polar consultation group is at risk if it is unable to

continue multidomain cooperation with a country (the Russian Federation) that effectively

controls more than half of the coastline (53%) of the Arctic Ice Ocean

To quote what Colin Ward and Njord Weggei (2023) prudently wrote at the end of their very rich article on

Russia's ambitions and limits in the Arctic: "it is probably too early to give an accurate and comprehensive

estimate of the future Russian warfighting capability in the Arctic, given the impact of the Ukraine war. It

would be prudent, however, given what is known and what is coming to light, to revisit assumptions that

guided prewar analysis, campaign modelling, and wargaming concerning the region. Indeed, U.S. military

doctrine is explicit that assumptions should be constantly reconsidered in light of new information, and

NATO doctrine echoes this. As NATO's new Supreme Allied Commander Europe starts crafting the alliance's

new regional defence plans, there is an opportunity to consider some of these preliminary findings in High

North scenarios. In the meantime, the old saying, sometimes attributed to Winston Churchill, that 'Russia

is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks', it might be a prudent approach for

the West with respect to its security and defence planning in the Arctic".

Many authors and organizations have had doubts about the future of the Council. See, for example, Brett

Simpson (May 31, 2023), "The Rise and Sudden Fall of the Arctic Council", Foreign Policy, who quickly argued that

"(w)ith Russia no longer involved, it's hard to see what Arctic politics can still accomplish".

Until the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022, the increase in geopolitical tensions did not

prevent the Arctic states from collaborating under the auspices of the Arctic Council. With the war in Ukraine

continuing, the future of co-operation in this politico-geographical area seems to be jeopardized. On March

3, 2022, the Arctic 7 issued a joint statement announcing the suspension of cooperation with Russia in this

forum. Russia seems not to have taken much notice of the isolation to which it has been condemned by the

other seven Arctic countries, concentrating on its own internal Arctic affairs, seeking to co-operate with

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An Arctic Council that remains inoperative risks spawning harmful consequences for the

ecological environment of our north polar region, and for its 4 million inhabitants who

are struggling with the effects of the disappearance of sea ice and the growing interest

of non-Arctic countries in the mineral resources that still exist in an inhospitable region.

Summing up, the work of the wider Council, the so-called Arctic 8, has produced some

binding agreements in the past, mostly related to environmental protection and

preservation. As we mentioned, it was also a forum that provided a voice for the

indigenous peoples of the region. However, it has never been a forum for security issues,

since it has no jurisdictional competencies in this area, nor is it plausible that it now shall.

As an outcome of the interruption of cooperation with Moscow, around a third of the

Council's 130 projects have stalled. Worse still, new projects cannot continue and those

that remain cannot be renewed. The scientific communities working on both sides. (the

Western and the Russian) have simply stopped sharing new knowledge about climate

change, for example. Or on cooperation for possible search and rescue missions or even

ecological disasters, such as oil spills. All, in good truth, has been discontinued.

The fact that the Russian Federation finds itself excluded and isolated by the other seven

Arctic states (the Arctic 7) forces her to look, often desperately, for non-Western partners,

in order to successfully accomplish her plans in the region. Moscow has tended to turn

to Beijing. But the Russian and Chinese differences of perspective are striking, something

Moscow does not seem to want to recognize: n Russia's wishful eyes China appears to

be a privileged partner above all because of the volume of investment it could mobilize.

For China, collaboration with Russia in any field appears to be seen as both an opportunity

and a challenge. Xi Jin Ping will have to manage this issue very carefully to avoid seeing

China equally ostracized by all the other states (to repeat, the Arctic 7) of this inland

"quasi-lagoon". The fall is already happening, as Beijing has loudly responded positively

to Moscow's invitation to deepen a strong bilateral cooperation in the Arctic. Surely that

sounded good. Beijing thus not only strengthened its energy cooperation with Russia but

it has also opened the door for deeper forms of cooperation in new areas, such as

navigation on the Northern Maritime Route. It is well worth highlighting here a

geopolitical decision by China that goes back a long way, namely the creation, drawn up

in 2017 and formalized in 2018, of what Beijing decided in a White Paper to call the Polar

Silk Road

As one might expect, the academic, the diplomatic, and political worlds quickly reacted.

The following year, in February 2019, Maud Descamps, in a European Union publication,

China and inviting it to participate in Russian Arctic development projects, something we shall return to

here. Hilde-Gunn Bye (8 March 2022), "Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Joint Declaration from Arctic States:

Pausing Arctic Council Meetings", High North News. As we repeatedly emphasized, the situation is today

hardly straightforward.

Xinhua (Jan. 21, 2018), "China publishes Arctic policy, eyeing vision of Polar Silk Road", Xinhuanet, Beijing.

According to the official Xinhua article, "Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou shows a white paper

on China's Arctic policy during a press conference in Beijing, capital of China, Jan. 26, 2018. China published

a white paper on its Arctic policy Friday, pledging cooperative governance and elaborating a vision of "Polar

Silk Road". The document states at the outset that "China, as a responsible major country, is ready to

cooperate with all relevant parties to seize the historic opportunity in the development of the Arctic, to

address the challenges brought by the changes in the region", according to the White Paper promulgated

by its State Council Information Office. To read the original text of the White Paper, see the English

translation, published by The State Council of the People's Republic of China.

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put up an article, in Focus Asia. Perspective and Analysis, entitled "The Ice Silk Road: is

China a 'Near Arctic State'?", which "explores the economic and political impact

surrounding potential new trade routes that could open-up in the Arctic region given the

rapid pace of melting polar ice-caps". It is a generic and also a rich paper, which provides

an analysis according to which what is actually at stake are "the measures taken by China

to ascertain greater access to the region and reap the financial benefits of this new

frontier". Maud Descamps' text was critical and realistic, when she noted, for example,

that

"Beijing is gearing up to further its presence in the Arctic by promoting the

Transpolar Sea Route, a passage that would make use over the shorter route

past the Arctic circle for commercial and civilian purposes. However, most of

the Chinese vessels which to date are able to operate in high north, all of

which are ice breakers, belong to the People's Liberation Army navy (PLA-N)

while there is only one ship operated under the aegis of the Polar Research

Institute of China (PRIC)".

The author concluded that "(t)he further development of channels between Europe and

Asia via the Arctic is an open question that is linked to geopolitics, sovereignty,

sustainability and reciprocity"

From this lucid and careful standpoint, it seems to become almost inevitable that many

other decisions would follow, both in Europe and North America. Little by little, the tone

has changed in a West in which there have been some (few) dissonances within the

framework of growing cohesion. One of many examples came in February 2023, when

three American authors, James McBride, Noah Berman and Andrew Chatzky, published a

more in-depth article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "China's Massive Belt and Road

Initiative"

. In their well thought-through article the authors advanced as a central

argument that "China's colossal infrastructure investments may usher in a new era of

trade and growth for economies in Asia and beyond. But skeptics worry that China is

laying a debt trap for borrowing governments". The focal point of their criticism were

China's methodic policies of indebtedness. Without focusing specifically on the Polar Silk

Road, the three authors lucidly emphasised that

"(a)s Russia's relationship with the West has deteriorated, however, President

Vladimir Putin has pledged to link his Eurasian vision with the BRI. Some

experts are sceptical of such an alliance, which they argue would be

economically asymmetrical. Russia's economy and its total trade volume are

Descamps' text was critical and realistic, noting, for example, that "Beijing is gearing up to further its

presence in the Arctic by promoting the Transpolar Sea Route, a passage that would make use over the

shorter route past the Arctic circle for commercial and civilian purposes. However, most of the Chinese

vessels which to date are able to operate in high north, all of which are ice breakers, belong to the People's

Liberation Army navy (PLA-N) while there is only one ship operated under the aegis of the Polar Research

Institute of China (PRIC)". The author concludes by arguing that "(t)he further development of channels

between Europe and Asia via the Arctic is an open question that is linked to geopolitics, sovereignty,

sustainability and reciprocity".

McBride, James, Noah Berman and Andrew, Chatzky (Feb. 2, 2023) "China's Massive Belt and Road

Initiative", Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington.

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Armando Marques Guedes, Isidro de Morais Pereira

both roughly one-eighth the size of China's – a gulf that the BRI could widen

in the coming years". What's more, they called for a robust European

intervention, raising the following question: "An Opportunity for the EU to

Pitch In?".

That is not all, when it comes to the potentially deeper collusion in a Russia-China

connection that is still not entirely clear, either for Europe or for North America. Nor, we

believe, will it be for China and Russia. As regards the suspension of the Arctic Council,

China has also publicly stated that it would not recognize the Arctic Council without

Russia

. A classic – as taking advantage of the ongoing confrontation between Russia

and the other seven Arctic countries, within the larger framework of Arctic 8, China

senses and seizes the opportunity to more easily set in motion new cooperation projects

at a much easier bilateral level. And there with various focuses and apparently, at least

for now, many without major obstacles, albeit with some convenient opacity, as is typical

of the always complex relationships between "allies". For Beijing, deepening Arctic

cooperation with Russia favors its own interests as concerns its economy, energy security

and political influence in the region. Perhaps the question, on the one hand, is the

following; how long can last the good times of Sino-Russian cooperation, promoted by

short-term external conflicts? On the other hand, the deepening of China-Russia

cooperation is taking place against the backdrop of an ever-greater division of the other

actors' designs with a potentially ever-greater agency in the Arctic, whether it is as co-

operation or as competition.

The deeper China's cooperation with Russia, the more probable that that will become a

matter likely to engender misunderstandings and surveillance from the remaining Arctic

countries. And this reading, in turn, will most surely lead to the creation of a climate of

mistrust towards Beijing by other regional or global states and even trigger tensions and

even confrontations between China and the Arctic 7 states.

In the current situation, the recent rapprochement between China, or the China-Russia

pair, with states like Iran or North Korea, to give just two examples, could have

On this issue, see another article by A. Staalesen, (2022) "Chinese shippers shun Russian Arctic waters",

The Barents Observer, 22 August. Since 2022, China and the Chinese state shipping company COSCO have

refused to use the Northern Route, although they continue to operate in other Russian regions. Since 22

August 2022, the Russian state-owned Rosatom, which grants permits for the Route, has seen 869 ships

pass through, all of them Russian. China's COSCO has not made any requests to use the Northern Route

since the invasion of Ukraine. According to "Russian Arctic expert Mikhail Grigoriev says international

shipping companies now carefully steer clear of Russia". "The feeling among international shippers and

traders is that everything that goes through Russia now is like acid," wrote Mr Grigoriev. According to

Elizabeth Buchanan, in an article published on March 18, 2022, the British renowned Royal United Services

Institute (RUSI) stated that the conflict could jeopardize "the existing rules-based Arctic order". See also,

for a reading more focused on a generic perspective of the potential impact of the ongoing conflict, the

Royal United Services Institute article, this one by Elizabeth Buchanan (Mar. 11, 2022), entitled "Ukraine

War and the Future of the Arctic", RUSI. The most recent and already cited article by Colin Wall and Njord

Wegge (Jan. 25, 2023), the former American and the latter a Norwegian professor at the Norwegian Military

Academy. The positions they take and map out in detail hold very interesting nuances, particularly Russia's

military evolution in the Arctic, both logistical and operational coming as they do from almost a year after

Putin’s attack on Ukraine.

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consequences and provoke reactions the extent of which we cannot yet foresee or

ascertain very clearly.

8. What are the future dynamics emerging in this region?

The impact of Russia's war in Ukraine has clearly damaged peaceful coexistence and

cooperation in the Arctic region. The member states of the Arctic 7 group refused to

cooperate with the Russian Federation, openly and understandably confronting and

marginalizing the Kremlin. In order to overcome this situation, Russia, lacking the means

to act alone, found itself – and continues to find itself – needing to look at China as its

partner of choice for pursuing her projects in this large area of the High North. Although

China has generally been cautious, the Russian Federation's eagerness to co-operate with

Beijing in this region seems to be generating a possible opportunity for

(re)rapprochement between the two states.

But only partially and not always favorably for Moscow. It should be noted, for example,

that Beijing needs to continue being extremely vigilant and cautious about the possibility

of deepening any Chinese cooperation projects with Russia. The reason for this is simple

to equate. Both the conjuncture and the correlation of forces between these two states

are today very different from what they were in the past. In what specifically concerns

the High North, these rapprochements, however good they may seem to Moscow, could

negatively and irreversibly affect China’s relations with the other states (the Arctic 7)

linked to this new regional conjuncture, especially after their reaction to Russia's invasion

of Ukraine.

A couple of examples demonstrate this fully, we believe. It is an indisputable fact that

since end February 2022 and until the 11th of May 2023, Russia did not allow ships from

states in the Wider West to pass through the Northern Route. The Kremlin did, however,

authorize the passage of Chinese ships, some of them commercial VLCCs (Very Large

Container Carriers), along with a growing number of ice-brakers built by Moscow, and

other military and/or dual use vessels. But, surely out of prudence and possibly to at

least some surprise in Moscow, China decided not to do so, at least until 2023, when

transit resumed

What is more, as we have pointed out, Russia has organized large-scale joint military

exercises on the Northern Sea Route, such as the famous Vostok (East) 2018, 2019 and

2022 joint Russian military exercises; or the 2023 also joint exercise which took place in

Malte Humpert (Oct. 9, 2023), "Chinese Container Ship Completes First Round Trip Voyage Across Arctic",

High North News. As Humpert wrote, "(a) Chinese container ship has completed a three-months round trip

voyage from the Baltic Sea to China and back. It is the first step in establishing regular, albeit small-scale,

container liner service utilising Russia's Northern Sea Route." The first commercial ship to pass through the

Route was a Danish Maersk vessel, in 2018. In this case, as the author notes, not only did the ship do the

round tour, with a return trip, but also, "the NewNew Polar Bear's roundtrip voyage is the first of its kind

establishing regular service, rather than experimental or ad-hoc container ship voyages such as Maersk's

2018 voyage with the Venta Maersk (...) A NewNew Shipping Line entered the Arctic with five container

vessels this summer with service along the full route between China and St. Petersburg. The ships are the

2,741 TEU Xin Xin Hai 1, the 2,741 TEU Xin Tian 1 and the 3,534-TEU NewNew Star. These three container

ships made their way to St Petersburg, thus entering the Baltic via the Danish Sea; the remaining two

stayed in Arkhangelsk, near the Kola Peninsula.

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the Sea of Japan rather than the Arctic. In of these, there Russia has been keen on

demonstrations of new equipment, some sharing of technology took place, and some

interoperability between the participating forces has been warranted. Most crucially,

despite the delays caused, on the one hand by the pandemic and on the other by

Moscow's focus on Ukraine, commercial and military cooperation with China has not

completely stalled. However, Russia is now facing a complex, difficult and unparalleled

situation in its Arctic, and not only in the Arctic Basin in general.

The Kremlin is currently subject to multiple sanctions imposed by the United States and

by the other NATO states, by the European Union ones, and also by a dozen or so others

that have joined these. At the same time, all of these countries' support for Ukraine is

putting a general increasing amount of pressure on Russia, both internally and externally.

At the same time, all official links and contacts between the Arctic 7 and Russia were

swiftly canceled after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For example, all the Member-States

of the "Nordic Council of Ministers" quickly announced the cessation of pretty much any

sort of regional co-operation between the Nordic countries and the Russian Federation.

Greenland stopped exchanging fishing quotas with Russia; Norway followed the European

Council and joined the sanctions of restrictive measures against Russia, as planned,

Moscow ceased to chair the Arctic Council on the planned date of 11 May 2023

What is the larger picture and what will be the final outcome? We cannot rule out the

prospect of China wanting to repeat step by step, complementing what it is doing in

south-eastern Eurasia – along the former ‘soft belly’ of the USSR. In other words, in the

Central Asian arc – a new One Road, One Belt, which will allow it privileged access to the

Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, where it already has a pied à terre from Myanmar

to Sri Lanka, from Djibouti to Tanzania, South Africa and Angola, to name but a few. It

should also be noted that on the other side of the Atlantic Basin, partners ranging from

Brazil to a huge number of states on both the east and west coasts of South America,

not forgetting the many more states in the Caribbean did so too.

Nevertheless, crucially, this time, China, after a lull, has carefully restarted links with

Russia in what concerns the High North. What we could perhaps call a Northern One

Road, One Belt in order to enter, and to regularly access, via by this route, a prosperous

North Atlantic, in which stand face to face the two largest economic blocs on the planet:

the European Union (plus the United Kingdom), as well as the northern part of the New

World – namely Canada, the United States of America, and an increasingly prosperous

Mexico. What will come of this is still unknown, but we can speculate about a prospect

that we think is at least credible. As we noted above, the hypothesis of this Northern

Route is not new, having been called a Polar Silk Road by Beijing in the 2018 White Paper

published in Beijing, to which we referred above. In the West, the expression "Polar Silk

Edvardsen, Astri (May 12, 2023), "Russia: "The Risk of Weakening the Arctic Council Should Not Be

Underestimated"", High North News Only Norway took part in the handover; the other Council states spoke

online, digitally with the Russians and Norwegians present in the Russian city of Salekhard. The impact was

immediate. As Russian Ambassador Nicolay Korshunov steadfastly stated, "The future of the council and

cooperation within this format under Norwegian chairmanship appears uncertain".

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Road" has been used, at least since 2021, in a literal translation from the original

Mandarin

In an interesting summary, after writing about the cooperation China has with Moscow

and the common interests that the two states share, the aforementioned Anu Sharma

formulated the following series of considerations, which we make our own:

"through various economic and commercial commitments, China has taken

constructive diplomatic steps to cultivate relations with the Arctic Council that

will facilitate Chinese interests. China has entered into joint ventures with

Russian gas companies, in addition to building an embassy in Iceland and

financing the Kouvola-Xi'an train in Finland. China has also warmed relations

with Norway and Greenland through various investments. This inflow of

investments will, in turn, help Greenland to lessen its reliance on Denmark.

Moreover, all this has helped China to increase its foothold in Arctic nations"

Studies like these have gained a particular academic weight, given the lucidity with which

they unveil the correlation of forces between China and Russia. It is worth emphasizing

this by quoting the words of a Chinese academic from Peking University, Chuan Chen, in

a recent article he published in April 2023 in the journal of The Arctic Institute, based in

Washington DC. Words that we also make our own. In a well-founded and scathing view,

Chuan lucidly stated the following in his article:

"China should ensure that its collaboration with Russia does not harm its

relationship with other Arctic states. At present, Russia is excluded and

isolated by the seven other Arctic states (Arctic 7) in the Arctic, and Russia's

Arctic strategy has also been hindered. To realise its Arctic plans, Russia

desperately needs non-Western partners to jointly develop the Arctic.

Therefore, Russia sees China as a suitable option. For China, collaboration

with Russia is both an opportunity and a challenge, and China needs to handle

it carefully to avoid being ostracised by other countries in the Arctic".

In other words, Beijing wants to ensure good ties with the Arctic 7, even if it has to do

so without Moscow

Which is hardly surprising, if we pause and ponder for a moment. China and Russia are,

in fact, two very different states. Although China considers itself "a quasi-Arctic state",

the truth is that it quite clearly is not. It does not take long to fathom and comprehend

that the Russian Federation and China have very divergent interests, commitments,

The academic study published by the US military's Air University (AU) a couple of years ago, created for

the academic support of the relatively new Air and Space Forces that the US decided to establish as a fourth

branch of its Armed Forces, will do for everyone: Anu Sharma (Oct. 25, 2021), "China's Polar Silk Road:

Implications for the Arctic Region", Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Sharma is an Indian academic and

journalist from Jaipur now working with the United States from New Delhi.

Idem, op. cit.

Chuan Chen (Apr. 4, 2023), "China-Russia Arctic Cooperation in the Context of a Divided Arctic", The Arctic

Institute, Centre for Circumpolar Security Studies, Washington DC.

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visions of the future, stakes and types of alliances, histories, economies and

demographics that are quite different from each other, as well as quite dissimilar concepts

of sovereignty and political and geopolitical projects. In terms of their generic capacities

and their respective cultural broths. It is therefore difficult to glimpse the "eternal

friendship and alliance" that they profess to have for each other. It is plain to see, once

we combine the two readings quoted and which we share in the broadest sense, it would

be difficult to discern more clearly the Middle Kingdom's tacit appetite for

articulation/penetration in the North Atlantic via the route provided by Moscow, literally

"flanking" a Russia under pressure as a result of the sanctions imposed on it by the West

in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

If the economic situation continues as it is, the Kremlin will never have access to the

North Atlantic markets that China is trying to penetrate. But if, and only if, the states in

North America and Europe (the latter, for the time being, less averse to collaborating

with China) consent it. One hypothesis, however, seems at least partly predictable: we

are facing a new reality where, as in the case of the southern One Road, One Belt, Moscow

will only be able to participate as a second fiddle in the northern Polar Silk Road.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (Novembro 2023-Abril 2024)

NOVAS COLD WARS NO HIGH NORTH?

A RÚSSIA E A PROGRESSIVA MILITARIZAÇÃO DO ÁRTICO

ARMANDO MARQUES GUEDES

amarquesguedes@gmail.com

Professor Catedrático (jubilado), NOVA School of Law, UNL, na qual foi eleito Diretor do centro de

investigação (CEDIS, Portugal). Bacharel em Administração no ISCPS, Universidade de Lisboa,

BSc e MPhil no LSE, Londres, Diplôme de l'École, EHESS, Paris, todos em Antropologia Social, e

Doutoramento na FCSH, UNL. Agregação em Direito, UNL. Foi Conselheiro Cultural Português em

Luanda, Angola e Presidente do Instituto Diplomático no MNE Português. Foi, ainda, fundador e

Presidente da Mesa da Assembleia Geral da Sociedade Portuguesa de Direito Internacional

(SPDI). ORCID: 0000-0002-2622-331

ISIDRO DE MORAIS PEREIRA

isidromoraispereira@gmail.com

Major General do Exército Português, na situação de Reserva (Portugal). Mestre em Ciências

Militares, a frequentar um Doutoramento em Relações ISCSP da Universidade de Lisboa. Com

experiência nacional e internacional incluindo o desempenho de funções e operações no ámbito

da NATO. Foi Sub-Diretor do Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares (IESM). E também Adido

Militar nas Embaixadas Portuguesas em Washington DC, nos EUA e em Ottawa, no Canadá.

ORCID: 0009-0006-0650-1107