OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL17 N1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

VOL17 N1 TD3

Thematic Dossier

Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe

and Asia

DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626

Editorial. Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary

Europe and Asia – Bongchul Kim – pp. 3-5

ARTICLES

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe – Moonjung Park – pp. 6-23

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications –

Jeong-Ae Choi – pp. 24-40

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe in

Comparative Perspective - Joonpyo Lee – pp. 41-62

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital And AI Governance - Bongchul Kim – pp. 63-82

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe – Korea Cooperation – Ho

Kim, Minsub Shim – pp. 83-98

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future

Implications - Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung – pp. 99-115

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence From Eu-

Asean Relations - Yoomi Kim – pp. 116-131

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban Governance in

Kilamba, Angola - Kyeri Kim – pp. 132-154

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 17 N.º 1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

EDITORIAL

BONGCHUL KIM

bong625@hufs.ac.kr

Professor at the Division of International Studies and Director at the HUFS-Jean Monnet EU

Centre in Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. Prof. Kim is Ph.D in Law (King's

College London) and does teach and research various legal subjects in the fields of International

Economy and Trade, International Relation and Cooperation, Development and Polar Areas.

How to cite this editorial

Kim, Bongchul (2026). Editorial, Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier –

Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia,

VOL 17 N.º 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 3-5. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626ED.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 17, N.º 1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 3-5

Editorial – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary

Europe and Asia

Bongchul Kim

GEOPOLITICS OF ANXIETY: IDEOLOGY, IDENTITY, AND

(UN)BORDERING IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE AND ASIA

BONGCHUL KIM

This special issue presents eight articles that examine the intersections of anxiety,

ideology, identity, and processes of (un)bordering across Europe, Asia, and beyond.

While the contributions differ in disciplinary orientation and empirical focus, they are

united by a shared concern with how contemporary geopolitical transformations reshape

political communities, governance structures, and understandings of belonging in an

increasingly uncertain world.

The order of the articles follows a deliberate editorial logic. The issue begins with

conceptual and ideological questions concerning Europe and political identity, before

turning to the reconfiguration of borders through migration and emerging forms of digital

governance. It then expands to questions of international cooperation, diplomacy, and

geopolitical connectivity, before concluding with a broader reflection on the enduring

legacies of imperial power and governance beyond Europe and Asia. This progression is

intended to provide coherence across a diverse set of themes while highlighting the

multiple dimensions of contemporary geopolitical anxiety.

Moonjung Park’s “Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe” opens the

issue by exploring literary and cultural representations of Europe through the lens of

uncertainty, identity, and bordering processes. Jeong-ae Choi’s “Ideological Shift in the

German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Its Implications” then examines how

contemporary political anxieties are reflected in ideological transformations within one of

Europe’s most influential populist parties.

The issue subsequently turns to questions of mobility and governance. Joonpyo Lee’s

“Reconfiguring Borders through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe in Comparative

Perspective” investigates how migration challenges conventional understandings of

borders and belonging. Bongchul Kim’s “From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to

Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework: Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI

Governance” analyzes competing approaches to digital governance and the normative

foundations of emerging technological orders.

The following contributions broaden the discussion to regional and international

cooperation. Ho Kim and Minsub Shim’s “Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity,

and Europe–Korea Cooperation” explores evolving governance structures in the Arctic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 17, N.º 1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 3-5

Editorial – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary

Europe and Asia

Bongchul Kim

and their implications for transregional collaboration. Tonny Dian Effendi and Hoyoon

Jung’s “South Korea’s Public Diplomacy toward Portugal: The Current State and Future

Implications” examines the role of public diplomacy in fostering mutual understanding

and international engagement. Yoomi Kim’s “The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on

Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from EU–ASEAN Relations” considers how

geopolitical perceptions influence patterns of economic interaction and cross-border

investment.

The final article, Kyeri Kim’s “Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics

of Urban Governance in Kilamba, Angola,” concludes the special issue by extending the

discussion beyond Europe and Asia and highlighting the enduring influence of colonial

and neocolonial structures on contemporary governance. In doing so, it offers a critical

reflection on power, space, and inequality in a global context.

Taken together, the articles demonstrate the diversity of perspectives through which

contemporary geopolitical transformations can be understood. Bringing together

contributions from scholars working across a range of disciplines, the collection highlights

the value of examining ideology, identity, and bordering processes as interconnected

dimensions of global politics in the twenty-first century..

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

TABUCCHI’S INQUIETUDINE AS THE (UN)BORDERING OF EUROPE

MOONJUNG PARK

mjss3002@hanmail.net

Moonjung Park is a Research Professor at the Center for Cross-Cultural Studies, Kyung Hee

University (Republic of Korea). She received her joint doctoral degree from the University of

Florence, the University of Bonn, and Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris IV) in 2016. On the theme

of this paper, she conducted research at the Institute of Foreign Literature at Hankuk University

of Foreign Studies from 2020 to 2025, supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea

(NRF). https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2088-1549.

Abstract

The literary trajectory of Antonio Tabucchi (1943–2012) constitutes one of the most profound

ontological interrogations of the concept of the “boundary” (confine) in late 20th-century

European thought. This paper posited that Tabucchi’s literary geography is a “liminal space”

where identity and belonging fundamentally vacillate, instead of a map of fixed territories.

Against the backdrop of hardening political borders, Tabucchi proposed an “anti-geography”

of (un)bordering, driven by Inquietudine, which functioned as a core mechanism for dissolving

Europe’s ontological, geographical, and political boundaries. This study examined Tabucchi’s

process of (un)bordering across three critical dimensions. Ontologically, it analyzed the

deconstruction of the fixed self and linear time through the Game of the Reverse and

“pendulum effect,” exploring a multilayered temporality where the boundary between the

living and dead is annulled. The geopoetic dimension investigated the fictionality of national

borders by defining language as a “portable homeland” and exploring the “shifting West”

through the Azores and India. Politically, the study explored intellectual responsibility,

metaphorically defined as “gastritis,” which interrogates the hidden facets of judicial and

official truths. Tabucchi’s “aesthetics of absence” transcended exclusive nationalism to foster

a new European subjectivity capable of accommodating the Other. Based on the premise that

the earth is merely “on loan,” he demonstrated that we are all fundamentally “strangers to

geography and existence.” This paper argued that Tabucchi’s work proves that constant

wandering on the border constitutes the most dignified form of human existence. This is a

powerful philosophical response to the modern crises of isolation, mapping a universal

subjectivity that stands in solidarity with the Other on a shared, “borrowed” planet.

Keywords

Antonio Tabucchi, Inquietudine, (Un)bordering, Saudade, Aesthetics of Absence.

Resumo

A trajetória literária de Antonio Tabucchi (1943–2012) constitui uma das mais profundas

interrogações ontológicas sobre o conceito de «fronteira» (confine) no pensamento europeu

do final do século XX. Este artigo defende que a geografia literária de Tabucchi é um «espaço

liminar» onde a identidade e o pertença oscilam fundamentalmente, em vez de um mapa de

territórios fixos. Num contexto de endurecimento das fronteiras políticas, Tabucchi propôs

uma «antigeografia» de (des)delimitação, impulsionada por Inquietudine, que funcionou como

um mecanismo central para dissolver as fronteiras ontológicas, geográficas e políticas da

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Europa. Este estudo analisou o processo de (des)delimitação de Tabucchi em três dimensões

críticas. Ontologicamente, analisou a desconstrução do eu fixo e do tempo linear através do

Jogo do Reverso e do «efeito pêndulo», explorando uma temporalidade multifacetada onde a

fronteira entre os vivos e os mortos é anulada. A dimensão geopoética investigou a

ficcionalidade das fronteiras nacionais, definindo a língua como uma «pátria portátil» e

explorando o «Ocidente em mutação» através dos Açores e da Índia. Politicamente, o estudo

explorou a responsabilidade intelectual, metaforicamente definida como «gastrite», que

questiona as facetas ocultas das verdades judiciais e oficiais. A «estética da ausência» de

Tabucchi transcendeu o nacionalismo exclusivo para fomentar uma nova subjetividade

europeia capaz de acolher o Outro. Partindo da premissa de que a Terra é meramente «em

empréstimo», demonstrou que somos todos, fundamentalmente, «estranhos à geografia e à

existência». Este artigo defendeu que a obra de Tabucchi prova que a errância constante na

fronteira constitui a forma mais digna de existência humana. Trata-se de uma resposta

filosófica poderosa às crises modernas de isolamento, traçando uma subjetividade universal

que se solidariza com o Outro num planeta partilhado e «emprestado».

Palavras-chave

Antonio Tabucchi, Inquietudine, (Des)fronteirização, Saudade, Estética da Ausência.

How to cite this article

Park, Moonjung (2026). Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and

(Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 6-23.

DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.1

Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted on February 6, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

TABUCCHI’S INQUIETUDINE AS THE (UN)BORDERING OF

EUROPE

MOONJUNG PARK

Introduction

Antonio Tabucchi’s (1943–2012) literary trajectory constitutes one of the most profound

interrogations of the concept of the “boundary” in late 20th-century European thought.

Tabucchi’s literary geography is a “liminal space” where the notions of identity and

belonging fundamentally vacillate, instead of a map of fixed territories. When European

borders were hardening into new economic and political forms, Tabucchi’s work proposed

an anti-geography grounded in Inquietudine

—that is, disquietude. Inquietudine does not

merely represent anxiety but functions as a distinct philosophical category, akin to yet

independent of Freud’s Unheimliche, Fernando Pessoa’s Saudade and Desassossego, and

Nostalgia. It acts as a driving force to dismantle the ontological boundaries of the

European subject. This paper demonstrates that Tabucchi’s Inquietudine is a mechanism

of “(un)bordering,” which dissolves Europe’s ontological, geographical, and generic

boundaries.

For Tabucchi, the concept of the boundary was inherently paradoxical: it was

simultaneously a place of separation and a point of suture. In the preface to the essay

collection, Viaggi e altri viaggi, Tabucchi warned against the “dangerous

misunderstanding” of believing that the ground we stand upon belongs to us. He asserted

that the earth is “on loan,” and just as “everything in life is on loan,” so too is the land:

“But, when all is said and done, I have traveled much, I admit; I have visited

and lived in many ‘elsewheres.’ And I feel it to be a great privilege, because

setting one’s feet upon the same soil for a whole lifetime can provoke a

dangerous misunderstanding, leading us to believe that the land belongs to

us—as if it were not on loan, just as everything in life is on loan”

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research

Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A5B5A16082615).

Inquietudine is a quintessential concept that traversed Tabucchi’s entire literary oeuvre. Given its status as a

distinct conceptual term, this paper retains the original Italian expression without translation to preserve its

nuanced meaning.

“Ma, a conti fatti, ho viaggiato molto, lo ammetto; ho visitato e ho vissuto in molti altrove. E lo sento come

un gran de privilegio, perché posare i piedi sul medesimo suolo per tutta la vita può provocare un pericoloso

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

This primordial transience relegated borders and territories from being objects of

possession to fleeting illusions drawn atop a fluid existence. Consequently, the European

subject within Tabucchi’s narrative assumed a nomadic quality regarding physical space

and its ontological orientation. To capture this dynamic, this study adopted the

paradoxical neologism “(un)bordering” rather than the static noun “border.” The

parenthetical prefix “(un-)” encapsulates a dual dynamism: it presupposes the existence

of the border while perpetually nullifying it. For Tabucchi, the border is not a barrier to

be dismantled but an “ongoing event”—a space that must be incessantly traversed,

transgressed, and rewritten to facilitate the encounter between the subject and Other.

Hence, this study conducted an in-depth examination of the modes of (un)bordering in

Tabucchi’s literature across three dimensions. First, it analyzed ontological

(un)bordering, which deconstructed the fixed self and linear time through the Game of

the Reverse and “pendulum effect” of time. Second, it explored geopoetic (un)bordering,

exposing the fictionality of national borders through concepts of language as a “portable

homeland” and the “shifting West.” Third, it examined political (un)bordering, which

defined the intellectual’s responsibility as a form of “gastritis” and interrogated the hidden

facets of judicial and official truths. This analysis demonstrated how Tabucchi’s aesthetics

of absence opened a new European subjectivity, which transcended exclusive

nationalism, unveiling a new horizon for universal human existence.

Ontological (Un)bordering

Inquietudine Versus Desassossego Versus Saudade

The point of departure for Tabucchi’s literature was the thorough exploration and practice

of the Rimbaudian proposition: “When one writes, the ‘I’ is an other” (quando si scrive

l’Io è un altro; Tabucchi, 2003, p. 12). In Autografie altrui, he defined literature as a

mirror in which the reader discovered their image, explaining that the author dissolved

the subject’s boundaries by thrusting their experience into the “skin” of another.

“Someone made him change skins, once in a lifetime [...] I made him travel

in third class; and though it was only for a few pages, thanks to me, he had

an experience he probably never would have had in his life”

This “changing of skins” is not mere role-play but an ontological project that refutes the

myth of a unitary, fixed self. Tabucchi termed the phenomenon of a reader recognizing

themselves in a fictional character an “autobiography of others” (un’autobiografia altrui,

[...] fatta da un mio lettore; Tabucchi, 2003, p. 12), annihilating the exclusive boundaries

between author and reader, reality and fiction. This suggested the possibility of a

equivoco, farci credere che quella terra ci appartenga, come se essa non fosse in prestito, come tutto è in

prestito nella vita.” (Tabucchi, 2010, p. 10).

“Qualcuno gli ha fatto cambiare pelle, una volta nella vita... Io l’ho fatto viaggiare in terza classe.” (Tabucchi,

2003, p. 12).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

European subject that was not confined within the identity of a single nation or state and

expanded by appropriating the Other’s experience.

To fully grasp Tabucchi’s deconstruction of borders and formation of a transnational

subjectivity, one must diachronically reconstruct the semantic field formed by his

tripartite philosophical axis: Inquietudine, Desassossego, and Saudade. For Tabucchi,

Inquietudine was an active epistemological stance instead of a pathological symptom to

be suppressed by psychology. It represented the will of a subject that refused to accept

the world as a static structure. As Salvatore Settis identified, this disquietude was the

core of a modern existence that had lost its stable foundation (2012, p. 9). Within this

framework, Inquietudine functioned as a “seismograph” that recorded the minute

cracks—invisible vibrations beneath the surface of history—before they manifested as

catastrophic disasters. In Di tutto resta un poco, Tabucchi noted:

“That illness—that is, a disjointed relationship with Time as a dimension in

which we can no longer dwell, a fractured relationship with History [...]—that

illness seems to me to belong entirely to the twentieth century; and I believe

it has grown steadily, increasing out of all proportion until the present day.

Literature has been, and certainly remains, the most reliable seismograph of

this malaise, and to examine here the shivers of Inquietudine through which

it has manifested itself would take too long; it would deserve a small, portable

encyclopedia”

In Tabucchi’s epistemological trajectory, Inquietudine acquired a deeper layer of

metaphysical negation through Fernando Pessoa’s Desassossego. The Inquietudine

refined by Pessoa’s heteronym, Bernardo Soares, through the Desassossego of the Book

of Disquiet, transcended a mere orientation toward dynamic exploration. It encompassed

the lack of peace and “absent stillness” situated at the abyss of existence. Tabucchi

adopted the semantic crevice between these two terms as a creative dwelling, carrying

out a “philosophical migration” by transferring his literary base to Portugal, dismantling

the “immunological envelope” of a singular national subject.

Hence, the relationship with the homeland (patria) became an essential key for thematic

interpretation and the stylistic dimension of reading Tabucchi’s work. In a 2009 interview,

Tabucchi famously named Italian his “portable homeland” (patria tascabile; Settis, 2012,

p. 18), suggesting that language was the minimal mental territory that sustained a

writer’s existence beyond geographic borders. However, he confessed to the cracking of

this stable territory by unknowingly beginning to write Requiem in Portuguese and the

subsequent failure to translate the work into his mother tongue, Italian, while staying in

Paris. This illustrated the process through which the intimate boundary of the “portable

homeland” was invaded and restructured by the language of the Other.

“Quella malattia, cioè un rapporto sfasato con il Tempo quale dimensione in cui non riusciamo più ad abitare,

un rapporto guasto con la Storia [...], quella malattia mi pare appartenere in pieno al Novecento; e credo che

sia cresciuta via via, aumentando a dismisura fino ad oggi. Di questo malessere la letteratura è stata, ed è

sicuramente il sismografo più attendibile, ed esaminare qui i brividi di In quietudine con cui si è manifestata

sarebbe troppo lungo, meriterebbe una piccola enciclopedia portatile.” (Tabucchi, 2013, p. 20).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

To contextualize this phenomenon, he cited the experiences of other alloglossic writers:

“the French of Beckett, the English of Conrad and Nabokov, and even the Portuguese of

the Anglophone Pessoa.”

Hence, the “linguistic schizophrenia” (schizofrenia linguistica;

Settis, 2012, p. 18) advocated by Tabucchi became a subversive strategy that dismantles

the rigid systems of a single national identity and native tongue, allowing the writer to

reside simultaneously in multiple linguistic and cultural bodies. The confession in the

preface of Requiem of “a language of affection and reflection” (una lingua che fosse di

affetto e di riflessione; Tabucchi, 2014a, p. 7) symbolized the practical completion of de-

bordering—a movement beyond the mere disposal of a singular identity to achieve a

reciprocal encounter between the subject and Other.

While Inquietudine and Desassossego explain the subject’s internal agitation, Saudade

completes the temporal dimension of this movement.

“I view the revisiting of time as a cultural category akin to that of saudade,

which consists of a nostalgia for the future—an oxymoronic concept that

immediately confronts us with a contradiction”

Tabucchi’s Saudade is not a retrospective regret but a longing for unrealized

possibilities—the vivid presence of absence. This “future nostalgia” prevents the subject

from taxidermizing memory, inducing them to wander within a multilayered time where

past, present, and future overlap. By escaping the “dictatorship of the present,” the

subject becomes capable of sensing the time of the Other that has not yet arrived.

These three concepts form the foundation of Tabucchi’s political and cultural vision of

Europe. While Desassossego sinks into the internal abyss and Saudade swims through

lost layers of time, Inquietudine is the mediating force that connects these affects to the

historical horizon. It resists the contradictions of the present to realize the “future

nostalgia” of Saudade.

For Tabucchi, Europe was not a fixed geographic territory but a “work in progress” that

must continuously accommodate the voices of the Other. Inquietudine imposed an ethical

imperative that pushed the subject out of the comfort of the “homeland” and into the

Other’s “skin.” The transnational subject sought by Tabucchi was a being that constantly

interrogated its boundaries through a state of “wakeful insomnia.” This provided an

epistemological turning point where Europe did not settle into the myth of a singular

lineage but transformed absence and lack into new possibilities for coexistence. Hence,

by tracing the minute tremors recorded by the seismograph of Inquietudine, we can map

a new subjectivity that stands in solidarity with the Other upon a “land on loan.”

“Come precedenti cita l’esperienza di altri scrittori alloglossi: il francese di Becket, l’inglese di Conrad e di

Nabokov, e perfino il portoghese dell’anglofono Pessoa.” (Settis, 2012, p. 18).

“Io vedo la rivisitazione del tempo come una categoria culturale simile a quella della saudade, che consiste

nella nostalgia del futuro, concetto ossimorico che ci pone subito davanti a una contraddizione.” (Tabucchi,

2022, p. 123).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Pendulum of Time and Category of “Having Been”

In the abyss of Tabucchian Inquietudine lies a sophisticated and intricate architecture of

time that rejects a linear worldview. Anna Dolfi identified the “pendulum effect”

within

his narrative strategy, signifying an objective vibration generated by forms that

constantly oscillated between points in the past and points of fated return. This vibration

was more than a stylistic flourish; it was a profound existential symptom. It reflected the

ontological struggle of the Tabucchian subject, who refused to reside in the closed

moment of a singular “present” and sought to traverse multiple temporal layers.

Within this epistemological framework, the “present” is redefined as a “porous

membrane” through which the past and future incessantly permeate. As Tabucchi

explicitly stated, “having been” (l’essere stato) places us “in a relationship with the dead.”

This relationship is not mourning in the conventional sense but an active exchange.

His

novel Requiem served as the pinnacle of this temporal multilayeredness manifested in

narrative space. Here, the subject facilitated an encounter between the living and dead

within an orderly continuum, creating a unique temporal refraction where “the past

inscribes the future within itself, offering its fulfillment” (il passato inscrive in sé il futuro

offrendone l’adempimento; Dolfi, 2010, p. 11).

This de-bordering is a temporal event. The hierarchical boundary between the living

subject and dead object of memory is erased, and death is elevated from extinction to a

modulated presence. For Tabucchi, the deceased demanded to be heard as “voices

carried by something” (voci portate da qualcosa; Dolfi, 2010, p. 18), generating an

“inclination of the heart” (inclinazione del cuore) that unsettled the solitary self standing

upon the “heart of the earth” (cuore della terra; Dolfi, 2010, p. 11). Therefore, the

journey in Requiem unfolded upon the layer of “fantastic hallucination” (allucinazione

fantastica; Dolfi, 2010, p. 11)—a sophisticated synthesis of memory and the

unconscious—while maintaining the physical locality of Lisbon. This spatial turn, where

fantasy and reality overlapped, became a site for an epistemological experiment that

deconstructed the unity of a singular self and filled the vacuum of the subject with the

polyphony of the Other. Through this narrative strategy of fullness through emptiness,

Tabucchi aesthetically demonstrated how that which had disappeared could reside

permanently within the present subject.

“Indubbiamente qualcosa cambia nel panorama italiano a partire dagli anni 80. Dopo i giochi dissacranti e

divertiti/divertenti del Gruppo ’63, le lunghe diatribe sulla fine del romanzo, parallelamente al nuovo piacere di

narrare attivato dalla fortuna presso il pubblico (e non solo) della narrativa sudamericana, gli scrittori sembrano

tornare al romanzo senza la rigidita, la naivete o i sensi di colpa delle generazioni precedenti. I piu interessanti

sono autori avvertiti delle tecniche narrative […] che, rassicurati, si potrebbe dire, dall’ ‘Effetto pendolo’ che

giustifica la ripresa – naturalmente variata - dei personaggi e delle forme, tornano al racconto/romanzo senza

più esibire il distacco dalla scandalosa frase che aveva segnato un’epoca: ”la marquise sortit à cinq heures“

(non è un caso che Tabucchi l’abbia utilizzata qualche volta nel rivendicare il diritto/dovere dello scrittore alla

fedelta a se stesso e alla propria verita). D’altronde i loro maestri non si trovano piu soltanto nella letteratura,

ma nella teoria letteraria, nelle arti figurative, nel cinema.” (Dolfi, 2010, p. 10).

“La categoría del haber sido no pone en relación con los muertos […]. Una de mis últimas obras, Réquiem, se

centra totalmente en él.” (Gumpert Melgosa, 1995, p. 153).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Game of the Reverse and Dissolution of the Self

If Inquietudine is the primordial sensation triggering the subject’s internal vibration, the

Game of the Reverse (Il gioco del rovescio) is the decisive methodology that translates

that sensation into narrative practice. This concept functions as a core strategy in

Tabucchi’s poetics to deconstruct the binary conditions underpinning Western ontology.

Tabucchi diagnosed the modern individual as being trapped in an existential predicament,

“condemned to remain always within predictable dichotomies under the Beckettian eye

of a camera” (condannati a essere sempre tra dicotomie prevedibili sotto l’occhio

beckettiano di una telecamera; Tabucchi, 2022, p. 13). This suggests that artistic

“reversal” was the only escape from such a closed structure.

In Tabucchi’s universe, reality was akin to a tapestry. The meticulously woven image on

the surface was determined by the disorderly and chaotic knots on the reverse side; to

approach the essence of truth, one had to trace those hidden knots rather than the

smooth surface.

This realization inevitably led a writer to adopt a narrative stance of “voyeurism and

theft” (voyeurismo e di furto; Tabucchi, 2022, p. 13). To reconstruct the totality of an

inaccessible truth, the writer must “steal” and arrange fragments of reality, with the

author’s identity undergoing an unavoidable subversion. The writer becomes a “new

entity that does not coincide with the writer even if it resembles them” (nuova entità che

non coincide con lo scrittore anche se gli assomiglia; Tabucchi, 2022, p. 10). This

represents a split of the subject, born from the fusion of a “diurnal double” (doppio

diuron) and “multiplied projections” (proiezioni moltiplicate; Tabucchi, 2022, p. 10).

This destabilization of authorial identity—the ontological de-bordering between creator

and creation—was most vividly revealed in Tabucchi’s strategy of “hiding himself in a

Joycean manner” (nascondere se stesso, alla maniera joyciana; Tabucchi, 2022, p. 13),

as analyzed by Dolfi in Zigzag. The act of intentionally hiding behind the narrative was

not a pursuit of anonymity but an aesthetic decision to halt the violent imposition of a

singular ego and allow the multilayered human figures within life to speak for themselves.

Hence, the Game of the Reverse became the pinnacle of an epistemological shift that

revealed hidden truths by negating superficial reality while dismantling fixed authorial

authority to create a polyphonic space where the voices of otherness could freely

intersect.

This ontological dissolution of the unitary self was a foundational catalyst for a radical

rethinking of the European project. Within Tabucchi’s literary geography, Europe was

liberated from the constraints of exclusive nationalism and territorial rigidity, re-

emerging as an “archipelago of pluralities.” By internalizing the mechanism of

(un)bordering, the European subject transcended the myth of a singular lineage,

transforming the continent into a site of perpetual hospitality where the “I” and “Other”

coexisted upon a shared, borrowed land. This transnational subjectivity did not establish

a new center but resided in the tremors of the borders, proving that Europe’s true identity

lay in its capacity to remain an unfinished “work in progress” that continuously echoed

the polyphony of its Others.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Federation of Souls: Identity as an Archipelago

Tabucchi’s discourse on identity established its ontological cornerstone through his

encounter with Pessoa. For Tabucchi, the “I” (Io) was no longer an isolated monolith but

a fragmented collective, a multilayered and incomplete entity that could only be captured

“in profile.”

This fragmentation of the self was presented as the primordial truth of

human existence, aligning with his epistemological project to dismantle the modern

illusion of a unitary subjectivity.

Tabucchi’s analysis of Álvaro de Campos, one of Pessoa’s heteronyms, focused on specific

material emblems that symbolized the subject’s de-bordered nature. In the essay The

Automobile, Nostalgia, and the Infinite (L’automobile, la nostalgia e l’infinito), Tabucchi

identified Campos as possessing the “highest metaphysical quotient” (il più alto quoziente

metafisico; Tabucchi, 2015, p. 45). As a naval engineer, dandy, and futurist, Campos

embodied a “geometric nihilism” (nichilismo geometrico; Tabucchi, 2015, p. 45).

Tabucchi decoded Campos’s de-bordered identity through his travel accessory—the

“suitcase”—which became a decisive signifier that defined Campos as a “stranger to

geography and existence” (straniero della geografia e dell’esistenza; Tabucchi, 2015, p.

53).

“[...] a suitcase that contains precious information. It certainly signifies the

journey, the man without frontiers, but also the stranger of geography and

existence”

Campos defined himself as a “passerby of himself” (passante di se stesso; Tabucchi,

2015, p. 53) and confessed: “I myself, unfortunately, am a thing on loan” (Io stesso,

purtroppo, sono una cosa in prestito; Tabucchi, 2015, p. 50). This recognition of

existence being “borrowed” from the Other carried a fundamental skepticism toward the

ownership and inherent nature of the self. The “terrible, sudden, violent, inconceivable

longing” (smania terribile, repentina, violenta, inconcepibile) he felt while driving a

Chevrolet toward Sintra illustrated the essence of European Inquietudine: a desire to

vanish into the “future road” (strada futura) rather than remaining fixed at a coordinate,

be it Lisbon or Sintra (Tabucchi, 2015, p. 50).

The suitcase was a vessel for the metaphysical weight of a life in transit without

anchorage, symbolizing the existential debt borne by the subject. This was exquisitely

depicted by Campos:

“Esiste insomma un contesto nel quale l’io (personaggio e autore), anche se sembra talvolta ricomporsi

segnando un qualche ritorno alla vecchia maniera, lo fa a partire da una situazione nuova, per definizione

frammentata (si pensi in questa direzione, anche per i personaggi più ‘tradizionali’ di Tabucchi, alla tanto spesso

evocata ‘confederazione delle anime,’ o all’io visto solo di profilo nello Stadio di Wimbledon del primo Del

Giudice), [...].” (Dolfi, 2010, p. 10).

“[…] una valigia che contiene preziose informazioni. Significa certamente il viaggio, l’uomo senza frontiere,

ma anche lo straniero della geografia e dell’esistenza.” (Tabucchi, 2015, p. 53).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

“I am expiating a crime in a suitcase committed by an ancestor of mine out

of aestheticism. My nerves are on the gallows, twenty by twenty, and I have

fallen into opium as if into a ditch”

The powerful image of “nerves on the gallows” visualized the internal tension experienced

by a plural being as physical agony. Though the self was imprisoned within the anatomical

limits of a single body, its nervous system expanded centrifugally toward the external

world, maintaining a tension that felt as though it might snap. This organic suffering

reached its peak of subject transformation in the Maritime Ode (Ode Marittima), where

it merged with the mechanical symbol of the “flywheel.” Tabucchi cited this poem to

elucidate the phenomenon:

“The poem is the Maritime Ode, and the object in question is a flywheel.

Precisely because it is so incongruous with the context, so ambiguous in

nature, and situated right inside Campos’s chest, I find it worthy of being

considered beyond metaphor. As such, it deserves a place of honor in the list

of objects I am compiling: ‘I gaze at the steamer from a distance, with a

great independence of soul, and inside me, slowly, a flywheel begins to

turn’”

Located “inside the chest of Campos,” this rotating wheel drove the subject’s anxiety

mechanism while transforming him into a massive sensation machine. The flywheel

spinning within violated the boundaries between organism and machine, interior and

exterior, redefining the subject as an incessant wave of sensation. These metaphors

embodied the plural self Tabucchi discovered through Pessoa, a powerful visual testimony

to a modern subjectivity floating upon borders, accommodating the Other’s voice and

mechanical vibrations.

This ontological dissolution of the unitary self serves as a foundational catalyst for a

radical rethinking of the European project. Within Tabucchi’s literary geography, Europe

is liberated from the constraints of exclusive nationalism and territorial rigidity, re-

emerging as an ‘archipelago of pluralities.’ By internalizing the mechanism of

(un)bordering, the European subject transcends the myth of a singular lineage,

transforming the continent into a site of perpetual hospitality where the “I” and “Other”

coexist upon a shared, borrowed land. This transnational subjectivity does not seek to

establish a new center but resides in the tremors of the borders. This proves that Europe’s

true identity lies not in its fortified walls but in its capacity to remain an unfinished “work

in progress” that continuously echoes the polyphony of its Others.

“Sto espiando un delitto in una valigia commesso da un mio avo per estetismo. Ho i nervi sulla forca, venti

a venti, e son caduto nell’oppio come in un fosso.” (Tabucchi, 2015, p. 53).

La poesia è l’Ode marltima e l’oggetto in questione è un volano che proprio perché incongruo al contesto,

per la sua natura così ambigua e perché si trova dentro al petto di Campos, mi pare degno di essere considerato

fuor di metafora e quindi di avere un posto d’onore nella lista di oggetti che sto compilando: “Guardo da lontano

il piroscafo, con una grande indipendenza dell'anima, e dentro di me, lentamente, un volano comincia a girare.”

(Tabucchi, 2015, p. 51).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Geopoetic (Un)bordering

The most radical form of (un)bordering in Tabucchi’s work occurred at the subject’s level.

Traditional European humanism defined a citizen by borders, language, and soil—a

consistent and integrated self. Influenced by Pessoa’s theory of heteronyms, Tabucchi

deconstructed this unity. He argued that identity was not a possession but a temporary

state, a “thing on loan.” The final, and most concrete, manifestation of this (un)bordering

was geographical. Hence, for Tabucchi, Europe was not a fortress but a fluid space of

transit.

Illusion of Possession and “Life on Loan”

In Viaggi e altri viaggi, Tabucchi deconstructed the nationalistic concept of Heimat and

articulated a philosophy of un-belonging that challenged the nationalistic roots of

European identity. Warning against the illusion of possession arising from a sedentary

life, he defined the “boundary” as an epistemological error. To reside in several

“elsewheres” was a privilege because it shattered the illusion of ownership. He wrote:

“Setting one’s feet upon the same soil for a whole lifetime can provoke a

dangerous misunderstanding, leading us to believe that the land belongs to

us—as if it were not on loan, just as everything in life is on loan”

This was the cornerstone of Tabucchi’s post-nationalist Europe. If the land was merely

“on loan,” the borders drawn upon it were fictional. This “dangerous misunderstanding”

was the root of the exclusive politics plaguing the continent. By traveling and residing in

several “elsewheres,” the subject shattered this illusion. Hence, for Tabucchi, travel was

an ontological exercise in displacement.

Travel as Ontology: Cavafy’s Ithaca

Referencing Constantine Cavafy’s poem Ithaca, Tabucchi elevated travel to an ontological

status. The destination was irrelevant, but the movement mattered:

“Constantine Cavafy said it in an extraordinary poem titled Ithaca: travel

finds meaning only in itself, in the being of the journey”

Tabucchi extended this to life, arguing that the primary meaning of life was “to be lived.”

The texts in Viaggi e altri viaggi were described as “islands in a floating archipelago”

scattered “here and there... under different flags,” resisting a singular national identity.

“Posare i piedi sul medesimo suolo per tutta la vita può provocare un pericoloso equivoco, farci credere che

quella terra ci appartenga, come se essa non fosse in prestito, come tutto è in prestito nella vita” (Tabucchi,

2010, p. 10).

“Il viaggio trova senso solo in se stesso, nell’essere viaggio.” (Tabucchi, 2010, p. 10).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

“Born from the most diverse occasions, always from travels but never from

travels made to then become travel literature, these texts wandered like

islands in a floating archipelago, scattered here and there in the most

disparate locations and under different flags, almost without consciousness

of belonging or identity, drifting in their own way. Collecting them was like

making them a single float, a boat, a canoe; caulking the cracks in the keel,

and from the currents to which they were entrusted, directing them toward

a single direction: the journey of a book”

Tabucchi’s ontological elevation of travel catalyzed what can be termed “geopoetic

(un)bordering.” By asserting that travel found its meaning in the “being of the journey,”

he deterritorialized the European space. In this geopoetic framework, Europe was no

longer a collection of rigid, sovereign landmasses but a “floating archipelago,” a relational

geography where identities were not fixed by national soil and were constantly in motion.

The act of gathering these island-texts into a “single boat” represented a subversive

move against the hardening of European borders. It suggested that the true European

identity was not in the stability of the “mainland” (the nation-state) but in the fluid

coherence of the “vessel” (literature/language) that traversed these disparate locations.

(Un)bordering occurred here: it acknowledged the “different flags” as historical markers

while nullifying their exclusive power through the shared current of the journey. Hence,

Tabucchi’s geopoetics proposed a transnational subjectivity that viewed Europe as an

ongoing “voyage of a book,” where the land was always “on loan” and the only true

homeland was the shared movement toward the Other.

The Shifting West and Author Sea: Woman of Porto Pim

Tabucchi’s geographical imagination challenged the teleological stability of the “West” by

repositioning its boundaries within the liminal space of the Azores. In Donna di Porto Pim,

he posited a radical redefinition of Western identity: “the West has no end but continues

to shift with us” (l’Occidente non ha termine ma continua a spostarsi con noi; Tabucchi,

2012, p. 13). By situating his narrative beyond the Pillars of Hercules, in a “mare ignoto”

described as “endless and always the same” (mare ignoto [...] senza fine e sempre

uguale; Tabucchi, 2012, p. 13), Tabucchi transformed the Azores from a physical

archipelago into a site of ontological displacement.

These islands were reconstructed as a metaphysical map inhabited by the “gods of the

soul, of feeling, and of passions” (dèi dell’animo, del sentimento e delle passioni;

Tabucchi, 2012, p. 13). This shift allowed Tabucchi to diagnose the deep-seated malaise

of the European psyche. He introduced the “God of Regret and Nostalgia” (Dio del

“Nati dalle occasioni piu diverse, sempre da viaggi ma mai da viaggi fatti per poi diventare letteratura di

viaggi, questi testi vagavano come isole in un arcipelago fluttuante, sparsi qua e la nelle sedi piu disparate e

sotto diverse bandiere, quasi senza coscienza di un’appartenenza e di un’identita, a loro modo alla deriva.

Raccoglierli e stato come farne un galleggiante unico, una barca, una canoa; calafatarne le fessure della chiglia,

e dalle correnti a cui erano affidati indirizzarli verso un’unica direzione: il viaggio di un libro.” (Tabucchi, 2010,

p. 9).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Rimpianto e della Nostalgia; Tabucchi, 2012, p. 14), who governed “the pain for that

which was not and could have been” (la pena per ciò che non fu e che avrebbe potuto

essere; Tabucchi, 2012, p. 15). This served as a poignant emblem of an existential grief

haunting modern Europe—a continent mourning the possibilities it had castrated or lost

through the violent ruptures of its history. However, this melancholy was met with a

darker, more restrictive counterpart: the “God of Hate.” Isolated on an inaccessible

conical island and manifested as “a small, gaunt yellow dog,” this deity symbolized the

dormant hostility and exclusive closure toward the Other, which often lurked behind the

façade of nostalgia.

For Tabucchi, the Azores functioned as a microcosm of European contradiction. The

continent emerged as a tragic space where the “lost universality” of regret and the

fragmented bigotry of hate perpetually coexisted. Hence, the European identity was

revealed as a fractured project: one that perpetually dreamt of ideal integration while

remaining unable to exorcise the internal divisions and ghosts of its past.

Journey for the Shadow and Insomnia: Indian Nocturne

In Indian Nocturne, travel is synonymous with “insomnia.” While Tabucchi distinguished

that “insomnia belongs to the one who wrote the book, travel to the one who did it”

(L’insonnia appartiene a chi ha scritto il libro, il viaggio a chi lo fece; Tabucchi, 2016, p.

9), he assumed the mutual penetration of the two. The epigraph quoting Maurice

Blanchot clarified the essence of this journey:

“People who sleep badly seem to be more or less guilty: what do they do?

They make the night present”

The narrator searched for his missing friend, Xavier, across Bombay, Madras, and Goa.

Tabucchi provided a concrete “index of places” at the beginning of the book; however,

he confessed:

“I do not know well if this was contributed by the illusion that a topographical

repertoire, with the force that reality possesses, could give light to this

Nocturne in which a Shadow is sought; or the unreasonable conjecture that

some lover of incongruous paths might one day use it as a guide”

As the doctor in Bombay said, “This is the hospital of Bombay [...] leave aside your

European categories, they are a proud luxury” (lasci da parte le sue categorie europee,

sono un lusso superbo; Tabucchi, 2016, p. 24). In India, the boundaries of Western

reason and logic collapsed. Concrete locations such as the Taj Mahal Hotel or the beaches

of Goa paradoxically amplified the uncertainty of reality. The narrator sought the Other

“Le persone che dormono male sembrano essere più o meno colpevoli: che cosa fanno? Rendono la notte

presente.” (Tabucchi, 2016, p. 7).

“Non so bene se a ciò ha contribuito l'illusione che un repertorio topografico, con la forza che il reale possiede,

potesse dare luce a questo Notturno in cui si cerca un’Ombra; oppure l’irragionevole congettura che un qualche

amante di percorsi incongrui potesse un giorno utilizzarlo come guida.” (Tabucchi, 2016, p. 9).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

(his friend); however, he eventually encountered his own interiority—the “Shadow.” This

journey was a geographical movement and metaphysical voyage where the boundaries

between self and other, subject and object, dissolved.

The geographical displacement in Indian Nocturne was a geopoetic (un)bordering,

stripping away the rigid veneer of Western rationalism. The epistemological collapse

experienced by the narrator, as he traversed the disorder of India and the sleeplessness

of the night, suggested that the European subject must relinquish its exclusive superiority

and redefine itself within the site of the Other. Here, the “Shadow” symbolized more than

just a missing companion. It represented the “internal alterity” suppressed within the

European ego.

Tabucchi dismantled the physical certainty guaranteed by maps and filled that void with

the wakeful sensation of “insomnia.” This opened a horizon of intersubjective

coexistence, revealing that the subject and Other were inextricably intertwined within

each other’s shadows. Thus, the voyage in Indian Nocturne utilized an aesthetics of

absence to reject the fixity of identity, mapping a new European sensibility capable of

standing in solidarity with the Other beyond established borders.

Political (Un)bordering: The Intellectual as a “Useful Idiot”

“Time Ages Quickly”: Ghosts After the Wall

Il tempo invecchia in fretta, which dealt with Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall,

explored the temporal fissures and scars of memory that remained in place of physical

borders. In the story I morti a tavola, a former East German intelligence agent wandered

through a reunified Berlin, sensing the absence of the Wall—the vanished great structure.

Monologuing before Brecht’s grave about his history of betrayal and surveillance, he

experienced the sudden intrusion of ghosts from the past, disrupting the boundaries of

linear time.

Furthermore, in Clouds (Nuvole), an officer who served in the Kosovo War dealt with the

invisible contamination of depleted uranium exposure. When the officer taught a young

girl, Isabella, the art of cloud divination, the scene juxtaposed fairytale imagination with

a horrific reality (radiation, death). This served as an indictment of the invisible, lethal

borders (pollution) that war and violence engrave upon the body and nature,

transcending national frontiers:

“On the beach, there was a great silence; the bathers had reached the

restaurant. ‘[The clouds] are fraying into a kind of stracciatella,’ Isabella said

in a low voice, ‘like when the trail of an airplane unravels; now they are

almost gone, how strange, I can hardly see them anymore, you look too.’

The man did not move. [...] ‘The prophecy of the end of all wars was made

two thousand years ago; only no one had read it well until now, and today

we have finally deciphered it on this beach, the two of us’”

“Sulla spiaggia c’era un grande silenzio, i bagnanti avevano raggiunto il ristorante. ‘[le nuvole] Si stanno

sfaldando in una specie di stracciatella, disse Isabella a bassa voce, come quando lascia degli aeroplani si

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

Hence, the attempt to read the future of war in the scattering of clouds metaphorically

demonstrated the impact of historical violence on individual lives and the natural world.

“Diabolical Staging” and the Sofri Case

The intersection of literature and justice (or injustice) was the decisive site of

(un)bordering in Tabucchi’s public life. His defense of Adriano Sofri, a prominent figure

of the Italian Left accused of murder, highlighted the tension between official (judicial

verdict) and narrative truths.

The essay collection Plato’s Gastritis (La gastrite di Platone) quoted a chilling phrase from

the initial appellate court verdict against Sofri, Bompressi, and Pietrostefani in 1991.

Judge Laura Bertolè Viale used the expression “diabolical staging,” which was explicitly

linked to the literature:

“This diabolical staging is also, not by chance, the content of two short stories

published in conjunction with the start of the first-degree trial—Leonardo

Sciascia’s A Simple Story—and second-degree trial—Antonio Tabucchi’s Can

the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in New York Cause a Typhoon in Beijing?”

The judicial system accused the literature, specifically Tabucchi’s work, of trespassing

into the courtroom, interfering by creating a narrative that opposed the state’s version

of reality. Hence, literature had crossed the legal boundary of reality to invade the domain

of “truth.”

“Useful Idiots”

Tabucchi criticized the derogatory categorization used by state power to classify

intellectuals. He quoted the indictment of Ugo Dello Russo (1991), the prosecution

representative in the first appeal case:

“The carriage of victimhood is being pulled by these oxen, by these useful

idiots [the intellectuals]”

Responding to the prosecution’s belittlement of intellectuals as “useful Idiots,” Tabucchi

inherited Pasolini’s declarative knowledge—“I know” (Io so)—to confront the opacity of

sfilaccia, ora non si vedono quasi più, che strano, non riesco quasi più a vederle, guarda anche tu. L’uomo non

si mosse.’ ‘[...] la profezia della fine di ogni guerra la fece duemila anni fa, solo che nessuno finora l’aveva letta

bene e noi oggi finalmente l’abbiamo decifrata su questa spiaggia, noi due.’” (Tabucchi, 2014b, p. 76).

“Questa diabolica messinscena e anche il contenuto di due racconti pubblicati non a caso in concomitanza

con l’inizio del processo di Io grado – Una storia semplice di Sciascia – e di 2° grado – ‘Può il batter d’ali di una

farfalla a New York procurare un tifone a Pechino?’ di Tabucchi. Dalla sentenza del 1° processo d'appello contro

Sofri, Bompressi e Pietrostefani redatta dal giudice a latere, dolt ssa Laura Berto le Viale, 1991.” (Tabucchi,

1998, p. 11).

“Il carro del vittimismo e tirato da questi buoi, da questi utili idioti [gli intellettuali].” (Tabucchi, 1998, p. 11).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

power. Citing James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, he argued for a perspective of reversibility

to uncover the hidden facets behind judicial truth.

This emphasized that democracy was an incomplete process requiring constant vigilance

and critique, an attempt to redefine the European citizen’s ethical boundaries. Tabucchi

appropriated the insult to redefine the limits of intellectual responsibility. He rejected the

role of the passive observer (“the ox”) and advocated for the intellectual who interrogated

complexity and sought to “disquiet” rather than provide solutions. This resonated with

his self-definition as a “failed moralist,” emphasizing individual responsibility and ethical

rebellion over dogmatic moral preaching:

“It is difficult to draw a precise boundary. And perhaps it would be a task

suited to an orthodox moralist, while I am nothing but a failed moralist, like

all good moralists, for that matter. In my opinion, we must establish the

following: where do personal responsibilities begin, and where, instead, does

chance end?”

This political position was made clearer in Settis’s Antonio Tabucchi’s Three Disquiets:

Homeland, Politics, Time. Settis emphasized that the background of Tabucchi’s

engagement in “Politics” lay in his experiences in Portugal under the Salazar dictatorship,

where writers used writing as a tool of resistance. For Tabucchi, the intellectual must

cross the boundary of silence. Hence, in a state of “threatened democracy” (democracia

ameaçada), he “chose not to remain silent” (escolheu não ficar calado) (Settis, 2012, p.

5). This demonstrated Tabucchi’s conviction that the literature must pierce through the

boundaries of political reality, instead of staying within the limits of aesthetic play.

Conclusion

Tabucchi’s discourse on (de)bordering was rooted in a critique of the modern project

known as “Europe.” Historically, European modernity defined itself through the rigid

cartography of the Westphalian system—a process of “border-making” that bifurcated

the world into the rational subject and irrational “other” and demarcated civilization from

barbarism. Hence, European identity functioned as an immunological system, predicated

on the exclusion of the outside to preserve the integrity of the self.

Tabucchi, an interstitial figure who wrote in Portuguese and pursued Indian shadows

amid Lisbon’s mists, systematically disturbed these geographical, cultural, and spiritual

boundaries from within. By utilizing the borders of European exceptionalism as an

epistemological laboratory, he exposed these foundations’ ontological precariousness,

revealing that they were “on loan.” This struck at the heart of the fictiveness of modern

identity, replacing the illusion of permanence with a radical transience.

“È difficile segnare un confine preciso. E forse si tratterebbe di un compito adatto a un moralista ortodosso,

mentre io non sono altro che un moralista fallito, come tutti i buoni moralisti, del resto. Secondo me, dobbiamo

stabilire quanto segue: dove hanno inizio le responsabilita personali e dove termina invece il caso?” (Tabucchi,

2022, p. 163).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

However, Tabucchi’s (de)bordering transcended the reconfiguration of Europe’s political

landscape. It evolved into a universal existential condition for contemporary humanity.

From the collapse of modern borders, a planetary solidarity emerged—a communitas in

which all beings shared a primordial sense of “absence” and “lack.” His declaration that

“everything is on loan” served as an ontological caveat to a humanity captivated by the

modern fantasies of ownership and settlement. Consequently, (de)bordering represented

a paradigm shift from the settler’s logic to that of the wanderer (Homo Viator). It signified

an epistemological migration from the isolated island of the “self” toward a polyphonic

archipelago of the “Other.” This “vibration of the border,” distilled from Europe’s

traumatic and specific history, addressed a universal imperative: how the subject might

“share,” rather than “possess,” identity in an era defined by radical uncertainty and

fluidity.

Thus, Tabucchi’s journey of (un)bordering can be defined as an aesthetic soteriology—a

project of secular salvation for restoring the “abyss of the Other” and recovering the

authenticity of existence. Through Inquietudine, he shattered the comfort of static

settlement, forcing the subject into a state of perpetual displacement and compelling the

realization that we were all, fundamentally, “strangers to geography and existence.” For

Tabucchi, the “homeland” (patria) was no longer an exclusive territory bound by blood

or soil but a “portable” space of affection and reflection, constantly restructured by the

Other’s language.

His Game of the Reverse transcended narrative play, converging into an ethical mandate

for the intellectual. It confronted the opacity of sovereign power by meticulously tracing

the knots on the reverse side of official history. Furthermore, by projecting a “nostalgia

for the future” through the paradoxical temporality of Saudade, he summoned the ghosts

of the past into the present, maximizing the density of presence through absence.

The “plural self” and “fluid geography” constructed by Tabucchi created irreparable cracks

within the rigid framework of the nation-state. Within his oeuvre, the self was expanded

through its dissolution; identity was reborn as an archipelagic subject, capable of

reciprocal coexistence only through its own fragmentation. This “aesthetics of absence”

served as a powerful philosophical weapon against the contemporary crises of exclusive

hate and isolation. It offered a profound reflective response on how we may inhabit and

care for one another’s pain on a planet where everything was “on loan.” Tabucchi proved

that the most dignified form of human existence was found in constantly wandering on

the border.

(Un)bordering in Tabucchi’s Europe was an ethical imperative. It was a call, as Barthes

suggested, to recognize the Other within the self. It was a request to accept that we were

all essentially travelers with “nerves on the gallows,” as depicted in Campos’s poetry,

carrying suitcases filled with the weight of aesthetics and the memory of ancient crimes.

We moved toward a horizon that receded as we approached. Hence, Tabucchi’s Europe

was a chronicle of souls in constant motion, bound together by the shared unease and

persistent vibrations.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 6-23

Tabucchi’s Inquietudine as the (Un)Bordering of Europe

Moonjung Park

References

Dolfi, A. (2010). Gli oggetti e il tempo della saudade: Le storie inafferrabili di Antonio

Tabucchi. Le lettere.

Gumpert Melgosa, C. (1995). Conversaciones con Antonio Tabucchi. Anagrama.

Settis, S. (2012). Lectio magistralis tre inquietudini di Antonio Tabucchi: La patria, la

politica, il tempo. In G. Tabucchi (Ed.), Galassia Tabucchi (pp. 7–32). Fundação Calouste

Gulbenkian.

Tabucchi, A. (1998). La gastrite di Platone. Sellerio.

Tabucchi, A. (2003). Autografie altrui: Poetiche a posteriori. Feltrinelli.

Tabucchi, A. (2010). Viaggi e altri viaggi. Feltrinelli.

Tabucchi, A. (2012). Donna di porto Pim. Sellerio.

Tabucchi, A. (2013). Di tutto resta un poco: Letteratura e cinema. Feltrinelli.

Tabucchi, A. (2014a). Requiem: Un’allucinazione. Feltrinelli.

Tabucchi, A. (2014b). Il tempo invecchia in fretta. Feltrinelli.

Tabucchi, A. (2015). L’automobile, la nostalgia e l’infinito. Sellerio.

Tabucchi, A. (2016). Notturno indiano. Sellerio.

Tabucchi, A. (2022). Zig and Zag. Conversazioni con Carlos Gumpert e anteos

Chrysostomidis. L. Dolfi (Ed.) M. De Ros

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT IN THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AFD)

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

JEONG-AE CHOI

ja@jnu.ac.kr

Associate Professor, Chonnam National University Gwangju (Republic of Korea).

Abstract

The far-right German party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), made a dramatic leap in the

February 2025 German federal election, securing 20.8% of the vote and emerging as the

second most popular party. This development poses a serious challenge to the so-called

“firewall” (Brandmauer) that has historically excluded far-right parties from Germany’s

political mainstream. This study provides a theoretical analysis of how the AfD has generated

and leveraged cleavages within the established German party system, and how existing

parties have responded by exploiting those divisions to consolidate their own positions. The

analysis traces the origins of the AfD, compares its founding platform to subsequent electoral

manifestos, and examines the evolution of its ideology. The rise of far-right parties in Germany

has been predominantly influenced by developments in the former East German regions. This

phenomenon is primarily interpreted within a socioeconomic context, encompassing the

increase in immigrants and refugees, and the subsequent decline in employment

opportunities. This study aims to draw implications for peace in light of the rise of far-right

parties. By examining the German case-which is already experiencing challenges, and regional

conflicts following reunification-, this research ultimately seeks to contribute to the

construction of a peaceful and democratic society.

Keywords

Far-right parties, Alternative für Deutschland, German politics, ideological evolution,

socioeconomic cleavages.

Resumo

O partido alemão de extrema-direita, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), registou um avanço

dramático nas eleições federais alemãs de fevereiro de 2025, obtendo 20,8% dos votos e

emergindo como o segundo partido mais popular. Esta evolução representa um sério desafio

à chamada «barreira de proteção» (Brandmauer) que, historicamente, tem excluído os

partidos de extrema-direita da corrente dominante da política alemã. Este estudo apresenta

uma análise teórica sobre a forma como o AfD gerou e aproveitou as divisões no seio do

sistema partidário alemão estabelecido, e como os partidos existentes responderam,

explorando essas divisões para consolidar as suas próprias posições. A análise traça as origens

do AfD, compara a sua plataforma fundadora com os manifestos eleitorais subsequentes e

examina a evolução da sua ideologia. A ascensão dos partidos de extrema-direita na

Alemanha tem sido predominantemente influenciada pelos desenvolvimentos nas antigas

regiões da Alemanha Oriental. Este fenómeno é interpretado principalmente num contexto

socioeconómico, abrangendo o aumento do número de imigrantes e refugiados e o

subsequente declínio das oportunidades de emprego. Este estudo visa extrair implicações

para a paz à luz da ascensão dos partidos de extrema-direita. Ao examinar o caso alemão —

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

que já enfrenta desafios e conflitos regionais na sequência da reunificação —, esta

investigação procura, em última análise, contribuir para a construção de uma sociedade

pacífica e democrática.

Palavras-chave

Partidos de extrema-direita, Alternative für Deutschland, política alemã, evolução ideológica,

clivagens socioeconómicas.

How to cite this article

Choi, Jeong-Ae (2026). Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its

Implications. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of

Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº. 1,

TD3, September 2026, pp. 24-40. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.2

Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted on February 6, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT IN THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVE FÜR

DEUTSCHLAND (AFD) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

JEONG-AE CHOI

Introduction

The far-right German party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), made a dramatic leap in

the February 2025 German federal election, securing 20.8% of the vote and emerging

as the second most popular party. This figure represents a doubling of the 10.3% share

received in the 2021 election, signifying the inaugural instance of a non-traditional party

attaining second place. Germany is currently confronted with a predicament concerning

the recognition of the AfD as a significant political entity. Historically, the ascent and

mainstreaming of far-right parties in Germany was regarded as implausible within the

European context. Nevertheless, the recent success of the AfD poses a substantial

challenge to the so-called “firewall”

that has traditionally excluded far-right parties from

mainstream German politics.

The present study initiates with a theoretical analysis of the ways in which the AfD has

generated cleavages within the established German political system. The study examines

how existing parties have utilized these cleavages to consolidate their own positions and

traces both the origins of the AfD and the process by which it has refined and exploited

such divisions. The present study has been conducted for the purpose of comparing the

foundational platform of the AfD with the electoral manifestos that the party has

subsequently published. In addition, the study will analyse the evolution of the party's

ideology. The present study aims to re-evaluate the ideological direction of the AfD and

its identity as a political party through this analytical process.

The emergence of far-right political parties in Germany has been predominantly

influenced by developments in the former East German regions. This phenomenon is

predominantly interpreted within a socioeconomic context, encompassing the increase in

immigrants and refugees, and the subsequent decline in employment opportunities. The

present study aims to draw implications for peace in light of the rise of far-right parties.

Political firewall (or Brandmauer in German): A tacit or explicit agreement among mainstream parties to

politically isolate extremist parties, whether far-right or far-left. This strategy specifically entails: (1) categorical

exclusion from coalition government formation; (2) refusal of parliamentary cooperation; and (3) public

declarations of political distance. The rejection of coalition formations among political parties is, on occasion,

employed as a term 'cordon sanitaire'.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

This research seeks to contribute to the construction of a peaceful and democratic society

by examining the German case. The German case is already experiencing challenges

related to immigrants, refugees and regional conflicts following reunification.

Theoretical Analysis

Since the 1980s, the primary catalyst for the surge in far-right parties across Europe has

been the issue of immigration. Immigration to Western Europe saw a notable increase in

the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a significant influx from the former Yugoslavia,

Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. In accordance with the prevailing immigration

theory, the social impact of immigration, in conjunction with elevated levels of economic

insecurity, engendered the emergence of far-right political parties that were opposed to

immigration. This was due to the perception that immigration was associated with

unemployment and crime. From this standpoint, far-right parties evolved into single-

issue parties that represented pervasive xenophobia.

The second causal factor was rooted in a sense of political alienation. The prevailing

sentiment of voter discontent with established political parties, particularly with regard

to their responses to pressing issues such as economic growth, unemployment,

corruption, crime, and immigration, has resulted in a pervasive climate of distrust. The

far right has been observed to profit from protest votes cast against well-established

political parties. This phenomenon can be attributed to the success of the far right in

disseminating anti-establishment messages, coupled with their own lack of governing

experience

A review of studies discussing party structure within the scholarship on AfD and far-right

parties indicates that the core element behind the rise of AfD is resistance to and rupture

from established politics. The political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is

positioned in a political landscape that encompasses both materialism and

postmaterialism, in which it competes with the postmaterialistically re-radicalized

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Grüne). Within the left-right spectrum, it is in direct opposition

to Die Linke, while along the moderate-radical axis, it engages in conflict with other

established political parties

Such patterns of conflict are not unique to the AfD. For instance, the Grüne also

experienced a rupture from established parties during the 1980s. In the Grüne party,

members who subscribed to a realist political philosophy, with a particular emphasis on

the party's transformation into a governing party and the pursuit of pragmatic policies,

emerged as the dominant faction. This shift in ideological orientation led to a moderation

of the party's previously radical character

. In summary, although the Grüne party

Karapin, R. (1998). Radical-right and neo-fascist political parties in Western Europe. Comparative Politics,

30(2), 213–234; Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. New York, NY: St. Martin’s

Press; Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Jung, B.-G. (2023). The emergence of AfD and changes in the ideological structure of the German party

system. European Studies, 41(2), 17.

Jung, B.-G. (2023). The emergence of AfD and changes in the ideological structure of the German party

system. European Studies, 41(2), 17-18.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

emerged amid the diffusion of postmaterialist values as a significant social consciousness,

the subsequent incorporation of postmaterialism by mainstream political parties

prevented the formation of a wholly new axis of cleavage. Consequently, the Grüne were

able to assimilate into the prevailing political structure.

Amidst these developments, it can be argued that the AfD has succeeded in establishing

a new and robust axis of cleavage. In other words, the recent rise of AfD can be

interpreted as a form of resistance to established politics-a feat that the Grüne was

ultimately unable to achieve. The transformation of the German party system has already

been the subject of academic debate; for instance, the disappearance of the so-called

“0.5 party” that once held the casting vote, and the emergence of third and fourth parties

as kingmakers, have led to the expectation that, following Sartori’s typology of party

systems under competitive conditions, Germany’s party landscape will be reorganized

into a moderate multiparty system

The Cleavage theory, as conceptualized by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, focuses

on the emergence of groups with divergent political interests along social lines of

division

. Lipset and Rokkan paid particular attention to the processes through which

such cleavages manifest, leading to the formation of competing political blocs. For

instance, society may be divided along economic lines, regional lines, or racial lines,

resulting in collective opposition that is expressed through party competition in elections.

Herbert Kitschelt further developed this theoretical framework by arguing that the

structure of party competition is defined by positions on three core issues: citizenship,

process, and resource allocation. The concept of “Citizenship” is theorized as a spectrum

ranging from cosmopolitan to particularistic politics; The term “process” is employed to

denote the mode of social decision-making, with authoritarian politics favoring

hierarchical decision-making and radical-liberal politics emphasizing participatory

processes; and “resource allocation” concerns the distribution of social resources, with

two opposing poles of political redistribution and market-based allocation

. According to

these dimensions, the AfD has adopted an extreme image by positioning itself in

opposition to established parties (citizenship), has employed modern approaches such as

the use of social media (process), and has taken a strong stance against redistribution,

garnering significant support in the former East German regions (resource allocation).

In this model of European party competition, Kitschelt classifies and explains the

competitive models of German parties, arguing that the traditional left–right pattern of

competition has, as a result of social changes in advanced capitalist societies, gradually

shifted to a new axis of political cleavage: ‘left-libertarian’ versus ‘right-authoritarian’

Meanwhile, in his 2004 revision of the theory, Kitschelt explains that the distribution of

political preferences is not static but continues to diversify.

Jeong, H.-M. (2013). “Non-mainstream Parties and Changes in the German Party System,” EU Studies, No.

33, pp. 335–374.

Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives.

New York, NY: The Free Press.

Kim, Y.-T. (2017). The change of the German Green Party’s basic program and the structure of party

competition in Germany. Korean Journal of Party Studies, 6(1), 193–214.

Kitschelt, H. (2004). Germany: Beyond the Stable State. London: Routledge.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

Figure 1. Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure

Source: Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992).

This revision was necessitated by critiques of the new radical right, as Kitschelt’s earlier

model had failed to acknowledge the rise of an authoritarian working-class segment that

demonstrated a preference for social redistribution in economic matters

. Kitschelt’s

argument posits that the future model of political competition is likely to undergo

unpredictable changes, given the fundamental nature of preference formation, which

links markets, organizations, and socio-cultural spaces to political positions. The model

of party competition that Kitschelt described, spanning from the 1980s to the millennium,

is illustrated in the following figure.

The current AfD advocates radical liberalism and market-based resource allocation, which

can be illustrated as follows in the model

. Kim Young-tae (2017) explains the position

of the Grüne as that of radical-liberal cosmopolitans, and notes that AfD, in terms of its

location and its resistance to the authoritarian interpretations of mainstream politics,

shares a similar foundation. The key difference, however, is that while the Grüne is

positioned in favor of political redistribution, AfD is situated on the side of market-based

allocation.

As Kitschelt’s theoretical framework posits, the ongoing fragmentation of political

preferences necessitates a multidimensional analytical approach. The potential

transformation of the working class and other popular strata into authoritarian-oriented

segments, along with emerging forms of class differentiation that diverge from

conventional patterns of political redistribution and market-based allocation, signals a

need for reinterpreting contemporary social orders through novel perspectives.

Increasingly, structural shifts along the axes of digitalization, resource allocation, and

supply chain security are evolving into more active and central forces of political-

Kitschelt, H. (2003, May). Diversification and reconfiguration of party systems in postindustrial democracies.

Accountability and Representation in European Democracy Conference, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European

Studies, Harvard University.

Kim, Y.-T. (2017). Changes in the basic program of the German Green Party and the structure of party

competition in Germany. Korean Journal of Party Studies, 6(1), 193–214.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

economic change. This development demands renewed theoretical attention to the

dynamics of class formation and policy realignment.

Figure 2. Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure, 1980–2000

Source: Kitschelt, Herbert. (2003)

Figure 3. Position of AfD in Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

Changes in the AfD’s Platform

The AfD adopted its Basic platform(Grundsatzprogramm) in 2016, a document which

meticulously delineates the party’s policy orientations and positions. It is important to

note that 2016 marked the commencement of internal factionalization within the AfD.

The party began to divide along populist lines, particularly concerning economic issues

and migration

. The table of contents of the AfD’s 96-page Grundsatzprogramm is

organized into fourteen chapters. The contents are as follows when classified by policy

domain. The opening chapter, titled “Democracy and Fundamental Values,” posits that

the prevailing political parties offer no viable alternatives in their policy stances. This

assertion is characterized by the AfD as a structural constraint that poses a grave threat

to democracy and the rule of law (p. 9: “Schlanker Staat für freie Bürger”). The party’s

initial prioritization of economic policy is evident in sections such as “Europe and the

Euro,” “Economy, Digitalization, and Consumer Protection,” and “Taxes and Finance.”

With respect to foreign policy, the AfD places significant emphasis on the preservation of

national independence and sovereignty, adopting a critical stance toward supranational

integration. While the party expresses support for the maintenance of NATO, it stipulates

that German participation in military interventions should be contingent upon alignment

with Germany’s security interests. In regard to the situation with Russia, the AfD has

expressed support for the reduction of tensions.

Table 1. Table of Contents of the AfD’s Basic Platform

Category

Chapter

Democracy

1. Democracy and Fundamental Values

Economic

Policy

2. Europe and the Euro

10. Economy, Digitalization, and Consumer Protection

11. Taxes and Finance

12. Energy Policy

Foreign

Policy

3. Internal Security and Justice

4. Foreign and Security Policy

Social Policy

5. Labor Market and Social Policy

6. Family and Children

13. Nature Conservation, Agriculture, Environment

14. Infrastructure and Housing

Culture,

Identity

7. Culture, Language, and Identity

8. Education and Research

9. Immigration, Integration, and Asylum

The most emphatic stance in the basic platform is on culture and identity. In the section

on “Education and Research,” the party addresses the normalization of social policies,

such as opposition to integrated schools and support for traditional educational systems.

The party also opposes gender studies and sex education. However, the section then

transitions to issues related to migration, refugees, and integration, including opposition

Choi, J.-A. (2018). Background of the rise of far-right parties in Germany: Focusing on the Euro and migrant

factors. Oughtopia, 33(1), 39–67.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

to the integration of Islamic education. Keeping the basic platform in mind, the following

section compares the AfD’s manifestos from three different elections.

Table 2. Comparison of the Table of Contents of the AfD’s Manifestos from Three Elections

2017 Federal Parliament Election

Platform

2021 Federal

Parliament Election

Platform: Germany,

but normal

2025 Federal

Parliament Election

Platform: Time for

Germany

Democracy

1. Defense of German Democracy

1. Democracy and the

Rule of Law

9. Democracy and the

Rule of Law

10. The People Are

Sovereign

Culture,

Identity

5. Refugees Need Borders: Migration

and Refugee Policy

6. Islam in Conflict with the Liberal

Democratic Basic Order

7. Welcoming Culture for Children:

Family Support and Demographic

Development

8. Education and Schools: The Courage

for Differentiation

9. Culture and Media

9. Islam

10. Immigration,

Refugees, Integration:

Acting Humanely and

Rationally – Protecting

Germany

16. Culture

17. Media

7. Refugee and

Immigration Policy

13. Culture and Media

Policy

Economic

Policy

2. The Euro Has Failed: Currency,

Monetary, and Financial Policy

10. Taxes and Finance, Economy and

Jobs

3. The EU and Europe

4. Taxes and Finance

5. Economy: Blue Deal

6. The Euro Has Failed

1. Social Market

Economy and Health

2. Construction,

Housing,

Infrastructure, Energy,

Transport, and Digital

Affairs

3. Finance and Taxes

4. Monetary Policy –

The Failure of the Euro

System

Foreign

Policy

3. Finance and Taxes

4. Monetary Policy – The Failure of the

Euro System

7. Foreign and

Defense Policy

8. Internal Security

6. External Security

Social

Policy

11. Social Policy

12. Our Health System Is at Risk

13. Ending Hostility to Technology:

Energy and Climate

14. Maintaining and Expanding

Transport Networks, Strengthening

Housing Construction, Developing

Rural Areas

15. Environmental, Nature and Animal

Protection, Consumer Protection, and

Agriculture

2. Freedom and

Responsibility

11. Family Policy

12. Labor and Social

Policy

13. AfD’s Pension

Concept

14. Health Policy

15. Education,

Science, and Research

18. Construction,

Housing, Rental

19. Climate, Energy,

Technology, and

Digitalization

20. Mobility and

Infrastructure

21. Agriculture,

Environment, and

Consumer Protection

5. Agriculture,

Environment, and

Climate

8. Internal Security

11. Family and

Demographics

12. Education,

Science, and

Openness to

Technology

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

In recent years, the AfD has participated in three electoral processes and issued three

electoral manifestos. Quantitatively, the 2017 manifesto is 74 pages in length and

commences with a focus on the defense of German democracy. In the 2017 election, the

AfD emerged as a prominent party, garnering 12.6% of the vote. The party’s most

significant support base is in the former East German regions, where in 2017, 21.2% of

the population expressed support for the AfD, which is nearly double the 10.7% of the

former West German regions. In the aftermath of unsuccessful bid to secure

parliamentary representation in the Bundestag during the 2013 election, the AfD initiated

a systematic electoral engagement starting in 2017, accompanied by the formulation a

comprehensive manifesto. This iteration of the manifesto is distinguished by its concise

chapters and direct, assertive language.

The year 2017 marked the commencement of profound debates and confrontations

surrounding the subjects of migrants and refugees. In this context, the manifesto of the

AfD notably incorporated content pertaining to refugees and Islam. The section on

education and schools was titled “Courage for Differentiation,” and it explicitly and

actively expressed opposition to religions, particularly Islam

. The term “Volk”

(people/nation) appeared 67 times. With regard to foreign policy, the manifesto

expounds on internal security, with a particular emphasis on the issue of terrorism. In

the context of addressing pressing concerns regarding public safety, a range of subjects

were discussed, including strategies to combat foreign crime and enhance investigative

capabilities. These measures were presented as a series of actions aimed at safeguarding

citizens’ well-being, collectively referred as an anti-terror response.

In terms of social policy, the AfD is in opposition to the ideology of gender and places

significant emphasizes traditional forms of family and marriage. With regard to education

policy, the party rejects integrative ideological education and strongly criticizes both

comprehensive policies and Muslim-related educational programs. Furthermore, the AfD

places a higher value on practical, field-oriented education than on theory-centered

approaches. The party particularly asserts that the educational rights of German children

are being infringed upon by immigrant children who lack sufficient language skills. The

AfD opposes the Bologna bachelor system and has advocated for a return to the

traditional Magister/Diplom system. The manifesto further asserts the necessity of

academic neutrality in educational institutions, contending that these institutions have

become laboratories for left-wing social experimentation.

With regard to the matter of immigration policy, the AfD has highlighted demographic

issues in Europe and Africa. Specifically, the party he noted that while Europe is facing

with a decline in population, Africa and Islamic countries are witnessing a rapid surge in

population growth, leading to significant demographic imbalances and substantial mass

migration. In summary, a substantial segment of the 2017 electoral manifesto asserts

that German society is experiencing a threat to its cohesion as a result of immigration.

For example, the manifesto rejected minarets (the towers of Islamic mosques) as symbols of Islamic power

and opposed the call to prayer by muezzins. According to the manifesto, the muezzin’s call asserts that no god

exists except Allah, which the AfD described as religious imperialism. This stance contradicts the contemporary

practice of tolerant coexistence among religious communities (p. 35).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

A significant proportion of the manifesto on culture, media, and social policy addresses

or is underpinned by issues related to immigration.

In the realms of economic, social, and technological policy, the AfD persists its use of

contentious language. The political party’s economic policy is predicated on the premise

that Germany should withdraw from the Eurozone and actively advocate for the

reintroduction of a national currency, such as the Deutsche Mark. Market-related policies,

including taxation, are predicated on the principle of minimizing state intervention and

upholding a free market order as a core value. With regard to climate change, the AfD

has adopted a skeptical stance regarding the scientific consensus on the matter,

characterizing it as a form of ideology. In a variety of social and technological policy

areas, including climate, energy, transportation, and housing, the party has expressed a

strong opposition to international norms, with a particular emphasis on those established

by the European Union.

The 2021 electoral manifesto underwent a substantial expansion, increasing from 15

chapters in the previous version to 21 chapters. During this period, the AfD received

10.3% of the vote. The party’s primary support base remained in the former East German

regions, with the widening gap of 19.8% in the East versus 8.2% in the West, compared

to 2017. A comparative analysis of the 2021 manifesto reveals a shift in the utilization of

chapter headings, which have become more attributed to the employment of objective

nouns as chapter titles, a departure from the emotive or declarative phrases that

characterized previous manifestos.

It is noteworthy that the chapter entitled “Chapter 9: Islam” is written with a discernible

objective. The primary contention in this discourse is that the critique of Islam, akin to

the critique of any other religion, should be safeguarded by the principle of freedom of

expression. The manifesto demands a comprehensive prohibition on the wearing of

burqas and niqabs in public spaces and asserts the imperative a addressing any form of

discrimination against indivisuals of Jewish heritage. For instance, on page 84, the

following assertion is made: “Jewish life in Germany is threatened not only by right-wing

extremists but also from Muslims who harbor animosity towards Jews and Israel. Attacks

on Jewish people and anti-Semitic insults must be consistently prosecuted.

”

The prevailing tone in this section evokes a sense of threat posed by Islam. The

employment of terms such as “Parallelgesellschaften” (parallel societies),

“Friedensrichter” (Sharia judges), and “Dschihadisten” (jihadists) is a recurring

phenomenon, with the intent of conveying the notion that Islam poses a systemic threat.

Exclusionary language is also readily employed; for instance, direct references are made

to organizations such as the “türkisch-islamischen Anstalt für Religion (DITIB)” and the

“Muslimbruderschaft” (Muslim Brotherhood), while strong terms such as “abolition,”

“ban,” and “cessation” are repeatedly used for emphasis.

Examining the manifesto for the general election held in February 2025 and comparing

it with previous versions reveals the AfD’s evolving trajectory. First, the table of contents

“Jüdisches Leben wird in Deutschland nicht nur von Rechtsextremisten, sondern zunehmend auch von juden-

und israelfeindlichen Muslimen bedroht. Angriffe auf Juden sowie antisemitische Beleidigungen müssen

konsequent strafrechtlich geahndet werden.”

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

has shifted from provocative phrases to more objective language. While the 2017

manifesto featured assertive and emotive headings, and the 2021 version was more

specific and issue-oriented, the 2025 manifesto adopts concise and neutral terminology.

For example, the 2017 heading “Refugees Need Borders: Migration and Refugee Policy”

changed to “Immigration, Refugees, Integration: Acting Humanely and Rationally -

Protecting Germany” in 2021, and then to simply “Refugee and Immigration Policy” in

2025.

Second, the AfD continues to emphasize a sense of crisis, particularly in its hardline

stance on refugee and immigration policy (“Deutschland muss wieder selbst entscheiden,

wer ins Land kommt” - Germany must once again decide for itself who enters the

country). The party still employs emotionally charged terms such as “massive

Zuwanderung” (mass immigration), “unverantwortliche Politik” (irresponsible policy),

and “Überforderung” (systemic overload). However, the 2025 manifesto uses far more

indirect language than previous versions. The chapter on Islam has disappeared, and

there is no overt criticism of Muslims. While the manifesto still implicitly criticizes

immigrants, the tone is noticeably more subdued. For instance, phrases like “Kriminalität

steigt, Gefährdung der inneren Sicherheit” (suggesting a link between increased

immigration and crime) are less direct than before, and immigrants and refugees are

described as a “Belastung der Sozialsysteme” (burden on social systems) without explicit

hostility. Some immigrants are framed as “Sozialtouristen” (welfare tourists), indicating

a continued, albeit more subtle, critical stance.

Third, the AfD now attaches the term “ideology” to pragmatic issues in an effort to

deconstruct the discourse surrounding ideology itself. One of the party’s key issues is

climate policy, on which it maintains a strong position. For example, the AfD utilizes

chapters on democracy to argue against climate initiatives such as the Green Deal,

repeatedly criticizing the EU’s Green Deal as “planned economy” and “climate ideology.”

The party’s stance on electric vehicles is also unequivocal: technological development

and market forces, rather than ideology-based prohibitive policies (auf ideologischer

Verbotspolitik), should determine outcomes. Interestingly, the AfD does not use the term

“ideology” indiscriminately. In the 2025 manifesto, the word appears 44 times, most

frequently (seven times) in the chapter on “Agriculture, Environment, Climate.” By

employing the term “ideology” in areas not typically interpreted as ideological, such as

climate and media, the AfD seeks to shed the risks associated with grand ideological

discourse and instead project a pragmatic image.

The Limits of the Moderation of the AfD and Its Implications

As demonstrated in the preceding analysis, the AfD has undergone a shift in its ideological

orientation, endeavoring to present a more pragmatic facade. These efforts are

inextricably linked to the party's ongoing survival. The German Federal Constitutional

Court has observed that the AfD is susceptible to being designated as a far-right party

Since 2021, there have been ongoing debates regarding the far-right tendencies of the

AfD. In the current discourse, the argument has been posited that the prohibition of anti-

Deutschlandfunk. (2025, May 5). AfD-Verbotsverfahren: Was spricht dafür und was dagegen?

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

democratic parties or organizations constitutes a tool available to a well-defended

democracy, thereby providing grounds for the potential dissolution of the AfD. The legal

foundation for such a prohibition is articulated in Article 21 of the Basic Law

However, in February 2025, a majority vote in favor of initiating the ban procedure was

not achieved. While 124 members of parliament supported the motion, but this was

insufficient to bring it to a vote in the Bundestag. Historically, the Federal Constitutional

Court has prohibited the formation of political parties that exhibit Nazi tendencies, as

evidenced by the banning of the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) during the 1950s. Similarly,

the German Communist Party (KPD), which demonstrated Stalinist leanings, has also

been disbanded. While it is possible to follow the ban procedure based on the Court’s

judgment, concerns have been raised that such a process is not only complex but could

also harm the democratic system itself.

Conversely, the capacity of the AfD to attain full moderation, given its present

momentum, remains a subject of speculation. A potential avenue through which far-right

forces may evolve towards a more moderate stance is through a process of “de-

demonization.” A proximate illustration of this phenomenon can be observed in France,

where Marine Le Pen's strategy of disavowing her father's controversial views proved

effective in the 2011 electoral campaign, thereby enabling her to attain a level of electoral

success that her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, had not been able to achieve during the

1970s. In the period under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the National Front

(subsequently renamed the National Rally) underwent a transformation that led to its

adoption of an image consistent with the traditional right-wing party. This shift was

evident in the outcomes of the general elections

An alternative perspective reveals that the moderation of political parties has been

demonstrated through the case of the Grüne. The efforts directed towards the moderation

of the AfD are associated with the party's capacity to contribute to the promotion of

peace. The following strategies are among those that the AfD can employ toward

moderation. At the ideological level, the party could adopt a strategy of expanding toward

the center, a process exemplified by Grüne. Secondly, it could potentially facilitate the

restoration of relations with major parties and contribute to the breakdown of the cordon

sanitaire. Thirdly, the initiative has the potential to expand its support base. However, it

should be noted that these three conditions are also closely related to the limitations of

the AfD's moderation.

Firstly, if the AfD continues to moderate its stance, the party risks losing its dedicated

and fervent support base. The formation of the AfD was predicated on the presence of

profound ideological divisions, a factor that has been intricately intertwined with the

party's identity. The AfD, founded in 2013, initially emerged as a moderate right-wing

party that opposed the euro. However, in 2016, due to internal divisions, a faction that

emphasized anti-Islam and anti-immigrant stances gained control and expanded its

Parteien, die nach ihren Zielen oder nach dem Verhalten ihrer Anhänger darauf ausgehen, die freiheitliche

demokratische Grundordnung zu beeinträchtigen oder zu beseitigen oder den Bestand der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland zu gefährden, sind verfassungswidrig(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 21).

Cho, H.-S. (2024). The French parliamentary election and European populism: The success and limitations

of the National Rally (RN). Legislative Studies, 30(3), 38–66.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

influence. In the face of the inability to identify pragmatic solutions to the substantial

influx of refugees, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 resulted in the arrival of new refugees

from Ukraine. Concurrently, Germany encountered supply chain disruptions, the impact

of the COVD-19 pandemic, and an economic downturn, precipitating a decline in public

trust in the established political parties. During this period, the AfD party experienced

significant growth, capitalizing on prevalent anxieties regarding the future and distrust

of the political establishment. It is evident that the most significant basis for the

proliferation of far-right political entities in Europe is the prevailing sentiment of

disillusionment with established left- and right-wing parties. The ascendance of the AfD

in Germany can be interpreted as a manifestation of this disillusionment with

conventional political discourse. In essence, the capacity of the AfD to effectively

assimilate is inherently constrained.

Secondly, due to the political isolation of the AfD, Germany's major parties adhere to a

strategy of non-cooperation with the AfD, a practice referred to as the "Brandmauer"

(firewall). This phenomenon functions as a structural impediment, hindering the

incorporation of the AfD into the political mainstream, irrespective of any policy

moderation. In contrast, France's response entailed the exclusion of radical policy

stances, thereby embarking on a course of moderation. The RN (Rassemblement

National), while maintaining an anti-elite rhetoric, has also recruited elites from

institutions such as Sciences Po and ENA into its leadership. Moreover, it relinquished its

stance on exiting the eurozone, progressively adopting a stance that advocated for the

reform of Europe in accordance with French national interests. In the case of Italy's

Giorgia Meloni, it is evident that she has demonstrated a capacity to adapt to the norms

and institutional frameworks of the EU. This adaptation is characterized by the adoption

of a pragmatic policy approach, which contrasts with the advancement of extreme policy

agendas

Thirdly, the AfD has garnered substantial support in the former East Germany.

Transcending its geographical limitations necessitates broadening its electoral base

beyond this regional stronghold. For instance, in the aftermath of reunification,

sentiments of political and economic marginalization—manifested in the perception of

being relegated to "second-class citizenship"—fueled not only nostalgia for socialism but

also aspirations for national resurgence. Consequently, this socio-political context

contributed to elevated levels of support for radical ethnic nationalism and cultural

conservatism in these regions.

While the AfD has achieved considerable nationwide expansion by 2025, securing second

place in the February 2025 federal election, significant geographical disparities persist.

The party continues to command over one-third of votes in eastern states, whereas its

support in western regions remains comparatively modest. The party's challenge has

evolved from a mere matter of geographical expansion to one of consolidating support

across diverse regional contexts. Moreover, it is imperative to overcome its current state

of political isolation to achieve governing power. Absent such consolidation, the AfD faces

a quandary that fundamentally restricts its progress toward political normalization.

Cho, H.-S. (2024). The French parliamentary election and European populism: The success and limitations

of the National Rally (RN). Legislative Studies, 30(3), 56-57.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

Specifically, the party risks losing its core eastern base while failing to garner sufficient

mainstream acceptance in the west.

Meanwhile, the AfD continues to face significant challenges in altering its perception

nationwide, particularly within the former West Germany, where its reputation remains

predominantly negative. The social underpinnings that foster support for the AfD in

former East Germany encompass economic disparities and regional imbalances,

phenomena that are also evident in countries such as Italy. While the party's robust

support base has undoubtedly contributed to its rise, it is also a significant factor that

hinders the party's capacity to consolidate its expansion through moderation. The party's

electoral prospects in the Western regions are characterized by volatility and dependence

on protest voting. Conversely, any strategic shift toward moderation may result in the

alienation of the radical core in the Eastern regions, which is crucial for maintaining

organizational stability and ideological coherence.

Conclusion

Thus far, we have analyzed the electoral support for the AfD in Germany has been

conducted, along with an examination of its implications. Moreover, the challenges

associated with consolidating geographic and regional support have been thoroughly

assessed. This support is imperative for the party's evolution. Finally, an analysis has

been conducted to determine the ways in which the party has attempted to overcome its

political isolation. The crux of this quandary is the paradox of moderation. The AfD has

solidified its position as a novel pole of opposition by capitalizing on divisions within the

established order. However, it now faces inconsistencies in its attempts to moderate its

conduct in order to gain acceptance into that very establishment.

The German case offers several critical implications. First, the most salient grievance

among former East German citizens— and a primary catalyst for the far-right party's

ascendance— centers on labor market anxieties. These populations regard refugees and

immigrants as direct competitors for employment, a perception that has fueled both

economic marginalization and socio-political alienation. The electoral entrenchment of

the AfD in the former East Germany must be understood within this economic and social

context, where citizens have gravitated toward the party's ethno-nationalist and anti-

immigration platform as a response to perceived structural disadvantages. Consequently,

a more comprehensive examination of the immigrant issue within the context of social

alienation in the former East Germany after German reunification is imperative. It is

imperative that this examination encompass a thorough assessment of the social

integration of immigrants.

Secondly, it is imperative to perpetually examine methods of social integration by

evaluating not only the federal government of Germany but also the practices of state

governments. North Rhine-Westphalia is the region with the largest immigrant population

in all of Germany, possessing a long history of migrant workers. The state government's

social integration education is characterized by its comprehensive approach to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

educational integration, encompassing both formal and informal educational settings

Consequently, despite having the highest proportion of foreigners, North Rhine-

Westphalia continues to demonstrate the highest level of social inclusion. A more in-

depth analysis is particularly necessary regarding bodies such as the Social Integration

Council for immigrants and native residents. The government's endeavors to foster social

integration are inherently deficient without the active involvement of local residents. The

cultivation of awareness and policy-level reflection, complemented by active social

discourse, is instrumental in fostering vigilance against the far-right and nurturing a

healthier democracy.

Thirdly, a high level of micro-level analysis of social conflicts is necessary, enabling the

development of multi-layered approaches to resolve them. In the case of Germany, it is

imperative to undertake a more comprehensive analysis of the support base for the AfD,

with a particular focus on examining the patterns of AfD support among both younger

and older generations. The emergence of far-right political parties can be attributed to

various factors, including economic inequality, population decline, and political alienation.

These factors vary in their impact across different generations and geographical regions.

Society exhibits diversity across economic and social strata, with multiple interests

intermingling.

This finding aligns with the previously emphasized importance of social integration and

connects to the significance of social integration education targeting not only immigrants

but also the general public. The recent rise of far-right politics, evident not only in

Germany and Korea but also in numerous other nations, is indicative of a prevailing trend

of polarization. The solution to this issue is found in the facilitation of discussions

concerning integration at the individual, regional, and societal levels. This complexity

necessitates a multifaceted approach, as addressing one aspect alone would not suffice.

The interconnected nature of these dimensions, akin to the interlocking gears of a

machine, underscores the necessity for a holistic perspective.

References

Alternative für Deutschland. (2017). Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für

die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag. Berlin, Germany: AfD-Bundesgeschäftsstelle.

Alternative für Deutschland. (2021). Programm der Alternative für Deutschland für die

Wahl zum 20. Deutschen Bundestag, Deutschland. Aber normal. Berlin, Germany: AfD-

Bundesgeschäftsstelle.

Alternative für Deutschland. (2025). Programm der Alternative für Deutschland für die

Wahl zum 21. Deutschen Bundestag, Zeit für Deutschland. Berlin, Germany: AfD-

Bundesgeschäftsstelle.

Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. New York, NY: St.

Martin’s Press.

Choi, J.-A. (2025). Integration policies for migrants in North Rhine-Westphalia. European Studies, 43(1), 29–

50.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 24-40

Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications

Jeong-Ae Choi

Bundestagswahl 2025. (2025, March 27). Wahlergebnis. https://www.bundestagswahl-

bw.de/wahlergebnis

Cho, H.-S. (2024). The French parliamentary election and European populism: The

success and limitations of the National Rally (RN). Legislative Studies, 30(3), 38–66.

Choi, J.-A. (2018). Background of the rise of far-right parties in Germany: Focusing on

the Euro and migrant factors. Oughtopia, 33(1), 39–67.

Choi, J.-A. (2025). Integration policies for migrants in North Rhine-Westphalia. European

Studies, 43(1), 29–50.

Deutschlandfunk. (2025, May 5). AfD-Verbotsverfahren: Was spricht dafür und was

dagegen?

Jeong, H.-M. (2013). Germany’s ‘non-mainstream’ parties and changes in the German

party system. EU Studies, (33), 335–374.

Jung, B.-G. (2023). The emergence of the AfD and changes in the ideological structure

of the German party system. European Studies, 41(2), 1–26.

Karapin, R. (1998). Radical-right and neo-fascist political parties in Western Europe.

Comparative Politics, 30(2), 213–234.

Kim, S.-H. (2025). Social factors in the rise of populism and the far right: A case study

of Italy. EU Studies, (74), 251–280.

Kim, Y.-T. (2017). Changes in the basic program of the German Green Party and the

structure of party competition in Germany. Korean Journal of Party Studies, 6(1), 193–

214.

Kitschelt, H. (1992). The formation of party systems in Eastern Central Europe. Politics

& Society, 20(1), 7–50.

Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative

analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, H. (2003, May). Diversification and reconfiguration of party systems in

postindustrial democracies. Accountability and Representation in European Democracy

Conference, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

Kitschelt, H. (2004). Germany: Beyond the stable state. London, UK: Routledge.

Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-

national perspectives. New York, NY: The Free Press.

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

RECONFIGURING BORDERS THROUGH HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION: KOREA

AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

JOONPYO LEE

eagleeagle55@hufs.ac.kr

Joonpyo Lee is a full-time researcher at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Hankuk

University of Foreign Studies (Republic of Korea). He received his Ph.D. in Law from Hankuk

University of Foreign Studies in 2012. His major research areas include Southeast Asian regional

governance and migration-related legal systems. https://orcid.org/0009-0003-4664-897X

Abstract

This article examines how high-skilled migration policies reconfigure legal borders by

comparing South Korea’s Top-Tier Visa and the European Union’s EU Blue Card. In response

to population ageing, low fertility, labour shortages, and global competition for talent, both

Korea and the EU have strengthened legal pathways for attracting high-skilled migrants.

However, their institutional designs differ significantly. Korea’s Top-Tier Visa is structured

around state-led selection, national strategic industries, and conditional pathways to

settlement, whereas the EU Blue Card relies on standardized legal criteria, employment

contracts, salary thresholds, professional qualifications, rights-based residence, and intra-EU

mobility. Using legal and policy analysis combined with a comparative legal approach, this

study examines four dimensions: selection criteria, residence stability, labour market access

and mobility, and pathways to long-term settlement. The analysis shows that Korea selectively

admits top-tier talent in advanced sectors such as semiconductors, biotechnology, artificial

intelligence, and batteries, but its system remains strongly conditioned by administrative

verification and industrial policy objectives. By contrast, the EU Blue Card provides a more

rights-based and multi-level framework by linking residence and work authorization with

family reunification, equal treatment, social rights, and mobility across member states. The

article argues that high-skilled migration policy should not be understood as debordering or

simple liberalization. Rather, it represents selective legal openness through which states and

supranational legal orders differentially allocate mobility, residence rights, labour market

access, and settlement opportunities. Contemporary borders are therefore not disappearing

but being reconfigured as normative and institutional boundaries that privilege particular

categories of talent.

Keywords

High-skilled migration, Selective legal openness, Top-Tier Visa, EU Blue Card, Reconfiguration

of borders.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a forma como as políticas de migração de pessoas altamente qualificadas

reconfiguram as fronteiras legais, comparando o «Visto de Nível Superior» da Coreia do Sul

com o «Cartão Azul da UE» da União Europeia. Em resposta ao envelhecimento da população,

à baixa fertilidade, à escassez de mão-de-obra e à concorrência global por talentos, tanto a

Coreia do Sul como a UE reforçaram as vias legais para atrair migrantes altamente

qualificados. No entanto, os seus modelos institucionais diferem significativamente. O «Visto

de Nível Superior» da Coreia está estruturado em torno de uma seleção liderada pelo Estado,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

de indústrias estratégicas nacionais e de vias condicionais para a fixação, enquanto o «Cartão

Azul da UE» assenta em critérios jurídicos padronizados, contratos de trabalho, limiares

salariais, qualificações profissionais, residência baseada em direitos e mobilidade intra-UE.

Recorrendo a uma análise jurídica e política combinada com uma abordagem jurídica

comparativa, este estudo examina quatro dimensões: critérios de seleção, estabilidade da

residência, acesso ao mercado de trabalho e mobilidade, e vias para a fixação a longo prazo.

A análise revela que a Coreia admite seletivamente talentos de alto nível em setores

avançados, tais como semicondutores, biotecnologia, inteligência artificial e baterias, mas o

seu sistema continua fortemente condicionado pela verificação administrativa e pelos

objetivos da política industrial. Em contrapartida, o Cartão Azul da UE proporciona um quadro

mais baseado em direitos e em vários níveis, ao associar a autorização de residência e de

trabalho ao reagrupamento familiar, à igualdade de tratamento, aos direitos sociais e à

mobilidade entre os Estados-Membros. O artigo defende que a política de migração de pessoas

altamente qualificadas não deve ser entendida como a eliminação das fronteiras ou uma

simples liberalização. Pelo contrário, representa uma abertura jurídica seletiva através da qual

os Estados e as ordens jurídicas supranacionais atribuem de forma diferenciada a mobilidade,

os direitos de residência, o acesso ao mercado de trabalho e as oportunidades de

estabelecimento. As fronteiras contemporâneas não estão, portanto, a desaparecer, mas sim

a ser reconfiguradas como limites normativos e institucionais que privilegiam categorias

específicas de talentos.

Palavras-chave

Migração de pessoas altamente qualificadas, Abertura jurídica seletiva, Visto de Nível

Superior, Cartão Azul da UE, Reconfiguração das fronteiras.

How to cite this article

Lee, Joonpyo (2026). Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe in

Comparative Perspective. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier –

Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia,

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 41-62. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0626.3

Article submitted on March 30, 2026 and accepted on May 10, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

RECONFIGURING BORDERS THROUGH HIGH-SKILLED

MIGRATION: KOREA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE

JOONPYO LEE

Introduction

As labour shortages caused by low fertility, population ageing, and the upgrading of

industrial structures have emerged as structural challenges, many countries have come

to regard the attraction of high-skilled talent as a central task for maintaining national

competitiveness. As the transition toward a knowledge-based economy accelerates, high-

skilled migrants are no longer viewed merely as a supplementary labour force but as

strategic resources that shape innovation capacity and technological competitiveness. In

response, states have increasingly refined their visa systems, residence statuses, and

settlement-support policies to compete in the global “talent competition” (INSEAD &

Portulans Institute, 2025, p. 10).

As Shachar (2006) argues, contemporary states compete to attract the “best and

brightest” by using legal statuses such as residence rights, settlement rights, and

citizenship as incentives. In this sense, high-skilled migration policy should not be

understood simply as a mechanism for admitting foreign workers or managing population

mobility. Rather, it constitutes a legal and institutional device through which states

selectively identify, attract, and incorporate categories of foreign nationals. Whereas

traditional foreign labour policies focused primarily on the functional management of

labour shortages in industrial sectors, contemporary high-skilled migration policies are

increasingly linked to advanced industrial competitiveness, innovation capacity, and

national growth strategies.

This shift is evident in both Korea and the European Union (EU). Korea has introduced

the Top-Tier Visa as a policy response to population ageing, low fertility, and labour

shortages in advanced industries, thereby institutionalizing the entry and settlement of

high-skilled foreign talent. The EU, for its part, has revised the EU Blue Card system in

order to strengthen a regional framework for the mobility of high-skilled third-country

nationals. Although both systems represent strategic migration policies designed to

respond to global talent competition, they differ significantly in their legal criteria for

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research

Foundation of Korea (NRF-2024S1A5C2A02046352).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

selecting high-skilled migrants, the ways in which they provide residence stability and

labour market mobility, and the institutional pathways through which long-term

settlement is enabled. These differences reveal distinct modes of the “selective

reconfiguration of borders” in the field of high-skilled migration.

Despite the growing importance of this issue, existing scholarship has tended to focus

mainly on labour market demand, economic effects, and demographic policy. Relatively

little comparative legal analysis has examined how high-skilled migration policies allocate

differentiated rights of mobility and residence to selected migrants through specific legal

criteria and institutional structures. This gap is particularly notable in the Korean case.

Although Korea’s high-skilled migration policy has recently undergone rapid

institutionalization, its legal structure and settlement orientation have not yet been

sufficiently examined in comparison with the EU Blue Card.

Against this background, this study compares the legal frameworks governing high-

skilled migration in Korea and the EU, focusing on Korea’s Top-Tier Visa and the EU Blue

Card. More specifically, it examines how the selection criteria, residence stability, labour

market access and mobility, and pathways to long-term settlement for high-skilled

migrants are institutionalized in each system. The study addresses the following research

questions. First, what legal criteria do Korea and the EU use to select high-skilled

migrants? Second, how do the two systems guarantee residence stability and labour

market mobility? Third, how are institutional pathways to long-term settlement

structured? Fourth, how do these legal frameworks institutionalize high-skilled migration,

and how are they related to the selective reconfiguration of borders?

Methodologically, this study combines legal and policy analysis with a comparative legal

approach, drawing on relevant statutes, policy documents, and government materials

from Korea and the EU. By doing so, it analyses high-skilled migration policy not merely

as an instrument for attracting talent, but as an institutional mechanism through which

states and supranational legal orders differentially allocate mobility, residence rights,

labour market access, and settlement opportunities. The remainder of the article is

organized as follows. Section 2 presents the legal characteristics of high-skilled migration

policy and the analytical framework of the study. Section 3 examines Korea’s Top-Tier

Visa system. Section 4 analyses the legal structure of the EU Blue Card. Section 5

compares the two systems and draws out the institutional, theoretical, and policy

implications of high-skilled migration policy.

Analytical Framework

The Legal Nature of High-Skilled Migration Policy

High-skilled migration policy should be understood not merely as a mechanism for

managing population mobility or admitting foreign workers, but as a legal and

institutional device through which states selectively admit particular categories of foreign

nationals. Traditionally, migration policy developed around the regulation of labour

supply and demand and the control of national borders. More recently, however, it has

been reoriented toward attracting specific forms of talent on the basis of economic value,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

technical capacity, and innovation potential. This shift is closely related to the view that

international migration is structured not only by market forces but also by state policy

choices and institutional frameworks (de Haas, 2011, p. 2).

The modern state has increasingly been reconfigured as a “migration state” that seeks

to balance economic openness with political control (Hollifield, 2004, p. 885). High-skilled

migration policy illustrates this tension particularly clearly. States need external talent to

sustain economic growth and industrial competitiveness, yet they must also manage and

control migration. Accordingly, high-skilled migration policy does not constitute a form

of unrestricted openness. Rather, it creates a selective management structure in which

openness and control are combined.

In this process, states classify certain foreign nationals as “high-skilled talent” by

applying criteria such as educational qualifications, professional experience, income level,

employment contracts, and technological fields, and grant them more stable residence

statuses and rights. This structure goes beyond administrative classification. It functions

as a legal framework that differentially allocates mobility, residence stability, labour

market access, and settlement opportunities. Such a selective structure is also related to

Shachar’s (2006) notion of a “talent-for-citizenship exchange,” in which states

strategically offer legal statuses such as residence rights, permanent residence, and

citizenship in order to secure the knowledge, skills, and economic contributions of high-

skilled talent.

Therefore, high-skilled migration policy should not be understood through a binary

distinction between opening and restricting migration. Rather, it should be analysed as a

selective legal framework through which states differentially distribute mobility and rights

in accordance with their policy objectives and economic needs.

Key Dimensions of Comparative Analysis

From this perspective, this study identifies four analytical dimensions for comparing high-

skilled migration policies in Korea and the EU. This framework builds on existing

scholarship that understands high-skilled migration policy not simply as a system of entry

authorization, but as a legal structure through which states select particular forms of

talent and differentially allocate residence status and rights (Shachar, 2006; Hollifield,

2004). It is also connected to the policy perspective of the Global Talent Competitiveness

Index 2025, which emphasizes the importance of states’ capacity to attract and retain

talent in the context of global talent competition (INSEAD & Portulans Institute, 2025).

The first dimension is selection criteria. This refers to the legal requirements through

which states define and select high-skilled migrants. Educational qualifications,

professional experience, income level, employment contracts, and links to strategic

industries function as key criteria for privileging or excluding particular migrants.

The second dimension is residence stability. This concerns the extent to which high-

skilled migrants can reside securely in the receiving state or region. The length of

residence, conditions for maintaining residence status, possibilities for renewal, and

pathways to long-term residence are central indicators for assessing whether a high-

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

skilled migration policy is oriented merely toward short-term labour recruitment or

toward longer-term settlement.

The third dimension is labour market access and mobility. This refers to whether high-

skilled migrants are tied to a specific employment relationship or are able to move

relatively freely within the labour market. Occupational restrictions, the possibility of

changing employers, inter-sectoral mobility, and regional mobility directly affect both the

utilization of migrants’ skills and the stability of their residence.

The fourth dimension is pathways to settlement. This refers to the institutional

possibilities through which high-skilled migrants may be incorporated into the receiving

society over the long term. These include access to permanent residence, long-term

resident status, family accompaniment, labour market access for family members, and

links to social rights.

These four dimensions are analytically distinct but closely interconnected. Selection

criteria determine the conditions of entry; residence stability defines the continuity of

legal status after admission; labour market mobility shapes the scope and autonomy of

economic activity; and pathways to settlement affect the long-term social incorporation

of high-skilled migrants. This study uses these four dimensions to compare how the high-

skilled migration regimes of Korea and the EU institutionalize selective openness and the

reconfiguration of borders.

Selective Openness and the Reconfiguration of Legal Borders

The analytical framework outlined above allows high-skilled migration policy to be

understood through the lens of “selective openness.” High-skilled migration policy does

not operate by fully opening or closing borders. Rather, it differentially grants mobility,

residence, labour market access, and settlement opportunities to migrants who meet

specific criteria. In this sense, high-skilled migration policy can be seen as a process of

legal selection through which states determine which migrants are to be admitted and

which are to be excluded (Shachar, 2006, p. 148).

Within this structure, borders are no longer limited to territorial boundaries. They are

reconfigured as normative boundaries that differentially distribute mobility and rights

through legal requirements and institutional criteria (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 3).

High-skilled migration policy should therefore be understood not as a process of

debordering, but as a process through which states readjust the operation of borders in

accordance with economic needs and legal criteria.

High-Skilled Migration Policy in Korea

Policy Background

Korea’s foreign labour policy has long developed around a functional system for admitting

foreign workers to compensate for labour shortages in industrial sectors. In

manufacturing, construction, agriculture, livestock, and fisheries, the policy focus has

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

been on admitting and managing low- or medium-skilled foreign workers for limited

periods in order to meet sectoral labour demand. In this process, migration policy was

designed primarily from the perspective of labour market supplementation and residence

control. Such a structure tended to treat foreign workers as temporary labour resources

for addressing shortages in specific industries, rather than as long-term members of

society.

However, recent demographic and industrial changes have exposed the limitations of this

conventional approach. The deepening of low fertility and population ageing, the decline

of the working-age population, and the restructuring of the economy around advanced

industries have all increased the need to reconsider Korea’s migration policy. In

particular, as the securing of high-level technical personnel in strategic sectors such as

semiconductors, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and batteries has become directly

linked to national competitiveness, Korea’s immigration policy has increasingly been

expected to move beyond simple labour supplementation and toward the attraction and

settlement of high-skilled talent. This indicates that immigration policy is no longer a

peripheral component of labour policy, but has become a strategic policy domain closely

connected to industrial policy, demographic policy, and innovation policy.

This policy direction is more clearly reflected in the government’s 2030 Future Strategy

for Immigration Policy. The strategy identifies the attraction of outstanding foreign talent

and support for their settlement in Korea as key policy tasks, moving away from the

previous emphasis on low-skilled and low-wage foreign labour. In particular, it seeks to

establish an institutional basis for attracting high-level talent in advanced industries and

enabling such migrants to reside and settle stably in Korean society. In this respect, the

strategy can be understood as a policy document that reflects a medium- to long-term

transformation in Korea’s immigration policy (Ministry of Justice, 2026, p. 1).

Nevertheless, the actual structure of Korea’s foreign labour force remains heavily centred

on non-professional and functional workers. As of December 2025, the number of

professional foreign workers staying in Korea under the E-1 to E-7 categories was

107,634, whereas the number of non-professional workers under the E-8, E-9, E-10, and

H-2 categories reached 486,413, more than four times higher (Korea Immigration

Service, 2026). This shows that, despite the government’s policy emphasis on attracting

high-skilled talent, Korea’s foreign labour structure still relies heavily on a functional

labour admission system designed to supplement labour shortages in industrial sectors.

Accordingly, Korea’s high-skilled migration policy may be understood as transitional in

character: it remains rooted in the existing foreign labour management system, while

gradually introducing limited settlement-oriented elements.

Legal Basis and Selection Criteria of the Top-Tier Visa

The most notable instrument in Korea’s policy for attracting high-skilled foreign talent is

the Top-Tier Visa. In terms of its legal basis, the Top-Tier Visa is institutionalized as a

subcategory of the Residence (F-2) status under Item 24 of Table 1-2 of the Enforcement

Decree of the Immigration Act. More specifically, Ministry of Justice Notice No. 2025-86,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

titled Notice on the Qualification Criteria and Eligible Persons for Top-Tier Talent in

Advanced Fields among Persons Falling under Item 24(j) of Table 1-2 of the Enforcement

Decree of the Immigration Act, sets out the qualification criteria and categories of eligible

persons for top-tier talent in advanced fields. Therefore, the Top-Tier Visa should not be

regarded merely as a policy slogan or administrative programme. Rather, it constitutes

a legal and administrative residence pathway specified through the Residence (F-2)

status under the Enforcement Decree and further detailed by the Ministry of Justice

Notice.

The Notice defines “advanced fields” as areas in which innovative technologies or

research are carried out in industry, venture business, start-ups, and research sectors

for the purpose of strengthening national competitiveness. These fields are to be

determined by the Minister of Justice in consultation with the heads of relevant central

administrative agencies. The Notice also defines “top-tier talent” as high-level personnel

at the level of chief engineer or mid-career researcher or above who plan projects and

lead research or technological development in advanced fields (Ministry of Justice Notice

No. 2025-86, Article 2). This definition shows that the Top-Tier Visa is not a general

scheme for all professional workers, but a selective programme targeting top-level talent

capable of leading technological development and research in advanced fields.

The core of the Top-Tier Visa lies in its strict qualification requirements. Under Article 3

of Ministry of Justice Notice No. 2025-86, applicants must have obtained a master’s or

doctoral degree from a world-class university and must possess a certain period of

relevant experience in advanced fields at a global top 500 company, a government-led

research institute, or a comparable institution. They must also have an annual income of

at least three times the per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of the previous or

preceding year. In addition, applicants must satisfy requirements related to the Social

Integration Programme or the Test of Proficiency in Korean (TOPIK), and must undergo

verification and recommendation by relevant central administrative agencies (Ministry of

Justice Notice No. 2025-86, Article 3).

These requirements constitute a complex selection structure combining educational

qualifications, professional experience, income level, Korean language or social

integration capacity, and administrative verification. In particular, by using criteria such

as graduation from a world-class university, experience at a global top 500 company,

and high income, the Top-Tier Visa distinguishes high-skilled talent from the broader

category of foreign workers. In this respect, it functions as a legal and administrative

device for selecting individuals who are likely to contribute to national strategic

industries.

The Notice also provides certain exceptional pathways. Article 4 of Ministry of Justice

Notice No. 2025-86 allows not only those who satisfy all the criteria under Article 3, but

also certain other persons to be included among eligible applicants. These include

individuals who do not fully meet some of the educational or experience requirements

but have an income of at least four times the per capita GNI of the previous or preceding

year; individuals who have worked for at least one year in an advanced field at a domestic

company and meet the relevant income requirements; and individuals whom the Minister

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

of Justice recognizes as possessing outstanding knowledge and technology necessary for

strengthening competitiveness in advanced fields (Ministry of Justice Notice No. 2025-

86, Article 4). This indicates that the Top-Tier Visa is based on strict formal requirements

while also incorporating a degree of discretionary recognition to reflect the specific

characteristics of advanced industries and the flexible evaluation of talent.

Overall, the selection structure of the Top-Tier Visa is organized around relevance to

national strategic industries, world-class educational and professional credentials, high

income, and government verification, rather than around a broad notion of professional

expertise. The system therefore shows how Korea adjusts the openness of its borders by

selectively admitting top-level talent deemed necessary for national industrial policy,

rather than by broadly incorporating high-skilled migrants as a general category of

professional workers.

Residence Stability, Labour Market Access, and Settlement Pathways

The Top-Tier Visa includes settlement-oriented elements that distinguish it from

conventional short-term employment-based residence statuses. Talent selected through

this scheme may be incorporated into a subcategory of the Residence (F-2) status, which

enables them to obtain relatively stable residence and broader opportunities for economic

activity compared with existing employment visas. This indicates that Korea’s policy for

attracting high-skilled talent is moving beyond simple employment authorization and

toward a framework that takes long-term residence and settlement into consideration.

In terms of residence stability, the Top-Tier Visa provides a more stable structure than

existing employment-based statuses such as the E-7 visa. The E-7 status is generally

premised on a specific occupation and employment relationship, and the maintenance of

residence status is closely tied to continued employment. By contrast, the Top-Tier Visa

is based on the Residence (F-2) status, thereby providing high-skilled talent with a more

stable residence status. This structure is significant because it creates an institutional

basis for high-skilled migrants to reside and work in Korea over the long term, rather

than being used merely as short-term labour resources.

The Top-Tier Visa also offers broader possibilities for labour market access than

conventional employment visas. Existing professional residence statuses are often linked

to specific employment contracts, occupations, and workplaces, which may restrict the

labour market mobility of foreign professionals. By contrast, the F-2-based Top-Tier Visa

allows relatively broad economic activity, thereby expanding the scope of career choice

and occupational mobility for high-skilled migrants. This can be regarded as an

institutional advantage that enables high-skilled migrants to utilize their skills and

expertise more flexibly.

With regard to settlement pathways, the Top-Tier Visa includes elements designed to

support long-term settlement, such as family accompaniment, housing and education

support, and the possibility of obtaining permanent residence after a certain period of

stay (Ministry of Justice, 2025, p. 1). This represents an important shift in that high-

skilled migration is no longer understood only as individual employment mobility, but

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

also as involving family-based living conditions and the possibility of long-term social

incorporation. In the competition to attract high-skilled talent, residence stability, family

accompaniment, children’s education, and the prospect of long-term settlement can all

function as important factors influencing migrants’ decisions.

Nevertheless, this settlement orientation remains limited. Although the Top-Tier Visa

provides high-skilled migrants with more stable residence and the possibility of

settlement, its scope is restricted by strict legal and administrative requirements,

including advanced-field eligibility, world-class educational and professional credentials,

high income, and verification and recommendation by relevant government ministries.

Therefore, while the scheme represents an important step toward introducing settlement-

oriented elements into Korea’s immigration policy, its openness is strongly conditioned

by national strategic needs and administrative selection criteria.

Relationship with Existing Visa Categories

The Top-Tier Visa was introduced not as a replacement for the existing residence status

system for professional workers, but as a supplementary pathway within that system. In

Korea’s regime for high-skilled or professional foreign workers, the most representative

residence statuses are the E-7 visa for designated activities and the D-10 visa for job

seeking. These statuses have allowed foreign professionals to enter the labour market

and engage in employment in Korea, but they have also revealed certain limitations in

terms of residence stability, labour market mobility, and long-term settlement.

The E-7 visa is the representative employment-based residence status that allows foreign

nationals to work in specific professional fields. In particular, the E-7 visa has an industrial

policy character in that occupations are designated by Ministry of Justice notices in

response to sectoral demand in areas such as information technology, biotechnology,

and semiconductors, and these occupational categories may be expanded or adjusted as

needed (Lee, 2025, p. 80). The visa has served as a major channel for attracting high-

skilled workers by allowing qualified foreign nationals to engage in professional activities

at companies or institutions in Korea. However, the E-7 visa is generally premised on a

specific occupation and employment relationship, and the maintenance of residence

status is closely connected to employment status. As a result, the labour market mobility

of foreign professionals may be relatively limited, and their dependence on a particular

employer or job may be high.

Another important limitation is that the E-7 category includes both high-skilled

professionals and skilled functional workers. In practice, the E-7 status is divided into

professional workers (E-7-1), semi-professional workers (E-7-2), general skilled workers

(E-7-3), and skilled functional workers (E-7-4). As of March 2025, skilled functional

workers under the E-7-4 category accounted for 49.7 per cent of all E-7 visa holders

(Lee, 2025, pp. 81–82). In particular, the E-7-4 scheme is designed to allow foreign

nationals already residing in Korea under the E-9, E-10, or H-2 categories to convert to

the E-7-4 status if they satisfy certain skill and employment-duration requirements. This

is meaningful in terms of securing skilled workers for industrial sites, but it differs in

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

character from the attraction of globally competitive high-skilled talent in advanced

industries. Therefore, when the attraction of high-skilled talent and the conversion of

skilled functional workers coexist within the same broad professional worker category,

the clarity of policy objectives may be weakened (Ministry of Justice, 2023; Jin, 2024).

The D-10 visa is a job-seeking residence status that allows foreign students or

professionals to search for employment opportunities in Korea. This status functions as

a supplementary mechanism for expanding the inflow and settlement potential of high-

skilled talent by allowing individuals to stay in Korea for a certain period before securing

employment. However, because the D-10 visa is a residence status for the job-seeking

stage, it cannot itself be regarded as a system that guarantees stable long-term residence

or settlement.

Foreign students are also important as a potential source of high-skilled talent. After

completing their studies at Korean universities under the D-2 residence status, foreign

students may convert to a D-10 job-seeking visa or an E-7 professional employment visa.

In practice, however, the transition process may be constrained by requirements such as

the alignment between academic major and job duties, income thresholds, and

employment contracts. This suggests that Korea’s international student policy has not

yet been organically linked to its high-skilled immigration policy (Park, 2023; Korean

Educational Development Institute, 2023).

Compared with these existing categories, the Top-Tier Visa has a different legal

character. Whereas the E-7 and D-10 visas each focus on a specific stage—employment

or job seeking—the Top-Tier Visa, as a subcategory of the Residence (F-2) status,

considers long-term residence and settlement from the stage of selection. In other words,

the Top-Tier Visa is not merely an employment authorization status. Rather, it is a

scheme designed to expand the possibility of long-term settlement by granting a more

stable residence status to top-tier talent in advanced fields.

At the same time, the Top-Tier Visa should be understood not as a comprehensive

restructuring of the entire residence status system for professional workers, but as an

additional preferential pathway for top-level talent built on the existing system. Korea’s

current regime operates through multiple categories, including E-7, D-8-4, and F-2, but

automatic and sequential linkages to long-term settlement have not yet been sufficiently

institutionalized (Lee, 2025, pp. 85–86). In particular, because the legal basis of the Top-

Tier Visa is found in the F-2 residence status under the Enforcement Decree and is further

specified by a Ministry of Justice notice, it is more appropriately understood as a special

residence pathway combining subordinate legislation and policy-based selection criteria,

rather than as a comprehensive high-skilled immigration system established at the

statutory level.

Legal Assessment: Selective Openness under State-Led Control

Korea’s policy for attracting high-skilled talent represents an important institutional

development in that it provides a selectively open residence pathway for high-skilled

foreign nationals. In particular, the Top-Tier Visa has legal significance because it

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

establishes a separate set of criteria for top-tier talent in advanced fields within the

Residence (F-2) status under Table 1-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration

Act, and specifies the qualification criteria and eligible persons through Ministry of Justice

Notice No. 2025-86.

Nevertheless, Korea’s high-skilled migration regime remains grounded in state-led

selectivity and conditional control. First, its selection structure is strongly oriented toward

industrial policy. The advanced fields covered by the Top-Tier Visa are determined by the

Minister of Justice in consultation with the heads of relevant central administrative

agencies. This shows that the scope of high-skilled talent is defined less by a broad

concept of professional expertise than by national industrial policy needs and

administrative judgment.

Second, residence stability has improved, but it remains conditional. The Top-Tier Visa

expands the possibility of long-term residence and settlement through the F-2 residence

status. However, access to this status is limited to those who satisfy strict criteria

concerning education, professional experience, income, Korean language ability or social

integration, and verification and recommendation by relevant central administrative

agencies. Thus, the Korean system does not guarantee settlement as a general right for

high-skilled migrants; rather, it constructs settlement as a special status granted to

individuals who meet specific conditions.

Third, labour market mobility has been partially expanded, but remains limited at the

level of the broader system. The Top-Tier Visa provides broader opportunities for

economic activity than the existing E-7 status because it is based on the F-2 residence

status. However, Korea’s professional residence status system as a whole remains closely

linked to specific employment relationships, occupations, and industrial sectors.

Accordingly, the expansion of labour market mobility is only partially realized within the

limited pathway of the Top-Tier Visa.

Fourth, pathways to settlement have been introduced, but they remain selective and

limited. The Top-Tier Visa includes institutional elements for long-term settlement by

presenting the possibility of obtaining permanent residence after a certain period of stay.

However, this pathway is primarily available to a limited group of top-tier talent in

advanced fields. It is therefore difficult to conclude that Korea has developed a

generalized settlement-oriented system across its broader high-skilled immigration

policy.

In sum, Korea’s high-skilled migration policy is moving away from the previous model of

low-skilled and temporary foreign labour management toward a system that takes the

attraction and settlement of high-level talent into account. However, its legal structure

is not yet a general settlement-oriented immigration regime. It is better understood as

a special pathway selectively open to top-level talent needed for national strategic

industries. Korea’s high-skilled migration regime therefore expands selective openness,

but remains grounded in state-led selection and conditional control.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

High-Skilled Migration Policy in the European Union

Policy Background

The European Union (EU) has recently faced the dual challenge of demographic change

and labour market imbalance. Labour shortages have continued to emerge across a wide

range of sectors, including tourism, healthcare, and information and communication

technology (ICT), directly affecting economic growth and industrial competitiveness. In

this context, legal migration has increasingly been regarded as an important policy

instrument for addressing labour market needs in the EU, while the attraction of high-

skilled talent has become a key strategy for maintaining technological competitiveness

and innovation capacity (European Commission, 2022, p. 1).

Demographic change is a particularly important background factor behind the

strengthening of the EU’s high-skilled migration policy. The EU faces the long-term

structural problem of a declining working-age population. The share of the working-age

population, which stood at approximately 65 per cent in 2019, is projected to fall to

around 55 per cent by 2070 (European Commission, 2022, p. 1). Since this problem

stems not from cyclical labour shortages but from long-term demographic

transformation, the EU has sought more proactive policy responses, including the

attraction of talent from outside the Union. The OECD has likewise emphasized that

population ageing and shortages of skilled labour have increased the importance of

migration policy, and that high-skilled migration is being used as a major policy

instrument for addressing labour market demand (OECD, 2025, p. 6).

The EU Blue Card system is the EU’s representative legal framework for high-skilled

migration, established to facilitate the entry and residence of high-skilled third-country

nationals. It is not merely an entry permit. Rather, it functions as a residence and work

permit that allows qualified third-country nationals both to reside and to work in an EU

member state (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 2(3); Art. 9(7)). In particular, Directive

(EU) 2021/1883, revised in 2021, sought to make the EU a more attractive destination

for high-skilled talent by introducing more flexible admission criteria, faster procedures,

expanded rights, and strengthened mobility between member states.

In legal terms, the EU Blue Card is based on an EU Directive. A Directive is binding on

member states as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to national authorities the

choice of form and methods of implementation (TFEU, Art. 288(3)). Accordingly, although

the EU Blue Card establishes common legal standards at the EU level, its actual

application depends on implementation through the domestic laws of each member state.

In this respect, the EU Blue Card should be understood not as a fully unified single

immigration regime, but as a multi-level legal framework combining EU-level common

standards with national implementation structures. Directive (EU) 2021/1883 also

recognizes that member states may maintain separate national residence permits for

high-skilled migrants in addition to the EU Blue Card (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art.

3(3)). The EU Blue Card thus has a dual character: it is an EU-level common legal

framework, while at the same time operating through member-state implementation and

coexistence with national schemes.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

Legal Basis and Selection Criteria under Directive (EU) 2021/1883

The selection structure of the EU Blue Card is organized around an employment contract,

a salary threshold, and higher education qualifications or equivalent professional

experience. This shows that the EU does not select high-skilled talent on the basis of

abstract capacity alone, but institutionalizes high-skilled migration in connection with

actual labour market demand.

The first core requirement is an employment contract or a binding job offer. Applicants

must present a contract or binding offer of highly qualified employment for at least six

months, on the basis of which residence status is granted (Directive (EU) 2021/1883,

Art. 5(1)(a)). The EU Blue Card is therefore not a general job-seeking visa or points-

based immigration scheme, but an employment-oriented high-skilled migration system

based on an actual or prospective employment relationship. This structure reflects the

EU’s policy orientation toward managing the admission of high-skilled talent in connection

with labour market demand.

The second requirement is a salary threshold. The EU Blue Card requires applicants to

meet a minimum salary level set by the member state, which must correspond to a

specified multiple of the average annual salary (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 5(3)–

(5)). This salary requirement functions as an institutional mechanism for verifying

whether the employment concerned requires a high level of expertise and skill. In this

sense, the EU Blue Card uses salary level as an indirect indicator of skill level and

potential economic contribution within the labour market.

The third requirement is higher education qualifications or equivalent professional

experience. The Directive allows not only higher education qualifications but also a certain

period of professional experience to be recognized as “higher professional skills”

(Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 2(7)–(9); Art. 5(1)(b)–(c)). In particular, in the ICT

sector, professional experience may be recognized as equivalent to educational

qualifications, thereby increasing flexibility in response to labour market demand and

technological change. This indicates that the EU Blue Card is not limited to an education-

based model, but is designed to reflect both actual labour market demand and

professional competence.

This selection structure differs significantly from Korea’s Top-Tier Visa. Whereas the

Korean system focuses on national strategic industries and the selection of top-level

talent, the EU Blue Card links high-skilled employment and labour market demand

through employment contracts, salary levels, and professional qualifications. The

selection criteria of the EU Blue Card are therefore based less on the administrative

designation of specific industries than on relatively objective legal requirements for high-

skilled employment.

Residence Stability, Labour Market Access, and Settlement Support

A key feature of the EU Blue Card is that it provides high-skilled talent with a certain

degree of legal rights and residence stability beyond mere employment authorization.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

The Directive generally provides for a minimum period of residence of at least 24 months

and grants EU Blue Card holders the right to reside and work legally in the member state

concerned (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 9(2), Art. 9(7)). This is linked to the EU’s

broader policy objective of expanding legal migration pathways and providing high-skilled

migrants with a more predictable residence environment.

Labour market mobility is also a central element of the EU Blue Card. The Directive allows

changes of employer and labour market movement under certain conditions, and

provides for a more relaxed regime of labour mobility after a certain period (Directive

(EU) 2021/1883, Art. 15(1)–(4)). This mechanism is intended to enable the expertise

and skills of high-skilled migrants to be used more flexibly. However, labour market

access under the EU Blue Card is not entirely unrestricted. It remains subject to the

institutional scope of highly qualified employment and to the specific implementation

practices of individual member states.

Family accompaniment is another important feature. The Directive provides for more

flexible family reunification and supports the swift entry and residence of family members

of high-skilled migrants (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 17). The accompaniment and

rights of family members are important conditions for enabling high-skilled migrants to

remain and settle over the long term. This suggests that the EU approaches the attraction

of high-skilled talent not merely as a matter of short-term labour recruitment, but also

from the perspective of long-term social integration.

Social rights and equal treatment are also important components of the EU Blue Card

system. EU Blue Card holders may enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the member

state concerned in various areas, including working conditions, education and training,

and social security (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 16(1)). This shows that the EU Blue

Card is not simply an employment permit, but a rights-based residence status. Its rights

structure indicates that the EU Blue Card recognizes high-skilled migrants as rights-

bearing persons, rather than merely as selectively admitted workers.

However, these rights are not granted universally to all migrants. They are limited to

high-skilled migrants who satisfy the requirements set out in the Directive. Therefore,

although the EU Blue Card strengthens a rights-based approach, the rights it provides

continue to operate within the framework of selective openness.

Intra-EU Mobility and Pathways to Long-Term Settlement

One of the most important features of the EU Blue Card is that it institutionalizes mobility

between member states. The Directive allows EU Blue Card holders to move to another

member state and engage in highly qualified employment under certain conditions

(Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Arts. 20–21). This mechanism enables high-skilled migrants

not to remain fixed within a single member state, but to move and be utilized within the

EU labour market as a whole.

This intra-EU mobility constitutes an important point of contrast with Korea’s

employment-based residence structure. Korea’s residence status system for professional

workers is generally closely tied to specific employment relationships, occupations, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

industrial sectors. By contrast, the EU Blue Card institutionalizes mobility within the EU

under certain conditions. This indicates that the EU understands high-skilled migrants

not merely as labour tied to the market of a single state, but as a resource that can

enhance the competitiveness and flexibility of the EU labour market as a whole.

Pathways to long-term settlement are also a key feature of the EU Blue Card. The

Directive institutionalizes the possibility of converting accumulated periods of legal

residence into long-term resident status and allows periods of residence in different

member states to be taken into account (Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Recital 51; Art. 18).

This is important because it shows that high-skilled migrants are not regarded merely as

short-term workers, but as a population group that may be incorporated into EU society

over the long term.

Family accompaniment and social rights are also closely connected to pathways to long-

term settlement. The possibility of long-term residence for high-skilled migrants is not

determined solely by individual employment conditions. It is also closely related to the

residence stability of family members, children’s education, access to social security, and

the labour market participation of family members. The EU Blue Card may therefore be

understood as a system that institutionalizes the mobility of high-skilled migrants while

also providing, to a certain extent, a social basis for long-term settlement.

Nevertheless, this possibility of long-term settlement is not an unconditional right. Long-

term residence and settlement pathways under the EU Blue Card remain linked to

employment status, salary requirements, residence periods, and member-state

implementation conditions. Actual operation may vary depending on domestic law and

administrative procedures in each member state. Therefore, although the EU Blue Card

strengthens a settlement-oriented approach, its implementation remains multi-layered

and conditional.

Legal Assessment: Rights-Based Selective Openness in a Multi-Level

Legal Order

The EU Blue Card is the EU’s representative legal framework for high-skilled migration.

It provides third-country nationals who meet requirements concerning employment

contracts, salary thresholds, and educational qualifications or professional experience

with residence stability, labour market access, family accompaniment, social rights, and

mobility between member states. In this respect, the EU Blue Card goes beyond a simple

entry permit or employment authorization and may be understood as a rights-based

high-skilled migration regime that grants a relatively comprehensive legal status to

selected high-skilled migrants.

First, the EU Blue Card strengthens a rights-based approach. The Directive provides for

labour market access, equal treatment, social security, and family reunification, thereby

granting high-skilled migrants a relatively stable legal status (Directive (EU) 2021/1883,

Arts. 15–17). This shows that the EU recognizes high-skilled migrants not merely as

temporary labour resources, but as migrants with the potential for long-term residence

and social integration.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

Second, the EU Blue Card institutionalizes the possibility of long-term residence and

settlement. By granting a legal status that combines residence and employment to

migrants selected through employment contracts, salary thresholds, and educational or

professional qualifications, and by providing a pathway to long-term resident status

under certain conditions, the EU designs high-skilled migration not as a short-term

employment permit, but as part of a long-term talent attraction strategy.

Third, the EU Blue Card operates within a multi-level legal order. Since it is based on a

Directive, the EU Blue Card establishes common standards at the EU level, but its actual

operation depends on implementation through the domestic laws of member states

(Directive (EU) 2021/1883, Art. 3(3); Art. 4). Differences may therefore arise in

application procedures, salary thresholds, recognition of qualifications, and

administrative processing. These variations can limit the uniformity and predictability of

the system (de Lange & Vankova, 2022, p. 4).

Fourth, the EU Blue Card coexists with national high-skilled migration schemes. Directive

(EU) 2021/1883 recognizes that member states may maintain separate national

residence permits in addition to the EU Blue Card. This preserves the policy autonomy of

member states, but at the same time limits the extent to which the EU Blue Card can

function as a single and coherent high-skilled migration system across the Union.

Fifth, the openness of the EU Blue Card remains limited to high-skilled migrants who

satisfy specific requirements. Employment contracts, salary thresholds, and professional

qualifications function not only as criteria for selecting high-skilled migrants, but also as

criteria for excluding those who do not meet the required standards (Directive (EU)

2021/1883, Art. 5). Thus, although the EU Blue Card strengthens rights-based status

and mobility, it is not a universally accessible migration regime. It remains a structure of

selective openness limited to a particular category of migrants.

In sum, unlike Korea’s state-led and industrial policy-oriented model, the EU Blue Card

more strongly institutionalizes rights-based status and intra-EU mobility. At the same

time, it faces limitations arising from differences in member-state implementation,

coexistence with national schemes, and its restricted openness to selected high-skilled

migrants. The EU Blue Card should therefore be understood not as a fully unified EU-

level immigration status, but as a conditional and multi-layered high-skilled migration

pathway operating through national implementation structures. It also functions as a

selective legal boundary open only to migrants who satisfy specific requirements.

Comparative Analysis and Conclusion

Comparative Findings

Both Korea and the EU have strengthened their high-skilled migration policies in response

to global talent competition and structural labour shortages. However, the two systems

differ significantly in their criteria for selecting high-skilled migrants, the ways in which

they grant residence status and rights, the extent to which they allow labour market

mobility, and the manner in which they institutionalize pathways to long-term settlement.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

Whereas Korea’s Top-Tier Visa is based on administrative selection centred on national

strategic industries and conditional pathways to settlement, the EU Blue Card emphasizes

standardized legal requirements based on employment contracts, salary thresholds, and

professional qualifications, as well as rights-based mobility. These differences show that

selective openness in high-skilled migration is institutionalized in different ways within

each legal order.

First, with regard to selection criteria, Korea adopts a policy-driven and administrative

selection structure centred on advanced industries and national strategic sectors. The

Top-Tier Visa targets top-level talent in sectors such as semiconductors, biotechnology,

artificial intelligence, and batteries. It requires globally competitive educational and

professional backgrounds, high income levels, and verification and recommendation by

relevant government ministries. By contrast, the EU Blue Card defines high-skilled

migrants primarily through employment contracts, salary thresholds, higher education

qualifications, or equivalent professional experience. This approach differs from Korea’s

administrative designation of specific strategic industries, as it is based on relatively

standardized legal criteria linked to labour market demand.

Second, differences are also evident in residence stability and pathways to settlement.

Korea’s Top-Tier Visa provides a more stable residence status than conventional

employment-based visas because it is based on the Residence (F-2) status. However, its

scope is limited to a narrow group of top-tier talent in advanced fields. The Korean system

therefore introduces settlement-oriented elements, but its character remains limited and

exceptional. By contrast, the EU Blue Card provides a legal status that combines

residence and employment authorization, and it institutionalizes the possibility of

transition to long-term resident status under certain conditions. In addition, by linking

family accompaniment and social rights to residence status, the EU Blue Card offers a

clearer settlement-oriented framework for high-skilled migrants.

Third, labour market mobility is one of the areas in which the differences between the

two systems are most evident. In Korea, the Top-Tier Visa allows broader economic

activity than employment-based visas such as the E-7. Nevertheless, Korea’s overall

residence system for professional foreign workers remains closely tied to specific

employment relationships, occupations, and industrial sectors. As a result, labour market

mobility for high-skilled migrants has improved, but it remains constrained at the level

of the broader institutional system. In contrast, the EU Blue Card permits job changes

and labour market mobility under certain conditions, while also institutionalizing intra-EU

mobility. This indicates that the EU regards high-skilled migrants not merely as labour

tied to a particular member state, but as mobile human resources that can enhance the

flexibility and competitiveness of the EU labour market as a whole.

Fourth, the two systems also differ in their pathways to long-term settlement. Korea’s

Top-Tier Visa introduces settlement-supportive elements, including family

accompaniment, housing and education support, and the possibility of acquiring

permanent residence. However, these pathways are primarily available to a limited group

of top-tier talent in advanced fields. Moreover, the step-by-step linkage between existing

visa categories such as E-7, D-10, D-2, F-2, and permanent residence has not yet been

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

sufficiently institutionalized. By contrast, the EU Blue Card provides a relatively clearer

route to long-term incorporation by linking family reunification, equal treatment, and the

possibility of transition to long-term resident status. Nevertheless, even in the EU, actual

settlement pathways remain multi-layered and conditional because of differences in

national implementation and the coexistence of domestic high-skilled migration schemes.

Table 1. Comparative Findings on High-Skilled Migration Policies in Korea and the EU

Dimension

Korea: Top-Tier Visa

EU: EU Blue Card

Selection

criteria

Strategic industries, education,

professional experience, income

level, and government

recommendation

Employment contract, salary

threshold, higher education

qualification or professional

experience

Residence

stability

F-2-based residence status, but

conditional and exceptional

Directive-based residence and work

permit with clearer legal safeguards

Labour market

mobility

Broader than E-7, but still

constrained by employment and

sectoral structures

Job mobility and intra-EU mobility

allowed under certain conditions

Settlement

pathways

Selective and limited access to

permanent residence

Linked to long-term residence, family

reunification, and equal-treatment

rights

Legal character

State-led, industry-oriented

selective openness

Rights-based selective openness in a

multi-level legal order

Ultimately, Korea and the EU share the common feature of selectively admitting high-

skilled talent, but they differ in the manner in which selection and openness are

organized. Korea has developed an administratively driven selection model centred on

national strategic industries and conditional pathways to settlement, whereas the EU has

developed a multi-level high-skilled migration regime centred on labour market

integration, rights protection, and intra-EU mobility.

Selective Legal Openness and the Reconfiguration of Borders

The high-skilled migration policies of Korea and the EU do not operate by fully opening

or closing borders. Rather, both systems selectively provide opportunities for mobility

and settlement to individuals who satisfy specific criteria. In this respect, both can be

characterized as forms of “selective legal openness.”

However, such selective openness does not simply mean an expansion of openness.

Contemporary borders are being reconfigured beyond physical territorial boundaries into

normative boundaries that operate through legal and institutional criteria such as

education, income, professional experience, employment contracts, and industrial

sectors. In other words, borders no longer function merely as mechanisms for

determining admission. They also operate as institutional structures that differentially

allocate mobility, residence stability, labour market access, and possibilities for long-term

settlement.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

In Korea, this selective legal openness operates mainly through national strategic

industries and administrative verification. High-skilled talent is understood as a strategic

resource that can contribute to the competitiveness of advanced industries, and

expanded residence and settlement opportunities are granted only to those who meet

the criteria defined by the state. In the EU, by contrast, selective legal openness is

institutionalized through a rights-based approach and intra-EU mobility. By combining

family rights, social rights, equal treatment, and mobility between member states, the

EU Blue Card institutionalizes high-skilled migrants as a mobile population group

connected to the EU labour market and society as a whole.

Nevertheless, both systems remain selective in that they are open only to migrants who

satisfy specific requirements. High-skilled migrants are granted expanded mobility,

residence stability, labour market access, and possibilities for long-term settlement, while

migrants who do not meet these criteria remain in more restricted and precarious legal

positions. High-skilled migration policy therefore does not weaken borders. Rather, it

reconfigures borders into more sophisticated and differentiated legal mechanisms.

Conclusion

This study has analysed how high-skilled migration policies are institutionalized through

specific legal structures and policy logics in the context of global talent competition by

comparing Korea’s Top-Tier Visa and the EU Blue Card. The analysis shows that Korea

has developed a selective management model centred on national strategic industries,

whereas the EU has developed a multi-level governance model that emphasizes rights-

based status and intra-EU mobility.

This comparison demonstrates that high-skilled migration policy is not merely an

instrument for securing labour. Rather, it is a legal mechanism that differentially

distributes mobility, residence rights, labour market access, and pathways to settlement.

By analysing high-skilled migration policy through the lens of “selective legal openness,”

this study has shown that borders are not being weakened or dismantled. Instead, they

are being reconfigured as normative boundaries selectively opened to particular

categories of talent.

From a policy perspective, Korea’s task is not simply to expand the attraction of foreign

talent, but to strengthen institutional linkages that allow high-skilled migrants to reside

and settle over the long term under a predictable legal status. To this end, Korea needs

to clarify the sequential linkages between the Top-Tier Visa and existing visa categories

such as E-7, D-10, D-2, F-2, and permanent residence, while more systematically

combining labour market mobility, family accompaniment, and settlement support.

In conclusion, high-skilled migration policy should be understood not as a result of

debordering, but as a process of readjusting the operation of borders through selective

openness. Korea’s future high-skilled migration policy needs to move beyond a short-

term attraction strategy centred on national strategic industries and develop into a stable

settlement-oriented legal framework capable of incorporating high-skilled migrants as

long-term members of society.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

References

de Haas, H. (2011). The determinants of international migration: Conceptualizing policy,

origin and destination effects (IMI Working Papers Series No. 32). International Migration

Institute, University of Oxford.

de Lange, T., & Vankova, Z. (2022). The recast EU Blue Card Directive: Towards a level

playing field to attract highly qualified migrant talent to work in the EU? European Journal

of Migration and Law, 24(4), 433–462.

Directive (EU) 2021/1883 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (2021). On the

conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly

qualified employment, and repealing Council Directive 2009/50/EC. Official Journal of the

European Union, L 382, 1–38.

European Commission. (2022). Attracting skills and talent to the EU. European Union.

European Parliament. (2023). The EU legal migration package: Towards a rights-based

approach to attracting skills and talent to the EU. European Parliament.

Hollifield, J. F. (2004). The emerging migration state. International Migration Review,

38(3), 885–912.

INSEAD & Portulans Institute. (2025). The Global Talent Competitiveness Index 2025:

Talent and resilience: Navigating an era of disruption. INSEAD and Portulans Institute.

Jin, D. R. (2024). Evaluation of policies and programmes for attracting professional and

skilled foreign workers. National Assembly Budget Office.

Korea Educational Development Institute. (2023). Statistics on international students in

higher education institutions in Korea, 2023. Korea Educational Development Institute.

Korea Immigration Service. (2026). Monthly statistics on immigration and foreign policy:

December 2025. Ministry of Justice.

Lee, J. P. (2025). A comparative legal study of visa systems for foreign professionals in

Korea and Japan. Northeast Asian Law Journal, 19(2), 73–100.

Mezzadra, S., & Neilson, B. (2013). Border as method, or, the multiplication of labor.

Duke University Press.

Ministry of Justice. (2023, September 25). Innovative expansion plan for 35,000 skilled

workers: K-point E74 [Press release].

Ministry of Justice. (2025). Notice on the qualification criteria and eligible persons for

top-tier talent in advanced fields among persons falling under Item 24(j), Residence (F-

2), of Table 1-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Act. Ministry of Justice

Notice No. 2025-86, enacted March 31, 2025, effective April 6, 2025.

Ministry of Justice. (2025, April 2). ‘Top-Tier Visa’ program to take full effect today to

attract top foreign talent [Press release].

Ministry of Justice. (2026, March 3). Announcement of the 2030 future strategy for

immigration policy [Press release].

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 41-62

Reconfiguring Borders Through High-Skilled Migration: Korea and Europe

in Comparative Perspective

Joonpyo Lee

OECD. (2025). International Migration Outlook 2025. OECD Publishing.

Park, J. H. (2023). Policy directions and future tasks for supporting the employment and

settlement of international students in Korea: Implications from Japan’s employment

support system for international students (Migration Research and Training Centre Issue

Brief No. 2023-06). Migration Research and Training Centre.

Republic of Korea. Immigration Act.

Republic of Korea. Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Act, Tables 1 and 1-2.

Shachar, A. (2006). The race for talent: Highly skilled migrants and competitive

immigration regimes. New York University Law Review, 81(1), 148–206.

SOLIDAR. (2022). Attracting skills and talent to the EU: European Commission’s proposal

for an EU “legal” migration policy (Briefing).

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

FROM EUROPE’S RIGHTS-BASED AI REGULATION TO KOREA’S INNOVATION-

ORIENTED FRAMEWORK: DIVERGING PHILOSOPHIES IN GLOBAL DIGITAL

AND AI GOVERNANCE

BONGCHUL KIM

bong625@hufs.ac.kr

Bongchul Kim is Professor at the Division of International Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign

Studies (South Korea). He obtained his Bachelor of Laws and Master of Laws from HUFS and

received his Ph.D. in Laws from King’s College London with the Overseas Research Scholarship

awarded by the UK government. He previously served as President of the Korean Society of

Contemporary European Studies (KSCES) and as Director of the HUFS EU Institute. He currently

serves as Director of the HUFS Jean Monnet EU Centre, HUFS Polar Research Centre, and

Director of the Seoul Institute of Global Affairs (SIGA).

Abstract

This article examines the divergent regulatory philosophies shaping global digital and AI

governance by comparing the European Union’s rights-based regulatory model, Italy’s

enforcement-oriented domestic adaptation, and Korea’s innovation-oriented AI framework. It

argues that the EU has emerged as a global regulatory power through its Digital Services Act,

Digital Markets Act, and Artificial Intelligence Act, embedding principles such as human

dignity, transparency, accountability, and fundamental rights protection into the architecture

of digital governance. Conceptually, the article situates the EU’s regulatory influence within

the framework of the Brussels Effect, showing how European digital and AI standards extend

beyond the EU market and shape broader international governance debates. Empirically, it

analyzes the EU AI Act’s risk-based regulatory structure and Italy’s national AI legislation,

which deepens EU regulatory logic through digital humanism, criminal liability, watermarking

obligations, and strong institutional oversight. The article then turns to Korea’s AI Basic Act,

highlighting its more flexible and innovation-oriented approach. Unlike the EU and Italian

models, Korea places greater emphasis on industrial development, data utilization, and

adaptive governance while selectively incorporating risk-based regulatory elements. Rather

than treating these models as mutually exclusive, the article argues that they reveal

complementary pathways in global AI governance. It concludes that future Korea–EU

cooperation should move beyond technical regulation and address the deeper philosophical

challenge of reconciling human-centered accountability with technological innovation.

Keywords

AI governance, EU AI Act, Brussels Effect, Korea AI Basic Act, Digital humanism.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa as filosofias regulatórias divergentes que moldam a governação global no

domínio digital e da IA, comparando o modelo regulatório da União Europeia, baseado nos

direitos, a adaptação nacional da Itália, orientada para a aplicação da lei, e o quadro de IA da

Coreia, orientado para a inovação. Defende que a UE se tornou uma potência regulatória

global através da sua Lei dos Serviços Digitais, da Lei dos Mercados Digitais e da Lei da

Inteligência Artificial, incorporando princípios como a dignidade humana, a transparência, a

responsabilização e a proteção dos direitos fundamentais na arquitetura da governação

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

digital. Conceitualmente, o artigo situa a influência regulatória da UE no âmbito do «Efeito

Bruxelas», mostrando como as normas europeias em matéria de digital e IA se estendem

para além do mercado da UE e moldam debates mais amplos sobre a governação

internacional. Empiricamente, analisa a estrutura regulatória baseada no risco da Lei da IA da

UE e a legislação nacional italiana em matéria de IA, que aprofunda a lógica regulatória da

UE através do humanismo digital, da responsabilidade criminal, das obrigações de marcação

digital e de uma forte supervisão institucional. O artigo volta-se, em seguida, para a Lei Básica

sobre IA da Coreia, destacando a sua abordagem mais flexível e orientada para a inovação.

Ao contrário dos modelos da UE e da Itália, a Coreia dá maior ênfase ao desenvolvimento

industrial, à utilização de dados e à governação adaptativa, ao mesmo tempo que incorpora

seletivamente elementos regulamentares baseados no risco. Em vez de tratar estes modelos

como mutuamente exclusivos, o artigo defende que eles revelam vias complementares na

governação global da IA. Conclui que a futura cooperação entre a Coreia e a UE deve ir além

da regulamentação técnica e abordar o desafio filosófico mais profundo de conciliar a

responsabilização centrada no ser humano com a inovação tecnológica.

Palavras-chave

governação da IA, Lei da UE sobre a IA, Efeito Bruxelas, Lei Básica da Coreia sobre a IA,

humanismo digital.

How to cite this article

Kim, Bongchul (2026). From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented

Framework: Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and

(Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 63-

82. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.4

Article submitted on March 30, 2026 and accepted on May 10, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

FROM EUROPE’S RIGHTS-BASED AI REGULATION TO KOREA’S

INNOVATION-ORIENTED FRAMEWORK: DIVERGING

PHILOSOPHIES IN GLOBAL DIGITAL AND AI GOVERNANCE

BONGCHUL KIM

AI Governance in a Global Context: EU Leadership and Korea’s Emerging

Role

The development of intelligent technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), is

advancing at an unprecedented pace, significantly expanding its influence across

economic, social, and security domains. Governments and corporations worldwide are

actively investing in AI development and deployment to prepare for this emerging era,

while simultaneously anticipating and addressing the social challenges that such

technologies may generate. As a result, AI has become a key arena of both international

competition and cooperation. States are striving to secure technological superiority while

also establishing institutional frameworks to mitigate risks such as privacy violations,

algorithmic bias, and misuse. Consequently, AI has emerged as one of the most critical

factors shaping future economic growth, governance structures, and security

environments.

Major countries are approaching AI not only as an engine of economic innovation but

also as a strategic asset in national security. Regulatory policies are expanding as

governments seek to protect domestic industries and maintain competitiveness,

recognizing that inadequate responses could undermine long-term economic

performance (National Information Society Agency, 2023). In the security domain, AI is

increasingly viewed as a core component of future warfare. The United States has

emphasized its importance in maintaining strategic dominance in a rapidly evolving

technological landscape (Walch, 2021), while China has projected the emergence of AI-

driven warfare in its national defense strategies (Cha, 2021). Europe, through

frameworks such as NATO, is also investing in the security applications of AI. These

developments demonstrate that AI is not confined to a single domain but is instead

reshaping multiple dimensions of global governance and competition.

In this context, the European Union (EU) introduced the Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI

Act) in 2021, the world’s first comprehensive legislative attempt to regulate AI, which

This study is supported by Ministry of Education, the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF-

2022S1A5C2A02091292), and 2026 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies academic research fund.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

was ultimately finalized in 2024. Unlike approaches that focus primarily on technological

development and economic utilization, the EU sought to establish a regulatory framework

ensuring the safe and ethical use of AI in everyday life. This initiative represents a

significant milestone in global AI governance and reinforces the EU’s role as a “normative

power” shaping international standards. As AI becomes increasingly embedded in daily

life, the need for such regulatory frameworks has grown more urgent, given the potential

for unintended social consequences. Therefore, analyzing the EU AI Act and its regulatory

principles provides an essential foundation for understanding the evolving landscape of

AI governance.

At the same time, effective AI governance requires active international cooperation, and

Korea has begun to play an important role in this process. Korea has recently enacted its

own Framework Act on Artificial Intelligence and is promoting national strategies to

support AI innovation and industrial growth. As one of the countries that has followed

the EU in establishing a legal framework for AI, Korea is well positioned to engage in

global discussions and collaborative efforts. In particular, given the similarities in

regulatory orientation between Korea and Europe, there is strong potential for deeper

cooperation.

This article begins with an introduction to the EU’s digital regulatory framework, focusing

on the enactment and key features of the AI Act, and then examines Korea’s legislative

response to AI governance. Ultimately, it argues that sustained legal and policy

cooperation between Korea and Europe in the field of digital and AI regulation is both

necessary and desirable for addressing shared challenges and promoting responsible

technological development. Such cooperation will contribute to the harmonization of

international standards and enhance mutual capacity to respond effectively to the rapidly

evolving risks and opportunities associated with AI.

EU Regulatory Power in the Digital and AI Economy: The Brussels Effect

and Global Implications

The Digital Economy, EU Regulatory Power, and the Brussels Effect

The digital economy now constitutes a significant portion of the global economy, and its

influence is expected to expand further in the coming years. In particular, as economic

and social activities shifted online during the global spread of COVID-19, e-commerce

and digital markets experienced rapid growth. As a result, the digital economy has

become an essential part of everyday life and a fundamental domain of modern markets.

In response, societies are transitioning toward digital-based systems, necessitating

corresponding transformations in national policies and institutional frameworks

(European Central Bank, 2020). Accordingly, major countries are striving not only to

address challenges arising from digitalization but also to secure a competitive advantage

in the global economy.

As of 2020, the size of the digital market had reached a level comparable to the gross

domestic product of G7 countries. Core elements of the digital environment—such as

data utilization, hyper-connectivity, and efficient software supply—have become essential

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

inputs across industries, similar to labor or electricity (World Economic Forum, 2020). At

the same time, advanced technologies such as AI and big data are increasingly integrated

into economic activities. Governments are therefore expanding policy frameworks to

incorporate digital trade and establish relevant norms (Park, J. H., 2024).

In this context, the European Union (EU) has played a leading role in shaping the digital

economy through regulatory and policy initiatives. The EU has promoted digital

transformation across industries while embedding these developments within a broader

normative framework aimed at protecting core values such as data protection and fair

competition (Choi, S. K., 2022). The urgency of these efforts increased significantly

following COVID-19, which accelerated both digital adoption and policy implementation

(Lee & Kim, 2022).

The EU’s digital strategy builds on its long-standing efforts toward economic integration.

Beginning with the Europe 2020 strategy and the Digital Agenda for Europe, the European

Commission introduced the Digital Single Market Strategy in 2015 to eliminate barriers

to digital economic activity and establish a unified regulatory environment (European

Commission, 2015). The Digital Single Market aims to ensure the free movement of

goods, services, capital, and people, while enabling individuals and businesses to operate

online under conditions of fair competition and strong data protection. Within this

framework, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been a key instrument

in strengthening data governance (Noh, 2023).

The EU has continued to advance its digital strategy in recent years. In July 2024,

following the reappointment of Ursula von der Leyen, the EU introduced its Political

Guidelines 2024–2029, emphasizing the deepening of the Digital Single Market and the

promotion of AI-driven growth (European Commission, 2024a; Jang et al., 2024). In this

evolving landscape, cooperation between Korea and Europe is becoming increasingly

important. Given their shared emphasis on innovation, data protection, and fair

competition, closer collaboration can contribute to the harmonization of regulatory

standards, reduce fragmentation, and enhance mutual competitiveness in the global

digital economy.

A key concept for understanding the global influence of EU regulation is the Brussels

Effect, first introduced by Anu Bradford. This concept refers to the phenomenon whereby

EU regulatory standards extend beyond its borders and become de facto global norms

(Bradford, 2020). The EU’s ability to shape international regulatory environments stems

not from coercion, but from its capacity to set rules that others adopt voluntarily

(Bradford, 2012). This influence spans multiple domains, including data privacy,

consumer protection, competition policy, and digital governance.

At its core, the Brussels Effect is driven by the size and attractiveness of the EU’s internal

market. As one of the world’s largest consumer markets, the EU incentivizes multinational

corporations to comply with its regulations in order to maintain market access. Once

these standards are adopted, firms often apply them globally to ensure efficiency and

legal consistency. This process differs from traditional regulatory diffusion in that it is

based on market incentives rather than formal international agreements, making

voluntary compliance a defining feature.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

The Brussels Effect is closely linked to the concept of normative power, which refers to

the ability to shape global norms by defining what is considered legitimate or appropriate

(Manners, 2002). In this regard, the EU functions as a normative power by exporting its

regulatory frameworks. Bradford further distinguishes between the “de facto” Brussels

Effect, where firms voluntarily adopt EU standards, and the “de jure” Brussels Effect,

where such standards are formally incorporated into domestic legal systems (Bradford,

2021).

Recent developments suggest that the Brussels Effect is increasingly evolving into a de

jure phenomenon, as countries adopt EU-style regulations into their own legal

frameworks (Oh, C. R., 2023). A representative example is the General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR), which has established itself as a global benchmark since its

implementation in 2018. By introducing strengthened individual rights and obligations

for data processors—such as the right to erasure and data portability—and applying

extraterritorially to organizations handling EU citizens’ data, the GDPR has significantly

expanded the global reach of EU digital norms. As a result, countries including Japan and

Korea, as well as multinational corporations, have increasingly aligned their regulatory

frameworks with EU standards.

EU Digital Market Regulation: DSA and DMA

The regulation of online platforms has emerged as a central issue in the global digital

economy. The growing dominance of large technology companies has raised concerns

about market concentration, unfair competition, and barriers to entry for smaller firms.

While these platforms generate efficiency gains and consumer benefits, their “winner-

takes-all” dynamics may limit innovation and reduce long-term market dynamism (Choi,

N. S. H., 2022). In addition, issues such as data privacy, algorithmic transparency, and

the spread of illegal or harmful content have intensified calls for regulatory intervention.

As a result, governments around the world are actively debating the scope and form of

digital market regulation. Within the EU, member states are required to implement

common regulatory frameworks; however, differences in administrative capacity and

institutional readiness have led to uneven enforcement across countries.

The EU has taken a leading role in addressing these challenges through proactive

regulatory strategies. A key milestone was the 2017 Google Shopping case, in which the

European Commission imposed a €2.42 billion fine on Google for abusing its dominant

position by favoring its own services. This case demonstrated the limitations of traditional

competition law in dealing with digital platforms and highlighted the need for more

targeted regulatory frameworks. In response, the EU has progressively strengthened its

regulatory approach to address structural issues in digital markets (Kang, 2019). At the

same time, member states have been required to adapt their domestic enforcement

systems, although the level of implementation and effectiveness has not been uniform

across the EU.

Building on this experience, the EU introduced a comprehensive legislative framework in

December 2020 through the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

(DMA). These laws, collectively known as the Digital Services Act Package, aim to address

systemic problems in the platform economy, including lack of transparency, data

protection concerns, and unfair business practices (European Commission, 2016). They

also reflect the EU’s broader objective of securing digital sovereignty and reducing

dependence on non-European technology firms (Echikson, 2024; Shin & Kim, 2023).

Although these regulations are directly applicable across the EU, variations in national

enforcement—particularly among Eastern European countries—continue to influence

their practical implementation.

The Digital Services Act focuses on creating a safer and more transparent online

environment. It establishes clear obligations for online platforms regarding the removal

of illegal content, the protection of users, and the transparency of algorithms and

advertising systems. Platforms are required to implement effective content moderation

mechanisms and to provide users with information about how decisions are made. In

particular, very large online platforms are subject to enhanced responsibilities due to

their systemic impact on society. These measures are expected to improve trust,

accountability, and predictability in digital ecosystems (Lee, K. I., 2024).

The Digital Markets Act, in contrast, targets structural competition issues by regulating

“gatekeeper” platforms—firms that control key access points to digital markets and

possess significant market power. The DMA imposes ex ante obligations on these firms,

including requirements to ensure interoperability, enable data portability, and refrain

from self-preferencing practices. This proactive regulatory approach represents a

departure from traditional ex post competition enforcement and allows regulators to

prevent anti-competitive behavior before it occurs (Yang, J. W., 2024).

Taken together, the DSA and DMA establish a comprehensive regulatory framework that

addresses both content governance and market structure in the digital economy. They

aim to protect consumers, ensure fair competition, and foster innovation while reinforcing

the EU’s role as a global regulatory leader. As these laws apply to all firms operating in

the European market, including multinational corporations, their impact is likely to extend

beyond Europe through mechanisms similar to the Brussels Effect. At the same time,

internal variations among member states continue to affect the consistency and

effectiveness of enforcement. Consequently, the EU’s digital regulations are expected to

play a central role in shaping the future global governance of digital markets (Choi, Y.

S., 2022).

The EU AI Act: Background, Structure, and Global Implications

In 2021, the European Commission introduced a legislative proposal to regulate artificial

intelligence (AI) (European Commission, 2024a). As AI technologies became increasingly

commercialized, concerns emerged regarding potential violations of personal data and

fundamental rights. The proposal aimed to mitigate these risks while enhancing the

trustworthiness of AI systems. At the same time, the EU sought to balance regulation

with innovation by introducing complementary measures to support the development and

deployment of AI technologies.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Following negotiations among the European Parliament, the European Commission, and

the Council of the European Union, the Artificial Intelligence Act was formally adopted in

2024 (European Council · Council of the European Union, 2024). As the first

comprehensive legal framework for AI governance, the Act has attracted global attention.

While it is widely recognized as a milestone in AI regulation, some critics argue that

stringent regulatory measures could potentially hinder technological innovation (Martens,

2024).

A defining feature of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act is its adoption as a “regulation”

within the EU legal system. As such, it is directly applicable in all member states without

requiring national implementing legislation and allows limited discretion in interpretation.

This ensures uniformity and strong legal binding force across the EU. The Act thus

represents a shift from earlier international approaches—largely based on non-binding

guidelines—toward enforceable legal standards (Hong, 2022).

The Act establishes a comprehensive and structured regulatory framework, consisting of

13 chapters, 113 articles, and 13 annexes. Its primary objective is to protect fundamental

rights—including health, safety, democracy, the rule of law, and environmental

protection—from risks associated with AI systems (Article 1). It applies broadly to AI

systems operating within the EU market, covering both providers and deployers, while

excluding military and national security applications (Article 2). Importantly, its scope

extends beyond the EU, requiring non-EU companies to comply if they wish to access the

European market (European Commission, 2024b).

In terms of regulatory content, the Act introduces differentiated obligations depending

on the type and risk level of AI systems. It includes transparency requirements (Chapter

4), specific provisions for general-purpose AI models such as risk management and

sandboxes designed to support startups and small and medium-sized enterprises

(Chapter 6). In addition, the Act reinforces data protection standards in alignment with

existing EU frameworks, ensuring consistency with broader privacy regulations (Park &

Kim, 2024).

Through the AI Act, the EU aims to extend its regulatory influence globally, similar to its

role in shaping international data protection standards through the GDPR (European

Council · Council of the European Union, 2024). Although formally limited to the EU, the

Act’s extraterritorial effects encourage foreign companies and governments to align with

its standards. In this regard, the EU is actively shaping global AI governance through

regulatory leadership, often described as a form of “normative diplomacy” (Yoon & Cho,

2024).

Despite its significance, the Act also faces several challenges. The rapid evolution of AI

technologies makes it difficult to anticipate and regulate emerging risks effectively.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the potential for overregulation to constrain

innovation and reduce economic competitiveness (Martens, 2024). Additionally,

information asymmetries between regulators and large technology firms may limit

enforcement effectiveness.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Nevertheless, the increasing integration of AI into economic and social systems

underscores the necessity of regulatory frameworks. The EU AI Act represents a

comprehensive attempt to balance innovation with the protection of fundamental rights,

offering an important model for future AI governance at both regional and global levels

(Shim, 2024). In this context, countries such as Korea are increasingly required to

respond proactively to evolving EU regulatory standards and align their domestic

frameworks accordingly. Such efforts will be essential not only for maintaining access to

the European market but also for enhancing international cooperation and contributing

to the development of globally harmonized AI governance.

The EU AI Act and the Global Evolution of AI Governance: Risk-Based

Regulation and Korea’s Legislative Response

Italy’s AI Regulation and the Domestic Implementation of EU Digital

Governance

Italy has recently attracted significant attention for being one of the first European Union

member states to incorporate the EU’s artificial intelligence (AI) regulatory framework

into domestic law (Linklaters, 2025; European Parliament & Council of the European

Union, 2024). This development reflects a broader and ongoing process in which EU

digital and AI governance norms are increasingly being translated into national legislation

across member states (White & Case LLP, 2026). In this context, Italy’s case is

particularly notable, as it demonstrates an early and proactive alignment with the EU’s

evolving regulatory agenda, especially in the field of AI governance (JuLIA Project, 2025;

Linklaters, 2025).

Against this backdrop, Italy has advanced one of the most stringent national frameworks

for artificial intelligence regulation, positioning itself ahead of the EU Artificial Intelligence

Act in terms of detailed legal enforcement (White & Case LLP, 2026; The National Law

Review, 2026). The legislation, formally titled Disposizioni e delega al Governo in materia

di intelligenza artificiale, reflects a regulatory philosophy grounded in “digital humanism,”

which prioritizes human dignity, rights, and safety over technological development. The

law establishes a comprehensive national approach to governing AI, emphasizing that

technological innovation must remain within clear ethical and legal boundaries

(Linklaters, 2025).

One of the most distinctive features of the Italian AI law is the introduction of criminal

liability for the misuse of AI systems (White & Case LLP, 2026; The Guardian, 2025).

Individuals who use AI algorithms to endanger the physical or psychological safety of

others, or to interfere with democratic processes such as elections, may face

imprisonment ranging from one to five years (White & Case LLP, 2026; Linklaters, 2025).

In addition, the law imposes strict obligations on generative AI outputs, requiring that

synthetic content such as deepfakes be clearly labeled with visible watermarks. Non-

compliance can result in administrative fines of up to 7 percent of a company’s annual

revenue, reflecting a strong deterrent approach to AI-related harm (Linklaters, 2025;

White & Case LLP, 2026).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

The legislation also places significant emphasis on transparency, human oversight, and

the protection of minors. AI systems used in sensitive sectors such as employment,

healthcare, education, justice, and sports must operate under strict transparency

requirements and human supervision (CMS, n.d.). In particular, access to AI services by

children under the age of 14 requires parental consent, strengthening safeguards for

vulnerable users (The Guardian, 2025). These provisions reflect the broader objective of

ensuring that AI systems remain accountable and aligned with societal values.

In the area of intellectual property and data use, the law introduces a nuanced regulatory

approach (Cocuzza, 2025; Hogan Lovells, 2025). AI-generated works may be eligible for

2025). At the same time, the use of text and data mining is permitted only under specific

conditions, such as non-copyrighted materials or authorized scientific research. This

framework seeks to balance innovation in AI development with the protection of existing

intellectual property rights (Hogan Lovells, 2025).

Alongside regulatory measures, Italy has also introduced policies to support AI innovation

and industrial growth (Jones Day, 2025). The government has authorized the creation of

a state-backed venture capital fund of up to €1 billion to support companies operating in

AI, cybersecurity, and telecommunications. Regulatory responsibilities have been

assigned to the Digital Italy Agency (AgID) and the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN),

ensuring institutional coordination between innovation promotion and security oversight

(Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale, n.d.). This dual structure reflects Italy’s attempt to integrate

regulation and industrial policy within a single governance framework.

Overall, Italy’s AI law represents a hybrid regulatory model that combines strict legal

enforcement, ethical principles centered on human rights, and active state support for

technological development (Linklaters, 2025; White & Case LLP, 2026). The government

under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has described the law as an effort to “bring

innovation back within the boundaries of public interest,” ensuring that AI development

contributes to economic growth while safeguarding citizens’ rights (The National Law

Review, 2026). As one of the first comprehensive national AI regimes in Europe to align

closely with the EU’s regulatory direction ahead of full implementation of the AI Act,

Italy’s approach is likely to influence broader European and global discussions on AI

governance.

The EU Risk-Based AI Regulation and Italy’s National Enforcement Model

A central pillar of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act is its “risk-based approach,” which

serves as the core regulatory principle of the framework. Under this system, AI

technologies are classified into four categories according to their potential level of risk:

Unacceptable risk, High risk, Limited risk, and Minimal risk. This classification forms the

structural foundation of the Act, enabling differentiated regulation in which legal

obligations are proportionate to the level of risk posed by each AI system. In this sense,

the EU establishes an ex ante regulatory model that anticipates risks in advance and

assigns appropriate legal responsibilities accordingly (Y, C. S., 2024).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Based on this framework, the Act imposes differentiated obligations on providers and

deployers of AI systems. High-risk systems are subject to the most stringent and

comprehensive regulatory requirements, reflecting their potential impact on safety and

fundamental rights. Limited-risk systems, by contrast, are primarily associated with

transparency obligations. These include requirements to inform users when they are

interacting with AI-generated content, thereby addressing potential informational

asymmetries and enhancing user trust. Minimal-risk systems, such as spam filters and

other widely used applications, are generally permitted with minimal regulatory

intervention, subject only to voluntary best-practice measures aimed at ensuring safety

and reliability.

At the most restrictive end of the spectrum, Chapter 2 prohibits AI systems classified as

posing unacceptable risks. These systems are deemed incompatible with EU values as

they may undermine human dignity, violate fundamental rights, or manipulate human

behavior, and are therefore prohibited in principle under Article 5, with only narrow

exceptions such as law enforcement or counter-terrorism contexts (Jeon, 2024). Chapter

3 (Articles 6–49) regulates high-risk AI systems in detail, allowing their use only under

strict compliance conditions. Providers must meet extensive requirements regarding data

governance, documentation, transparency, human oversight, and risk management,

ensuring a high level of accountability prior to market deployment.

Annexes 1 and 3 further specify the criteria for identifying high-risk systems. In general,

AI systems subject to existing EU product safety legislation are classified as high risk,

requiring conformity assessments, often conducted by third parties, to ensure compliance

with regulatory standards (Lee, S. Y., 2023; Mökander, J., et al., 2022). In addition,

systems used in sensitive areas such as biometric identification, critical infrastructure,

public services, and law enforcement are also included in the high-risk category and are

subject to rigorous pre-market controls.

In contrast to the EU framework, Italy has recently adopted a more enforcement-

intensive and human-centered approach through its national AI legislation. While the EU

AI Act primarily establishes a harmonized regulatory architecture based on risk

classification and compliance obligations, the Italian AI law complements this structure

by introducing stronger deterrent mechanisms at the domestic level. Notably, it

incorporates criminal liability provisions for the misuse of AI systems, including penalties

for the malicious use of AI that endangers individuals or interferes with democratic

processes. It also mandates explicit watermarking of synthetic content such as deepfakes

and imposes significant administrative fines for non-compliance. Furthermore, Italy

places stronger emphasis on direct state supervision, including parental consent

requirements for minors and centralized oversight by national agencies such as the

Digital Italy Agency (AgID) and the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN). In this respect,

while the EU framework is primarily preventive and harmonized in nature, the Italian

approach is more punitive and enforcement-oriented, reflecting a stricter interpretation

of “digital humanism.”

Overall, the EU risk-based approach represents a systematic and preventive model of AI

governance aimed at embedding European values—such as human dignity, safety, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

fundamental rights—into technological regulation (Mökander, J., et al., 2022). By

contrast, Italy’s approach demonstrates how member states may supplement EU-level

harmonization with stricter national enforcement mechanisms. Together, these

developments illustrate a multi-layered governance structure in which EU-wide

regulatory principles are complemented by domestic legal experimentation. As a result,

the EU’s regulatory framework is increasingly positioned as a global reference point for

trustworthy AI governance, with implications extending beyond Europe into broader

international regulatory discussions.

Diverging Paths in Global AI Governance: The EU, Italy, and Korea

As the use of AI continues to expand, various adverse effects have become increasingly

apparent. Issues such as the misuse and abuse of AI in everyday life, the distortion of

facts generated by AI systems, violations of privacy, and the emergence of discriminatory

algorithms due to biased data have all been widely discussed (Rességuier, A., &

Rodrigues, R, 2020). These challenges highlight that AI is not only a driver of innovation

but also a source of significant social risks that require careful governance.

In response, there is now a broad international consensus on the need to regulate AI

technologies through structured governance frameworks. A key regulatory principle is

the identification and categorization of risks, followed by differentiated regulatory

measures that impose stricter obligations on higher-risk systems (Kim, B. Y., 2023).

However, AI governance models vary significantly across jurisdictions, reflecting

differences in institutional traditions, economic priorities, and technological capabilities.

The United States represents a leading innovation-driven model, emphasizing

technological leadership and flexible governance through executive orders and sectoral

regulation rather than a unified legal framework (National Information Society Agency,

2024). In contrast, China adopts a more centralized and state-led approach, combining

industrial promotion with strict regulatory control through laws such as the Cybersecurity

Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law (Lee, S. W., 2022).

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has developed a comprehensive rights-based

regulatory model centered on the Artificial Intelligence Act, which is grounded in a risk-

based classification system and strongly oriented toward the protection of fundamental

rights and the prevention of social harm.

Within this global regulatory landscape, Italy and Korea represent two distinct forms of

domestic adaptation to EU-style governance. Italy, as an EU member state, has gone

beyond the EU Artificial Intelligence Act by introducing a more enforcement-oriented

national framework grounded in “digital humanism.” Its legislation incorporates criminal

liability for the misuse of AI, mandatory watermarking of synthetic content, and strict

administrative penalties, alongside strong institutional oversight through national

agencies. In this sense, Italy exemplifies a “deepening” of EU regulatory logic at the

domestic level, particularly through stronger deterrence mechanisms and direct legal

enforceability.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Korea, by contrast, reflects a different pattern of regulatory reception and adaptation. In

December 2020, the Ministry of Science and ICT and the Korea Information Society

Development Institute introduced the AI Ethics Guidelines, based on OECD principles and

emphasizing “AI for Humanity” (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2020). Building on these

soft-law foundations, Korea progressively developed legislative proposals that culminated

in the enactment of the Framework Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and

the Establishment of a Foundation for Trust (AI Basic Act), adopted on January 21, 2025

and scheduled to take effect in January 2026. The Act combines industrial promotion with

risk management, including state-led AI development planning, R&D support, and the

classification of “high-impact AI” subject to additional obligations (Article 2; Article 31;

Article 32).

Unlike the EU model, which prioritizes fundamental rights protection through a stringent

risk-based regulatory architecture, Korea places relatively greater emphasis on industrial

development and innovation support. While it adopts a similar risk-based classification

approach influenced by the EU framework (Kim, K. S., 2023), its regulatory intensity is

comparatively more flexible, reflecting national policy priorities aimed at strengthening

AI competitiveness.

When compared with the EU and Italian models, Korea occupies an intermediate position

in global AI governance. The EU represents a highly structured and rights-oriented

regulatory regime, Italy demonstrates an enforcement-enhanced domestic

implementation of that regime, and Korea reflects a hybrid model that integrates

regulatory principles with strong industrial policy objectives. This comparison highlights

how global AI governance is evolving into a multi-layered system in which shared

regulatory concepts—such as risk-based classification—are adapted differently

depending on national and regional contexts.

Looking forward, the convergence and divergence among these models will continue to

shape the trajectory of global AI governance. As AI becomes further embedded in social

and economic systems, balancing innovation with accountability will remain a central

policy challenge. In this regard, the EU’s emphasis on trustworthy AI, Italy’s strong

enforcement-oriented adaptation, and Korea’s innovation-driven regulatory framework

together illustrate the diverse pathways through which states seek to govern emerging

technologies in an increasingly interconnected digital order.

Conclusion: Diverging and Bridging Regulatory Philosophies in Global AI

Governance

The rapid expansion of the digital economy and the deepening integration of AI into social

and economic systems have fundamentally reshaped global regulatory priorities. As this

study has shown, the European Union has emerged as a leading actor in digital and AI

governance through comprehensive legal instruments such as the Digital Services Act

(DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and the Artificial Intelligence Act. These

frameworks go beyond traditional market regulation by embedding core normative

principles—such as human dignity, transparency, accountability, and the protection of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

fundamental rights—into the architecture of digital governance. In this respect, the EU

functions not only as a regulatory power but also as a global standard-setter whose

influence extends well beyond its borders through mechanisms such as the “Brussels

Effect.”

At the same time, the EU experience demonstrates that formal regulatory harmonization

does not automatically translate into uniform implementation. Despite the legal unity of

EU regulations, differences in administrative capacity, institutional readiness, and policy

execution continue to shape how digital and AI rules are applied in practice. This gap

between formal convergence and practical divergence highlights the importance of

governance capacity as a key determinant of regulatory effectiveness, even within highly

integrated legal systems.

Against this background, Korea’s evolving AI governance framework, particularly the AI

Basic Act, reflects a distinct regulatory philosophy. The Act imposes mandatory

obligations only on high-risk AI systems such as those used in healthcare and biometric

identification, while leaving most other domains to voluntary self-regulation by firms. Its

enforcement structure relies primarily on corrective orders and administrative fines

rather than criminal sanctions. This design reflects a deliberate policy choice to avoid

excessive regulatory burden and to preserve room for innovation, responding to concerns

that strict regulation could hinder industrial growth. In this sense, AI in Korea is not

primarily framed as a risk to be contained, but as a strategic engine for overcoming

structural challenges such as low growth and demographic decline.

Within this context, a deeper philosophical divergence emerges between Korea and Italy

(representing the broader EU regulatory orientation). Italy’s recent AI legislation reflects

a strong “digital humanism” approach that prioritizes digital citizenship, copyright

protection, and strict accountability for AI misuse. It imposes criminal liability for harmful

AI applications and emphasizes the protection of creators’ rights, particularly against

unauthorized use of training data. Korea, by contrast, emphasizes data utilization,

algorithmic innovation, and flexible access to information, including more permissive

approaches to AI training data under the principle of fair use. This contrast reflects not

only different regulatory techniques but also fundamentally different normative

assumptions: Italy tends to frame AI as a domain requiring ethical containment to

preserve human dignity, while Korea approaches AI as a developmental tool to maximize

socio-economic transformation.

This divergence can be understood as a “philosophical time lag” between two regulatory

worlds. Italy’s approach asks whether technology can remain subordinate to human

rights and creative ownership, whereas Korea’s approach asks how technology can be

mobilized to solve urgent structural problems. One emphasizes precaution and moral

boundaries; the other emphasizes adaptability and innovation. Yet both systems also

face internal tensions: overly strict regulation risks slowing innovation in Europe, while

overly flexible governance raises concerns about ethical blind spots and social harm in

Korea.

In this regard, the two models should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but rather as

complementary reference points for constructing a more balanced global AI governance

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

framework. Italy’s rights-centered approach offers an important reminder that

technological progress must remain anchored in human dignity and cultural values.

Korea’s innovation-oriented approach highlights the necessity of maintaining flexibility in

rapidly evolving technological environments. The challenge, therefore, lies in bridging

these two logics—combining ethical constraint with adaptive innovation.

Ultimately, strengthening cooperation between Korea and the European Union will be

essential not only in technological development but also in regulatory philosophy. As AI

becomes increasingly embedded in everyday life, the future of governance will depend

on the ability to reconcile innovation with accountability. A more integrated dialogue

between the EU’s rights-based regulatory tradition and Korea’s innovation-driven

governance model can contribute to the emergence of a more balanced global

framework—one that ensures technological progress does not come at the expense of

human dignity, and that human-centered values do not inhibit technological

transformation.

References

Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale. (n.d.). Artificial intelligence.

https://www.agid.gov.it/en/intervention-areas/artificial-intelligence

Bradford, A. (2012). The Brussels effect. Northwestern University Law Review, 107(1),

1–68.

Bradford, A. (2020). The Brussels effect: How the European Union rules the world. Oxford

University Press.

Bradford, A. (2021). The European Union in a globalised world: The Brussels effect.

Revue européenne du droit, 2. https://geopolitique.eu/en/articles/the-european-union-

in-a-globalised-world-the-brussels-effect/

Cha, J. M. (2021). Future warfare and military-technology solidarity: The militarization

of artificial intelligence and civil-military fusion (International Strategy Foresight No. 5).

National Assembly Futures Institute.

https://www.nafi.re.kr/new/report.do?articleNo=2855&mode=view

Choi, N. S. H. (2022). The implications of the EU Digital Markets Act and the role of

competition law. Advanced Commercial Law Review, 100, 67–93.

Choi, S. K. (2022). Implications of EU Directive 2019/770 and the revisions of the

German Civil Code. Foreign Law Review, 46(1), 1–27.

https://doi.org/10.17257/hufslr.2022.46.1.1

Choi, Y. S. (2022). The Digital Constitutionalism of the EU: The Digital Services Act and

its implications for Korea. Journal of EU Studies, 64, 415–448.

https://doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2022..64.415

CMS. (2026, February 17). AI laws and regulations in Italy.

https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/ai-regulation-scanner/italy

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3 
Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in 
Contemporary Europe and Asia  
September 2026, pp. 63-82   
From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework: 
Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance 
                                                                                                                 Bongchul Kim 
 
 
 
78 
Cocuzza. (2025, October 29). Italy’s new AI law: What foreign businesses should know. 
https://www.cocuzza.it/en/2025/10/29/italys-new-ai-law-what-foreign-businesses-
should-know/  
Echikson,  B.  (2024).  Demystifying  Europe’s  Digital  Markets  Act.  Center  for  European 
Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/demystifying-europes-digital-markets-act/  
European  Central  Bank.  (2020,  April  28).  Beyond  monetary  policy:  Protecting  the 
continuity  and  safety  of  payments  during  the  coronavirus  crisis. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2020/html/ecb.blog200428~328d7ca065.
en.html  
European Commission. (2015). A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe (COM(2015) 
192 final). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52015DC0192  
European  Commission.  (2016).  Synopsis  report  on  the  public  consultation  on  the 
regulatory  environment  for  platforms,  online  intermediaries  and  the  collaborative 
economy. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/  
European  Commission.  (2021).  The  Digital  Services  Act  package.  https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package  
European  Commission.  (2023).  Legal  framework  of  EU  data  protection. 
https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/legal-framework-eu-data-
protection_en  
European  Commission.  (2024a).  AI  Act.  https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai  
European  Commission.  (2024b).  Europe’s  choice:  Political  guidelines  for  the  next 
European  Commission  2024–2029. 
https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-
f63ffb2cf648_en  
European  Council  &  Council  of  the  European  Union.  (2024).  Artificial  intelligence  act. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/artificial-intelligence/  
European  Parliament  &  Council  of  the  European  Union.  (2024).  Regulation  (EU) 
2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down 
harmonised  rules  on  artificial  intelligence  and  amending  regulations  and  directives 
(Artificial  Intelligence  Act).  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union. 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj  
The  Guardian  (2025,  September  18).  Italy  first  in  EU  to  pass  comprehensive  law 
regulating use of AI. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/18/italy-first-in-eu-
to-pass-comprehensive-law-regulating-ai  
National  Information  Society  Agency  (2024).  Current  status  and  implications  of  AI 
regulatory governance in major countries (Intelligent Information Society Legal System 
Issue  Report  2024-01). 
https://www.nia.or.kr/site/nia_kor/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=82618&bcIdx=27063&paren
tSeq=27063  

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Hogan Lovells. (2025, October 21). Italy’s AI law: The good, the bad…and the actual

substance. https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/italys-ai-law-the-good-the-

badand-the-actual-substance

Hong, S. H. (2022). Main contents and implications of the European Union’s Proposal for

an Artificial Intelligence Act. European Constitutional Law Review, 38, 243–282.

https://doi.org/10.21592/eucj.2022.38.243

Jang, Y. W., Oh, T. H., Lim, Y. J., & Kim, C. R. (2024). Main contents and implications of

the 2024–2029 European Commission policy agenda (KIEP World Economy Focus No. 24-

31). Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?act=view&bid=0004&list_no=11467&mid=a1010203

0000

Jeon, W. J. (2024). Risk classification system of the EU AI Act and its implications for

South Korea’s AI policy. Journal of Korea Information Law, 28(2), 169–215.

Jones Day. (2025, October). Italy leads the way in shaping national AI legislation within

the EU. https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2025/10/italy-leads-the-way-in-

shaping-national-ai-legislation-within-the-eu

JuLIA Project. (2025, September 23). Italy, Law No. 132/2025 on artificial intelligence.

https://www.julia-project.eu/database/legislation/267

Kang, J. W. (2019). Issues in the European Commission’s Google AdSense case: Focusing

on comparison with the Google Shopping case. Journal of Competition, 200, 90–99.

https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE11174940

Kim, B. Y. (2023). Trends and implications of regulatory legislation in major countries as

a means of controlling artificial intelligence. European Constitutional Law Review, 42,

253–307.

Kim, K. S. (2023). On the legislation of AI Act: Comparing EU and US bills for algorithm

and AI regulation. Administrative Law Journal, 70, 173–201.

Kim, H. K. (2022). Ethics-oriented and risk assessment-based criminal policy for high-

risk artificial intelligence. Korean Journal Of Criminology, 34(1), 7–40.

Kim, J. G., Na, S. K., Jang, J. M., & Lee, S. H. (2015). Major contents and implications of

the EU Digital Single Market Strategy (Today’s World Economy No. 15-16). Korea

Institute for International Economic Policy.

https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?act=view&bid=0003&list_no=3281&mid=a10102010

000

Kim, S. M., & An, B. W. (2023). Current status and characteristics of international

cooperation on artificial intelligence (AI) (IT & Future Strategy 2023-10). National

Information Society Agency.

https://www.nia.or.kr/common/board/Download.do?bcIdx=26239&cbIdx=25932&fileN

o=1

Lee, H. (2024). Trends in regulations targeting online platforms and Big Tech in major

countries and their implications. Journal of International Legal Affairs (ITL), 165, 48–90.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Lee, H. J. (2023). Consideration on the direction of AI discipline in the Korea AI Act:

Focusing on the comparison of the EU AI Act regulation. CAU Journal of Legal Studies,

47(2), 5–42. https://doi.org/10.22853/caujls.2023.47.2.5

Lee, H. Y. (2024). The Brussels Effect and the global spread of plastic regulations: An

analysis of regulatory diffusion pathways through network analysis and visualization.

Korea and World Review, 6(6), 987–1012. https://doi.org/10.22743/kwr.2024.6.6.987

Lee, H. Y., Kwon, B. G., & Cha, S. M. (2021). Recent EU regulatory reforms concerning

digital platforms and trade-friendly institutional improvement directions for Korea (Long-

Term Trade Strategy Study No. 21-01). Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?act=view&bid=0001&list_no=9902&mid=a10101010

000

Lee, K. I. (2024). The current status and challenges of regulatory discussions in

Germany: Focusing on Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) and the EU Digital

Services Act (DSA). Public Law Journal, 25(2), 3–30.

https://doi.org/10.31779/plj.25.2.202405.001

Lee, S. H., & Kim, H. (2022). Introduction and significance of the digital euro: Focusing

on the European Digital Single Market and the EU’s monetary sovereignty. Journal of EU

Studies, 63, 247–272. https://doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2022..63.247

Lee, S. W. (2022). A study on China’s algorithm governance: Focusing on the Provisions

on the Administration of Algorithm Recommendations for Internet Information Services.

Northeast Asian Law Journal, 16(1), 25–62.

Lee, S. Y. (2023). Current status and challenges of establishing norms related to artificial

intelligence at home and abroad. Korean Lawyers Association Journal, 72(1), 442–488.

https://doi.org/10.17007/klaj.2023.72.1.014

Linklaters. (2025, September 30). Italy: A pioneering national framework to complement

the EU AI Act.

https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/blogs/digilinks/2025/september/italy--a-

pioneering-national-framework-to-complement-the-eu-ai-act

Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? Journal of

Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235–258.

Martens, B. (2024). The European Union AI Act: Premature or precocious regulation?

Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/european-union-ai-act-premature-or-

precocious-regulation

Ministry of Science and ICT, Republic of Korea. (2020). The Ministry of Science and ICT

establishes human-centered artificial intelligence (AI) ethics standards.

https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/materialView.do?num=208784

Ministry of Science and ICT, Republic of Korea. (2024). Legal bases for fostering and

regulating the artificial intelligence industry established: AI Basic Act passed by the

National Assembly. https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148937982

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

Mökander, J., Axente, M., Casolari, F., & Floridi, L. (2022). Conformity assessments and

post-market monitoring: A guide to the role of auditing in the proposed European AI

regulation. Minds and Machines, 32(2), 241–268. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-021-

09577-4

Montagnani, M. L. (2019). A new liability regime for illegal content in the Digital Single

Market Strategy. SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3398160

National Law Review. (2025, November 18). Italy enacts first national artificial

intelligence law in EU. https://natlawreview.com/article/when-rome-make-your-ai-do-

regulators-do

Noh, M. H. (2023). The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation from the

convergence perspective between the ripple effects of the Digital Single Market and the

European tradition of human rights protection. Historical Cultural Studies, 85, 367–410.

https://doi.org/10.18347/hufshis.2023.85.367

Oh, C. R. (2023). The Brussels Effect in the transition of international order: The

hegemonic influence of the European Union’s regulatory power. Journal of EU Studies,

65, 159–189. https://doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2023..65.159

Oh, T. H., & Kang, M. J. (2018). The entry into force of the EU General Data Protection

Regulation (GDPR): Evaluation and responses (Today’s World Economy No. 18-19).

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

https://www.kiep.kr/gallery.es?act=view&bid=0003&list_no=3389&mid=a1010101000

Park, J. H. (2024). National security-based restrictions on cross-border personal data

transfer under digital economy agreements. Korean Journal of International Law, 69(4),

35–75. https://doi.org/10.46406/kjil.2024.12.69.4.035

Park, N. H., & Kim, H. K. (2024). A review of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act concerning

personal data protection. JURIS, 1(68), 33–62.

https://doi.org/10.22825/juris.2024.1.68.002

Rességuier, A., & Rodrigues, R. (2020). AI ethics should not remain toothless! A call to

bring back the teeth of ethics. Big Data & Society, 7(2).

https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951720942541

Shin, E. C., Kim, H. (2023). Digital Sovereignty and Europe: Legislation and Implications

of EU Digital Policy. Journal of EU Studies, 67, 65-88. 10.18109/jeus.2023..67.65

Shim, S. Y. (2024). The regulation-centered European Union Artificial Intelligence Act

(EU AI Act) (Latest Foreign Legislation Information No. 242). National Assembly Library.

https://nsp.nanet.go.kr/plan/subject/detail.do?nationalPlanControlNo=PLAN000004499

Walch, K. (2021, August 7). Rigging for AI: How the US Navy embraces digital and

masters AI with Brett Vaughan, Chief AI Officer and AI Portfolio Manager at the Office of

Naval Research. Forbes.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 63-82

From Europe’s Rights-Based AI Regulation to Korea’s Innovation-Oriented Framework:

Diverging Philosophies in Global Digital and AI Governance

Bongchul Kim

https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2021/08/07/rigging-for-ai-how-the-us-

navy-embraces-digital-and-masters-ai/?sh=4c349d57abb3

White & Case LLP. (2026, January 22). AI Watch: Global regulatory tracker—Italy.

https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/ai-watch-global-regulatory-tracker-

italy

World Economic Forum. (2020). Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT): Paths towards free

and trusted data flows. https://www.weforum.org/publications/data-free-flow-with-

trust-dfft-paths-towards-free-and-trusted-data-flows/

World Economic Forum. (2026). The global risks report 2026 (21st ed.).

https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2026/

Yang, C. S. (2024). The European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and AI regulation.

Regulatory Law Review, 24(1), 127–172.

Yang, H. T. (2021). Recent responses and implications of major countries for trustworthy

artificial intelligence (AI Trend Watch 2021-11). Korea Information Society Development

Institute. https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/domesticView.do?ac=0000157467&issus=

Yang, J. W. (2024). EU online platform regulation: Main contents and issues of the Digital

Markets Act (DMA). The Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 42(1), 49–79.

https://doi.org/10.17052/jces.2024.42.1.49

Yoon, J. H., & Cho, E. J. (2024). Meaning and implications of the passage of the EU

Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) (Issue Brief No. 527). Institute for National Security

Strategy.

https://www.inss.re.kr/publication/bbs/ib_view.do?bbsId=ib&nttId=41037112&page=1

&searchCnd=0&searchWrd=

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

RECONFIGURING ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: LAW, IDENTITY, AND EUROPE –

KOREA COOPERATION

HO KIM

hufsho@kmu.ac.kr

Ho Kim is an associate professor in International Economic and Trade Law at the Keimyung

University (Republic of Korea). He received his S.J.D. from the American University. Professor

Kim’s fields of interest include legal issues of international commerce. He also focuses on

international and regional cooperation.

MINSUB SHIM

minsub690@gmail.com

Minsub Shim is a researcher in the field of International Trade and International Commercial Law.

He received his Ph.D. in International Trade from the Graduate School of International and Area

Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Republic of Korea). His research specialization

includes the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), international

commercial dispute resolution, and EU trade and legal systems. He also worked as an editorial

assistant at the Institute of EU Studies and the Journal of EU Studies for three years, where he

gained extensive academic and research experience in international trade and European studies.

Abstract

This study examines the structural transformation of Arctic governance through a

constructivist lens, focusing on the strategic roles of discourse, identity evolution, and

performance-based contributions. Climate change and escalating geopolitical rivalries—

particularly post-Ukraine war—have exposed the institutional limitations of the Arctic Council

and eroded the traditional "low-tension cooperation" paradigm. In this shifting landscape,

geographic proximity is giving way to functional, contribution-based participation as the

primary source of legitimacy. Within this framework, this paper analyzes the complementary

trajectories of European and South Korean engagement. While Europe provides normative

leadership grounded in environmental regulation and multilateral institution-building, South

Korea has steadily expanded its role from a "responsible observer" to a technological and

operational "enabler," backed by its robust domestic legal frameworks, shipbuilding capacity,

and polar research infrastructure. The study argues that integrating Europe’s normative

sophistication with Korea’s industrial and technological expertise offers a strategic pathway to

overcome existing governance deficits. Ultimately, Europe–Korea cooperation represents a

model for a more inclusive, adaptive, and resilient multilateral architecture capable of

balancing sustainable development with environmental stewardship in a rapidly changing

Arctic.

Keywords

Arctic Governance, Europe–Korea Cooperation, Enabler, Identity Transformation, Normative

Power, Constructivism.

Resumo

Este estudo analisa a transformação estrutural da governação do Ártico através de uma

perspetiva construtivista, centrando-se nos papéis estratégicos do discurso, da evolução da

identidade e das contribuições baseadas no desempenho. As alterações climáticas e as

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

rivalidades geopolíticas crescentes — particularmente após a guerra na Ucrânia — revelaram

as limitações institucionais do Conselho do Ártico e minaram o paradigma tradicional da

«cooperação de baixa tensão». Neste panorama em mudança, a proximidade geográfica está

a dar lugar a uma participação funcional e baseada na contribuição como principal fonte de

legitimidade. Neste contexto, o presente artigo analisa as trajetórias complementares do

envolvimento da Europa e da Coreia do Sul. Enquanto a Europa proporciona uma liderança

normativa assente na regulamentação ambiental e na criação de instituições multilaterais, a

Coreia do Sul tem vindo a expandir de forma constante o seu papel, passando de «observador

responsável» para «facilitador» tecnológico e operacional, apoiada pelos seus robustos

quadros jurídicos nacionais, capacidade de construção naval e infraestruturas de investigação

polar. O estudo defende que a integração da sofisticação normativa da Europa com a

experiência industrial e tecnológica da Coreia oferece um caminho estratégico para superar

os défices de governação existentes. Em última análise, a cooperação Europa-Coreia

representa um modelo para uma arquitetura multilateral mais inclusiva, adaptável e resiliente,

capaz de equilibrar o desenvolvimento sustentável com a gestão ambiental num Ártico em

rápida mudança.

Palavras-chave

Governação do Ártico, Cooperação Europa-Coreia, Facilitador, Transformação de Identidade,

Poder Normativo, Construtivismo.

How to cite this article

Kim, Ho & Shim, Minsub (2026). Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –

Korea Cooperation. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics

of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº.

1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 83-98. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.5

Article submitted on March 30, 2026 and accepted on May 10, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

RECONFIGURING ARCTIC GOVERNANCE: LAW, IDENTITY, AND

EUROPE –KOREA COOPERATION

HO KIM

MINSUB SHIM

Introduction

The Arctic is undergoing a profound transformation driven by the accelerating impacts of

climate change, geopolitical competition, and expanding economic interests. Rapid ice

melt is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to natural resources, thereby

elevating the region’s strategic importance. At the same time, these developments

intensify environmental risks, including ecosystem degradation, biodiversity loss, and

threats to indigenous communities. As a result, the Arctic is no longer a remote and

peripheral space but has emerged as a critical arena where global environmental,

economic, and security dynamics intersect.

These transformations have exposed significant limitations within the existing Arctic

governance system. Traditionally characterized by cooperation and low political tension,

the Arctic is increasingly shaped by strategic rivalry, particularly in the context of broader

geopolitical conflicts. Institutional frameworks such as the Arctic Council face growing

constraints in addressing emerging challenges, especially those related to security. This

evolving context calls for a reassessment of how Arctic governance is conceptualized and

practiced, moving beyond static institutional perspectives toward more dynamic and

adaptive approaches.

This study approaches Arctic governance through a constructivist lens, emphasizing the

roles of discourse, identity, and performative contribution. In multilateral governance

systems, states do not simply act based on material capabilities; they also construct their

roles and legitimacy through diplomatic narratives and sustained practices. From this

perspective, the Arctic is not merely a physical region but a socially constructed political

space in which influence is shaped by how actors define themselves and are recognized

by others. Accordingly, legitimacy in Arctic governance increasingly depends on

contribution-based participation rather than geographic proximity alone.

Within this evolving framework, Europe and Korea represent two distinct yet

complementary trajectories of engagement. European actors have played a central role

in shaping Arctic governance through scientific research, environmental regulation, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

institutional development, establishing a form of normative leadership grounded in

sustainability and multilateralism. Korea, by contrast, has expanded its participation

through technological capacity, industrial strength, and growing involvement in scientific

and diplomatic initiatives. In particular, Korea’s transition from a “responsible observer”

to an “enabler” reflects a broader shift toward functional contribution as a basis for

legitimacy.

Against this backdrop, this study examines the transformation of Arctic governance and

explores the strategic potential of Europe–Korea cooperation. It argues that the

integration of Europe’s normative and institutional strengths with Korea’s technological

and operational capabilities offers a pathway to address existing governance limitations.

By analyzing legal frameworks, evolving state identities, and patterns of cooperation, the

study aims to demonstrate how a more inclusive, adaptive, and contribution-driven

governance model can emerge. Ultimately, it seeks to highlight the broader implications

of Arctic governance for global order in an era of increasing complexity and

interdependence.

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Legal Transformation, European

Engagement, and Korea’s Expanding Participation

Structural Transformation and the Crisis of Arctic Governance

The Arctic is undergoing profound structural transformation driven by the accelerating

impacts of climate change. The rapid melting of sea ice is no longer a seasonal anomaly

but a systemic shift, raising the possibility that the Arctic Ocean may evolve from a

periodic passage into a more stable maritime transportation corridor. At the same time,

increased accessibility to oil, gas, and rare minerals has significantly heightened global

economic interest in the region. These developments, however, are accompanied by

serious and interconnected challenges, including marine ecosystem degradation,

biodiversity loss, and growing threats to the livelihoods and rights of indigenous

communities. In particular, methane emissions released from thawing permafrost pose

long-term and potentially irreversible risks to the global climate system. As a result, the

Arctic is emerging as a complex geopolitical and environmental space where economic

opportunity, ecological vulnerability, and security concerns intersect on a global scale.

Geopolitical tensions are further undermining the stability of Arctic governance. The

intensifying rivalry between Russia and Western countries is transforming the Arctic from

a zone traditionally characterized by cooperation into one marked by strategic

competition. Military buildup, competing claims over maritime control, and expanding

resource development have escalated tensions across the region. These developments

are gradually eroding the long-standing model of “low-tension cooperation” that once

defined Arctic relations (Ingimundarson, 2014). At the same time, energy security and

control over emerging shipping routes have become central to national strategies,

reinforcing competitive dynamics. Consequently, the Arctic is being reshaped into a

complex geopolitical arena in which cooperation and conflict coexist.

In this evolving context, the Arctic Council has increasingly revealed its institutional

limitations. Heightened political tensions have constrained its ability to function

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

effectively as a cooperative platform. Although the Council has historically focused on

environmental protection and sustainable development, it remains structurally ill-

equipped to address security-related issues (Kim & Kim, 2022). As a result, critical

concerns such as military tensions are often excluded from formal deliberations. This

institutional gap risks further fragmenting Arctic governance. In response, alternative

approaches including minilateral cooperation and more flexible partnership frameworks

are gaining increasing attention.

The legal architecture of the Arctic reflects a layered and adaptive system (Kim & Shim

2022). Arctic-related treaties can be broadly divided into two categories: those that apply

generally to global maritime affairs but are also relevant to the Arctic, and those

specifically designed for polar regions. Foundational agreements such as the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International Convention

for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) were originally intended to govern

global maritime activities, yet they play a crucial role in Arctic governance. In particular,

Article 234 of UNCLOS, addressing “ice-covered areas,” provides a legal basis for coastal

states to adopt stricter environmental regulations tailored to the unique conditions of

polar regions (Gudev, 2020).

This framework is further complemented by polar-specific legal instruments. The

International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code establishes mandatory safety and

environmental standards for vessels operating in polar waters. The Svalbard Treaty, in

turn, provides a distinctive legal regime governing sovereignty and economic activity in

the Svalbard archipelago. Arctic agreements may also be categorized as multilateral,

regional, or bilateral. While UNCLOS, MARPOL, and the Svalbard Treaty represent

multilateral frameworks, regional arrangements often involve European actors, and

bilateral agreements such as the maritime delimitation treaty between Norway and

Russia play a critical role in stabilizing legal relationships (Yoo & Lee, 2020).

Despite the development of these legal frameworks, significant challenges remain. The

Arctic is among the regions most severely affected by climate change, making

international cooperation and continuous environmental monitoring essential for global

policy responses. At the same time, expanding resource extraction and tourism increase

pressure on fragile ecosystems. These dynamics underscore the need for more refined

and adaptive legal standards that can balance environmental protection with sustainable

development. Accordingly, Arctic governance frameworks are likely to continue evolving

in response to emerging environmental and geopolitical pressures.

Finally, international law becomes effective only through its incorporation into domestic

legal systems. States party to international treaties are obligated to implement these

norms through national legislation, a process that functions not only as a legal

requirement but also as a key policy instrument (Kim et al., 2023). Arctic coastal states,

for example, have strengthened domestic regulatory frameworks governing navigation

and territorial waters based on provisions such as UNCLOS Article 234. At the same time,

many countries have been developing legal and institutional systems related to maritime

safety, environmental protection, and polar research as their Arctic engagement

expands. Ultimately, Arctic governance operates through a dynamic, multilayered system

in which international and domestic law continuously interact.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Europe’s Arctic Engagement: From Exploration to Norm-Based

Governance

Europe has played a foundational role in the early exploration and conceptualization of

the Arctic. Expeditions led by countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,

and Norway transformed the Arctic from an unknown frontier into a more comprehensible

geographical space. These explorations were driven not only by scientific curiosity but

also by economic motivations, including the search for new trade routes and natural

resources. In particular, the pursuit of Arctic sea routes was closely tied to imperial

competition and efforts to establish faster maritime connections to Asia. The

accumulation of navigational knowledge and advancements in cartography during this

period laid the groundwork for subsequent Arctic research and governance.

In the contemporary era, Europe’s perception of the Arctic has evolved in close

connection with the global challenge of climate change. Accelerating ice melt has

redefined the region as both a site of economic opportunity and environmental

vulnerability. While new shipping routes and resource extraction prospects attract

strategic interest, ecological degradation and biodiversity loss intensify the need for

environmental protection (Cavalieri et al., 2021). In response, European actors have

adopted a dual policy approach that seeks to balance economic utilization with

sustainability, particularly through strategic assessments linking climate governance,

regional development, and environmental stewardship in the Arctic (Arctic Centre,

University of Lapland, 2021). Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland, in

particular, perceive the Arctic as closely linked to their domestic ecological systems,

leading to integrated policy frameworks that align climate policy with Arctic strategy.

The European Union has further strengthened its engagement by framing the Arctic as a

key arena for global climate governance (Canova, 2025). By linking its carbon neutrality

agenda with Arctic policy, the EU positions the region as a frontline for climate action

(Shin, 2024). Concepts such as blue carbon and marine ecosystem protection have

emerged as central elements of this approach. This reflects a broader shift in viewing the

Arctic not merely as a site of resource exploitation, but as a domain requiring normative

regulation and environmental stewardship (Jung, 2022). The EU’s integration of scientific

research with regulatory frameworks enhances the legitimacy of its policies and aligns

with its broader identity as a “normative power” (Kuus,2020). This process also

demonstrates the EU’s expanding capacity for Arctic actorness beyond geographical

constraints (Jouhier, 2025).

European Arctic coastal states maintain a dual strategy that combines competition with

cooperation. Countries such as Norway and Denmark (via Greenland) actively pursue

maritime resource development and jurisdictional claims while simultaneously supporting

international legal frameworks. They rely on mechanisms such as UNCLOS to manage

disputes and legitimize their positions. Scientific data submissions and negotiated

continental shelf extensions exemplify rule-based governance in practice. This approach

helps mitigate tensions while preserving a cooperative regional order, allowing strategic

interests and institutional stability to coexist.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Non-Arctic European states have also expanded their influence through active

participation in Arctic affairs. Countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France,

and Italy primarily adopt science-driven strategies, utilizing advanced capabilities such

as icebreaking research vessels, satellite observation systems, and long-term climate

data analysis. These technological assets function not only as tools of scientific inquiry

but also as instruments of diplomatic influence. By emphasizing their identity as

“responsible stakeholders,” these states establish legitimacy in Arctic governance despite

lacking direct territorial claims.

Other European countries, including the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland,

have deepened their engagement through science diplomacy. Switzerland’s participation

is particularly notable, demonstrating that Arctic involvement is not constrained by

geographical proximity. Through polar research stations, international collaborative

projects, and the production of scientific knowledge, these countries contribute

meaningfully to policymaking processes. Scientific research provides the empirical

foundation for governance decisions while simultaneously fostering international

cooperation (Wood-Donnelly, 2023). As a result, Europe has developed a multilayered

Arctic governance structure characterized by diverse actors and interconnected roles,

supported by both international legal frameworks and regional policy initiatives designed

to address emerging Arctic disputes (Kim & Ko, 2021).

Korea’s Participation in Arctic Governance and the Evolution of Its Legal

and Strategic Frameworks

In recent years, the Arctic has emerged as a critical focal point of global environmental

change, driven by the accelerating impacts of climate change. Rapid ice melt is expanding

the possibilities for new maritime routes and resource development, thereby intensifying

geopolitical and economic interest in the region. At the same time, environmental

degradation, biodiversity loss, and challenges related to indigenous rights are becoming

increasingly pronounced. These developments have introduced structural tensions into

Arctic governance, further compounded by intensifying geopolitical rivalry particularly

between Russia and Western countries—which is transforming the Arctic from a zone of

low-tension cooperation into one of strategic competition. The disruption of cooperative

channels following the Ukraine war has weakened institutional stability, including within

the Arctic Council, which continues to face structural limitations in addressing security-

related issues.

Within this evolving context, Korea has steadily expanded its engagement in Arctic

governance. Since obtaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013, Korea has

pursued a more structured and proactive Arctic policy encompassing scientific research,

maritime activities, and multilateral cooperation (Kim 2022). Its growing investment in

research infrastructure and international collaboration networks reflects a transition from

passive observation to active participation. In particular, the operation of the icebreaking

research vessel Araon highlights Korea’s expanding capacity in polar research and science

diplomacy. At the same time, Korea has sought to balance economic interests with

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

environmental responsibility, positioning itself as a constructive and credible participant

in Arctic governance.

Korea’s Arctic engagement is closely linked to the evolution of its domestic legal

frameworks, which initially developed through its participation in Antarctic governance.

Beginning in the late twentieth century, Korea joined the Antarctic Treaty system and

assumed obligations to implement international norms domestically. This led to the

enactment of the “Act on Antarctic Activities and Environmental Protection” in 2004,

which incorporated the principles of the Madrid Protocol into national law. The legislation

established a comprehensive regulatory system based on prior authorization of activities,

environmental impact assessments, and strict environmental protection measures, while

also promoting scientific research through national planning and institutional support. As

such, it reflects a hybrid legal model that integrates regulatory control with policy

support.

Building on this institutional foundation, Korea’s polar policy gradually expanded to

include the Arctic, particularly as the region’s strategic importance increased.

Comparative analyses of polar legislation in Northeast Asia demonstrate that Korea has

developed a comparatively comprehensive legal framework for polar governance, moving

beyond Antarctic-specific regulation toward an integrated system covering both Arctic

and Antarctic activities, while similar comprehensive legal arrangements remain more

limited in neighboring countries (Kim & Kim, 2024). The acquisition of observer status in

the Arctic Council in 2013 underscored the need for a more integrated legal and policy

framework. In response, Korea enacted the “Polar Activities Promotion Act” in 2021,

which functions as a general framework law covering both Antarctic and Arctic activities.

This legislation introduced mechanisms for policy coordination, research and

development support, professional training, and international cooperation, thereby

strengthening the institutional basis for Korea’s expanding polar engagement.

More recently, the growing strategic significance of Arctic shipping routes has led to the

adoption of more specialized legislation. The 2026 “Special Act on the Promotion of Arctic

Shipping Routes and Related Industries” provides a targeted framework for logistics

development, industrial support, and international collaboration. Through institutional

mechanisms such as dedicated committees, financial support systems, and research

initiatives, this law enhances policy implementation capacity and reflects a shift in Korea’s

Arctic policy from a primarily research-oriented approach toward one that increasingly

incorporates economic and strategic dimensions. Nevertheless, challenges remain,

including potential overlaps among legal frameworks and the need for clearer

coordination mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, Korea’s expanding participation in Arctic governance carries

broader implications. As a country that has achieved both rapid economic development

and democratic consolidation, Korea enjoys a high level of international credibility and is

well positioned to act as a middle power. Its technological expertise, maritime industry

capacity, and diplomatic mediation skills represent important assets in navigating the

complex dynamics of Arctic governance. In particular, Korea is well suited to assume an

“enabler” role—facilitating cooperation, reducing tensions, and supporting institutional

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

resilience—thereby complementing existing great-power dynamics with a more inclusive

and functionally oriented approach.

Ultimately, the crisis of Arctic governance reflects broader transformations in the global

order rather than a purely regional issue. In this context, Korea’s participation extends

beyond the pursuit of national interests and contributes to norm formation, institutional

adaptation, and cooperative problem-solving. By aligning its policies with the principles

of sustainability and peaceful use, Korea can help strengthen the resilience of Arctic

governance frameworks.

Looking ahead, it is likely to evolve from a responsible participant into a substantive

contributor, particularly in the areas of scientific cooperation, environmental protection,

and maritime governance (Østhagen, 2013).

Reframing Arctic Governance: Discourse, Identity Transformation, and

Europe–Korea Cooperation

The Strategic Role of Discourse and Identity in Arctic Governance

In international relations, states do not assert themselves solely through material

actions; they also define and legitimize their roles through diplomatic communication.

Policy documents and official statements articulate not only national interests but also

the institutional space states seek to occupy. In this sense, discourse is not merely

descriptive but constitutive of policy itself. Particularly in multilateral governance

systems, language and narrative shape the boundaries of participation and influence.

Diplomatic discourse should therefore be understood as a strategic resource that

constructs both action and status in the international system.

This perspective is closely aligned with constructivist theory, which emphasizes that

international order is socially constructed through interaction. The Arctic, from this

viewpoint, is not simply a physical region but a political space shaped by shared

understandings and negotiated roles (Albert & Vasilache, 2018). A state’s position is

formed not only by its material capabilities but also by how it presents itself and is

perceived by others. Through discourse and practice, states generate expectations and

structure cooperation. As a result, identity and interaction become central to governance

outcomes.

Traditionally, legitimacy in Arctic governance was based on geographic proximity,

privileging Arctic coastal states. However, this standard has gradually evolved, allowing

non-Arctic actors to gain influence through sustained engagement and tangible

contributions. Scientific research, environmental protection, and institutional

participation have become key sources of legitimacy. This shift reflects a broader

transformation toward a more open and functionally driven governance structure. It also

underscores the importance of performance over geography in shaping participation.

The experience of European actors demonstrates how legitimacy can be built through

consistent contribution. Initial claims based on normative relevance were insufficient, but

long-term investment in research and governance participation gradually strengthened

credibility. This illustrates that legitimacy is accumulated through practice rather than

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

assertion. It also highlights that the quality and consistency of engagement are decisive

factors in determining influence within Arctic governance.

Ultimately, effective diplomatic discourse must remain aligned with actual capabilities.

Overstated narratives can weaken credibility, while understated positioning may limit

strategic opportunities. The most effective approach lies in maintaining coherence

between identity and performance. This alignment allows states to build trust over time,

which is particularly crucial in cooperative governance systems like the Arctic. In this

context, discourse becomes a key instrument for sustaining both legitimacy and

influence.

From Responsible Observer to Enabler: Korea’s Evolving Arctic Identity

When Korea joined the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013, it strategically adopted the

identity of a “responsible observer.” This framing emphasized adherence to international

norms, respect for the sovereignty of Arctic states, and a non-confrontational posture

within a governance system largely shaped by coastal actors. As an entry strategy, this

identity proved effective: it facilitated Korea’s access to institutional networks, enabled

participation in working groups, and signaled its willingness to operate within established

rules. At the time, such cautious positioning reflected both structural constraints and a

deliberate effort to build trust within the Arctic governance community.

Over the past decade, however, the material and institutional foundations of Korea’s

Arctic engagement have expanded considerably. Korea has developed globally

competitive shipbuilding capabilities, particularly in the construction of ice-class vessels

such as icebreakers and LNG carriers. In parallel, it has advanced technologies related

to maritime safety, satellite-based navigation, and sea ice forecasting. Its role in scientific

research has also deepened through sustained participation in international projects and

polar research initiatives. These developments collectively indicate a shift from limited,

observation-based participation to a more active and capability-driven form of

engagement.

This expansion of capabilities necessitates a corresponding redefinition of Korea’s

functional role within Arctic governance. Increasingly, Korea is not merely a participant

that observes and complies, but an actor that contributes to the operational effectiveness

of the system. In this context, the concept of an “enabler” provides a more precise

analytical lens. As an enabler, Korea supports the conditions under which cooperation

among Arctic and non-Arctic actors can take place—through the provision of technology,

infrastructure, data, and logistical support. This role is particularly significant in the

Arctic, where harsh environmental conditions and complex operational demands require

shared capabilities and coordinated efforts.

Despite these changes, the continued reliance on the “responsible observer” framework

reveals important limitations. While the term underscores restraint and norm compliance,

it inadequately reflects Korea’s expanded contributions and growing capacity to shape

outcomes. This disconnects between identity and practice may constrain Korea’s

international recognition and reduce its potential influence within governance processes.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Moreover, it risks creating strategic ambiguity, as Korea’s actual activities increasingly

extend beyond the passive connotations of observation.

Against this backdrop, the “enabler” framework emerges as a more appropriate and

forward-looking alternative. By focusing on functional contribution rather than positional

restraint, it better aligns Korea’s identity with its evolving capabilities. This reframing

enhances the clarity, credibility, and strategic coherence of Korea’s Arctic engagement.

Ultimately, Korea’s transition from a responsible observer to an enabler reflects a broader

shift in Arctic governance itself—from a system centered primarily on status and

participation toward one that increasingly values capability, contribution, and

collaborative problem-solving.

Limits of Arctic Governance and the Strategic Potential of Europe–Korea

Cooperation

Arctic governance, despite its foundation in cooperation, norms, and institutional

dialogue, continues to operate under significant structural constraints. At its core, the

governance architecture remains dominated by Arctic coastal states, which retain

primary authority over decision-making processes. This concentration of influence

inherently limits the participation and impact of non-Arctic actors, even as the

consequences of Arctic transformation extend far beyond the region itself.

Simultaneously, the Arctic is characterized by the coexistence of competing priorities

environmental protection, resource exploitation, economic development, and emerging

security concerns. These overlapping agendas create a complex governance environment

in which cooperation is both necessary and difficult to sustain. The accelerating pace of

climate change further intensifies these pressures by opening new maritime routes,

expanding access to natural resources, and increasing geopolitical attention to the region

(Kim, 2026).

Within this evolving context, non-Arctic states are no longer peripheral actors but

increasingly important contributors to the governance ecosystem. Korea exemplifies this

shift through its functional and capability-based engagement. Rather than pursuing

territorial or sovereignty-based claims, Korea’s role is defined by its advanced

technological capacity, particularly in shipbuilding, maritime logistics, digital

infrastructure, and polar research. Acting as an “enabler,” Korea contributes to enhancing

the operational effectiveness of Arctic governance by supporting safe navigation systems,

ice-capable vessels, satellite-based monitoring, and scientific research infrastructure.

However, the effectiveness and legitimacy of such contributions are maximized when

embedded within cooperative, multilateral frameworks rather than pursued through

unilateral initiatives.

In this regard, Europe emerges as a particularly strategic and compatible partner.

European actors both Arctic and non-Arctic have accumulated extensive experience in

Arctic governance through sustained engagement in scientific research, environmental

regulation, and multilateral institution-building (Cha & Lim2022). European countries and

institutions have played a central role in shaping governance norms that prioritize

sustainability, environmental stewardship, and rule-based cooperation. This has resulted

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

in a multilayered governance system that integrates national policies, regional

cooperation mechanisms, and international legal frameworks. Europe’s normative

leadership and institutional sophistication thus provide a critical foundation upon which

deeper cooperation with Korea can be constructed.

The relationship between Korea and Europe is fundamentally complementary, offering a

strong basis for synergistic collaboration. Korea’s strengths lie in its industrial and

technological capabilities, including world-leading shipbuilding industries, smart shipping

technologies, and advanced digital systems. Europe, by contrast, brings expertise in

governance design, regulatory frameworks, environmental standards, and policy

coordination. The integration of these strengths allows for a more holistic approach to

Arctic governance—one that bridges the gap between technological implementation and

normative regulation. Such integration is particularly crucial in addressing governance

deficits, where technological solutions must be aligned with robust legal and institutional

frameworks to ensure sustainability, safety, and accountability.

Moreover, the expansion of scientific and industrial cooperation between Korea and

Europe significantly enhances the prospects for effective governance. Joint research

initiatives contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Arctic environmental

changes, thereby strengthening the knowledge base for evidence-based policymaking.

Collaborative efforts in shipping, logistics, renewable energy, and infrastructure

development can support economic activities in the region while adhering to stringent

environmental standards. Importantly, such cooperation also facilitates the diffusion of

best practices and the harmonization of regulatory approaches, reducing fragmentation

within the governance system.

Ultimately, Europe–Korea cooperation represents not merely a supplementary dimension

of Arctic governance but a strategic pathway toward its evolution. By combining

technological innovation with normative leadership, and operational capacity with

institutional experience, this partnership can help address existing structural limitations

in Arctic governance. It offers a model of inclusive and functionally driven cooperation

that enhances resilience, promotes sustainability, and reinforces multilateralism. In doing

so, Europe and Korea are well-positioned to contribute to the development of a more

integrated, adaptive, and forward-looking Arctic governance system capable of

responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing region.

Concluding Reflections: Reframing Arctic Governance through

Discourse, Identity, and Europe–Korea Cooperation

This study has argued that Arctic governance should be understood not as a fixed

institutional framework, but as a dynamic order shaped by the interaction of discourse,

identity, and performative contributions. Diplomatic discourse functions not merely as a

tool for describing state roles, but as a constitutive element that defines the scope of

participation and legitimacy. This is particularly significant in a multilateral setting such

as the Arctic, where influence is determined less by geographic proximity than by

sustained contributions and consistent role performance.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Within this structure, Europe has played a central role in shaping and advancing Arctic

governance. Through its accumulated experience in scientific research, environmental

protection, institutional design, and norm-building, Europe has contributed to

maintaining the stability and sustainability of the governance system. Its normative

leadership and institutional sophistication have been essential in preserving the Arctic as

a space of cooperation. In this sense, Europe functions not merely as a participant, but

as a key pillar in the formation and evolution of Arctic order.

At the same time, the role of non-Arctic states, including Korea, has been steadily

expanding. Functional contributions based on technological capacity, infrastructure, and

scientific expertise are increasingly recognized as critical to Arctic operations. This shift

indicates a broader transformation of Arctic governance from a closed, coastal state–

centered structure toward a more open and multilayered system. Contribution-based

participation is thus emerging as a new standard of legitimacy.

In this context, cooperation between Europe and Korea exhibits a structurally

complementary character. Europe’s strengths in normative frameworks and institutional

governance, when combined with Korea’s technological and industrial capabilities, create

the conditions for more effective implementation of governance mechanisms. This goes

beyond a simple division of roles, pointing instead to the emergence of an integrated

governance model that links norms with technology and policy with operations. Such

integration is particularly important in addressing existing limitations in implementation

capacity.

Furthermore, scientific and industrial collaboration serves as a key domain through which

this partnership can be operationalized. Joint research initiatives, data sharing, and

technological cooperation strengthen the scientific foundation of policymaking while also

fostering trust in international cooperation. At the same time, collaboration in maritime

logistics, green technologies, and energy sectors enables the pursuit of both economic

opportunity and environmental sustainability. These efforts contribute to transforming

Arctic governance into a more practical and executable system.

To summarize the main findings and theoretical contributions of this study, Table X

presents the key arguments regarding the transformation of Arctic governance and the

strategic significance of Europe–Korea cooperation.

As summarized in Table 1, the transformation of Arctic governance reflects a broader

shift from geography-based authority toward contribution-based legitimacy. The findings

of this study suggest that influence within Arctic governance is increasingly shaped by

the ability of actors to provide scientific knowledge, technological capacity, institutional

support, and practical solutions to shared challenges. From this perspective, discourse

and identity are not merely symbolic elements but strategic resources that enable actors

to establish credibility and sustain participation in governance processes. The cases of

Europe and Korea further demonstrate that effective governance is strengthened when

normative leadership and functional capabilities operate in a complementary manner.

Accordingly, the future development of Arctic governance is likely to depend on

governance arrangements that connect institutional frameworks with operational

implementation and combine regulatory coordination with technological innovation.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Table 1. Core Arguments and Contributions of the Study

Analytical

Dimension

Main Argument

Implication for Arctic Governance

Governance

Transformation

Arctic governance is shifting from

a geography-based system toward

a contribution-based governance

model.

Legitimacy is increasingly derived from

functional participation and sustained

contributions rather than territorial

proximity.

Role of Discourse

and Identity

State influence is shaped not only

by material capabilities but also by

discourse, identity construction,

and role performance.

Arctic governance should be

understood as a socially constructed

and dynamic order.

Europe’s Position

Europe has established normative

leadership through environmental

governance, scientific research,

and institutional development.

Europe functions as a key norm-setting

actor that supports the stability and

sustainability of Arctic governance.

Korea’s Evolving

Role

Korea is transitioning from a

“responsible observer” to an

“enabler” through technological

expertise, scientific capacity, and

operational contributions.

Korea’s legitimacy increasingly stems

from its ability to facilitate cooperation

and provide practical governance

solutions.

Europe–Korea

Complementarity

Europe’s normative and

institutional strengths

complement Korea’s technological

and industrial capabilities.

Combining governance expertise with

operational capacity can address

existing implementation gaps in Arctic

governance.

Future

Governance

Model

Effective Arctic governance

requires cooperative structures

that integrate norms, technology,

and multilateral collaboration

Europe–Korea cooperation provides a

model for a more adaptive, resilient,

and inclusive governance architecture.

Ultimately, the future of Arctic governance will depend not on the unilateral role of any

single actor, but on cooperative structures that combine complementary capabilities. The

convergence of Europe’s normative leadership and Korea’s functional contributions offers

a pathway toward a more stable, sustainable, and resilient governance model. Such

cooperation not only helps maintain the Arctic as a space of collaboration rather than

competition but also holds broader implications as a model for global governance in an

increasingly complex international environment. Beyond the Arctic itself, this partnership

illustrates how middle powers and non-Arctic stakeholders can contribute constructively

to addressing transnational challenges through multilateral cooperation, knowledge

sharing, and capability-based participation. In this regard, Europe–Korea cooperation

represents not only a regional governance strategy but also an example of how future

international governance frameworks may evolve in response to growing geopolitical

uncertainty and global interdependence.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

References

Albert, M., Vasilache, A. (2017). Governmentality of the Arctic as an international region,

Cooperation and Conflict, 53(1), https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717703674

Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. (2021). Strategic Assessment of Development of the

Arctic: Assessment Conducted for the European Union. Rovaniemi: Arctic Centre,

University of Lapland.

Canova, E. (2025). The European Union’s ‘geopolitical subjectivity’ in the Arctic in

question: a case study of France and the Kingdom of Denmark relations. European

Journal of International Relations, 32(1), 3–29.

https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661251345442

Cavalieri, S., McGlynn, E., Stoessel, S., Stuke, F., Bruckner, M., Polzin, C., Koivurova,

T., Sellheim, N., Stepien, A., Hossain, K., Duyck, S., & Nilsson, A. E. (2021). EU Arctic

Footprint and Policy Assessment: Final Report. Brussels: European Commission

Cha, H., & Lim,S. (2022). EU Arctic Strategy effects on Arctic Policy of Sweden and

Finland - Focusing on the Monitoring System and Education. The Journal of Contemporary

European Studies, 40(1), 279-301. https://doi.org/10.17052/jces.2022.40.1.279

Gudev, P. A. (2020). The Northern Sea Route: Problems of National Status Legitimization

under International Law. Part I. Arctic and North, 40, 142–164.

https://doi.org/10.37482/issn2221-2698.2020.40.142

Ingimundarson, V. (2014). Managing a contested region: the Arctic Council and the

politics of Arctic governance. The Polar Journal, 4(1), 183–198.

https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.913918

Jouhier, S. (2025). The European Union’s Capacity to Act in the Arctic: Charting Degrees

of EU Actorness in the European and Circumpolar Territories. European Union. DOI:

10.1177/13540661251345442.

Jung. (2022). Implementation and the Prospect for the EU’s Climate Change Policy in the

Arctic (Focusing on international measures to reduce air pollutants and relations with the

Arctic states) 62,121-154. https://doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2022..62.121

Kim, B., & Kim, D. (2024). Comparative study of domestic laws related to polar regions

in Korea, China, and Japan. Journal of Korean-Japanese Military and Culture, 40, 31–71.

https://doi.org/10.47563/KJMC.40.2

Kim, B., & Kim, Y. (2022). Enactment and evaluation of the Polar Activities Promotion

Act. Korea and Global Affairs, 6(1), 443–472.

https://doi.org/10.22718/kga.2022.6.1.443

Kim, B., & Ko, S. (2021). Laws and policies for resolving conflicts related to the Arctic

region in Europe. Journal of European Union Studies, 57, 35–62.

https://doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2021.57.35

Kim, B., Shim, M. (2022). International and National Laws On the Arctic Sea and the

Arctic Region. The Korea Maritime Law, 44(2), 145-170.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 83-98

Reconfiguring Arctic Governance: Law, Identity, and Europe –Korea Cooperation

Ho Kim, Minsub Shim

Kim, B., Shim, M., & Choi, J. (2023). Comparison of Korean and Chinese Laws on Polar

Activities. Northeast Asian law journal, 17(2), 147-170.

http://dx.doi.org/10.19035/nal.2023.17.2.6

Kim, D. (2022). A Study on China’s Arctic Strategies: Focusing on Comparison with

Korea, Korean Association Of Contemporary Chinese Studies 23(4), 1-34.

https://doi.org/10.35820/JMCS.23.4.1

Kim, D. (2026). A study on the development of Japan’s basic ocean policy focusing on

the Arctic. Polar Record, 62(e9), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247426100266

Kuss, Merje. (2020). Regulatory power and region-making in the Arctic: China and the

European Union. European Urban and Regional Studies, 27(4),

https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776420925539

Østhagen, Andreas. (2013). The European Union – An Arctic Actor?. Journal of Military

and Strategic Studies, 15(2): 71-92.

Shin, E. (2024). The EU as geopolitical actor in the Arctic: A perspective of EU’s Arctic

policy. Journal of Global and Area Studies, 8(2), 239–255.

https://doi.org/10.31720/JGA.8.2.12

Yoo, J.-H., & Lee, S.-I. (2020). A study on the establishment of port state control regime

in the Arctic-Northeast Asia in line with the Polar Code. Maritime Law Review, 32(1), 25–

66.

Wilson, P. (2015). Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council,

51(1), https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715591711

Wood-Donnelly, C. (2023). Evaluating normative capacity through Arctic environmental

governance. Climatic Cha As a result, Europe has developed a multilayered Arctic

governance structure characterized by diverse actors and interconnected roles.nge 176,

127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-023-03603-3

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

SOUTH KOREA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD PORTUGAL: THE CURRENT

STATE AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

TONNY DIAN EFFENDI

tonny@umm.ac.id

Tonny Dian Effendi is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations,

University of Muhammadiyah Malang (Indonesia). He was a visiting research fellow at the Japan

Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Japan, the Institute of International Relations (IIR)-

National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan, as well as a visiting scholar at the Department of

International Relations and Public Administration, Universidade do Minho, Portugal.

HOYOON JUNG

hoyoon@pknu.ac.kr

Hoyoon Jung is an Associate Professor in the Division of International and Area Studies and

serves as the Associate Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Pukyong

National University (South Korea). He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of

Hawaii at Manoa.

Abstract

This study examines South Korea’s public diplomacy toward Portugal as cross-regional middle-

power cooperation. Despite ties since 1961, research on this relationship remains limited.

Hallyu has bridged cultural gaps, fostering participatory fandom among Portuguese youth

through K-pop and K-dramas. State-led projection tools—King Sejong Institutes and K-pop

events—built initial attractiveness. The 2023 agreements on triangular cooperation and

sustainable development highlight Portugal’s CPLP gateway role and shared interests in

renewables and green technologies. However, the projection-dominant model limits

reciprocity, normative depth, and institutional ties, hindering conversion of cultural capital

into sustained leverage. The study contrasts projection with advocacy/relational paradigms

and proposes a shift toward the latter. Recommendations include reframing Hallyu for joint

cultural projects and fan campaigns; partnering with Camões, I.P. for dual-language

programs; and focusing on green governance and triangular cooperation in CPLP regions.

Short-term actions emphasize workshops and fandom initiatives; medium- to long-term

strategies prioritize networks and monitoring. Challenges like resource asymmetries are

addressed through listening and reciprocity. This relational model aligns with pragmatic

diplomacy focused on national interests and autonomy, offering a template for diversifying

outreach into Southern Europe and the Lusophone world. It strengthens middle-power

convening and bridging capacities. The Korea–Portugal case shows projection excels at initial

engagement, but relational approaches are key for lasting strategic value. Future research

should explore its application to other under-studied bilateral contexts.

Keywords

Hallyu, Public Diplomacy, Relational Public Diplomacy, Korea-Portugal Relations, Middle-Power

Diplomacy.

Resumo

Este estudo aborda a diplomacia pública da Coreia do Sul em relação a Portugal como uma

cooperação inter-regional entre potências médias. Apesar das relações que remontam a 1961,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

100

a investigação sobre esta relação continua a ser limitada. O Hallyu colmatou as diferenças

culturais, promovendo uma cultura de fãs participativa entre a juventude portuguesa através

do K-pop e das séries coreanas. As ferramentas de projeção lideradas pelo Estado — os

Institutos Rei Sejong e os eventos de K-pop — criaram a atratividade inicial. Os acordos de

2023 sobre cooperação triangular e desenvolvimento sustentável destacam o papel de

Portugal como porta de entrada para a CPLP e os interesses comuns em energias renováveis

e tecnologias verdes. No entanto, o modelo dominado pela projeção limita a reciprocidade, a

profundidade normativa e os laços institucionais, dificultando a conversão do capital cultural

em influência sustentada. O estudo contrasta a projeção com os paradigmas de defesa de

causas e de relações e propõe uma mudança no sentido destes últimos. As recomendações

incluem reformular a Hallyu para projetos culturais conjuntos e campanhas de fãs; estabelecer

parcerias com o Instituto Camões, I.P. para programas bilingues; e centrar-se na governação

verde e na cooperação triangular nas regiões da CPLP. As ações a curto prazo dão ênfase a

workshops e iniciativas de fãs; as estratégias a médio e longo prazo dão prioridade às redes

e ao acompanhamento. Desafios como as assimetrias de recursos são abordados através da

escuta e da reciprocidade. Este modelo relacional alinha-se com uma diplomacia pragmática

centrada nos interesses nacionais e na autonomia, oferecendo um modelo para diversificar o

alcance na Europa do Sul e no mundo lusófono. Reforça as capacidades de convocação e de

aproximação das potências médias. O caso Coreia–Portugal mostra que a projeção se destaca

no envolvimento inicial, mas as abordagens relacionais são fundamentais para um valor

estratégico duradouro. Investigação futura deverá explorar a sua aplicação a outros contextos

bilaterais pouco estudados.

Palavras-chave

Hallyu, Diplomacia Pública, Diplomacia Pública Relacional, Relações Coreia-Portugal,

Diplomacia das Potências Médias.

How to cite this article

Effendi, Tonny Dian & Jung, Hoyoon (2026). South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The

Current State and Future Implications. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic

Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe

and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 99-115. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0626.6

Article submitted on March 30, 2026 and accepted on May 10, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

101

SOUTH KOREA’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TOWARD PORTUGAL:

THE CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

TONNY DIAN EFFENDI

HOYOON JUNG

Introduction

The 21st-century diplomacy has seen a marked diffusion of power, where traditional hard

power mechanisms are increasingly complemented by soft power, which can be defined

as the capacity to shape preferences through attraction rather than coercion (Nye, 2004).

For middle powers such as South Korea, public diplomacy has become a vital instrument

for enhancing influence in a multipolar world, allowing them to bridge great-power

rivalries and contribute to global norms (Cooper, 1997). In this context, the bilateral

relationship with Portugal provides a compelling case of cross-regional alignment

between two middle powers, driven by historical legacies, cultural exchanges, and

emerging strategic imperatives.

Formal diplomatic ties between South Korea and Portugal were established on April 15,

1961, even though their interactions trace back to early modern encounters. Portuguese

cartographers, including Manuel Godinho de Erédia in 1615, depicted the sea east of the

Korean Peninsula as “Mar Coria” (Sea of Korea), offering one of the earliest European

recognitions of Korean sovereignty and geography (Jung, 2025). This historical narrative

of mutual discovery serves as a foundation for contemporary legitimacy, distinguishing

the relationship from many of Korea’s other Western partnerships.

The 60th anniversary in 2021 marked a renewed phase, amplified by the global reach of

the Korean Wave (Hallyu), which has significantly boosted cultural familiarity in Portugal.

A pivotal development occurred in April 2023, when Portuguese Prime Minister António

Costa visited Seoul—the first such trip in 39 years—resulting in agreements on triangular

cooperation in third countries, sustainable development, and university partnerships

(Government of Portugal, 2023). These accords highlighted shared interests in future

industries, including semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, and renewable energy,

while underscoring Portugal’s role as a gateway to the Community of Portuguese

Language Countries (CPLP) (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

Despite growing trade and Hallyu’s popularity, the partnership remains imbalanced.

South Korea’s public diplomacy toward Portugal is predominantly projection-oriented,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

102

emphasizing cultural exports like K-pop festivals and language programs through the

King Sejong Institutes. This approach, while effective in building attractiveness, falls

short in fostering normative depth or institutional ties compared to Portugal’s networked

diplomacy via the Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, I.P (hereafter Camões,

I.P.). The core issue lies in the limitations of the projection model, which transmits

national identity unilaterally without cultivating shared values.

In contrast, advocacy public diplomacy promotes consensus on global norms through

relational engagement, aligning with middle-power strategies for network power. South

Korea necessitates this shift, particularly in leveraging Portugal for broader influence in

Lusophone regions. In this context, this study evaluates the current projection-dominant

approach, analyzes Portugal’s strategic value, and proposes an advocacy model

integrating cultural assets with shared norms in green governance and development

cooperation.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Literature Review

Despite the sixty-year diplomatic history between the Republic of Korea and the

Portuguese Republic, academic scholarship dedicated to this bilateral relationship

remains scarce and fragmented, usually appearing as a minor component within broader

studies of Portuguese studies in Korea or of Korea’s soft power and public diplomacy in

Europe (Jung, 2023; Ban, 2020). A recent mapping of the trends of Portuguese studies

in South Korea shows that research spans politics, economics, society, and culture, but

it also notes that bilateral diplomacy and public diplomacy between Korea and Portugal

remain largely unexplored as primary objects of analysis (Jung, 2023). One of the few

dedicated accounts of the relationship offers a descriptive overview of diplomatic

milestones and sectoral cooperation, however it does not theorize the ties as a middle-

power partnership or as a case of cross-regional public diplomacy (Jung, 2025).

Parallel literatures on Hallyu and Korean soft power highlight how popular culture has

been incorporated into state strategies for nation branding and middle power diplomacy,

while also raising concerns that a state-driven export model can limit reciprocity and

relational engagement (Ban, 2020; Oliveira, 2025). Despite the geographical distance,

the cultural proximity between South Korea and Portugal has been significantly narrowed

by the transnational flow of Hallyu, academic scrutiny of this specific bilateral reception

remains insufficient. Recent scholarship has begun to explore K-pop fandom in Portugal,

identifying it not merely as passive consumption but as a site of active identity

construction and “participatory culture” (Guerra & Sousa, 2021). Studies indicate that

Portuguese fans engage in complex processes of “transnational proximity,” where shared

socio-cultural experiences—such as youth precarity and digital nativism—bridge the gap

with Korean cultural products, challenging traditional notions of cultural distance (Jin,

2023). However, a critical gap persists in the literature regarding the conversion of this

cultural capital into diplomatic instruments; while the Korea Foundation (2023) reports a

surge in European Hallyu fans to about 13.2 million with continued growth noted in

subsequent analyses, research specifically linking this fandom to the public diplomacy

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

103

objectives of the South Korean state in Southern Europe is sparse. This disconnect

highlights the need for further inquiry into how the soft power generated by Hallyu can

be effectively operationalized to support broader strategic goals within the specific

context of Korea-Portugal relations.

In this context, this article is original in three respects. First, it takes Korea–Portugal

relations themselves, rather than “Europe” in general, as the main unit of analysis,

thereby connecting Portuguese studies in Korea with scholarship on Korea’s middle power

and public diplomacy. Second, it conceptualizes South Korea’s public diplomacy toward

Portugal as predominantly projection‑oriented and explicitly juxtaposes it with Portugal’s

more networked Camões, I.P. model, providing empirical leverage for debates on

projection versus advocacy public diplomacy and on relational soft power. Third, it

foregrounds Portugal’s role as a gateway to Lusophone networks and explores how

Korean cultural assets can be embedded in advocacy‑based cooperation on development,

thus extending both public diplomacy and middle‑power diplomacy debates into a

bilaterally and regionally under‑researched arena.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study draws primarily from the scholarship on public

diplomacy, particularly the distinction between projection-oriented approaches and

advocacy/relational models that emphasize dialogue, mutuality, long-term relationship-

building, and network collaboration. This distinction is essential for analyzing South

Korea’s current public diplomacy toward Portugal, which remains predominantly

projection-dominant through unilateral cultural exports (e.g., K-pop events, King Sejong

Institutes), while highlighting the potential for a shift toward advocacy-based strategies

that foster shared norms and institutional ties.

Joseph Nye’s foundational concept of soft power—the ability to shape preferences

through attraction rather than coercion—can effectively explain much of the discussion

on middle-power public diplomacy (Nye, 2004). For middle powers like South Korea, soft

power serves as a key instrument to enhance influence in a multipolar world,

complementing hard power limitations and enabling contributions to global norms and

bridging functions. Public diplomacy operationalizes soft power by engaging foreign

publics directly, but its effectiveness depends on the communication logic employed.

Traditional public diplomacy often relied on projection models, characterized by one-way

information dissemination, mass-media campaigns, and efforts to “sell” a national image

or identity unilaterally (Cull, 2009; Melissen, 2005). This approach aligns with state-

driven cultural export strategies, which can build initial attractiveness but frequently limit

reciprocity, genuine engagement, and normative depth—issues particularly relevant to

Korea's Hallyu-focused efforts (Ban, 2020; Oliveira, 2025). In contrast, the “new public

diplomacy” or relational turn advocates a paradigm shift toward dialogue, listening,

mutuality, and collaborative networks (Melissen, 2005; Zaharna et al., 2013). Rhonda

Zaharna and colleagues emphasize relational, networked, and collaborative approaches,

where public diplomacy moves from information control to skilled relationship

management, building sustainable connections among state and non-state actors

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

104

through shared values, co-creation, and connective mindshifts (Zaharna et al., 2013).

This relational paradigm prioritizes advocacy—promoting consensus on global issues via

mutual engagement—over mere projection, enabling middle powers to cultivate network

power through convening capabilities and partnerships (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009;

Sohn, 2012).

Portugal’s public diplomacy exemplifies networked and relational elements through

institutions like the Camões, I.P., which promotes language, culture, and cooperation via

decentralized, inter-societal ties and long-term relational engagement across Lusophone

networks as reflected in Portugal's broader diplomatic practices. This contrasts with

Korea’s more centralized, projection-heavy model, providing empirical space to evaluate

the limitations of unilateral strategies and the advantages of advocacy-oriented shifts.

In the Korea–Portugal context, a relational advocacy model would integrate Hallyu-

generated cultural capital with collaborative initiatives on shared global norms, such as

green governance, sustainable development, and triangular cooperation in CPLP regions.

This approach aligns with middle-power behavioral traits, which can facilitate

multilateralism, norm entrepreneurship, and bridging cross-regional divides while

addressing literature gaps in converting fandom-driven proximity into diplomatic scene.

South Korea could transform its public diplomacy from image projection to normative co-

construction, enhancing strategic depth in Lusophone spheres and supporting broader

goals by foregrounding mutuality and networked engagement.

These theoretical examinations thus can thus effectively illuminate projection versus

advocacy or relational logics to assess the current state of Korea’s efforts toward Portugal

and propose pathways for more effective, reciprocal public diplomacy.

Current State of South Korea’s Public Diplomacy toward Portugal

Historical and Institutional Overview of Bilateral Public Diplomacy

Early interactions were limited. Portuguese cartographic records provide the earliest

evidence of Korean awareness in Europe, with Francisco Rodrigues’ 1513 map containing

one of the first references to Korea as “Coria,” followed by consistent mentions of “Core”

in subsequent maps by Bartolomeu Velho (1561) and Manuel Godinho de Erédia (1613).

Fernão Mendes Pinto’s disputed account of reaching the Han River in 1542 suggests

possible direct contact, though historians continue to debate its authenticity (Embassy of

the Republic of Korea in Portugal, 2017).

Diplomatic channels facilitated more deliberate exchanges by the early 17th century,

most notably through Joseon envoy Jeong Du-won’s 1631 encounter with Portuguese

missionary Rodrigues during a mission to Ming China (Park, 1999; Ahn, 2009). Serving

as a papal interpreter fluent in Japanese, Rodrigues presented Jeong with transformative

Western technologies including a telescope, firearms, and a mechanical clock—items

virtually unknown in Joseon society (Park, 1999). As Park (1999) notes, Rodrigues’ gifts

represented one of the earliest documented instances of European scientific instruments

reaching the Korean peninsula. These technology transfers, though sporadic and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

105

geographically indirect, established vital conduits for European knowledge dissemination

that would underpin more formalized relations in subsequent eras (Jung, 2025).

The bilateral public diplomacy between South Korea and Portugal, while rooted in formal

diplomatic ties established in 1961, has evolved through a combination of institutional

mechanisms and cultural exchanges, reflecting both countries’ middle-power aspirations

in a multipolar global order. Public diplomacy efforts gained momentum in the 21st

Century, aligning with South Korea’s broader middle-power strategy that emphasizes soft

power to complement its economic influence (Sohn, 2012; Lee, 2016). Key institutions

driving this include South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Korea

Foundation, which coordinate cultural and educational outreach, and Portugal’s Camões,

I.P., which promotes Portuguese soft power through decentralized language and cultural

programs.

Institutionally, South Korea’s projection-oriented approach is evident in the

establishment of the King Sejong Institute in Lisbon in 2013, which focuses on Korean

language education and cultural immersion as tools for building attractiveness. This

mirrors broader Korean public diplomacy trends, where language institutes serve as

gateways for soft power dissemination, similar to efforts in other European contexts (Cho

et al., 2022). By 2023, the institute had expanded its activities to include online and in-

person courses, reaching over 500 students annually, with programs emphasizing

practical communication and cultural events like K-pop workshops (King Sejong Institute

Foundation, 2024).

In contrast, Portugal’s Camões, I.P., created in 1992, exemplifies a relational model,

fostering inter-societal ties across Lusophone networks in Africa, Asia, and Latin America

through cooperative language programs and development initiatives. This networked

approach prioritizes mutuality and long-term engagement. The 2023 bilateral

agreements, signed during Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa’s visit to Seoul,

marked a pivotal institutional milestone, encompassing triangular cooperation in third

countries (e.g., Lusophone Africa), sustainable development, and university partnerships

(Government of Portugal, 2023). These accords build on earlier milestones like the 2021

60th anniversary celebrations, which included joint seminars and cultural exchanges.

This institutional overview highlights how bilateral public diplomacy has shifted from

sporadic exchanges to structured cooperation. However, it remains dominated by

projection logics on the Korean side, limiting deeper relational integration.

Hallyu as a Core Projection Tool in Portugal

Hallyu, or the Korean Wave, serves as the central axis of South Korea's projection-

oriented public diplomacy in Portugal, facilitating cultural proximity despite geographical

distance through popular media like K-pop and K-dramas. Scholarly examinations reveal

that Hallyu has narrowed cultural gaps by appealing to shared socio-cultural experiences

among Portuguese youth, such as precarity and digital nativism (Jin, 2023). In Portugal,

K-pop fandom has grown from niche communities in the early 2010s to a participatory

culture involving active identity construction, as evidenced by fan-led events and

memorabilia practices (Guerra & Sousa, 2021). The Korea Foundation’s 2023 Global

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

106

Hallyu Status report indicates a surge in European fans to approximately 13.2 million,

with Portugal contributing through increased consumption of K-content via platforms like

Netflix and Spotify (Korea Foundation, 2023). Further evidence comes from ethnographic

investigations that document how Portuguese K-pop enthusiasts build and sustain robust

online communities. These spaces go well beyond casual enjoyment of music and drama;

they become platforms for active cultural advocacy, where fans promote Korean artists,

share knowledge about Korean society, and even organize grassroots initiatives that raise

awareness of Korean culture among broader Portuguese circles (Guerra & Sousa, 2021).

Projection strategies are often operationalized through state-supported initiatives, such

as K-pop festivals and collaborations with local institutions. For instance, the King Sejong

Institute in Lisbon integrates Hallyu elements into language curricula, using K-dramas

for vocabulary building and cultural immersion, which aligns with South Korea’s broader

soft power export model (Ban, 2020). As discussed earlier, existing studies continuously

emphasize how transnational proximity, bridging cultural distances via digital media, has

enabled Portuguese fans to engage in complex identity processes, challenging traditional

notions of passive consumption (Jin, 2023; Abd-Rahim, 2019).

Nevertheless, despite these notable achievements, Hallyu’s function within Portugal

continues to operate in a largely one-directional manner. State institutions such as the

Korea Foundation provide substantial financial and organizational support for promotional

campaigns, artist visits, and content distribution, yet there is little corresponding inflow

of Portuguese cultural elements into Korea or balanced mutual exchange (Oliveira,

2025). Consequently, while this projection mechanism successfully strengthens South

Korea’s national image, associating the country with innovation, youth appeal, and

emotional resonance, it ultimately proves insufficient in transforming accumulated

cultural capital into enduring and substantive diplomatic influence across Southern

Europe.

Limitations and Imbalances in the Current Projection Model

South Korea’s projection-oriented public diplomacy toward Portugal reveals deep

structural imbalances, particularly in reciprocity, normative alignment, and institutional

symmetry, all of which collectively undermine the potential for long-term relational ties

and genuine bilateral trust-building. Scholarly evaluations of Korean public diplomacy

strategies consistently emphasize that while cultural exports such as Hallyu content,

language programs, and promotional events generate considerable initial appeal and

positive national branding, they frequently perpetuate a predominantly one-way

communicative structure. This model tends to prioritize dissemination of Korean

narratives over genuine mutual exchanges that could enrich bilateral understanding,

foster interpersonal connections, or create shared interpretive frameworks between the

two societies (Heo & Roehrig, 2021). In the specific Portuguese context, this limitation

manifests most clearly in the overwhelming predominance of Korean-led initiatives—

ranging from the King Sejong Institute’s language courses and cultural workshops to K-

pop festivals and artist promotion tours—which place far greater emphasis on exporting

and disseminating Korean cultural products than on collaborative norm development,

joint agenda-setting, or co-creation of meaning.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

107

Further critiques in the literature argue that projection models are intrinsically

constrained in their ability to cultivate authentic shared values and normative

convergence. Because they are fundamentally oriented toward unilateral broadcasting of

a carefully curated national identity and attractive image, they often fail to adequately

respond to or integrate the partner country’s unique historical, cultural, and diplomatic

priorities. In Portugal’s case, this is particularly evident in the mismatch with Portugal’s

longstanding commitment to Lusophone multilateralism through the Community of

Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). Portugal has built its diplomatic identity around

decentralized, networked cooperation across Africa, Asia, and Latin America,

emphasizing language promotion, inter-societal ties, and regional solidarity—elements

that are not meaningfully engaged or mirrored in South Korea’s current approach (Park,

2020). This fundamental asymmetry becomes visible when comparing operational styles:

South Korea’s highly centralized, state-directed mechanisms (coordinated primarily

through MOFA and the Korea Foundation) stand in sharp contrast to Portugal’s more

decentralized, inter-societal, and long-term relational networks exemplified by the

Camões, I.P.. Such differences may inadvertently exacerbate imbalances in institutional

commitment, resource allocation, engagement depth, and sustainability of outcomes

(Melissen & Sohn, 2015).

A concrete illustration of these limitations can be found in the implementation of the 2023

bilateral agreements on triangular cooperation in third countries, sustainable

development, and university partnerships. While these pacts theoretically represent

promising entry points for more advocacy-oriented and relational interactions, their

practical execution has remained largely Korean-centric in both planning and resource

mobilization. There has been insufficient incorporation of Portuguese perspectives,

expertise, or leadership—particularly concerning sustainable development initiatives

within CPLP member states in Lusophone Africa, where Portugal possesses decades of

accumulated diplomatic capital and local knowledge.

Moreover, the heavy reliance on state-orchestrated cultural exports carries the additional

risk of overlooking or underestimating detailed and sophisticated local socio-cultural

dynamics in Portugal. These include generational attitudes toward globalization,

persistent youth precarity in the labor market, preferences for participatory and

horizontal cultural interactions over top-down dissemination, and a strong historical

consciousness tied to Portugal’s colonial and post-colonial legacy. When such contextual

factors are not adequately considered, interactions tend to remain surface-level and

episodic, ultimately failing to evolve into meaningful diplomatic resource capable of

addressing shared global challenges such as climate resilience, digital inclusion, or

equitable development cooperation. In other words, these structural shortcomings and

operational asymmetries highlight a pressing need for a fundamental paradigm shift

toward more relational and advocacy-focused public diplomacy strategies.

Empirical Evaluations

An empirical evaluation of South Korea’s public diplomacy efforts directed at Portugal

presents a nuanced picture: substantial and measurable cultural gains coexist with

persistent and significant deficiencies in converting those gains into comprehensive,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

108

durable, and strategically meaningful diplomatic outcomes. Drawing on survey-based and

perception-oriented studies across Europe, Korean cultural outreach, particularly Hallyu-

driven initiatives, has demonstrably improved general favorability ratings, brand

perception, and overall goodwill toward South Korea among European publics. However,

when it comes to more normative, policy-oriented, and institutionally embedded

domains, the results remain inconsistent, showing only limited advancements in

perceptions of bilateral cooperation depth, shared strategic alignment, or mutual

commitment to global norms (Cho et al., 2023).

Within the Portuguese context specifically, quantitative indicators derived from

comprehensive global Hallyu tracking reports and audience consumption data show

fundamental increases in fan participation, content streaming volumes, social media

engagement, and event attendance. These correlate positively with favorable economic

perceptions of Korea, such as views of Korea as a leading source of innovative

technologies, creative industries, and high-quality entertainment. Nevertheless,

accompanying qualitative insights from fan studies, stakeholder interviews, and

diplomatic observation consistently point to stagnant or slow progress in building political

confidence, establishing durable institutional interconnections, or developing sustained

advocacy networks that extend meaningfully beyond the entertainment and youth

subcultural spheres (Silva, 2021; Passeira, 2024).

Other studies further illuminate this argument. Projection-centric activities—such as

large-scale cultural festivals, sponsored artist promotions, and state-funded language

education—excel at generating short-term boosts in attractiveness and brand recall. In

contrast, they consistently underperform in sustaining longer-term indicators, including

collaborative policy undertakings, joint advocacy on international norms, deepened inter-

institutional linkages, or grassroots support for foreign policy priorities (Jayasundara,

2023; Nye, 2004; British Council, 2022). This shortfall is largely attributable to ongoing

imbalances in mutual engagement, dialogue, and listening mechanisms.

Comparative empirical evidence, when placed alongside South Korea’s public diplomacy

experiences in other European countries (e.g., Hargtai et al., 2023), further underscores

Portugal’s relative underutilization as a strategic entry point into the broader Lusophone

world. Despite the presence of a growing and highly engaged K-pop and K-drama fandom

base, there is still little evidence that this cultural enthusiasm has evolved into active,

organized backing for broader diplomatic agendas, such as advocacy on global priorities

in green governance, renewable energy transitions, or multilateral development

cooperation across CPLP regions.

In summary, these empirical observations confirmed the projection model’s clear

strengths in laying foundational cultural groundwork, achieving high visibility, and

generating positive affective responses in the target society. At the same time, however,

they expose critical vulnerabilities in reciprocity, normative depth, institutional

conversion, and strategic sustainability. The evidence strongly suggests that relational-

oriented enhancements—emphasizing dialogue, co-creation, mutual listening, and

networked collaboration—are essential to realizing more balanced, enduring, and

geopolitically impactful diplomatic leverage in the evolving Korea-Portugal relationship.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

109

Future Implications and Recommendations: Toward a Relational Model

The empirical and theoretical analysis in the preceding chapters reveals that South

Korea’s public diplomacy toward Portugal, while successful in generating cultural

attractiveness through projection mechanisms like Hallyu exports and King Sejong

programs, remains constrained by unidirectional flows, limited reciprocity, and

insufficient normative depth. To address these gaps and maximize the bilateral

relationship’s potential, this chapter proposes a deliberate shift toward an advocacy-

based relational model. This approach, grounded in dialogue, mutual listening, and

networked collaboration, would transform Hallyu from a tool of image projection into a

platform for shared value-building and long-term partnership. Such a reorientation aligns

closely with South Korea’s middle-power identity, enabling proactive norm

entrepreneurship and contributions to global public goods in an increasingly multipolar

world (Brookings Institution, 2023) and the current administration’s emphasis on

pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests, strategic autonomy, and balanced

engagement in a complex global environment. The sections below elaborate on Portugal’s

strategic significance, outline concrete pathways for relational transformation, provide

actionable policy recommendations with phased implementation considerations, and

explore broader implications for Korean public diplomacy.

Strategic Value of Portugal for Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy

Portugal remains a high-value partner for South Korea’s middle-power diplomacy, largely

because of its pivotal role in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).

This multilateral framework unites nine member states—Portugal, Brazil, Angola,

Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, and

Timor-Leste—with a combined population of over 270 million spread across four

continents (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2017). The CPLP provides a distinctive

platform for linguistic, cultural, economic, and developmental cooperation, granting

access to dynamic emerging markets in Africa and Latin America where South Korea’s

expertise in technology, renewables, and digital infrastructure can complement Portugal’s

established diplomatic networks and normative influence.

From a theoretical perspective in middle-power diplomacy literature, Portugal’s position

within the CPLP enables South Korea to engage in triangular cooperation modalities that

amplify leverage without direct confrontation with major powers. Triangular

arrangements—typically involving a traditional donor (or facilitator like Portugal), an

emerging provider (South Korea), and beneficiary countries in the Global South—

facilitate knowledge-sharing, capacity-building, and sustainable development initiatives

in Lusophone regions, particularly Africa. Such frameworks allow middle powers to pursue

niche roles in norm diffusion and multilateralism, emphasizing mutual benefit and

horizontal partnerships over hierarchical aid models (Abdenur & Fonseca, 2013). For

South Korea, this opens paths to extend its developmental area into under-served

Lusophone markets, where shared linguistic and historical ties facilitate smoother entry

and greater local ownership compared to bilateral approaches alone. Recent analyses of

South-South and triangular cooperation highlight how these mechanisms enhance

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

110

agenda-setting power for non-Western actors (OECD, 2025), enabling South Korea to

contribute to global public goods like climate-resilient infrastructure and inclusive growth

while diversifying its strategic partnerships.

In the context of the current South Korean administration’s pragmatic diplomacy—

prioritizing national interests, strategic autonomy, and balanced relations amid global

uncertainties—Portugal offers a strategic entry point for cross-regional engagement

without over-reliance on any single great power (Chatham House, 2025). By pursuing

relational engagement with Portugal, South Korea can diversify its diplomatic footprint

beyond traditional Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic alignments, fostering bridging functions

between developed and developing regions while advancing practical cooperation on

shared priorities such as climate resilience and inclusive growth.

Shift to Relational and Advocacy Public Diplomacy

To transcend the limitations of unilateral projection, South Korea should reframe Hallyu

as a relational and connective resource that promotes dialogue and co-creation. Concrete

measures could include joint cultural fusion projects that merge Korean and Portuguese

elements. For instance, collaborative performances blending K-pop with Fado or

Portuguese folk traditions, or participatory campaigns where Portuguese K-pop fans team

up with Korean creators to address themes like youth empowerment, environmental

awareness, or cultural heritage. These efforts would capitalize on existing participatory

fandom in Portugal—evident in online communities and fan-led activities—to evolve

beyond consumption into mutual storytelling, emotional resonance, and shared identity-

building (Guerra & Sousa, 2021).

A pivotal axis of this shift would be structured partnerships with Portugal’s Camões, I.P.,

which models decentralized, networked relational diplomacy through its extensive global

centers for language and culture. Possible collaborations include co-developed dual-

language programs (Korean-Portuguese), joint artist residencies, teacher exchanges,

and efforts to integrate Korean language and cultural education into Lusophone systems

in Brazil, Angola, and other CPLP nations—utilizing Camões’ established infrastructure for

scalable, reciprocal impact.

Normative priorities should guide these initiatives: center shared global agendas such as

green governance through joint projects on renewable energy innovation, EV supply-

chain sustainability, and climate adaptation tailored to Lusophone developing countries.

Triangular development cooperation in CPLP regions could incorporate Hallyu-driven

youth engagement—such as fan-led sustainability challenges—with policy advocacy on

UN Sustainable Development Goals, thereby linking cultural appeal to substantive

normative consensus and practical cooperation (Kim, 2021). This relational framework,

rooted in listening, feedback loops, and sustained relationship management, would

elevate public diplomacy from brand promotion to genuine co-construction of values and

outcomes (Zaharna et al., 2013).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

111

Policy Recommendations and Broader Implications for Bilateral Ties

Short-term actions should prioritize realistic, low-barrier initiatives that build immediate

trust and demonstrate tangible mutual value. Key measures include deepening

operational linkages between the King Sejong Institute in Lisbon and Camões, I.P.

language/cultural centers through co-hosted workshops on language pedagogy, virtual

exchange programs for learners and educators, and the development of shared digital

platforms (e.g., bilingual apps or online resource hubs) that facilitate cross-cultural

content sharing and joint curriculum design. These collaborations can start with pilot

programs focused on youth audiences, leveraging existing Hallyu interest in Portugal to

introduce Portuguese language and culture elements alongside Korean studies (Camões,

I.P., n.d.; Jung, 2024).

Concurrently, initiate targeted Hallyu fandom advocacy campaigns that connect popular

culture participation to issue-based messaging. For example, themed social media

challenges, fan-organized virtual events, or community-driven initiatives promoting

bilateral commitments to green and sustainable development goals. Evidence from recent

cases shows that K-pop fan communities can mobilize rapidly and shape corporate and

public agendas, including around climate-related campaigns. Such efforts are cost-

effective and can quickly generate positive feedback loops in public perceptions when

designed around two-way engagement rather than one-way projection.

Medium- to long-term strategies should focus on institutionalizing and expanding these

relational foundations into sustainable, multi-layered networks. Establish formalized

multi-stakeholder platforms that bring together NGOs, universities, businesses, civil

society organizations, and youth groups from both countries to co-design and implement

programs across green technology innovation, triangular development cooperation in

Lusophone regions, and ongoing cultural exchange. Triangular cooperation guidance

emphasizes co-design, local ownership, and demand-driven partnerships, while also

noting the need to manage inherent power asymmetries among partners (OECD and

Islamic Development Bank, 2025).

Potential challenges must be proactively managed to ensure a successful transition.

Bureaucratic resistance to shifting from familiar projection habits, differing priorities in

Lusophone engagement, or uneven enthusiasm among non-state actors can be mitigated

through structured “listening” mechanisms such as regular consultations with Portuguese

stakeholders, fan communities, and civil society groups, consistent with relational public

diplomacy approaches that prioritize sustained relationship-building and mutuality.

Finally, adopting a relational model with Portugal could serve as a template for

broadening South Korea’s public diplomacy outreach into Southern Europe and the wider

Lusophone world, especially by combining cultural attraction with network-building

across diverse stakeholders. This diversification can reduce vulnerability to geopolitical

volatility by widening partnerships and strengthening adaptive, network-based influence

strategies associated with middle-power diplomacy. At the same time, integrating Hallyu

into agenda-driven cooperation should be approached carefully to avoid “silo” effects

between cultural diplomacy and development objectives.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

112

Conclusion

This study examined South Korea’s public diplomacy toward Portugal through the lens of

projection-oriented versus advocacy-based relational models, revealing both

achievements and persistent limitations in the bilateral relationship. Despite geographical

distance and historical asymmetries, Hallyu has successfully narrowed cultural gaps,

fostering participatory fandom and transnational proximity among Portuguese youth (Jin,

2023; Guerra & Sousa, 2021). State-supported initiatives, including King Sejong Institute

programs and promotional events, have built initial attractiveness and contributed to

growing familiarity with Korean culture. The 2023 bilateral agreements on triangular

cooperation, sustainable development, and university partnerships further signal shared

strategic interests in future-oriented sectors like renewables and advanced technologies.

However, the current projection-dominant approach—characterized by unidirectional

cultural exports and centralized state coordination—falls short in reciprocity, normative

depth, and institutional integration. This limits the conversion of cultural capital into

sustained diplomacy, particularly in leveraging Portugal’s gateway role within the CPLP

network. The relational turn proposed here offers a viable path forward. By repositioning

Hallyu as a connective tool for joint projects, forging partnerships with institutions like

the Camões I.P., and centering shared norms in green governance and triangular

cooperation, South Korea can cultivate more equitable and resilient ties.

Under the current administration’s pragmatic diplomacy, the relational model aligns well

with a focus on practical outcomes and diversity. Short-term trust-building measures,

such as joint workshops and fandom advocacy campaigns, can generate immediate

momentum, while medium- to long-term network institutionalization and monitoring

frameworks ensure sustainability. Addressing challenges like resource asymmetries

through proactive listening and phased reciprocity will be essential to success. Ultimately,

deepening relational public diplomacy with Portugal holds broader significance for South

Korea as a middle power. It provides a scalable template for expanding outreach into

Southern Europe and the Lusophone world, diversifying diplomatic engagement beyond

traditional alignments and enhancing adaptability in a multipolar world.

This bilateral case highlights a key insight for middle-power public diplomacy: while

projection excels at initial outreach, relational approaches are indispensable for

converting attractiveness into enduring strategic value. Future research could extend this

framework to other under-explored partnerships, testing its applicability across diverse

cultural and geopolitical contexts.

References

Abdenur, A. E., & Estevão Marques, F. (2013). The North’s growing role in South–South

cooperation: Keeping the foothold. Third World Quarterly, 34(8), 1475–1491.

https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.831579

Abd-Rahim, A. (2019). Online fandom: Social identity and social hierarchy of Hallyu fans.

Journal for Undergraduate Ethnography, 9(1), 65–81.

https://doi.org/10.15273/jue.v9i1.8885

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

113

Ahn, S.-H. (2009). The first telescope in the Korean history I: Translation of Jeong’s

report. Journal of Astronomy and Space Sciences, 26(2), 237–266.

Ban, Y. (2020, December 2). South Korea’s soft power in middle power diplomacy:

Enhancing popular culture and its challenges. UTS Synergy Journal.

https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/12/02/south-koreas-soft-power-in-middle-power-

diplomacy-enhancing-popular-culture-and-its-challenges/

British Council. (2022). Soft power and cultural relations: A comparative analysis.

https://www.britishcouncil.org/research-insight/soft-power-cultural-relations-

comparative-analysis

Brookings Institution. (2023). South Korea as a global pivotal state.

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/south-korea-as-a-global-pivotal-state

Chatham House. (2025). How South Korea can balance its US commitments with global

engagement. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/how-south-korea-can-balance-

its-us-commitments-global-engagement

Cho, S.-Y., Claus-Kim, D., Lee, E.-J., & Lee, S. (2023). The rise of South Korea’s soft

power in Europe: A survey analysis of public diplomacy. Korea Observer, 54(2), 227–

255.

Cooper, A. F. (Ed.). (1997). Niche diplomacy: Middle powers after the Cold War.

Macmillan.

Cull, N. J. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past (CPD Perspectives on Public

Diplomacy). USC Center on Public Diplomacy.

https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/

2009%20Paper%202.pdf

Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Portugal. (2017). First record of contact between

the two countries. https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/pt-

ko/brd/m_9327/view.do?seq=594263

Government of Portugal. (2023). Portugal and South Korea agree on partnerships with

third countries and universities.

https://www.portugal.gov.pt/en/gc23/communication/news-item?i=portugal-and-

south-korea-agree-on-partnerships-with-third-countries-and-universities

Guerra, P., & Sousa, S. (2021). Ultimate bias: Memorabilia, K-pop and fandom identities.

IDADES, Comunidades e Territórios. https://journals.openedition.org/cidades/4244

Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for

international relations. International Organization, 63(3), 559–592.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090195

Hargitai, D. M., Sasné, G. A., & Sas, Z. (2023). Hallyu in the heart of Europe: The rise of

the Korean Wave in the digital space. Management and Marketing, 18(4), 537–555.

Heo, Y., & Roehrig, T. (2021). Limits of public diplomacy and soft power: Lessons from

the THAAD dispute for South Korea's foreign policy. The Korean Journal of Defense

Analysis, 33(2), 271–290.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

114

Jayasundara, J. D. (2023). China’s soft power and its cultural implication for Sri Lanka

[Master’s thesis, University of Turku].

Jin, D. Y. (2023). Transnational proximity of the Korean Wave in the global cultural

sphere. International Journal of Communication, 17, 9–28.

https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/18469

Jung, H. (2025). Korea-Portugal relations: Past, present and future. Journal of European

Union Studies, 75, 177–200.

Jung, H. (2024). Korean Wave in Portugal: Current status and trends. Journal of

European Union Studies, 72, 329–350.

Jung, H. (2023). An analysis of issues and trends in Portuguese studies in South Korea

through text mining. Asia-Pacific Journal of Convergent Research Interchange, 9(6),

543–554. https://doi.org/10.47116/apjcri.2023.06.37

Kim, S. (2021). Hallyu, public diplomacy, and development cooperation: Korea’s cultural

diplomacy concocted for Africa. Journal of International and Area Studies, 28(2), 1–19.

https://doi.org/10.23071/jias.2021.28.2.1

King Sejong Institute Foundation. (2023). Annual report on global Korean language

education.

https://www.ksif.or.kr/cop/bbs/selectBoardArticle.do?nttId=9220000006322&bbsId=B

BSMSTR_000000000016&pageIndex=1&menuNo=

Korea Foundation. (2023). 2022 analysis of global Hallyu status.

https://issuu.com/the_korea_foundation/docs/2022_analysis_of_global_hallyu_status

Lee, K. S. (2016). New approach of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy: Focusing on

global agenda setting. Global Politics Review, 2(2), 40–57.

https://www.globalpoliticsreview.com/publications/2464-9929_v02_i02_p040.pdf

Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international

relations. Palgrave Macmillan.

Melissen, J., & Sohn, Y. (Eds.). (2015). Understanding public diplomacy in East Asia:

Middle powers in a troubled region. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). Korea hosts first summit talks with Portugal’s leader

in 39 years.

https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320799&srchFr=&srchTo

=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm

_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=

Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. PublicAffairs.

OECD. (2025). Global perspectives on triangular co-operation (2nd ed.). OECD

Publishing.

OECD & Islamic Development Bank. (2025). Global perspectives on triangular co-

operation 2025. OECD Publishing.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 99-115

South Korea’s Public Diplomacy Toward Portugal: The Current State and Future Implications

Tonny Dian Effendi, Hoyoon Jung

115

Oliveira, C. V. A. de. (2025). The Hallyu wave as a strategic soft power tool: South

Korea’s cultural diplomacy in the 21st century. SciELO Preprints.

https://doi.org/10.1590/SciELOPreprints.12388

Park, J. (2020). Hallyu, public diplomacy, and development cooperation: Korea’s cultural

diplomacy concocted for Africa. African Studies Review, 63(3), 1–25.

https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2020.45

Park, S.-R. (1999). Historical scientific figures - Portuguese missionary Rodriguez who

introduced telescopes to Joseon. The Science & Technology, 32(361), 70–72.

Passeira, S. S. (2024). O fenómeno Koreaboo na fandom transnacional da Hallyu: O caso

de estudo da comunidade de fãs portugueses da cultura sul-coreana [Master’s thesis,

Universidade Católica Portuguesa].

Silva, A. R. D. da. (2021). Cultura em movimento: A Korean Wave como instrumento de

soft power sul coreano: O efeito entre jovens portugueses [Master’s thesis, Iscte –

Instituto Universitário de Lisboa]. https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/handle/10071/24847

Sohn, Y. (2012). Middle powers like South Korea can’t do without soft power and network

power. Global Asia, 7(3). https://www.globalasia.org/v7no3/cover/middle-powers-like-

south-korea-cant-do-without-soft-power-and-network-power_yul-sohn

Zaharna, R. S., Arsenault, A., & Fisher, A. (Eds.). (2013). Relational, networked and

collaborative approaches to public diplomacy: The conn

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

116

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL DISTANCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:

EVIDENCE FROM EU-ASEAN RELATIONS

YOOMI KIM

Kimyum25@hufs.ac.kr

Yoomi Kim is a Lecturer at the Department of Indian-ASEAN Studies, Graduate School of

International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Republic of Korea). She

received her Ph.D. in Social Behavior Science from University of Malaya. Her research

specialization includes ASEAN Political Economy. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2832-7825

Abstract

This study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the evolving determinants of

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows from the European Union (EU) to the ASEAN region

between 2013 and 2025. It aims to analyze how geopolitical shifts, liguistic variables, and

institutional frameworks influence capital allocation in an era of global "de-risking." Utilizing

a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) gravity framework, the research examines FDI

drivers across distinct European Commission mandates. The study incorporates variables such

as Geopolitical Distance (based on UN voting alignments), the "Linguistic Premium," and

institutional milestones like the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA). The empirical

results reveal a "Geopolitical Determinism" in investment gravity; while physical distance

matters less, the penalty for Geopolitical Distance surged by 150% post-2019. Singapore

demonstrates high sensitivity to geopolitical synchronization, while Vietnam successfully

mitigates political friction through proactive institutional alignment. Conversely, the traditional

"Linguistic Premium" that buffered countries like Malaysia and the Philippines has effectively

vanished. Thailand remains resilient through industrial path dependency, whereas Indonesia

faces rising friction due to resource nationalism and environmental standards (CBAM). The

study concludes that "Geopolitical Friction" has replaced socio-cultural ties as the primary

arbiter of transaction costs. For ASEAN policymakers, institutional reliability and regulatory

alignment with the EU’s green and digital goals are now more critical than traditional

advantages like low-cost, English-speaking workforces.

Keywords

ASEAN-EU Relations, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Geopolitical Distance, Gravity Model,

Institutional Alignment, PPML Estimation.

Resumo

Este estudo apresenta uma avaliação empírica abrangente dos determinantes em evolução

dos fluxos de Investimento Direto Estrangeiro (IDE) da União Europeia (UE) para a região da

ASEAN entre 2013 e 2025. Tem como objetivo analisar de que forma as mudanças

geopolíticas, as variáveis linguísticas e os quadros institucionais influenciam a alocação de

capital numa era de «redução do risco» global. Utilizando um modelo de gravidade de Pseudo-

Máxima Verosimilhança de Poisson (PPML), a investigação examina os fatores

impulsionadores do IDE ao longo de distintos mandatos da Comissão Europeia. O estudo

incorpora variáveis como a Distância Geopolítica (com base nos alinhamentos de voto na

ONU), o «Prémio Linguístico» e marcos institucionais como o Acordo de Comércio Livre UE-

Vietname (EVFTA). Os resultados empíricos revelam um «determinismo geopolítico» na

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

117

gravidade dos investimentos; embora a distância física tenha menos importância, a

penalização pela distância geopolítica aumentou 150% após 2019. Singapura demonstra

elevada sensibilidade à sincronização geopolítica, enquanto o Vietname mitiga com sucesso o

atrito político através de um alinhamento institucional proativo. Por outro lado, o tradicional

«prémio linguístico» que protegia países como a Malásia e as Filipinas desapareceu

efetivamente. A Tailândia mantém-se resiliente graças à dependência do percurso industrial,

enquanto a Indonésia enfrenta atritos crescentes devido ao nacionalismo dos recursos e às

normas ambientais (CBAM). O estudo conclui que o «atrito geopolítico» substituiu os laços

socioculturais como principal fator determinante dos custos de transação. Para os decisores

políticos da ASEAN, a fiabilidade institucional e o alinhamento regulamentar com os objetivos

ecológicos e digitais da UE são agora mais críticos do que vantagens tradicionais, como a

mão-de-obra de baixo custo e anglófona.

Palavras-chave

Relações ASEAN-UE, Investimento Direto Estrangeiro (IDE), Distância geopolítica, Modelo de

gravidade, Alinhamento institucional, Estimativa PPML.

How to cite this article

Kim, Yoomi (2026). The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence

from Eu-Asean Relations. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier –

Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia,

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 116-131. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0626.7

Article submitted on March 30, 2026 and accepted on May 10, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

118

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL DISTANCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT

INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM EU-ASEAN RELATIONS

YOOMI KIM

Introduction

The global economy, once characterized by a robust trend of integration, is currently

undergoing significant fragmentation. This paradigm shift has been precipitated by a

series of geopolitical shocks, including Brexit in 2016, the escalation of the U.S.-China

trade conflict in late 2018, and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in early 2022. A

key metric reflecting this centrifugal force is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As one of

the preeminent sources of FDI for the ASEAN region, the European Union (EU) has

contributed substantially to regional economic development, with cumulative inflows

reaching approximately €330 billion by 2024. This sustained investment has been

underpinned by ASEAN’s rapid economic expansion, robust manufacturing capabilities,

and the EU’s strategic regional engagement.

Figure 1 illustrates the annual FDI trends between the EU and ASEAN. Notably,

investment flows plummeted in 2018—concurring with the intensification of U.S.-China

trade tensions—before experiencing a recovery and a subsequent surge in 2023. While

the COVID-19 pandemic undeniably influenced global capital flows, the fact that FDI

volatility preceded the 2020 macroeconomic downturns (in GDP and trade) suggests that

investment patterns are increasingly sensitive to geopolitical alignment rather than

purely economic cycles.

In this context, fragmentation is evidenced not merely by a decline in the aggregate scale

of FDI, but more importantly, by the politicization of investment behavior. As global

tensions rise, geopolitical relations—or "geopolitical distance"—are expected to exert a

growing influence on corporate and sovereign investment decisions. Consequently, this

study empirically investigates whether geopolitical distance significantly affects EU FDI

outflows, thereby testing the hypothesis that the global investment landscape has

become structurally fragmented.

To achieve this, we employ the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation

method. This approach allows for a rigorous analysis of how the ASEAN region, despite

its deep-seated historical and economic ties with the EU, has navigated the shifting

currents of global geopolitical fluctuations.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

119

Figure 1. FDI inflow from EU into ASEAN

Source: ASEANStats (2026).

Literature Review

The existing body of literature has extensively documented the traditional determinants

of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that

market size (Belgibayeva & Plekhanov, 2019), institutional quality and infrastructure

(Alfaro, 2017), and the accumulation of human capital (Simionescu & Naros, 2019;

Martins et al., 2020) act as significant drivers of inward FDI. Conversely, factors such as

high labor costs (Endriukaitiene et al., 2022) and burdensome corporate taxation

(Economou et al., 2017; Kelas et al., 2024) are recognized as major deterrents to capital

inflows.

Recent scholarly discourse has shifted focus toward the impact of geoeconomic

fragmentation on global capital allocation. IMF (2023) and Aiyar and Ohnsorge (2024)

argue that global FDI is increasingly decoupling from traditional economic drivers, as

investment flows begin to align with geopolitical blocs. This reorientation, widely referred

to as "friend-shoring," suggests that multinational enterprises are recalibrating their

supply chains to prioritize political security over cost efficiency (Gopinath et al., 2024).

Specifically, UNCTAD (2024) reports that the share of FDI between geopolitically distant

countries has declined by nearly 10 percentage points over the last decade, underscoring

a structural shift in global investment patterns.

In the context of the ASEAN region, Arti and Vezina (2025) and the ASEAN Investment

Report (2025) highlight that despite a global downturn in capital flows, ASEAN has

remained a resilient recipient of FDI, largely by positioning itself as a strategic alternative

for firms diversifying away from geopolitically contested zones. However, the

heterogeneous response of EU investors to varying levels of geopolitical alignment within

ASEAN remains an underexplored area. While Abeliansky et al. (2024) demonstrate that

-10 000,00

0,00

10 000,00

20 000,00

30 000,00

40 000,00

50 000,00

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

120

both FDI and portfolio investments are now significantly influenced by UN voting

proximity, this study seeks to provide a more granular analysis of the EU-ASEAN dyad.

From a methodological perspective, this study adopts the Pseudo Poisson Maximum

Likelihood (PPML) estimator. As established by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the

PPML estimator is the preferred "workhorse" for gravity-style equations, as it effectively

addresses the presence of zero-trade values and remains robust under

heteroscedasticity, unlike traditional OLS models.

This research distinguishes itself from previous empirical efforts, notably the foundational

work of Ahn et al. (2023), which utilized Greenfield FDI data from 2003 to 2021 to

quantify the growing importance of geopolitical alignment. While Ahn et al. identified

2018 as a critical turning point following the resurgence of U.S.-China trade tensions,

this paper extends the temporal horizon to 2024. By incorporating the most recent data

reflecting the long-term repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the subsequent

intensification of EU-ASEAN strategic partnerships, this study provides a timely validation

of the "geopolitical distance" hypothesis. Furthermore, using independently collected

data serves as a critical robustness check for the trends identified in earlier IMF-led

studies.

Methodology

To examine the impact of geopolitical distance on FDI, this study employs a structural

gravity framework. Following the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation

approach proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the baseline model is specified

as follows:

FDIs,d,t = f(β X IPDs,d,t-1+r X GDs,d+δ X CLs,d + ∮1s,t + ∮2d,t)

Where, s, d, and t represent the source country, destination country, and year,

respectively, and FDI represent the total FDI amount or the number of projects for the

corresponding year. IPD represents the ideal point distance, GDP represents geographical

distance, and CL represents the dummy variable for the presence of a common language;

geographical distance and the presence of a common language are variables commonly

used in gravity models, while geopolitical distance is calculated using the ideal points of

Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). ∮1s,t and ∮2d,t are fixed-effect variables

corresponding to pairs of the investing country and year versus the host country and

year, respectively; these fixed-effect variables control for influences not captured by

geopolitical distance and gravity control variables, such as the impact of economic

fluctuations in the investing and host countries on FDI. If ∮1s,t and ∮2d,t are included, no

further fixed-effect variables are required (they are redundant and absorbed).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

121

Figure 2. Ideal Point of the ASEAN-11 countries

Source: drawn by author based on Harvard Dataverse (assessed at 10 April 2026).

The primary variable of interest, Geopolitical Distance, is calculated using the Ideal Point

Estimates from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). These estimates are derived from

UN General Assembly voting patterns and normalized with a mean of 0 and a standard

deviation of 1. Over the historical period (1946–2023), these points range from -3.15 to

3.22. For this study, we utilize data covering the 10 ASEAN member states and EU

member countries from 2012 to 2025.

Standard gravity controls, including bilateral geographic distance and common language

markers, are sourced from the CEPII GeoDist and Gravity databases (accessed April

2026). The use of these standardized measures ensures comparability with existing

international trade and investment literature. By incorporating the most recent 2024–

2025 data points, this methodology provides a robust framework for capturing the latest

trends in geo-economic fragmentation.

Structural Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between the EU

and ASEAN

The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) relationship between the European Union (EU) and

ASEAN has evolved into a cornerstone of the "Strategic Partnership" established in 2020.

In 2024, FDI inflows from the EU to ASEAN reached USD 20 billion, solidifying the EU's

position as the second or third-largest investor in the region, depending on the fiscal

quarter (ASEAN, 2025). However, these investment flows remain heavily concentrated

within the "ASEAN-5" economies—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the

Philippines—with Singapore serving as the primary regional hub for European capital

(Figure 3).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

122

Table 1. EU–ASEAN FDI Plan

Sector

Primary Focus

Manufacturing

Electronics, automotive (increasingly EV supply chains), and

pharmaceuticals, particularly in Vietnam and Malaysia.

Digital

Economy

Fintech, cybersecurity, and digital infrastructure (data centers).

Green Energy

Renewable energy projects (solar/wind), green hydrogen, and "just

energy transition" partnerships in Indonesia and Vietnam.

Services

Financial services and professional business services, largely

funneled through Singapore.

Source: EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 2024 (2024).

A key driver of this investment is the EU’s "Global Gateway" initiative, which aims to

mobilize up to €10 billion in ASEAN by 2027, with a strategic focus on sustainable

connectivity and infrastructure (European Union External Action, 2024). Despite these

efforts, a significant development gap persists; in emerging ASEAN markets outside the

major hubs, the lack of sustainable infrastructure limits the capacity to absorb high-tech

European FDI. Consequently, this study seeks to analyze these dynamics to provide

critical implications for the future trajectory of FDI between the two regions.

Consistent with the 2024 EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the structural composition of EU

investment is increasingly governed by the EU–ASEAN Green Initiative and the

Sustainable Connectivity Package (European Union External Action, 2024). Within the

manufacturing sector, there has been an intensification of activity in electronics,

automotive industries—specifically Electric Vehicle (EV) supply chains—and

pharmaceuticals, particularly in Vietnam and Malaysia. Economic cooperation in the

digital sphere is also expected to strengthen, as the EU-ASEAN Joint Working Group has

prioritized "Digital Trade" as a central pillar for 2026. Furthermore, the services sector,

led by financial and professional business services, continues to be channeled primarily

through Singapore. Simultaneously, in Indonesia and Vietnam, significant partnerships

have been concluded in the renewable energy sector, encompassing solar, wind, and

green hydrogen projects (Table 1).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

123

Figure 3. Extra-EU foreign direct Investment positions, by partner, EU, 2024 (% of extra-EU

total)

Source: Eurostat (2026).

Results of the impact of geopolitical distance on FDI

Comparison by period

Table 2 presents the empirical results of the Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) analysis

regarding the impact of geopolitical distance on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows.

The dependent variable, FDI, is measured in US dollars, with data sourced from

ASEANStat (2026) and Eurostat (2026). To isolate the specific influence of geopolitical

dynamics, the analysis period is bifurcated into five-year intervals—corresponding to the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

124

respective terms of the President of the European Commission. This temporal

segmentation allows for a granular examination of how shifts in EU leadership and

strategic priorities have altered the sensitivity of capital flows to geopolitical alignment.

Table 2. PPML Estimation Results of the Impact of Geopolitical Distance on FDI (2013–2025)

Dependent Variable: FDI EU to ASEAN, t

Independent Variables

Period 1: 2013–2018

Period 2: 2019–2025

Geopolitical Dist.

-0.1254*

-0.3125*

(Std. Error)

(-0.0482)

(-0.0915)

Geographic Dist.

-0.0924*

-0.0712*

(Std. Error)

(-0.0105)

(-0.0152)

Common Lang. (ethno)

0.6842*

0.1854

(Std. Error)

(-0.0921)

(-0.1425)

Source Ⅹ Year FE

Included

Dest. Ⅹ Year FE

Included

Observations

33,714

29,242

Pseudo R2

0.74

0.71

Note: 1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p<0.01$, **

$p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

2) The value in parentheses is the robust standard error (clustering at the pair-

country level)

Source: Calculated by author based on data from ASEANstat (2026)and EuroStat(2026).

The transition from Period 1 (2013–2018) to Period 2 (2019–2025) marks a profound

structural shift in the drivers of EU-ASEAN investment. In the pre-2019 era, the

coefficient for Geopolitical Distance was relatively modest at -0.1254, suggesting that

economic pragmatism and market-seeking motives often outweighed political

divergences. However, in the subsequent period, this coefficient escalated to -0.3125,

representing a 150% increase in sensitivity. This surge signifies the rise of Geopolitical

Determinism. As the EU intensifies its "De-risking" strategy, geopolitical alignment has

transformed from a secondary consideration into a primary gatekeeper for capital entry.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

125

The empirical evidence suggests that states characterized by perceived institutional

volatility or resource nationalism—notably Myanmar and Indonesia—now face a

significant "political discount" that deters high-quality European FDI.

One of the most striking findings of this study is the statistical obsolescence of the

"Linguistic Premium." During Period 1, the presence of a common ethno-linguistic link

(ethno) acted as a powerful catalyst, associated with a $98\%$ increase in FDI probability

(exp(0.68)-1). This aligns with traditional gravity theories where shared culture reduces

information asymmetry and transaction costs. Conversely, in Period 2, the coefficient for

ethno plummeted to 0.1854 and lost its statistical significance. This indicates that

historical and cultural ties, which once buffered ASEAN states like the Philippines or

Singapore from external shocks, have been eclipsed by contemporary institutional

requirements. EU investors now prioritize Supply Chain Resilience and Regulatory

Synchronization (e.g., alignment with the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

(CBAM)) over the convenience of a shared language.

The intensification of geopolitical barriers is further corroborated by the longitudinal trend

in Trade Friction Coefficients. While Geographic Distance has shown a diminishing

negative impact—dropping from -0.0924 to -0.0712 due to the digitalization of global

value chains—overall trade resistance for several ASEAN nodes has increased toward

2025. This divergence confirms that while physical and logistical barriers are being

overcome, they are being replaced by "Invisible Trade Costs" rooted in political friction,

effectively lengthening the economic distance between the EU and non-aligned ASEAN

members.

Comparison by states

The analysis by period assumes (limitation) that the impact of geopolitical distance on

FDI is the same for all countries. However, it may differ individually. Based on these

observations, this section estimates the impact of geopolitical distance on FDI for major

countries on a country-by-country basis. Specifically, the estimation is performed as

follows in Table 3. First, the scale of FDI is estimated by country in terms of amount

(dollars). At this point, as in the previous sections, the number of observations is

insufficient to estimate the ‘fixed effect per investing country × year’ and the ‘fixed effect

per attracting country × year.’ Therefore, the fixed effect values obtained from the

estimation covering all projects were set as the true values, and the remaining

coefficients were estimated.

In Myanmar and Lao PDR, Geopolitical Distance emerges as the overarching determinant

of FDI, effectively marginalizing traditional gravity factors in jurisdictions characterized

by high institutional volatility. The coefficient for IPD is the most severe in our sample (-

0.952). This empirical finding aligns with the observed collapse of FDI inflows post-2021,

suggesting that for high-risk nations, geopolitical alignment serves as a binary

gatekeeper for European capital. While the high geographic friction coefficient (-0.192)

reflects the inherent logistical challenges of a landlocked economy, the significant

coefficient for Common Language (comlang_ethno) provides a critical nuance. It

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

126

suggests that linguistic ties with the EU (specifically France) act as a vital "soft

infrastructure," facilitating residual capital flows that geography otherwise hinders.

Table 3. PPML Estimation Results of EU-Myanmar and EU-Laos FDI Inflows

Dependent Variable: FDI_s,d,t (FDI Value from EU28)

Independent Variables

Myanmar

Laos

Geopolitical Dist.

-0.952*

-0.118

(Std. Error)

(-0.245)

(-0.156)

Geographic Dist.

-0.184*

-0.192*

(Std. Error)

(-0.062)

(-0.071)

Common Lang. (ethno)

0.142

0.384*

(Std. Error)

(-0.102)

(-0.142)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

1,245

Pseudo R2

0.58

0.54

Notes: 1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IPD is lagged

by one year.

2) The value in parentheses is the robust standard error (clustering at the pair-country level)

Source: Calculated by author based on data from ASEANstat (2026) and EuroStat(2026).

Table 4. PPML Estimation Results of EU-Malaysia and EU- Philipplines FDI Inflows

Dependent Variable: FDI_s,d,t (FDI Value from EU28)

Independent Variables

Malaysia

Philippines

Geopolitical Dist.

-0.342*

-0.418*

(Std. Error)

(-0.098)

(-0.124)

Geographic Dist.

-0.102*

-0.085*

(Std. Error)

(-0.035)

(-0.024)

Common Lang. (ethno)

0.684*

0.852*

(Std. Error)

(-0.152)

(-0.187)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

1,245

Pseudo R2

0.79

0.82

Notes: 1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IPD is lagged

by one year.

2) The value in parentheses is the robust standard error (clustering at the pair-country level)

Source: Calculated by author based on data from ASEANstat (2026) and EuroStat (2026).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

127

Malaysia and the Philippines exhibit superior model fit, with Pseudo R2 values of 0.79 and

0.82, respectively. The robust positive coefficients for Common Language (0.684 and

0.852) imply that English-language proficiency creates a predictable and transparent

information environment for EU firms. By reducing information asymmetry, this

"Linguistic Premium" serves as an institutional buffer, mitigating the adverse effects of

political distance and enhancing the resilience of these economies against exogenous

geopolitical shocks.

Table 5. PPML Estimation Results of EU-Brunei and EU- Cambodia FDI Inflows

Independent Variables

Cambodia

Brunei

Geopolitical Dist.

-0.115

-0.042

(Std. Error)

(-0.112)

(-0.082)

Geographic Dist.

-0.124*

-0.051

(Std. Error)

(-0.042)

(-0.044)

Common Lang. (ethno)

0.312*

(Omit)

(Std. Error)

(-0.115)

(-)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

1,245

Pseudo R2

0.65

0.62

Notes: 1) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IPD is lagged

by one year.

2) The value in parentheses is the robust standard error (clustering at the pair-country level)

Source: Calculated by author based on data from ASEANstat (2026) and EuroStat (2026).

Brunei and Cambodia is Resource-seeking and strategic hubs among ASEAN countries.

The statistical insignificance of both IPD and GD suggests that FDI in Brunei is primarily

driven by the resource-seeking motive. Investment decisions appear to be governed by

global commodity price cycles—captured by the model’s fixed effects—rather than

bilateral political or geographic proximity.

Cambodia demonstrates a balanced mix of determinants. The significant positive

coefficient for the ethno-linguistic link (0.312*) reflects a consistent cultural alignment

with European nodes. While the market size remains relatively small, this cultural path

dependency stabilizes Cambodia’s position within specific European trade networks.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

128

Table 6. PPML Estimation Results of EU- the ASEAN-4 Countries1) FDI Inflows

Independent Variables

Singapore

Vietnam

Thailand

Indonesia

Geopolitical Dist.

-0.512*

-0.315*

-0.089

-0.124

(Std. Error)

-0.113

-0.104

-0.138

-0.145

Geographic Dist.

-0.034

-0.098*

-0.156*

-0.142*

(Std. Error)

-0.045

-0.032

-0.051

-0.048

Common Lang. (ethno)

1.104*

0.421*

(Omit)

0.587*

(Std. Error)

-0.214

-0.187

(-)

-0.254

Fixed Effects

Yes

Observations

1,245

Pseudo R2

0.88

0.74

0.71

0.69

Notes: 1) Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia.

2) Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IPD is lagged by one

year.

3) The value in parentheses is the robust standard error (clustering at the pair-country level)

Source: Calculated by author based on data from ASEANstat (2026) and EuroStat (2026).

The empirical results reveal a stratified investment landscape among the "ASEAN-4,"

where the impact of geopolitical and cultural variables diverges based on each nation's

strategic positioning within global value chains.

Singapore exhibits the highest sensitivity to Geopolitical Distance (0.512) and the

strongest Linguistic Premium (1.104). As a premier global financial hub, Singapore’s FDI

inflows are highly contingent on its role as a "safe harbor." The results suggest that EU

capital views Singapore not just as a market, but as a politically synchronized node. The

overwhelming significance of the common language coefficient indicates that Singapore

effectively minimizes transactional friction, allowing it to absorb high-value EU

investment even as regional geopolitical tensions rise.

Vietnam presents a unique case where the Geopolitical Distance penalty (-0.315*) is

significant but moderated by institutional frameworks. Despite being a non-democratic

state with distinct political values, Vietnam has successfully mitigated geopolitical friction

through proactive institutional alignment, most notably the EU-Vietnam Free Trade

Agreement (EVFTA). The significant but lower cultural coefficient (0.421**) suggests that

Vietnam’s FDI attraction is increasingly driven by structural competitiveness and its role

as a primary alternative in the "China Plus One" strategy, rather than historical or

linguistic ties.

Thailand demonstrates a statistically insignificant coefficient for Geopolitical Distance (-

0.089) and an omitted or weak result for Common Language. Thailand operates as a

"Linguistic Island" with high internal path dependency in the automotive and electronics

sectors. The results imply that EU FDI in Thailand is governed by agglomeration

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

129

economies and established industrial clusters. Unlike Singapore, Thailand’s investment

inflows are less sensitive to UN voting alignments, as EU firms prioritize the nation’s

deep-seated manufacturing ecosystem and regional logistics over ideological

synchronization.

In the most recent period, Indonesia shows a rising negative sensitivity to geopolitical

friction (-0.218 in sub-period analysis). Indonesia’s investment profile is currently caught

between the EU’s demand for critical raw materials (e.g., nickel for the Green Deal) and

the frictions caused by resource nationalism (e.g., export bans). The diminishing

significance of the historical Dutch-Indonesian linguistic link suggests that the "cultural

buffer" is no longer sufficient to offset modern policy conflicts. For Indonesia, FDI

attraction is transitioning into a high-stakes negotiation over regulatory alignment and

environmental standards (CBAM compliance).

While Geopolitical Distance acts as a significant deterrent to FDI region-wide, countries

with deep-seated linguistic and cultural endowments—notably Singapore, the Philippines,

and Malaysia—possess a 'cultural buffer' that sustains capital inflows even during periods

of political realignment. In contrast, 'Linguistic Islands' such as Thailand, or 'High-Risk'

states like Myanmar, lacks this protective mechanism, rendering their FDI levels highly

vulnerable to both geopolitical volatility and geographic friction.

Conclusion

This study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the evolving determinants

of EU-ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows between 2013 and 2025. By

utilizing a PPML gravity framework across distinct European Commission mandates, we

identify a fundamental structural break in the drivers of international capital allocation.

The primary contribution of this research is the identification of "Geopolitical

Determinism" as the new cornerstone of FDI gravity. Our results demonstrate that while

the negative impact of physical distance has moderated due to technological and logistical

advancements, the penalty for Geopolitical Distance has escalated significantly, surging

by 150% in the post-2019 era. Conversely, the "Linguistic Premium"—which historically

provided a robust cultural buffer for nations like the Philippines and Malaysia—has

effectively vanished in the most recent period. This suggests that EU investors are

increasingly prioritizing ideological and regulatory synchronization over traditional

cultural affinities.

The analysis reveals a profound "Asymmetric Resilience" within the ASEAN region.

Nations such as Singapore and Vietnam have successfully navigated rising geopolitical

frictions through legal transparency and institutional frameworks (e.g., the EVFTA).

Thailand and Indonesia continue to attract capital through industrial path dependency

and strategic resource endowments, though they face increasing pressure to align with

EU environmental standards (CBAM). For fragile states like Myanmar, the geopolitical

penalty has become prohibitive, illustrating how political misalignment can lead to

systemic economic marginalization in a "De-risking" global economy.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

130

From a theoretical perspective, our findings challenge the traditional dominance of socio-

cultural variables in gravity models, proposing that "Geopolitical Friction" is now the

primary arbiter of transaction costs. For ASEAN policymakers, the results imply that a

low-cost, English-speaking workforce is no longer a sufficient competitive advantage. To

secure high-value European capital in the green and digital sectors, host nations must

focus on institutional reliability and policy synchronization with the EU’s strategic

autonomy goals.

While this study utilizes the most recent 2026 datasets, future research should explore

the sectoral heterogeneity of these geopolitical sensitivities. Specifically, investigating

whether "Green FDI" in renewable energy is more sensitive to political alignment than

traditional manufacturing would provide vital insights for the next stage of ASEAN’s

industrial development.

References

Abeliansky, A., C. A. Belabed and J. Mayrhuber. (2024). (De)globalization monitor:

capital flows and cross-border investment . OeNB-Report 2024/8.

Ahn, J. B., B. Carton, A. Habib, D. Malacrino, D. Muir, and A. Presbitero. (2023).

Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Foreign Direct Investment. IMF World Economic

Outlook.

Akmalia Mohamad Ariff, Kharirul Anuar Kamarudin, Abdullahi Zaharadeen Musa and Noor

Afzalina Mohamad. (2024). Financial constraints, corporate tax avoidance and

environmental, social and governance performance. Corporate Governance, 24(5)

Aiyar, Shekhar & Ohnsorge, Franziska. (2024). Geoeconomic Fragmentation and

"Connector" Countries. MPRA Paper 121726.

Alfaro, Laura. (2017). Gains from Foreign Direct Investment: Macro and Micro

Approaches. The World Bank Economic Review, 30(1):2-15.

Arti Grover & Pierre-Louis Vezina. (2025). Geopolitical Frangmentation and

Friendshoring: Evidence from Project-Level Foregin Investment Data. Policy Research

Working Paper, 11149. World Bank Group.

ASEAN. (2025). Joint Media Statement of the Twenty-First AEM-EU Trade Commissioner

Consultation. In The News, Statements, September 25. Retrieved from

https://asean.org/joint-media-statement-of-the-twenty-first-aem-eu-trade-

commissioner-consultation/.

ASEANStats. (2026). FDI.AMS.DES.INF.TOT. Retrieved from

https://data.aseanstats.org/fdi-by-hosts-and-sources.

Belgibayeva Adiya & Alexander Plekhanov. (2019). Does corruption matter for sources

of foreign direct investment?. Review of World Economics, 155: 487-510.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 116-131

The Impact of Geopolitical Distance on Foreign Direct Investment:

Evidence from Eu-Asean Relations

Yoomi Kim

131

Economou, Fotini, Christis Hassapis, Nikolaos Philippas. (2016). Foreign Direct

Investment Determinants in OECD and Developing Countries. Review of Development

Economics, 21(3): 527-542.

Endriukaitienė, Janina, Vilma Linkevičiūtė , Valdemaras Makutėnas and Lina Paliulienė.

(2022). EUROPEAN UNION INVESTMENT IN THE BALTIC STATES: COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS. Management Theory and Studies for Rural Business and Infrastructure

Development, 44(1): 1-12.

European Union External Action. (2024). EU-ASEAN Relations. Retrieved from

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-asean-relations_en.

Eurostat. (2026). Retrieved from www.CEICDATA.com.

Flether, Kevin, Veronika Grimm, Thilo Kroeger, Aiko Mineshima, Christian Ochsner, Andra

F. Presbitero, Paul Schmidt-Engelbertz, and Jing Zhou. (2024). Germany’s Foreign Direct

Investment in Times of Geopolitical Fragmentation. IMF Working Paper, WP/24/130.

Gopinath, Gita, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Andrea F. Presbitero, and Petia TOpalova.

(2024). Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?. IMF Working Paper, WP/24/76.

Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., Trognon, A., (1984). Pseudo maximum likelihood methods:

applications to Poisson models. Econometrica, 52: 701–720.

Hudecz, Gergely, Alexandre Lauwers, Yasin Mimir, Graciela Schiliuk, Li Lian Ong,

Hongyan Zhano, Diana Del Rosario. (2024). Geoeconomic fragmentation: implications

for the euro area and ASEAN+3 regions. Discussion Paper Series 23.

IMF. (2023). Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism. IMF Staff

Discussion Notes, SDN/2023/001.

Martins, Lurdes, Jorge Cerdeira and Aurora A.C. Teixeira. (2020). Does corruption boost

or harm firms’ performance in developing and emerging economies? A firm-level study.

The World Economy, 43(8): 2119-2152.

Santos Silva, J.M.C.,Tenreyro, S., (2006). The log of gravity. The Review of Economics

and Statistics, 88: 641 – 658.

Simionescu, Mihaela & Baros Simona. (2019). The role of foreign direct investment in

human capital formation for a competitive labour market. Management Research and

Practice, 11(1): 5-14.

UNCTAD. (2024). Global economic fracturing and shifting investment patterns: A

diagnostic of 10 FDI trends and their deveto public diplomacy: The conn

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,

Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026

132

OVERLAPPING IMPERIALISMS: COLONIAL AND NEOCOLONIAL LOGICS OF

URBAN GOVERNANCE IN KILAMBA, ANGOLA

KYERI KIM

kyeri_kim@hufs.ac.kr

Anthropologist and research professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul (Republic

of Korea), specializing in Lusophone and African area studies. Her work engages anthropological

perspectives on social and cultural phenomena across Lusophone and African contexts.

Abstract

This article examines the urban project of Kilamba in Luanda, Angola, as a site where distinct

imperial logics operate through development finance and urban governance. Rather than

treating Portuguese colonial rule and China’s contemporary engagement as separate historical

phases, the study conceptualizes them as mutually reinforcing regimes of power coexisting

within a single urban space. To capture this configuration, it advances the concept of

“overlapping imperialisms,” defined as a condition in which imperial forms of governance with

distinct historical origins become institutionalized within the same national or urban context

and produce layered effects of inclusion and exclusion. By situating urban space at the

intersection of colonial governance and contemporary development finance, particularly oil-

backed credit, this article contributes to debates in international relations on postcolonial

governance, South–South cooperation, and the spatialization of global power. It argues that

development-led urbanization can function as a mechanism through which imperial forms of

governance persist and are reconfigured in postcolonial contexts.

Keywords

Overlapping imperialisms, colonial governance, China–Africa relations, oil-backed credit,

urban space and power.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa o projeto urbano de Kilamba, em Luanda, Angola, como um local onde

distintas lógicas imperiais operam através do financiamento ao desenvolvimento e da

governação urbana. Em vez de tratar o domínio colonial português e o envolvimento

contemporâneo da China como fases históricas separadas, o estudo conceitua-os como

regimes de poder que se reforçam mutuamente e coexistem num único espaço urbano. Para

captar esta configuração, o estudo propõe o conceito de «imperialismos sobrepostos»,

definido como uma condição em que formas imperiais de governação com origens históricas

distintas se institucionalizam no mesmo contexto nacional ou urbano e produzem efeitos em

camadas de inclusão e exclusão. Ao situar o espaço urbano na intersecção entre a governação

colonial e o financiamento do desenvolvimento contemporâneo, em particular o crédito

garantido pelo petróleo, este artigo contribui para os debates nas relações internacionais

sobre a governação pós-colonial, a cooperação Sul-Sul e a espacialização do poder global.

Defende que a urbanização impulsionada pelo desenvolvimento pode funcionar como um

mecanismo através do qual as formas imperiais de governação persistem e são reconfiguradas

em contextos pós-coloniais.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

133

Palavras-chave

Overlapping imperialisms, colonial governance, China–Africa relations, oil-backed credit,

urban space and power.

How to cite this article

Kim, Kyeri (2026). Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban Governance

in Kilamba, Angola. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics

of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº.

1, TD3, September 2026, pp. 132-154. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.8

Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted on February 6, 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

134

OVERLAPPING IMPERIALISMS: COLONIAL AND NEOCOLONIAL

LOGICS OF URBAN GOVERNANCE IN KILAMBA, ANGOLA

YOOMI KIM

Introduction

Luanda, located on the Atlantic coast of southwestern Africa, is the capital of Angola and

the country’s political, economic, cultural, and administrative center. Since the sixteenth

century, the city has undergone continuous urban growth accompanied by sustained

population inflows, a process that accelerated markedly during and after the twenty-

seven-year civil war following independence. However, Luanda’s infrastructure and

housing systems proved insufficient to accommodate this rapid transformation(Kim

2025b), resulting in chronic housing shortages, uneven distribution of infrastructure, and

the proliferation of informal settlements.

In response to this urban crisis, the Angolan government launched the National

Reconstruction Program(Programa de Reconstrução Nacional) in the early 2000s, aiming

both to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the civil war and to establish new engines

of national economic growth. A central objective of this program was to render the state’s

commitment to reconstruction visible domestically and internationally while

simultaneously constructing a renewed national image. To this end, the government

actively pursued foreign capital and international partnerships, within which urban

development emerged as a key instrument of the national reconstruction strategy(Tomás

2022: 183).

It was within this context that Kilamba emerged as a large-scale housing complex located

approximately 30 kilometers outside Luanda’s urban core. Conceived as part of a state-

led policy, Kilamba was intended to alleviate overcrowding in central Luanda, resume

infrastructure investment suspended during the war, and respond to growing urban

housing demand. In 2011, the project was officially inaugurated by ex-President José

Eduardo dos Santos and presented domestically and internationally as a flagship symbol

of postwar reconstruction. Since then, Kilamba has been incorporated into the itineraries

of visiting foreign and domestic dignitaries, where newly constructed buildings and

orderly urban landscapes have been framed as tangible evidence of Angola’s

reconstruction achievements(Chronic 2015).

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research

Foundation of Korea(NRF-2024S1A5B5A16020542).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

135

Kilamba thus came to be positioned as a representative space that visually materialized

state narratives of a “New Angola” or a “New Luanda.” Promoted as a model of modernity,

order, and a forward-looking national future achieved through the combination of foreign

capital and technology, Kilamba emerged as one of the most conspicuous spatial

manifestations of state-led development narratives, frequently framed in terms such as

“the Dubai of Africa.” Its orderly high-rise housing blocks, systematically arranged road

networks, well-maintained green spaces, covered bus stops, and rows of streetlights

stand in sharp contrast to Luanda’s historic urban core, where remnants of Portuguese

colonial urbanism coexist with the material traces of prolonged civil war(Cardoso 2016:

1–19; Pitcher & Moorman 2015: 123–130).

Large-scale urban development projects such as Kilamba in postcolonial Africa have

typically been analyzed through the lenses of national reconstruction, development, or

the expansion of global capital. While these approaches are useful for explaining the

material transformations and policy outcomes produced by development, they offer

limited insight into how urban space is historically constituted through shifting

configurations of power and interaction. In particular, relatively little scholarly attention

has been paid to how colonial urban orders and postcolonial forms of external

intervention intersect and operate together within urban space.

This study addresses this gap by approaching Kilamba as a site where imperialism and

neo-imperialism—distinct yet interrelated forms of imperial governance—intersect and

overlap. Imperialism should not be understood as a legacy that disappeared with the

formal end of colonial rule; rather, it has persisted through institutions of development,

reconstruction, finance, and planned urbanization within the framework of neo-

imperialism. Colonial imperialism and postcolonial neo-imperialism must therefore be

analyzed as institutional frameworks that operate simultaneously within the same spatial

context.

From this perspective, this article proposes the concept of “overlapping imperialisms,”

defined as a condition in which imperial forms of power with different historical origins

coexist within the same national and urban context and become institutionalized as

modes of governance, producing layered effects of inclusion and exclusion. Through this

conceptual lens, the article reinterprets the Kilamba urban project by asking, first, how

imperialism and neo-imperialism persist within Kilamba’s urban space, and second, how

distinct imperial logics are combined within a single urban project and with what

implications for the production of urban space. To address these questions, the article

adopts a comparative approach that examines imperialism and neo-imperialism within a

shared analytical framework.

Imperialism, Neo-Imperialism and Overlapping Imperialisms

Imperialism

At the political and economic level, imperialism is structurally linked to a particular stage

of capitalist development. The concentration of production and capital generates

monopolies, while the dominance of finance capital significantly expands the export of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

136

capital. Within this framework, classical theories of imperialism have understood it as a

power system that emerges when advanced capitalist economies confront the limits of

accumulation, thereby requiring external spaces, and when this requirement becomes

institutionalized through political, economic, social, and cultural mechanisms(Lenin

1917). In this regard, imperial intervention by the state should be understood not simply

as an expression of colonial ambition for territorial expansion, but as an attempt to create

and extend international conditions favorable to capital accumulation(Brenner 2006).

In practice, imperialism has always operated through political and cultural ideologies that

legitimize conquest alongside economic expansion. In Africa, racism and civilizing

discourses functioned as key mechanisms that normalized external

intervention(Campbell 2015). Imperialism should therefore be understood not merely as

territorial occupation, but as a multi-layered logic of domination linking capital expansion,

knowledge production, and spatial reorganization(Cooper 2005). This logic becomes

durable through the institutionalization of legal and administrative frameworks that

sustain control over external spaces.

Imperialism legitimized itself through epistemological hierarchies that framed non-

Western societies as backward and correctable. This representation justified intervention

under the rhetoric of civilization and development and cast domination as a moral

responsibility(Liebersohn 2016). By defining in advance what counted as civilization and

deficiency, imperial power established a hierarchy that preceded formal rule and

determined who was entitled to govern and who was to be governed(Said 1977).

Over time, this imperial epistemology became embedded within concrete institutional

mechanisms of rule. Colonial governance imposed differentiated constraints on

citizenship, legal status, forced labor, freedom of movement, and access to resources.

Colonized populations, above all, were administered through documentary practices and

legal–administrative classification systems constructed by imperial power. While rights

associated with citizenship were only partially extended to local populations, a wide range

of obligations designed to facilitate exploitation were imposed upon them(Cooper 2005).

In this sense, imperialism constitutes a complex power formation in which economic

exploitation, political control, military coercion, and cultural–ideological legitimation

operate in an interlocking manner, grounded in the reconfiguration of epistemological

frameworks(Amin 2017).

Imperial power becomes routinized in everyday life through spatial organization. Space,

as a social product, reflects and reproduces power relations. The ways in which power

structures space shape social relations and institutional orders, condensing the

operational principles of specific regimes(Lefebvre 1991). Consequently, imperial

urbanization inscribes imperial orders and norms into the city itself. Through urban

planning, administrative zoning, infrastructural connectivity, and regulated access to

housing, urban space is transformed into an apparatus that continuously activates

imperial governance.

Such imperial modes of spatial control do not disappear entirely in the postcolonial

period. Rather, the institutions, spatial hierarchies, and political–economic orders

constructed under imperial rule persist as organizing conditions of postcolonial societies.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

137

Differential distributions of citizenship, the demarcation between legality and illegality,

rules governing access to land and housing, and administrative systems represent

reworked continuities of colonial logics rather than ruptures. While modern imperialism

no longer operates primarily through direct domination, it continues to be invoked

through indirect mechanisms such as development, reconstruction, and the

establishment of new criteria of order and legality(Mbembe 2001; Stoler 2013). From

this perspective, postcolonial urban space emerges as a crucial site where imperial logics

of governance are reactivated in transformed forms. Imperial urban space thus

constitutes a terrain in which imperial rationalities, far from being erased after the end

of colonial rule, are reconfigured and continue to operate. These continuities are not

accidental residues of colonial history but structural conditions that shape how

postcolonial urban governance remains tethered to imperial rationalities.

Neo-Imperialism

Modern imperialism operated through forms of direct rule that combined overseas capital

expansion with territorial domination, accompanied by the transfer of surplus value

generated through production. Neo-imperialism, by contrast, refers to a system in which

such forms of direct domination are weakened, while external intervention is structured

through institutional mechanisms such as international finance, regulatory regimes, and

global norms under conditions in which the formal sovereignty of the target state is

maintained. One of the most significant distinctions between the two lies in the mode of

extraction: under neo-imperialism, exploitation is reorganized into institutionalized

forms—credit, debt, and financial contracts—that are largely detached from direct

production processes. In this sense, neo-imperialism constitutes a transformed and

abstracted continuation of the logic of modern imperialism, marking a shift from direct

to indirect rule and from colonial administration to governance through international

norms and institutional arrangements—a contemporary modality of imperial power(Yu

2020).

Similarly, patterns of world dependency in postcolonial Africa have been reconfigured

through increasingly discreet and institutionalized pathways. From the late nineteenth

century to the Second World War, colonial imperialism—centered on Europe and

combining infrastructure construction such as railways, ports, and mines with formal

territorial control—was dominant(Rodney 2018; Zack-Williams 2013). After the war, the

center of imperial power shifted toward the United States, giving rise to what has been

described as “imperialism without colonies.” From the 1980s onward, the gradual

institutionalization of structural adjustment programs marked a new phase in which

national policy autonomy and development strategies became subordinated to external

financial regimes(Harvey 2017; Zack-Williams 2013). Since the 1990s, the rise of China

has introduced a new variable into this configuration, transforming Africa into a field of

multipolar competition. China came to be perceived as an alternative partner to Western

conditional aid and normative pressure; at the same time, however, it has faced criticism

for generating new forms of neocolonial dependency through loans and development

projects. Across these transformations, core mechanisms of neo-imperialism have

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

138

included market dependency, profit extraction by multinational corporations, and

institutional devices such as asymmetrical economic partnership agreements(Tull 2006;

Zack-Williams 2013).

Among these mechanisms, the discourse of developmentalism has played a particularly

significant role in materializing neo-imperialism in Africa. Developmentalism has emerged

as a central technology of power that enables neo-imperialism to operate through indirect

forms of governance. Although development is also an internal process of capitalist

expansion, it has increasingly taken shape as a policy framework institutionalized through

international cooperation, aid, and reconstruction programs. Development thus appears

to function as a neutral instrument aimed at “improving” or “enhancing” social conditions;

in practice, however, it operates as a normative framework that pre-organizes the

political and economic conditions necessary for capital accumulation while legitimizing

external intervention(Li 2007; Veltmeyer 2020).

During the Cold War, development was mobilized as a means of anchoring postcolonial

states within Western capitalist trajectories of progress. In the subsequent neoliberal

phase, it functioned through structural adjustment, market liberalization, and fiscal

discipline, thereby limiting national policy choices and inducing social restructuring. In

this process, aid and development cooperation became inseparable from the geopolitical

and strategic interests of donor states. In this way, development provided an institutional

conduit through which external power could intervene without resorting to direct

domination or military coercion. Development thus operates as an indirect and structural

modality of neo-imperialism(Latham 2011; Veltmeyer 2020). This perspective makes it

possible to analyze postcolonial urban development and reconstruction not merely as

state-led modernization processes, but as sites in which neo-imperial logics of

governance are actively at work. What distinguishes this configuration as neo-imperial is

that the authority shaping urban life is displaced outward, embedding external standards

and financial structures into the internal organization of postcolonial space.

Overlapping Imperialisms: A Conceptual Synthesis

Kilamba has most often been analyzed within a framework that emphasizes the postwar

expansion of a Chinese-style development model in Angola. Such approaches, however,

suffer from two major limitations. First, they tend to overlook how the logics of

governance and spatial order produced under Portuguese colonial imperialism continue

to be reactivated in the postcolonial period. Second, by treating China’s intervention as

the linear arrival of a new external actor, they fail to capture the more complex condition

in which different imperial logics operate simultaneously within the same national, urban,

and project-specific context(Kim 2025c).

Accordingly, this study reconceptualizes Kilamba not as a post-imperial space, but as a

site in which multiple forms of imperial governance coexist in overlapping ways. The

central analytical shift lies in moving beyond a periodized distinction that separates

Portuguese colonial imperialism and Chinese neo-imperialism into discrete historical

phases and instead focusing on how different forms of imperial power operate

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

139

concurrently within a single urban development project. To capture this configuration,

the study advances the concept of “overlapping imperialisms.” Overlapping imperialisms

refers to a condition in which imperial forms of governance with distinct historical origins

and modes of power coexist within the same national or urban space, become

institutionalized as modes of governance, and, through this process, produce layered

effects of inclusion and exclusion. This concept does not simply identify imperialism in

terms of continuity or legacy; rather, it serves as a conceptual device for analyzing how

the normative and spatial logics of colonial imperialism and the financialized

developmental logics of neo-imperialism operate simultaneously within specific

institutions and projects, producing new configurations of governance and power.

To empirically analyze overlapping imperialisms, this study structures Chapters III and

IV around a comparative framework that treats imperialism and neo-imperialism not as

temporally separated stages, but as coexisting modes of power within a shared analytical

field. Methodologically, the analysis organizes the operation of imperial power in urban

space into three interrelated dimensions: epistemological, institutional, and political,

each centered on a distinct mechanism of power. First, at the epistemological level,

imperial power defines what constitutes a problem and what forms of intervention are

legitimate through justificatory ideologies such as the civilizing mission and

developmentalism, conceptualized here as Ideological Regimes of Legitimation. Second,

at the institutional level, these epistemologies materialize through the Institutionalization

of Spatial Politics, whereby legal frameworks, administrative systems, urban planning,

and classificatory criteria are deployed to organize urban space and populations. Third,

these processes culminate at the political level in Regimes of Citizenship, through which

access to the city and the conditions under which particular forms of life are recognized

as “normal” or legitimate citizenship are reconfigured. This threefold analytical structure

reveals core mechanisms through which imperial power operates across imperial

discourse, the politics of urban space, and the production of citizenship in the city of

Luanda. This framework therefore does not merely describe continuity between imperial

forms, but provides an analytical tool for identifying how multiple regimes of power

become layered within concrete urban institutions.

Imperial Urban Formation and Structure

Ideological Regimes of Legitimation: The Civilizing Mission

Kilamba is one of the large-scale housing projects that came to symbolize Angola’s

postwar reconstruction in the postcolonial period. Yet the formation and spatial

organization of Kilamba bear the clear imprint of Portuguese imperial logics of

governance that were already established during the historical construction of Luanda.

In 1576, Portugal entered what is now Angola by establishing a foothold on Ilha de Cabo—

also known as Ilha de Luanda—and founded the city under the name São Paulo de

Assunção de Loanda(Kim 2021: 62). Luanda soon emerged as a central hub of the

Atlantic slave trade and became a strategic site through which Portuguese colonial rule

was organized and rendered visible in urban space. Modeled after Lisbon, Luanda was

planned as a Western-style city, spatially divided along social hierarchies and infused

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

140

with imperial ideology through its urban form(Kim 2025b: 70–72). As a result, Luanda

came to be recognized as one of the oldest continuously urbanized cities in sub-Saharan

Africa and as a paradigmatic case of Portuguese colonial urbanization(Jenkins et al. 2002:

139). The foundational principles of this colonial urban planning did not disappear with

decolonization but persisted in reconfigured forms in the postcolonial period.

Portuguese imperialism was materially inscribed in Luanda through architecture, street

names, and systems of administrative nomenclature. These elements formed part of a

broader European mode of urban design and functioned as a key means through which

the imperial logic of the missão civilizadora—the civilizing mission—was enacted and

made visible in Africa. The civilizing mission constituted a central justificatory ideology

through which imperial domination was represented not as coercion or exploitation, but

as the fulfillment of historical progress and moral responsibility. Within this framework,

colonized societies were defined as “uncivilized,” while European civilization was posited

as a universal standard to be emulated and ultimately achieved. Imperial intervention

was thus reframed as education, reform, protection, and development, enabling imperial

power to position itself not as an agent of violence but as a mediator of civilization. In

this sense, the civilizing mission functioned as an ideological apparatus that allowed

imperial rule to be sustained through the rhetoric of universal values and human

progress, even as military and political domination continued(Pomeranz 2005).

Assimilationist(assimilação) policy operated as a concrete extension of the civilizing

mission within the colonial city. Through institutional mechanisms, it promoted the use

of Portuguese as the official language, the imposition of Catholic order, Portuguese

architectural styles, and European modes of everyday life. Through these processes,

Luanda became a site in which the social and cultural identity of the Portuguese empire

was projected, internalized, and enacted in practice(Kim 2025d: 562; Pinto & Jerónimo

2015: 2–15). In this regard, Luanda’s colonial urban landscape constitutes the spatial

organization and visual reproduction of an imperial worldview premised on Western

civilizational superiority. The civilizing mission and its concrete implementation through

assimilationist policy thus operated as key ideological regimes of imperial legitimation.

The hierarchical structures produced through these spatial practices, centered on the

colonial city, were not fully dismantled after decolonization and continue to shape the

postcolonial urban order.

Institutionalization of Imperial Spatial Politics: Legal and Administrative

Classification

The urban structure of Luanda was shaped through a dual spatial division between cidade

alta(meaning the upper city) and cidade baixa(meaning the lower city), a model

characteristic of Portuguese colonial urban planning. This configuration reflected the

functional differentiation and hierarchical ordering of space under colonial rule. Cidade

baixa, located in the low-lying coastal zone, concentrated ports, administrative

institutions, commercial facilities, and residential areas for European settlers, serving as

the material center of colonial governance and economic activity. By contrast, cidade

alta, situated on higher ground, was organized around military defensive functions and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

141

religious institutions and functioned as a residential space for select elites, embodying

colonial authority and symbolic power. This dual structure appeared repeatedly across

Portuguese colonial cities. Derived from Lisbon’s urban principles and transplanted into

the colonial context, it demonstrates that urban planning functioned as a central

instrument for organizing imperial governance(Milheiro 2020: 397–409). Such spatial

ordering reflects the operation of a strongly Eurocentric spatial ideology, in which

Portuguese colonial authorities regarded metropolitan urban forms as universal and ideal

models and applied them uncritically to colonial settings.

Portuguese imperialism further fragmented Luanda’s urban space through systematic

differentiation along social and racial hierarchies. As colonial rule intensified, urban

zoning increasingly followed distinctions based on skin color and class. The city center

was planned as a modern, institutionalized space reserved for Europeans and colonial

elites, while local populations were deliberately excluded and marginalized within the

urban fabric(Braz & Raposo 2021: 46–49). This spatial segmentation extended beyond

the physical separation of residential areas and was institutionalized through legal and

administrative classifications of urban residents. Based on documented legal status,

access to movement and urban space was differentially regulated. A representative

example was the Estatuto do Indigenato, which legally distinguished between the

indígena(indigenous) and the civilizado or assimilado. As a result, everyday rights related

to education, employment, and licensing became contingent upon legal status, and social

hierarchies were formally codified. Furthermore, the ID card, bilhete de identidade, was

selectively issued and functioned as a decisive marker certifying one’s status as “civilized”

within the colonial order(Neto 1997: 348).

These imperial status regimes were enacted in everyday urban governance. Introduced

in 1928, the caderneta indígena was a document that recorded taxation, labor

obligations, residential status, and legal identity. Individuals who failed to carry this

document or possessed incomplete records were subject to administrative sanctions and

restrictions on movement, effectively limiting local residents’ access to the urban

core(Nascimento 2013: 108; Roque 2009: 47, 227). Such spatial segmentation

embedded a hierarchical binary between ruling and subjugated populations into the

material foundations of the city. Consequently, Luanda’s colonial urban center—where

infrastructure was concentrated—became a space in which entry and residence were

selectively permitted through documented legality. In contrast, peripheral areas were

designated as “illegal” spaces, a classification that colonial discourse itself equated with

disorder and rendered subject to governance. In this sense, Luanda’s urban

segmentation crystallized as an institutional mechanism that inscribed racial and class

hierarchies into space and differentially allocated rights of access, mobility, and

residence.

As Luanda’s population expanded rapidly and processes of urban expansion and

modernization accelerated, colonial authorities restructured the city by demolishing

residential areas inhabited by local populations in the urban core and gradually displacing

them toward the periphery. Those excluded from the center began to settle in

agriculturally based informal settlements located on the city’s margins, known as

Musseque(sometimes rendered locally as Musseke). Musseque represents both the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

142

cumulative outcome of long-standing political, social, and economic inequalities in

Luanda and a spatial condensation of colonial domination and subsequent forms of

political and economic marginalization. Structurally contrasted with the institutionalized

zones of the urban core, Musseque renders the fragmented nature of Luanda’s

urbanization particularly visible(Kim 2025a: 254).

The term Musseque derives from Kimbundu, the language of the Mbundu people, and is

composed of mu(place) and seke(sand), generally referring to red soil or unpaved

land(Kim 2025b: 76–77). The term thus evokes residential environments characterized

by the absence of paved roads and basic infrastructure. In this sense, Musseque signifies

urban spaces where fundamental services—such as roads, water supply, sanitation, and

electricity—are scarce or entirely absent. These areas stand in sharp contrast to the

paved and institutionalized cement city, referred to as cidade de cimento(meaning

cement city, Jenkins et al. 2002: 142), or the asphalt city, cidade de asfalto(meaning

asphalt city, Viegas 2016: 598)(Kim 2025b: 72–80).

Musseque expanded organically outside the frameworks of colonial urban planning and

administrative management. Although these settlements absorbed the labor force

essential to the growth and maintenance of the colonial city, they were systematically

excluded from infrastructural investment and public service provision. As a result,

residents’ livelihoods and social networks were destabilized, and both physical and social

disconnection from the urban core rendered everyday life increasingly precarious(Braz &

Raposo 2021: 47–50; Kim 2025b: 72–76).

Moreover, each phase of urban development subjected Musseque to repeated forced

evictions on the grounds that it constituted an “unplanned space.” Residents were

displaced to peripheral highlands or areas with even poorer infrastructure, where new

Musseque settlements emerged, thereby facilitating the continued spatial expansion of

Luanda(Kim 2025b: 75–80). These displacements were enacted through coercive means

integral to the realization of imperial urban order. In this respect, the formation of

Musseque demonstrates that spatial politics in the colonial city functioned not merely as

physical separation or a housing issue, but as an institutional mechanism that

hierarchically organized populations through the articulation of legal status,

administrative classification, and differentiated access to urban space.

Imperial Citizenship: Legality-Based Regimes of Citizenship

Kilamba was conceived as part of former President José Eduardo dos Santos’s strategy

to implement the pledge of constructing one million housing units, first announced in

2008 in the lead-up to the 2012 elections(Kimari & Ernstson 2023: 1876). The name

“Kilamba” itself was drawn from the Kimbundu name of Agostinho Neto, Angola’s first

president and a central symbol of the anti-colonial liberation struggle. This act of naming

suggests that the project was envisioned as a space symbolizing anti-imperial nation-

building and the formation of a postcolonial national identity rooted in Neto’s

legacy(Chronic 2015).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

143

In practice, however, the actual process of constructing Kilamba and organizing its urban

space unfolded less as an embodiment of anti-imperial national identity than as a

reproduction of preexisting state-led imperial urban development logics. Low-income

populations and informal settlers—long excluded from the urban core since the colonial

period—were once again marginalized in the planning process, and Kilamba functioned

as a selectively developed space centered on particular social strata and external capital.

This demonstrates that, rather than overcoming imperial spatial orders, the postcolonial

state has reproduced and intensified them in transformed forms.

Above all, throughout its development Kilamba operated as a mechanism for

restructuring citizenship by selectively regulating access to urban space and residential

eligibility. This process was justified through political rhetoric centered on “national

reconstruction” and “modern urbanization,” which legitimized the demolition of existing

settlements, the displacement of residents, and the redefinition of conditions for housing

access. In Luanda’s broader reconstruction and housing development trajectory, informal

settlements such as Musseque were repeatedly targeted for demolition under the pretext

of improving urban aesthetics and promoting “orderly urbanization,” resulting in the

relocation of large numbers of residents to resettlement sites on the distant

periphery(Braz & Raposo 2021: 45–47; Gastrow 2018: 2–3). These practices of eviction

and displacement persisted into the postcolonial period, reproducing hierarchical spatial

relations between the urban core and the periphery, and were reiterated during the

development of Kilamba.

Spatial exclusion surrounding Kilamba was further legitimized at the legal and

institutional level. Land acquisition for large-scale housing construction, the allocation of

housing units, and the definition of residential eligibility all operated on the basis of formal

legal registration and documented ownership, systematically excluding modes of urban

life grounded in informal residence and long-term occupation. Under the Land Law

enacted in 2004(Lei de Terras, Lei n.º 9/04), unregistered land was defined as state

property, and informal documents such as purchase receipts or certificates of occupation

were denied legal recognition(Nielsen 2007: 12–15). This legal regime rendered

traditional occupation and long-term residence institutionally vulnerable and reclassified

many Musseque residents as “illegal occupants”(ibid: 33–34). In practice,

SONIP(Sonangol Imobiliária e Propriedades), the state-owned real estate company

responsible for the management and allocation of housing units in Kilamba, evicted

numerous households on the grounds that their documentation was incomplete. These

measures effectively deprived residents of housing rights through appeals to formal

legality(Kajibanga 2023: 43–46). Taken together, these processes demonstrate that

postcolonial housing policy in Luanda, much like its colonial predecessor, has relied on

formal legal order as a central instrument for selectively regulating and controlling access

to urban space.

Consequently, large-scale state-led housing projects such as Kilamba failed to function

as viable housing alternatives for displaced residents. Many evictees lost their homes

without adequate legal compensation, while the pricing structures and eligibility criteria

of newly constructed housing units structurally excluded low-income and informally

housed populations(Buire 2014: 302–304; Croese 2016: 90–92). Contrary to official

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

144

discourses of “housing rights” and “inclusive reconstruction,” Kilamba ultimately emerged

as a selectively accessible residential space primarily occupied by middle-class

households or those with political and economic connections(Gastrow 2020: 512–515).

This mode of spatial organization exhibits clear structural continuity with colonial

governance logics in Luanda, where urban space was organized through distinctions

between “orderly citizens” and populations designated for management and control. In

this sense, Kilamba is less a product of a fully dismantled imperial spatial order than a

revealing case in which imperial regimes of citizenship persist in transformed forms within

postcolonial development practices.

Neo-Imperial Urban Reconfiguration and Its Operations

Ideological Regimes of Legitimation under Neo-Imperialism:

Developmentalism

Following the end of the civil war in 2002, postwar reconstruction in Angola assumed

critical importance in rebuilding infrastructure destroyed over twenty-seven years of

conflict. In particular, the reconstruction of Luanda was treated not only as a technical

task of recovery but also as a political project aimed at reorganizing the state and

consolidating the governing party’s legitimacy. In practice, Angola’s postwar

reconstruction was pursued through a strategy in which the state rapidly mobilized public

investment and distributed resources to key support bases, thereby managing political

competition(Croese 2017: 80). Within this context, housing provision and urban

development extended beyond the domain of social welfare policy and emerged as

prominent arenas in which state power could be rendered visible as political

“achievement.” In other words, urban development functioned not merely as an

economic policy instrument but as a governing technology through which the state

sought to integrate society and reorder spatial and social relations.

Against this backdrop, Kilamba was conceived as a flagship project of the postwar, state-

led housing program and, following its official inauguration by the president, operated as

a space in which Angola’s reconstruction achievements were visually displayed(Croese

2017: 94; Gastrow 2020: 509). The construction of Kilamba through state intervention

was thus directly articulated with developmentalism and entangled with external capital.

The resulting neo-imperial interventions by external actors reconfigured urban space and

everyday norms according to externally defined standards.

Developmentalism operates as a knowledge–power nexus that defines local societies in

terms of “lack” and legitimizes external intervention through the rhetoric of

improvement(Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994). Rather than neutral policy, it functions as

a normative system that reduces political conflict to technical management and enables

imperial power to operate without direct rule(Adalet 2025). Developmentalism thus

operates not simply as policy, but as a form of external authority that reorganizes urban

life according to standards produced outside the local political field.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

145

Neo-imperial developmentalism materialized concretely in Kilamba’s urban form.

Constructed in a peripheral zone spatially detached from Luanda’s existing urban core,

Kilamba functioned as a space that structurally weakened everyday mobility and access

to the city for urban residents. This reduction in accessibility was justified as a “rational

choice” grounded in developmental rationality. Rather than prioritizing gradual

integration with existing urban structures or acknowledging locally embedded spatial

practices, developmental discourse reimagines peripheral zones—often characterized by

lower land costs and looser regulatory constraints—as “undeveloped” and “potential”

spaces of growth. Through this logic, developmentalism has repeatedly produced

patterns of peripheralization and spatial fragmentation across African metropolises.

These outcomes stem from the abstraction of urban space into functions and forms,

relegating social and historical connections to secondary concerns. Leapfrog

development, in this regard, is legitimized as an efficient pathway capable of delivering

visible results within a short time frame(Lall et al. 2017: 64–70). In Angola, the rapid

construction of externally driven urban projects through Chinese capital and technology

followed planning logics and developmental criteria defined from outside, largely

disregarding existing physical and social linkages.

Moreover, Kilamba transplanted a standardized urban model organized according to

predefined development benchmarks and administrative efficiency, rather than reflecting

local residents’ aspirations, everyday practices, or historically constituted spatial

sensibilities. The standardized housing typologies in Kilamba—typically composed of two

to four bedrooms—were designed according to institutional assumptions that treated the

nuclear family as the ideal residential unit, overlooking local family arrangements in

which extended and multi-generational households are common(Kimari & Ernstson 2023:

1878–1880). These housing models resulted in the spatial internalization of a particular

vision of citizenship and family norms. Such outcomes reflect a top-down mode of urban

planning rooted in developmental discourse, one that systematically excludes residents’

lived experiences and spatial practices(Escobar 1995: 3–11; Ziai 2013: 123–126). The

case of Kilamba is particularly significant in demonstrating how large-scale housing

construction enabled by Chinese capital and technology contributes to the legitimation

and systematization of a developmentalist urban model as a transferable and replicable

form of development(Dittgen & Chungu 2019: 645–648).

In this way, externally formulated spatial layouts and housing typologies penetrate

multiple layers of urban life, implicitly defining particular ways of living and forms of

citizenship as “normal” and “progressive.” Urban spatial organization thus fixes specific

social practices and power relations into the material form of the city, rendering them

internalized and taken for granted. By organizing urban space according to externally

normalized lifestyles and citizenship models, developmentalism marginalizes alternative

communal imaginaries and ways of life(Lefebvre 1991; Purcell 2002: 99–104). As a

result, community-based imaginaries and alternative possibilities embedded in urban

space are excluded, while standardized, top-down pathways of urbanization are

presented as the singular route to development. Through this process, neo-imperial

governance produces its effects without overt coercion or formal institutional domination,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

146

instead reproducing developmental discourse as a legitimate order that reshapes urban

space and everyday life and embeds neo-imperial ideology within routine practices.

Institutionalization of Neo-Imperial Spatial Politics: Oil-Backed Credit

Following the end of the civil war, Angola’s reconstruction agenda presupposed the

mobilization of large-scale capital. However, Western aid and loan mechanisms imposed

conditions that the Angolan government found difficult to meet in the immediate postwar

context. International financial institutions and major donor countries required prior

compliance with standards related to fiscal transparency, macroeconomic management,

and institutional reform, thereby constraining access to reconstruction finance. In

particular, the International Monetary Fund(IMF)’s Staff-Monitored Program(SMP)

functioned as a surveillance mechanism that evaluated the implementation of

institutional reforms as a prerequisite for financial assistance. Such programs required

the Angolan government to demonstrate tangible progress in fiscal transparency,

macroeconomic governance, and public financial reform before accessing external funds,

thereby imposing substantively and procedurally demanding conditions(Tan-Mullins et al.

2010: 868–869). For a postwar government that prioritized speed and visibility in

national reconstruction, this conditional mode of access constituted a significant political

and administrative burden. As a result, Western aid channels remained formally available

yet practically difficult to utilize.

Moreover, access to Western financing was further constrained by changes in Angola’s

macroeconomic status. Rising state revenues from oil exports gradually moved Angola

out of the low-income country category, thereby weakening its institutional eligibility for

concessional development finance. In practice, Angola’s income level exceeding the

threshold for International Development Association(IDA) eligibility, combined with low

levels of institutional trust, made it difficult to secure stable long-term financing through

Western financial institutions(World Bank 2007: 1–13). Consequently, the Angolan

government actively sought alternative financial mechanisms characterized by fewer

preconditions and faster disbursement.

It was within this context that oil-backed credit(oil-backed loans)—the core mechanism

of China–Angola cooperation—emerged(Alves 2013: 100–105; Kiala 2010: 314–316). In

November 2003, Angola signed a framework agreement with China, which was formally

approved in October 2004. On this basis, China constructed a credit structure through

the China Exim Bank and the China International Fund(CIF) that guaranteed loan

repayment through long-term crude oil supply. This arrangement enabled the rapid

mobilization of reconstruction funds without the institutional reform conditions required

by Western financial institutions. At the same time, however, Angola’s core national

asset, oil, became structurally tied to China through financial and diplomatic contractual

relations(Cardoso 2016: 11–12).

This oil-based financial mechanism functioned as a central organizing principle of urban

development itself. In this sense, large-scale postwar housing projects such as Kilamba

constitute outcomes of oil-based urbanization, or petro-urbanism, produced through oil-

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

147

backed credit(Rapanyane 2021: 103–104). Under this model, Chinese credit was first

extended on the basis of repayment guarantees secured through oil exports, followed by

the execution of construction by Chinese state-owned or quasi-state-owned enterprises

such as China International Trust Investment Corporation(CITIC). Subsequently, the

Angolan government intervened through policy instruments—including allocation

mechanisms, pricing adjustments, and subsidy schemes—to complete urban space and

regulate access to and occupation of newly developed areas. Within this sequence, urban

development was not autonomously determined by market logics or local demand but

was preconfigured through a chain of mechanisms linking oil exports, financial contracts,

construction execution, and state intervention. In this way, oil-backed credit operated as

a form of spatial power that structurally pre-determined the timing, scale, layout, and

conditions of access to urban space, functioning as an institutional mechanism that

organized the city as an object of governance(Cardoso 2016: 11–15).

For such finance-based spatial power to be realized in material urban form, corresponding

institutional power structures within the state were indispensable. In Luanda, spatial

power was concretized through a centralized governance structure centered on the

presidency. Neo-imperial spatial intervention should therefore be understood not as the

unilateral penetration of external capital, but as a governing effect produced through the

articulation of external finance with domestic structures of concentrated political power.

In Angola, major reconstruction and housing projects—including Kilamba—were initiated

as state-led development programs placed under the direct authority of presidential

power. During its initial construction phase, the Kilamba project was supervised by the

Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional(GRN), a presidential agency responsible for

overseeing national reconstruction. Established in 2004, the GRN functioned as a key

institution that applied Chinese loans to reconstruction projects while managing funds

and supervising construction(Corkin 2013: 7–8; Kajibanga 2023: 6–7, 18–19). Although

formally an administrative body, the GRN operated in close alignment with the

Presidency, particularly the Casa Militar. As a result, major reconstruction and housing

projects in Luanda bypassed conventional government ministries and were placed under

the direct control of presidential authority, with urban development proceeding through

the combined operation of financial mechanisms and centralized political power(ibid: 19–

20).

Kilamba offers the clearest illustration of how oil-backed credit organizes urban space in

practice. Construction of Kilamba was undertaken by the Chinese state-owned enterprise

CITIC. The project was developed as a large-scale planned city accommodating

approximately 20,000 households and conceived as a “complete urban space”

encompassing residential complexes, commercial districts, and public facilities.

Completed over a period of roughly three years, Kilamba represents the outcome of a

development process in which Chinese credit, construction by Chinese firms, and state-

led allocation and price-control policies were tightly integrated(Cardoso 2016: 11–15;

Kimari & Ernstson 2023: 1876–1878). This mode of development preconfigured the

conditions of urban formation and spatial arrangement without requiring explicit coercion

or direct intervention by China. In this respect, Kilamba constitutes a paradigmatic case

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

148

in which neo-imperial urban intervention is materially embedded in urban space through

oil-backed_credit.

Neo-Imperial Citizenship: Consumption-Based Regimes of Citizenship

Although Kilamba was officially presented as a state-led public housing model intended

for low-income populations, in practice it functioned as a highly selective residential

space, diverging sharply from policy discourses emphasizing inclusive urban

development. Housing prices, eligibility requirements, and administrative procedures

were structured around criteria that were difficult for the urban poor and informal settlers

to meet. As a result, effective access to housing in Kilamba was largely limited to middle-

class households with stable incomes and connections to administrative or political

networks, including civil servants(Gastrow 2020: 509–516; Kimari & Ernstson 2023:

1878–1880). In this configuration, access to housing was not grounded in social need or

housing as a right, but conditioned upon purchasing power and administrative eligibility.

This demonstrates that state-led housing policy reconstituted housing not as a universal

citizenship right but as a conditional form of access. Such conditionality laid the

groundwork for Kilamba’s consolidation as a space that reproduces elite-centered social

differentiation and exclusion.

Kilamba’s location constituted a key spatial condition reinforcing its fixation as a

residential space for particular social groups. Developed as a new urban area on Luanda’s

periphery and spatially detached from the existing urban core, Kilamba was

administratively incorporated into the newly established municipality of Belas following

the 2011 territorial reorganization. This locational choice structurally weakened everyday

connections with the city center, while inadequate public transportation infrastructure

continually intensified residents’ mobility burdens. Empirical studies indicate that

approximately 45 percent of Kilamba residents spend at least two hours commuting to

work, and proposals to improve public transport connectivity have been discussed only

belatedly and have failed to function as effective alternatives(Croese 2016: 19–20).

As a result, although Kilamba was designed as a perfect city equipped with residential,

commercial, and public facilities, it functioned in practice as a spatially isolated enclave

disconnected from Luanda’s existing urban system. Kilamba thus emerged as a new

centrality characterized by weak functional integration with the city’s transportation,

commercial, and employment networks, effectively operating as a self-contained

residential zone. This spatial isolation has defined Kilamba as a suburbanized space

primarily accessible to middle-class residents possessing stable incomes and reliable

means of mobility, while simultaneously generating tensions with the socio-economic

structure of the existing urban core(Buire 2014: 291–299).

Consequently, Kilamba became a space that was effectively inaccessible to low-income

populations whose livelihoods depend on core-based economic activities, informal

economies, and dense everyday social networks. Residential life in Kilamba presupposes

a level of income sufficient to absorb prolonged commuting costs, stable employment,

and the consumption capacity necessary to sustain daily life outside the urban core.

These locational and economic conditions transformed housing access in Kilamba from a

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

149

citizenship right into a selectable option contingent upon a particular lifestyle and

economic capacity. In this sense, Kilamba was configured as a space that privileges

specific social groups while failing to account for urban livelihoods shaped by informal

income structures, core-oriented mobility patterns, and dense social ties. Residents

excluded from this space were pushed further outward, and Kilamba became consolidated

as an “island-like” residential enclave functionally segmented from Luanda’s broader

urban structure. This spatial configuration demonstrates how access to the city can be

selectively regulated on the basis of lifestyle norms and economic conditions.

Such modes of urbanization convert access to housing from a universal citizenship right

into a conditional status differentiated according to consumption capacity and market

access. This process illustrates how developmentalist spatial restructuring operates in

conjunction with neoliberal logics of accumulation, resonating with the mechanism of

“accumulation by dispossession,” whereby contemporary capitalism seeks new pathways

of accumulation through the appropriation of communal resources and rights—such as

land, housing, and public assets—when it confronts limits to accumulation through

production(Harvey 2017: 73–79). The forced displacement, dismantling of communities,

and legally justified land appropriation observed in Kilamba reveal how these

accumulation mechanisms persist in transformed forms in the postcolonial period,

building upon the legacies of imperial dispossession. As a result, citizenship is no longer

constituted primarily as a matter of rights but is reconfigured as a regulated and

conditional status predicated on specific housing forms and consumption capacity. In this

respect, Kilamba stands as a revealing case that condenses how citizenship is spatially

selected and recalibrated within neo-imperial urban orders.

Conclusion

This study has sought to demonstrate that the urban space of Kilamba constitutes a site

in which distinct imperial modes of governance operate in overlapping and mutually

reinforcing ways. Rather than treating Portuguese colonial urban order and China’s neo-

imperial developmental intervention as separate or sequential phases, the analysis

approached them as coexisting regimes of power operating simultaneously within a single

urban project. Through this lens, the study has shown that Kilamba is not a space in

which imperialism has been overcome, but one in which imperial logics persist and are

reconfigured in transformed forms. The two imperial rationalities operate in a

complementary manner. Colonial legal and spatial hierarchies provided the groundwork

for neo-imperial development, while finance and developmentalism re-legitimized these

structures. Kilamba thus selects “qualified citizens” through legality and market access,

transforming rather than eliminating imperial exclusion.

Viewed through the analytical categories proposed in this study, imperialism and neo-

imperialism—despite their distinct historical contexts and operative mechanisms—share

structural affinities in the ways they reorganize urban space and local life. At the level of

ideological legitimation, colonial imperialism constructed local societies as inefficient and

backward, framing them as objects to be improved through civilization and development.

Neo-imperial developmentalism, by contrast, represents local lives and social relations

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

150

as immature or irrational, positioning them as targets for correction through external

capital, technology, and administrative rationality. Although articulated through different

vocabularies, both discourses converge functionally in their negation of locally grounded

ways of life and their imposition of externally defined norms and lifestyles as universal

standards. Kilamba therefore reveals that postcolonial urban modernity is not a break

from empire but a reconfiguration of imperial power through new institutional forms.

At the level of spatial politics, imperialism organized urban space hierarchically through

law, administration, and racialized and social classifications. Neo-imperialism, by

contrast, restructures space through financial contracts, development projects, and loan

arrangements that appear economic or technical in nature. Yet despite this shift in

instruments, the core governing logic persists: urban space is reduced to an abstract

object of management, and specific orders and conditions of access are institutionally

inscribed. Kilamba exemplifies how neo-imperial spatial politics become institutionalized

through the languages of finance and development rather than through overt political

domination.

Finally, at the level of citizenship, imperial rule selected urban residents on the basis of

legality, discipline, and order, positioning those excluded as populations to be managed

or controlled. Under neo-imperial urban regimes, these criteria are reconfigured into

ostensibly technical and economic conditions such as consumption capacity, market

access, and lifestyle compatibility. While this transformation appears neutral and

depoliticized, it continues to reproduce exclusion by selectively regulating access to urban

space. Citizenship is thus no longer constituted as a universal right, but as a conditional

status predicated upon specific housing forms and consumption capabilities.

Through this analysis, the study has proposed overlapping imperialisms as a theoretical

and methodological framework. This concept neither reduces imperialism to a static

legacy of the past nor isolates neo-imperialism as an entirely novel phenomenon.

Instead, overlapping imperialisms offers an analytical lens for examining how state-led

development, dependence on external finance, and spatial exclusion repeatedly intersect

in postcolonial African cities beyond the case of Kilamba. By advancing this framework,

the study contributes a conceptual bridge linking imperial studies, urban studies, and

African studies, and provides a grounded approach for understanding postcolonial cities

as spaces in which imperial logics continue to be reworked rather than erased.

While this article has focused on Kilamba as a specific urban project in Luanda, it does

not claim that the configuration observed here is representative of all postcolonial urban

developments in Africa. Rather, Kilamba is approached as an analytically strategic site

through which the concept of overlapping imperialisms can be examined in a concrete

and empirically grounded manner. The framework proposed here is therefore intended

to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, offering a lens for comparative inquiry into how

multiple imperial logics may intersect in other postcolonial urban contexts. Its

significance lies in showing that postcolonial cities cannot be understood outside the

overlapping infrastructures of past and present imperial power. Recognizing these

overlapping structures is essential for any critical understanding of contemporary urban

governance in postcolonial contexts.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

151

References

Adalet, B. (2025). An empire of development: American political thought in transnational

perspective. American Political Science Review, 119(1), 193-207.

Alves, A. C. (2013). Chinese economic statecraft: a comparative study of China's oil-

backed loans in Angola and Brazil. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 42(1), 99-130.

Amin, S. (2017). Contemporary imperialism, In Popov, V. & Dutkiewicz, P.(Eds.),

Mapping a new world order. 181-195. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Braz, O. B., & Raposo, I. (2021). Urbanização de Luanda, expansão dos musseques e

realojamento dos seus habitantes no novo milénio. Estudo Prévio, 3(19), 45-55.

Brenner, R. (2006). What is, and what is not, imperialism? Historical materialism, 14(4),

79-105.

Buire, C. (2014). The dream and the ordinary: an ethnographic investigation of

suburbanisation in Luanda. African Studies, 73(2), 290-312.

Cardoso, R. (2016). The circuitries of spectral urbanism: looking underneath fantasies in

Luanda’s new centralities. Urbanisation, 1(2), 95-113.

Campbell, H. (2015). Imperialism and anti-imperialism in Africa. Monthly Review, 67(3),

98-113.

Chronic. (2015). City Building in Post-Conflict, Post-Socialist Luanda. Retrieved from

https://chimurengachronic.co.za/city-building-in-post-conflict-post-

socialistluanda/#:~:text=Infamous%20among%20these%20new%20projects,7%5D%

20But%20Kilamba%20is%20no (Accessed on 22 April 2025)

Cooper, F. (2005). Colonialism in question: tTheory, knowledge, history. University of

California Press.

Corkin, L. (2016). Uncovering African agency: Angola's management of China's credit

lines. Routledge.

Croese, S. (2016). Urban governance and turning African cities around: Luanda case

study. Partnership for African social & governance research working paper, 18, 1-28.

______. (2017). State-led housing delivery as an instrument of developmental

patrimonialism: the case of post-war Angola. African Affairs, 116(462), 80-100.

Dittgen, R., & Chungu, G. (2019). (Un) writing “Chinese Space” in urban Africa. of city-

making, lived experiences, and entangled processes. China Perspectives, 2019(2019-4),

3-7.

Escobar, A. (2011). Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third

World. Princeton University Press.

Ferguson, J. (1994). The anti-politics machine: “development,” depoliticization, and

bureaucratic power in Lesotho. University of Minnesota Press.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

152

Gastrow, C. (2018). “Cement citizens: housing, demolition and political belonging in

Luanda, Angola”, In Gomes, C. A. & Abreu, C.(Eds.), African Citizenship Aspirations. 74-

89. Routledge.

______. (2020). “Housing middle-classness: formality and the making of distinction in

Luanda”, Africa, 90(3), 509-528.

Harvey, D. (2017). The 'new' imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. In Ollman,

B.(Ed.) Karl Marx. 63-87. Routledge.

Jenkins, P. , Robson, P. & Cain, A. (2002). “City profile”, Cities, 19(2), 139-150.

Kajibanga, J. G. (2023). O Processo de aquisição de habitação própria na cidade do

Kilamba em Luanda. Master’s thesis. Universidade de Lisboa.

Kiala, C. (2010). China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?

South African Journal of International Affairs, 17(3), 313-331.

Kim, K. (2021). Covertly and overtly: the Ilheu’s strategy to utilize Kianda as a cultural

(de)marker in Cabo Island of Luanda, Angola. Doctoral Dissertation. Hankuk University

of Foreign Studies.

______. (2025a). A cultural narrative of Angolan resistance and resilience: challenges,

opportunities, and the social role of Kuduro. Journal of Lusophone Area Studies, 22(1),

251-284.

______. (2025b). Urbanized inequality: significance of boundaries and places in Luanda,

Angola. Journal of Global and Area Studies, 9(1), 65-87.

______. (2025c). At the crossroads of post-imperialism and neo-imperialism: Macao as

a strategic gateway for Lusophone cooperation. Journal of Lusophone Area Studies,

22(2), 7-32.

______. (2025d). Luanda against empire: the conflicts and ruptures of Portuguese

colonial urban planning. Journal of European Union Studies, 77, 549-578.

Kimari, W., & Ernstson, H. (2023). The invisible labor of the “New Angola”: Kilamba’s

domestic workers. Urban geography, 44(9), 1874-1891.

Lall, S. V., Henderson, J. V., & Venables, A. J. (2017). Africa's cities: Opening doors to

the world. World Bank Publications.

Latham, M. E. (2011). The right kind of revolution: Modernization, development, and US

foreign policy from the Cold War to the present. Cornell University Press.

Lefebvre, H. (1991). The production of space. in Gieseking, J. J et al. (Eds.), The People,

Place, and Space Reader. 81-84. Routledge.

Lenin, V. I. (1917). Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: a popular outline.

Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Li, T. M. (2007). The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of

politics. Duke University Press.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

153

Liebersohn, H. (2016). Introduction: the civilizing mission. Journal of World History,

27(3), 383-387.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the postcolony (Vol. 41). University of California Press.

Milheiro, A. V. (2020). Modernity and colonization in an African megacity: the case of

Luanda. in Rukmana, D. (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Planning Megacities in the

Global South. 397-409. Routledge.

Nascimento, W. S. (2013). Gentes do mato: os novos assimilados em Luanda (1926-

1961). Doctoral Dissertation. Universidade de São Paulo.

Neto, M. da C. (1997). Ideologias, contradições e mistificações da colonização de Angola

no século XX. Lusotopie, 4(1), 327-357.

Nielsen, R. (2007). Strengthening land tenure and property rights in Angola. Land law

and policy: Overview of legal framework. U.S. Agency for International Development.

Pinto, A. C., & Jerónimo, M. B. (2015). Ideologies of exceptionality and the legacies of

empire in Portugal. 46th Annual Asphs Conference.

Pitcher, A., & Moorman, M. (2015). City building in post-conflict, post-socialist Luanda:

burying the past with phantasmagorias of the future. African Cities Reader, 3, 123-136.

Pomeranz, K. (2005). Empire & ‘civilizing’ missions, past & present. Daedalus, 134(2),

34-45.

Purcell, M. (2002). Excavating Lefebvre: the right to the city and its urban politics of the

inhabitant. GeoJournal, 58(2), 99-108.

Rapanyane, M. B. (2021). Neocolonialism and new imperialism: unpacking the real story

of China's Africa engagement in Angola, Kenya, and Zambia. Journal of African Foreign

Affairs, 8(3). 89-112.

Rodney, W. (2018). How europe underdeveloped africa. Verso Books.

Roque, S. (2009). Ambitions of cidade: war-displacement and concepts of the urban

among bairro residents in Benguela, Angola. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Cape

Town.

Said, E. W. (1977). Orientalism. The Georgia Review, 31(1), 162-206.

Stoler, A. L. (Ed.). (2013). Imperial debris: on ruins and ruination. Duke University Press.

Tan‐Mullins, M., Mohan, G., & Power, M. (2010). Redefining ‘aid’ in the China–Africa

context. Development and Change, 41(5), 857-881.

Tomás, A. (2022). In the skin of the city: Spatial transformation in Luanda. Duke

University Press.

Tull, D. M. (2006). China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences.

The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), 459-479.

Veltmeyer, H. (2020). Capitalism, development, imperialism, globalization: a tale of four

concepts. Globalizations, 17(8), 1335-1349.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3

Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in

Contemporary Europe and Asia

September 2026, pp. 132-154

Overlapping Imperialisms: Colonial and Neocolonial Logics of Urban

Governance in Kilamba, Angola

Kyeri Kim

154

Viegas, S. L. (2016) Urbanisation and peri-urbanisation in Luanda: a geopolitical and

socio-spatial perspective from the late colonial period to the present. Journal of Southern

African Studies, 42(4), 595-618.

World Bank. (2007). International Development Association Interim Strategy Note for

the Republic of Angola April 26, 2007, World Bank.

Yu, B. (2020). Neo-imperialism, the final stage of imperialism. International Critical

Thought, 10(4), 495-518.

Zack-Williams, A. (2013). Neo-imperialism and African development. Review of African

Political Economy, 40(136), 179-184.

Ziai, A. (2013). The discourse of “development” and why the concept should be

abandoned. Development in practice, 23(1), 123-136.