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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1
Maio-Outubro 2023/May-October 2023
Vol 14, Nº. 1 – Maio-Outubro 2023/May-October 2023
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1
ARTIGOS/ARTICLES
Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia: From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev
and Russian nationalists - Michal Racyn – pp 1-16
The Soviet-Finnish Border as a State Securitization Project in the early 1920s - Oksana
Ermolaeva – pp 17-40
O DIP e o terrorismo internacional. Antes e após o 11/09. Como a guerra ao terrorismo
desafia o Direito Internacional Público? - Bruno Bessa – pp 41-54
Pecautización del análisis sobre la violencia contemporánea en Colombia: una propuesta
categórica en construcción - César Niño – pp 55-68
La educación en Defensa: un análisis comparado entre los Colegios de Defensa de Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador y Perú - Lester Cabrera Toledo – pp 69-86
O Desfasamento entre a Ação Política e a Estratégia Militar: uma análise ao Iraque e
Afeganistão (2006-2009) - Luís Barroso – pp 87-105
Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair Bolsonaro e o ideário
da extrema-direita - Helder Prior – pp 106-124
South Korean Foreign Policy under Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee: contrasting
strategies under similar structural constraints - Vítor Ramon Fernandes – pp 125-141
Jakarta’s city branding as para-diplomacy: beyond greening stradium and race - Luerdi
Luerdi – pp 142-169
Game Change in the Gulf of Guinea: Three Intertwined Perspectives on Sino-
Equatoguinean Cooperation - Yu Ma and Francisco José Leandro – pp 170-194
Polemology of Central Africa (1990-2020) - Henrique Morais – pp 195-208
Polemologia da África Central (1990-2020) – Henrique Morais – pp 209-223
Politics and ritual infanticide: a reading of political instability in Guinea-Bissau from political
theory - Claudia Favarato – pp 224-237
A relevância da APE para o estudo da política externa: o caso da adesão de Portugal à CEE
- Flávio Silva – pp 238-256
Characterization of the olive sector in the Iberian countries: the approach of a new reality
- António Duarte Santos e Sandra Cristina Ribeiro – pp 257-278
NOTAS/NOTES
Problems of evaluation of digital evidence based on blockchain technologies - Otabek
Pirmatov – pp 279-288
China and Morocco: Improbable Partners? - Niv Horesh – pp 289-294
Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da Ucrânia - Daniel Lara – pp 295-
299
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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023)
1
KHAZAR KHAGANATE IN THE REALMS OF SOVIET ACADEMIA:
FROM M. I. ARTAMONOV TO L. N. GUMILEV AND RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS
MICHAL RACYN
racyn@phil.muni.cz
Masaryk University graduate in Philological Area studies. Current he is a PhD student at
department of Slavonic Studies (Czech Republic). His dissertation project is focused on the
transformation and development of eurasianist concepts in time period from 1945 to 1991
Abstract
This paper deals with the reception of M. I. Artamonov's (1898–1972) and L. N. Gumilev's
(1912–1992) works focused on the history of Khazar Khaganate and their position in the
context of Soviet academia. The paper is based on the prosographical approach to the topic
and comparative analysis of primary texts published by Gumilev and Artamonov, mainly in
the 1960s and 1970s. The main aim of the study is to analyze and reflect on their findings in
the broader context of the Soviet academic discourse and intellectual milieu of Russian
nationalists. I argue that Gumilev’s radical revision of the history of Khazar Khaganate far
exceeded previous Artamonov’s findings and attracted the attention of Russian nationalist
groups of the post-Stalinist era mainly due to its antisemitic narrative. Furthermore, despite
the ever-present ambivalence of Gumilev’s contact with Russian nationalists during the 1970s,
he was heavily affected by the unstable relationship between Russian nationalists and the
official Soviet regime. During that time, Gumilev faced strong censorship of his texts, and his
most radical revisionist study focused on the Khazaria was eventually published only
posthumously in 1993.
Keywords
Khazar Khaganate; Soviet academia; Russian nationalism; antisemitism; M. I. Artamonov;
L. N. Gumilev
Resumo
Este artigo analisa a aceitação dos trabalhos de M. I. Artamonov (1898-1972) e L. N. Gumilev
(1912-1992) centrados na história de Khazar Khaganate e na sua posição no contexto da
academia soviética. O artigo baseia-se na abordagem prosográfica do tema e na análise
comparativa de textos primários publicados por Gumilev e Artamonov, principalmente nas
décadas de 1960 e 1970. O principal objectivo do estudo é analisar e reflectir sobre as suas
conclusões no contexto mais amplo do discurso académico soviético e do meio intelectual dos
nacionalistas russos. É defendido que a revisão radical da história de Khazar Khaganate por
Gumilev excedeu em muito as anteriores descobertas de Artamonov e atraiu a atenção dos
grupos nacionalistas russos da era pós-estalinista, principalmente devido à sua narrativa anti-
semita. Além disso, apesar da sempre presente ambivalência do contacto de Gumilev com
nacionalistas russos durante a década de 1970, ele foi fortemente afectado pela relação
instável entre os nacionalistas russos e o regime soviético oficial. Durante esse período,
Gumilev enfrentou uma forte censura dos seus textos, e o seu estudo revisionista mais radical
centrado na Khazaria acabou por ser publicado apenas postumamente em 1993.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023), pp. 1-16
Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
2
Palavras-chave
Khazar Khaganate; academia soviética; nacionalismo russo; antisemitismo; M. I. Artamonov;
L. N. Gumilev
How to cite this article
Racyn, Michal (2023). Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia: From M. I.
Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.1
Article received on November, 7 2021, accepted for publication on February, 10 2023
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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023), pp. 1-16
Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
3
KHAZAR KHAGANATE IN THE REALMS OF SOVIET ACADEMIA:
FROM M. I. ARTAMONOV TO L. N. GUMILEV AND
RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS
MICHAL RACYN
M. I. Artamonov in the context of Soviet research of the Khazar
Khaganate
Artamonov's academic work in the interwar period
The Khazar Khaganate or Khazaria was a state that existed from the second half of the
7th century until the mid-10th century, with a territory that approximately included
Crimea, the coast of the Caspian Sea, and what is now the Dagestan Republic of the
Russian Federation to the north
1
.
As recently pointed out by Victor Schnirelmann, the current academic approach to the
topic still holds an extensive number of contradictions related not only to the state border
of Khazaria but also to its core political, economic, and religious aspects (Schnirelmann,
2012b: 11). Yet, due to its general geographical location, the study of Khazar history has
naturally been of interest mostly to Russian and Soviet historians, since it was directly
related to the history of other peoples in Central Asia and around the river Volga and the
history of successor states in the geopolitical area.
One of the key and essential aspects of the soviet historiography of the Khazars has been
related to its alleged state religion – Judaism. This topic has regularly led to heated
discussions, particularly during the 20th century, and has been a key factor in
determining views on the history and overall importance of the Khazar Khaganate in the
realms of the Soviet intellectual milieu.
M. I. Artamonov, an archaeologist and historian, became a leading Soviet expert on the
Khazars in the 1930s. According to Peter Golden, the publication of Artamonov’s
monograph Outlines of the ancient history of the Khazars (Очерки древнейшей истории
Хазар) in 1936 marked the beginning of modern research into Khazar history (Golden,
2007: 28).
Artamonov’s publication focused on clarifying the circumstances in which the Khazar
Khaganate emerged and explaining the role it played in the formation of medieval Russia.
In the preface to his book, Artamonov criticized the marginalization of the topic of his
1
Maps depicting approximate borders of Khazar Khaganate from 600 c. e. to 850 c. e. were published in
2002 in monograph by Felix Kitroser (Kitroser, 2002). Digital reprints by Richard Burd are also available
online at Bibliotecapleyades.net website (see Burd, R. Maps of the Khazar Kingdom. bibliotecapleyades.net,
https://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/esp_sociopol_khazar03.htm).
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
4
monograph and the shortcomings that pervaded the historical research on non-Russian
Soviet nations in general (Artamonov, 1936: 4). One of the principal tenets of his text
was his argument that the Khazar Khaganate played a significant role in shaping the
Kievan Rus’ in its early days. Artamonov’s publication also stressed the high level of
political organization and independence of the Khazar Khaganate and its tight political
and economic connection with the surrounding states (Artamonov, 1936: 4).
As noted by Mark Bassin, Artamonov's 1936 monograph was quite clearly a reflection of
the general Soviet political tendencies at that time. To a large extent, it conformed to
the internationalism embraced by the Bolsheviks and the criticism of tsarist Russia
(Bassin, 2016: 85). However, regardless of the political connotations of the text, it was
first and foremost a foundation for a much more extensive historiographic and
archaeological study of the Khazars (Artamonov, 1936: 5).
This attracted the attention of the young L. N. Gumilev (1912–1992), who enrolled at
the Leningrad university in 1934. Since both his parents were prominent poets in
prerevolutionary Russia, Gumilev regularly faced the persecutions of the new regime,
which had a highly detrimental effect on his future academic career. In 1938 he was
accused of anti-Soviet activities and sentenced to five years imprisonment for the first
time. A second conviction followed in 1949. As a result, Gumilev spent more than ten
years in Soviet labor and correctional camps, and his academic and professional career
did not officially begin until the second half of the 1950s, shortly after his return to
Leningrad (Bassin, 2016: 15).
Gumilev and Artamonov met in 1935 on an archaeological expedition to the valley of the
Manych River. Under the lead of Artamonov, Gumilev joined another expedition in the
summer of 1936, which aimed to excavate the supposed site of the Khazar town of Sarkel
(Beljakov, 2012: 351). However, their collaboration was interrupted in 1938 due to
Gumilev’s first sentence. (Kozyreva, 2012: 835). Gumilev eventually returned to
Leningrad at the end of 1945 (Kozyreva, 2012: 835). However, during that time, WWII
put a stop to many of Artamonov’s activities as well. As his archaeological research was
suspended, he focused his energy on topics surrounding the history of the Slavs and the
Scythians (Plenteva, 1998: 206).
M. I. Artamonov’s academic work after WWII
Artamonov resumed his research on the Khazars in the second half of 1949. His new
archaeological expedition continued in the footsteps of the research started in the 1930s;
again, he focused his attention on the area situated left of the lower course of the Don
(Pletneva, 1998: 207). Gumilev briefly joined this expedition, only to be rearrested for
the second time in November 1949. This time, he received a 10-year sentence (Beljakov,
2012: 836). In the meantime, Artamonov continued his archaeological research, while
continuing to work on his key monograph on Khazar history.
The situation changed radically in late 1951 when a December issue of Truth (Правда)
featured sharp criticism of the existing historiographic view of the Khazars (Ivanov, 1951:
3). When viewed in a broader context, the publication of this article clearly reflected the
marked change in the discourse of internal Soviet politics. This had been characterized
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
5
since the second half of the 1940s by a renewed war on cosmopolitanism, which was
viewed as undesirable in the Soviet environment. Stalin oversaw the closure of a number
of Jewish institutions, while the publication of some Jewish periodicals was restricted
(Zubov, 2010: 253). This antisemitic campaign intensified in May 1948 with the
declaration of the independent state of Israel and culminated in the early 1950s.
Famously, the campaign included the so-called doctor’s plot, a fabricated case designed
by Stalin to eliminate several elite Jewish doctors and start a new purge of the Communist
Party. Due to his sudden death in March 1953, the campaign eventually tapered off
(Malia, 2004: 315).
The criticism of the then-current research of Khazar history came at the height of the
anti-Semitic campaign. The attack was directed explicitly at the research of Artamonov,
who began to publish the results of the resumed archaeological expeditions at the end of
1949. The author of the article also criticized Artamonov's 1936 monograph and accused
him of attributing too much importance to the Khazar Khaganate and too little to the
independent development of medieval Russia. The article concluded that Artamonov’s
approach was completely wrong and unacceptable (Ivanov, 1951: 3). The archaeological
part of Artamonov’s research also came under scrutiny, since it allegedly failed to uncover
tangible evidence to substantiate Artamonov’s claims about the size and the level of
development of the Khazar Khaganate (Ivanov, 1951: 3).
The effect of these events on Artamonov's future academic activities was profound and
the devastating criticism of his papers caused several years of delay in the publication of
his monograph on the history of the Khazar Khaganate, even though it was almost
completed at that point. Moreover, these events led to a radical reassessment of the
whole Khazar historiography.
The critical article clearly drew new boundaries from 1951, which gave an unequivocal
answer to the questions about the origin and importance of the Khazars (Ivanov, 1951:
3). This new trend in research into Khazar history quickly found its way into mainstream
Soviet academia. In 1953, the journal Soviet archeology (Советская археология)
published a paper by B. A. Rybakov, which again challenged the results of Artamonov’s
archaeological expeditions and focused on criticising his overestimation of the Khazarian
territory (Rybakov, 1953: 146). The article also repeatedly highlighted the parasitic
nature of the state and claimed that the Khazar economy was wholly dependent on
exploiting the important trade routes of East Europe (Rybakov, 1953: 131).
Artamonov eventually resorted to rethinking his theses and reworked a large part of his
monograph to avoid the threat of censorship. Gumilev, who returned to Leningrad in May
1956, again appeared on the scene. Shortly after his return, Artamonov offered him a
job in the State Hermitage Museum, and Gumilev joined him in his work on the
monograph as an editor. Between 1959 and 1962, Gumilev also led a series of
archaeological expeditions, whose findings were included in Artamonov’s monograph
(Beljakov, 2012: 357).
Artamonov’s History of the Khazars (Исторя Хазар) was eventually published in 1962.
In an attempt to stay within the recently set boundaries of the historiographic discourse,
he admitted to having erred and revised many of his previous conclusions. Artamonov
shifted his focus to Judaism, the Khazarian state religion, and postulated that the spread
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
6
of Judaism had had a profound negative impact on the further development of the
Khaganate. In particular, Artamonov questioned the idea that the Khazar leaders of the
mid-8th century were able to freely convert to Judaism, arguing that the very nature of
Judaism forbade proselytism (Artamonov, 1962: 273).
According to Artamonov, as a result of these events, the Khazar elite became dissociated
from their people, and the chasms between the various classes of the religiously and
ethnically diverse Khazar Khaganate widened. Judaism was allegedly promoted by
Obadiah, a Khazar ruler who did not belong to the original line of Khazar khagans, but
whose Jewish ancestors probably held important positions in the administration of the
ruling family (Artamonov, 1962: 280). Artamonov argued, that with their help, Obadiah
gradually took control of the whole state and founded a new dynasty, creating dualism
within the state’s ruling classes. The original Khazar nobility lost all power and fell under
complete control of the new Jewish elite (Artamonov, 1962: 282).
Artamonov also claimed that adherence to Judaism also provided the new Khazar rulers
with a large degree of independence and reduced the religious pressure exerted by the
Byzantine Empire and the Arabic Caliphate (Artamonov, 1962: 281). However,
Artamonov’s assessment of the broader historical connotations of this move was far from
favorable (Artamonov, 1962: 457).
In a nutshell, Artamonov revised his view of Khazar history mostly in a way that would
fit the predefined narrative. However, he maintained a degree of objectivity despite the
enforced changes. While the final chapter of Artamonov’s book stressed that his previous
idealisation of the Khazars and the undue emphasis he had placed on their cultural
significance was wrong, it also contained sharp criticism of Rybakov’s ideas, particularly
his unsubstantiated effort to completely discount the historic role of the Khazar
Khaganate (Artamonov, 1962: 458).
Artamonov’s monograph concluded an important chapter in Khazar's historiography. His
long archaeological research brought the topic to the attention of the next generation of
Soviet academics; and in the 1960s, Gumilev became the most widely known
representative of this generation.
A radical revision of Khazar history in the works of L. N. Gumilev
L. N. Gumilev in the context of Soviet academia
L. N. Gumilev was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable and controversial Soviet
intellectuals of the second half of the 20th century. There have been many papers,
particularly since the 1990s, that studied his ideas and often reached contradictory and
ambiguous conclusions.
One of the ides that has always attracted significant interest, academic and otherwise, is
Gumilev’s proclaimed adherence to Eurasianism. While some see Gumilev as an
important representative and proponent of the original Eurasianist movement, with its
roots going back to the interwar Russian émigrés (Lavrov, 2007: 216), many experts are
wary of such sharp distinctions and are extremely critical of Gumilev’s alleged Eurasianist
theses (Laruelle, 2001: 459). Despite all the contradictory in the current research, it is
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
7
without any doubt that Gumilev’s view on Eurasianism was formed mainly by P. N.
Savitsky and G. V. Vernadsky – two important representatives of the inter-war
Eurasianist movement, with whom Gumilev maintained a long-lasting personal
correspondence which stated shortly after Gumilev’s return to Leningrad (Beisswenger,
2013: 107).
Another frequently discussed topic is Gumilev’s concept of ethnogenesis, described in his
key theoretical monograph Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere (Этногенез и биосфера
Земли), officially published only in 1989, where he attempted to make the conclusions
of his previous, less abstract papers more generally valid in a much broader theoretical
context. To describe the process of ethnogenesis, he drew on his knowledge of history,
geography, archaeology, biology, and several additional disciplines. It was this
unorthodox approach that has made his arguments subject to many heated
interdisciplinary debates, past and present (Zilbet, 2012). Indeed, a key example of
Gumilev’s interdisciplinary synthesis and the following generalizations related to his
ethnogenesis theory can be precisely tracked in his Khazaria research.
Moreover, in the 1960s, some of Gumilev’s ideas began to gain traction among the
Russian post-Stalinist nationalists. In the decades that followed, their attitude to
Gumilev’s research would often shift from positive responses to sharp criticism (Bassin,
2016: 177). However, the first theme of Gumilev’s research that strongly resonated with
the Russian nationalists was his view of the history of the Khazar Khaganate.
Gumilev’s revisionist approach to the history of the Khazar Khaganate
Considering that Gumilev was a long-time colleague of Artamonov, it was only natural
that he followed in his footsteps and took on Artamonov’s research on Khazar history.
The archaeological expeditions that he began to organize in 1959 generated
supplementary material for Artamonov’s monograph published in 1962. However, the
expeditions under Gumilev’s leadership continued and he regularly published his findings
in a series of papers titled Landscape and ethnos (Ландшафт и этнос).
2
In 1966, Gumilev published a summary of these expeditions in his book The Discover of
Khazaria (Открытие Хазарии). As a historian, Gumilev clearly followed in Artamonov’s
footsteps, reiterating the same arguments that Artamonov made, highlighting the wide
chasm that arose between the ruling Jewish elite and the Khazar people. Like Artamonov,
he viewed the Jewish rulers as usurpers who seized power in a coup (Gumilev, 1966:
107). However, historiography did not encapsulate the whole of Gumilev’s research, and
he emphasized that his book was a “biography of a discovery”, as he called it, rather
than a traditional academic text (Gumilev, 1966: 181).
Gumilev’s research was a synthesis of several disciplines, taking advantage of
archaeological findings as well as geographical and climatological data, which he carefully
compared with written sources. As a result of this synthesis, he reached novel and
surprising conclusions. Gumilev argued that, contrary to all existing presumptions,
Khazars were mostly sedentary or semi-nomadic people. This was supposedly caused by
2
This is an extensive series of 14 papers published on a regular basis in the journal Nature (Природа). The
last of these was published in 1973. (Kozyreva, 2012: 842–860).
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
8
the level of the Caspian Sea, which had been much lower during the 6th century than it
was at the time of Gumilev’s expeditions in the early 1960s. Much of the Khazar
population at that time lived in the natural delta of the Volga River created by the lower
sea level. However, major climate changes led to a rise in the Caspian Sea level by
several dozen meters during the 10th century and the Khazar settlements disappeared
under the sea surface (Gumilev, 1966: 92). In Gumilev’s opinion, Khazar Khaganate was
the 'Caspian Netherlands' (Gumilev, 1966: 92) that gradually became the 'Russian
Atlantis' (Gumilev, 1966: 127).
Examined within the wider context of its time, Gumilev’s innovative historiographical and
geographical analysis of Khazaria can be as well understood as the beginning of Soviet
environmental history (Bassin, 2016: 135). Moreover, his paper describing the marine
transgression of the Caspian Sea was published just as its level was beginning to fall
again (Beljakov, 2012: 359). In the 1960s, this phenomenon led to a suggested 'project
of the century', which was supposed to turn the direction of the natural flow of several
Russian rivers and divert it towards the shrinking sea. The project was never fully
implemented, mainly because the level of the Caspian Sea began to quickly rise again
towards the end of the 1970s (Beljakov, 2012: 360). However, from the very beginning,
starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gumilev actively criticized the absurdity of
such megalomaniac projects and pointed out their negative environmental impact
(Bassin, 2016: 135).
In the relatively encouraging political atmosphere of the post-Stalinist era, his criticism
of the Russian environmental policy soon found a sympathetic audience and the first
supportive voices came from among the Russian nationalists. In those early days,
environmental protection quickly became an important part of their program and one of
the few 'positive' aspects of the new movement (Shlapentokh, 1990: 277). The Russian
nationalist movement then began to show a more profound interest in Gumilev’s
environmental views in the early 1970s, when it enjoyed the surprising strong support
of the then Soviet authorities.
Gumilev and the new wave of Russian nationalism
The first intellectuals to support the pro-Russian nationalist idea had close ties to the
Village Prose literary movement, whose authors became actively involved in the new
direction of official Soviet politics shortly after Stalin’s death. In the early 1960s, their
works strongly influenced the budding liberal and conservative factions of the Russian
nationalist movement. The two factions were later joined by a third, radical faction
(Brudny, 1998: 17).
As pointed out by Brudny, until the end of the 1970s, the representatives of all three
nationalist factions were given relatively free rein (Brudny, 1998: 18). Although
surprising, this freedom was the direct result of the so-called inclusive politics that
prevailed in the USSR at the time. While ideas connected with the liberal opposition were
strongly suppressed, the nationalists seemingly enjoyed the official support of the Soviet
regime. However, inclusive politics was primarily a mechanism to suppress the
undesirable reform activities started by Khrushchev in the second half of the 1950s.
Nationalist groups, while critical of the government, were viewed as easier to control,
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Khazar Khaganate in the realms of Soviet academia:
From M. I. Artamonov to L. N. Gumilev and Russian nationalists
Michal Racyn
9
which made them a particularly useful tool for Khrushchev’s successors (Brudny, 1998:
16).
In the mid-1960s, the supporters of Russian nationalism began to form so-called Russian
clubs backed by two journals: Our contemporary (Наш современник) and Young Guard
(Молодая гвардия). Both journals served as their main publishing platforms. Some
nationalist authors also published in the Leningrad journal Russian literature (Русская
литература) founded in 1958 under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
(Brudny, 1998: 173).
The debate in nationalist circles revolved mostly around the position of ethnic Russians
in the Soviet Union. One faction in particular, the statists (государственники) highlighted
the unfavorable status of ethnic Russians compared to the non-Russian nations of the
Soviet Union and claimed that it had a significant detrimental effect on Russian statehood
and national awareness (Shlapentokh, 1990: 212). Very soon, the Jewish community
became the main target of this criticism. While Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin’s cult of
personality put a temporary stop to xenophobic domestic policy, and the official campaign
against the threat of cosmopolitism ended with a public disclosure that the 'doctors' plot'
was fabricated, antisemitism never completely disappeared from the Soviet political
discourse (Brudny, 1998: 42). It resurged in the mid-1960s; this time, under the guise
of fighting against world Zionism (Bassin, 2016: 187).
In this political atmosphere, Gumilev’s revised version of Khazar history from 1966
received a warm welcome among the nationalists, as Gumilev’s carefully substantiated
arguments laid the groundwork for their own anti-Semitic activities (Bassin, 2016: 189).
Their interest in his work grew in the following years with Gumilev’s rather theoretical
papers, which aimed to give more general validity to his previous historiographic
arguments.
In 1974, Gumilev successfully defended his second dissertation called Ethnogenesis and
the Biosphere (Этногенез и биосфера земли) (Kozyreva, 2012: 838). However, he was
unable to publish it as a monograph under the same name, and until 1989, it was only
accessible through one deposited copy (Beljakov, 2012: 505). Despite this difficulty, the
individual chapters of Gumilev’s major theoretical work achieved almost a cult-like status
among the Russian nationalists (Bassin, 2016: 182).
Gumilev’s next major opportunity to expand on his historiographic and theoretical
arguments came in 1976 when he was asked to contribute to a series of popular-science
compilations titled Prometheus (Прометей). The books were published by Young Guard
(Молодая гвардия), a publishing house that also published the eponymous nationalist
journal (Gumileva, 1993: 6).
Gumilev was asked to contribute a rather long paper on the history of the Khazar
Khaganate and its contact with other political entities in the area. The resulting text was
a culmination of his views on Khazar history. In many aspects, it went further than
Artamonov’s forced revision as well as Gumilev's previous work on the topic – as in this
case, he used Khazar history to illustrate important aspects of his complex theory of
ethnogenesis.
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10
Gumilev’s zigzags of the history
Gumilev began his text with a description of the general geography of the Eurasian
continent, noting its diversity and changeability. In his opinion, geography had a
significant impact on the genesis and formation of almost all the ethnic groups (referred
to as ethnos)
3
in Eurasia, including the Khazars.
According to Gumilev, the Khazar people arrived in the flooded Volga Delta in the 3rd
century. They found sufficient natural resources in the area, and the delta also served as
natural protection against the dangerous nomads that lived in the surrounding steppes
(Gumilev, 1993: 378). Gumilev describes this time in idyllic terms and remarks upon the
balance between the Khazar ethnos and its environment. Using Gumilev’s terminology,
the Khazars (descendants of previous ancient inhabitants of the western part of central
Eurasia) were in the homeostasis phase, one of the last stages of ethnogenesis (Gumilev,
1993: 380).
The situation changed dramatically in the late 6th century with a conflict between the
Khazars and the Göktürks (tiurkiuty in Gumilev’s terminology), who used the Khazar
territory as a base for their military incursions and mingled with the local inhabitants
(Gumilev, 1993: 384).
Passionarity (ппассионарность) is a central concept within Gumilev’s theory of
ethnogenesis. It refers to the increased capacity of an individual to take action. Those
who are endowed with this special energy (passionaries) can exert a strong influence
over other people and drive radical social changes (Gumilev, 2001: 303). In the case of
the Khazars, it was their long-term contact with the Turks that resulted in a new wave
of passionarity. Their influence strengthened in the early 7th century, as the Turkic
Khaganate dissolved into several separate territories. From the mid-7th century, the
Khazar Khaganate was ruled by Turkic khans and the biracial descendants of the two
ethnoses became known as Khazars.
Gumilev presented the contact between the Khazars and the Göktürks in overwhelmingly
positive terms and credited the nomadic Göktürks for the subsequent political and
cultural progress of the Khazars. He described the relationship between the two ethnoses
as symbiotic, and this symbiosis lasted over a hundred years. In Gumilev’s classification,
both the Khazars and the Göktürks belonged to the same Eurasian superethnos, which
allowed the Khazars to spread their influence quickly without the need for destructive
military campaigns (Gumilev, 1993: 388).
Each of the above-mentioned ethnoses in Eurasia (including the Slavic ethnos) occupied
its own ecological niche. Any conflict within this environment could have been caused
only by a change in the level of passionarity. Gumilev maintains that such a change
occurred in the 9th century and was caused by the activities of the Jewish community
within the Khazar Khaganate. In Gumilev’s system, the Jewish people are a superethnos
composed of individual groups that inhabit the entire Eurasia, from Germany to Iran.
3
In Gumilev’s terminology, ethnos refers to a population group with specific behavioural stereotypes, which
arise primarily as a reaction to biological and geographical factors. However, the use of this term is not
entirely consistent throughout Gumilev’s works (Gumilev, 2001: 201–260).
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Despite obvious external differences, such as culture and ideology, these groups maintain
certain internal unity and characteristic features. Of these, Gumilev highlighted the lack
of their own territory, centralised government and a permanent army (Gumilev, 1993:
390).
According to Gumilev, two branches of the Jewish superethnos shaped the Khazar
Khaganate: the Persian (Mazdakite) Jews and the Byzantine Jews. The former group
arrived in Khazar territory during the 5th century. These people allegedly forwent many
of the teachings of the Talmud and co-existed peacefully with the Khazars for the next
200 years (Gumilev, 1993: 402). In the first half of the 8th century, the Persian Jews
joined the Khazars in their fight against the Arabic Caliphate. Supposedly, the success of
the Khazar offensive was, to no small degree, due to the Jewish leader Bulan, who later
led the conversion of his people back to Jewish traditions and abandoned Mazdakism,
which was originally practiced by this group. Importantly, Bulan was a proponent of
Karaite Judaism, rather than Rabbinic Judaism (Gumilev, 1993: 403).
After establishing this strict division of the Jewish peoples in Khazaria, Gumilev presented
each group as having different characteristics. According to Gumilev, the Persian Jews
did not pose any threat to the indigenous Khazar population. This Jewish community
subsisted on the natural resources that were available to them, primarily on herding, and
their interests were identical to the interests of the Khazars (Gumilev, 1993: 402).
However, the arrival of Byzantine Jews in the 8th century caused serious problems.
Gumilev was doubtful about the reasons for their emigration and challenged the
information that the Jews left the Byzantine Empire due to the onset of forced
Christianisation. He was in no doubt about the circumstances of their arrival (Gumilev,
1993: 404).
According to Gumilev In the mid-8th century, these Jewish traders (or Radhanites as
they were called by Gumilev), gained control of the trade routes between China and
Europe, while a new northern route opened from Iran to the River Kama (Gumilev, 1993:
407). The Khazar Khaganate was at the crossroads of these two routes and soon became
an important center for Jewish traders (Gumilev, 1993: 409). These traders subsequently
settled in all the major towns of the Khazar Khaganate and eventually took over
diplomatic and economic control. The naive assumptions of the local Göktürk khans made
it easy for them to become part of the ruling elite (Gumilev, 1993: 409).
Based on the above thesis, Gumilev presents the most crucial idea of his study and
another term of his ethnogenesis theory: the concept of the Jewish-Khazar chimera,
which laid the groundwork for the descriptions of the many negative consequences of
Jewish activities in Khazaria.
In Gumilev’s terminology, a chimera (химера) is a form of contact between two ethnic
groups, which results in a parasitic relationship between the indigenous and the newly
arrived ethnos. In the case of the Khazar Khaganate, the Byzantine Jews played the role
of the parasitic ethnos: they planned a coup, distanced themselves from the Khazar
people, and resorted to violence to seize power in the Khaganate. These events disrupted
the further development of the Khazar ethnos. This is what Gumilev’s zigzag – a term he
used in the title of his study – refers to: a disruption of the natural course of history
(Gumilev, 1993: 413).
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However, Gumilev’s revised version of the Khazar history went even further. Building on
his concept of an ethnic chimera, he devoted the second part of his text to an analysis
of the relationship of the chimera with the surrounding states. He challenged the existing
written sources; in particular, he attempted to reinterpret the information contained in
Nestor’s Tale of Bygone Years. He proposed that the author of the chronicle purposely
adapted the content to suit the political situation of his time and misrepresented many
key historical events (Gumilev, 1993: 439).
In this context, Gumilev paid particular attention to the arrival of the Varangians in
Kievan Rus’, an event which he described in remarkably negative terms. In his opinion,
the actions of the new Varangian rulers in the late 9th century were the direct cause of
a prolonged war with the Khazar Khaganate. To fill in this time gap, Gumilev used several
Arabic sources from that time. In his interpretation of this material, he arrived at another
controversial argument (Gumilev, 1993: 441). Gumilev describes the late 9th and early
10th century as the peak of the Jewish-Khazar dominance in Eastern Europe. The local
Slavic inhabitants were controlled by Varangian intruders, who in turn were forced to pay
a regular tax to the Khazar Khaganate (Gumilev, 1993: 447). In Gumilev’s opinion, the
Varangian rulers brought political turmoil to the Kievan Rus’ while failing entirely in all
their military incursions (Gumilev, 1993: 457).
The situation changed only in the second half of the 10th century when Princess Olga
and her son Svyatoslav appeared on the political scene and reestablished - according to
Gumilev – the previous Slavic tradition interrupted by the Varangian invasion (Gumilev,
1993: 461). Another war between the Kievan Rus’ and the Khazar Khaganate broke out
soon after, probably in the late 950s, when Olga converted to Orthodox Christianity and
established a close alliance with the Byzantine Empire. Svyatoslav followed in his
mother’s footsteps and conquered Atil in a victorious military campaign in 965. According
to Gumilev, this was the end of the local ruling elite and the Jewish-Khazar chimera was
obliterated from Eurasia (Gumilev, 1993: 469).
Publication of Gumilev’s findings
Gumilev’s highly controversial and revisionist study brought him remarkably close to the
then-current interests of Russian nationalists. While his interpretation of the Khazar
history was, on the surface, entirely dissociated from modern politics, it clearly reflected
the anti-Semitic mood that escalated during the 1970s. Norman theory, which was
another hotly debated topic at the time and was criticized by many nationalists, was also
involved (Bassin, 2016: 196).
Gumilev’s study sided with nationalists and provided them with a number of new
arguments. In short, Gumilev completed his assignment with care. The text he submitted
to the Young Guard (Молодая гвардия) was innovative and grounded in his own
research, which combined a number of disciplines. Nevertheless, it was never published
in the series as intended. Although Gumilev completed the text in 1976, the production
process dragged on until 1979 when it was officially rejected, although Gumilev received
the promised payment (Belajkov, 2012: 573). Eventually, a shortened version of the
study became part of his monograph Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe (Древняя Русь
и великая степь) published in 1989. The original version of the Zigzags of history (Зигзаг
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13
истории) was first published only posthumously as a part of a compilation titled
Ethnosphere: the history of people and the history of nature (Этносфера: история людей
и история природы) (1993). Furthermore, both Young Guard (Молодая гвардия) and
another nationalist journal, Our contemporary (Наш современник), refused to publish
other articles by Gumilev that focused on the Khazars during the 1970s (Bassin, 2016:
188).
Mark Bassin concludes that Gumilev’s contributions were rejected due to their anti-
Semitic nature, which was found to be too radical (Bassin, 2016: 188). His controversial
revision of Khazar history has been sharply criticized by Viktor Shnirelman (Shnirelman,
2012a: 515) and other contemporary researchers (Rossman, 2002: 34). Although some
experts claim that Gumilev’s alleged anti-Semitism is simply a misinterpretation of his
ideas, the negative depictions of Jews in his works are difficult to miss (Saraev, 2012:
933). However, Bassin’s argument is somewhat paradoxical since Gumilev’s negative
portrayal of Jews perfectly matches one of the main ideas that unified the individual
nationalist factions in Russia. As noted by Vladimir Shlapentokh in the early 1990s:
“For many Russophiles, particularly ‘patriots’, hatred of the Jews has become
the most important element of their credo, a sort of shibboleth that allows
them to recognize one another. This hatred is, for them, a most significant
social phenomenon in which they are deeply involved at an emotional level,
and which could probably push them to do things against their personal
interests. During the 1970s Jews, their activities, and their innumerable abject
flaws were by all accounts the main topic of private communication among
these Russophiles, who also tried to raise the Jewish issue at all public
gatherings, either directly or indirectly” (Shlapnetokh, 1990: 221).
An additional description of Gumilev’s relationship with the Russian nationalists was
formulated by Brudny. However, Brudny sees Gumilev as being associated with the
nationalists mainly since the 1980s and, accordingly, focuses on Gumilev’s writings on
other topics, which were published to mark the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo
(Brudny, 1998: 186). Nevertheless, Brudny’s detailed analysis of Soviet inclusive politics
is particularly useful for shedding light on Gumilev’s position in the 1970s. At the time
Gumilev finished his study, the attitude of the Soviet regime to the activities of the
Russian nationalists underwent a major change (Brudny, 1998: 114). The growing
nationalist opposition to Brezhnev’s policies was met with a sharp rebuke from the regime
and the nationalists received several clear warnings during the second half of the 1970s.
Our contemporary (Наш современник) and several other nationalistic periodicals were
particularly criticized for their publications.
The push against the Russian nationalists was escalated by Yuri Andropov, who
succeeded Brezhnev in November 1982 and remained in the office of the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party until his death in February 1984. In April 1981,
he initiated the persecution of Sergei Semanov, a prominent member of the Russian club;
Gumilev was personally acquainted with him (Beljakov, 2012: 582). However,
Andropov’s ambitions plans were never fulfilled, and the repression of Russian
nationalists only deepened their dissatisfaction with official Soviet politics (Brudny, 1998:
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Michal Racyn
14
126). In other words, the rejection of Gumilev’s study in 1976 and the subsequent
systematic obstruction of his other papers were closely related not only to the antisemitic
narrative of his texts but also to the latest developments in the complicated, obscure,
and often counterproductive efforts of the USSR to control Russian nationalist groups at
the time when Gumilev focused his research on Khazaria.
Conclusion
In the context of Soviet academia, the history of Khazar Khaganate always represented
a highly contradictory topic. During the 20th century, academic view on the subject was
repeatedly altered by the official regime, which led to significant discourse transformation
– in the forefront of these shifts stood primarily two soviet historians: M. I. Artamonov
and L. N. Gumilev.
Already in the 1930s, Artamonov published several crucial texts focused on Khazaria and
eventually became the leading Soviet expert on the topic. Although in the first half of the
1950s, Artamonov was accused of overstating the historical significance of the Khazaria,
and his earlier works were discredited entirely by the official Soviet academia. Under
regime pressure, the historian carried out a rigorous revision of his earlier studies and in
1962 published a seminal monograph entitled Histoy of the Khazars (История Хазар).
However, despite the forced revision, his work on the topic has created solid ground for
further research and strengthened academic interest in the topic.
In the 1960s Artamonov’s works were followed and further developed mainly by
Leningrad's historian L. N. Gumilev. In the circumstances of the new Bolshevik regime,
Gumilev was forced to interrupt his university studies at Leningrad University several
times and eventually spent several years in Soviet gulags and labor camps. Even though
his academic career practically began only in the late 1950s, in the following years,
Gumilev elaborated a vast body of work overarched by the complex theoretical concept
of ethnogenesis backed by his field research initially explicitly related to the history of
Khazaria. Gumilev’s interdisciplinary approach to the issue brought many new, although
controversial, conclusions.
Although Gumilev’s most controversial study focused on the history of Khazaria was
officially published only posthumously in 1993, the resonance of his overall radical
revisionist approach to the topic significantly overshadowed the previous findings of
Artamonov. At the same time, Gumilev’s questionable assessment of the influence of
Judaism on the overall development of Khazaria soon attracted significant attention from
the newly emerged movement of Russian ethnic nationalists supported by post-Stalinist
changes in the soviet academic and the overall soviet intellectual milieu. Although
Gumilev never entirely endorsed the Russian nationalist movement, and his relationship
with the movement representatives remained very ambivalent, his persona and work
significantly influenced the overall direction of the movement. Besides his Khazar
research in the 1960s and 1970s, it became apparent especially in the early 1980s when
Gumilev shifted his academic focus to 13th and 14th century Russia: this time, the
Russian nationalists reacted with an assault on his 'dangerous' Eurasianism concepts,
which eventually led to significant internal disruption among individual representatives
of the movement and further escalated in parallel with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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15
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OBSERVARE
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17
THE SOVIET-FINNISH BORDER AS A STATE SECURITIZATION PROJECT
IN THE EARLY 1920S
1
OKSANA ERMOLAEVA
ksana27@yahoo.com
Research editor of EuropeNow journal (Spain). Ph.D. in History of Eastern and Central Europe
obtained from the Central European University.
She is a Fulbright visiting scholar program finalist 2023–2024.
Abstract
Undertaking a case study of the Soviet-Finnish border in the 1920s, the article explores how
problems of Soviet international borders’ security and Soviet initial responses to them locally
played on the ground. It discusses, how the early Soviet border securitization project,
intertwining with the Soviet security threats, entailed the first “cleansing” operations in the
border zones. It argues that the Soviets engaged in their first “prophylactic cleansing”
experiments in the mid-1920s in the relatively stable borderlands earlier than the actual first
“security threats” of the 1920s materialized. Therefore, the heritage of the revolution and the
civil war mixed with the tenets of Bolshevik ideology left its imprint not only on Stalin’s
mentality as a primary trigger of Soviet “cyclical violence,” as many scholars argue, but
generated a continuum of hibernating but never ceasing state violence which was easily
triggered locally by the regional actors.
Keywords
Soviet western border; 1920s; security threats; border securitization; repressive operations;
local responses
Resumo
Seguindo um estudo de caso sobre a fronteira soviético-finlandesa nos anos 20, o artigo
analisa os problemas de segurança das fronteiras internacionais soviéticas e o desempenho
das respostas iniciais no terreno. É discutido o projecto de securitização das primeiras
fronteiras soviéticas entrelaçado com as ameaças à segurança, e as implicações das primeiras
operações de "limpeza" nas zonas fronteiriças. É defendida a ideia que os soviéticos
participaram nas suas primeiras experiências de "limpeza profiláctica" em meados da década
de 1920 nas zonas fronteiriças relativamente estáveis, mais cedo do que se materializaram
as primeiras "ameaças à segurança" dos anos 20. A herança da revolução e da guerra civil,
misturada com os princípios da ideologia bolchevique, deixou a sua marca na mentalidade de
Estaline como principal desencadeador da "violência cíclica" soviética. Mas, como muitos
estudiosos argumentam, gerou um continuum de hibernação, nunca cessando a violência
estatal que foi facilmente desencadeada localmente pelos actores regionais.
Palavras-chave
Fronteira ocidental soviética; década de 1920; ameaças à segurança; securitização de
fronteiras; operações repressivas; respostas locais
1
The article developed as an outcome of the paper presented at the 8th Annual Conference on Eurasian
Politics and Society, 22-24 September 2021, Lisbon, Portugal and was written under the aegis of the
Research Fellowship of the New Europe College, Bucharest, Gerda Henkel track (2020–2021). The author
acknowledges the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments and suggestions.
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The soviet-finnish border as a state securitization project in the early 1920s
Oksana Ermolaeva
18
How to cite this article
Ermolaeva, Oksana (2023). The soviet-finnish border as a state securitization project in the early
1920s. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted
[online] in date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.2
Article received on November, 19 2021, accepted for publication on February, 13 2023
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The soviet-finnish border as a state securitization project in the early 1920s
Oksana Ermolaeva
19
THE SOVIET-FINNISH BORDER AS A STATE SECURITIZATION
PROJECT IN THE EARLY 1920S
OKSANA ERMOLAEVA
Background and Introduction
1917 marked the demise of the Russian empire, 1991 the end of its Soviet successor. In
both cases border security was an issue of primary concern, with the obsessive fear of
imperial decay remaining a driving force of international and internal policy targeted at
safeguarding and expanding the borders. This is also the case with contemporary Russia,
which, advancing its foreign policy and seeking to reclaim its superpower status, inherited
from the former Russian empire and the Soviet Union a rich tapestry of political and
military thinking patterns.
The use of the “border insecurity” argument as a powerful mass mobilization device has
become a typical ground for Russian domestic, regional, and foreign policy alterations
(Newmann, 2015; Roberts, 2017). A scholarly research into the origins of Soviet border
securitization experiments goes back to the 1920s–1930s, when the first security
dilemmas related to the “foreign threat” were elaborated (Shearer, 2018).
The article employs the concept of securitization advanced by the Copenhagen school of
International Relations and redefined by Barry Buzan. It uses the core argument of the
securitization theory stating that “it is by labeling something a security issue that it
becomes one” (Wæver, 2004: 13). Thus, is considers how a particular border was
actually turning into a security issue locally on the ground under a certain (Soviet)
political regime. In other words, how in the course of the border securitization the
discursive “staged” threat (Huysmans, 1998; Febrica, 2010) and a peculiar Soviet
reaction to it – repressive operations in its border zones were (inter-) subjectively
constructed and actually implemented as a non-linear reaction to it (Balzacq, 2019; Baele
and Thomson, 2017; Stritzel, 2007).
To begin with, the securitization of the Soviet borders entailed military mobilization
preparations and propaganda campaigns, but also a peculiar Soviet solution coined to
protect the longest border in the world, for the Russian frontier, ranging from Arctic
tundra through forest to arid steppe, separates it from 12 other countries and traverses
some 20,000 kilometers across eight time zones. (Werth, 2021: 623–44). Repressive,
or “cleansing,” operations in the border zones and borderland areas, aimed not only at
military forces, but at wide categories of peaceful population, were deemed as a natural
and the most efficient way to control the borders and prepare them for potential warfare.
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This was one of the solutions to major problems which arose in attempts to delimit and
control the Soviet international borders, which had three dimensions in their entangled
relationships. The first was political, reflecting the challenging geopolitical entanglements
in the contested Eurasian post-imperial frontiers, shifting political relationships of Russia
and its neighbors, and Bolshevik fears of foreign threat. The second was a problem of
controlling the movement of people and goods across the borders, aggravated by a
severe lack of financial and human resources and new, politicized Soviet contexts after
1917. The third was the active involvement of the borderlands community networks,
reflecting mixed ethnic compositions of the population, in drawing the borderlines
according to their needs and (non-) observing the official regulations for crossing them.
The current article focuses on how these factors intertwined in their entangled relations
in the early Soviet border securitization project.
It argues that in addition to regular counter-intelligence operations along its Western
border zones, the Soviet GPU (Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, State Political
Directorate) engaged in its first “prophylactic cleansing” experiments in the mid-1920s,
with the relatively stable borderlands in response, first, to emerging problems in other
parts of the “Western border belt,” and, secondly, to the local refusal to abide by the
existing Soviet border regulations on the part of all actors involved in the (b)order-
making process. The first mass-scale “cleansing” operations — occurring in spring 1925
— came earlier than the first actual “war threat” of the same year materialized at the
end of spring— summer 1925 (Dullen, 2014). This means that the heritage of the
revolution and the civil war mixed with the tenets of Bolshevik ideology left its imprint
not only on Stalin’s mentality as a primary trigger of Soviet “cyclical violence” (Shearer,
2018: 213), but generated a continuum of hibernating but never-ceasing state violence
which was extremely easily triggered locally, by the regional actors.
To demonstrate this argument, the article undertakes a case study of the Soviet-Finnish
border as an illustrative example of politicized, contested frontier (Paasi, 2005), and
distinguishes two separate border strips within its framework. As such, it provides special
sections on Russian Karelia (from 1923, AKSSR, the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic), and at the Karelian isthmus in the Petrograd/Leningrad province (gubernia).
Historically these territories belonged to different administrative units – Olonets and
Archangelsk provinces in Russian Karelia, and Vyborg and Petrograd provinces on the
Karelian isthmus. Within the newly created Soviet state, the respective border strips were
managed by different administrative structures within the AKSSR and Petrograd (from
1924 Leningrad) province.
The first part of the article explores local Soviet border controls and population responses
to them in the two respective border strips, while the second one focuses on examples
of anti-espionage, cleansing and repressive operations in the borderland areas which are
conceived of as an important aspect in the earliest stage of the Soviet border
securitization project. Finally, the article evaluates the rationale behind these operations
against the background of broader geopolitical exigencies and evolving international
“security alarms.”
The work complements the dearth of studies devoted to the first among the above
mentioned dimensions of the Soviet international border protection — a political one—
as well as the scholarship on the Soviet security threats and securitization policy. Experts
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on Soviet securitization of the inter-war period tend to approach the situation of the
1920s through the so-called “military alerts,” especially the one of 1927, when Great
Britain broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw
Pyotr Voykov was assassinated, and acts of terrorism were committed in Leningrad. All
this was used to clobber party opposition and to mobilize the society to change the course
(Takala, 2016: 117). This situation is considered as a decisive moment in Soviet history,
and a critical year in the shaping of Stalinist rule, partly for the reason that the state’s
responses to those realities established precedents that would characterize the entire
Stalin era: an assault on peasant autonomy and widespread arrests of suspected enemies
in so-called mass operations, all fueled by a paranoid sense of vulnerability to foreign
attack (Velikanova, 2013).
The “classic” interpretations of the “Soviet war scares” tended to explain it as a
manipulative device, and a discursive construct, either to gain political advantage over his
opponents, to mobilize the population, to deflect blame for ill-advised and extreme policies,
or in some other way to consolidate the dictator's power. (Sontag, 1975). Later works, still
accentuating Stalin’s personal role, and revealing patterns established during the dictator's
experience as a military commander in the Russian revolutionary and civil wars from 1918 to
1920, provided more nuanced interpretations, taking into account the Bolsheviks’ fears
of imminent invasion (Ken, 2002: 325; Khaustov, Samuelson, 2010: 326; Nezhinsky,
2004: 15; Golubev, 2008: 50; Velikanova, 2013: 47; 80; Shearer, 2018: 188-217).
The link between “external” (diplomatic relations and military alerts) and “internal” (the
population’s worsening attitude towards the Soviet regime) factors in the Soviet border
securitization process, which entailed repressions along the Soviet border zones, has
been amply researched in Russian as well as Western literature starting from the end of
the 1920s (Cimbala, 2013; Hudson, 2012: 145–156; Velikanova, 2013; Takala, 2015;
Shearer, 2018: 188-217; Harris, 2016). The existing scholarly tradition usually tends to
start this story with the summer operations of 1927, when around 9,000 arrests among
nobility were made, and focuses on the subsequent waves of dekulakization in 1929-
1930 and 1931-1932 and the mass roundups – “the conspiracy cases” of 1932-1933
(Danilov, 2002: 311; Takala, 2016; Shearer, 2017). The intricacies of Soviet diplomatic
relations with Finland have received ample attention as a local securitization trigger from
the beginning of the 1930s (Rupasov, Chistikov, 2007; Kilin, 2012). However, little to
nothing is known about the Soviet borders from the early period as a factor in the Soviet
securitization. The only exception is the work of Andrei Shlyakhter, who, focusing on the
wide contraband flows along the Soviet “Western border belt” in the first half of the
1920s, linked them to the increasing border security concerns (Shlyakhter, 2020).
The imbalance is most probably related to the fact that although the “external threat” in
Soviet propaganda was becoming increasingly dominant starting from Stalin’s early
report at the 15th Congress of the Communist Party in 1926 (Stalin, 1948: 262), the
concept of the “endangered border,” tightly connecting the internal opposition with
external threats, became a key element in this process as well as in the Soviet
propaganda discourse only in the late 1930s. The notion of the “border” took a firm root
in the Soviet public discourse only at the end of the 1930s against the background of the
Great Purge, events in Manchuria, and the real growth of the war threat (Takala, 2015:
119). The current study differs from the existing scholarship mainly by introducing the
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multiple-factor scholarly analysis of Soviet international border securitization in the first
half of the 1920s.
The research draws from a wide array of published and unpublished sources. The
discussion makes extensive use of available document collections as well as unpublished
archival materials generated by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Karelia (Sovet
Ministrov RK), the local Karelian GPU (State Political Directorate), and the Customs
Administration, stored in the National Archives of Karelia.
The section on the 200-kilometer border strip of the Karelian isthmus is based on the
archival collections of the Leningrad Oblast State Archive (LOGAV), devoted to the Soviet-
Finnish border controls and trafficking – encompassing the bulk of contraband and
espionage cases from the 1920s processed by the Petrograd (Leningrad) Gubernia court
of the People’s Commissariat of Justice (1922-1924) and the Petrograd Gubernia
Revolutionary Tribunal of the Petrograd military district (1921-1924) (LOGAV. F. R- 2205.
Op. 1.)
Previously, the border strip of the Karelian isthmus has been almost exclusively studied
from the point of view of counter-intelligence operations of the second half of the 1920s,
such as the famous Trust affair (Mainio, 2019) or the deportations of the 1930s (Martin,
1998). Materials from the Leningrad Oblast state archives (LOGAV) used in the current
paper mostly tell the story from the beginning of the 1920s.
The problem of the documentary base is unavoidable in such a study. Multiple archival
sources related to the Soviet GPU repressive policies— a distinctive feature of the Soviet
border securitization, as well as the data on the espionage in the area, — are still
classified. The existing publications based on materials from the archives of the Russian
special services bear a certain bias and require a double check, which is not possible. The
data on counter-intelligence traffic from Russian and Finnish archives, provided by
Russian and Finnish historians, significantly differ, with the only materials on the
intelligence activity in Soviet Karelia in an open access being weekly GPU reports from
the mid-1920s, stored in the NARK, and these are extremely scarce. An important
question is to what extent Soviet numbers on the espionage activity in the borderland
areas can be trusted from the period when the country already was taking its first steps
towards infiltrating mass consciousness with the “spy mania” but locally the political
“border project” did not work? Finally, an extremely blurred distinction between
smuggling and espionage in the early Soviet period makes it impossible to assess the
number and the role of all those who were to some extent unofficially “subcontracted”
by the counter-intelligence services. Despite this limitation, this research nonetheless
teaches important lessons about the early Soviet borders securitization patterns that are
critical in understanding problems related to border regimes, cross-border practices, and
transnational geopolitical entanglements today.
State concern over security in protecting the socialist project from capitalist encirclement
led to a number of radical changes in the management of border controls. Felix
Dzerzhinsky, the chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka),
proclaimed that “the border is a political divide, and it is a political body that must protect
it.” Therefore, starting in 1920, a Special Division of the Cheka became the responsible
agency for the Soviet border protection. Later, in September 1922, this institution was
renamed the State Political Administration (GPU) and the Border Guards of the USSR
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(Pogranichnye voiska SSSR) were placed under the aegis of the NKVD (People’s
Commissariat of Internal Affairs).
The securitization of Soviet borders was taking place against the background of a
complicated process happening in the USSR in the 1920s-1930s which was known in
Soviet and Russian historiography as the “mobilization preparation.” It was a complex of
measures undertaken by the Soviet state in the borderlands as a reaction to the security
threats for the state border – in particular, a potential invasion by the enemy (Kilin,
1999). The spatial-territorial aspect of this process included the creation of special
“border regimes” around its perimeter.
The postulates of the Dzerzhinsky commission, supported by the class politics of the
Soviet state, already gave a priority to the dividing (barrier) function of the state border.
On November 24, 1920, the RSFSR Council for Labor and Defense (STO) reviewed the
Dzerzhinsky commission’s suggestions on reorganization of border protection and made
a decision to “close” the state border throughout its length. Following that, in the first
half of the 1920s, a broad range of efforts was taken in order to concentrate border
protection in the hands of the state security bodies, to introduce a new structure of border
defense, to establish control over the movement of people and goods across the state
border and to form a system of border strips on the micro-, middle and macro-levels
(Khondozhko, 2002: 84). Each of the levels on every individual border strip was given a
specific functional purpose. The range of functions included restrictions of the border-
crossing regime.
The Soviet territories adjacent to the Soviet-Finnish border were part of the so-called
Western border belt of the RSFSR/USSR. On the Finnish border segment it included the
Murmansk Gubernia, the Karelian Labor Commune (KTK, from June 1923 the Autonomus
Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic, AKSSR) and the Petrograd Gubernia of the RSFSR. It
also included the Pskov Gubernia of the RSFSR, the Vitebsk Gubernia of the RSFSR, the
Crimean ASSR, and the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics. Beginning from
1922, the Western borderland belt in its entirety was included in the enemy-threatened
zone (RGVA. F. 32032. Op. 1 D. 14 L. 4; Repukhova, 2021). This decision was fully
reflective of the experimental character of the Bolshevik project of border protection and
included an apparent inconsistency: in the case of an enemy attack in, say, Crimea, it
was necessary to begin mass evacuation in the Aleksandrovsk Uezd of the Murmansk
Gubernia.
However, during the military reform, on the OGPU chairman’s order no. 122/44 of
February 25, 1924, “On reorganization of border protection based on unification of border
defense organs and border guard troops,” the subjects of the USSR Western border belt
were divided between 4 military districts (Tereschenko, 2015: 70). Thus, the territories
adjacent to the Soviet-Finnish border were relegated to the Leningrad Military District
(LVO). The LVO covered those north-western territories that the Revolutionary-Military
Council (RVS) in 1922-1926 defined as “the North-Western sector under enemy attack
threat” (RGVA. F. 32032. Op. 1 D. 14 L. 4; Repukhova, 2021). It is important to note
that the military command responsible for borderland security was trying to influence the
formation of internal administrative-territorial borders in the areas of the Western border
belt: the Western and Ukrainian military districts, as well as the Crimean border district,
were completely congruent with the macro-level administrative-territorial units of the
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Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics and the Crimean ASSR, while the
LVO territory in 1924 in fact marked the boundaries of the future Leningrad Oblast.
Local Border Controls and Population Responses: The Case of the Soviet-
Finnish Border
With Finland becoming independent in 1917, the 1,245.6 kilometer long border of
Russian Karelia was confirmed as a boundary between two sovereign states. (NARK. F.
R-690. Op. 1. D. 6/27. L. 74). However, as with all other Soviet borders, the turmoil of
the civil war meant that the demarcation line was porous, almost unguarded and open
to frequent violations. In the Finnish historiography the conflict was defined as the
multiple Wars for Kindred Peoples (heimosodat), fought between 1918 and 1922.
Inspired by Finnish nationalistic ideology, Finnish right-wing radicals and nationalist
activists wanted to unite all the Finno-Ugric peoples in Finland, Russia, and Estonia and
expand the borders of Finland to the east. Thousands of Finnish volunteers took part in
military expeditions into the Russian regions of Ingria, the Karelian Isthmus, East Karelia,
White Sea Karelia, and Pechenga (Mainio 2019, 290). These cataclysmic events resulted
in a large-scale population displacement and trans-border migrations. (Repukhova,
2015: 3243-3253). The establishment of the national Soviet republic (Karelian Labor
Commune) in 1920, later (Autonomous Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic) neighboring
the “bourgeois” Finland opened a new page in the history of the embattled Northern
frontier.
In line with the Russian imperial strategic designs elaborated by the beginning of the
First World War, in relation to the Western border belt, an “especially protected” strip
(pogranichnaya polosa) was set up along the newly created state border, encompassing
7.5-km sections from thirteen volosts (NARK, F. R-690. Op. 1. D.6/27.74). Unlike the
Byelorussian and the Ukrainian SSR, where martial law imposed in connection with the
Soviet-Polish war was abolished in 1922, according to the VTsiK RSFSR decree, in the
Karelian ASSR it was extended. As a result, by the end of 1925, an entire western part
of Russian Karelia, adjacent to the state border retained special status. “The exclusion
zone” (zapretnaya zona) of 7.5 km was followed by 16- and 22-km strips, usually
measured from the border outposts, with their locations throughout the 1920s being
constantly shifted to the east (NARK, F. R-690. Op. 1. D. 6/27.74). In 1926 the Soviet-
Finnish border situation was normalized, and the term of the Soviet-Finnish border area
agreement extended (Kilin, 1999: 109). However, the territory of the AKSSR remained
in the Western Soviet “endangered zone.”
Nevertheless, in the strategic allocation of human and financial resources along the
Soviet Western border throughout the 1920-1930s Soviet military structures gave
preference to Ukraine and Byelorussia due to their proximity to Poland and Romania (Kilin
1999, 135). As a result, by the end of 1924, the Karelian border with Finland was still
only partially blocked by the GPU border detachments (NARK. F. Р-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L.
77). An acute shortage of border guard personnel at this border strip manifested itself
more poignantly than in other parts of the Soviet Western “border belt.”
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Fig. 1. Karelian ASSR, 1930.
Source: Vedlozero rural settlement, https://vedlozero.ru/karelia/maps/maR-karelia-1930
The first significant increase in the Soviet border guard force in the West in summer 1925
added to its protection 2,600 more men, with the total Soviet borderguard force
increasing to 35,300 by July 1925 (Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 1973). Most of them,
however, went to the border with Poland as a response to an increase in number and
scale of guerrilla assaults in the mid-1920s at the Polish border (Dullin, 2014;
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Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 1973), and to a conference of General Staffs of Romania,
Poland, Latvia, and Estonia, with Finland as observer, in Riga in spring 1925.
As a result, the “density” of the border guard, an important OGPU indicator of the border
guard effectiveness, was much lower in Karelia than in the rest of the “Western border
belt.” In 1925, for example, the resulting average of Soviet border guard at the border
part from Estonia to Romania (2,875 km) was 3.2 people per 1 km. (Dullin, 2019). From
1927 the average density at the Soviet-Polish border reached 4 people per km, while in
AKSSR this indicator was obviously lower, around 1.4, with just 1,805 guards for 1,245
km (NARK. R. 690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 74). By March 1927, border guards of the GPU of the
Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR) numbered only 1,805 men (90%
of them of peasant origin), with 520 horses as their only means of transportation (NARK.
F. R-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 78). This was almost five times less than estimated as
necessary for securing this particular border area several years earlier (RGAE F. 413. Op.
14. D. 7. L. 147, 149-150).
Secondly, regular purges of the border guard personnel on political, national, and social
grounds from 1923 onwards – a unique feature of the Soviet politicized “border project”
– led to a noticeable cut in numbers and operational capacities of the Karelian GPU staff
in the first half of the 1920s (Organy bezopasnosti Karelii 2007, 64). The situation with
the personnel at the Soviet North-Western border continued to aggravate until 1926-
1927, when a steady All-Union increase in political police and state security personnel,
including its border guard force, started as a part of the Soviet securitization strategy,
which intensified from the beginning of the 1930s (Shearer 2015, 117).
As a result, from the beginning of the 1920s, illegal trafficking swept across the Soviet
North-Western border. Initially, it took the form of mass smuggling, stimulated by the
famine of 1922 and the gap in prices on different sides of the Soviet border (Egorov
1997, 26), as well as between Soviet inland and borderland regions, with the prices in
the latter being 80% higher (NARK. F. R-544. Op. 2. D. 3/58. L. 44). Even in 1927 the
Karelian GPU chiefs admitted that in most of the borderland villages all the inhabitants
were, one way or another, engaged in illegal trans-border networks, and regularly and
effortlessly crossed the border (NARK. F. R-382. Op. 4. D. 25/568. L. 4-19). Wide and
well-organized smuggling networks covering several villages were exploited by Soviet
counter-intelligence which introduced new features into the complex world of illegal
trans-border encounters. Such activities were carried out in all the Soviet borderlands
during the decade after the revolution (Dullin, 2014; Shlyachter, 2020). However,
specific regional seasonal climatic conditions and the nature of the terrain frequently
made roads impassable, as the GPU reports made clear, and contributed to the inactivity
of Soviet border guards operating in some sectors of the Karelian borderland (NARK. F.
R- 689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123).
The Finnish counter-intelligence agents and couriers received most active support on the
part of their closest relatives and business partners on the Soviet side, who regularly
supplied them with provisions and contraband, shelter, information, and denied their
connections to them during the interrogations (NARK. R-382. Op. 1, D. 24/539. L. 21-
39). Professional agents disguised as professional contrabandists unofficially assisting
counter-intelligence services and as “ordinary” Karelian peasants occasionally “going to
Finland” to get provisions or commodities they needed, ran minor intelligence missions
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(NARK. F. R-382. Op. 4. D. 25/568. L. 220; F. R-689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123). And to
some extent, Finnish espionage in Soviet Karelia, accomplished by native Karelians,
became a family business.
Fig. 2. Customs posts along the border with Finland on the 1924 map of the AKSSR marked with
an asterisk
Source: National Archive of the Republic of Karelia, map 3.1
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In the first half of the 1920s the Karelian GPU struggled in vain to create a working
network of informants to counteract illegal trans-border activity. Most of the residents in
the borderland settlements were extremely unwilling to volunteer for such a duty (NARK.
F. R-275. Op. 1. D. 1/2. L. 65). The situation was typical of other borderland areas,
forcing the Soviet GPU to recruit its informants through the local newspaper ads
(Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 1973). Professional” smugglers and counter-intelligence
agents preferred to be shot either during the escape attempts during the GPU raids and
ambushes, or by local inhabitants in search for prey than to get caught alive and expose
their networks (NARK. F. R-382. Оp. 1. D 22/485. L. 4, 31; F. R-382. Op. 1. D. 24/539.
L. 24).
Intelligence intensiveness in the area was much less pronounced than in other Western
parts of the Soviet “border belt.” Largely, it was the consequence of the remoteness of
the border location from the Soviet centers, its length, physical characteristics, and low
population density (NARK. F. R-689. Op. 1. D. D. 8/81. L. 123). The intelligence
information, gathered in the area and transmitted through the border, was limited to the
data on the Soviet military detachments, military mobility infrastructures, and on the
Soviet officials in the regional center – Petrozavodsk (NARK. F. R-382. Op. 1. D. 21/469.
L. 2; Laidinen, Verigin 2013, 173).
Harsh climatic conditions, isolation, aggravated by delays in regular food and
commodities deliveries due to lengthy connecting roads to border, persistent housing
shortages, unsuitable living and working conditions, resulted in multiple illnesses and low
morale for the border guards, as well as customs officials (NARK. F. R-690. Op. 1. D. 27.
L. 55). As a result, the guards, settled in crowded peasant (and sometimes smugglers’)
houses, engaged in a number of practices that violated and undermined their duties
(NARK. F. R-544. Оp. 3. D. 1/6. L. 12).
Contrary to the remote, lengthy, and scarcely populated Karelian part of the Russo-
Finnish border, the border strip at the Karelian Isthmus (a triangle between the Gulf of
Finland and Lake Ladoga, dividing Finland and Petrograd/Leningrad Gubernia of the
RSFSR) was rather short and densely populated. From north to south, the length of the
isthmus is 150-180 km, from west to east - 55-110 km. Traditionally, from pre-
revolutionary times, it hosted a politically charged, heavy illegal trans-border traffic.
Russian revolutionaries (led by Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin) made a major smuggling deal
accomplished through this border strip, with the leader of the world proletariat being
successfully bargained for Finland’s independence in 1917.
The scenario of dramatic events of 1918-1920 and 1921-1922 at the Finnish border in
the southern (Russian) part of the Karelian Isthmus (in Finnish academic literature -
Northern Ingria) had much in common with Northern Karelia, and the Finnish expeditions
had a similar rationale of liberating kindred Ingrian people. Similar to post-revolutionary
developments in Northern (White Sea) Karelia, marked by the creation of a short-lived
Ukhta republic (1919-1920) as a major outcome of the “Karelian uprising,” Ingrian Finns
inhabiting the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus seceded from Bolshevist Russia and
formed the short-lived, Finland-backed Republic of North Ingria, which was reintegrated
with Russia at the end of 1920 according to the provisions of the Treaty of Tartu (Musaev,
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2010: 14–15). As it happened in Soviet Karelia, the region continued to enjoy a certain
degree of national autonomy.
Fig. 3. The map of the Peterburg guberniya, 1922
Source: https://www.aroundspb.ru/karty/232/sg_1922.html
According to the Tartu peace treaty of 1920, the border was set along the Terijoki
(Sestra) river. At the closest point it was just 32 kilometers from Petrograd (renamed
Leningrad in 1924), the second largest city of Soviet Russia with the population of 3.19
million as of 1939, and a large industrial center, home to important military production,
and a key base for the Baltic Red Banner Fleet. A relatively good road, a railway network
(including the railway line St. Petersburg-Vyborg-Helsinki, opened in 1870) and absence
of significant natural obstacles endowed this area with strategic significance and
significantly alleviated illegal trans-border traffic.
Separate border guard detachments were set at this part of the border in the early 1920s.
Establishment of border security at this border strip was completed in 1925, when the
OGPU troops formed the Sestroretsky Border Guard, which on April 2, 1926 was renamed
as the 5th Sestroretsky Border Guard (5th SPO), subordinated to the Border Guard
Management, with the headquarters in Sestroretsk (Balashov, 2018: 19).
Despite the strategic importance of this border strip, control over the border was no less
problematic than in Soviet Karelia. Starting from 1919, the reports of the border guard
commanding offices on both sides of the border stated that the majority of the borderland
population abandoned their previous occupations and actively engaged in the refugees
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and contraband trafficking. (LOGAV. F. 147. Op. 1. D. 60. L. 1-3). Living and working
conditions at the emerging border control institutions were highly “unsatisfactory,” as
anywhere else (LOGAV. F. R-3441. Op. 7. D. 1. L. 16). Regular raids in the countryside
for cutting the numbers of cross-border traffickers in the mid-1920s turned out to be
unsuccessful due to the lack of the border guard personnel and mobility infrastructure
(LOGAV. F. R-3441. Op. 7. D. 7).
Refugee trafficking became a widespread and profitable business from 1918. A
professional cohort of trans-border guides of Russian refugees and of counter-intelligence
agents emerged from the ranks of the borderland peasantry, in service of the illegal
networks located in Petrograd with commercial agents actively and regularly searching
for new clients (LOGAV. F. R-2205. D. 19. Oр. 1. L. 10, 51; D. 993).
Against this background, an intense intelligence traffic became a distinctive feature of
this short border strip. Throughout the 1920s, instead of “sealing the border” or
improving its operational capacities, the Bolsheviks actively engaged in counter-
intelligence trans-border games through the border at the Karelian Isthmus, involving
the couriers of the Department of International Relations of the Komintern Executive
Committee (OMS IKKI), representatives and delegates to the Komintern Congresses
(Mainio, 2019: 289–309). Secret operations of Russian anti-Bolshevik combat
organizations based in Finland during the interwar period, 1917–1939, in cooperation
with the intelligence services of the Finnish General Staff also actively used this “window
to Europe.” It was a trans-border route for the well-known “Trust” clandestine operations,
in the course of which networks of different western countries and émigré organizations
targeting Soviet Russia were apprehended by the OGPU in 1922–1927 (Mainio, 2019:
296–300).
Intensive military-ideological training that took place on both sides of the entire length
of the Soviet-Finnish border from 1918 (Takala, 2016: 137; Musaev, 2003: 212)
prepared not only a militarized support of the newly created states, but also a cohort of
armed trans-border nomads. From the times of the Civil War the agents of Finnish and
Soviet intelligence services served as headhunters who negotiated the trans-border
space in search for displaced and disoriented peasantry (LOGAV. F. R-2205. Op. 1. D.
137. L. 9; 31). Some of the agents recruited among the locals during the Civil War in
Karelia and on the Karelian Isthmus in the 1920-1930s headed various units of the
Finnish special services. While in Karelia after the end of the civil war the majority of the
armed brigades were dismantled and their members searched for labor contracts in
Finland (NARK. F. R-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 32), at the Karelian Isthmus the “counter-
revolutionary” trans-border activities, managed from European centers, actively
employed dispossessed mercenaries active in the trans-border space. In general, in both
Soviet border areas, the fear of these mercenaries, expressed in the Soviet GPU reports
(Neizvestnaya Karelia 1998), became a powerful factor in the upcoming repressive
operations within the frontier zones. As a result of the latter, these zones transformed
from lively contact spaces to a “no man’s land,” trespassed almost exclusively by
professional counterintelligence agents.
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The “Policing” and “Cleansing” in the Border Zones
Despite the intensive illegal cross-border traffic, the weekly reports by GPU KASSR in the
mid-1920s presented the situation at the Karelian border and in the borderland as “calm,”
with the “banditry gradually disappearing” and “the network of Finnish espionage being
successfully destroyed”; some documents mentioned “mass intimidation of the
borderland population by the GPU” (NARK. F. R-378. Op. 4, D. 6. L. 29, L. 65). By March
1925 just 28 representatives of the Monarchist and other parties of the “ancien regime”
were registered in the area - all of them elderly ex-bureaucrats, expelled from Soviet
institutions (NARK. F. R-689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123). Despite the rumors of an upcoming
war with Finland circulating in the borderland areas (NARK. F. R-689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L.
123), the mood of the “toiling and peasant masses” in 1925-1926 was described as
“satisfactory” (NARK. F. R- 689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 142; 178).
Against this relatively peaceful background the year 1925 marked a powerful impetus
towards securitization in the area adjacent to the Soviet-Finnish border which manifested
itself in a three-fold way. First, a stable link between border crossing, smuggling and
espionage emerged in the contents of smuggling cases started by the Soviet Karelian
GPU. From this moment onwards investigators began to ascribe “spying connections” to
the local residents accused not only of smuggling as such, but also of “contraband
assistance” (NARK. F. R-382. Op. 4. D. 2/16. L. 11; F. R-689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123).
Although such extra charges rarely entailed harsher sentences, they became first
occurrences of the instrumentalization of the “Finnish danger” in the mass consciousness
of future perpetrators and victims alike (NARK. F. R-382. Op. 4). Stigmatization as
“spying accomplices” became a major long-term outcome of the hundreds of smuggling
cases initiated by the Karelian GPU in the 1920s. A decade later, in 1937-1938, it
transformed into an ample ground for convictions and executions in the borderland
settlements, with Finnish goods confiscated in the 1920s becoming “material evidence”
even in the cases where smuggling as such was not proved, as well as the presence of
relatives who had fled abroad in 1919-1922. With the Karelian NKVD revising the cases,
their defendants became almost automatically redefined from “spying accomplices” to
"Finnish spies" or “bandits” (Chukhin, 1997: 88-98).
Secondly, starting from 1925, the Karelian GPU initiated the first mass anti-espionage
arrests, in reality targeting local peasantry. The usual anti-espionage operations,
accomplished prior to them in the area, had been described as “not particularly effective”
(NARK. F. R- 689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123). The first mass scale operation of spring 1925
to “eliminate espionage in the border strip” of the southern Karelian district (Olonets and
Petrozavodsk uezdy), accomplished at the beginning of spring 1925, was proclaimed as
a major success.
Rusty cartridges, found in peasants’ houses, and one ammunition belt, kept since the
civil war, made the premises for most of the 85 arrests among peasantry in the western
part of the Petrozavodsk district
2
(Neizvestnaya Karelia, 77; NARK. F. 4. Op.1. D. 4/41;
NARK F. 1. Op. 1. D. 675. L. 13-14; Baron 2007; Takala 2016). The following
investigation was complicated by the heated discussions in the Soviet power structures
as to what jurisdiction was best suited and to what extent publicity was needed. At the
2
Weapons and ammunition were a usual currency in a trans-border “black market,” regularly kept and sold
by the peasantry to the agents and smugglers (NARK. F. R-382. Op. 1. D. 21/466. L. 3).
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end, in the Karelian case, it was decided to abstain from show trials and avoid publicity
(Baron, 2007). One of the reasons was “lack of material evidence,” mentioned as one of
the major problems during the investigation (NARK. F. R-689. Op. 1. D. 8/ 81. L. 123).
Thirdly, starting from 1925, the idea of an imminent repetition of an insurgence in the
Karelian borderland areas with Finland’s assistance – a copy of the Karelian uprising of
1921 – was locally resurrected and propagated in Karelia. Various local administrative
agents started to actively manipulate the idea of an “important insurgence.” For example,
Edward Gyulling, a chief of the Karelian government along with his associates regularly
repeated this idea in their petitions to the USSR Revolutionary Military Council
(Revvoensovet SSSR) and to Grigory Chicherin in support of their idea of creating a
Karelian national guard. (Edward Gyulling, 2020).
Local GPU chiefs used this argument in their petitions to the LVO and local SNK while
trying to solve multiple financial and housing problems of the Karelian border guards
(NARK. F. R-690. Op. 1. D. 27). This tendency found its culmination in the events of
August 1928, which became a clear manifestation of the manipulation of the idea of the
“imported revolt.” An assistant chief of the Karelian GPU and the chief of its counter-
intelligence section, on the basis of information provided by a single Soviet GPU agent
and a contrabandist who had just returned from Finland, compiled a faked report to the
administration of the LVO about the uprising preparation in the Karelian borderland
(Organy bezopasnosti Karelii, 81; Takala, 2016: 132-159). The constantly fueled
memory of the uprising of 1921 at the local level, of which they were witnesses as
members of the local branch of the Cheka, and the Soviet propaganda campaigns on the
“military threats” of 1927-1928 can be mentioned as possible reasons for this occurrence.
It did not result in any immediate actions on the part of the LVO, and the authors of the
report were dismissed from their positions. Nevertheless, it marked a start of a new era
of the borderland history – of mass scale deportations and repressions in border zones
that started from the beginning of the 1930s.
This border securitization drive in Karelia occurred prior to the first wide-scale Soviet
security alert of 1925, related to unrest at the Soviet-Polish border.
3
Since Poland was
conceived of by the Bolsheviks as a natural bridgehead for any military attack against
the Soviet Union (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR Vol. 8. P. 289, 293), leading Soviet
politicians, such as an architect of the Soviet VCheKa-GPU Felix Dzerzhinsky and the
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Grigory Chicherin, expressed high concerns about
an “aggressive Polish policy” from the end of spring—summer 1925 (Dokumenty
vneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol. 8. P. 289, 293). The increase in the flow of data from the
GPU border guards along the Soviet Western border on increasing attacks on the border
guards detachments and border zones also occurred from May 1925 (RGASPI. F. 76. Op.
2. D. 364).
In October 1925 the Soviet OGPU uncovered a sprawling network of Estonian spies and
agents who employed the traditional techniques of contraband camouflage to facilitate
their operations, followed by a show trial, approved by the Politburo, which was held in
Leningrad in February 1926 and ended with the executions of 12 defendants and the
3
Sabin Dullin offered a standard cycle of triggering a “war threat” alert: alarmed reports from the border
guards to Moscow, followed by the diplomatic and international political notes and communiqués, and
finally, a “war scare” disseminated during large-scale propaganda campaigns against a “foreign threat”
(Dullin, 2014).
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imprisonment of 34 (RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 524. L. 2). Marking a decisive shift towards
“preventive violence” as a ruling Soviet strategy, these operations were obviously related
to a range of Politburo decisions in 1925, reflecting concern about the threat of a hostile
bloc on the Western borders of the USSR and attempts to prepare for it in advance (Ken,
2002: 63). Moreover, they became an important breaking point in the history of the
Soviet political police, resulting in the GPU awards and increases in their financing and
personnel numbers, which became a regular trend throughout the 1920s–1930s (Organy
bezopasnosti Karelii, 99).
According to the available data, in the borderland areas of the Karelian Isthmus special
GPU operations also selectively targeted local peasantry, who allegedly participated in
the trans-border networks, such as the Petrograd Combat Organization (PBO). The
subject of the infamous Taganstev case (Taganstevskoe delo) (Chernyaev, 1999: 391),
a resistance group known as the Petrograd Combat Organization, was formed in the city
of Petrograd, and headed by Vladimir Tagantsev, a young professor of geography at
Petrograd State University with the famous Russian poet Nikolay Gumilev being its most
famous victim. In total, 833 people were arrested in the case of the Petrograd Combat
Organization of V.N. Tagantsev in 1921; 96 of the accused were executed or shot while
being detained (Chernyaev, 1999: 391- 395).
A second wave of mass arrests related to this case, not researched in historiography,
swept over a motley category of the “border people” - Ingrian smugglers, some of them
employees (or ex-employees) of the Terijoki branch of Finnish secret police; Russian and
Ingrian peasants of the borderland areas of the Petrograd Gubernia who served the PBO
as couriers, hosts of border stations, owners of safe houses, and intermediaries between
the counter-intelligence services and the organization itself; Soviet provincial mid-rank
and lower rank administrators (LOGAV. F. R-2205 Op. 1. D. 65. L. 164; D. 19, 19 a, 19
b. 19 v.) As reflected in the materials of the investigation process, started by the
Petrograd Gubernia Revolutionary Tribunal that lasted from May 1921 to 1925, most of
the victims were of peasant or, rarely, working class background, non-party members,
semi-literate, with the occupation indicated as “peasant,” “worker,” or “fisherman”
(LOGAV. F. R-2205 Op. 1. D. 65. L. 164; D. 19, 19 a, 19 b. 19 v.). Giving shelter to
trans-border travelers of common ethnic origins, a natural way of providing a daily
subsistence in the conditions of economic devastation, became a solid ground for their
arrests (LOGAV. F. R-2205 Op. 1. D. 19 a. L. 12-40; D. 19. L. 26; D. 39. L. 110.)
Nevertheless, these arrests did not result in a decrease of the cross-border traffic, which
remained rampant in the area throughout the 1920s. Relatives of arrested owners of
barter stations, trans-border guides, local couriers, and smugglers uptook their duties
and the networks revived (LOGAV. F. R- 2205, Op. 1. D. 19 b. L. 114; D. 19. L. 141).
For almost a decade, the most widespread tactics of the Soviet GPU in tackling Finnish
espionage was infiltration of the emigrant “counter-revolutionary” organizations (Mainio
2019, 289-309), and most of successful arrests in the 1920s were accomplished during
the cross-border transfers of the agents, as a result of the infiltration (LOGAV. F. R-2205.
Op. 1. D. 19. L.107, L. 22-26; D. 65. L. 10 – 11). The specific Soviet response to the
border insecurity — the mass prophylactic “cleansing” came much later.
The first Soviet plans of on the “cleansing” of the border strip at the Karelian Isthmus in
the form of mass deportations were elaborated already in 1919, after the martial law was
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introduced there by the Soviet defense committee (ardently supported by the Karelian
sector). However, the mass eviction of the populace from the 10-km border strip was not
accomplished due to the resistance of the Petrograd Gubernia executive committee. In
1923 the Ingrian Council through the Finnish government’s note to the Soviet authorities,
prevented deportation of inhabitants of 40 borderland villages in the area, removing the
question of the “cleansing” of the border zone from the political agenda until the late
1920s – early 1930s, when the Soviet desire to create restricted security zones along
the borders with Finland marked a new stage of the “Soviet border project,” starting with
the October 4, 1929 decree of the Council of the People’s Commissars “On the
resettlement of the socially dangerous elements of the population of the borderland
districts of Leningrad and Western areas” (Musaev, 2003: 255).
Fig. 4. Leningrad oblast, 1932. The borderland regions are marked in blue, “the threatened zones”
in red, and the border zone (pogranichnaya polosa) in light green
The situation at the Soviet-Finnish border drastically changed from the end of the 1920s,
when a shift from the New Economic Policy to Stalinist political economy resulted in the
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introduction of new security measures and an increased number of OGPU border guards.
Systemic and massive centralized repressive operations at the Soviet North-Western
borderlands began with the anti-Kulak operations in 1931, and were followed by the
1932-1933 operation against “the Conspiracy of the Finnish General Staff.” From the
beginning of the 1930s the alleged “contamination” of the Soviet intelligence trans-
border connections and corridors became yet another important rationale behind the
OGPU repressive operations and deportations in the area. For example, during the
operations of 1932-1933, couriers’ transfer to connect with the residents of the 4th
Section of the LVO staff in Finland was accomplished through a single route, and the
individuals responsible for it – the three brothers Kouhja – confessed during the
interrogation that starting from 1929 they collaborated with the Finnish counter-
intelligence. Two existing PRPs (border intelligence points) displayed repeated failures.
From 1935 deportations of the borderland communities as a major “cleansing”
instrument of the Soviet securitization were accomplished in many Soviet regions
(Takala, 2016). The repressive Soviet policy reached its apogee in the operations in the
Soviet-Finnish border zones during the Great Terror.
The early stages of these operations again featured the factor of “initiative from below.”
Though there was no official directive on the beginning of the “Finnish operation,” the
NKVD organs of the Leningrad Oblast and Karelia began to “cleanse” the Finns as early
as September-October 1937. In doing so the Chekists were using NKVD Order no. 00485
on the Polish national operation. The Karelian People’s Commissar for the Interior K. Ya.
Tenisson who understood that it was impossible to make a career by repressing Poles,
Germans and Latvians, whose numbers in Karelia were insignificantly small, made
numerous requests to Yezhov complaining about absence of directives on Finns. Finally,
the central authorities greenlighted such repressions, and in December 1937 the first
reports on the Finns accused of espionage and sabotage were sent to Moscow.
The borderland zones of Soviet Karelia in a way became a “cleansed” and alienated space,
with just a few counter-intelligence agents well-known to each other operating there. At
the Karelian Isthmus, the banks of the River Sestra were tightened with rows of barbed
wire, mainly from the side of Soviet Russia. All bridges over the river were blown up
except for the only railway bridge near the Beloostrov station which accommodated all
rail traffic between Finland and the USSR. The border guard was distributed along the
entire border strip. It was one of the first Soviet borders to be actually “sealed,” and,
being reinforced by the Mannerheim line on the Finnish side, provided a rigid military
divide between the states.
Conclusion
In recent studies, the Bolshevik state violence in the postimperial borderlands of the late
1920s-1930s is usually interpreted as a result of a “dialogue” between the ruling elite
and society: spontaneous reactions of citizens living in the border area to the
international threats, their growing dissatisfaction with domestic policies, such as
collectivization, were treated by the Bolsheviks as a state threat and caused further
violence (Takala, 2015: 105; Cimbala, 2013; Shearer, 2018). As the current study has
demonstrated, there were other links to this vicious chain, which was formed much earlier
than is usually suggested: “leaky,” uncontrolled and unrecognized borders, stubbornly
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defied by the local communities, border guards, and customs officials alike, and
“contaminated” trans-border corridors. If we consider the frontier force as a barometer
of Bolshevik power in the borderlands, during the 1920s it was extremely weak, reflecting
acute regime insecurity.
Moreover, already in the mid-1920s local security chiefs and the Karelian republic’s
administrative actors triggered securitization frenzy by their false alarms and imagined
regime threats to attract financing, enhance their authority and influence in the local
“power struggles,” marking the first occurrences of the local impetus towards
“prophylactic policing” that later eventuated in Stalinist paroxysms of violence.
In the mid-1920s, however, a steady link between border security and espionage
gradually started to penetrate into the mass consciousness of perpetrators and victims
alike. A decade later, it evolved into the Soviet “spy mania” of the 1930s, and became a
distinguishing feature of the Stalinist political modernity. First mass arrests of 1925 in
the borderland areas provided a scenario for later operations, also based on a developed
network of insurgent cells, allegedly created by the Finnish General Staff, such as those
encompassing Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus in 1932 (Shearer, 2015: 116), as well
as various connections of Finnish intelligence to the skirmish-reconnaissance brigades
along the Soviet border. In their essence these were the first instances of a prophylactic
Soviet violence. The materials of the Finnish Central Investigative Police from the 1920s
confirm that it was largely just suspicions of espionage assistance on the part of the
Ingrian and Karelian communities that triggered the repressions of the 1920s in the
borderland zones (Rupasov, Chistikov, 2007: 195).
A degree of “failing” Soviet North-Western border of the 1920s and the beginning of the
1930s corresponded to the Russian historical and world practices – be it Western Europe
or the Balkans. But the Soviet experiment of the total border closure, which started a
decade later and was largely supported by the ‘cleansing’ operations in the borderland,
became a new modern phenomenon. The process of closure itself went on until the end
of the 1940s, when a multimillion Red Army stepped upon it, and a physical possibility
to install a barbed wire and to set up a tracking strip in Europe emerged.
However, before Joseph Stalin’s political triumph, which marked the beginning of the new
era in the border securitization practices, the Bolshevik state security authorities deemed
it more reasonable to create, coordinate, and finance the Trust or the Syndicate and to
selectively arrange these mass “counter-espionage” operations along the border zones
than to deploy troops or regular border guards at the Soviet Western borders and to
engage in a wholesale “cleansing” of the borderland populations, as it happened later.
But it was that time that gave birth to the sinister precursors of the future repressions in
the form of discursive constructions that took hidden but, possibly, permanent root in
the Russian statehood and contaminated its legal environment.
The Russian foreign policy maintains as permanent the existence of the “Other” as a
threat, in order to support and legitimize itself. In the USSR, “enemies of the people”
served as a designation for opposition to the regime. As this article has demonstrated,
this notion which was actively used during the wave of Stalinist repressions of the 1930s
had its origins already in the 1920s and was closely tied to the issue of espionage and,
consequently, to the security of the borders. Even though this term is not used in
modern-day Russia, the lists of “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations” are
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constantly growing. The persecution of dissenters including their arrests, interrogations
and imprisonment is gaining momentum. And, just as it was happening in the 1920s and
especially 1930s, it strikes not only political opponents but ordinary people who dare to
express their disagreement with the regime even in a veiled way.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023)
41
O DIP E O TERRORISMO INTERNACIONAL. ANTES E APÓS O 11/09.
COMO A “GUERRA AO TERRORISMO” DESAFIA O DIREITO INTERNACIONAL
PÚBLICO
BRUNO JOSÉ MARTINS BESSA
brunobessa10@gmail.com
Militar no Exército Português (Portugal). Mestrado em Relações Internacionais e Estudos
Europeus, Universidade de Évora. Participou nas missões da Organização das Nações Unidas
(ONU) na República Centro-Africana
Resumo
Após dois conflitos de proporções globais e de um falhanço na prossecução da paz entre estes,
foi assinada em São Francisco a Carta das Nações Unidas a 26 de junho de 1945 por forma a
instaurar a paz e a segurança coletiva e cimentá-las universalmente, ao abolir o uso da força
armada como instrumento para a resolução de conflitos interestatais.
Depois dos ataques de 11 de setembro de 2001 (11/09) aos Estados Unidos da América (EUA)
surgiu a proclamada “guerra ao terrorismo”. Uma expressão que coloca em causa as
representações tradicionais da guerra, quer a perspetiva tradicional, quer a da segurança
coletiva. Devido ao surgimento de um novo tipo de inimigo, não sendo um Estado não se
adequam as normas definidas. Deste modo a declaração de guerra ao terrorismo representa
uma provocação ao Direito Internacional Público (DIP).
A garantia da paz e segurança com a deliberação da proibição do uso banalizado da força
armada no Direito Internacional Público, leva a que procuremos entender como a complexa
problemática da “guerra ao terror”, após os ataques do 11/09, desafia o DIP.
Palavras-chave
Guerra; Segurança Internacional; Terrorismo; Direito Internacional.
Abstract
After two conflicts of global proportions and a failure to pursue peace between them, the
United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, to establish peace and
collective security reinforcing them universally, by abolishing the use of armed force as an
instrument for resolution of interstate conflicts. After September 11, 2001, attacks on the
United States of America came the war, the proclaimed "war on terrorism". An expression
that calls into question the traditional representations of war, both the traditional perspective
and that of collective security. Due to the emergence of a new type of enemy, not being a
state, does not fit the defined norms. Thus, the declaration of war on terrorism represents a
provocation to Public International Law. The guarantee of peace and security with the
deliberation of prohibition of the trivialized use of armed force in Public International Law,
leads us to seek to understand how the complex problematic of the "war on terror", after the
9/11 attacks, challenges the Public International Law.
Keywords
War; International Security; Terrorism; International Law.
Como citar este artigo
Bessa, Bruno José Martins (2023). O DIP e o terrorismo internacional. Antes e após o 11/09. Como
a “guerra do terrorismo” desafia o Direito Internacional Público. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations, Vol14 N1, Maio-Outubro 2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última
consulta, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.3
Artigo ecebido em 18 de Agosto de 2022, aceite para publicação em 4 de Março de 2023
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Bruno José Martins Bessa
42
O DIP E O TERRORISMO INTERNACIONAL. ANTES E APÓS O
11/09. COMO A “GUERRA AO TERRORISMO” DESAFIA O DIREITO
INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO
BRUNO JOSÉ MARTINS BESSA
Introdução
À medida que a humanidade evolui também se vai alterando a forma como esta se
relaciona, resultando das várias lições que vai tirando de episódios terríveis que
invariavelmente marcam a história.
A guerra como facto social, vem sofrendo alterações, desde a sua legitimidade total como
instrumento de se impor a vontade de um Estado sobre outro, a uma ilegalidade na sua
utilização optando-se por outros meios de resolução de divergências entre Estados.
Chegando na contemporaneidade, à constituição de um Direito Internacional enraizado
nos valores da paz e dos direitos humanos.
Nesta orientação a “guerra ao terrorismo” após o 11/09 vem desafiar o conceito
tradicional de Guerra quer a forma como o Direito Internacional a regulamenta. Será que
o combate ao terrorismo através da expressão de “guerra ao terror” contraria a
regulamentação internacional da guerra?
Antes de partirmos para a tentativa de resposta a esta questão devemos balizar o nosso
esforço por forma a que o leitor não incorra em erros de perceção. Neste trabalho não
pretendemos definir nós próprios o conceito de terrorismo ou indicar a forma como este
deve ser inscrito em legislação internacional, assumimos aqui sim, que o seu combate
internacional deverá ser realizado com base no Direito Internacional.
Por forma a procurarmos respostas a esta questão iremos organizar o trabalho em três
sessões. Na primeira sessão iremos passar em revista a evolução do conceito de guerra
da modernidade à contemporaneidade. Na segunda sessão iremos apontar ao conceito
de terrorismo, como se enquadra a questão do combate ao terrorismo no DIP e quais as
consequências do 11/09. Por fim iremos tentar alcançar uma conclusão acerca do
enquadramento deste último no DIP, em como o conceito de “guerra ao terrorismo” é
incompatível com o enquadramento jurídico da guerra. O trabalho sofrerá
invariavelmente uma longa exposição, do nosso ponto de vista necessária, do
enquadramento teórico dos conceitos guerra/terrorismo por forma a ressalvar o seu lugar
na regulamentação internacional e enquadrando o leitor nas diferentes tipologias de
terrorismo encontradas na literatura.
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A resposta a esta questão será elaborada qualitativamente, abordando esta problemática
numa perspetiva jurídico-política, através da aproximação aos tratados internacionais
nomeadamente, através da primeira tentativa de regular a guerra na Sociedade das
Nações (SDN) e no seu enquadramento pelas Nações Unidas, sendo o trabalho de seguida
apresentado elaborado com base em pesquisas documentais e bibliográficas.
Analisaremos as Resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas que
sucederam aos ataques terroristas do 11/09, artigos e livros de autores reconhecidos.
1. Revisão da literatura
Exemplos do emprego de meios violentos é comum por toda a História ficando muitos
deles marcados por serem contrários aos poderes estabelecidos. Condenado a
permanecer na memória coletiva ficou o ataque terrorista em solo norte-americano em
11 de setembro de 2001. Não só pela perda ou pela espetacularidade na transmissão em
direto para todo o mundo, mas também pela resposta dada a essa agressão.
Este ataque terrorista voltou a trazer o debate sobre o terrorismo e o seu combate à
mesa dos grandes poderes internacionais.
Sintetizando aqui a resposta dos EUA à expressão de “guerra ao terrorismo”, aparecem-
nos uma série de interrogações para quais as respostas não são tão simples como
aparentariam, analisando, nomeadamente, as conceções de guerra, terrorismo, legitima
defesa, legitima defesa preventiva e também sobre a sua repercussão sobre o Direito
Internacional.
O conceito de terrorismo por si só não se configura como sendo de fácil entendimento,
não pelo que significa, conotação ou até sentimento a este ligado, mas antes pelo
consenso, ou falta dele academicamente ou juridicamente. Vários são os autores que
consideram as definições de terrorismo serem abundantes, admitem, no entanto, não
existir uma que reúna consenso, como Schmid (2023) Blakely et al. (2019) ou Acharya
(2009), o que limita a sua criminalização internacional como faz notar Gouveia (2010),
ainda que, várias são as convenções que o punam criminalmente, não o terrorismo per
se, mas atos específicos de terrorismo, reconhece Skubevsky (1989). Já Cassesse (2006)
diz-nos que não se trata de um problema de ausência de conceito, mas sim de falta de
aprovação do conceito a nós exposto pelo direito consuetudinário.
A reação dos EUA à agressão terrorista leva a que vários autores destaquem o facto como
não legitimado pelo direito internacional, demonstrando como não se enquadram ora no
conceito de “legitima defesa preventiva” como Flynn (2008), ora pelo ataque terrorista
não se enquadrar juridicamente como “agressão” como Pereira (2012) (não concordamos
aqui simplesmente porque a Carta no seu artigo 39.º nos diz que o CS tem autoridade
para reconhecer o que entende por agressão) ou como a expressão “guerra” não se
adequa ao confronto Estado versus grupo como nos diz O'Connell (2004) “the right to
use armed force is connected with territory-facts of fighting on the ground, not the
presence of an individual suspected of being a terrorist” (p. 356).
A questão impõe-se. Como a afirmação “guerra ao terrorismo” desafia o DIP? De que
forma foi corrompido o Direito que enquadra juridicamente a guerra?
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2. A Guerra e o Terrorismo
A guerra
Carl Von Clausewitz, foi um General Prussiano que viveu entre 1789 e 1831 e que muito
contribuiu para a conceção da guerra, cuja obra Von Kriege é considerada fundamental
sobre este conceito. A sua experiência e compreensão sobre o tema levam-nos a revisitar
as ideias que nos deixou. Von Clausewitz apresentava duas teses interligadas. A primeira
que a guerra é um instrumento político dos Estados. Nesta aproximação ao conceito não
há nenhuma interpretação de motivos que levem à guerra como o radicalismo religioso
por exemplo. Existe uma total politização da guerra, para Clausewitz “a guerra... nasce
de uma situação política e irrompe por um motivo político, sendo, assim, sempre um acto
político” (Lara, 2017: 362) este é um dos principais contributos deste autor, de que, a
guerra é sempre dirigida por objetivos políticos. Neste plano os atores fundamentais são
os Estados e a guerra é uma forma de proteger os seus interesses, o que no DIP
corresponde ao Jus belli. A segunda aponta ao carácter absoluto da guerra, cujo objetivo
final, mais do que impor a vontade sobre o inimigo através da força, é destruí-lo
totalmente subjugando-o por meios unicamente violentos. Este modelo de “guerra
absoluta” (Lara, 2017: 361) divulgado por Napoleão Bonaparte e que teve o seu apogeu,
de forma dramática, durante as I e II Guerras Mundiais.
Esta exacerbada violência colocou ao DIP o grande desafio de encontrar formas de a
limitar no terreno das Relações Internacionais.
Neste âmbito podemos apontar como primeira tentativa de regulamentar a força armada
com a SDN cuja criação surgiu em 1920 com o intuito de perpetuar uma segurança
coletiva, ou seja, uma forma de todos se unirem em torno do objetivo da paz e de agirem
em uníssimo contra quem a prejudicasse. A SDN deu enquadramento jurídico à guerra,
não a proibindo, mas criando restrições à sua utilização.
A SDN verificou-se insuficiente na sua tentativa de prossecução de uma paz duradoura
ainda que as suas ideias base devessem ser estendidas. Criou-se então uma organização
internacional, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), com o objetivo de garantir o
anteriormente tentado, o garantir a paz e a segurança internacional.
Ainda antes da ONU, um pacto de não-agressão denominado Pacto Briand-Kellogg que
também regulamentar a guerra, assinado em Paris por 65 Estados em 1928, e que
consagrava “a renúncia à guerra como instrumento de resolução de conflitos” (Machado,
2019: 719). Este Pacto, também conhecido por Pacto de Paris, apresentava apenas três
artigos sendo que os dois primeiros nos dizem que as partes: “...condemn recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another” (art. 1.º, p. 1).
E que as partes concordavam que: “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means” (art. 2.º, p. 2).
Este Pacto assim como o da SDN falharam eclodindo a II Grande Guerra.
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A Carta das Nações Unidas entrou em vigor em outubro de 1945 e garantiu um marco
importante, a guerra torna-se ilegal, ainda que permitisse duas exceções,
nomeadamente, a legítima defesa e através de decisão do Conselho de Segurança (CS)
como último recurso.
O princípio da legítima defesa está assim consagrado no artigo 51.º da Carta das Nações
Unidas:
“Nada na presente Carta prejudicar o direito inerente de legítima defesa
individual ou coletiva, no caso de ocorrer um ataque armado contra um
membro das Nações Unidas, at que o Conselho de Segurança tenha tomado
as medidas necessárias para a manutenção da paz e da segurança
internacionais. As medidas tomadas pelos membros no exercício desse direito
de legítima defesa serão comunicadas imediatamente ao Conselho de
Segurança e não deverão, de modo algum, atingir a autoridade e a
responsabilidade que a presente Carta atribui ao Conselho para levar a efeito,
em qualquer momento, a ação que julgar necessária manutenção ou ao
restabelecimento da paz e da segurança internacionais.” (pp. 32-33).
Este artigo demonstra assim a possibilidade de um Estado se defender de um ataque
assim como de uma defesa coletiva, em que outros Estados o possam auxiliar.
Neste ponto de legítima defesa coletiva temos o exemplo da Organização do Tratado do
Atlântico Norte (OTAN) cuja base da sua constituição é essa mesma defesa coletiva,
como podemos constatar no seu artigo 5.º:
“As Partes concordam em que um ataque armado contra uma ou várias delas
na Europa ou na América do Norte ser considerado um ataque a todas, e,
consequentemente, concordam em que, se um tal ataque armado se verificar,
cada uma, no exercício do direito de legítima defesa, individual ou coletiva,
reconhecido pelo artigo 51.° da Carta das Nações Unidas, prestar assistência
Parte ou Partes assim atacadas, praticando sem demora, individualmente e
de acordo com as restantes Partes, a ação que considerar necessária,
inclusive o emprego da força armada, para restaurar e garantir a segurança
na região do Atlântico Norte.” (In Diário do Governo, 1949: 688).
A legítima defesa coletiva é assim espelhada em tratados deste tipo com base no artigo
51.º da Carta das Nações Unidas.
Em relação ao CS da ONU é este quem decide quando uma situação emergente pode ser
considerada como uma ameaça ou agressão, como explanado no seu artigo 39.º:
“O Conselho de Segurança determinar a existência de qualquer ameaça
paz, rutura da paz ou ato de agressão, e far recomendações ou decidir que
medidas deverão ser tomadas de acordo com os Artigos 41 e 42, a fim de
manter ou restabelecer a paz e a segurança internacionais.” (p. 27).
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Em caso positivo o CS pode adotar as medidas previstas tanto no artigo 41.º:
“O Conselho de Segurança decidir sobre as medidas que, sem envolver o
emprego de forças armadas, deverão ser tomadas para tornar efetivas suas
decisões e poder convidar os Membros das Nações Unidas a aplicarem tais
medidas. Estas poderão incluir a interrupção completa ou parcial das relações
económicas, dos meios de comunicação ferroviários, marítimos, aéreos,
postais, telegráficos, radiofónicos, ou de outra qualquer espécie, e o
rompimento das relações diplomticas.” (p. 28).
Como no artigo 42.º da Carta:
“No caso de o Conselho de Segurança considerar que as medidas previstas
no art.º 41 seriam ou demonstraram que são inadequadas, poder levar a
efeito, por meio de forças aéreas, navais, ou terrestres, a ação que julgar
necessária para manter ou restabelecer a paz e a segurança internacionais.
Tal ação poder compreender demonstrações, bloqueios e outras operações,
por parte das forças aéreas, navais ou terrestres dos Membros das Nações
Unidas.” (p. 28).
Vemos assim que a legitimação do uso da força armada se limita à decisão do S na
prossecução do restabelecimento da paz e da segurança internacional e apenas como
último recurso.
Este sistema de defesa coletiva não é perfeito e podemos-lhe apontar essa precariedade.
Primeiro no que foi a Guerra Fira como primeira ameaça à paz e segurança internacionais
devido ao domínio no sistema dos interesses das potências hegemónicas. Em segundo,
cuja ameaça mais recente é a que demonstrámos, representada pelo desenvolvimento
do terrorismo internacional.
O conceito de “guerra ao terrorismo” vem abalar quer a visão tradicional da guerra
(considera a importância do elemento moral/religioso e a questão dos
fundamentalismos), quer a perspetiva do sistema de segurança coletiva dominante no
direito internacional contemporâneo (perigo de passar do terreno da paz internacional
para uma “guerra” que não consegue ter limitações nem de espaço nem de tempo).
Como nota Greenwood (2004)
"In the language of international law there is no basis for speaking of a war
on AI-Qaeda or any other terrorist group, for such a group cannot be a
belligerent, it is merely a band of criminals, and to treat it as anything else
risks distorting the law while giving that group a status which to some implies
a degree of legitimacy” (in O'Connell 2004: 355).
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O terrorismo
O terrorismo não se configura como algo de novo no panorama mundial, ainda que o
facto é que depois da década de 60 houve um agravamento deste tipo de ações (Lara,
2017: 416).
Como exemplos recentes destas ações temos em 1995 os atentados ao edifício federal
de Ocklahoma, o ataque em 1995 ao metropolitano de Tóquio com gás Sarin, ou os
atentados de 2016 em Paris. Estes ataques são levados a cabo por organizações com
diferentes motivações que vão desde: o “separatismo-nacionalista” como a OLP, Abu
Nidal, ou a ETA; os “anarquistas”; os de “guerrilha tradicional”; os de “extrema-direita,
anti-esquerda ou racistas” como o Ku-Klux-Klan nos EUA ou o Vanguarda Nazionale em
Itália; e por fim os “fundamentalistas islâmicos” como o Hezbollah ou a Jihad Islâmica
(Lara, 2017: 430)
Quanto às tentativas a nível internacional na sua punição e prevenção podemos apontar
à SDN numa Convenção em 1937. A ONU também se apressou a encetar trabalhos que
combatessem este fenómeno através de várias convenções internacionais tiveram lugar
como forma de tentar combater o fenómeno do terrorismo apresentando como exemplos:
a convenção de Haia para a repressão de tomada ilícita de aeronaves, de 16 de dezembro
de 1970; passando pelas convenções de nova Iorque contra a tomada de reféns, de 17
de dezembro de 1979, sobre a repressão dos atentados terroristas cometidos com
bombas, de 15 de dezembro de 1997, ou a convenção para a eliminação do
financiamento do terrorismo, de 9 de dezembro de 1999 (Gouveia, 2010: 812). Ainda
que, como Gouveia (2010: 812) faz notar, a sua ineficácia é enorme, visto que “é escassa
a normatividade destas convenções, não só pelos poucos Estados vinculados como pela
imperfeição das soluções” assim como nos diz Schmid (citado por Blakeley et al., 2019:
7). “legal definitions are also imprecise and vary between jurisdictions and agencies”.
O Tribunal Internacional Penal (TIP), poderia suprir esta deficiência, já que reúne em si
as condições para poder julgar responsáveis por atos de terrorismo internacional, pelas
suas características de imparcialidade e permanência, mas o crime de terrorismo não se
encontra elencado no seu Estatuto, ainda que este se possa enquadrar, na nossa opinião
no que diz o seu artigo 5.º de que “A jurisdição do Tribunal será limitada aos crimes mais
graves que digam respeito à comunidade internacional como um todo” (Estatuto TIP).
Sobre o terrorismo muito se poderá escrever, vários são os autores a fazê-lo, mas
tentaremos sumariamente identificar o fenómeno e caracterizá-lo da melhor forma
possível, tendo em conta a falta de consenso global sobre uma definição para o mesmo,
como nos diz Blakeley et al. (2019: 7) apesar de todas as definições encontradas “there
is no generally accepted definition of terrorism” e esta impossibilidade é maioritariamente
política de acordo com o ponto de vista de Schmid (2023: 23) “linked to the divergente
interests of those holding state power, defending their own interests in their domestic
and foreign rivalries and conflicts – not one linked to the limitations of the legal and social
sciences”.
O fenómeno do terrorismo tem como principal característica as suas ações terem como
objetivo principal “a difusão do sentimento generalizado de medo capaz de provocar a
rutura de um sistema” (Lara, 2017: 411) indo de encontro à relação triangular à qual se
refere Gouveia (2010: 811) “em que alguém inflige um mal a outrem para exercer
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pressão sobre um terceiro” sendo invariavelmente as suas ações “necessariamente
violentas, destrutivas, empregando meios extraordinários, ilegais, clandestinamente
preparadas, intencionais” (Lara, 2017: 411). Como faz notar Moreira (2004: 481) o
terrorismo baseado no sentimento infligido através de violência indiscriminada e de
carácter invariavelmente político não se mistura com a banal bandidagem.
Uma definição para terrorismo vem da própria OTAN que o designa como “o uso ilegtimo
ou a ameaca de uso da forca ou da violncia contra indivduos ou bens com o objetivo
de coagir ou intimidar governos ou sociedades de forma a atingir objetivos polticos,
religiosos ou ideológicos” (OTAN, 2003).
Um ponto de interesse tem que ver com as diferentes classificações que podemos dar ao
terrorismo, dependendo do autor ou instituição. Como exemplos desta classificação
temos as do FBI, de Luigi Bonanate na obra “O Terrorismo Internacional” ou de Boaz
Ganor na obra “Defining Terrorism”.
O FBI apontou a uma classificação baseada nos apoios que grupos terroristas recebem,
podendo ser “terrorismo apoiado por Estados violadores das leis internacionais”,
“terrorismo apoiado por organizações independentes” (o financiamento recorre de
atividades ilícitas) ou “terrorismo patrocinado por grupos específicos” (como o exemplo
da Al Qaeda) (Lara, 2017: 415). Bonanate, por sua vez, aponta a uma diferenciação de
dois grupos: o terrorismo doméstico e o internacional. No primeiro inclui o território que
diga respeito ao âmbito interno do Estado, no segundo tudo o que implica diretamente
na política externa (Lara, 2017: 415). Ganor define uma classificação baseada no
envolvimento dos Estados no terrorismo, entre os “Estados que apoiam o terrorismo”
(aos níveis ideológico e de sustentação militar, financeira e logística), os “Estados que
dirigem o terrorismo” (para além do primeiro ainda planeiam e chefiam através de
estruturas paralelas) e os “Estados que empreendem o terrorismo” (criam estruturas
oficiais para tal) (Lara, 2017: 416). É de salientar para o que Lara (2017: 416) nos alerta
relativamente a estas, e outras, classificações de que “a fronteira entre as divisões
propostas é ténue e factualmente ultrapassada pelos Estados, consoante as épocas e as
circunstâncias”.
Os ataques de 11/09 parecem inserir-se numa designação diferente, como aponta Lara
(2017: 428), no super-terrorismo. Esta designação surge em 2001 por Alexander e
Hoening. Trata-se de “uma nova fase da avançada terrorista abrangendo meios cada vez
mais poderosos e letais”. As ações aqui incluídas são as ações suicidas em massa, o
terrorismo biológico, químico, nuclear e o ciberterrorismo. Todas estas diversas formas
resultam de adaptações do utilizado previamente na guerra convencional.
A globalização é apontada como o berço “que gera as condições propícias para o
desenvolvimento destas novas formas de super-terrorismo” (idem: 429) com certos
processos a ocorrerem “a coberto das instituições de uma sociedade aberta, como... o
treino dos pilotos que se suicidaram nos atentados” de 11/09. Esta mesma sociedade
aberta permite ainda como Lara (2010: 430) lhe chama o “mensageiro”, a comunicação
social de massas que procura esse tipo de notícias, permitindo que o objetivo do
terrorismo de “divulgar o medo” atinja “uma proporção psicológica e social... à escala da
sociedade global” (idem: 429).
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Surgiu a necessidade, depois do debate voltar à mesa com os ataques de 11/09, de
rever, de acordo com Gouveia (2010: 811), três pontos que ainda hoje carecem de
normatização no Direito Internacional, nomeadamente, “a definição de actos de
terrorismo; a punição penal desses actos; e a efectivação das estruturas repressivas”.
Este autor pretende mostrar como este vazio jurídico de consenso de definição de
terrorismo como crime per se torna possível uma perspetiva como a da “guerra ao
terrorismo” de se afirmar.
Esta ausência no DIP leva a que se tome esta problemática como ideológica quando
claramente se deveria constituir como jurídica, classificando o terrorismo como crime
através da responsabilização individual, através quiçá da sua inscrição no Estatuto de
Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional atribuindo jurisdição ao Tribunal Penal
Internacional do crime de terrorismo tais como o crime de genocídio, os crimes contra a
humanidade, os crimes de guerra ou o crime de agressão (art.º 5 do Estatuto de Roma
do Tribunal Penal Internacional). Pois tal como nos diz Skubiszewski (1989: 40)
reforçando o que vimos anteriormente “in most treaties dealing with terrorism there is,
however, no room for such a definition since they deal exclusively with a particular kind
or kinds of terrorist acts”.
Assim, apesar das várias convenções apontarem a casos específicos não nos dirigem a
um consenso (Acharya, 2009) levando a que autores como Lavelle (2007) afirmem que
uma definição do conceito de terrorismo a partir destas seja inviável.
3. A guerra ao terrorismo
Como vimos pelas características apontadas ao terrorismo não é fácil pura e
simplesmente combater uma ideologia, como numa guerra tradicional se combate um
inimigo com cores diferentes. Este inimigo perpetua de forma categórica o ambiente de
incerteza e terror na sociedade civil e põe em xeque qualquer possível ação de retaliação
de um qualquer Estado afetado, tendo em conta a sua capacidade de invisibilidade, de
atuar em qualquer lado do mundo, podendo estar presente inclusive no próprio Estado
que sofre o ataque.
Os ataques do 11/09 foram um ato horrendo, um dos muitos que aconteceram pelo
mundo, mas a resposta dos EUA com a proclamada “guerra ao terrorismo” foi o que
realmente levou à questão de uma reação a um ataque que poderia ou não ir de encontro
ao enquadramento no Direito Internacional.
Os EUA procuraram desde logo projetar uma imagem de poder junto da OTAN e da ONU
tentando de imediato o seu apoio de forma sustentada e obter uma ação justificável
perante todo o mundo através de uma declaração de força pelo seu Presidente.
No seu primeiro discurso após os ataques o Presidente Bush já apresentava uma
narrativa de justificação e de planeamento preparados para uma resposta política e
militar, como ressalva Sassoli (citado por Pereira, 2012: 503) “muito se ouviu falar de
guerra neste contexto... pouco se falou de Direito, e menos ainda de Direito
Internacional, apesar de ser o corpo jurídico que a regula”.
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Começando por interpretar o ataque como um ato de guerra “enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country” e elevando a ameaça terrorista a uma
ameaça à segurança internacional
“they are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to
camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror.
They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the
world to plot evil and destruction”.
Esta descrição levou diretamente a pressionar as instituições a adotarem sem reservas
o estipulado nos tratados, primeiro em considerar o artigo 51.º da Carta das Nações
Unidas de legítima defesa assim como o artigo 5.º da OTAN solicitando assistência aos
parceiros.
Nas resoluções do CS, de acordo com o seu artigo 39.º que nos diz que o “Conselho de
Segurança determinar a existência de qualquer ameaça paz, rutura da paz ou ato de
agressão, e far recomendações”, as posições tomadas sucessivamente com as
resoluções 1368 e 1373 vieram enquadrar este ataque aos EUA assim como alargar daí
para a frente os atos terroristas. Em primeiro lugar e mais premente veio reconhecer o
direito à legitima defesa como podemos ler na Resolução 1373 “reafirmando o direito
natural legítima defesa, individual ou coletiva, reconhecido pela Carta das Nações
Unidas e confirmado na Resolução 1368 (2001)” (2001: 1) e que reafirmando também
“esses atos, tal como todos os atos de terrorismo internacional, constituem uma ameaça
paz e segurança internacionais” (2001: 1).
A Resolução 1373 para além disto também nos dirige não só para as organizações que
planeiam e praticam o ato terrorismo, mas também aos Estados que o apoiam visto que
“cada Estado tem o dever de se abster de organizar, instigar, auxiliar ou participar em
atos de terrorismo noutro Estado ou de permitir atividades organizadas no seu território
com vista prática desses atos” (2001: 2) levando à interpretação de que uma ameaça
à segurança internacional patrocinada ou facilitada por um determinado Estado permitirá
à vítima acionar a legítima defesa.
Estas disposições do CS permitiram uma ação militar no Afeganistão através então da
responsabilização do Estado afegão em apoiar a organização terrorista, legitimando a
resposta.
Mas a questão da “guerra ao terrorismo” não se fica numa ação de resposta única. A
“guerra ao terror” insere-se assim num discurso de a resposta ao Afeganistão ser apenas
o início, ou seja, não como defesa limitada no tempo e no espaço, mas como uma guerra
que é potencialmente infinita apresentando-nos uma noção de “guerra infinita”. O
Presidente Bush no seu discurso deixa isso claro identificando este apenas como o
primeiro alvo “our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there”
continuando “it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated”. Isto tornou-se claro com a invasão do Iraque. A justificação para
a operação militar no Iraque baseou-se no artigo 51.º da Carta das Nações Unidas como
nos diz Pinheiro (citado por Silva e Rosa, 2015: 118)
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“os EUA defenderam a ideia de não ser necessário a existência de um ataque
armado para que se justifique a legítima defesa. Esta, segundo o governo
americano, pode ser aplicada também nos casos em que algum país adote
políticas armamentistas que possam colocar em risco a paz e segurança
internacional”
apoiando-se na ameaça que o Iraque representava nomeadamente no
“fato de o Iraque financiar, ainda que indiretamente o terrorismo, bem como
diante da possibilidade de produção de armas de destruição em massa, já
seriam motivos suficientes para justificar o uso da força pelos EUA” (Silva e
Rosa, 2015: 119).
Nesse contexto a ação militar no Iraque seria um ato de legítima defesa preventiva.
Esta questão da legítima defesa preventiva levada a cabo no Iraque, baseada na
justificação de financiamento do terrorismo e de produção de armas de destruição em
massa foi abalada em 30 de setembro de 2004, como aponta Flynn (citado por Silva e
Rosa, 2015: 120) “com a publicação do Relatório Duelfer, com os investigadores
admitindo que por alguma razão eles não encontraram nada. Isso desconstruiu a razão
de um ataque preemptivo ao Iraque”.
É neste âmbito, que a passagem da guerra do Afeganistão para o Iraque, perde a
possibilidade da legitimação pelo Direito Internacional, cujo conceito de “guerra de defesa
preventiva” se torna insustentável. Como Fitzpatrick (2003: 248) questiona acerca desta
“guerra ao terror” “wich war?”.
Conclusões
O DIP tem evoluído no sentido de tornar o mundo um local melhor através da tentativa
de eliminar a violência do leque de opções na resolução de conflitos, pretendendo ser
garantia de paz e segurança internacional baseando-se nos direitos humanos. A reação
ao terrorismo internacional veio abalar as suas fundações tendo em conta quer as suas
próprias falhas na conceção de terrorismo e daí a sua constituição como punível
penalmente (podendo considerá-lo crime per se), quer ainda pelo uso da força de forma
unilateral como resposta sem o CS o autorizar e assim sendo fora do Direito
Internacional. A “guerra ao terrorismo” apresentou um novo conceito de Guerra que não
se enquadra no DIP, pois não apresenta nenhuma das características tradicionais desse
conceito: quer no que diz respeito ao paradigma tradicional como conflito entre Estados
que defendem os seus interesses; quer no paradigma contemporâneo como legítima
defesa ou como último recurso pelo CS.
O seu começo constitui-se como uma tentativa de legítima defesa a um ator demasiado
vago, ou a uma ideologia que na realidade não se destruiria com a força, como se vê
hoje. A invasão de Estados soberanos não se constitui resolução conforme o DIP, cuja
ineficácia é incerta e que nos apresentou a ideia de uma guerra infinita, em que é muito
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difícil de estabelecer os limites de espaço e de tempo, que veio tão somente aumentar o
clima de insegurança no mundo.
Concluímos assim que esta “guerra ao terrorismo” desafiou o Direito Internacional
através de uma conceção errada de guerra, de um conceito de terrorismo imperfeito e
de uma utilização indevida do instrumento de defesa coletiva preventiva.
Por último, não podemos deixar de referir que a identificação da radicalização ou
extremismo que leva ao terrorismo não deve ser combatida por meios agressivos que
possam eventualmente exacerbar essas razões, o que pode alimentar um círculo vicioso
de violência. A resposta deve ser dada a longo prazo com base no apoio ao
desenvolvimento humano de Estados em situação de fragilidade, assim como numa visão
alargada de justiça, um mundo que deve ser governado não por interesses, mas pelo
Direito.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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PECAUTIZACIÓN DEL ANÁLISIS SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA CONTEMPORÁNEA EN
COLOMBIA: UNA PROPUESTA CATEGÓRICA EN CONSTRUCCIÓN
CÉSAR NIÑO
cnino@unisalle.edu.co
Profesor asociado de Relaciones Internacionales en la Facultad de Economía, Empresa y
Desarrollo Sostenible, Universidad de La Salle (Colombia). PhD en Derecho Internacional,
Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio y PhD en Estudios Internacionales en Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo,
Universitat Jaume I. Máster en Seguridad y Defensa Nacionales. Politólogo e Internacionalista.
Resumen
¿Cómo influyen las perspectivas de Daniel Pécaut en la configuración de una categoría
analítica particular sobre los procesos de la violencia contemporánea en Colombia? A través
de la revisión de literatura, de una aproximación secuencial, así como de la creación de
conceptos se propone la categoría de la pecautización como marco analítico en construcción
que parte de comprender los procesos violentizadores. Aquella categoría se basa en que la
violencia contemporánea se puede explicar desde las imbricaciones conceptuales y analíticas
sobre las visiones de violencias de la obra de Pécaut. En efecto, tras la firma del Acuerdo de
Paz de 2016, las formas de la violencia contemporánea en Colombia son el resultado de
dinámicas que Pécaut recogió en sus aproximaciones sobre el país. A dichas formas,
transformaciones e intersecciones de las violencias, se les llama pecautización.
Palabras clave
Pecautización; violencia contemporánea; Colombia; Pécaut
Abstract
How do Daniel Pécaut's perspectives influence the configuration of a particular analytical
category on contemporary violence processes in Colombia? Through literature review,
sequential approach, and concept creation, the category of "pecautización" is proposed as an
analytical framework under construction that starts from understanding violent processes.
This category is based on the idea that contemporary violence can be explained by the
conceptual and analytical interweaving of Pécaut's visions of violence. Indeed, after the
signing of the 2016 Peace Agreement, the forms of contemporary violence in Colombia are
the result of dynamics that Pécaut gathered in his approaches to the country. These forms,
transformations, and intersections of violence are called "pecautización".
Keywords
Pecautización; contemporary violence; Colombia; Pécaut
Como citar este artículo
Niño, César (2023). Pecautización del análisis sobre la violencia contemporánea en Colombia: una
propuesta categórica en construcción. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1,
Mayo-octubre de 2023. Consultado [en línea] en la fecha de la última consulta,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.4
Artículo recibido el 2 de febrero de 2022, aceptado para su publicación el 15 de marzo
de 2023
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PECAUTIZACIÓN DEL ANÁLISIS SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA
CONTEMPORÁNEA EN COLOMBIA:
UNA PROPUESTA CATEGÓRICA EN CONSTRUCCIÓN
CÉSAR NIÑO
Introducción
La investigación académica sobre la violencia en Colombia ha logrado penetrar en una
noción particular en relación con los enfrentamientos entre las élites políticas y partidistas
a principios del siglo XX (Cartagena, 2016). Estos estudios destacan dimensiones críticas
y explicativas sobre cómo la violencia se ha infiltrado como una característica del proceso
político y nacional en el país. Además, a través de la evolución de estas perspectivas
académicas (Cartagena, 2016; Ortíz, 1992), se ha determinado que todas estas
aproximaciones pueden contribuir a la violentología.
En 1962, Campos Guzmán, Eduardo Umaña y Orlando Fals Borda (2010) publicaron el
primer trabajo que desmarcó la relación de la violencia con las geografías partidistas y
enfatizó en un proceso sociológico y en los determinantes sociales (Guzmán et al., 2010;
Ortíz, 1992). Este estudio ha sido fundamental para comprender la complejidad de la
violencia en Colombia y ha permitido a los académicos profundizar en las causas y
consecuencias de este fenómeno.
En realidad, se podría plantear una gran disyuntiva respecto a si lo analizado teórica y
conceptualmente por los trabajos de varios autores es la violencia en Colombia o una
Colombia violenta (Collins, 2009). De hecho, el estado actual del conocimiento sobre el
tema muestra que tanto posturas como enfoques para abordar el fenómeno de la
violencia conducen a procesos en los que las razones y justificaciones se encuentran en
la política, la economía, la pobreza, la insurgencia, el crimen y la sociedad en general.
Por lo tanto, es importante considerar la violencia en relación con procesos transversales
y particulares que no se encuentren aislados de los proyectos de nación.
El siglo XX en Colombia fue el escenario donde se construyó la mayor cantidad de teorías
y conceptos para Daniel Pécaut. En esta ocasión, se propone que el siglo XXI, y
específicamente el contexto posterior a la firma del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016, es el
momento adecuado para profundizar en el análisis de la violencia colombiana en proceso
de transformación desde la perspectiva de Pécaut.
Las propuestas analíticas sobre la violencia y el conflicto en Colombia suelen estar
asociadas con reflexiones casuísticas que se enmarcan en narrativas contextuales
particulares. Algunas de estas ideas tienen como objetivo fragmentar la historia del
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conflicto para ordenar los hechos y fenómenos relevantes que pueden proporcionar
inferencias clave (Molano, 2015), mientras que otras buscan establecer ciclos y
dimensiones históricas con causalidades estructurales (Gutiérrez, 2015b, 2020) que
permiten identificar patrones violentos. Estos esfuerzos son valiosos para sistematizar
narrativas, datos y acontecimientos. Sin embargo, desde la perspectiva de la obra de
Daniel Pécaut, es posible ampliar el panorama de las explicaciones y comprensiones
sobre la violencia y el conflicto en Colombia.
El presente artículo tiene como objetivo presentar el concepto de la “pecautización” como
un marco analítico en construcción para el estudio de la violencia en Colombia. La
metodología utilizada para la elaboración de este estudio se basa en un análisis de
algunos textos del autor, a partir de los cuales se formula una pregunta problema y se
propone una respuesta que surge de la identificación de ciertos contextos y actores clave.
La sección del marco analítico se enfoca en presentar la pecautización como un proceso
y como categoría de análisis, con el fin de contextualizar su aplicación en el estudio de
la violencia en Colombia. En este sentido, se discute cómo la pecautización puede
proporcionar una perspectiva más amplia y profunda del fenómeno de la violencia,
considerando su complejidad y multidimensionalidad. En la sección siguiente, se realiza
una aplicación práctica del marco analítico de la pecautización en el contexto de la
violencia contemporánea en Colombia, tras la firma del Acuerdo de Paz y los estallidos
sociales de 2020. Se pretende demostrar cómo el uso de esta herramienta analítica puede
permitir una comprensión más precisa y detallada de los diferentes aspectos de la
violencia en este contexto específico.
Finalmente, se presentan las conclusiones, en las que se sugiere que el marco analítico
de la pecautización puede ser una línea de investigación interesante para los estudios de
la violencia en Colombia. La aplicación de este enfoque puede proporcionar una visión
más completa y rigurosa del fenómeno de la violencia.
Aproximación metodológica
A partir de una revisión bibliográfica centrada en las perspectivas de Daniel Pécaut sobre
la violencia en Colombia, se formula la siguiente pregunta que guía este artículo: ¿Cómo
influyen las perspectivas de Daniel Pécaut en la configuración de una categoría analítica
particular sobre los procesos de la violencia contemporánea en Colombia?
En respuesta a la pregunta planteada, se propone que las perspectivas teóricas e
interpretativas de Daniel Pécaut sobre la violencia en Colombia constituyen un proceso
dinámico que da lugar a una categoría analítica específica, denominada "pecautización".
Esta categoría surge como resultado de las dinámicas y lógicas que el autor emplea para
analizar la complejidad de la violencia en el país. La pecautización, como categoría
analítica, engloba tanto las diferentes perspectivas sobre el fenómeno de la violencia
como el marco que explica las distintas formas de violencia contemporánea en Colombia.
En consecuencia, este artículo se enfoca en la construcción de la categoría analítica de la
pecautización y propone nuevas líneas de investigación a partir de la obra de Pécaut.
Para aplicar la propuesta analítica en este estudio, se utilizaron los registros de
homicidios violentos generados por la Policía Nacional entre 2016 y 2022. A partir de
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estos datos, se puede evidenciar que la categoría analítica de la pecautización es
adecuada para comprender las dinámicas de la violencia después de la firma del Acuerdo
de Paz en Colombia. En otras palabras, el método de análisis propuesto es suficiente para
indagar e inferir los procesos de transformación violenta en el país.
Para la construcción analítica, se siguió una aproximación secuencial y ecléctica (Falleti
& Mahoney, 2016), identificando los contextos sociales e institucionales relevantes. En
particular, se consideraron la violencia de las antiguas FARC-EP (evento A), el proceso
de negociación (evento B), el Acuerdo de Paz (evento C), la proliferación de actores
armados después de las FARC-EP (evento D), la volatilidad de las violencias políticas y
no políticas (evento E) y la postfarcarización de la agenda de seguridad (evento F). La
combinación de estos eventos resulta en la pecautización de la violencia en Colombia.
En resumen, este estudio utilizó datos empíricos para demostrar la utilidad de la categoría
analítica de la pecautización en la comprensión de las dinámicas de la violencia en
Colombia después de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz. Además, se empleó una metodología
secuencial y ecléctica para identificar los eventos clave que han contribuido a la
pecautización de la violencia en el país.
Marco analítico: pecautización como proceso y categoría de análisis
Los estudios acerca de la violencia contemporánea en Colombia han llegado a un punto
convergente, y es la idea de que los procesos de violentización están vinculados a un
Estado fragmentado (Pécaut, 1999, 2004). La propuesta conceptual de la pecautización
como categoría analítica consiste en un mecanismo epistemológico que permite entender
la evolución de la violencia como fenómeno en el país. Esta violencia es dinámica y
flexible, adaptándose a los contextos cambiantes del país (García, 2021). En este sentido,
la pecautización engloba los procesos de marcos violentizadores que surgen de diversos
mecanismos causales y justificadores (Melo, 2021), en los que la agresión es aplicada
voluntariamente en dimensiones individuales, colectivas e institucionales, en las que a
menudo se involucra la variable política (Pécaut, 1987).
Tras el acuerdo de paz con las antiguas FARC-EP en 2016, la violencia política en
Colombia parece estar fragmentada, atomizada y desorganizada, lo que dificulta cada
vez más la distinción entre lo político y lo ordinario. De hecho, Pécaut (1997) ya sugería
hacia finales del siglo XX que la violencia en Colombia se percibía como un proceso
continuo y que, en un primer momento, tenía características principalmente políticas
debido a la confrontación entre las FARC-EP armadas y el establecimiento del régimen.
Según Pécaut (1997), en este conflicto se materializaba la noción de un proyecto
guerrillero contra uno de establecimiento y régimen.
Se ha observado un cambio en la dinámica de la violencia política en Colombia. La antigua
guerrilla FARC-EP solía acaparar la atención como vector de la violencia, pero tras su fin,
se ha visto una mercantilización de la violencia que afecta diferentes dimensiones
políticas y criminales (Arjona, 2016; Arjona et al., 2015). La farcarización y
postfarcarización son conceptos utilizados para describir los procesos que se han dado
en Colombia en relación con las FARC-EP (Niño & Palma, 2017, 2018). El primero de ellos
se refiere al hecho de que la guerrilla se convirtió en el foco principal de los problemas
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políticos, de seguridad, económicos y sociales en Colombia, lo que definió los umbrales
de las políticas públicas en el país. El segundo, por su parte, está relacionado con la
desaparición de las FARC-EP de la agenda de seguridad nacional, lo que permitió un
proceso de transición de la dinámica securitaria a la lógica política. Estos conceptos y
procesos acompañan los mecanismos que llevan a comprender las nuevas formas de
violencia en Colombia (Niño & Palma, 2018: 87).
De hecho, la violencia en Colombia se ha vuelto más transversal a los contextos
territoriales y nacionales, lo que sugiere una constante en el fenómeno de la violencia en
el país, que continúa fragmentado. Sin la presencia de las FARC-EP armadas, los grupos
armados organizados han desfragmentado la violencia de manera que esta se manifiesta
de forma más difusa y se ha vuelto más difícil de discernir entre lo político y lo criminal
(Ríos, 2018). Se ha argumentado que el éxito de estas nuevas estructuras armadas
radica en que su proyecto es más criminal que político (Pécaut, 2008).
Siguiendo la idea anterior, las explicaciones sobre la violencia en Colombia desde la
perspectiva de Pécaut sugieren que la violencia generada por los actores armados
organizados es el marco en el que se desarrollan todas las formas de violencia
desorganizada (Pécaut, 1997: 891; Valencia, 2017). Sin embargo, la propuesta
conceptual de la pecautización indica que la violencia contemporánea en el país va más
allá de los límites tradicionales de la violencia política debido a la imbricación de violencia
de todo tipo. Las diversas formas de violencia contemporánea son resultado de procesos
que tienen su explicación en los contextos y actores protagonistas (Melo, 2021). En otras
palabras, aunque las antiguas FARC-EP sirvieron como actor cohesionador de la violencia
política en el pasado, tras su desmovilización, la violencia en Colombia se ha
fragmentado, atomizado y mercantilizado en diversos ámbitos políticos y criminales (Niño
& Palma, 2017, 2018; Ríos, 2018; Pécaut, 2008).
Sobre la violencia contemporánea en Colombia
Desde la década de 1980, el aumento de la violencia urbana en Colombia, como señala
Pécaut (1997), fue una señal temprana del complejo panorama de violencia que se
desarrollaría durante finales del siglo XX y las primeras tres décadas del siglo XXI. En
este contexto, la violencia se convirtió en un medio de relacionamiento social que
trascendió las dinámicas políticas y culturales, relegando la violencia política a un
segundo plano (Pécaut & Restrepo, 1991). De hecho, la arquitectura de la violencia de
Galtung (1990), que identifica tres dimensiones complejas (directa, cultural y
estructural), resulta insuficiente para abordar la violencia contemporánea en Colombia.
El ascenso de la violencia ordinaria (Pécaut & Restrepo, 1991: 35), por ejemplo, supone
un fenómeno que va más allá de la triada de Galtung.
En este sentido, mientras Colombia se encuentra inmersa en un tercer ciclo de violencia
política (Gutiérrez, 2020), la violencia ordinaria emerge como un factor que contribuye a
la ruptura y fragmentación de la ciudadanía (Nussio, 2016; Waldmann, 2007). Como
señalan Pécaut y Restrepo (1991), la violencia ordinaria se ha convertido en una
característica transversal a las dinámicas políticas y culturales del país, relegando la
violencia política a un segundo plano. La complejidad de la violencia contemporánea en
Colombia, como señala Pécaut (1997), exige una revisión de las explicaciones
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tradicionales de la violencia en el país, porque las formas contemporáneas de la violencia
son producto de procesos que tienen explicación en los contextos y actores protagonistas.
La violencia ordinaria, que se caracteriza por la imbricación de factores económicos y
sociales cotidianos, produce diez veces más víctimas que la violencia política (Pécaut &
Restrepo, 1991: 35). En este sentido, mientras la violencia política se ha fragmentado
debido a las lógicas de los actores armados, la violencia ordinaria se ha convertido en un
fenómeno transversal que afecta todas las áreas sociales. En consecuencia, se confirma
que la perspectiva de la pecautización es un marco adecuado para explicar las diversas
formas de violencia que involucran aspectos políticos, económicos y sociales.
Aunque el Acuerdo de Paz ha eliminado a las FARC-EP de la agenda de seguridad del
país, el análisis y la comprensión de la violencia actual han sido complejos y turbulentos
(Ríos, 2021). Esto no implica que la violencia estuviera exclusivamente relacionada con
la antigua guerrilla, sino que antes se centraba en ella. Después de la desmovilización,
la violencia contemporánea se ha convertido en un medio de arreglo entre las élites
políticas (Moreno-Parra, 2018), una forma de transacción social en los territorios (Uribe,
2020), un objeto de comercio (Alzate-Zuluaga & Jiménez-García, 2021), un proceso de
gobernanza criminal (Lessing, 2020; Lessing & Graham, 2019) y una expresión
institucional (CIDH, 2021a). Desde la perspectiva de la pecautización, la población civil
es víctima tanto de los grupos armados irregulares como de las instituciones
gubernamentales en las que no confía (Pécaut, 1999: 8). En consecuencia, la violencia
es el factor que define al país.
Gráfico 1. Total de homicidios en Colombia entre 2010 y 2021
Fuente: elaboración propia con base en datos de (DIJIN-Policía Nacional, 2010-2021)
En 2015, durante las negociaciones de paz en La Habana, Daniel Pécaut proporcionó un
análisis relevante para el Centro de Memoria Histórica. En este, el autor enfatizó que las
masacres ocurridas entre 1982 y 2012 dejaron un saldo de 11.751 víctimas (Pécaut,
2015: 44). Los grupos paramilitares y las guerrillas fueron los responsables más visibles,
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Homicidios en Colombia entre 2010 y 2021
Homicidios en Colombia entre 2010 y 2021
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con el 58.9% y el 17.3%, respectivamente, mientras que otros actores de distintas
naturalezas representaron el 14.8%, y el Estado (fuerza pública) el 7.9%. Los grupos
mixtos, compuestos por fuerza pública y paramilitares, representaron alrededor del 12%
(Gutiérrez, 2015a; Guerrero & Wilches, 2020; Pécaut, 2015: 44).
Es evidente que todos los grupos generadores de violencia tienen en común el hecho de
que las hostilidades se llevan a cabo con población civil interpuesta, tanto antes como
después de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz (Pécaut, 2015). Desde la perspectiva de la
pecautización, se puede inferir que la población civil ha sido objeto de violencia en
Colombia por parte de las guerrillas, la fuerza pública y los grupos paramilitares, tanto
antes como después del Acuerdo de Paz.
La violencia que actualmente se vive en Colombia es el resultado de procesos violentos
que han ocurrido a lo largo del tiempo. Desde una perspectiva secuencial, se puede
afirmar que la violencia que precedió al Acuerdo de Paz tenía como eje central la narrativa
de las FARC-EP y las diversas formas de violencia criminal que se presentaban en el país.
Sin embargo, tras la firma del Acuerdo y la extinción de la guerrilla, las explicaciones
oficiales sobre la violencia ya no coinciden con la realidad de la antigua guerrilla
desarmada, sino que se enfocan en nuevas y recicladas formas de violencia territorial
generadas por grupos criminales diversos. En consecuencia, se puede afirmar que la
violencia actual es una manifestación de procesos violentos continuos, en los cuales
distintos actores han desempeñado un papel relevante, y que han generado graves
consecuencias para la población civil del país (Pécaut, 1999; Gutiérrez, 2015a).
En términos generales, la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016 no ha generado
una reducción significativa de los homicidios en Colombia. A pesar de la tímida
implementación del Acuerdo, la violencia sigue presente en el país, y parece ajustarse a
las dinámicas previas a su firma (El Espectador, 2019; Kroc, 2020). Además, se han
producido nuevas fragmentaciones en el contexto de la implementación del Acuerdo, lo
que ha contribuido a la aparición de nuevos actores violentos (Pécaut, 2021).
Aunque se observó una disminución de los homicidios tras la firma del Acuerdo, la
violencia ha reaparecido progresivamente (Pécaut, 2021: 186). De hecho, la violencia
después del Acuerdo se ha convertido en el principal problema social y de seguridad en
Colombia (Matriz de Acuerdos de Paz, 2021). En este contexto, se han producido más de
200 asesinatos de excombatientes de la guerrilla, y entre 2016 y 2019 se han reportado
más de 600 asesinatos de líderes sociales (Niño & Castillo, 2022).
Este fenómeno de violencia se debe en gran parte a procesos de reacomodo criminal que
se estaban configurando incluso antes de la firma del Acuerdo de Paz (Fundación Ideas
para la Paz, 2019; Gutiérrez, 2020). La proliferación y removilización de actores
multiviolentos en el país ha sido un factor clave en la persistencia de la violencia en
Colombia (Gutiérrez, 2020). Bajo esta perspectiva, la "pecautización" se configura como
un fenómeno que surge en el contexto postfarcarizado de Colombia. Una vez superada
la noción ortodoxa de seguridad y violencia en el país, enfocada exclusivamente en las
FARC-EP, se hizo evidente que dicha guerrilla no era el problema más complejo ni el
único en términos de violencia (Giordano, 2022). De hecho, después de la firma del
Acuerdo de Paz, la ciudadanía y la opinión pública se volvieron más críticas con respecto
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al establecimiento político (García, 2020) y se preocuparon más por las violencias en los
territorios, tales como masacres y desplazamientos forzados (Giordano, 2022).
Entre 2020 y 2021, cuarto y quinto año de implementación respectivamente, se
registraron 187 masacres con un saldo de 719 víctimas (Giordano, 2022; Indepaz,
2021a, 2021b). Este panorama complejo se da en un contexto en el que múltiples actores
armados están contribuyendo a la fragmentación social y violenta, y producen crisis
humanitarias que erosionan la legitimidad en los territorios. La "pecautización" se
convierte así en el centro de gravedad dentro del marco de la violencia contemporánea
en Colombia. De hecho, el Acuerdo de Paz ha generado nuevas fragmentaciones (Pécaut,
2021) y ha dejado al descubierto nuevas lógicas ciudadanas que, según Pécaut, deben
ser comprendidas estructuralmente.
En el quinto año de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, y en medio de la pandemia
de COVID-19, Colombia experimentó un estallido social sin precedentes el 28 de abril de
2021. Según Pécaut (2021), se trató de un país paralizado en todas sus dimensiones
donde las demandas ciudadanas legítimas superaron la capacidad de las instituciones
para satisfacerlas. Además, durante este tiempo, el Estado perpetró actos criminales y
violaciones de derechos humanos a través del Escuadrón Móvil Antidisturbios (ESMAD) y
la Policía Nacional (CIDH, 2021b). El Ejército Nacional también intervino en la seguridad
ciudadana en centros urbanos como Cali, Bogotá y Medellín, lo que sorprendió a la
población y generó mayor descontento (Uprimny, 2021).
El temprano 2021 fue testigo de una colisión de violencias, de legitimidades encontradas,
de actores ciudadanos y armados, de reclamos y represiones, así como de justificaciones
para hacer la violencia y un gobierno que no reconoce el problema (Tamayo, 2021). Sin
embargo, este tipo de movilizaciones no fueron completamente inesperadas, ya que
desde finales de 2019 se había iniciado un proceso de movilización y protesta social
significativo por reclamaciones económicas, tributarias, de educación y de violencia
contra excombatientes y líderes sociales (Pécaut, 2021: 177).
Según Pécaut (2021), estos acontecimientos lograron sacar a la luz los rasgos que
caracterizan a Colombia desde siempre: la carencia de una simbología nacional y una
sociedad dividida y fragmentada. La situación actual de Colombia se puede entender
como un país pecautizado, en el que la violencia contemporánea y la fragmentación social
y política son el centro de gravedad.
En 1991, Daniel Pécaut señaló que la violencia en Colombia no estaba polarizando a la
sociedad civil, sino que la dejaba como espectadora desbordada por la violencia entre las
fuerzas del gobierno y las guerrillas (Pécaut & Restrepo, 1991: 35). Sin embargo, en
2001, Pécaut reconoció que la violencia y el narcotráfico en Colombia eran alimentados
por la presencia de estructuras armadas y la relación con grupos guerrilleros que
permitieron el fortalecimiento de la economía del narcotráfico, a pesar de las operaciones
militares del gobierno (2001: 117).
En la segunda y tercera década del siglo XXI, el contexto de violencia en Colombia parece
haber cambiado su influencia sobre la ciudadanía. Antes del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016, las
élites políticas y criminales habían logrado configurar órdenes en los territorios, sin
modificar las estructuras sociales y territoriales (Schultze-Kraft, 2016; Pécaut, 2021:
182). Sin embargo, tras el proceso de paz, los actores sociales tradicionales entraron en
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crisis, lo que desembocó en un estallido social catalizado por la rabia ciudadana (Pécaut,
2021: 182).
En el contexto del paro general que tuvo lugar en abril de 2021, los operadores de
seguridad del Estado se convirtieron en un actor activo de violencia, lo que resultó en
decenas de muertes, casos de tortura, represión violenta y desapariciones (CIDH,
2021a). Esto rompió la tradición de la violencia explícita solo por parte de actores al
margen de la ley, y en esta oportunidad, el silencio del gobierno legitimó las acciones
criminales de las instituciones estatales sobre la sociedad (Pécaut, 2021: 183). Como
señala Pécaut (2021: 182), la violencia en Colombia se ha fragmentado en múltiples
formas, incluyendo la social, la institucional-estatal y la criminal, lo que refleja una
complejidad mayor que en épocas anteriores.
La violencia en Colombia ha evolucionado de una mera ecuación conflictual entre bandos
políticos y criminales a una forma de violencia más difusa en la que tanto las élites como
la ciudadanía han llegado a justificar el uso de la violencia siempre y cuando se obtenga
un beneficio propio (Lemaitre, 2019). Tras la extinción de las FARC-EP y la eliminación
de la agenda de seguridad centrada en ese grupo, la violencia ha adoptado una
naturaleza más desconcentrada y fragmentada, con actores y formas de violencia
reciclados e incluso transformados utilizados como fines en sí mismos, en lugar de medios
para alcanzar objetivos (Lemaitre, 2019).
La "pecautización" aplicada a la violencia en Colombia es el resultado de una secuencia
de eventos que incluyen la violencia de las antiguas FARC-EP (evento A), el proceso de
negociación (evento B), el Acuerdo de Paz (evento C), la proliferación de actores armados
después de las FARC-EP (evento D), la volatilidad de las violencias tanto políticas como
no políticas (evento E) y la postfarcarización de la agenda de seguridad (evento F).
La violencia en Colombia ha evolucionado hacia formas más difusas y fragmentadas
después del Acuerdo de Paz, con actores y formas de violencia reciclados y
transformados. La "pecautización" de la violencia es el resultado de una serie de eventos
que han contribuido a la proliferación de actores armados y a la volatilidad de las
violencias políticas y no políticas en el país.
Conclusiones
Finalmente, las violencias que aún persisten en Colombia tienen raíces en enclaves
violentizadores anteriores al Acuerdo de Paz de 2016, y son alimentadas por actores
armados removilizados, asociaciones criminales que se benefician de las economías
ilícitas, delincuencia común, gobernanzas criminales, violencias urbanas, violencia estatal
y polarizaciones sociales. La complejidad de estos fenómenos ha sobrepasado los clásicos
arquetipos conceptuales en la materia, por lo que se hace necesaria una reordenación de
las explicaciones para comprender los flujos y contraflujos de la violencia colombiana. El
trabajo de Daniel Pécaut ha sido fundamental en los estudios sobre la violencia, la
democracia, el conflicto y la política en Colombia, ya que rastrea los puntos de
convergencia sobre la violencia y el conflicto en la historia democrática colombiana y
ofrece un marco aplicable para la comprensión de la violencia como proceso, causa y
efecto.
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La pecautización, propuesta en este artículo, surge como una nueva línea de
investigación en los estudios sobre violencia en Colombia, capaz de mostrar algunas
secuencias de actores y problemas sociales que influyen en la arquitectura de la violencia
contemporánea en el país (Alldredge et al., 2017; Borrero, 2019; Fajardo, 2015;
Feldmann, 2018; Gutiérrez, 2015b; Wills, 2015; Yaffe, 2011). En un contexto
postfarcarizado, la violencia ha adquirido un sentido dinámico, distinto y en cierta medida
desconocido, por lo que se requiere de nuevos enfoques analíticos que permitan una
mejor comprensión de los fenómenos violentos actuales. La pecautización es un marco
analítico que puede ser aplicado en esta tarea, mostrando los diversos mecanismos
causales que dan lugar a los marcos violentizadores.
La violencia contemporánea en Colombia es compleja y requiere de nuevas herramientas
teóricas y analíticas para su estudio. La pecautización es una de estas herramientas,
capaz de mostrar las secuencias de actores y problemas sociales que influyen en la
arquitectura de la violencia contemporánea en Colombia. En ausencia de las FARC-EP
armadas, la ciudadanía se ha tornado más involucrada en los procesos sociales y rechaza
todo tipo de violencia, incluyendo la proveniente del Estado. Por lo tanto, la investigación
sobre la violencia en Colombia debe seguir siendo una preocupación académica y
ciudadana de gran envergadura.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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69
LA EDUCACIÓN EN DEFENSA: UN ANÁLISIS COMPARADO ENTRE LOS
COLEGIOS DE DEFENSA DE CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR Y PERÚ
LESTER CABRERA TOLEDO
lcabrera@analitiksrc.com
Licenciado en Ciencias Políticas y Administrativas por la Universidad de Concepción. Magister en
Seguridad y Defensa por la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos. Graduado del
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Washington DC. Doctor en Estudios
Internacionales por FLACSO. Es profesor en FLACSO (Ecuador), la Academia de Guerra del
Ejército del Ecuador, y en la Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas - ESPE. Es Director General de
Analitik Strategic Research Center - Ecuador. Su última publicación es “¿Por una línea en el mar?
Alegorías y discursos geopolíticos entre Chile y Perú” por FLACSO 2022.
Resumen
El presente trabajo surge de un ejercicio de comparación entre las organizaciones que son
consideradas como Colegios de Defensa, de acuerdo a la selección realizada por la Asociación
de Colegios de Defensa Iberoamericanos, en los países que son parte de la región del Pacífico
Sur sudamericano: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. En este sentido, la comparación se
efectúa sobre la base de cuatro dimensiones, las cuales son tener alguna revista académica
e indexada, poseer procesos de capacitación y formación disponibles a civiles, contar con
diferentes niveles de capacitación y formación, y contar dentro de su estructura con un Centro
de Estudios Estratégicos. Estas dimensiones permitirán tener una concepción con respecto al
papel que juegan aquellos Colegios de Defensa en el ámbito de la generación y difusión del
conocimiento, al tiempo que se plantean similitudes y diferencias tomando en cuenta los
contenidos, programas y procesos académicos. Se establece como conclusión que existe una
tendencia hacia una similitud en los programas ofertados por los Colegios de Defensa,
manteniendo un solo caso de excepción, lo que da como resultado una suerte de percepción
de homogenización de las amenazas y procesos de Defensa al interior de los respectivos
países estudiados.
Palabras clave
Defensa; Seguridad; Sudamérica; conocimiento; academia
Abstract
This paper arises from a comparison of the organisations that are considered Defence
Colleges, according to the selection made by the Association of Ibero-American Defence
Colleges, in the countries that are part of the South American South Pacific region: Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In this sense, the comparison is based on four dimensions:
having an academic and indexed journal, having training and education processes available
to civilians, having different levels of training and education, and having a Strategic Studies
Centre within its structure. These dimensions will allow us to have a conception of the role
played by those Defence Colleges in the field of knowledge generation and dissemination,
while at the same time establishing similarities and differences in terms of content,
programmes and academic processes. The conclusion is that there is a tendency towards
similarity in the programmes offered by the Defence Colleges, with only one case of exception,
which results in a sort of perception of homogenisation of the threats and processes of Defence
within the respective countries studied.
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La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
70
Keywords
Defence; Security; South America; knowledge; academia; South America
Como citar este artículo
Toledo, Lester Cabrera (2023). La educación en Defensa: un análisis comparado entre los Colegios
de Defensa de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations,
Vol14 N1, Mayo-octubre de 2023. Consultado [en línea] en la fecha de la última consulta,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.5
Artículo recibido el 27 de deciembre de 2022, aceptado para su publicación el 6 de marzo
de 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Mayo-Octobre 2023), pp. 69-86
La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
71
LA EDUCACIÓN EN DEFENSA:
UN ANÁLISIS COMPARADO ENTRE LOS COLEGIOS DE DEFENSA
DE CHILE, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR Y PERÚ
LESTER CABRERA TOLEDO
Introducción
¿Qué son los Colegios de Defensa? ¿Qué similitudes y diferencias que se pueden observar
en los Colegios de Defensa de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú? Esta investigación tiene
como objetivos responder a las anteriores interrogantes. Pero pese a un eventual
desarrollo de las mismas, resulta metodológicamente adecuado otorgar respuestas
simples e introductorias, para poder establecer los lineamientos generales de este
trabajo. En un primer sentido, y a modo de plantear límites conceptuales, se plantea que
para los fines de esta investigación, un “Colegio de Defensa”, es aquella institución que
agrupa a las principales ramas de las Fuerzas Armadas (FF.AA.) de un país, en conjunto
con componentes de la sociedad civil, en función de lograr una capacitación y
perfeccionamiento contante, en las diferentes áreas del conocimiento que forman parte
de la estructura de la Defensa, al tiempo que posee un reconocimiento institucional e
internacional de dicha cualidad. Esta definición, la cual tiene una concepción altamente
general sobre las cualidades de un Colegio de Defensa, detenta un aspecto relevante, y
es que dentro de la visión de la Defensa, especialmente en lo concerniente a la realidad
de los países sudamericanos, se encuentran diferentes instituciones que poseen un
objetivo similar, y que incluso mantienen un vinculo institucional directo con el sector
Defensa, como son las escuelas superiores o academias de guerra.
Sin embargo, de la definición dada se pueden extraer tres aspectos que permiten obtener
una clasificación e identificación de los Colegios de Defensa de forma particular. En primer
lugar, debe ser una institución que agrupe a la totalidad de las ramas de las FF.AA. En
otras palabras, debe existir una representación y expresión de “lo conjunto”, incluyendo
además la presencia de estamentos o actores de la sociedad civil. En segundo lugar,
dicha institución debe ser capaz de generar y construir programas de formación y
capacitación en diferentes niveles, siempre asociados a los quehaceres del sector
Defensa. Y en un tercer aspecto, se encuentra el ámbito del reconocimiento institucional
e internacional de la organización.
El último punto mencionado es el elemento sustancial sobre el cual se plantea, para esta
investigación, una visión discrecional debidamente argumentada. En este sentido, el
reconocimiento sobre una determinada organización bajo el rótulo de Colegio de Defensa,
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Lester Cabrera Toledo
72
pasa por la apreciación que se tiene desde lo internacional. De acuerdo a la Asociación
de Colegios de Defensa Iberoamericanos
1
, cada país posee una institución que puede ser
catalogada como Colegio de Defensa, en conjunto con la definición sobre las instituciones
que serán objeto de análisis dentro de la presente investigación. Este punto, además,
cuenta con el reconocimiento a través de diversas actividades, tales como encuentros,
seminarios y publicaciones, lo que da a entender que existe una institucionalidad que
agrupa a dichas organizaciones.
Y como forma de dar respuesta a la segunda interrogante planteada, para conocer y
establecer la comparación entre los Colegios de Defensa de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y
Perú, los criterios para la selección de dichos países pasan por diversos aspectos. Uno de
ellos se basa en compartir un área geográfica particular, como ser la totalidad de ellos
países ribereños del océano Pacífico en Sudamérica, lo cual puede ser considerado como
parte de un potencial complejo regional de seguridad (Méndez, 2017; Buzan y Wæver,
2009); un segundo aspecto es que poseen, en mayor o menor medida, una parte
identitaria de “países andinos” (Alda, 2018); y finalmente, como consecuencia de las
dinámicas delictuales, especialmente en torno a la producción y distribución de cocaína,
la totalidad de los países han construido estrategias que vinculan a las FF.AA. en labores
asociadas a las consecuencias del narcotráfico (Kacowicz y Mares, 2016; Thies, 2016).
En cuanto al enfoque metodológico, en conjunto con el hecho de plantear una perspectiva
comparada sobre la base de los Colegios de Defensa de los países del Pacífico sur
sudamericano, la reflexión se efectuará por medio de la estructura metodológica IMRyD
(Introducción, Método, Resultados y Discusión) (González y Mattar, 2010), para generar
una comparación tanto desde un sentido metodológico como del objeto de estudio. Por
ende, además de tener un enfoque metodológico cualitativo, se realizará la comparación
de diferentes procesos que se dan en los Colegios de Defensa de los países del Pacífico
Sur sudamericano, sobre la base de cuatro dimensiones: la existencia de revistas
académicas indexadas; los procesos de formación y capacitación abiertos a civiles; los
diferentes niveles que se poseen en términos de formación y capacitación; y la existencia
de Centros de Estudios Estratégicos (CEE).
Dichas dimensiones dan cuenta de tres aspectos sustanciales: en primer lugar, establecer
un análisis sobre la “vinculación con el medio” que los Colegios de Defensa de los países
seleccionados ofrecen, tanto a nivel estatal como dentro del contexto regional en cual se
insertan. En un segundo aspecto, se plantea que los Colegios de Defensa son
instituciones formadoras de una masa crítica que, en un futuro, permitirá una mejora en
los procesos de planificación, diseño, construcción, implementación y evaluación de las
diferentes áreas que conlleva una política pública enfocada en temáticas asociadas a la
seguridad y Defensa del país. Y finalmente, la propia cualidad de los Colegios de Defensa,
les permitiría situarse en un esquema de think tanks, dentro del campo seguritario,
debido a la asociación que se dan entre éstos y los niveles decisionales del Estado.
Con respecto a la obtención de datos e información, así como la temporalidad en torno a
su recolección, bajo el criterio de uniformidad y tratando de lograr la mayor objetividad
posible, se ha considerado el acceso a fuentes abiertas, especialmente por medio de sus
1
Al respecto, véase el sitio web de la Asociación de Colegios de Defensa Iberoamericanos
http://www.asociacioncolegiosdefensaiberoamericanos.org/index.php/paises-participantes.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Mayo-Octobre 2023), pp. 69-86
La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
73
sitios web institucionales, al tiempo que se busca lograr la identificación de los datos para
comparar sobre las dimensiones previamente establecidas. Este punto resulta crucial
para la posterior discusión, ya que la temporalidad será con respecto a los datos e
información obtenida será hasta el mes de diciembre del 2022
2
.
Se concluye que en gran parte de las dimensiones analizadas y comparadas, los países
seleccionados encuentran una gran similitud, especialmente en los fines de las mismas,
pero al mismo tiempo poseen diferencias sustanciales en cuanto a la forma en que se
exponen. Un caso especial al respecto se representa por la situación del Colegio de
Defensa en Ecuador, el cual se evidencia como una suerte de excepcionalidad; pero esto
también se podría entender desde el punto de vista de los constantes cambios
organizacionales e institucionales que dicho Colegio ha experimentado en los últimos
años. Este tema puede a su vez otorgar luces sobre una ampliación de la investigación
en seguridad y Defensa de los países, tomando en cuenta el impacto efectivo de la gestión
de los Colegios de Defensa, en la generación de políticas e iniciativas que ayuden a la
construcción y mantención de políticas dentro del sector en cuestión.
1. Comparación de las dimensiones
Como se señaló en el apartado introductorio, el objeto del análisis comparado serán los
Colegios de Defensa de los países que se ubican en la zona del Pacífico sur sudamericano,
particularmente Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú. Siendo así, y de acuerdo a la
categorización realizada por la Asociación de Colegios de Defensa Iberoamericanos, los
Colegios de Defensa de los países mencionados son los que se pueden apreciar en el
siguiente cuadro:
Cuadro No. 1: Colegios de Defensa en el Pacífico Sur sudamericano
Chile
Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE)
Colombia
Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESDEG)
Ecuador
Academia de Defensa Militar Conjunta (ADEMIC)
Preú
Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CAEN)
Fuente: Elaboración propia
Desde el caso chileno, el Colegio de Defensa establecido como tal, es la Academia
Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE), fundada en 1975, teniendo como
antecesora a la Academia de Defensa Nacional, creada en 1947. En términos
organizacionales, la ANEPE depende de la Subsecretaria de Defensa, dependiente del
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Se considera como aquella institución que articula el
quehacer de los diferentes segmentos y organismos de la Defensa Nacional con el ámbito
civil, desde la perspectiva académica. Para lograr lo anterior, la ANEPE oferta una serie
de programas que se encuentren en sintonía con los lineamientos planteados a nivel país,
2
En este punto, la totalidad de los datos para la elaboración de la comparación, fueron extraídos de los sitios
web institucionales de los respectivos Colegios de Defensa. Para el caso de Chile fue ANEPE
(https://anepe.cl/), en Colombia la ESDEF (https://esdegue.edu.co/), en Ecuador la ADEMIC
(https://ademic.ccffaa.mil.ec/), y para Perú el CAEN (https://caen.edu.pe/), revisados hasta el 27 de
diciembre de 2022.
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La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
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Lester Cabrera Toledo
74
dentro de la seguridad y la Defensa, constituyendo un espacio donde civiles y militares
confluyan.
La Escuela Superior de Guerra “Rafael Reyes Prieto” (ESDEG) en Colombia, fue fundada
en 1909, y en sus inicios solamente prestaba servicios a oficiales integrantes del ejército.
Su evolución implicó la ampliación tanto de la oferta de sus cursos, como también la
inclusión de las diferentes ramas de las FF.AA. y la Policía Nacional, incorporando de
forma paulatina a civiles por medio de programas de especialización y postgrado. Un
aspecto a considerar dentro de la naturaleza de la ESDEG, es que se encuentra ofreciendo
de forma permanente, cursos y especializaciones al ámbito militar, ya se a nivel de
Estado Mayor, como también al personal militar en condición de reserva. Siendo así, uno
de los principales objetivos de la ESDEG, es sensibilizar a los futuros profesionales en
aquellos aspectos que son atingentes a la seguridad y la Defensa Nacional, contribuyendo
así al mejoramiento constante del desarrollo del país.
El Ecuador posee la Academia de Defensa Militar Conjunta “Gral. Francisco Javier Salazar
Arboleda” (ADEMIC), creada el año 2017 bajo el nombre señalado y dependiente
directamente del Comando Conjunto de las FF.AA. Fue fundada desde el punto de vista
institucional en 1986, cambiando de denominación 4 veces, teniendo 3 nombres
diferentes en un período de 10 años. Dichos cambios, si bien pueden deberse a una
efectiva modificación de los patrones y estructuras doctrinarias, tomando como ejemplo
que en 2010 pasó de ser Instituto Nacional de Guerra (INAGUE) a Instituto Nacional de
Defensa (INADE), justamente tomando en cuenta una visión donde la perspectiva
conflictiva, fuera minimizada, en relación a los nuevos enfoques que el país estaba
construyendo, especialmente como parte del concepto de “seguridad integral”, dejando
de lado la perspectiva de la “seguridad nacional” (Andrade, 2021). Siendo así, la función
primordial de la ADEMIC es ser el centro de estudios superiores de Defensa del Ecuador,
en el cual los oficiales de las FF.AA. se capaciten en labores y temáticas propias del nivel
político-estratégico, tomando en consideración la gestión de la educación y la doctrina
de Defensa que posea el Ecuador.
Finalmente, el Perú posee el Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (CAEN). Esta institución
tiene sus orígenes dentro de la estructura del Ejército del Perú. Al respecto, el Centro de
Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), antecesor del CAEN, fue fundado en 1950, estableciendo
su nombre actual en 1997. En la actualidad, el CAEN es parte del Ministerio de Defensa,
la cual también se denomina Escuela de Postgrado (CAEN-EPG), siendo la institución al
más alto nivel dentro del sistema educativo dentro del sector Defensa, perfeccionando y
capacitando de forma permanente, tanto en los ámbitos militar como civil, en las áreas
de desarrollo, seguridad y Defensa Nacional, para así ayudar a garantizar la paz dentro
de la comunidad nacional.
Un punto a tomar en cuenta, es que gran parte de los Colegios de Defensa que son parte
del presente análisis, tienen dentro de su historia, una directa vinculación con las Fuerzas
Armadas, pero especialmente con la rama o área asociada a los ejércitos. Este punto no
solamente queda evidenciado en su propio nacimiento y evolución como instituciones
que ayudan a formar y afianzar la doctrina dentro de una determinada sociedad, sino
que también en la manera en cómo han sido direccionadas, tratando en un principio,
intereses que son más propios del ámbito terrestre, por sobre las prioridades de las otras
ramas de las Fuerzas Armadas. Este último aspecto también es posible de evidenciar en
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La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
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Lester Cabrera Toledo
75
torno a las cualidades y origen de los Directores de dichas instituciones, que al momento
de ser gestionadas por algún oficial en actividades, se ha tenido una proporción mayor
de oficiales provenientes de los ejércitos (ANEPE, 2021). Sin embargo, aquello solamente
queda como una observación puntual y de carácter histórica, tomando en cuenta que
como producto de la evolución y desarrollo de los mismos Colegios de Defensa, no
solamente ha habido una visión más integral de los fenómenos que afectan al país en su
conjunto, como también en torno a una perspectiva integral sobre su manejo,
especialmente considerando la naturaleza diversa y difusa de las amenazas.
Siendo así, y tomando en cuenta los Colegios de Defensa señalados, se plantean 4
dimensiones para comparar entre dichas instituciones, las cuales se desglosan en el
siguiente cuadro:
Cuadro No. 2: Dimensiones a comparar
Revistas académicas indexadas
Procesos de formación y capacitación disponibles a civiles
Niveles de formación y capacitación
Conformación de Centros de Estudios Estratégicos
Fuente: elaboración propia
La primera dimensión es la correspondiente a la existencia de revistas académicas e
indexadas. Al respecto, el hecho de considerar a una revista bajo el calificativo de
académica, da cuenta de la existencia de, por lo menos, una estructura permanente de
la revista, que permita la mantención de estándares científicos. Dicha estructura debiese
contar con un director, un editor, un comité editorial, y un comité científico, lo que daría
cuenta de estándares mínimos sobre los cuales pueda verificarse su calidad y aportación
al campo de estudio. Un ejemplo de esto último es el reconocimiento internacional de la
revista, basándose en la posesión de un Número Internacional Normalizado de
Publicaciones Seriadas (ISSN por sus siglas en inglés). Y otros aspectos que se tomarán
en consideración para el posterior análisis, es el proceso de evaluación de los artículos
por doble ciego, el acceso a los artículos de la revista, y si se encuentra indexada en
algún catálogo o base de datos. Siendo así, los resultados del análisis comparado entre
los Colegios de Defensa seleccionados en la primera dimensión, se evidencian en el
siguiente recuadro:
Cuadro No. 3: Revistas académicas e indexación
Si posee
No posee
Indexación
ANEPE Chile
X
Si
ESDEG Colombia
X
Si
ADEMIC Ecuador
X
No
CAEN Perú
X
Si
Fuente: Elaboración propia
La segunda dimensión establecida es la existencia de procesos de formación y
capacitación ofertados, pero que se encuentren disponibles, de forma abierta, a civiles.
En este sentido, se entiende esta dimensión como el hecho de tener algún curso o proceso
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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Mayo-Octobre 2023), pp. 69-86
La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
76
formativo que los Colegios de Defensa estén ofertando, no importando el nivel que los
mismos posean; es decir, puede ser un curso abierto, un diplomado, o incluso un
programa académico más elaborado, pero que debe contar con la cualidad de que al
mismo puedan acceder, de forma similar, tanto el personal civil como el militar.
También se considera en esta dimensión, la naturaleza del curso que se esté ofertando.
Si bien es cierto que la base de los cursos ofertados por los Colegios de Defensa
señalados, se acopla principalmente a las temáticas relacionadas a los estudios
estratégicos, también es efectivo que se pongan a disposición de la comunidad otros
cursos. En este punto, y debido a la naturaleza misma de los Colegios de Defensa
analizados, se tomarán en cuenta solamente los cursos que traten sobre tópicos
asociados a la seguridad y Defensa, y que tengan una apertura al personal civil,
evidenciándose aquello en el siguiente cuadro:
Cuadro No. 4: Procesos de formación y capacitación disponibles a civiles
Si posee
No posee
ANEPE Chile
X
ESDEG Colombia
X
ADEMIC Ecuador
X
CAEN Perú
X
Fuente: elaboración propia
La tercera dimensión por comparar son los niveles de formación y capacitación que se
ofertan. Al respecto, se ha podido visualizar que existen diferentes tipos y formatos de
cursos, tomando en consideración los niveles de complejidad y extensión en términos
temporales. Es así que se pueden observar desde cursos regulares, programas de
Maestría y de Doctorado. Tomando en cuenta aquello, es que se busca comparar cuales
son los niveles ofertados dentro de los Colegios de Defensa, para así llegar a conocer si
existen diferencias o similitudes, con respecto a la complejidad, estructura y niveles entre
los programas académicos. Los niveles de formación y capacitación de los Colegios de
Defensa seleccionados, se puede visualizar en el siguiente recuadro:
Cuadro No. 5: Niveles de formación y capacitación
Cursos
regulares
Diplomados
Licenciatura
Maestria
Doctorado
ANEPE Chile
X
X
X
X
X
ESDEG Colombia
X
X
X
X
ADEMIC Ecuador
X
CAEN Perú
X
X
X
Fuente: elaboración propia
La última dimensión se refiere a la existencia y conformación de los CEE. Dentro del
campo de los Estudios Estratégicos, hay una tendencia que las diferentes ramas de las
FF.AA., especialmente en América Latina, hayan establecido CEE como una forma de
publicitar algunos de sus productos y documentos de análisis e investigación, generar
eventos, e incluso servir como espacio que ayude al proceso de vinculación con la
sociedad. Y en este caso, los Colegios de Defensa, pese a que tienen una naturaleza que
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Mayo-Octobre 2023), pp. 69-86
La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
77
se relaciona con las FF.AA. del país al cual pertenecen, poseen una proyección que les
hace proclives a posicionarse en espacios más cercanos al ámbito civil y político,
planteando a los CEE como un canal más rápido y cercano con los aspectos ya señalados.
Así, lo que se tomará en cuenta para establecer la comparación en sí, es el hecho de que
el Colegio de Defensa posea o no, un CEE, o un área que tenga una denominación similar,
lo que se puede apreciar en el siguiente cuadro:
Cuadro No. 6: Conformación de CEE
Si posee
No posee
ANEPE Chile
X
ESDEG Colombia
X
ADEMIC Ecuador
X
CAEN Perú
X
Fuente: elaboración propia
2. Resultados obtenidos
Derivado de la comparación de las dimensiones entre los Colegios de Defensa de Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador y Perú, los resultados y el análisis de los mismos indican que existen
una serie de elementos que son similares en dichos establecimientos, al tiempo que se
observan diferencias relevantes. Para el caso de las similitudes, es posible visualizar que
las mismas son claras en todos los países, exceptuando el caso de la ADEMIC en Ecuador.
Pero sin perjuicio de aquello, se procederá a señalar y considerar la exposición de cada
una de las dimensiones por cada Colegio de Defensa.
Tomando en cuenta la dimensión sobre la generación de una revista académica con la
cualidad adicional de ser indexada, para el caso de la ANEPE en Chile, esta institución
posee la revista Política y Estrategia. Dicha publicación, dentro del primer semestre del
2022 se encuentra su número 139, y se viene realizando desde el año 1976 de forma
ininterrumpida, teniendo una periodicidad semestral. Cabe señalar que cualquier persona
puede publicar en dicha revista, cumpliendo con el formato requerido, contando con una
evaluación de pares ciegos. Posee una estructura basada en un director, un consejo
editorial, y consejeros, estos últimos con una duración de dos años. Además, se tiene
acceso libre a los artículos de los diversos volúmenes de la revista a través de un sitio
web, y la misma se encuentra indexada en Latindex y Dialnet, encontrándose en posesión
de un ISSN.
Para el caso de la ESDEG de Colombia, se poseen dos revistas que pueden considerarse
bajo el rótulo de académicas: la revista Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa, y la revista
Fuerzas Armadas. Al año 2022, la revista Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa posee su
último volumen como el 33 y se viene editando desde el año 2006. Esta revista se
encuentra abierta al público en la publicación de artículos como en la disponibilidad de
los mismos por medio de la plataforma de la institución. Publica números abiertos y
temáticos con una periodicidad de carácter semestral, cumpliendo un determinado
formato. Posee como estructura dentro de la publicación a un editor en jefe, asistentes
editoriales, un comité editorial y un comité científico. Dicha publicación se encuentra
indexada en múltiples bases de datos e índices, destacando su presencia en Latindex
Directorio y ERIHPLUS.
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La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
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Lester Cabrera Toledo
78
La ESDEG también posee la revista Fuerzas Armadas, la cual se viene editando desde
1960, y al año 2022, posee publicados 260 números. Al respecto, se puede señalar que
es una publicación de carácter cuatrimestral, y cuenta con criterios de publicación y un
consejo editorial, del cual todos sus miembros son miembros activos de las FF.AA., o en
situación de retiro. En este punto, se puede señalar que debido a la naturaleza de la
revista, es una publicación que mantiene ciertos criterios académicos, pero que por su
estructura e historia, mantiene una mayor apreciación a ser considerada como una
revista institucional. Ambas publicaciones poseen ISSN.
La ADEMIC en Ecuador, de acuerdo a su sitio web institucional, evidencia una publicación,
la cual es la revista Pensamiento Estratégico. Esta revista, si bien en un principio puede
ser considerada bajo criterios académicos, como el caso de poseer una estructura
editorial como un director y un comité, la totalidad de los integrantes son oficiales de las
FF.AA. en servicio activo. Posee una regularidad anual de publicación y no se encuentra
indexada. Al mismo tiempo, no posee criterios para la publicación de artículos para
cualquier persona que se dedique a investigar temáticas relacionadas. Y sin perjuicio de
que la publicación se encuentre disponible de forma abierta, esta revista no puede
considerarse como una obra académica como tal, ya que no hay mención sobre la
evaluación de los artículos por pares ciegos, lo que daría como consecuencia que la
misma sea más cercana a ser tomada en cuenta como una revista institucional. A modo
de complemento, la revista Pensamiento Estratégico no cuenta con un ISSN asignado.
El CAEN de Perú posee dos publicaciones: la revista Cuadernos de Trabajo, y la Revista
de Ciencia e Investigación en Defensa – CAEN. Como se señala en el sitio web
institucional, Cuadernos de Trabajo es una publicación que busca la difusión del
conocimiento científico, dentro de las diferentes áreas de trabajo que plantea la
institución. En este sentido, la mencionada revista se encuentra abierta al público para
que efectúen sus contribuciones, pero haciendo un especial énfasis en la comunidad
académica nacional como a invitados especiales. En su estructura, posee un director y
un editor, pero no se evidencia la existencia de un comité editorial o científico ni tampoco
de un ISSN. Tampoco se encuentra ubicada en algún criterio de indexación, ni posee una
periodicidad clara en términos de publicación. Pero pese a aquello, la revista posee una
estructura y normas editoriales definidas desde su primer número, el cual fue publicado
en 2020.
Mientras que la Revista de Ciencia e Investigación en Defensa trabaja tópicos similares
dentro del campo de la seguridad y Defensa, con una periodicidad cuatrimestral. Posee
un equipo editorial conformado por un editor jefe, un editor académico y editores
asociados, en conjunto con un comité asesor. Se viene publicando desde el 2019,
mantiene la cualidad de ser abierta al público, posee un ISSN y se encuentra indexada
en Latindex.
Con respecto a la dimensión en torno a los procesos de formación y capacitación
disponible a civiles, solamente la ADEMIC en Ecuador no posee aquel espacio. El resto
de los Colegios de Defensa analizados mantiene programas donde se forma y capacita a
civiles, en las diversas áreas vinculadas a la seguridad y la Defensa. Sin embargo, los
programas ofertados por la ESDEG en Colombia y el CAEN en Perú son cuantitativamente
mayores, en comparación a la ANEPE en Chile. Y en este plano, un punto a destacar es
que estas tres instituciones ofertan programas para civiles, que no guardan una relación
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Mayo-Octobre 2023), pp. 69-86
La educación en defensa: un análisis comparado entre los colegios de defensa
de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
Lester Cabrera Toledo
79
directa con los tópicos clásicos de seguridad y Defensa. Un ejemplo de aquello es que
ANEPE oferta un Diplomado en Toma de Decisiones Complejas para el ámbito público y
privado; la ESDEG oferta un Diplomado en Dirección de Organizaciones Sociales y un
Diplomado de Familia; y el CAEN un Diplomado en Administración y Gestión Pública.
Cuadro No. 7: Niveles de formación y programas en ANEPE Chile
Cursos regulares
- Conducción Política Estratégica y Defensa
Diplomado *
- Técnicas de Análisis de Inteligencia
- Toma de Decisiones Complejas para el Ámbito Público y Privado
- Ciberseguridad
Licenciatura
- Seguridad y Defensa
Magister
- Seguridad, Defensa y Relaciones Internacionales
- Inteligencia Estratégica
Doctorado
- Seguridad y Defensa
Cabe señalar que la ANEPE publica en su sitio web la planificación semestral de sus programas
de Diplomado. Los señalados corresponden al primer y segundo semestre del 2022
Fuente: elaboración propia
En relación con los niveles de formación y capacitación, la ANEPE en Chile es la única
institución que oferta la totalidad de los segmentos analizados, desde cursos regulares
exclusivamente para oficiales de las FF.AA., así como diplomados, y los diferentes niveles
de formación académica (licenciatura, magister/maestría y doctorado). Pero tanto la
ESDEG como el CAEN, a diferencia de su par chileno, poseen una mayor oferta en los
niveles de formación y capacitación. La ADEMIC en Ecuador posee 3 cursos de formación,
los cuales son exclusivos para oficiales pertenecientes a las FF.AA., aunque en los últimos
años, se puede apreciar una inclusión de oficiales de la Policía Nacional, especialmente
en el curso de Estado Mayor Conjunto. Los programas y su nivel por cada uno de los
Colegios de Defensa se detallan a continuación.
Cuadro No. 8: Niveles de formación y programas en ESDEG Colombia
Cursos regulares
- Altos Estudios Militares
- Estado Mayor
- Información Militar
- Avanzado de Información Militar para Profesionales Oficiales de Reserva
- Información Militar para Profesionares Oficiales de Reserva
- Integral de Defensa Nacional para Oficiales del Cuerpo Administrativo
- Agregados Militares
Diplomado
- Dirección de Organizaciones Sociales de Família
- Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa
- Logística Conjunta
Maestría
- Seguridad y Defensa Nacionales
- Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional de los Conflictos Armados
- Estrategia y Geopolítica
- Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa
Doctorado
- Estudios Estrategicos, Seguridad y Defensa
Fuente: elaboración propia
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80
Cuadro No. 9: Niveles de formación y programas en ADEMIC Ecuador
Cursos regulares
- Estado Mayor Conjunto
- Analistas de Inteligencia
- Operaciones de Información
Fuente: elaboración propia
Cuadro No. 10: Niveles de formación y programas en CAEN Perú
Diplomado
- Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres
- Administración y Gestión Pública
- Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa
Maestría
- Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Resolución de conflictos
- Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres
- Desarrollo y Defensa Nacional
- Ciberseguridad y Ciberdefensa com mención en Transformación Digital
- Administración y Gestión Pública com mención en Defensa Nacional
- Inteligencia Estratégica
Doctorado
- Desarrollo y Seguridad Estratégica
- Políticas Públicas y Gestión del Estado
Fuente: elaboración propia
La conformación de CEE es un aspecto que solamente se puede evidenciar en los casos
de la ANEPE en Chile y la ESDEG en Colombia. La ANEPE cuenta con el Centro de
Investigaciones y Estudios Estratégicos (CIEE), el cual tiene como objetivo administrar
el sistema de investigaciones de la institución, así como brindar asesoría a los diferentes
niveles de la administración pública en las temáticas que le competen. También tiene a
su cargo el proceso editorial de las diferentes publicaciones, incluyendo libros
especializados y la revista Política y Estrategia. Cuenta con una estructura donde se
aprecia una jefatura, encargados de procesos tales como administración y publicaciones,
estudios estratégicos, e investigación, y diferentes investigadores asociados al mismo.
Mientras que la ESDEG posee dos CEE: el Centro Regional de Estudios Estratégicos en
Seguridad (CREES), y el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos sobre Seguridad y Defensa
Nacionales (CSEDN). El CREES se enfoca en temáticas vinculadas al quehacer regional,
especialmente en el crimen organizado transnacional y la geoeconomía. Sirve de espacio
de discusión entre los diferentes organismos e instituciones que posean interés con
respecto a los tópicos de seguridad y Defensa; no obstante, no se observa su estructura
organizacional ni datos de contacto, aunque si evidencia una serie de vínculos
internacionales con instituciones similares. Mientras que por otro lado, se tiene al CSEDN,
el cual plantea ser un organismo que realiza investigación en el campo de la seguridad y
la Defensa, para así poder brindar una asesoría dentro de los diferentes procesos de
toma de decisiones, especialmente al Ministerio de Defensa. Pero al igual que el CREES,
tampoco se observan datos de contacto ni su estructura organizacional.
3. Discusión
Uno de los primeros aspectos que se destacan al momento de visualizar los contenidos,
materias y tópicos que son parte de la enseñanza de lo que comprende por seguridad y
Defensa en los Colegios de Defensa analizados, es posible apreciar que más allá de los
elementos y cualidades particulares que se dan, especialmente debido a las cualidades
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únicas de los contextos nacionales de cada país, es que existe una suerte de tendencia
a homogenizar los procesos y contenidos. Estos van desde los elementos que son
analizados dentro de los cursos y programas ofrecidos, como por ejemplo temas
asociados a la ciberdefensa, hasta la forma en cómo los Colegios de Defensa se proyectan
hacia el resto de la sociedad. Al respecto, es posible señalar que una serie de informes,
que permiten graficar la realidad seguritaria de la región (CEIUC, 2023), son insumos
que generan diversos diagnósticos sobre las amenazas comunes o mayormente
reflejadas en las realidades de los diferentes países. En este sentido, el crimen organizado
transnacional, el narcotráfico, los delitos informáticos, e incluso la migración ilegal
masiva (CEIUC, 2023), son procesos que son posible de reconocer y evidenciar como
parte del análisis, al interior de los programas académicos de los Colegios de Defensa, lo
que a su vez da cuenta de una suerte de homogeneización en cuanto a los contenidos
tratados, aunque siempre marcando diferencias como resultado de la ubicación
geográfica, la propia legislación, e incluso el impacto, directo o indirecto, de dichos
fenómenos en la seguridad de los países analizados.
Otro de los aspectos que pueden ser resaltados dentro de la discusión sobre las
dimensiones analizados, es el hecho de que en la totalidad de los Colegios de Defensa
analizados, se observa que la mayoría actúa entendiéndose como un organismo bisagra
entre las FF.AA. y el ámbito civil, que todos buscan dar a conocer sus líneas de trabajo y
temas de preocupación por medio de publicaciones, al tiempo que buscan generar
procesos de formación desde una noción que involucre el aspecto profesional y
académico. Sin embargo, el hecho de ser considerados como puntos de encuentro entre
el ámbito civil y el sector militar o propio de las FF.AA., no necesariamente es un
indicativo que dicha conjunción tenga un resultado efectivo, que se pueda visualizar en
proyectos de investigación con valor de uso, o incluso la inclusión de visiones diferentes
y que finalmente se plasmen en iniciativas de política pública y/o estrategias, siempre
enfocándose en el ámbito seguritario o de Defensa. Dentro de la condición y cualidad
académica de los Colegios de Defensa analizados, en la mayoría de los casos, es donde
se produce la vinculación y discusión entre los ámbitos mencionados.
La excepción a lo previamente mencionados, así como también dentro de las dimensiones
analizadas para los Colegios de Defensa, pasa por el caso ecuatoriano, debido a que los
únicos aspectos que comparte con los otros Colegios de Defensa son que, en primer
término, otorga cursos regulares para los Oficiales de las FF.AA.; en segundo lugar, que
posee la denominación de “Colegio de Defensa”; y finalmente, que posee una revista
institucional con segmentos académicos. Este fenómeno puede ser explicado desde tres
perspectivas: la existencia de otras instituciones que se yuxtaponen con el quehacer
esperado de un Colegio de Defensa dentro del país; los constantes cambios
organizacionales; y la propia naturaleza de la ADEMIC, al momento de considerar los
ascensos y jerarquías dentro de las mismas FF.AA. ecuatorianas.
La realidad institucional ecuatoriana en el ámbito de la Defensa, da cuenta de que posee
la Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas, antes llamada Escuela Politécnica del Ejército
(ESPE), la que dentro de su organización cuenta con un Departamento de Seguridad y
Defensa, el cual si bien hasta diciembre de 2022 no oferta cursos ni programas de
formación abiertos a la comunidad, si mantiene una planta docente que le permite
gestionar ciertos cursos institucionales obligatorios para todas las carreras de la
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universidad. Posee también una publicación científica con comité editorial e indexada en
Latindex Directorio, la Revista de Ciencias de Seguridad y Defensa. Y además, la propia
universidad encuentra dentro de su estructura al Centro de Estudios y Pensamiento
Estratégico (CESPE), el cual genera una serie de documentos relacionados al quehacer
de la seguridad y la Defensa nacional, disponibles por medio de su sitio web
3
. Estos
elementos plantean una suerte de yuxtaposición de labores y competencias dentro de la
institucionalidad de la Defensa ecuatoriana dentro de las dimensiones analizadas.
Un segundo aspecto va de la mano con la inestabilidad dentro de la propia ADEMIC. El
organismo, a lo largo de los últimos 10 años, ha tenido 3 denominaciones diferentes,
planteando una dificultad tanto nominal como de fondo en la identidad misma de la
institución. Al momento de señalar la primera modificación, es decir de Instituto Nacional
de Guerra (INAGUE) a Instituto Nacional de Defensa (INADE), la argumentación fue hacia
la valoración que tenía el gobierno de turno, a modificar la noción de seguridad del país,
lo que equivalía a otorgar una significación de la palabra “guerra” como una acción
agresiva, que no se conjugaba con las nociones propuestas dentro del concepto de
seguridad integral (Cabrera, 2019). Pero lo anterior no solamente pasa por una
nomenclatura, sino que también por el hecho de una eventual modificación en la
concepción doctrinaria del sector Defensa. Así, el último cambio de denominación, que
es la actual, acoge los elementos de Defensa, pero realza la visión de “lo conjunto”,
implicando nuevamente una readecuación los procesos mencionados.
Y finalmente, se aprecia que el principal rol que tiene la ADEMIC, dentro de la estructura
misma del sistema de Defensa del Ecuador, es la formación y capacitación de los oficiales
que serán considerados para un ascenso al grado de generales y almirantes, en conjunto
con otros cursos conjuntos más asociados al campo de la especialización, pero siempre
planteados de forma exclusiva al personal militar y la oficialidad. En este sentido, la
ADEMIC posee un papel principalmente enfocado hacia la generación y construcción de
capacidades y competencias en el ámbito político-estratégico de los futuros generales y
almirantes del país (Andrade, 2021), lo que le hace ser más cercano a una escuela de
formación, que a un verdadero Colegio de Defensa, incluyendo en este segmento a la
totalidad de las dimensiones en la que representa, por sí sola, una excepción a la realidad
que se evidencia en el resto de las instituciones analizadas.
Otro punto a considerar es la formación de civiles en seguridad y Defensa. Tres de los
cuatro casos analizados establecen cursos y áreas en donde los civiles son capacitados
en temáticas vinculadas a los estudios estratégicos en términos generales. La relevancia
pasa por el hecho de las cualidades que dichas áreas de formación poseen: se puede
evidenciar una clara tendencia a la homologación de la formación de civiles, con los
cursos impartidos en centros de educación superior, visualizándose en la capacidad para
otorgar títulos y grados académicos, desde el propio nivel de licenciatura hasta
doctorado. No obstante, el principal fundamento de aquello sería la formación de una
masa crítica de civiles que puedan acceder a determinados puestos de toma de decisión,
con un especial énfasis dentro del propio sistema de seguridad y Defensa de los países
en cuestión, pero también considerando otros centros de educación superior y diferentes
segmentos de la burocracia pública.
3
Véase al respecto https://cespe.espe.edu.ec/.
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En términos generales, al momento de observar la pertenencia y ubicación de los
Colegios de Defensa, dentro del esquema institucional al interior de los respectivos
países, es posible evidenciar que existe una directa relación, de carácter orgánica, con la
propia institucionalidad de la Defensa, especialmente como parte del nivel político-
estratégico. Esto podría interpretarse como uno de los principales vínculos, en términos
identitarios, de que las organizaciones en su conjunto posean aquella cualidad para ser
consideradas como Colegios de Defensa, en directo detrimento de otros organismos que
pueden tener funciones y roles relativamente similares. No obstante aquello, el hecho de
que se posea aquella vinculación de carácter político-administrativo con el sector
Defensa, no necesariamente implica que se posea una comunicación fluida, o bien que
se le otorgue un espacio dentro del proceso de toma de decisión a los Colegios de
Defensa, especialmente al momento de señalar el diseño o puesta en práctica de la
política de Defensa o seguridad de un país en particular.
Asimismo, puede señalarse que el punto más complejo de interpretar en términos de
comparación, es el relativo a la existencia de los CEE, los cuales pueden apreciarse de
forma explícita, en dos de los cuatro casos. Pero incluso dentro de dicha dimensión, la
cualidad, utilización, fines y estructura de dichos centros no queda claro, dejando un
espacio de subjetividad con respecto a la real utilidad de dichas estructuras dentro del
organigrama y composición de los Colegios de Defensa. En algunos casos, como en el
ámbito de la ESDEG en Colombia, los dos CEE plantean la realización de una labor en
torno a la asesoría y de promoción y desarrollo de determinadas líneas de investigación,
que se encuentran en línea con los objetivos generales y específicos del Colegio de
Defensa respectivo, pero no plantean la generación de actividades puntuales, ni tampoco
algún tipo de procesos específicos en los cuales hayan prestado servicios. El caso más
explícito de sus actividades es el CEE de la ANEPE en Chile, el cual permite apreciar su
participación de múltiples de sus integrantes, y desde un punto de vista orgánico-
institucional, en diversos segmentos, ya sea al interior de la propia ANEPE, como también
en ámbitos externos al Colegio de Defensa. Ejemplos de lo anterior es la participación,
como CEE, en sesiones de comisiones a nivel parlamentario, como en la propia gestión
de concursos de investigación, los cuales se encuentran abiertos a la comunidad en
general.
En torno a las publicaciones, si bien es cierto que la mayoría de los Colegios de Defensa
analizados, con algún tipo de revista que se enmarque dentro de determinados
parámetros académicos, nuevamente dejando de lado la excepcionalidad ecuatoriana,
cabe tomar en cuenta que el CAEN de Perú posee dos revistas, las que tienen una
organización que les permitiría situarles dentro de una categorización o estandarización
de indexación. Y es en este último punto, es decir las indexaciones, donde es posible
visualizar que ninguna publicación, posee un alto criterio de indexación, como es el caso
de contar con una revista en Scopus o Scimago, privilegiando en este sentido criterios
más regionales, como lo es Latindex, Dialnet o Scielo. Así también, dentro de la
constitución de los Comités Editoriales, se puede observar que existe un alto número de
oficiales, que son parte de la institución, que efectúan labores en ellos. Este es un punto
de alta complejidad, especialmente por la propia condición y característica de la
oficialidad, teniendo en cuenta su rotación y diferentes puestos y cargos que deben
desempeñar dentro de la vida militar, lo que determinaría una suerte de vacancia en
aquel puesto, en determinados momentos.
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Al momento de analizar la diversidad y contenidos dentro de los diferentes programas
académicos, uno de los puntos que mayormente llaman la atención en los Colegios de
Defensa previamente indicados, con la excepción de la ADEMIC en Ecuador, es la
inclusión de un área fundamental, especialmente al momento de señalar una bisagra
entre el ámbito de la Defensa, desde el punto de vista académico, y la institucionalización
o puesta en práctica de diferentes preceptos y lineamientos que, si bien pueden ser
discutidos previamente, requieren un estudio técnico y una posterior socialización: el
ámbito de las políticas públicas. En este sentido, resulta de alta relevancia, y un potencial
mecanismo de inclusión dentro de las discusiones en el segmento estatal y estratégico
de los países que poseen aquel direccionamiento, especialmente en temáticas que
representan una potencial amenaza, y que son compartidas por otros países dentro de
la realidad seguritaria, especialmente dentro del contexto regional (Cubides, 2014; Ávila,
2012).
Otro de los puntos que se pueden observar en la mayoría de los casos de los Colegios de
Defensa analizados, es que la totalidad de dichas instituciones cuentan con una amplia
oferta académica, tomando en cuenta los niveles de formación, especialmente en el
ámbito de postgrado. En este sentido, se puede observar que existe una tendencia hacia
el incremento con respecto a la oferta de los cursos ofrecidos, pero siempre cuidando de
tener una apreciación sobre una priorización en torno al nivel de Maestría/Magister, como
también en el ámbito de los diplomados, especialmente en lo concerniente a la
renovación de la oferta, como también a la ampliación de la misma. No obstante, aquella
situación no necesariamente es una evidencia de que los otros programas, especialmente
para el caso de los doctorados, no tengan una relevancia, sino que al contrario. Los
programas de doctorados poseen una alta relevancia dentro de la oferta académica
dentro de los Colegios de Defensa, tanto por el grado de especialización que plantean
dentro de aquellos procesos académicos, como por el hecho de las diferentes instancias
de vinculación con la sociedad que aquellos programas manifiestan, especialmente en
términos de eventos y difusión del conocimiento que los mismos representan.
Conclusiones
Es un hecho que dentro del análisis de la comparación en torno a las dimensiones
seleccionadas con respecto a los Colegios de Defensa de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú,
uno de los aspectos que mayormente resalta, es que dentro de los programas
académicos, las revistas, e incluso la inclusión de civiles a los ámbitos de la seguridad y
Defensa, estas instituciones tienen una fuerte tendencia a aunar y homologar criterios,
tanto en la forma como en el fondo de los mismos. Este aspecto puede ser uno de los
principales elementos que permita la construcción de bases para un eventual
acercamiento entre las partes, especialmente en la generación de potenciales programas
de intercambio, dando pie incluso para la construcción de medidas de confianza mutua y
un mayor grado de cooperación.
Al respecto, y visualizando los contenidos generales en los programas académicos de los
Colegios de Defensa, se aprecia que la temática clásica de la Defensa, aplicada desde
una noción estratégica y militar, ya no ocupa un espacio monolítico. Aspectos tales como
la gestión de riesgos, la toma de decisiones, o la dimensión ciber, son áreas de trabajo
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e investigación que se van repitiendo, generando que la función Defensa de los países
vaya en línea con los fenómenos y agendas internacionales de seguridad, tanto a nivel
de medios como de los actores involucrados.
La excepción recae en la realidad que se evidencia en Ecuador. La ADEMIC, si bien es
considerada como un Colegio de Defensa, no estaría cumpliendo con los criterios y
estándares que los otros Colegios poseen, ya que en todas las dimensiones planteadas,
dicha institución marca una diferencia con respecto a sus pares. Esto daría a entender
que la clasificación de la ADEMIC como Colegio de Defensa pasa por algo nominal, mas
no necesariamente por la valoración y condición misma de la institución dentro del área
de la Defensa. Al respecto, cabría efectuar un análisis y reflexión crítica sobre el valor
efectivo de dicha institución como Colegio de Defensa, en comparación con otros
organismos que comparten cualidades con las citadas instituciones, dentro del resto de
los países analizados.
Finalmente, cabe señalar que si bien la investigación tiene un enfoque netamente
descriptivo, especialmente derivado de fuentes abiertas, también permite establecer una
agenda relativamente nueva sobre este tipo de enfoques y estudios, especialmente
dentro de la realidad de América Latina. En este sentido, la construcción de indicadores
para reconocer el grado efectivo de influencia e incidencia que las labores de dichos
Colegios de Defensa poseen, especialmente dentro de la planificación de la función de
Defensa en sus respectivos países, así como también el grado de inclusión en temas de
género, o civiles formados en dichas instituciones, que se encuentren trabajando dentro
de las estructuras y niveles organizacionales de la Defensa. Ciertamente la agenda de
los Colegios de Defensa en la región, tomando en cuenta la multiplicidad de enfoques y
áreas que se ven afectadas en términos de seguridad, y la tendencia a incluir al ámbito
de la Defensa en dichas labores, son aspectos que ponen una priorización sobre el papel
y rol que dichos Colegios de Defensa deben cumplir a la sociedad a la cual se deben,
tanto como aporte, como en una necesaria y constante renovación y actualización de
conocimientos.
Referencias
Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (2021). Memoria Institucional
2021. Santiago: ANEPE.
Alda, Sonia. (2018). “Los desafíos de América Latina para proyectarse como actor
regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional”. Revista Relaciones Internacionales,
Estrategia y Seguridad, 13(1): 35-66.
Andrade, Miguel. (2021). “Doctrina y estructura militar ecuatoriana: de cara o de
espaldas a las amenazas del siglo XXI”. URVIO. Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de
Seguridad, 29: 109-121.
Ávila, Ariel. (2012). “Crimen organizado, narcotráfico y seguridad”. En Crimen
organizado y gobernanza en la región andina: cooperar o fracasar (29-40). Quito: FES
ILDIS.
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de Chile, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
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Buzan, Barry. y Wæver, Ole. (2009). “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations:
reconsidering scale in securitisation theory”. Review of International Studies, 35(2): 253–
276.
Cabrera, Lester. (2019). “La Seguridad Integral en Ecuador: una visión crítica al concepto
a una década de su concepción”. Revista UNISCI, 51: 397-416.
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Santiago: CEIUC.
Cubides, Olga. (2014). “La violencia del narcotráfico en los países de mayor producción
de coca: los casos de Perú y Colombia”. Papel Político 19 (2): 657-690.
González, Marco. y Mattar, Salim. (2010). “¿Formato IMRaD o IMRyD para artículos
científicos?”. Revista MVZ Córdoba, 15(1): 1895-1896.
Kacowicz, Arie. y Mares, David. (2016). “Security studies and security in Latin America:
the first 200 years”. En Kacowicz, Arie y Mares, David (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of
Latin American Security. New York: Routledge, pp. 11-30.
Méndez, Marco. (2017). “Prácticas de seguridad en América durante la Posguerra Fría
(1992-2010): ¿Complejos Regionales o Comunidades pluralistas de Seguridad?”. Revista
de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, 12 (1): 75-102.
Thies, Cameron. (2016). “Traditional Security: War and Peace. En Kacowicz, Arie y
Mares”, David (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security. New York:
Routledge, pp. 113–126.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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87
O DESFASAMENTO ENTRE POLÍTICA E ESTRATÉGIA MILITAR: UMA ANÁLISE
AO IRAQUE (2006-2007) E AFEGANISTÃO (2009)
LUÍS BARROSO
barrosolfm@gmail.com
Coronel Tirocinado do Exército Português (Portugal) e professor de Estratégia e História Militar no
IUM. Qualificado com o Curso de Estado-Maior pelo IAEM; Qualificado com o Curso de Estado-
Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas de España. Doutor em História, Defesa e Relações Internacionais
pelo ISCTE-IUL. Investigador no Centro de Estudos Internacionais do ISCTE-IUL
Resumo
Compreender o desfasamento originado pela atividade civil-militar e seus efeitos na estratégia
é um contributo essencial para a prática da estratégia. Partindo da análise de casos de valor
intrínseco para esta investigação, avalia-se a prática da estratégia para demonstrar que o
desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar resulta do facto de a guerra, como variável
dependente da política, assumir variações imprevisíveis, que obriga a que a estratégia, como
variável interveniente e como atividade resultante das relações civis-militares, seja definida
como teoria do sucesso. Este argumento está baseado em três explicações para a existência
daquele desfasamento: (1) a natureza da guerra influencia a natureza e a eficácia da
estratégia militar, porque os atores envolvidos atuam num ambiente de imprevisibilidade; (2)
a estabilidade e a coerência da relação entre política e guerra, materializada na prática da
estratégia militar, obriga a considerar que a razão da estratégia é o sucesso; (3) a eficácia
das relações civis-militares é determinante para diminuir as tensões naturais entre a ação
política e a ação militar. Conclui-se que a estratégia militar, como resultado do domínio das
relações civis-militares, segue as dinâmicas da complexa relação entre política e guerra.
Palavras-chave
Guerra; política; estratégia militar; relações civis-militares
Abstract
Understanding the gap caused by civil-military activity and its effects on strategy is essential
to the practice of strategy. Based on the analysis of cases of intrinsic value, the practice of
strategy is assessed to show that the discrepancy between politics and military strategy
results from the fact that war, as a policy-dependent variable, assumes unpredictable
variations, meaning that strategy, as an intervening variable and as an activity resulting from
civil-military relations, must be defined as a theory of success. The argument is based on
three explanations for the existence of that gap: (1) the nature of war influences the nature
and effectiveness of military strategy, because the actors involved in the process act in an
environment of great unpredictability; (2) the stability and coherence of the relationship
between politics and war, embodied in the practice of military strategy, makes it necessary
to consider the purpose of strategy is success; (3) the effectiveness of civil-military relations
is crucial to reducing the natural tensions between politics and military action. It is concluded
that military strategy because of civil-military relations follows the dynamics of the complex
relationship between politics and war.
Keywords
War; politics; military strategy; civil-military relations
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 87-105
O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
uma análise ao Iraque (2006-2007) e Afeganistão (2009)
Luís Barroso
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Como citar este artigo
Barroso, Luís (2023). O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar: uma análise ao Iraque
(2006-2007) e Afeganistão (2009). Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1, Maio-
Outubro 2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última consulta, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.14.1.6
Artigo recebido em 26 de Julho de 2022, aceite para publicação em 4 de Março de 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
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O DESFASAMENTO ENTRE POLÍTICA E ESTRATÉGIA MILITAR:
UMA ANÁLISE AO IRAQUE (2006-2007) E AFEGANISTÃO (2009)
LUÍS BARROSO
Introdução
O objetivo deste texto é avaliar a relação entre política e estratégia militar para
compreender que fatores contribuem para o desfasamento entre objetivos políticos e
ação militar em situação de guerra
1
. Os últimos 30 anos revelam que o Ocidente tem
tido uma “deficiente performance estratégica” (Osinga, 2021), porque tem sido difícil
converter o sucesso militar de nível tático em objetivos políticos. A implementação da
estratégia militar, como processo distintivo que liga a política às operações militares, é
muito mais exigente do que aparenta a teoria. O desfasamento entre política e estratégia
militar evidencia-se quando a ligação entre tática e política é quebrada, quando os
objetivos militares perdem relação com a política, ou quando o sucesso depende de
opções militares que não são exequíveis ou adequadas para solucionar o problema
político-estratégico. Para além da incerteza e fricção, inerentes à ação militar devidas à
natureza da guerra, muitos outros fatores emergem da luta política interna, das
personalidades envolvidas, da existência de coligações e alianças políticas e militares que
contribuem para aumentar o desfasamento natural entre política e ação militar.
A estratégia militar pode também não ser possível de implementar, porque o que
acontece no intervalo entre a política e a guerra é demasiado complexo e imprevisível
para ser teorizado (Betts, 2000). A tentativa de desenvolver uma teoria universalmente
aceite tem sido frustrada pela inerente imprevisibilidade dos assuntos militares e pela
ainda maior imprevisibilidade dos assuntos políticos (Freedman, 2013: 242), pelo que a
prática da estratégia militar é sempre a questão mais problemática (Strachan, 2019:
187-188). Mais do que a fórmula “Ends+Ways+Means” (Lykke Jr., 1989), a estratégia
militar é uma arte da política para criar poder, que entra em ação quando a situação que
se enfrenta é instável e imprevisível (Freedman, 2013: 617), devendo ser definida como
“teoria do sucesso” (Cohen, 2002: 33; Meiser, 2017: 86-87), uma vez que é o sucesso
que determina se a estratégia foi bem concebida e implementada.
1
Utiliza-se o termo “guerra” para referir as intervenções militares em que o resultado tem relação direta com
a eficácia do potencial de combate: situações em que há pelo menos um oponente; em que o emprego da
força pressupõe uma estratégia a implementar; a violência é opção para cumprir objetivos políticos; a ação
militar é governada pela política que impõe objetivos ou mandatos; a violência é legal, ou pelo menos aceite
pela maioria da comunidade que nela participa; e é uma atividade coletiva (Creveld, 2017: 50-51).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
uma análise ao Iraque (2006-2007) e Afeganistão (2009)
Luís Barroso
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O problema da eficácia da estratégia militar em situações de conflito tem sido
amplamente debatido para discutir se a sua definição é ou não suficiente para a realidade
contemporânea (Webb, 2019; Meiser, 2017; Freedman, 2013); se é ou não uma ilusão
(Betts, 2000), na medida em que o sucesso de uma estratégia depende de um tão
elevado número de fatores de ordem política (Kiszely, 2018; Payne, 2020; Jacobson,
2010), que obriga a considerar uma clara separação entre teoria e prática (Strachan,
2019); ou por motivos do ambiente das relações civis-militares (Brooks, 2008; Kohn,
2009; Travis, 2017; Owens, 2012). A ligação entre as relações civis-militares e eficácia
militar não tem merecido atenção suficiente (Nielsen, Civil-Military Relations Theory and
Military Efectiveness, 2002), mas parece ser cada vez mais um assunto relevante, uma
vez que parecem ter mais influência na derrota ou vitória do que as vantagens materiais
(Narang & Talmadge, 2018).
Compreender as razões do desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar, para além do
resultado natural da fricção da ação tática, permite avançar possíveis soluções para o
minimizar e contribui para o desenvolvimento da teoria da estratégia militar como
atividade resultante das relações civis-militares. Para o objetivo deste texto, avança-se
com o argumento de que o desfasamento entre a política e a estratégia militar emerge
do facto de a guerra, como variável dependente da política, assumir variações
imprevisíveis resultantes daquela relação e da sua natureza, que obriga a que a
estratégia militar, como variável interveniente e como atividade resultante das relações
civis-militares, seja orientada ao sucesso. O argumento combina a importância da
definição de estratégia militar como "teoria do sucesso" com a relevância das relações
civis-militares, cuja lógica está baseada em três explicações para a existência do
desfasamento entre a política e a ação militar no terreno. Na primeira, considera-se que
a natureza da guerra influencia a natureza e a eficácia da estratégia militar, porque os
atores envolvidos no domínio da política e da estratégia atuam num ambiente de grande
imprevisibilidade e complexidade, o que propicia o desfasamento natural entre os
objetivos políticos e o resultado da prática da estratégia. Desta forma, as decisões de
nível político e militar devem-na ter em conta na medida em que os resultados são
sempre diferentes do esperado e a estratégia tem constantemente de se adaptar. A
segunda, considera que a estabilidade e a coerência da relação entre política e guerra,
materializada na prática da estratégia militar, obriga a que o processo de conceção e
implementação da estratégia seja um processo político-militar iterativo. Desta forma, ao
adotar-se o conceito de estratégia como “teoria do sucesso” que depende da interação
entre os níveis de decisão político-militar reduz-se a tensão resultante da definição de
objetivos, conceção, implementação e avaliação de resultados da estratégia. A terceira,
resulta da evidência de que a estratégia militar, como “negócio pragmático”, é o resultado
das relações civis-militares, cuja eficácia é determinante para diminuir as tensões
naturais entre os níveis político e militar. Utilizam-se casos de “importância intrínseca”
para o objeto de estudo (Evera, 1997: 86-87), como os recentes casos do Iraque (2006-
2007) e do Afeganistão (2009) em que se evidencia tensão entre as lideranças políticas
e as lideranças militares. Outros exemplos são também mencionados para reforçar o
poder explicativo do argumento proposto.
A organização do texto segue a lógica da construção do argumento. Inicialmente,
caracteriza-se a ontologia da guerra e a natureza da estratégia militar, de forma a avaliar
como se influenciam e perceber se a atual definição responde aos desafios da natureza
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 87-105
O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
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da guerra, com o objetivo de servir como referência para a análise a efetuar nos casos
selecionados. Seguidamente, analisa-se os dados relativos às campanhas militares
selecionadas para apoiar o argumento, fazendo relevar os fatores que compõem algumas
das dinâmicas da relação entre a política e estratégia militar em situação de conflito que
contribuem para o alargamento do desfasamento natural entre política e ação militar.
Consequentemente, avalia-se a importância das relações civis-militares no desfasamento
entre política e estratégia militar. A opção de individualizar as relações civis-militares
decorre da importância que este domínio tem na prática da estratégia militar. Conclui-se
que a estratégia militar, como resultado do domínio das relações civis-militares, segue
as dinâmicas da relação entre política e guerra.
1. Natureza da Guerra e Natureza da Estratégia Militar: a base conceitual
A guerra tem sido adjetivada sob inúmeros rótulos, como guerra convencional, guerrilha,
guerra civil (Hendersson & Singer, 2000; Mello, 2010), e até agrupadas como “novas
guerras” (Kaldor, 2006; Creveld, 1991; Holsti, 1996; Hammes, 2004; Smith, 2005),
embora poucos se tenham debruçado sobre a sua natureza e sobre como o seu poder
gerador molda a vida social e política (Barkawi & Brighton, 2011). Não obstante a
classificação, o combate é o elemento unificador das várias perspetivas e o verdadeiro
teste para a estratégia militar e para a política, sendo a única força eficaz na guerra e
tudo o que acontece “deriva originalmente do combate” (Clausewitz, 1984: 95, 97). Com
efeitos imprevisíveis em tudo o que toca, distorce a razão, o conhecimento, a verdade,
torna quase impossível prever resultados e instala uma ordem da qual ninguém se pode
distanciar (Levinas, 1980: 9-10). É o combate que une a guerra, na generalidade e no
particular, e nenhuma ontologia o pode ignorar (Barkawi & Brighton, 2011: 135-137). A
centralidade do combate no pensamento estratégico ocidental tem raízes em Clausewitz
e na relevância da vitória militar tática (Newland, 2005).
O efeito disruptivo do combate sobre a ordem existente estabelece uma ligação íntima
entre a sociedade e a guerra, que vai para além da violência do combate, como se de
um excesso se tratasse. Este é a capacidade de a violência ser geradora de lógicas
sociopolíticas para além das dos contendores (Barkawi & Brighton, 2011: 136). A guerra
tem características únicas que podem gerar resultados contraditórios em relação aos
objetivos esperados. Ela escapa ao controlo dos interesses racionais, arrasta toda a
sociedade e impõe limites à racionalidade estratégica (Shaw, 2010: 7-11). Se a guerra
molda as relações sociais em que está inserida, então está presente muito para além da
frente de batalha e do momento em que está a ser combatida, sendo geradora de
mudanças nas relações sociais, económicas culturais, entre outras, após o seu termo
(Barkawi & Brighton, 2011: 132).
A incerteza é uma outra característica definidora da complexa relação entre a essência
do combate, a lógica político-estratégica e os efeitos do seu “excesso” na ordem político-
social. Tal como Clausewitz refere, a incerteza é um dos principais obstáculos ao
conhecimento (Clausewitz, 1984: 113) e à formulação de uma teoria positiva da guerra,
que obriga a confiar no talento e na sorte, porque o génio militar e o talento operam fora
das regras estabelecidas (Clausewitz, 1984: 140). Como problema especial, a incerteza
é um problema da e na guerra (Clausewitz, 1984: 140), porque é único, recorrente e
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inevitável. Por conseguinte, a incerteza deve também ser tida em conta como parte
integrante da ontologia da guerra, que torna tão difícil prever o seu excesso e com o qual
o cálculo político-estratégico tem de lidar.
Assim, em que medida a ontologia da guerra influencia a definição e a natureza da
estratégia militar? Para Coutau-Bégarie (2008: 75) a estratégia é a “dialética de
inteligências” em ambiente conflitual baseada na utilização ou ameaça de utilização da
força para os fins da política. Para Couto (2020: 227) a estratégia é a “ciência a arte de
desenvolver e utilizar as forças materiais e morais de uma unidade política ou coligação,
a fim de se atingirem objetivos políticos que suscitam, ou podem suscitar, a hostilidade
de uma vontade política”. Das definições anteriores, quando a forma de coação é a
militar, estamos no domínio da estratégia militar, cuja definição dominante no Ocidente
corresponde ao processo que relaciona objetivos e meios militares disponíveis (Ends +
Ways + Means) (Lykke Jr., 1989), que reflete a Doutrina Weinberger quanto ao privilégio
no emprego de forças militares como último recurso, com objetivos claros e apenas com
o apoio da população para evitar que os EUA se envolvessem em “atoleiros” como o
Vietname (Webb, 2019: 94-95).
Em situação de guerra ou crise, a estratégia militar identifica-se com a política,
monopolizando toda a sua ação (Coutau-Bégarie, 2008: 123). Uma vez que a estratégia
militar é julgada pelos resultados, planos bem desenhados e estruturados, grandiosidade
dos meios, ou genialidade são inúteis se no final o sucesso não é alcançado (Creveld,
2017: 94-95). Embora a estratégia tenha como finalidade a vitória militar, esta deve ser
sempre vista na dimensão política (Coutau-Bégarie, 2008: 80). Como ato da política, o
estadista e o comandante militar devem tentar perceber o tipo de guerra que vão
combater, porque as situações e as motivações das partes não são constantes
(Clausewitz, 1984: 88). Bush e Blair não entenderam a natureza da guerra em que os
seus exércitos intervieram no Afeganistão e no Iraque, tentando resolver situações
eminentemente políticas com meios desenhados para guerras convencionais, em linha
com a doutrina Weinberger (Elliot, 2015: 86-87) e, por conseguinte, com a definição de
Lykke. Os soviéticos lidaram com o mesmo problema no Afeganistão, entre 1979 e 1989,
cujo resultado foi decisivo para o fim da União Soviética (Braithwaite, 2011).
Ter uma natureza significa que, independentemente da evidência empírica, a estratégia
vale para além dos adjetivos que se queira atribuir: estratégia subversiva; estratégia
nuclear; estratégia militar convencional. Uma teoria geral da estratégia tem
aplicabilidade universal, independente das formas de luta ou combate (Gray, 2006: 3-
5). Seja para designar os meios, para designar a forma de alcançar a vitória, ou para
privar o adversário da sua capacidade de lutar, a estratégia é definida como a “escolha
de soluções vitoriosas” (Foucault, 1982: 793). Se o objetivo é o sucesso, o elemento
mais importante da natureza da estratégia militar é ser instrumento da política para o
emprego, ou ameaça do emprego, da força militar (Cf. Gray, 2006: 15).
A definição dos objetivos e a escolha dos meios é governada pelo contributo para o
sucesso, ao qual se opõe a capacidade, intenções e linhas de ação do adversário (Creveld,
2017: 97). Deste modo, a estratégia envolve sempre um grau de incerteza, conferido
pela presença do adversário e pelo acaso, que dificulta a sua implementação. Não sendo
possível controlá-los, o plano tem de ser regularmente revisto e acompanhado pela
política e pela estratégia, porque a ação militar só faz sentido se contribuir para o sucesso
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O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
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político. É esta necessidade que advém de a estratégia ser instrumental e que obriga ao
diálogo constante entre políticos e militares (Gray, 2006: 14).
A definição de Lykke Jr. (1989), dominante no mundo Ocidental, ignora a ligação entre
a natureza da guerra e a natureza da estratégia. Sem aquela, a estratégia militar deixa
de ser um instrumento e um conceito coerente. Aplicar definições típicas do ambiente
da Guerra Fria deixa a estratégia militar descontextualizada da sua ligação à política,
especialmente nas democracias em que as dinâmicas político-militares são afetadas por
um elevado número de fatores, como são os casos de eleições, das personalidades das
lideranças e da sua experiência política, pressões partidárias, regimes e sistemas
políticos, grau de controlo civil sobre os militares, meios de comunicação social, entre
outros. Parte da solução é conceitual, na medida em que a guerra assume uma direção
imprevisível derivada da competição constante entre os contendores (Strachan, 2013:
23). Por conseguinte, considera-se que a definição que melhor captura a natureza da
estratégia militar e a natureza da guerra é o conceito de Jeffrey Meiser (2017) como
“teoria do sucesso”. A palavra teoria cria a expetativa de que o conceito em estratégia
militar é uma explicação de como uma ação, ou conjunto de ações, causam sucesso.
Defini-la como “teoria do sucesso” encoraja o pensamento criativo, ao mesmo tempo que
se ancora no processo científico das “causas e efeitos” da criação de teorias (Evera, 1997:
7-8), obrigando o estrategista a clarificar como se alcança o sucesso. Uma outra
vantagem da definição de Meiser (2017: 86-87) é encorajar a pensar mais eficazmente
em relação ao poder que pode ser gerado com a implementação da estratégia, porque a
esta é também a “arte de criar poder”, que entra em ação quando a situação que se
enfrenta é instável e imprevisível (Freedman, 2013; xi, 617).
O sucesso pode ser definido em várias dimensões e pode variar de acordo com a evolução
da situação, mas está sempre ligado à consecução de objetivos políticos com os meios à
disposição e com resultados duradouros. Considerar a estratégia como teoria imprime
dinâmica à relação entre os líderes militares e civis envolvidos na conceção e
implementação da estratégia militar. Ao combinar-se os elementos constitutivos da
ontologia da guerra com a estratégia militar como teoria do sucesso e de produção de
poder, imerge-se num domínio que envolve dinâmicas da atividade política que obrigam
ao diálogo constante, embora desigual, entre governante e soldado, impedindo a ligação
perfeita que diferencia a teoria da prática.
2. A Prática da Estratégia e o desfasamento entre Política e Ação Militar
Teoricamente, a estratégia militar é o resultado de ligação perfeita entre os domínios
político e militar, em que cada um ocupa um espaço bem delimitado. Porém, como
atividade prática, a estratégia é moldada pelas realidades do momento (Strachan, 2013:
113). Uma estratégia é sempre julgada pelo sucesso de longo prazo, em que intervêm
fatores como meios envolvidos, modus operandi, definição dos objetivos, dinâmicas
políticas internas e externas e ação do adversário. Mesmo quando o contendor mais
“forte” parece ter a situação controlada, outros fatores emergem que tornam os
resultados imprevisíveis.
Os recentes casos do Afeganistão e do Iraque, envolvendo as personalidades militares e
civis responsáveis pela estratégia militar, ilustram a complexidade da prática da
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 87-105
O desfasamento entre política e estratégia militar:
uma análise ao Iraque (2006-2007) e Afeganistão (2009)
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estratégia militar. Depois do sucesso militar da operação Iraqui Freedom, seguiu-se um
surto de insurreição e violência sectária que colocou em causa a capacidade militar de
norte-americanos e britânicos. O caos resultou da inexistência de uma estratégia, porque
se privilegiou ações militares rápidas, violentas e a retirada das tropas o mais
rápidamente possível, conforme preconizado pela doutrina Weinberger-Powell, focada
em objetivos políticos claros, guerra relâmpago, derrota militar do adversário, apoio da
população e existência de uma estratégia de saída (Elliot, 2015: 87). Porém, a ligação e
a coordenação ao nível político não garantiram a coerência entre a estratégia militar e a
política. A divergência entre o secretário da Defesa, Donald Rumsfeld, e a secretária de
Estado, Condoleezza Rice, é disso um claro exemplo. Rumsfeld pretendia concentrar as
forças em bases, enquanto Rice pretendia garantir o controlo e a segurança das cidades
durante a “implementação da democracia” (West, 2008: 110). Esta situação revela a
falta de união de esforços e falta de direção estratégica de George Bush, que evitava
também imiscuir-se na campanha militar. Se o tivesse feito, teria tido a oportunidade de
perceber que, desde o sucesso militar do verão de 2003, a ação tática das forças militares
não contribuía para os objetivos políticos (West, 2008: 363).
A estratégia militar é o “negócio pragmático” de aplicar meios militares para alcançar
objetivos políticos claros e exequíveis, que tem relação direta com a natureza da guerra.
Na impossibilidade de provar que o Iraque possuía armas de destruição em massa, Bush
alterou o objetivo da operação para o fomento de uma democracia no Iraque que pudesse
contagiar a região (Johnson, 2010: 585). Apesar de enfrentar um grave problema
securitário no Iraque, Bush via a guerra em termos convencionais, estando mais
preocupado em saber “quantos inimigos tinham sido mortos ou capturados”. Para o
general George Casey, comandante da Multi-National Force – Iraq, a batalha norte-
americana era preparar os iraquianos para se protegerem e governarem sozinhos. Bush
não compreendeu a guerra nem como a vitória militar podia ser convertida em ganhos
políticos e económicos para o próprio Iraque (Woodward, 2008: 4-5).
Enviar forças militares para solucionar problemas políticos parece ser uma opção
apelativa, mas é sempre necessário avaliar o impacto das operações militares. Conforme
nota Clausewitz (1984: 95), a destruição das forças do inimigo não é a única solução se
há outros objetivos pelos quais a guerra é combatida. Bush e Rumsfeld pediram às forças
americanas para combaterem uma guerra para a qual não estavam preparadas, sem
compreender a sua natureza. Quando Bush decidiu invadir o Iraque com o apoio de
alguns aliados, nenhum responsável político antecipou que depois da queda de Saddam
se envolveriam numa guerra de longa duração (Metz, 2010: 1). Blair pediu aos seus
militares para se juntarem aos americanos, mas também sem qualquer estratégia (Elliot,
2015: 23).
O sucesso da implementação da estratégia militar depende da capacidade de se perceber
o caráter da guerra que se combate. No Iraque, apesar de a coligação não ter sofrido
nenhuma derrota em confrontação militar direta, a adequabilidade dos meios para o
sucesso político pós-invasão foi deficiente. A insurreição e a violência sectária estavam a
ser combatidas com meios militares e doutrina convencional (Woodward, 2008: 5-6;
West, 2008: 45). Especialmente durante 2006, a evolução do número de ataques contra
as forças da coligação e a violência sectária não foram suficientes para que se
reconhecesse que a estratégia era inadequada. As evidências levaram Bush e outros
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responsáveis políticos a perder a confiança em Casey, determinando a sua substituição
e a conceção de uma nova estratégia (Ricks, 2010: 58; Barno & Bensahel, 2020: 195-
215).
A ausência de uma estratégia de sucesso é muitas vezes substituída pela simples adição
de recursos ao problema. Em janeiro de 2007, Bush anunciou o reforço do dispositivo
americano no Iraque com cerca de 30 mil militares, conhecido como surge, para que o
esforço militar se orientasse na proteção da população e para evitar uma derrota que
parecia iminente (Metz, 2010: 5; Elliot, 2015: 115; Feaver, 2011: 87). Bush foi
assessorado por um grupo de americanos influentes, que o levou a reconsiderar as suas
opções porque era impensável que o exército mais poderoso do mundo fosse derrotado.
Bush tinha recusado a proposta de alguns dos seus generais para retirar e decidiu
aumentar os efetivos no Iraque em 2007, sob o comando do general David Petraeus
(Ricks, 2010). Nada foi pensado para encontrar uma solução política para a qual os
esforços militares seriam direcionados (Strachan, 2013: 12), mas apenas para diminuir
pressões em Washington junto da bancada Democrata no Congresso (Feaver, 2011: 88).
A opção, implementada por Patraeus, para diminuir com a violência sectária acabou por
dar resultados, apesar da ausência de uma estratégia (Strachan, 2013: 12, 220). O
reforço funcionou, muito mais pela mudança operada pela elite sunita por influência de
Petraeus do que pela ação militar. A surge converteu a estratégia inicial de abandonar o
Iraque, cerca de seis meses após a invasão, num plano para uma “guerra longa” contra
o terrorismo (Ricks, 2010: 124). Isto está em linha com a asserção de Betts (2000: 5-
6) de que, às vezes, a estratégia é uma ilusão e de que uma má estratégia, ou a sua
ausência, pode funcionar se ela for apenas a aplicação de recursos muito superiores
(atrição).
A campanha do Afeganistão, na Administração Obama, é também um exemplo da
inexistência de uma estratégia de sucesso. Depois de ter anunciado que diminuiria a
presença militar no Afeganistão, e depois de alguns meses de debate em que se assistiu
à incapacidade do general David Mckiernan de diminuir a violência, em 2009 o general
Stanley McChrystal propôs uma “estratégia” baseada no reforço de tropas. Porém,
Obama considerava que as modalidades apresentadas não eram suficientemente
diferentes, variando apenas nos efetivos a empenhar (Woodward, 2011: 273-274). Se,
por um lado, Obama não podia escolher com apenas uma opção, por outro, a estratégia
apresentada por McChrystal não estabelecia qualquer relação causal entre objetivos e
ações, conforme a construção de uma “teoria” obriga (Meiser, 2017: 88-89). Sem
surpresa, de 2009 a 2021, a situação no Afeganistão foi-se degradando até à retirada da
coligação e a tomada de poder pelos Taliban em Cabul.
Em guerra, ou em conflito, política e estratégia militar não estão apenas relacionadas,
elas são indistintas. A manutenção do poder em política interna pode substituir os
objetivos políticos como finalidade primária para a guerra. Tal como em outras
democracias
2
, os norte-americanos combinam recorrentemente estratégia militar,
opinião pública e considerações eleitorais na interação entre política e estratégia (Metz,
2
Veja-se o caso holandês em 2002 em relação a Sebrenica e em 2020 em relação ao Afeganistão, ou o caso
da Grã-Bretanha em relação à Síria em 2013 (Dimitriu, 2020: 667). A preocupação com as eleições e apoio
da população introduz um novo racional no emprego da força militar, que, conforme nota Smith (2005:
12), leva ao emprego de forças em missões de reconstrução, humanitárias, de polícia, para as quais não
estão bem preparadas.
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2010: 10), que relavam o impacto das questões políticas na estratégia militar A vitória
de Bush, em 2004, tinha dado ao Partido Republicano uma maioria. Porém, em 2008,
Obama venceu as eleições e o Partido Democrático ficou com o domínio no Congresso e
no Senado. Muitas razões podem ser apontadas, mas a guerra no Iraque e no Afeganistão
tiveram, certamente, um papel importante (Jacobson, 2010; Stevens, 2015). No verão
de 2006, apesar de a situação no Iraque obrigar a uma urgente revisão da estratégia
militar, esta só foi comunicada após as eleições intercalares de novembro desse ano, que
acabaram por dar uma vitória esmagadora ao Partido Democrático. Bush queria evitar o
anúncio de uma viragem na estratégia que equivalesse ao reconhecimento de que estava
errada (Payne, 2020: 173). Há também que considerar que o presidente receava chegar
às eleições presidenciais de 2008 com o fantasma de uma derrota militar no Iraque. A
impopularidade da guerra e a possibilidade de ser acusado de nada fazer para mudar a
situação, podem ter sido decisivas para que Bush impusesse o reforço do dispositivo,
mesmo contra a proposta dos seus generais (Bowen, 2013: 275).
Estratégia militar e política são domínios diferentes, mas o sucesso da prática estratégica
baseia-se no diálogo político-militar permanente em que a estratégia militar corresponde
exatamente ao domínio onde se intersetam (Strachan, 2013: 12, 20). Quase
imediatamente após a queda de Saddam, “política e conduta da guerra” seguiram
paralelamente sem nunca terem convergido. A 20 de maio de 2003, depois de vencer as
forças militares iraquianas, o general James Mattis, comandante da força de Fuzileiros,
estava convencido de que a sua missão era apoiar a reconstrução do país. No dia
seguinte, Paul Bremer, diretor da Coalition Provisional Authority, dissolveu o exército
iraquiano com o apoio do Pentágono e da Casa Branca sem qualquer ligação com os
comandantes militares no terreno. O presidente concedeu todo o poder a Bremer, que
não estava ao corrente das ações militares e sem ter qualquer controlo de Washington
(West, 2008: 8, 17). Bremer reportava diretamente a Bush sem consultar o general
Ricardo Sanchez, originando uma clara desunião de esforços que impedia que a ação
militar fosse consequente (Dyson, 2013: 478; Woodward, 2008: 20; West, 2008: 6) com
os objetivos políticos, criando um claro desfasamento entre ambos.
O elevado número de fatores ligados entre si faz com que a relação entre a política e a
estratégia seja problemática. A maioria deles está relacionada com questões de luta
política interna, fricção entre as lideranças políticas e militares, e com a mudança no
caráter da guerra e com a prevalência de conflitos, como a contrainsurgência,
estabilização e operações militares que envolvem atores não-estatais, que aumenta o
peso da ação política através do emprego de forças militares. Este ambiente, coloca as
principais potências ocidentais perante a “ratoeira da hegemonia” (Travis, 2018: 69-70)
em que os estrategistas e os políticos enfrentam situações complexas, ambíguas, incertas
e paradoxais. Ambientes como o da contrainsurgência exigem soluções “20 por cento
militares e 80 por cento políticas” (Galula, 2006: 62-63).
A luta pelo poder e as dinâmicas político-militares em situação de conflito conformam a
lógica clausewitziana da finalidade política da guerra. O decurso da conduta estratégica
da guerra ao nível político-militar tem servido também para a luta política interna e para
satisfazer a opinião pública. A evidência demonstra que as forças políticas internas são
um fator disruptivo em situação de conflito (Hooker R. D., 2013). Tal como referimos
que as decisões de mudança de estratégia no Iraque e Afeganistão com Bush e Obama
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tiveram em conta considerações políticas internas, também Blair estava mais preocupado
com as eleições do que em alcançar o sucesso no Afeganistão (Elliot, 2015: 124). Em
democracia, a liderança política exerce a sua função estratégica na guerra, não tanto
pela consecução dos objetivos políticos, mas pela manutenção ou obtenção do poder. É
neste ponto que existe a maior fricção entre o domínio político e o domínio militar, que
Dimitriu (2020) denomina como “desconexão político-militar”, resultante do
desenvolvimento da política contemporânea, típica das democracias ocidentais, em que
intervêm factores como a dificuldade em distinguir paz e guerra, sucesso e insucesso,
personalidades envolvidas e sua experiência, impacto dos meios de comunicação,
necessidade de envolver vários ministérios na ação estratégica, participar em coligações
e alianças, ou grau de controlo civil sobre a instituição militar. Se a guerra é a variável
dependente da política, quando esta muda também muda a guerra. Assim, também a
estratégia militar, como variável interveniente para atingir o sucesso do emprego da
força militar, tem de mudar. Por essa razão, considera-se que o alargamento do conceito
à teoria do sucesso serve esse objetivo, embora se deva considerar os fatores resultantes
da dinâmica das relações civis-militares para lhe garantir a coerência instrumental.
3. As Relações Civis-Militares: Coerência e Estabilidade da Relação entre
Política e Estratégia Militar
As relações civis militares descrevem a relação entre os militares, as instituições e a
população que servem, como comunicam, como interagem e como se regula a sua
ligação. O diálogo é desigual (Cohen, 2002: 263) e o controlo civil é utilizado pelo nível
político para exercer a sua autoridade sobre as forças armadas (Hooker J. R., 2011).
Neste texto, tem especial relevância compreender os processos de relacionamento civil-
militar ao nível político-estratégico para determinar a linha que separa as respetivas
responsabilidades e onde se sobrepõem, que dinâmicas existem na assessoria estratégica
por parte do chefe militar e que influência tem aquele relacionamento na eficácia das
operações. O diálogo entre militares e políticos é desigual, mas o seu estudo está na
base do que é a estratégia militar (Cohen, 2002: xii, 263), sendo uma questão essencial
da política do Estado.
A combinação do padrão das relações civis-militares e a conduta das operações tem
influência direta para a eficácia militar em proveito da política. Em última análise, o teste
às relações civis-militares é o contributo que tem para a estratégia militar, especialmente
no staffing, conceção e implementação. Em relação aos Estados Unidos da América, mais
de vinte anos após o final da Guerra Fria, o sucesso militar não se tem traduzido em
sucesso estratégico, porque se assiste a um “declínio da competência militar em relação
ao planeamento estratégico” (Kohn, 2008: 73, 76).
A “teoria normal” das relações civis-militares, baseada em Huntington, considera que o
corpo de oficiais é composto por militares cujo profissionalismo exige a separação clara
entre a perícia militar e domínio político (Huntington, 2000: 7). A principal função do
oficial é a gestão da violência, planeamento militar, organização e emprego da força, mas
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não a sua aplicação (Huntington, 2000: 7-18)
3
. O controlo objetivo assegura o domínio
civil sobre as forças armadas, que pretende que os militares sejam politicamente neutros
ou apolíticos (Cohen, 2002: 243). Por outro lado, a integração dos militares na sociedade
e a inserção do nível político nos assuntos de segurança e defesa garante à liderança civil
o controlo subjetivo (Huntington, 2000: 83-84). O controlo objetivo permite que os
militares se foquem nos assuntos operacionais, deixando a política para a liderança civil
(Huntington, 2000: 308). A separação que Huntington faz dos dois domínios parece
indicar um distanciamento entre violência e política, o que afeta a conceção e a execução
da estratégia (Nielsen & Liebert, 2021: 738). Aquela separação contradiz o papel que
Clausewitz (1984: 112) atribuía ao comandante-chefe, simultaneamente general e
político. O combate não é a simples utilização da força bruta para alcançar a vitória
militar, mas poder coercivo ao serviço de um estado final político que muitas vezes passa
pela negociação. A liderança civil e a militar devem garantir que os desafios resultantes
da relação dos domínios político, estratégico e operacional sejam integrados num todo
coerente (Barsuhn, 2022: 5, 9).
O nosso ponto é o de que a distinção entre política e estratégia militar não existe em
situação de crise ou guerra, fazendo com que a consciência política dos militares seja
fator inestimável para o sucesso (Nielsen & Liebert, 2021: 734). A autonomia operacional
dos militares proposta por Huntington infringe a máxima de Clausewitz de que a guerra
é uma extensão da política e não assegura que o profissionalismo resulte em melhores
decisões. Em contraste com a abordagem dicotómica de Huntington, Morris Janowitz
propõe uma aproximação mais pragmática, enfatizando a ligação à sociedade. Tal como
Huntington, Janowitz (1960: viii) considera o controlo objetivo como essencial na relação
com o poder político. Contudo, a sua aproximação requer oficiais com competências
sociopolíticas, sem tomar parte ativa na política interna, mas com sensibilidade às
questões políticas (Roennfeldt, 2019: 62). Esta abordagem é compatível com os valores
democráticos e com o controlo político que impedem a tensão entre os domínios civil e
militar e evita o autoritarismo militar (Janowitz, 1960: 439-440). Janowitz vê a esfera
militar e a esfera política integradas, em que os oficiais operaram em ambas. Os civis e
os militares, mesmo ao mais baixo escalão de comando devem cooperar para alcançar a
dissuasão estratégica, gerir crises e a resolver conflitos. Em conflitos como o Vietname
ou a Somália, é requerido aos oficiais que atuem fora do quadro convencional (Cohen,
2002: 258-259), porque as dinâmicas sociopolíticas ligadas às operações militares
mudam o contexto do emprego da força (Roennfeldt, 2019: 63).
Apesar da divisão de responsabilidades entre o domínio político e o militar ser apelativa,
em conflito as suas considerações não podem ser separadas. Os militares devem
participar de forma ativa nos processos de decisão estratégica dos Estados, em que
considerações políticas internas e externas são determinantes. Porque as ações militares
são, em última instância, julgadas pelos resultados políticos, a separação proposta por
Huntington é questionável (Travis, 2017; Travis, 2018; Roennfeldt, 2019). Nenhuma
decisão em guerra acontece sem a interferência das entidades civis, a quem qualquer
Constituição democrática atribui a responsabilidade da segurança nacional e
3
A “aplicação” refere-se à decisão política, enquanto o “emprego” se refere à condução das operações
militares. A descrição da especificidade da profissão militar é efetuada no capítulo 1 do livro, entre as
páginas 7-18.
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responsabilidade sobre a liderança militar que gere, administra e lidera as forças
armadas. Quando a relação funciona, o resultado é o alinhamento entre o interesse
nacional, os objetivos políticos, a estratégia militar e as operações militares. Quando a
relação não funciona, a estratégia militar e a política deixam de fazer sentido (Khon,
2008: 71). O Iraque é um claro exemplo da importância das relações civis-militares na
eficácia da estratégia militar. Apesar da vitória militar e da inabilidade estratégica de
alguns generais norte-americanos (Strachan, 2006: 63), muitos dos problemas no
período pós-Saddam foram essencialmente devidos à fricção e ineficácia das relações
civis-militares, especialmente com Rumsfeld. Este parecia ter uma agenda de
confrontação direta com os generais da Administração Clinton e que achava que o Joint
Chiefs of Staff era inútil (Brooks, 2008: 226-255).
A liderança política escolhe os comandantes militares com quem discute os objetivos e
as opções para assegurar que a estratégia militar é o resultado de um processo de debate
resultante de uma “teoria do sucesso”. Isto parece não ter acontecido no planeamento
da invasão do Iraque, onde não houve diálogo contínuo ao nível estratégico-militar nem
a atenção devida com o planeamento do período pós-Saddam. Para além da crispação
criada por Rumsfeld, a liderança militar também não conseguiu estabelecer a ligação
entre a política e as ações no terreno, devido ao seu foco no combate e na vitória militar
tática. A substituição de Rumsfeld por Robert Gates amenizou o ambiente na Defesa e
no Departamento de Estado, mas a inaptidão dos comandantes militares em preparar a
contrainsurgência que se seguiu manteve a tensão entre Washington, o Pentágono e os
comandantes no terreno (Hoffman, 2008: 229).
Nas democracias, o controlo civil é subalternizado pela eficácia estratégica por ser um
domínio onde as relações são menos estruturadas e onde há muitos fatores
intervenientes (Hoffman, 2008: 218). Perceber as responsabilidades de cada um na
formulação estratégica, na tomada de decisão e na supervisão da implementação está
no centro da prática da estratégia militar. Conforme Cohen (2002) deduz, o estadista de
sucesso não aceita linhas divisórias na responsabilidade, nomeia e demite comandantes,
e refina as estratégias para alcançar os objetivos políticos. Todavia, a conceção
estratégica não se pode focar apenas na mestria do líder político. O processo exige
também que a liderança militar tenha a coragem moral de fazer as questões devidas
sobre os objetivos militares e informar sobre os riscos dos planos, porque a ligação entre
objetivos e meios é bidirecional e interativa (Rapp, 2015: 20-25; Echevarria II, 2007:
85-97). Um exemplo do diálogo que deve existir é o do caso da solicitação de aprovação
do Pentágono para o reforço do teatro do Afeganistão no início de 2009. Obama, apoiado
por Colin Powell, iniciou uma ronda de discussões com o seu staff e com o Pentágono até
se assegurar que o reforço cumpria os objetivos políticos mais amplos do que a derrota
militar dos Taliban. Apesar de não ter recebido opções estratégicas para além do reforço
militar, Obama liderou uma estratégia com os meios e com os objetivos definidos por si
(Elliot, 2015: 226-227).
A estratégia militar é o produto do diálogo entre políticos e militares, e a sua essência,
ser instrumental, é o resultado da harmonização dos dois e não a sujeição de nenhum
deles (Strachan, 2013: 12, 78), como parece ter acontecido entre o general Sanchez e
Paul Bremer no Iraque, cada um deles a advogar um domínio próprio sem permitir
interferências (McColl, 2013: 113). Se a guerra é política e o sucesso é definido em
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termos políticos, então o militar está sempre ligado à política. Alcançar o sucesso requer
uma apreciação das condições políticas e a habilidade para inovar para as alcançar é tão
importante como pensar criticamente, ser criativo e obter a iniciativa em combate (Clark,
2016: 37). A política é o processo natural das democracias que envolve a arte de
controlar, proteger, apoiar e governar uma sociedade. Esta atividade inclui também a
obtenção e a manutenção do poder. O militar está envolvido nos assuntos políticos na
mesma medida em que a política intervém nos assuntos militares. Não há como abdicar
ou escapar da vida política, tal como definido por Janowitz (1960: 12-13) que considera
que oficial não deve ser um mero “técnico militar”, especialmente ao nível da “liderança
estratégica”, mas um interveniente direto na política interna, como estrategista, e na
política externa, como estrategista e estratega. A necessidade de compreender as
dinâmicas políticas que influenciam a guerra e a estratégia militar releva o facto de, ao
mais alto nível, a arte da guerra se tornar em política, e o comandante-chefe dever estar
com ela familiarizado (Clausewitz, 1984: 607, 146).
A lógica da guerra e da política mantêm a relevância na sua relação. As atuais campanhas
militares refletem a imersão do contexto sociopolítico nas operações com todas as
complexidades da política a serem traduzidas em constrangimentos, restrições e
desalinhamentos evidenciados até ao mais baixo escalão. A guerra, como variável
dependente da política, e a estratégia militar como variável interveniente, refletem essa
ligação. Só um aprofundamento do conhecimento da política contemporânea e as suas
implicações nas operações militares pode restabelecer a sua coerência teórica e prática
(Dimitriu, 2020: 672).
Conclusões
O desfasamento entre a política e a estratégia militar resulta da combinação de um
elevado número de fatores existentes no domínio civil-militar que afetam a prática da
estratégia, para além do efeito resultante da natureza da guerra. Embora a teoria defina
a linha que separa as responsabilidades do domínio civil do domínio militar, a prática da
estratégia militar indica que em situação de conflito as duas estão em ligação permanente
e se confundem. Esta asserção é particularmente importante nas democracias, embora
não lhes seja exclusivo, em que o diálogo desigual entre a liderança política e a liderança
militar não pode ser obstáculo ao diálogo franco, claro e honesto em que o nível político
prevalece. Em conflitos como o Iraque e o Afeganistão, guerra e política estiveram ainda
mais interligadas do que a teoria da estratégia parece pressupor. A guerra, como variável
dependente da política, assume variações imprevisíveis resultantes da sua natureza e da
influência da política. O que se evidencia do Iraque e do Afeganistão não é o resultado
de uma mudança da natureza da guerra, mas o reflexo da política contemporânea, em
especial do resultado das suas dinâmicas internas. Fatores como ação e luta política
interna, fricção entre lideranças políticas e militares, assimetria entre tempos políticos e
militares, adicionam um grau de complexidade à incerteza característica da natureza da
guerra que incrementa o desfasamento natural entre a política e a ação militar. O cerne
da prática da estratégia está em perceber as responsabilidades de cada um na sua
formulação, na tomada de decisão e na supervisão da implementação. É daqui que deriva
a natureza instrumental da estratégia militar, cujo objeto é a aplicação da força militar.
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Não compreender esta relação torna quase impossível avaliar o ambiente de incerteza e
de caos resultantes da natureza violenta do emprego de forças militares.
A estratégia, como variável interveniente na relação entre guerra e política, deve assumir
uma conceitualização que obrigue os seus praticantes a uma construção encadeada de
ações e resultados que levem ao sucesso. De pouco serve ter definições de estratégia
que não tenham relação direta com a prática e que não exijam criatividade. Esta é a
razão pela qual se assume como meritória a definição de J. Meiser como “teoria do
sucesso” e que se valoriza as relações civis-militares, por ser nesse domínio que se geram
fricções na conceção e implementação da estratégia que contribuem para aumentar o
desfasamento natural resultante da ação dos vários níveis da guerra. O papel da liderança
estratégico-militar na gestão da violência é debater a formulação e implementação dos
planos estratégicos com a liderança civil para que se apoie a sua decisão, para cuja
função necessita de ser competente no domínio da política, embora sem ser partidário.
Se a guerra é política e o sucesso é definido em termos políticos, então o militar está
sempre ligado à política. As operações militares exigem a compreensão do ambiente
político, que é essencialmente relevante nas operações de baixa intensidade, mesmo aos
mais baixos escalões, porque a ação militar do soldado é ação política. Planos vencedores
dependentes de vantagem esmagadora em recursos não são resultado da estratégia de
sucesso.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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106
NACIONAL-POPULISMO NO BRASIL: UMA REFLEXÃO SOBRE A ASCENSÃO DE
JAIR BOLSONARO E O IDEÁRIO DA EXTREMA-DIREITA
HÉLDER PRIOR
hprior@autonoma.pt
Doutor em Ciências da Comunicação pela Faculdade de Artes e Letras da Universidade da Beira
Interior com a menção Doctor Europaeus pelos estudos de investigação realizados na
Universidade Autónoma de Barcelona (2008-2012). Professor Visitante Estrangeiro no Programa
de Pós-Graduação em Comunicação da Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso do Sul, Brasil
(2019-2022). Realizou investigação de Pós-doutoramento na Universidade de Brasília, entre
2014 e 2015, com financiamento da Capes, e investigação de Pós-doutoramento na Universidade
da Beira Interior e na Universidade Autónoma de Barcelona, entre 2016 e 2018, com
financiamento da Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. É Professor Auxiliar do Departamento
de Ciências da Comunicação da Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (Portugal) e Investigador
Integrado do Labcom/Universidade da Beira Interior e do OBSERVARE
Resumo
O ensaio que o leitor tem entre mãos visa problematizar a afirmação do nacional-populismo
no Brasil, colocando em relação a ascensão do bolsonarismo com novas formas de mediação
da política assentes em práticas de comunicação directa proporcionadas pelas redes sociais
digitais. Com um olhar sobre as Eleições Presidenciais Brasileiras de 2018, problematizam-se
as estratégias de comunicação política do então candidato pelo Partido Social Liberal, Jair
Bolsonaro, tendo em conta dimensões discursivas próprias da mecânica populista. Com efeito,
ambicionamos compreender as principais conceptualizações sobre populismo e democracia
para, em um segundo momento, analisar a ascensão do bolsonarismo como um projecto
“antipolítico”, de cunho populista, e com raízes no activismo judicial da Operação Lava Jato.
Também realizamos um mapeamento sobre as supostas relações entre as categorias de
“populismo”, “neofascismo”, “novas direitas” e “bolsonarismo”, no sentido de melhor
compreender o campo da disputa política no Brasil contemporâneo.
Palavras-chave
Populismo; Extrema-direita; Bolsonarismo; Brasil.
Abstract
The essay that the reader has in his hands aims to discuss the affirmation of national populism
in Brazil, placing in relation the rise of Bolsonarism with new forms of mediation of politics
based on direct communication practices provide by digital social networks. With a look at the
2018 Brazilian Presidential Elections, we explore the political communication strategies of the
then candidate for the Social Liberal Party, Jair Bolsonaro, taking into account discursive
dimensions proper to populist mechanics. Indeed, we aspire to understand the main
conceptualisations about populism and democracy to, in a second moment, reflect on the rise
of Bolsonarism as an "anti-political" project, populist in nature, and with roots in the judicial
activism of Operation Car Wash. We also conducted a mapping on the supposed relations
between the categories of "populism", "neo-fascism", "new right" and "Bolsonarism", in order
to better understand the field of political dispute in contemporary Brazil.
Keywords
Populism; far-right; Bolsonarism; Brazil.
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Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair Bolsonaro
e o ideário da extrema-direita
Hélder Prior
107
Como citar este artigo
Prior, Hélder (2023). Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair
Bolsonaro e o ideário da extrema-direita. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1,
Maio-Outubro 2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última consulta,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.7
Artigo recebido em 3 de Novembro de 2022, aceite para publicação em 6 de Março de
2023
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Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair Bolsonaro
e o ideário da extrema-direita
Hélder Prior
108
NACIONAL-POPULISMO NO BRASIL:
UMA REFLEXÃO SOBRE A ASCENSÃO DE JAIR BOLSONARO E O
IDEÁRIO DA EXTREMA-DIREITA
HÉLDER PRIOR
Populismo: a revolta contra a democracia liberal
O espectro do populismo é, na contemporaneidade, convocado no espaço político,
mediático e até no senso comum, para qualificar dirigentes e movimentos políticos
eminentemente disruptivos, polémicos, anti-sistema e de forte apelo popular.
Multifacetado, ambíguo, vago, banalizado, em muitos casos utilizado de modo pejorativo
para qualificar dirigentes ou partidos políticos, o populismo, como categoria de análise
social e política, oferece-nos problemas muito específicos, tratando-se de um termo
essencialmente contestado. O facto de o conceito ser camaleónico, condicionado por
variáveis nacionais e geográficas, tem gerado um interessante debate em diferentes
disciplinas. “Um rasgo característico persistente e recorrente da literatura sobre
populismo é a sua reticência – ou dificuldade – para dar um significado preciso ao
conceito”, adverte Ernesto Laclau em A Razão Populista (2005: 15).
Nesse início de século, com particular incidência na última década, temos assistido ao
crescimento de uma miríade de partidos políticos e movimentos que articulam a política
mediante o método do populismo, justamente surgidos nas franjas políticas mais
radicais. Fala-se, com efeito, no debate político, mediático e também académico, sobre
a proeminência de lideranças populistas e sobre a forma como essas lideranças e
movimentos utilizam as condições de circulação discursiva dos media digitais para apelar
à insatisfação popular contra o sistema político dominante. Trata-se do avanço de um
populismo reacionário que explora discursivamente o carácter emancipatório do povo
frente às elites, e que se sustenta na retórica sobre a propalada crise das instituições da
democracia representativa, sobre o modo como as elites se alhearam das preocupações
do cidadão comum, no problema da corrupção, na perda de autenticidade da política, e
no avanço da anti-política, isto é, na repulsa à política e aos políticos tradicionais, por
um lado e, por outro lado, na ideia que os princípios dialógicos, pluralistas e convergentes
são desnecessários para a construção de um governo democrático em um mundo
globalizado.
O populismo é o oposto do pluralismo na política. Fala em nome de uma
maioria imaginária, e rejeita todos os pontos de vista que considera como
parte da minoria. Especialmente na sua versão de direita, os seus inimigos
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incluem frequentemente minorias religiosas e étnicas, e envolvem sempre a
imprensa independente (Finchelstein, 2020: 5).
De facto, o populismo é construído a partir da ideia de deturpação da democracia
plebiscitária por interposição das elites e de um processo de burocratização do Estado
que rompe com os princípios da ética da autenticidade própria da democracia como poder
do demos. O populismo converteu-se, assim, em um conceito recorrente, de uso
generalizado na esfera pública contemporânea, que tem sido utilizado para classificar e
capturar significações acerca de movimentos políticos muito diversos, da direita à
esquerda, dos movimentos agrários surgidos na Rússia (Narodniki) e nos Estados Unidos
no século XIX (People’s Party), aos movimentos socialistas latino-americanos, sem
esquecer, mais recentemente, o ressurgimento de sentimentos conservadores,
nacionalistas, autoritários e xenófobos em alguns países europeus. Na maior parte dos
casos, a ambiguidade do conceito é substituída pela descrição de um conjunto de
características fundamentais e até tipologias de populismo, como assinalou, por exemplo,
Margaret Canovan, ao distinguir entre populismos agrários e populismos políticos
(Canovan, 1999), aos quais podemos acrescentar a recente discussão acerca dos
“populismos mediáticos” (Mazzoleni, 2008), do “populismo judiciário” (Blokker e
Mazzoleni, 2020) ou do “populismo médico” (Lasco e Curato, 2019).
O populismo coexiste com o anti-elitismo, ou seja, com a ideia que as instâncias de
representação política foram ocupadas e colonizadas por dirigentes políticos abnegados
do interesse da res publica e da defesa dos interesses do povo. Divide, por conseguinte
e de modo simbólico, a sociedade em dois grupos homogéneos e antagónicos: de um
lado, o povo puro ou autêntico; do outro lado, as elites, geralmente qualificadas como
corruptas, “nós versus “eles”, aqueles que aspiram a ser identificados como legítimos
representantes do povo, que assumem e defendem valores identitários do bom povo ou
do povo nativo, contra aqueles que querem subverter os valores sociais ou culturais,
qualificados como uma ameaça, como inimigos ou out-groups corrompidos moralmente.
Neste sentido, os populistas constroem um conceito que eles próprios afirmam
representar de modo autêntico, unindo públicos diversos e “demandas sociais
insatisfeitas” (Laclau, 2005) representando o povo como uma espécie de maioria
silenciada e ignorada pelas elites ou pelo statu quo.
Articulando conceitos como “povo”, “vontade geral” e “interesse comum”, os populistas
aproximam-se da crítica de Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) ao governo
representativo. Para o filósofo genebrino, o governo representativo é percepcionado
como uma forma aristocrática de poder, uma vez que o povo não é mais do que uma
entidade passiva que apenas é mobilizada de tempos em tempos em processos eleitorais.
Face à vontade de todos (volonté de tous), que não é mais do que a soma de interesses
particulares em um determinado momento, a vontade geral resulta da capacidade dos
cidadãos de se unir em comunhão e de legislar em benefício do bem comum e do
interesse público (Rousseau, 1989). Os populistas de sucesso apelam, por conseguinte,
às noções de volonté générale e de auto-governo, propostas por Rousseau, para defender
que a política deve ser devolvida aos cidadãos, construindo, assim, o conceito de “povo”
como um dos elementos definidores do populismo.
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Por outro lado, um dos aspectos fundamentais da retórica populista é a crítica ao sistema
político, geralmente descrito como tendo sido ocupado pelas elites. Neste ponto, o anti-
elitismo e a exploração da retórica anti-sistema implicam, igualmente, a construção do
conceito de “elite” enquanto entidade corrupta ou desinteressada da vida do cidadão
comum. Na perspectiva da comunicação populista, as elites dão prioridade aos seus
próprios objectivos em detrimento do interesse geral e das demandas do povo, o que as
torna incapazes de representar a maioria silenciada (Hameleers e Rens Vliegenthart,
2020). O aspecto determinante da distinção entre o povo e a elite é moral, já que o povo
é caracterizado como uma entidade pura, ao contrário das elites, definidas como
corruptas e interessadas nos seus próprios desígnios. De acordo com Cas Mudde e Rovira
Kaltwasser, a elite “é definida com base no poder, ou seja, inclui a maioria das pessoas
que têm lugares destacados na política, na economia, nos media e nas artes” (Mudde e
Kaltawasser, 2017: 25). Para estes autores, o populismo é uma “ideologia de baixa
densidade”, a thin-centered ideology, cuja porosidade e maleabilidade permitem que se
adapte a múltiplos contextos. Trata-se de um modo maniqueísta de conceber a
democracia, dividindo a sociedade entre puros e impuros. Do lado dos puros, encontra-
se o povo, silenciado pelos impuros, na maior parte dos casos, as elites corruptas,
afastadas das preocupações do cidadão comum.
Uma ideologia de baixa densidade que considera que a sociedade está, em
última instância, dividida em dois campos homogéneos e antagónicos – o
povo puro versus a elite corrupta – e que defende que a política deveria ser
uma expressão da volonté générale (vontade geral) do povo (Mudde e
Kaltwasser, 2017: 18).
Os populistas interpretam a política como um campo de batalha moral entre o verdadeiro
povo, ou o povo impoluto, e as elites ou outros grupos que os populistas considerem
como outsiders ou grupos de fora. Geralmente, estes grupos são descritos e qualificados
como uma ameaça aos desígnios do povo nativo. Assim, minorias étnicas, religiosas,
imigrantes ou outros grupos excluídos da sociedade, são interpretados como uma
ameaça aos valores sociais partilhados pelo “bom povo”. As mensagens dos líderes
populistas incluem apelos ao povo puro, evocando aspectos nativistas e nacionalistas, ao
mesmo tempo que instigam à revolta moral contra os out-groups. A identificação de um
out-group típico não é, porém, uma característica definidora de todos os tipos de
populismo, já que, dependendo do contexto, essa mobilização pode ser feita contra
inimigos internos ou inimigos vindos de fora. Não obstante, a retórica out-group é
frequentemente utilizada por populistas de esquerda, geralmente contra a banca e os
inimigos “capitalistas”, e por populistas de direita, habitualmente contra imigrantes ou
minorias (de Vreese et al., 2018: 428). Em conclusão, e tal como enfatizam Albertazzi e
McDonell (2008: 4-5), o populismo é constituído pela tríade “povo”, “elites” e “outros”,
estes “outros” identificados como perigosos para a sociedade.
À luz dos principais estudos sobre populismo, podemos, por conseguinte, sistematizar
algumas características do fenómeno: (1) a hostilidade face à democracia liberal; (2) a
referência à comunidade ou ênfase da vontade geral do povo; (3) a proclamação de
determinados valores políticos e sociais; (4) a percepção de um estado de crise que
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necessita de reparação; (5) a distinção moral entre as elites e o povo (Taggart, 2004;
Mudde e Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Laclau, 2005).
Para Ernesto Laclau, máximo expoente dos estudos que analisam o populismo como
discurso, o conceito é um modo de operação e construção da política, uma táctica que
permite a articulação de “demandas insatisfeitas” da sociedade. Nas palavras do teórico
argentino, que inspirou vários partidos populistas da esquerda radical: “por populismo
não entendemos um tipo de movimento – identificável com uma base social especial ou
com uma determinada orientação ideológica – mas antes uma lógica política” (Laclau,
2005: 150).
Em A Razão Populista, Laclau define o populismo como uma lógica retórica de
confrontação social que opõe povo e elites dominantes. Quando a hegemonia política é
questionada, isto é, quando os detentores do poder ou “bloco dominante” perdem a
legitimidade e o apoio social por parte dos cidadãos, entram em operação novos
mecanismos de disputa da dominação política, mecanismos que estabelecem um conflito
entre o “bloco dominante”, ou poder hegemónico, e o povo como entidade traída ou
negligenciada pelo establishment. Neste sentido, o populismo cria uma identidade política
erigida a partir do conflito, da oposição entre “nós”, o povo, e “eles”, as elites ou grupos
hegemónicos. Ao instituir o conflito na política através de um movimento contra-
hegemónico, o populismo é identificado, por Laclau, como uma força positiva ou
emancipatória, no sentido em que permite que o processo democrático passe a
contemplar demandas e grupos excluídos pelas elites ou pelo “bloco dominante”. Com
efeito, para Laclau o populismo não é uma forma de degradação da democracia, uma vez
que permite a ampliação das bases democráticas da sociedade ao incluir grupos excluídos
pelo establishment e ao realçar a soberania popular, a vontade geral do povo e o governo
da maioria. Esta visão do populismo como “força positiva” ou “emancipatória”, torna-se
problemática no contexto das democracias liberais, embora se deva reconhecer, tal como
enfatizam Eatwell e Goodwin, que o populismo “também levanta legítimas preocupações
democráticas que milhões de pessoas querem levar a debate e resolver” (2019: 11).
A democracia liberal consiste em um sistema de governo em que direitos e liberdades
individuais são oficialmente reconhecidos e protegidos, no qual todos participam através
do voto em um representante e em que o exercício do poder político é limitado pelo
Estado de direito, reconhecendo-se a divisão tripartida do poder político entre Legislativo,
Executivo e Judicial, a pluralidade de visões e opiniões, bem como a protecção dos
direitos dos grupos minoritários (Eatwell e Goodwin, 2019: 91). Porém, ao opor-se ao
princípio do pluralismo, polarizando a sociedade entre povo e elites, puros e impuros, o
populismo rejeita alguns princípios fundamentais das democracias liberais, como o
respeito às minorias ou à pluralidade e heterogeneidade de visões políticas. É,
justamente, neste sentido, que autores como Cas Mudde, Jan-Werner Müller, Galston ou
Pappas, consideram que o populismo é uma ameaça à democracia liberal, não obstante
o seu carácter democrático. A propósito, Galston acrescenta:
Os populistas dizem atacar o liberalismo em nome da democracia. Conseguem
faz-lo porque a democracia traz consigo princpios que operam em diferentes
dimensões. “Democracia” diz respeito a um modo de governo, enquanto
“liberal” define o campo no qual esse modo de governo pode operar de
maneira legtima. No conceito de democracia liberal, o antónimo de “liberal”
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no “conservador”, mas “total”. A democracia liberal uma democracia
limitada pelo medo da tirania e pelo princpio dos direitos individuais (Galston,
2020: 34).
Líderes populistas atacam os “inimigos do povo”, sejam as elites ou os out-groups, em
termos morais, isto é, interpretando o povo como uma entidade virtuosa e apresentando
os “inimigos do povo” como entes corruptos, pertencentes a forças ocultas ou
demoníacas que corrompem a democracia. O sucesso do populismo depende de um
conflito entre essas forças demoníacas corrompidas política e moralmente, e o “povo
puro” ou os cidadãos comuns que precisam de ser defendidos desses inimigos. Alguns
líderes nacionais-populistas, um tipo de populismo construído a partir da direita, de
cunho nacionalista e agenda conservadora, defendem princípios iliberais que suscitam
preocupações associadas aos direitos das minorias, particularmente dos imigrantes,
demonizados como “potenciais bombas biológicas”, como é exemplo o discurso de Viktor
Orbán, na Hungria. Os mesmos princípios iliberais permitem a Jair Bolsonaro, no Brasil,
atacar o Supremo Tribunal Federal, o Congresso Nacional e a própria imprensa,
argumentando que a democracia se fortaleceria se tais instituições não fiscalizassem o
governo.
A democracia liberal só existe de forma totalmente desenvolvida há cerca de 100 anos.
Apesar de se ter tornado dominante no Ocidente, tendo sido apontada por Fukuyama
como “a derradeira forma de governo humano”, a democracia liberal continua a enfrentar
desafios, sobretudo devido à influência de pequenos círculos de poder, eminentemente
elitistas, que operam por detrás da democracia. O continuado poder do nacionalismo
étnico, bem como a desconfiança face às elites, têm possibilitado, com efeito, o
crescimento das “democracias iliberais” e do nacional-populismo.
Da Lava Jato ao Bolsonarismo: activismo judicial e a crise da democracia
A ascensão dos populismos tem-se sentido, sobretudo, em muitos países europeus e
também nos Estados Unidos da América, embora a vitória de Jair Bolsonaro, na Eleição
Presidencial Brasileira de 2018, seja uma das manifestações de maior relevo. Mediante
um discurso nacional-populista, o ex-capitão do Exército prometeu fazer ouvir a voz do
povo, principalmente dos brasileiros mais negligenciados pelo sistema político ou mais
críticos face ao statu quo, ou, nas palavras do próprio Bolsonaro, a “tudo isso que está
aí”. A crise do governo de esquerda, liderado por Dilma Rousseff até ao impeachment de
2016, bem como a generalização da ideia de corrupção endémica derivada da
mediatização da Operação Lava Jato
1
e de sucessivos escândalos de corrupção
envolvendo quer o governo da República, quer os governos estaduais, desencadearam
um conjunto de revoltas populares que polarizaram a sociedade brasileira entre puros e
1
O escândalo Lava Jato eclodiu em Março de 2014, após o desvelamento de uma rede criminosa de
branqueamento de capitais que utilizava postos de abastecimento de combustível e lavagem de automóveis,
conhecidos no Brasil por lava a jato. O desenvolvimento das investigações revelou um esquema criminoso
de desvios de recursos públicos da empresa Petrobras para financiar partidos políticos através de concursos
manipulados pelas maiores construtoras brasileiras. O nome da operação policial acabou por consagrar um
dos maiores escândalos políticos da vida pública brasileira, também apelidado, na sua fase inicial, de
Petrolão.
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impuros. De um lado, aqueles que apoiavam o activismo político-judicial do juiz Sérgio
Moro, líder da justiça Federal na condução da Operação Lava Jato, definidos como “o
povo de bem”; do outro, aqueles que apoiavam a narrativa dos grupos políticos de
esquerda, criminalizados pelos discursos anti-corrupção que emergiram na sociedade
brasileira, particularmente através das redes sociais digitais.
No processo de pulverização dos partidos hegemónicos, particularmente do Partido dos
Trabalhadores, mas também das alternativas de centro e centro-direita, a maior parte
das instituições mediáticas brasileiras, historicamente de viés conservador, concentradas
em oligopólios familiares, de propriedade cruzada e de baixo paralelismo político
(Azevedo, 2006), operaram no sentido de legitimar a narrativa dos procuradores da Lava
Jato e do juiz Sérgio Moro, justamente na identificação do Partido dos Trabalhadores com
o fenómeno da corrupção política. Inspirado pelo processo Mani Pulite
2
, processo judicial
que dizimou os maiores partidos italianos com o intuito de purgar o sistema político
corrupto, o juiz Sérgio Moro foi convertido em algoz e símbolo da moralidade pelos media
brasileiros, tendo sido considerado “personalidade do ano”e “brasileiro do ano” pelas
revistas Veja e Istoé, respectivamente. Entre 2015 e 2018, a politização do judiciário e
a mediatização da justiça conduziram à divulgação, para a imprensa, de partes
processuais e escutas telefónicas que visavam criminalizar o PT, particularmente Lula da
Silva, apontado como favorito na disputa eleitoral de 2018. Um dos casos que maior
convulsão social e política provocou foi a divulgação, em 2016, de uma conversa
telefónica entre Lula e Dilma Rousseff, cuja publicidade foi decretada por Sérgio Moro
após interceptações ilegais, conforme o próprio juiz reconheceu. Já em 2018, e a apenas
uma semana antes da primeira volta das eleições, o juiz liberou parte da delação
premiada de Antônio Palloci, ex-ministro da Fazenda do governo Lula, um acto político
do judiciário interpretado como mais uma tentativa de interferir no processo eleitoral.
Deste modo, a génese do antipetismo, concepção política fundamental para entender a
eleição de 2018, não pode deixar de ser relacionada com a actuação da Lava Jato na
criminalização de actores importantes da política brasileira, especificamente do maior
partido de esquerda e do ex-presidente Lula, condenado por Sérgio Moro em 2017 e, por
isso, afastado do processo eleitoral de 2018 devido à Lei da Ficha Limpa, projecto
sancionado pelo próprio Lula da Silva em 2010 e que torna inelegível um candidato
condenado por decisão judicial. De referir que, em 2021, o Supremo Tribunal Federal
(STF) anulou as condenações da Lava Jato contra Lula da Silva, decretando parcialidade
de Sérgio Moro nos processos do Triplex do Guarujá e do Sítio de Atibaia. O ódio ao
sistema político dominante, especificamente aos actores tradicionais identificados com o
fenómeno da corrupção, é uma concepção de política que resultou na convergência do
activismo político da Lava Jato com o emergente campo do bolsonarismo como a principal
corrente de desafio ao sistema hegemónico. Não ao acaso, o ex-juiz Sérgio Moro, símbolo
da luta moral contra a corrupção, aceitou ocupar a pasta do Ministério da Justiça no
governo Bolsonaro. Com efeito, entre 2016 e 2018, vários factos políticos são gerados
pelo processo de mediatização e politização da justiça com o intuito de criminalizar o PT
2
A operação “Mãos Limpas”, Mani Pulite, foi uma investigação judicial realizada em Itália, inicialmente na
cidade de Milão, que implicou a banca, a Máfia, o Banco do Vaticano e os maiores partidos políticos italianos.
A operação visava esclarecer casos de corrupção durante a década de 90 e pulverizou os partidos italianos
que tinham dominado o cenário político, como a Democracia cristã, o Partido Socialista Italiano, o Partido
Liberal Italiano ou o Partido Social Democrata Italiano.
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e, sobretudo, o ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, não obstante o facto do maior
partido da esquerda se ter envolvido, entre o Mensalão
3
e o Petrolão, em vários
escândalos, sobretudo na compra de apoio político e na distribuição de cargos para
sustentar os seus governos e aprovação das suas políticas no Congresso Nacional.
Efectivamente, a baixa exigência republicana dos partidos políticos brasileiros,
particularmente do Partido dos Trabalhadores durante três mandatos, e as dificuldades
dos partidos da oposição em aceitar os resultados eleitorais de 2014, são factores
importantes que ajudaram a germinar a crise da democracia brasileira.
Por outro lado, o conturbado processo de impeachment que, em 2016, culminou no
afastamento de Dilma Rousseff, intensificou o processo de polarização política e o
sentimento “antipetista” de camadas importantes da sociedade brasileira, já que, apesar
de Dilma Rousseff ter sido afastada devido a crimes de responsabilidade fiscal, foram as
várias acusações de corrupção relacionadas com o desvio de dinheiro público da estatal
Petrobras para o financiamento ilícito de campanhas eleitorais, que instigaram a
cobertura adversária dos media e as manifestações populares pró-impeachment que
ocorreram entre 2015 e 2016 (Prior, 2020). Ora, em um contexto de crise de
governabilidade, de avanço das investigações da Lava Jato e de manifestações populares
anti-política, Jair Bolsonaro, uma figura surgida nas margens do espectro mais radical da
direita política brasileira, emerge como a principal alternativa anti-sistema, como o
representante legítimo dos “puros”, do “cidadão de bem”, contra os “impuros”,
representados pela esquerda e por alguns movimentos sociais progressistas envolvidos
na defesa de grupos minoritários.
Apesar de ter surgido das franjas políticas mais conservadores e minoritárias, Jair
Bolsonaro foi capaz de se assumir como a principal figura anti-política e anti-petista,
recorrendo ao moralismo e ao messianismo como principais estratégias políticas,
instigando sentimentos de indignação frente à política e assumindo a necessidade de
purgar o sistema e de moralizar a sociedade, ameaçada por comportamentos apontados
como desviantes e contrários à identidade brasileira. O avanço da extrema-direita como
principal força reacionária, respondeu ao sentimento punitivo da política, à punição dos
políticos corruptos como principal demanda da sociedade. Em conjunto, os factores
elencados anteriormente abriram uma brecha considerável para o nacional-populismo de
Bolsonaro, aquilo que Eatwell e Goodwin apelidam de “base de potencial”, devido ao
elevado número de brasileiros que deixaram de se identificar com os políticos instalados.
Se, até ao início de 2018, Jair Bolsonaro ocupou as margens do espaço político, ficando
conhecido por criticar as instituições da democracia, pela defesa da ditadura militar
(1964-1985) e por discursos racistas e até misóginos, discursos que, no entanto, lhe
valeram ampla visibilidade mediática, com o fracasso do projecto centrista, em boa parte
devido à impopularidade do governo liderado por Michel Temer após o afastamento de
Dilma Rousseff, os grupos mediáticos, empresariais e conservadores, chegaram à
conclusão que apoiar o ex-capitão do Exército era a única forma de derrotar o projecto
da esquerda, liderado por Fernando Haddad, ex-prefeito de São Paulo, em substituição
de Lula da Silva. Foi neste contexto que surgiu um certo pânico moral na sociedade
3
Esquema de corrupção que desviava dinheiro público para comprar o apoio político de parlamentares ao
governo do Partido dos Trabalhadores. O esquema de corrupção começou em 2002 e só foi revelado em
2005, após uma entrevista do deputado Roberto Jefferson ao jornal Folha de S. Paulo.
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brasileira, em boa parte sustentado pelo medo ao comunismo, tal como havia sucedido
nos anos 50 e 60, e pela disseminação de informações falsas nos media digitais, como a
polémica relacionada com o kit gay
4
nas escolas, e outros exemplos de uma alegada
imoralidade social fomentada pelos grupos de esquerda e que estaria a ameaçar
instituições como a família, a escola ou a religião.
Nessa operação, Bolsonaro e Moro são apresentados como fonte de pureza
ética e também moral. O campo da cultura é integrado ao da luta
anticorrupção e emergem os puros absolutos durante a campanha eleitoral
de 2018, sempre em contraposição ao PT e à esquerda, apresentados como
centro da corrupção (Avritzer, 2020: 151).
Novas direitas, bolsonarismo e neofascismo
Ora, é neste contexto que a expressão “nova direita” ganhou força, a par de outras
expressões que têm sido utilizadas para interpretar a ascensão do bolsonarismo, como
os termos “maré conservadora”, “autoritarismo” ou “neofascismo”. A formação da nova
direita brasileira é um fenómeno complexo que envolve questões como o desgaste
político do Partido dos Trabalhadores relacionado, sobretudo, com o fenómeno da
corrupção e com a mediatização da Operação Lava Jato, a defesa de uma agenda social
conservadora inerente à contrariedade a uma agenda de costumes, como os temas do
aborto ou da despenalização da maconha, e a formação de grupos parlamentares de viés
conservador, como a bancada BBB, termo utilizado para se referir, conjuntamente, às
bancadas armamentista, da bala, bancada evangélica, da bíblia, e bancada ruralista, do
boi. Nas palavras de Odilon Neto:
Os tempos mais recentes no cenário político brasileiro evidenciam o
crescimento da atividade de pequenas e médias organizações e, em especial,
de um discurso e imaginário político de extrema-direita, com capilaridade na
sociedade. Permeados pela misoginia, em contrariedade às políticas sociais e
de distribuição de renda, assim como o desprezo aos direitos humanos, esses
agrupamentos partilham elementos de continuidade de uma cultura política
autoritária, em que o anti-comunismo é um elemento de engrenagem
sistmica, de culto à liderança e de escolha de “salvadores da pátria” (Neto,
2020: 160).
O período de hegemonia das forças de esquerda no contexto latino-americano e,
particularmente, brasileiro, resultou na progressiva articulação de movimentos
autoritários e conservadores, desenvolvidos antes e após a lenta transição democrática,
em torno de um discurso de oposição às pautas progressistas, ao imaginário do
“marxismo cultural” e ao suposto avanço do comunismo no Brasil. O aprofundamento da
crise política, sobretudo após o impeachment de Dilma Rousseff, fomentou o surgimento
4
Expressão pejorativa utilizada por Jair Bolsonaro para se referir ao projecto Escola sem Homofobia do
governo federal brasileiro, material didático para professores e alunos sobre os direitos humanos da
comunidade LGBT. Jair Bolsonaro apelidou o seu opositor, Fernando Haddad, de ser o candidato do kit gay,
acusando-o, falsamente, de ter incluído no programa livros sexuais para serem distribuídos nas escolas com
o intuito de sexualizar os jovens e implementar ideologia de género.
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de lideranças políticas mais radicais, como a Frente Nacionalista, fundada em Curitiba,
com inspiração no fascismo italiano e no integralismo de Plínio Salgado. O integralismo
brasileiro foi a maior força fascista no continente latino-americano e tem persistido como
o principal referencial político da extrema-direita. Inspirado na tríade “Deus, Pátria e
Família”, slogan usado várias vezes por Jair Bolsonaro em discursos à nação ou em
materiais de propaganda, o integralismo brasileiro foi um dos movimentos coadjuvantes
da implantação da ditadura militar, em 1964. Defendendo a construção do PAN (Partido
da Ação Nacionalista), o movimento, fundado em 1932 por Plínio Salgado, procurou
assumir-se como representante autêntico do nacionalismo brasileiro, tendo como
princípios fundamentais a luta contra a ameaça do imperialismo estrangeiro e do
comunismo.
Apesar de fragmentada e desarticulada, a extrema-direita brasileira chegou a alcançar
7,39% dos votos nas eleições de 1994, por meio da candidatura de Éneas Carneiro e do
fortalecimento político do Partido de Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (PRONA), de cunho
nacionalista e conservador, com apoio de pequenos grupos conspiracionistas e de
concepções ideológicas relacionadas ao anti-semitismo e ao negacionismo, alguns deles
ligados ao integralismo brasileiro. Devido à ascensão do PT e de lideranças políticas de
esquerda na América Latina, o PRONA acabou extinto em 2006, embora tenha
permanecido como a principal referência partidária da extrema-direita brasileira. As
actividades da Comissão Nacional da Verdade, criada em 2011 com o objectivo de
averiguar as violações aos direitos humanos durante a ditadura militar, intensificaram a
actuação de grupos políticos de extrema-direita ligados ao PRONA e de sectores militares
que passaram a contestar os relatórios desta comissão através de narrativas alternativas,
como o então deputado federal, Jair Bolsonaro. Instigados pelo aprofundamento da crise
política iniciada logo após as eleições de 2014, partidos políticos como o Partido
Trabalhista Renovador Brasileiro (PTRB), liderado por Levy Fidelix, assumem um
posicionamento mais radical, aproximando-se de grupos neofascistas como a Frente
Nacionalista e de partidos de direita inspirados no PRONA, como o Partido Liberal (PL),
que em 2022 elegeu a maior bancada no Congresso Nacional, e o Patriota, anteriormente
Partido Ecológico Nacional, de agenda religiosa e militar. Estes aspectos acabam por ser
relevantes, já que o vice-presidente do Brasil, o general Hamilton Mourão, é filiado ao
PTRB e o filho de Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio Bolsonaro, filiou-se ao Patriota em 2021. Apesar
do bolsonarismo não ser fruto directo do neofascismo, a movimentação das “novas
direitas” e a sua aproximação a grupos neofascistas ajudou a fomentar o bolsonarismo e
o fortalecimento da candidatura de Jair Bolsonaro na eleição de 2018. De referir que, na
Eleição Presidencial de 2022, Jair Bolsonaro foi candidato à reeleição pelo Partido Liberal,
ajudando a consolidar este partido como a força mais representada na Câmara dos
Deputados e no Senado.
Bolsonaro era um representante de parcelas mais radicais da extrema-direita
brasileira. Figura politicamente ativa desde o período da transição
democrática, Bolsonaro se notabilizou pela defesa da tortura e de outras
atividades incompatíveis com a legalidade democrática, fomentando a
descrença na democracia liberal, nos ritos institucionais, no desprezo às
minorias e na perseguição política aos adversários. Dessa maneira, não é de
espantar que o então deputado Jair Bolsonaro tenha sido reconhecido como
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uma possível liderança por grupos mais radicais da extrema direita brasileira,
inclusive de inspiração neonazista (Neto, 2020: 170).
Populismo 2.0: a construção da “bolsoesfera digital”
“O poder popular não precisa mais de intermediação, as novas tecnologias permitiram uma
relação directa entre o eleitor e seus representantes”
Jair Bolsonaro
De uma forma geral, os líderes populistas utilizam uma linguagem comum, por vezes
grosseira, para demonstrarem a sua afinidade com o “povo real”, o cidadão genuíno,
visando cimentar o seu papel de outsiders com o recurso a uma terminologia de “nós
contra eles”, “bem contra o mal” (Eatwell e Goodwin, 2019: 60). Devido ao facto de
serem movimentos ou organizações mais débeis em comparação com os partidos
políticos tradicionais, os movimentos populistas são mais dependentes dos meios de
comunicação. De acordo com Mazzoleni (2008), os media comerciais, sobretudo as
televisões privadas e os media sensacionalistas, são aqueles que dedicam maior atenção
aos movimentos ou actores populistas, enfatizando uma cobertura mais crítica às elites
e ao establishment. Os políticos populistas têm uma relação dicotómica com os media
convencionais. Por um lado, consideram que os media convencionais integram o
establishment corrupto e protegem as elites. Por outro, beneficiam da cobertura dos
media mais sensacionalistas que mesclam informação política com entretenimento no
sentido de aumentar as audiências (Moffitt e Tormey, 2014; Prior, 2021).
Tal como os actores políticos tradicionais, os políticos populistas procuram adaptar as
suas mensagens à lógica dos media. Estratégias próprias da mediatização, como a
simplificação das mensagens, a personalização, a dramaticidade, a priorização do
conflito, e o foco em eventos escandalosos, são alguns critérios de noticiabilidade que se
combinam com o estilo da comunicação populista. A propósito, Mazzoleni argumenta,
justamente, que a relação entre o fenómeno da mediatização e o populismo é muito
próxima. Por conseguinte, termos como “telepopulismo” ou “populismo mediático”
(Mazzoleni, 2008; Krämer, 2014) têm sido utilizados para caracterizar a relação dos
media convencionais com o populismo.
O sucesso dos actores populistas depende da estrutura de oportunidade discursiva, isto
é, das possibilidades que uma mensagem tem de ser difundida na esfera pública ou de
conquistar visibilidade mediática. Neste ponto, as redes sociais digitais converteram-se
em um mecanismo especialmente importante para contornar a hegemonia dos media
convencionais na administração da visibilidade pública e dos temas entendidos como
relevantes para a cidadania, desafiando o discurso imposto pelas elites políticas e
mediáticas. As plataformas digitais oferecem uma autonomia comunicacional que
permite aos políticos e aos movimentos sociais difundir as suas mensagens sem
intermediação, ultrapassando as barreiras dos gatekeepers do espaço público. “Na era
digital, as audiências, antes passivas, tornam-se activas, e os actores de fora do sistema
convertem-se nos novos heróis da web 2.0” (Alonso-Muñoz, 2018: 66).
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e o ideário da extrema-direita
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No âmbito das novas oportunidades discursivas oferecidas pela Internet, os políticos
populistas encontraram nas plataformas digitais um espaço importante para difundir as
suas mensagens, contactar directamente com a cidadania e estimular sentimentos de
indignação face ao establishment e face às elites. As plataformas digitais oferecem novas
possibilidades de comunicação directa entre os políticos e o povo, permitindo que os
primeiros incutam valores, crenças, opiniões e atitudes fora dos mecanismos tradicionais
de mediação e sem a influência dos filtros jornalísticos, apelando ao povo sem
intermediários. Alguns autores sublinham, justamente, que os movimentos populistas
contemporâneos capitalizam o poder da web e das redes sociais digitais, valendo-se do
potencial democrático da Internet para fomentar a representação directa e a soberania
popular. Gerbaudo (2018) apelidou este fenómeno de “populismo 2.0”.
O novo ecossistema comunicacional, composto por uma mutação nas condições de
circulação discursiva na rede, pautado pela capilaridade, ubiquidade, portabilidade e
compartilhamento, enfraqueceu os pólos intermediários de inspiração mass mediática
entre o cidadão-eleitor e os dirigentes políticos, provocando uma descentralização dos
processos comunicacionais própria dos cibermeios.
De acordo com Castells (2009), a “mass-self communication”, ou comunicação individual
de massas, é um tipo de comunicação que, beneficiando da rede, pode alcançar uma
audiência infinita, mas que, por outro lado, está ao alcance de qualquer indivíduo,
estimulando audiências activas. Deste modo, através das plataformas digitais os actores
políticos beneficiam de mais autonomia comunicacional (Jenkins, 2006), controlando o
processo de comunicação, os enquadramentos informativos e as narrativas políticas, ao
mesmo tempo que estimulam vínculos emocionais com a cidadania. Efectivamente, as
redes sociais estimulam a personalização ou personificação da política, oferecendo aos
políticos a possibilidade de humanizar a sua imagem ou de acentuar características que
os aproximam do cidadão comum. Ao partilharem momentos da sua vida privada e ao
enfatizarem as dificuldades diárias do povo, os políticos populistas conseguem assumir-
se como a “voz do povo”.
As campanhas políticas de Jair Bolsonaro ilustram a exploração da comunicação directa
e do modelo da rede por parte dos movimentos neopopulistas. Os social media foram
propositadamente escolhidos por Bolsonaro como a principal arena pública de desafio ao
statu quo brasileiro, isto é, à classe política dominante, aos partidos políticos da
governação e aos meios de comunicação hegemónicos. Se, em pouco tempo, Jair
Bolsonaro se tornou no principal outsider da política brasileira, o desafiador da “velha
política”, tal não pode ser dissociado da cultura digital que caracterizou a sua
candidatura, por um lado e, por outro lado, da exploração da revolta ética contra o
establishment político e contra o fenómeno da corrupção.
Com efeito, os media digitais oferecem aos movimentos populistas a possibilidade de
recorrerem a canais alternativos de comunicação directa de onde emergem outros
regimes comunicacionais fora das instâncias mass mediáticas, regimes importantes na
disseminação de discursos anti-establishment que estimulam a mobilização cidadã
necessária à sua base de apoio. Nas Presidenciais Brasileiras de 2018, a Internet mudou
o cenário de centralidade da televisão no Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral
(HGPE). Em 2018, o Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) beneficiou da maior
fatia de tempo no HGPE, mas a campanha de Jair Bolsonaro, que no primeiro turno das
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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 106-124
Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair Bolsonaro
e o ideário da extrema-direita
Hélder Prior
119
eleições beneficiou de apenas 8 segundos diários, deixou para trás campanhas que
utilizaram as estratégias enunciativas típicas da comunicação de massa e com muito
mais tempo de exposição televisiva.
Por conseguinte, uma das principais características da comunicação política da
candidatura de Bolsonaro tem que ver com uma profunda alteração nas condições de
produção e de circulação das mensagens, um processo que saiu das fronteiras de campos
especializados, como o campo do jornalismo, e que foi operado mediante uma nova
ambiência com claras manifestações de recusa, e inclusivamente repulsa, por formas de
interacção que envolvessem estruturas e representantes de instâncias mediadoras. A
criação, em Setembro de 2017, da TV Bolsonaro, o canal oficial do candidato na
plataforma Youtube que, em Abril de 2023, conta com 1 milhão e quatrocentos mil
subscritores, ilustra a escolha dos media alternativos como forma de desafio às elites
políticas e mediáticas.
Todavia, a principal novidade da campanha eleitoral de 2018 foi a utilização da aplicação
WhatsApp como mecanismo eficaz da operacionalização da campanha digital de
Bolsonaro. A campanha do candidato do PSL conseguiu construir um canal de propaganda
política incutida de forma directa em bolhas digitais exclusivas e de forte capilaridade,
em que os próprios utilizadores estavam dispostos a produzir e a partilhar conteúdo
favorável a Bolsonaro. Embora a utilização das redes sociais não tenha sido uma novidade
nas estratégias de comunicação e de marketing político, as eleições de 2018
consolidaram a centralidade da aplicação WhatsApp como canal de propaganda, mas
também de prolongamento das discussões políticas em grupos criados na plataforma.
Por outro lado, o WhatsApp converteu-se em fonte de informação para muitos
utilizadores de onde emergiram outros “regimes de opiniões” (Fausto Neto, 2019)
provenientes, por exemplo, do “individualismo em rede” (Castells, 2009) como fonte de
relatos que escapam às lógicas regulatórias dos media tradicionais e às suas formas de
enunciação. É, justamente, neste sentido, que emerge a discussão acerca da circulação
da desinformação nas redes sociais e da pós-verdade como estratégias de propaganda
do populismo digital (Waisbord, 2018; Prior, 2021). A fabricação, montagem e circulação
de narrativas nos media digitais, escapa a uma órbita regulatória, isto porque é muito
difícil rastrear o conteúdo de desordem informacional que circula nas redes, instalando
um cenário paradoxal da sociedade mediática: “quanto mais rede, mais zonas de
sombras se instalam nos veios em que circulam e se transformam sentidos” (Fausto
Neto, 2019: 194).
O novo quadro enunciativo proporcionado pela Internet permitiu à candidatura de
Bolsonaro mobilizar elementos operativos da mecânica populista. Ora, o discurso
populista é sempre anti-sistema e um dos principais méritos do candidato Bolsonaro foi
o de se ter apresentado como político de ruptura com o establishment governativo,
mesmo actuando politicamente há praticamente três décadas e de ter passado por nove
partidos políticos. O populismo surge em um contexto de recuo do institucionalismo
provocado por crises no sistema político, na esfera da justiça, ou inclusive em instituições
como a família e a religião. Como, a propósito, sublinha Laclau, "a primeira dimensão de
fractura é a experiência de uma falta, uma brecha que surgiu na continuidade harmoniosa
do social. Há uma plenitude da comunidade que está ausente. Isto é decisivo: a
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 106-124
Nacional-populismo no Brasil: uma reflexão sobre a ascensão de Jair Bolsonaro
e o ideário da extrema-direita
Hélder Prior
120
construção do povo será uma tentativa de dar um nome a essa plenitude ausente”
(Laclau, 2005: 113).
No período compreendido entre 2014 e 2018, uma nuvem negra se instalou nas
instituições brasileiras, da política à justiça, sem esquecer os media tradicionais e as
redes sociais digitais permeadas por discursos de ódio, circulação de informações falsas
e polarização política. O resultado da eleição brasileira de 2018 não pode ser
compreendido sem a consideração de um enquadramento mais amplo acerca do contexto
político polarizado, iniciado nas Jornadas de Junho de 2013, e aprofundado pela crise
política que, em 2016, acabou por destituir Dilma Rousseff mediante um controverso
processo de impeachment. Paralelamente, a ampla mediatização da Operação Lava Jato,
deflagrada no início de 2014, contribuiu para a descredibilização da classe política, num
primeiro momento de nomes importantes do Partido dos Trabalhadores, como o ex-
presidente Lula da Silva, mas posteriormente de políticos e de partidos do centro-direita,
como o Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, partido de Michel Temer, que
sucedeu a Dilma Rousseff no governo interino, e Eduardo Cunha, ex-presidente do
Congresso Nacional e responsável pela abertura do processo de impedimento. Também
a alternativa tradicional ao Partido dos Trabalhadores, o Partido Social da Democracia
Brasileira, que apoiou o processo de impeachment e as posteriores reformas impopulares
do governo de transição, foi envolvido nas investigações da Lava Jato e em sucessivos
escândalos de corrupção, sobretudo nos governos estaduais de São Paulo e Minas Gerais.
Com efeito, a tradicional polarização da política brasileira, desde 1994 entre o PT e o
PSDB, deu lugar a dois novos movimentos que mediram forças nas eleições de 2018: o
lulismo e o “partido da Lava Jato”. Esvaziado o centro político como principal alternativa
à esquerda brasileira, Jair Bolsonaro foi quem mais beneficiou dos discursos anti-
corrupção, mas também da própria actuação de Sérgio Moro, juiz que impediu a
candidatura do ex-presidente Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro colocou-se como principal
protagonista da ruptura política desejada pelos eleitores brasileiros, em um contexto
político e social de insatisfação generalizada face à corrupção endémica desvelada pelos
desdobramentos da Operação Lava Jato.
Operando uma mecânica discursiva que remete à construção da fronteira antagónica
amigo/inimigo, “nós versus “eles”, a campanha de Bolsonaro adoptou uma estratégia
beligerante entre “puros” e “impuros”. De acordo com Cas Mudde e Kaltwasser, “os
populistas de sucesso conseguem combinar uma vasta gama de queixas sociais em torno
de um discurso populista de nós, o bom povo contra eles, a elite corrupta” (Mudde e
Kaltawasser, 2017: 127). Um dos principais sucessos da campanha de Bolsonaro teve
que ver com um apelo a recursos retóricos de mobilização de sentimentos anti-Partido
dos Trabalhadores, explorando a polarização social herdada das eleições brasileiras de
2014 e aprofundada pelo processo que resultou no impeachment de Dilma Rousseff em
2016. A mobilização do chamado antipetismo e, durante a campanha, do anti-comunismo
e anti-esquerdismo generalizados, ocorreu associando estes movimentos à corrupção e,
em geral, à degeneração dos valores sociais e morais da nação brasileira, retratada como
estando a ser ameaçada nos seus valores tradicionais, particularmente em núcleos como
a escola e a família, associando essa degeneração a comportamentos e a pautas
defendidas por movimentos progressistas de esquerda, como os movimentos feministas,
a população LGBT ou o Movimento Sem Terra (MST). O antagonismo amigo-inimigo
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e o ideário da extrema-direita
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acabou por se sobrepor à polarização povo versus elites, permitindo construir a sensação
de uma ameaça permanente à integridade do “cidadão de bem”. Neste ponto, “narrativas
conspiratórias” sobre a deturpação de valores da identidade nacional e a referências a
“forças terríveis" conotadas à esquerda estiveram entre os conteúdos que mais
circularam no WhatsApp (Cesarino, 2020: 100).
A “cadeia de equivalências” foi sendo construída à medida que o eixo amigo-inimigo se
associou a outros dois importantes eixos da mecânica populista de Bolsonaro: o
moralismo e a construção do verdadeiro povo brasileiro constituído por cidadãos de bem
que assumem sentimentos nacionalistas e identitários. O politólogo Jan-Werner Müller
destaca, justamente, que o populismo converte o debate de ideias, próprio de uma
democracia, em uma luta moralista e anti-pluralista. Na construção da suposta essência
do verdadeiro povo brasileiro, aplicaram-se estratégias argumentativas de dualidade e
antagonismo que visavam reforçar a lealdade dos convertidos, estimulando a
identificação tribal e, simultaneamente, visando seduzir potenciais eleitores através de
valores nativistas, idiossincráticos, identitários e de costumes. O investimento discursivo
no eixo moralista da mecânica populista de Bolsonaro, permitiu estabelecer fronteiras
entre grupos, os puros e homens de bem, contra inimigos corruptos, bandidos que
contaminam a sociedade, ou grupos que causam repulsa, como movimentos feministas,
gays e lésbicas, e demais grupos protegidos pelas políticas de reconhecimento das pautas
progressistas que visam proteger as minorias ou grupos sociais em situação de
desigualdade estrutural. “Construiu-se, em oposição a essa concepção do inimigo, uma
cadeia de equivalência articulada através de identidades vagas como indivíduos, cristãos,
trabalhadores ou “patriotas”, colocados como preteridos ou oprimidos pela militncia pelo
direito à diferenca” (Cesarino, 2020: 109).
Uma das estratégias fundamentais do nacional-populismo de Jair Bolsonaro, foi a de
incentivar a polarização social e política entre “nós”, o positivo, e “eles”, o negativo. Para
mobilizar partes do eleitorado ligadas a valores religiosos, morais e nacionais, a
campanha de Bolsonaro exaltou valores e estruturas tradicionais ligadas ao
conservadorismo social brasileiro e ao ideário da extrema-direita, identificado os
divergentes como inimigos antagonistas, “marginais vermelhos” que devem ser
combatidos para purgar a sociedade:
Não tem preço as imagens que vejo agora da Paulista e de todo o meu querido
Brasil. Perderam ontem, perderam em 2016 e vão perder a semana que vem
de novo. Só que a faxina agora será muito mais ampla. Essa turma, se quiser
ficar aqui, vai ter que se colocar sob a lei de todos nós. Ou vão pra fora ou
vão para a cadeia. Esses marginais vermelhos serão banidos de nossa pátria
(Bolsonaro, 2018).
5
Conclusão
A Eleição Presidencial Brasileira de 2018 é um exemplo do processo de transformação de
uma multidão insatisfeita, porém heterogénea na sua fase inicial, na unificação de uma
liderança nacional-populista que alegava vir de fora do sistema corrupto e imoral para
5
https://www.reuters.com/article/politica-eleicao-bolsonaro-vermelhos-ban-idBRKCN1MW017-OBRDN
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e o ideário da extrema-direita
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purgar a sociedade e restituir a ordem social, moral e política. Como em um jogo
desportivo, a campanha de 2018 transformou eleitores em adeptos ou “torcedores”, em
que era impossível não pertencer a um dos lados da barganha. Desde o início da
campanha, Bolsonaro utilizou a camisola verde e amarela da selecção nacional brasileira,
em contraposição ao vermelho do PT e do comunismo, apropriando-se da simbologia
nacional e do discurso patriótico numa luta moral e emocional contra as cores e as
ameaças da esquerda e do comunismo. O caso brasileiro possibilita-nos compreender
como o nacional-populismo ganhou força no processo eleitoral de 2018, sobretudo
através de um activismo judicial e mediático que criminalizou as elites políticas brasileiras
e os principais partidos da governação e que causou um certo pânico moral na sociedade
através do fenómeno da corrupção. A discussão sobre o populismo contemporâneo no
Brasil resulta, com efeito, da articulação entre democracia e escândalo, insatisfação
popular, enfraquecimento institucional, judicialização e polarização política, factores
fundamentais para entender a mecânica populista operada por Jair Bolsonaro na eleição
de 2018. Este artigo corresponde a uma tentativa de compreender a ideologia
bolsonarista, focando em um conjunto de acontecimentos que ocorreram entre 2013 e
2018 e que resultaram na vitória do candidato da extrema-direita.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SYNGMAN RHEE AND PARK CHUNG
HEE: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES UNDER SIMILAR STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES
vrf@edu.ulusiada.pt
Assistant Professor, Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa, Research Member at CEJEA, Center for
Judicial, Economic and Environmental Studies (Portugal), and Member of Wolfson College,
University of Cambridge. PhD in International Relations, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Master’s
degree in economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, and in Business Management, ISCTE-IUL;
First degree in Economics, Nova School of Business and Economics. Graduate of the National
Defense Course, National Defense Institute.
Abstract
International relations theory tends to be characterized by a dichotomy between those who
emphasize international constraints with regards to grand strategy and foreign policy
decisions, most often associated with realist theories of international relations, and those who
emphasize domestic factors, most notably liberal theories. These two approaches are often
framed as if they were incompatible. This article attempts to contribute to bridging the gap
by examining the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea.
A comparison between the two presidencies reveals very different political visions for the
Republic of Korea. However, it also shows very contrasting grand strategy and foreign policy
options under similar international constraints. This is consistent with neoclassical realist
theory and the idea that grand strategy and foreign policy are fundamentally determined by
international pressures but nevertheless are also influenced by domestic-level factors.
Keywords
Syngman Rhee; Park Chung Hee; Republic of Korea; United States of America; Neoclassical
Realist Theory.
Resumo
A teoria das relações internacionais tende a caracterizar-se por uma dicotomia entre aqueles
que enfatizam as condicionantes internacionais no que concerne a grande estratégia e as
decisões de política externa, que estão geralmente associadas às teorias realistas das relações
internacionais, e aqueles que enfatizam os fatores domésticos, mais particularmente, as
teorias liberais. As duas perspetivas são frequentemente consideradas como se fossem
incompatíveis. O presente artigo procura contribuir para se estabelecer uma ponte entre as
duas perspetivas através da análise das presidências de Syngman Rhee e de Park Chung Hee
da República da Coreia. A comparação entre ambas as presidências revela duas visões
políticas muito diferentes para a República da Coreia. No entanto, também revela que foram
adotadas duas estratégias bastante diferentes por parte dos dois presidentes apesar de
condicionantes estruturais semelhantes. Este resultado é coerente com a teoria realista
neoclássica e a noção de que a grande estratégia e a política externa são fundamentalmente
determinadas em função das pressões internacionais existentes, mas também são
influenciadas por fatores a nível doméstico
Palavras-chave
Syngman Rhee; Park Chung Hee; República da Coreia; Estados Unidos da América; Teoria
Realista Neoclássica
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Vítor Ramon Fernandes
126
How to cite this article
Fernandes, Vítor Ramon (2023). South Korean foreign policy under Syngman Rhee and Park Chung
Hee: contrasting strategies under similar structural constraints, Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.8
Article received on September, 15 2022, accepted for publication on March, 11 2023
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similar structural constraints
Vítor Ramon Fernandes
127
SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SYNGMAN RHEE AND
PARK CHUNG HEE: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES UNDER SIMILAR
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES
1
Introduction
International relations theory tends to be characterized by a dichotomy between those
who emphasize international constraints, most often associated with realist theories of
international relations, and those who emphasize domestic factors, notably liberal
theories. These two approaches are often framed as if they were incompatible. This article
attempts to somewhat bridge the gap by examining the presidencies of Syngman Rhee
and Park Chung Hee. Syngman Rhee was the first president of the Republic of Korea
2
,
between 1948 and 1960, after the division of the Korean Peninsula into two states, South
Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
3
, while Park Chung Hee was the
third president of South Korea, from 1961 to 1979.
A comparison between the two presidencies reveals very different political visions for
South Korea. Nevertheless, and most interestingly, it also shows contrasting foreign
policy options in spite of similar international constraints. This provides support to the
idea that grand strategy and foreign policy are fundamentally determined by structural
factors and international pressures but are also influenced by domestic agenda setting.
This is consistent with the neoclassical realist approach to international politics that
argues that grand strategy and foreign policy decisions are fundamentally determined by
changes in the structure of the international system but are also dependent on domestic
factors and allow states to pursue different policy options (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell,
2016; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009).
The article proceeds as follows: After a brief introduction, I present the context of the
first years of South Korea after the division of the Korean Peninsula, underlying the
regional setting and the main international pressures. Following that, I examine the
presidency of Syngman Rhee in terms of his policy options. After that, I lay out the
circumstances that allowed Park Chung Hee to gain power in South Korea, as well as his
political vision and strategy for South Korea. Next, I detail Park Chung Hee’s foreign
policy decisions relative to South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. This is
1
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2
Hereafter, South Korea.
3
Henceforth, North Korea.
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followed by an analysis of the consequences of South Korea re-establishing relations with
Japan. The last section examines the motivations and the consequences of Park Chung
Hee’s implementation of the Yushin Constitution. The article concludes with a
presentation of the main conclusions.
The neoclassical realist framework
The main idea behind neoclassical realist theory is that in addition to structural effects
there are domestic-level factors that intervene in foreign policy decisions. It is a realist
theory of foreign policy that describes the structural effects of power in international
relations. Those structural effects act as a major constraint in the states’ foreign policy
decision-making process. Nevertheless, neoclassical realist theory also considers that
domestic-level factors intervene between the external drivers and the strategic response
by states.
According to structural realism, given the characteristics of the international system and
under the conditions of anarchy and self-help “the pressures of competition weight more
heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures.” (Waltz, 1986: 329).
What that means is that states cannot ignore the conditions of the international system
and the requirements of international competition because that may put their security at
risk. The structural elements are considered determinant in the sense that states that
choose to ignore them risk facing negative consequences within the international system.
However, structural realism does not tell us anything about the state’s domestic political
process of decision-making concerning foreign policy decisions as strategic responses.
Ignoring those domestic factors would mean that foreign policy decisions are only
determined by structural external constraints. As a theory of foreign policy, neoclassical
realism considers that the international structural constraints dominate but that there
are also intervening domestic factors between the international system and the strategic
response in terms of foreign policy decisions (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016). As
such, the structure is not considered to be the sole determinant of strategic outcomes
because states do not only respond to external conditions. In a certain sense, it is also
about understanding that “what is needed is an ideational component to realist theory
that explains why some states take advantage of systemic opportunities, while others do
not” (Schweller, 2009: 230). What that means is that under similar structural constraints
there is room for states to act differently up to a certain extent.
Neoclassical realist theory analyses how and why states respond to certain pressures in
particular ways, paying attention to the importance of the permissiveness of the external
environment in determining the impact of domestic level intervening variables on foreign
policy outcomes (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 52-56). The external
environment provides the starting point, but domestic variables play a significant role in
determining foreign policy outcomes. In order to try to refine the framework Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell (2016: 58-79) identify four categories that affect foreign policy
decisions to systemic stimuli given the external environment: leader images, strategic
culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions. These categories will not
always influence foreign policy decisions nor to the same degree. Understanding how
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they intervene in the state’s foreign policy decision-making process will also depend on
the nature of the countries’ political system, leadership, political institutions, and culture.
Concerning the foreign policy executive in the specific case of South Korean foreign policy
decision-making, the key domestic actors were both Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee
at the time of each presidency given the non-democratic nature of the political system in
each case. Therefore, although there may have been other actors who were involved in
the foreign policy executive their influence would have been negligible. These other
actors did not have a significant role in the decision-making process and as a result the
foreign policy executive is considered to have been limited to each president. Having said
that, even in democratic systems there may be members of the government that may
be interested in foreign policy affairs but their role and relevance in the state’s foreign
policy is not meaningful.
Noteworthy, neoclassical realist theory is not a very homogeneous theory. Back in 2009,
Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman (2009: 10) stated that there was not just one version of
neoclassical theory of foreign policy. And more recently, Onea (2012: 4) has argued in
his study—which tests the explanatory power of the main strands of neoclassical realism
in accounting for U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War—that there are three schools that
coexist and compete within neoclassical realism. One of them is considered the closest
to traditional neorealism while a second one tends towards classical realism, which is not
a structural theory. In addition, there is a third school that sits in between the former
two. These schools reflect different views concerning “how they weigh the contribution
of structural and non-structural variables in foreign policymaking, and according to their
emphasis on factors belonging to either domestic or international sphere”.
There have also been significant developments over time. Initially, neoclassical realism
attempted to explain why states did not behave as expected by neorealism. In these
circumstances, states were seen as responding to systemic forces but in inconsistent
ways, most notably in a way that has been named as “underbalancing” (Schweller, 2004;
2006). This has been named Type I Neoclassical Realism, which was followed by Type II
that attempts to develop a theoretical approach to explain foreign policy (Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 26-29). However, more recently the focus has been on
formulating a theory of international politics — Type III Neoclassical Realism (Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 82-83). Beyond addressing states foreign policy, it attempts
to explain how those choices, particularly by great powers, can affect and change the
nature of the international system.
The first years following the division of the Korean Peninsula
Over the course of its long and fascinating history the Korean Peninsula has been the
stage for conflicts and wars, some of them internal and others due to invasions and
occupations by foreign countries, notably great powers. As noted by Oberdorfer and
Carlin (2014: 3), “Geography dealt Korea a particular difficult role. Located in a strategic
but dangerous neighborhood between the great powers of China, Japan, and Russia,
Korea has suffered nine hundred invasions, great and small, in its two thousand years of
recorded history”. More recently and following the end of the Second World War the
Korean Peninsula was divided into two states along the 38th parallel—South Korea and
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North Korea. The former under the influence and protection of the United States of
America
4
and the later under the influence of the Soviet Union. This decision was initially
taken for an unlimited period of time and without even consulting Koreans. Moreover, it
was taken before August 15, 1945, the date at which Hirohito, the 124th Emperor of
Japan, announced Japan’s surrender (Myers, 2010: 29).
The intentions of President Kim Il Sung of North Korea from the very beginning were to
reunite the Korean Peninsula under his leadership and the communist ideology. With that
objective, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, which sparked the Korean
War
5
that lasted until 1953 (Cumings, 2011; Haruki, 2017; Hastings, 2020; Sandler,
1999). The war transformed both Koreas into enemies with the war ending with an
armistice rather that a peace agreement. This is significant because it signals that the
war had not ended at the time. The situation remained as such for many years
6
.
The Korean War needs to be considered within the broader conflict between the two
superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—that is, the Cold War. This also
displays the security fragility of the region. Although from a geostrategic point of view
the division of the Korean Peninsula into two states was an acceptable solution for the
two superpowers—with both Koreas gaining legitimacy relative to their existence—the
actual situation never ceased to be a source of tensions and problems, both at the
political, security, and the economic level (Buzo, 2007: 84-85). Significantly, both South
Korea and North Korea became subject to the influence and support of the United States
and the Soviet Union for several years, respectively. In the case of South Korea, that
support is still significant today whereas in the case of North Korea the Soviet support
was replaced mainly by China since the end of the Cold War. Over time, South Korea has
become one of the most developed countries in the world whereas North Korea remains
a close authoritarian regime.
The Korean War also had a significant impact with long-lasting effects in the United
States, albeit not comparable to the Vietnam War (Cumings, 2011: 205-222). The most
significant is, in all probability, the approval and implementation of NSC-68 with very
important and lasting implications for the American military-industrial complex. The
change from the previous containment strategy that had been developed by George
Kennan to NSC-68 suggested that the military component should play an important role
in the containment doctrine, even at times when the United States was not at war, in
order to ensure the country’s preparedness to intervene militarily when deemed
necessary.
4
Henceforth, United States or U.S.
5
During this conflict, South Korea was supported by the United States while North Korea was essentially
supported by the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent by the Popular Republic of China, henceforth China.
6
It should be noted that an attempt to sign a formal peace treaty only occurred during the inter-Korean
summit on April 27, 2018, between Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae In, with the signing of the Panmunjom
Declaration under the auspices of the United States and China. This declaration involved an agreement
about mutual efforts and actions for transforming the 1953 armistice agreement into a formal peace treaty.
Later, during the 2018 Trump-Kim Jong Un summit a Joint Statement was also signed reaffirming the
Panmunjom Declaration.
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Syngman Rhee, the recurrent idea of reunification, and the North
American support
In addition to Kim Il Sung, Syngman Rhee also displayed intentions of reunification. In
fact, he pressured the U.S. authorities several times to prolong the war with that
objective, inclusively delivering speeches to that avail (Seth, 2011: 331). This was largely
due to fears of North Korea because he was aware of Kim Il Sung’s intentions.
Furthermore, since the end of the Korean War, and even after the signing of the
ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement in October of 1953
7
, he continued to struggle
between the need for U.S. support in economic and security terms—which he never
questioned—and the will to achieve reunification. In fact, the signing of the ROK/U.S.
Mutual Security Agreement resulted largely from Syngman Rhee’s pressuring President
Eisenhower to have security guaranties from the United States against external enemies,
in particular North Korea (Kim, 2012: 446). However, it often became a source of tension
between himself and Eisenhower, with the former having tried to convince the latter to
agree to an invasion of North Korea, albeit without success. Noteworthy, the sentiment
towards reunification at the time was shared by the majority of the South Korean
population (Seth, 2011: 480).
However, the United States did not share the same view and did not wish to get involved
in another war. According to Cha (2016: 4), the reason for the ROK/U.S. Mutual Security
Agreement at the time—as with the case of the similar agreement in 1954 with the
Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek—was not only to contain the spread of
communism, but also to avoid these countries engaging war with North Korea and China,
respectively. In the particular case of North and South Korea it was essentially to avoid
any attempt of reunification by force. The alternative would probably involve the United
States in a generalized war in the region, which was negatively viewed for several
reasons, in particular because the major concern of the United Sates at the time was
Western Europe.
At any event, the Korean War ended up strengthening Syngman Rhee with respect to his
presidency due to his popularity and in spite of the existence of a strong political domestic
opposition, particularly at the National Assembly. At the time, the South Korean
population was also focused on family issues attempting to survive in the aftermath of
the war and all of its impact in terms of the endured suffering (Buzo, 2007: 95). His
popularity may be somewhat puzzling given that the regime was quite authoritarian and
conservative. Nevertheless, Syngman Rhee was profoundly anti-communist and very
weary of North Korea, which was valued by a large proportion of the South Korean
population. This was because there were a number of occasions when North Korea
considered the possibility of reverting the situation of the Korean War and reunite the
whole Korean Peninsula under its communist regime (Buzo, 2007: 91). The domestic
support provided by the general population to Syngman Rhee in terms of his stance
7
The ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement was established in October 1953, although many sources
consider that it was only signed in the beginning of 1954.
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towards North Korea can be considered as an example of domestic factors influencing
foreign policy decisions.
Concerning foreign policy and economic development, Syngman Rhee was a very inward-
looking leader. He was very nationalist and never really revealed any serious intention
to internationalize South Korea. This is somewhat surprising given that he had been
educated in the United States and lived there for several years (Seth, 2010: 96).
8
Furthermore, because of his memories of the Japanese invasion, which occurred between
1910 and 1945, he always refused to re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations
with Japan and never attempted to establish external relations with other countries—
besides the United States—that could eventually lead to a stronger economic growth and
development, as well as a greater autonomy of the country. The re-establishment of
relations between South Korea and Japan would have strongly benefited South Korea in
terms of its economic development as later occurred under Park Chung Hee (Kim, 2012:
447-448). Syngman Rhee’s main concern was to maintain the United States’ support to
South Korea with respect to the economy and security.
Syngman Rhee’s regime was also quite corrupt, which generated great dissatisfaction
from a significant part of the South Korean population, particularly in light of the slow
economic recovery after the Korean War. Overtime, Syngman Rhee’s overall domestic
support fell, particularly as the rural population, which tended to support him the most,
started migrating to the cities. The urban population was significantly more critical of
corruption and of the slow economic recovery, and that clearly weakened the regime over
time (Seth, 2011: 374-375). As a result, South Koreans began to contest and challenge
the regime and several public demonstrations, notably by students, took place at the
time. Many were repressed but despite that they did not become less intense, quite the
opposite. Ultimately, Syngman Rhee resigned in 1960 (Buzo, 2007: 98). After his demise,
a parliamentary regime followed, the Second Republic under President Yun Posun—pro-
western and democratic. Nevertheless, Posun’s presidential term was a short one, from
August 13, 1960, to March 24, 1962, as public demonstrations and instability continued.
Syngman Rhee’s legacy is still very debated and disputed. To some, he was the founder
of South Korea and the president who saved the country from communism. With his
conservative stance, he was able to protect South Korea from negative foreign influence.
But to others, he was just a dictator, clinging to power, someone who opted for a “divide
and rule strategy” and who failed to develop the country (Kim, 2012: 428). Others
consider him a patriotic leader, always searching for an opportunity to reunite the Korean
Peninsula (Seth, 2011: 376).
The politics and strategy of Park Chung Hee
Park Chung Hee rose to power on May 16, 1961, through a military coup and following
the democratic attempt by President Yun Posun, and at a time when street
demonstrations were increasingly violent (Seth, 2011: 339). He remains a controversial
figure but one that played a very significant part in South Korea’s history (Podoler, 2016).
8
Syngman Rhee held a BA degree from George Washington University, a master’s degree from Harvard
University, and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.
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His background and education were very different from Syngman Rhee. He was born in
1917 to a poor rural family and he was the youngest of seven brothers. Early in his life
he showed academic ability, particularly at the Taegu Normal School, where he was
admitted in 1932 (Buzo, 2007: 106). Later, he gained access to the Manchukuo Military
Academy and served as a military officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. He
commissioned as a second lieutenant from 1944 until having been demobilised in 1946.
Following that, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1948, reprieved and dismissed
from the Army, after being implicated in the Yosu military rebellion. He was later rehired
as a civilian, then reinstated after the outbreak of the Korean War, and finished the war
as a Brigadier general. By May 1961, he had advanced to the rank of Major-general.
From a political point of view, although Park Chung Hee considered himself a democrat,
he was neither a liberal nor a democrat. In fact, he was favourable to an excessive
concentration of power at the presidential level and considered that the liberal and
democratic system led to social fragmentation (Moon and Jun, 2011: 125).
Park Chung Hee frequently compared the presidency of Syngman Rhee to a democratic
and corrupt system, very incompetent and divisive, and one that had been incapable of
addressing the external challenges facing South Korea, such as had occurred with the
Joseon Dynasty, which had not been able to prevent the Japanese invasion in 1910 (Park,
1970: 121). He considered Syngman Rhee a dictator who had worn down South Korea
during his twelve years of presidency (Hee, 1970b: 166). Differently, he aimed at
constructing a self-sufficient South Korea, independent of other countries. In his view
there was a need for South Korea to be more assertive in the international sphere and
to be able to be more autonomous and self-reliable. In one of his works he states, in
what seems to be a melancholic tone, that: “A deep regret is that despite all the
accumulated sufferings, we have never once undertaken a foreign excursion by turning
the tide” (Hee, 1970a: 166).
However, although Park Chung Hee would like to see South Korea as an autonomous
country the reality was that the dependency relative to the United States was almost
complete. As a result, any withdrawal of the United States from South Korea at the time
would have led in all probability to an annexation by North Korea. During the 1950s, U.S.
aid to South Korea amounted to more than fifty percent of the government national
yearly budget and about seventy-two percent of the defence budget (Baek, 1982: 118).
Support in terms of infrastructures included around five hundred economic consultants
responsible for controlling financial support. Because of this dependency, the United
States largely controlled the economic policy of the South Korean government (Kim and
Baik, 2011: 58). Notwithstanding, the capacity of the United States to enforce certain
policies and measures on the South Korean government in order to achieve certain
specific goals was somewhat limited due to the existing international pressures that also
gave the South Korean regime some leverage. In effect, the United States were
constantly confronted with somewhat conflicting priorities. On the one hand, there was
the need to defend South Korea against foreign threats as part of the strategy of
containment during the Cold War. On the other hand, the existing will to foster
democratic and liberal values that were associated with progress and development was
also paramount in terms of legitimising domestically U.S. support to South Korea (Dueck,
2006: 84).
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More importantly, there was always great difficulty in terms of accounting for, on the one
hand, the security concerns and, on the other, the development and cultural choices.
Much of that resulted from diverging views on each part concerning different priorities
relative to reforms and economic policy measures. Often, South Korean leaders were
primarily concerned with essentially obtaining as much support as possible from the
United States for as long as possible, as was the case of Syngman Rhee. These situations
tended to focus on security, and to somewhat neglect the creation of the necessary
conditions for South Korea to be able to gain more autonomy. However, the country’s
economic conditions also constrained the U.S. authorities to accommodate certain
positions on the part of those leaders because the costs of withdrawal for the United
States were also high (Kim and Baik, 2011: 59). What this all meant was that, until and
during the early 1960s, South Korea faced a complex dilemma given that the country
needed to withstand U.S. influence in order to obtain its support but did not achieve the
much-needed economic development. Nonetheless, the United States was also unable to
reap the expected benefits from the development of South Korea, which raised the costs
of a possible U.S. withdrawal given the fragility of South Korea relative to North Korea.
The South Korean support during the Vietnam War
There is evidence that supports the idea that Park Chung Hee feared a U.S. withdrawal
during the 1960s and 1970s. This is supported by the fact that there had been threats
from North Korea caused by incursions along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, with an
increase of around 200 incidents per year to 736 in 1961 alone (Lee, 2011b: 405).
Moreover, when Park Chung Hee took power in South Korea the North Korean economy
was stronger than South Korea due to strong existing alliances with the Soviet Union and
China. This was also reinforced by the reductions in annual U.S. support to South Korea,
from US$230 million in the period between 1959 and 1963 to US$110 million in the
period from 1964 to 1968, which is less than half (Lee, 2011b: 407).
Also providing support to this idea was his decision to send South Korean troops to assist
U.S. efforts in the Vietnam War in 1965, which was a controversial decision at the time
(Brazinsky, 2007: 132-133). It can be considered as resulting from Park Chung Hee’s
willingness to ensure the continuing support of the U.S but also due to significant U.S
pressures to see the adoption of a series of foreign policy initiatives by Park Chung Hee.
This was in order to see economic reforms and political liberalization implemented, which
were considered crucial. The decision to send combat troops to Vietnam was not without
risks given the political opposition and the occurring social unrest in South Korea.
Nevertheless, it proved to be a wise foreign policy decision given that South Korea was
also able to guarantee additional U.S financial support (Kim, 2011: 174). In the end,
although the decision resulted largely from U.S. pressures it enabled Park Chung Hee to
ensure economic assistance, to carry out reforms, and to secure continuing U.S. Military
support. It seems clear that Park Chung Hee viewed South Korean assistance to the
United States in the Vietnam War as critical, which is why he volunteered to send South
Korean troops to Vietnam if deemed necessary during a meeting in Washington in 1961.
That explains also why in August 1963 he reported that if the United States requested
that South Korea send military troops to Vietnam, then South Korea would be "Obliged
out of both economic and security considerations" (Lee, 2011b: 409). Therefore, when
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the American request arrived, he did not hesitate to send non-combatant personnel,
initially in May and December 1964, and later combat troops in July 1965 and June 1966.
That said, the South Korean contribution to the Vietnam War was at a reduced cost
because the annual cost of a South Korean soldier in Vietnam was about $5,000 while
that of an American soldier was approximately 13,000, that is, almost triple the amount,
which translated into a very satisfactory solution for the United States (Lee, 2011b: 416).
From a security point of view, Park Chung Hee got the assurance of a continued U.S.
presence in South Korea. But in addition, it facilitated the acquisition of some combat
experience and a modernization of the South Korean armed forces. Further to that, it
created opportunities for some South Korean companies to produce useful products to
support the war effort, which strengthened the South Korean economy. However, some
additional conditions were also agreed. For instance, when the first South Korean troops
were sent to Vietnam the agreement was that there would be no reductions in U.S.
military in South Korea without prior consultation with the South Korean government to
ensure that U.S. support would be maintained up to a certain level. Moreover, the United
States provided funding for the transport of South Korean troops to Vietnam (Lee, 2011b:
412-413). This is also how Park Chung Hee obtained assistance and support from the
United States to modernize the South Korean military forces in terms of equipment and
other defence capabilities. Furthermore, whenever possible, preference was also given
to South Korean producers to supply equipment and services to the United States
government. In return, the United States would provide technical support to South Korea
to improve its export capabilities (Lee, 2011b: 419). Lastly, Park Chung Hee gained
political support for his authoritarian way of governing.
The importance of restoring relations between South Korea and Japan
Park Chung Hee's decision to send South Korean troops to Vietnam also had the effect
of increasing the importance of South Korean and Japanese contributions to U.S. strategy
in Asia, particularly during the Vietnam War as the war got worse. In terms of foreign
policy orientation, although both Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee both adopted a
similar attitude relative to alliances, the latter was much more outward oriented than the
former (Snyder, 2018: 18). This is a relevant issue. Contrary to what had always been
the position of his predecessor, Syngman Rhee—who for decades strongly opposed to
the re-establishment of relations with Japan—Park Chung Hee decided to promote the
restoration of these relations. Following much debate within South Korea relations
between the two countries were re-established in 1965 (Kim, 2012: 448). According to
Park Chung Hee, South Korea should view the military system as a reference in terms of
an organization model and guide itself by Japan, particularly with its achievements in
terms of development during the 1930s and 1940s.
9
Inclusively, South Korea should copy
and emulate the Japanese procedures that were responsible for its success (Moon and
Jun, 2011: 120).
These ideas were the basis for the re-establishment of diplomatic and commercial
relations between South Korea and Japan in 1964 and 1965 under the auspices of the
9
Following the political, economic, and social developments during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) Japan
became one of the great powers.
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United States. In Park Chung Hee’s view, the re-establishment of these relations would
bring political and economic advantages to South Korea. In his own words: "Diplomatic
rapprochement between Korea and Japan has remained an unfinished task for the past
ten years" (Hee, 1970a: 156).
Some in Japan, notably its Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not necessarily most of
the population, also saw interest in these relations (Lee, 2011a: 438). In his view, the
fact that Park Chung Hee was an authoritarian leader also had the advantage of him
being able to control South Korea's internal politics, and to prevent anti-Japanese and
communist movements from developing, which would have had negative consequences
for Japan. Notwithstanding, the restoration of these relations also caused a great stir and
discontent in South Korea, particularly among students. This was fundamentally related
to the need to establish whether the Japanese colonial past in Korea was to be considered
legal or illegal. Following that, it was important to determine whether South Korea should
abandon its right to compensation from Japan (Lee, 2011a: 451). Nonetheless, when the
drafting of the treaty was completed in April 1965 the treaty was signed in late 1965.
Ultimately, the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan favoured Park
Chung Hee’s political situation, in large measure due to his demonstration of being able
to manage asymmetric relations between South Korea and the United States during the
1960s, with positive consequences for the South Korean economy (Lee, 2011a: 456).
Instead of systematically seeking to increase South Korean autonomy relative to the
United States and challenging some of the claims for stability and economic development
in favour of the reunification of the Koreas—as had happened with Syngman Rhee—Park
Chung Hee's strategy provided political and military support to the United States in its
strategy for Asia. This was done in exchange for political, economic, and military
assistance in the development of South Korea. The result of that strategy was that he
was able to bring the United States closer to South Korea. With this strategy, he also
managed to acquire a degree of autonomy that allowed him to govern without integrating
some of the fundamental democratic and liberal values promoted by the United States,
and to pursue a high degree of planning, directing and authoritarianism (Lee, 2011b:
428-9).
The Yushin Era: A turning point?
The presidency of Park Chung Hee was also marked by the implementation of the Yushin
Constitution
10
in 1971, following the electorate approval of a very substantial revision of
the Constitution on November 21 of the same year, and that lasted until October 26,
1979—the date of his assassination. The basic idea was to strengthen executive powers
in order to meet the demands and challenges posed by the economy and the possibility
of reunification brought about by a military initiative carried out by North Korea. This
granted almost absolute powers to Park Chung Hee on a wide range of subjects, including
appointing a third of the National Assembly and a virtually life-long presidency, with the
guarantee of six-year terms without any limit. This would occur through an indirect
election by an electoral college of about 2,300 directly elected delegates supported by
10
Frequently referred to as the Yushin System as well.
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security institutions such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the Presidential
Security Service (Im, 2011: 234). The regime became even more totalitarian and
repressive than during the previous period. According to Brazinsky (2007: 160), "In
October 1972 Park suddenly ended what remained of South Korean democracy". Park
Chung Hee declared a state of martial law, dismissed the National Assembly, and even
shut down universities (Buzo, 2007: 122). The media also became under strict
censorship. The enactment of the new constitution demonstrated a growing lack of
tolerance on the part of Park Chung Hee for any demonstrations against the regime or
its leadership.
From an economic point of view, Park Chung Hee adopted more expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies from 1972 onwards, but also some totally contrary to the liberalization
previously occurred in the 1960s (Solingen, 2007: 89). A system of price controls was
implemented, including various subsidies and protection of national industries, namely
heavy industry and electronics, with a view to increase national autonomy and
independence. The well-known Chaebols
11
were great supporters of these policies, which
were quite successful in terms of economic development, particularly those export-
oriented, and generated results often significantly better that what had initially been
anticipated (Kim, 2004: 117).
Noteworthy, the expression Yushin in Japanese is pronounced Isshim, in reference to the
reforms conducted in Japan in the 19th century during the Meiji Era. Park Chung Hee's
intention was greatly influenced by the Meiji Restoration in Japan and his vision of making
South Korea go through a process similar to the one that had occurred in Japan. His
intention was to transform South Korea from a political, economic, and security point of
view to make the country richer and more powerful. Buzo (2007: 126) points out that,
despite all the negatives, this change had its positives. It allowed Park Chung Hee to
project the image and vision of a strong and rich South Korea, particularly from a
militarily point of view, which was, in some way, a feeling shared by many South Koreans
and much like what was happening in Japan at the time.
There is a debate as to whether these political changes should be considered as a
continuation of the third Republic or its end. For instance, Buzo (2007: 123) considers
that, after all, this period is part of a continuity of the third Republic while Seth (2011:
407) refers to the Yushin Era as the end of the third Republic. Im (2011) also raises this
issue. In effect, Park Chung Hee's political regime had shown, since its inception, a
centralising and totalitarian tendency. Thus, in this sense the Yushin Era was related to
promoting and ensuring Park Chung Hee’s way of governing (Im, 2011: 236-7). However,
the Yushin Era was, to a great extent, most likely caused by pressures stemming from
outside South Korea, particularly the changes that occurred in the international
environment and a response to structural constraints, albeit consistent with Park Chung
Hee’s wish to reinforce his power (Seth, 2011: 408-9). That is, the structural constraint
due to the international setting should probably be considered as the major policy
constraint, in addition to the factors related to the political domestic agenda associated
with Park Chung Hee's leadership (Im, 2011: 236-7).
11
Chaebols are the conglomerates of companies around a parent company, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and
LG.
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That is, changes at the international level probably deserve prominence in terms of their
ability to explain Park Chung Hee’s implementation of the Yushin Constitution. Several
events provide support to that idea. To begin with, there had been attempts of aggression
and other destabilising actions by North Korea not long before (Seth, 2011: 408;
Radchenko and Schaefer, 2017). In addition, it had also become clear that the United
States intended to withdraw from Vietnam as soon as possible, something that had been
discussed for some time, including in previous presidencies and notably that of Lyndon
Johnson. Inevitably, this raised fears on the part of Park Chung Hee of a U.S.
abandonment. This concern was also exacerbated by Nixon's announcement of the 'Guam
Doctrine'
12
in July 1969 in which the willingness to withdraw some 20,000 U.S. military
personnel from South Korea was enunciated (Seth, 2011: 407). Furthermore, in 1971
there was a rapprochement between the United States and China through President
Nixon with Mao Zedong. Kissinger's visit to Beijing prompted Park Chung Hee to ask in
front of Western media, "How long can we trust the United States?" (Oberdorfer and
Carlin, 2014: 11). Park Chung Hee sought at the time to obtain assurances that the U.S.
rapprochement with China would not affect U.S. relations with South Korea, but the
response was delaying, which led him to say that what was happening endangered the
survival of the South Korean people. Following the announcement of the 'Guam Doctrine'
and the rapprochement between the U.S. and China South Korea begun the development
of a nuclear program during the first half of the 1970s. However, it never reached nuclear
capabilities due to the efforts and pressures on the part of the United States against
proliferation by South Korea and all the support granted in terms of security (Siler, 1998).
Conclusion
The question whether grand strategy and foreign policy can essentially be explained by
structural factors, that is, essentially by international pressures, or by domestic factors
may seem blurred. The argument here is that it seems reasonable to start by analysing
the position of a specific country within the international system and consider that
structural factors play a determining role in grand strategy and foreign policy decisions.
However, structural factors alone are often not sufficient for a full explanation and agency
also needs to be taken into consideration. This is the approach underlying neoclassical
realist theory.
In essence, neoclassical theorizing considers that external constraints prevail when it
comes to foreign policy decisions, similar to what occurs with neorealism. In that sense,
it is a structural realist theory. Nevertheless, it also considers that there is a domestic
component to the formulation and decision-making of foreign policy, consisting of
intervening variables in the process. It considers crucial analysing the structural
constraints that condition and constrain grand strategy and foreign policy decisions at
the start of the foreign policy process, but it also views the processes through which
domestic factors influence the process, namely due to differences in threat perception.
The significance of the above is that it allows for strategic choice in terms of foreign policy
decisions and escapes the determination of neorealist theory. This may reduce the
12
The so-called 'Guam Doctrine' was intended to limit the U.S. military presence in Asia and make Asian
countries more accountable for their defence.
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parsimony of the analysis, but it allows for additional explanatory power in terms of
understanding foreign policy choices.
The analysis of the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee provides support
to the idea that there is a domestic component to foreign policy. It reveals that, in spite
of similar international constraints, each president opted for different foreign policy
options. This supports the argument, associated with neoclassical realism, that the
structure of the international system plays a determinant role in constraining grand
strategy and foreign policy decisions but that it is important to complement—rather than
ignore—the influence of domestic factors that are specific to that country at a particular
moment in time.
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Press
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023)
142
JAKARTA’S CITY BRANDING AS PARA-DIPLOMACY:
BEYOND GREENING STADIUM AND RACE
LUERDI LUERDI
luerdi2202@gmail.com
A doctoral student in International Relations at Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (Malaysia). Former
Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Abdurrab,
Indonesia. The main focus of the author’s research is on the issues surrounding foreign policy
and para-diplomacy.
Abstract
Mega-structures and sport mega-events have been attractions in many mega-cities
representing their identity to the rest of the world. Such phenomenon has also taken place in
Jakarta by the existence of the newly erected Jakarta International Stadium and the recently
held Formula E and both have gained attention and stimulated conversations in Indonesia. So
have both been known as a green stadium and a green race. Integrating sustainability to
urban development has been a global trend and Jakarta attempts to take advantage of such
trend to create branding. This research aimed to describe the rationale of greening the
stadium and race by the Jakarta regional government within its city branding policy. This
research employed the qualitative method and descriptive analysis in addition to the concept
of para-diplomacy and city branding. This research found that both green stadium and race
were utilized as symbols or promotional value to promote green development in the city. City
branding by the Jakarta regional government was a diplomatic practice bringing a message
about the city transformation to be a green and global city. This paper provides a perspective
that city branding is para-diplomacy itself or one form of para-diplomacy practices. This paper
argues that through city branding, cities should be able to not only widen their specific needs
locally but also pave their global role in addressing the global challenges like climate crisis.
This paper benefits those who are interested in or are studying today city para-diplomacy and
global urban politics.
Keywords
Jakarta regional government; Jakarta International Stadium; Formula E; sustainability; green
and global city.
Resumo
Mega-estruturas e mega-eventos desportivos têm sido atracções em muitas mega-cidades
representando a sua identidade para o resto do mundo. Tal fenómeno também teve lugar em
Jacarta devido à existência do recentemente erguido Estádio Internacional de Jacarta e da
Fórmula E realizada, tendo ambos ganhado atenção e estimulado discussões na Indonésia.
Ambos têm sido conhecidos como um estádio verde e uma corrida verde. A integração da
sustentabilidade no desenvolvimento urbano tem sido uma tendência global e Jacarta tenta
tirar partido desta tendência para criar uma marca. Esta investigação visa descrever a razão
de ser da ecologização do estádio e da corrida pelo governo regional de Jacarta no âmbito da
sua política de marca da cidade. Foi seguido o método qualitativo e a análise descritiva, para
além da análise do conceito de paradiplomacia e de marca da cidade. Como resultados,
percebeu-se que tanto o estádio verde como a Fórmula E foram utilizados como símbolos ou
valor promocional para promover o desenvolvimento verde na cidade. A marca da cidade
utilizada pelo governo regional de Jacarta resultou numa prática diplomática que trazia uma
mensagem sobre a transformação da cidade tornando-a verde e global. Este documento
fornece uma perspectiva de que a marca da cidade consiste na própria paradiplomacia ou
numa forma de práticas paradiplomáticas, defende que, através da marca, as cidades devem
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Jakarta’s city branding as para-diplomacy: beyond greening stadium and race
Luerdi Luerdi
143
ser capazes não só de alargar localmente as suas necessidades específicas, mas também de
reforçar o seu papel global na abordagem dos desafios globais como a crise climática. Este
documento beneficia aqueles que estão interessados ou que estudam hoje a paradiplomacia
das cidades e a política urbana global.
Palavras-chave
Governo regional de Jacarta; Estádio Internacional de Jacarta; Fórmula E; sustentabilidade;
cidade verde e global
How to cite this article
Luerdi, Luerdi (2023). Jakarta’s city branding as para-diplomacy: beyond greening stadium and
race, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted
[online] in date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.9
Article received on November, 23 2022, accepted for publication on March, 11 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Jakarta’s city branding as para-diplomacy: beyond greening stadium and race
Luerdi Luerdi
144
JAKARTA’S CITY BRANDING AS PARA-DIPLOMACY:
BEYOND GREENING STADIUM AND RACE
LUERDI LUERDI
Introduction
Global politics and international relations are no longer limited to the issues of hard
politics, such as state security and sovereignty. International communities are currently
challenged by more various global issues and the entities below national governments
like cities have been showing their interests and active engagement in addressing them.
Cities especially mega-cities seems impossible to restrict themselves from the issues as
they are the most directly exposed to the impacts and the excesses of their national
governments’ foreign policy and diplomacy. That cities attempt to respond to them in
both local and international level whose actions are known as para-diplomacy is the main
topic in this paper.
Considering themselves as the regions within a state which are the most exposed to
globalization and are loaded with better resources, cities are even attempting to take
advantage of current trends to promote their interests beyond national borders. Cities
have been important agents in international arena since diplomacy is no longer the state
monopoly strongly attached in globalization process (Zeraoui & Villar, 2016). One of the
current strategies among cities to pursue their interests is city branding, which is also
becoming attention within the study of city para-diplomacy (city diplomacy). City
branding is a self-sustained effort by creating good images through, such as offering
excellent facilities and services and hosting various events. City branding which is
believed to contribute to multiple positive impacts to the cities is not only as an economic
tool, but also as a central element of urban development (Zeraoui & Villar, 2016).
Jakarta is just like other world’s mega-cities attempts to create attractions through city
branding towards its audiences. Jakarta has just had another new mega-structure called
the Jakarta International Stadium (JIS) which began its construction in 2019 and was
completed in 2022. Located in the coastline area of the northern Jakarta, the stadium
has been widely known as a new icon of the city. In addition, Jakarta has been a global
attention as it has recently hosted a sport mega-event called the Formula E (Jakarta E-
Prix). The Formula E is a global motorsport event whose race cars count on electric
batteries in stead of fossil fuel, so that it is also known as a net zero-emission motorsport
event. Besides having triggered conversations among domestic as well as international
audiences, both the JIS and the Formula E have similar characteristic, that is applying
the principle of environmental sustainability.
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Luerdi Luerdi
145
The Jakarta regional government has been promoting the JIS and the Jakarta E-Prix since
last few months when the COVID-19 pandemic began to decrease in the city. However,
the case of city branding and para-diplomacy regarding the new icons have not yet gained
wide attention among scholars. This paper sheds light on how the mega-structure and
mega-event alike matter in Jakarta’s city branding facilitating the message spreading
beyond merely as a landmark and an event.
Literature review
The studies of para-diplomacy have been becoming a rising interest among scholars
within the realm of international relations that there exists literature on para-diplomacy
worldwide with a variety of actors and objects as research foci. This section provides a
brief review of several previous works which can be categorized in four different groups,
such as sports diplomacy, city branding, branding sustainability, and other types of para-
diplomacy. Despite the groupings, they share some key concepts and meaningfully
complement each other. The literature that this study attempts to asses is the following:
Table 1. Studies of Para-Diplomacy from Sports Diplomacy to Other Types of Para-Diplomacy
Sports Diplomacy
City Branding
Branding Sustainability
Para-Diplomacy
(Others)
Acuto, 2013a (city
global role)
McDowell, 2022
(regional identity
insertion)
Auschner et al., 2020
(identity creation)
Jelinčić et al., 2017
(identity creation)
Ulldemolins, 2014
(global competition)
Zamorano & Morató,
2015 (global
competition)
Noori & De Jong, 2018
(local transformation)
Erlandsen, 2018
(digital diplomacy)
Ruiz‐Campillo, 2022
(city networks)
Suharyadi, 2016 (city
networks)
Lee, 2014 (city
translocal relations)
Source: compiled by author.
Para-diplomacy through global sporting events have been studied by a few scholars
(Acuto, 2013a; McDowell, 2022). The city initiated to host a global sporting event as a
reaffirmation of primacy on its environmental policy making (Acuto, 2013a). The city has
attempted to demonstrate its capability and play its global role by associating its para-
diplomacy to environmental sustainability which is one of the global concerns (Acuto,
2013a). Similarly, a study by Lee (2014) suggests that cities’ local efforts go beyond
national boundaries to enhance their role to combat climate crisis. On the other hand,
McDowell (2022) argued that an overseas territory inserted its identity to forward its
polity by participating in a global sporting event.
It is widely known that branding cities has been a para-diplomacy strategy for sub-
national governments to attract investments, tourists, and capitals. A number of scholars
have studied city branding through various case studies (Auschner et al., 2020; Jelinčić
et al., 2017; Ulldemolins, 2014; Zamorano & Morató, 2015). Those studies attempt to
suggest city branding as the creation of a new identity (Auschner et al., 2020; Jelinčić et
al., 2017) and a strategy for global competition (Ulldemolins, 2014; Zamorano & Morató,
2015). City branding has been created through transformation in diplomacy (Zamorano
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& Morató, 2015) and internationalization of local development (Auschner et al., 2020).
Despite their different case studies, they suggest culture as the main driver of city
branding (Jelinčić et al., 2017; Ulldemolins, 2014; Zamorano & Morató, 2015). Slightly
different from the others, in addition to cultural factor Jelinčić et al., (2017) suggests the
role of community participation in building city branding which differentiates city branding
from destination branding.
City branding as strategy for a global competition is not only a concern among cities in
the more open countries but also those in a close country as studied by Noori and De
Jong (2018). That the cities in the close country are open to global competition has been
driven by industrial transformation and ecological modernization in the post-oil era (Noori
& De Jong, 2018). Unlike the studies emphasizing on city para-diplomacy and city
branding, Erlandsen (2018) has studied para-diplomacy for nation branding through
digital diplomacy. However, social media as tools of para-diplomacy tended to facilitate
the conversation about independence from a mother country instead of nation branding
or identity of the region (Erlandsen, 2018).
Cities also take advantage of the existence of global fora and networks as platforms in
which they can practice their para-diplomacy more actively and more effectively. The
studies on the roles of such platforms towards city para-diplomacy development have
been conducted by a few scholars (Ruiz‐Campillo, 2022; Suharyadi, 2016). The platform
can facilitate a city to increase its branding and cooperations (Suharyadi, 2016). In
addition, the platform can pave the local initiatives adopting sustainability to gain
international visibility and recognition (Ruiz‐Campillo, 2022).
From the abovementioned review, para-diplomacy by sub-national governments and
branding by cities have been common practices within international relations in which
states are no longer the only actors and national interests are no longer the only
motivation of interactions nor actions beyond borders. Sub-national governments have
put attention to their specific needs which they run after through para-diplomacy. As the
world is facing enormous challenges and problems, not only national but also sub-
national governments have to address them.
One of the global issues which has been a world’s common problem is climate crisis.
Cities especially those in the developed world have raised their concern about
sustainability as many ecological problems grow in the cities. The studies conducted by
Acuto (2013a), Lee (2014), and Ruiz‐Campillo (2022) have revealed that how cities
thanks to their local green development attempt to play a more ambitious role in the
global stage as the actors promoting and championing environmental sustainability. Even
the cities with less sophisticated methods have also attempted to transform towards
ecological development (Noori & De Jong, 2018).
Despite growing interest in and commitment to green development or sustainability
among city governments, the studies on city para-diplomacy regarding the issue is still
limited and the existing literature is dominantly observing the cities in developed
countries as good examples instead of those in developing world. Furthermore, the study
on city branding regarding sustainability-linked global trend, especially by Jakarta is still
rare. Not only does this study have strong relevance to the previous works, it also
benefits from the key concepts they have offered.
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Conceptual framework
Para-Diplomacy
Para-diplomacy is an interdisciplinary study with a variety of dimensions. In the realm of
international relations, among scholars para-diplomacy is the “part of broadening of the
universe of international affairs” (Keating, 2013). Simply, para-diplomacy is foreign or
external relations of sub-national governments as a “form of political communication for
reaching economic, cultural, political, or any other types of benefits” (Kuznetsov, 2015).
Para-diplomatic activities by sub-national governments are self-sustained actions
towards foreign governmental and non-governmental actors (Kuznetsov, 2015).
According to Kuznetsov (2015), regional governments
1
are the actors of para-diplomacy
representing the regions below national governments’ authority such as cities, provinces,
states, and other kinds of autonomous regions with lower authorities. However, some
studies have shown that para-diplomacy is not the only privilege of regional governments
but also the participating area of non-governmental actors within a sovereign country
(Añorve et al., 2022; Meissner & Warner, 2021). Another view also suggests that para-
diplomacy refer to the actors themselves – while para-diplomacy is the actors, diplomacy
is the activities – as para-diplomacy is the plural form of diplomacy (Melisen, cited in
Fathun, 2022).
Both internal and external institutions called opportunity structure are the common
determinants for a sub-national government to pursue its interest through para-
diplomacy (Keating, 2013; Lecours, 2002). Opportunity structure is any internal and
external institution which the regions are exposed to, either allowing or encouraging
them to conduct para-diplomatic activities. Regarding the opportunity structure, for
instance, globalization and the rise of international regimes have obscured a distinctive
line between domestic and foreign affairs which bring a consequence that the
responsibility divisions between state and sub-national governments are inevitable
(Keating, 2013). A national government will find it difficult to manage an expanding range
of international linkages, economic interdependence, and the demands of policy issues
alone without involving its sub-national governments. Moreover, a national government
can only provide general needs within the country and it is the responsibility of sub-
national governments to fulfil the regional specific needs (Hocking, 1993). Meanwhile the
para-diplomacy strategy is the result of the existing opportunity structure and
motivations generated by the sub-national government (Keating, 2013).
Para-diplomacy can be carried out by sub-national governments in a various form of
actions, starting from attending ceremonial events involving foreign entities to signing
international treaties or campaigning for secession. Little does literature study
disharmonious relationship between national and sub-national governments shown by
their para-diplomatic practices. Instead, para-diplomacy is often seen as an intersection
of public diplomacy and state foreign policy which suggests para-diplomacy by sub-
national governments to be the extension of state foreign policy. It means that sub-
national governments’ external relations are purposively conducted to assist the
1
Alexander Kuznetsov (2015) would rather use the phrase ‘regional government’ in para-diplomacy study to
refer to the local governments ruling all kinds of regions sub-ordinate to their national governments.
However, this paper also uses a similar phrase ‘sub-national government’ which can be interchangeably
used.
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pursuance of national interests. However, Keating (2013) suggests a distinctive line
between para-diplomacy and conventional diplomacy or state diplomacy since the former
is more “functionally specific and targeted” and often “opportunistic and experimental.”
Thus, sub-national governments can project para-diplomacy driven by their distinctive
motives as well as opportunity structure to pursue regional interests either without
harming national interests or in addition to supporting state diplomacy.
Referring to para-diplomacy concept elaborated above – despite the absence of
consensus on para-diplomacy – this paper introduces the Jakarta regional government
as the actor. Jakarta’s para-diplomacy is a political communication driven by both
motives and opportunity structure to be a green and global city. Integrating the values
of environmental sustainability to infrastructure and events has been a global trend
especially in developed countries. Thanks to the cities’ increased role and sustaining
activism, green development has been a global norm penetrating national boundaries so
that cities begin to consider that human activities must be friendly to environment
including infrastructure provision and recreational activities.
Green development or sustainability is the opportunity structure that the Jakarta regional
government has been attempting to catch. Localizing sustainability such as building a
green stadium like the JIS and hosting a green race like the Formula E compliant with
the global norm is a regional attempt to promote the city’s green transformation to its
audiences. Such transformation is also expected to create an image that Jakarta is
transforming to be a sustainable and livable global city with more active global
engagement.
City Branding
Just like para-diplomacy, city branding attracts attention of scholars from various
disciplines including international relations. While brand is widely known as a “name,
term, sign, symbol, or a combination of them” (Kasapi & Cela, 2017), branding is the
“activity of giving a particular name and image to goods and services so that people will
be attracted to them” (Oxford University Press, 2022). Rooted in management and
marketing world, branding cities is increasingly necessary for regional governments
especially those exposed to globalization to benefit from the interconnected world
through either competition or cooperation. As para-diplomacy studies grow, its purposes
and functions also expand, including to strengthen region or city branding (Auschner et
al., 2020). City branding is often associated to creating identity of the city. Meanwhile,
para-diplomacy is seen as a ”multifunctional vehicle for promotion of interests and
identity” (Lecours, 2008). Sub-national entity may project certain regional characteristic
transforming to be a brand which has promotional purposes as well as symbolic value
(Zeraoui, 2016, cited in Auschner et al., 2020).
In contrast, instead of seeing city branding as a purpose or function of para-diplomacy,
dos Santos (2021) argues that para-diplomacy by cities (city diplomacy) and city
branding overlap as both share commonalities. Considering dos Santos’ findings (dos
Santos, 2021), this paper offers another view that city branding can be seen as para-
diplomacy itself or one form of para-diplomatic activities by city actors projected to their
local and international audiences (governments and non-governments). Despite different
views on para-diplomacy and city branding relationship, this paper argues they do have
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the same end, that is gaining material and non-material advantages by promoting or
internationalizing local development. This is in line with what Kavaratzis (2019, cited in
dos Santos, 2021) argues that city branding is the “application of branding to the
development of cities”.
As city branding shares a few principles of corporate banding (Kavaratzis, 2009), regional
governments act like corporate organizations. However, city branding is not restricted to
promotional activities, rather it is a complete and continuous process interlinked with all
marketing efforts, and it is also a common language which would facilitate interactions
(Kavaratzis, 2009). Adopting the corporate branding concept, cities’ increased interests
in branding can be explained by three reasons; differentiation, transparency, and cost
reduction (Hulberg, 2006). Cities attempt to show that they are different or unique from
their environment (differentiation) and external audiences can demand to access those
behind the brand and their policies (transparency). In addition, instead of promoting
several brands separately, cities can introduce certain well-resonated brands, join them,
and create synergies between them (cost reduction).
Branding can demonstrate local development thanks to the regional governments’
capability of mobilizing all resources, such as ideas, capital, and local knowledge which
lead to collaboration (Helbrecht, 1994, cited in Kavaratzis, 2004). In addition to attracting
investments, tourists, and capitals, branding can enhance cities’ engagement in global
politics. For example, a study by Acuto (2013a) reveals that a global city like London has
ambition to be a more active player in global stage by forwarding its role as a green
leader thanks to the local development it has achieved. Furthermore, regional
governments are currently the main actors calling for networking and search for more
intense international connectedness (Auschner et al., 2020; Zamorano & Morató, 2015).
Hankinson (2004) offers four brand perspectives; brand as perceptual entities, as
communicators, as relationships, and as value enhancers. Using these perspectives, city
branding aims to create positive image towards cities, spread certain messages, maintain
good relationship, and promote certain culture or belief. Branding is the process of
shifting the function of tangible elements to the emotion of people (Auladell, 2014).
Within this process, in the case of cities, at the beginning city governments may focus
on improving architecture, industry, leisure areas, and other tangible elements which will
evolve to the promotion of the whole city. That when places finally serve as a source for
imagination of a brand creates the basis of experience among audiences.
Regarding image communication, Kavaratzis (2004) develops city-brand communication
framework consisting of primary, secondary, and tertiary communication. Primary
communication refers to communicative effects of city actions, but such communication
is not the main goals of the actions covering four areas of intervention; (a) landscape
strategies; referring both actions and decisions relevant to urban design, architecture,
green spaces, and generally public spaces in the city; (b) infrastructure projects;
referring to regional government’s projects developed to create, improve, or give a
distinctive character to the various types of infrastructure needed in the city; (c)
organizational and administrative structure; referring the effectiveness and improvement
of the city governing structure; (d) behavior; referring to the city leaders’ vision, the
strategy adopted, the financial incentives provided to various stakeholders, and events
organized (Kavaratzis, 2004, 2009).
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Though such primary communication is unintentional or indirect, the role is vital for a
city to gain trust from its audiences. On the other hand, secondary communication refers
to the formal, intentional communication which most commonly takes place through
marketing practices, such as indoor and outdoor advertising and tertiary communication
refers to communication ways other than the previous types, such as words of mouth,
reinforced by media and competitors’ communication (Kavaratzis, 2004). While
secondary communication can be controlled by city governments’ marketers, tertiary
communication is uncontrollable. Thanks to today digital development, the author
suggests that conversations in social media meet the latter’s category.
This paper embraces the view that city branding is para-diplomacy, meanwhile branding
as a decision obviously needs strategies. In this study, the Jakarta regional government’s
initiatives, such as building a green mega-structure following current global trend and
hosting a green sport mega-event which are considered as strategies have been intended
for city branding. Jakarta attempts to build an identity or characteristic of sustainability
by integrating green principle to its stadium and sporting event. As the iconic landscape
and event are signs and symbols as well as the primary way of communication to spread
messages especially to its international community, they are expected to mold a good
image of the whole city regarding its ambition to be green and global.
Promoting Jakarta’s local development as the purpose of city branding will in turn
facilitate the regional government to gain economic and cultural advantages. While an
amount of literature suggests city branding to be a strategy for global competition
(Anttiroiko, 2015; Ulldemolins, 2014; Zamorano & Morató, 2015), this paper argues city
branding by the Jakarta regional government leads to collaboration with foreign entities
to widen local green development. In addition to collaboration, city branding by the
Jakarta regional government also aims to enhance the values of sustainability since city
branding can be seen as value enhancer and through which as experienced by advanced
global cities, Jakarta is expected to play more active global role in campaigning
sustainability and inclusiveness among the world’s cities when its local development
becomes more significant in the future.
Methods
This research applied the qualitative method and the descriptive analysis method. As a
qualitative research, it was intended to comprehend “phenomena, activities, and social
processes” focusing on “meanings and understanding in stead of quantification” (Bakry,
2017). The data were retrieved from the official files published by the Jakarta regional
government and its affiliations as primary sources, such as report documents, pers
releases, and relevant videos in addition to secondary sources like scholarly journals,
books, and reliable online sources. The data were analyzed through Mile and
Hubberman’s interactive model or technique comprising a few steps; data collection, data
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing or verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Employing the technique, all of the stages will cease only if the research report is really
completed (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The steps carried out based on the interactive technique during this research were as the
following; firstly, an amount of early information was retrieved as a start. Secondly, data
were sorted out in order to formulate a few critical questions regarding the phenomenon
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to result in a specific issue. Thirdly, early conclusion or finding could be drawn, but it
needed supporting by more data and during this stage, data acted to confirm such
finding. As the interactive model is a cyclic technique, collecting data was supposed to
still proceed along with the other steps until the research report was completed. Fourthly,
the conclusion was becoming clear and strong since meanings, regularities, explanatory
patterns, configurations, causalities, and propositions were convincingly recorded.
Results and discussion
Both the iconic mega-structure and sport mega-event have demonstrated innovations
integrating environmental sustainability which is a global norm as well as a global trend.
Jakarta’s city branding is intended to create characteristic or identity which can represent
Jakarta’s green transformation. In other words, the existence of the JIS and the Jakarta
E-Prix is projected to promote a series of local development and tell its audiences that
transformation towards a green and global city has been taking place in the city.
Simultaneously, Jakarta will be able to gain material and non-material advantages,
including to forward its international roles through the branding of such local
development.
Sustainability As a Global Norm
The attention on human activities and its impacts to environment has been a widely rising
awareness among international communities. One of the global issues that has been
affecting people lives due to ecological deterioration is climate crisis. The view that
human behaviors must contribute to ecological perseverance is becoming necessary as
it is a global public good. The ecological perseverance together with other global concerns
has been championed through the idea of sustainability and it has been transforming to
be a global norm (Mol & Zhang, 2012). The United Nations (UN) is widely known as the
norm entrepreneur upholding sustainability and ensure international communities to
comply with it voluntarily. In addition to the UN, sustainability is also championed by
countries and international organizations worldwide. The UN has formulated 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and some of which are addressed as a set of
guidelines to tackle ecological threats by countries in the world (United Nations, n.d.).
Sustainability attached in the SDGs is a global governance by goal-setting (Biermann et
al., 2017). One of the SDGs specifies the issue of industry, innovation, and infrastructure.
The goal aims to encourage countries and other international communities to build
resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster
innovation (United Nations, n.d.). Regarding this, it is inevitable that sustainability has
been infused in sport, too. Sport industry engaging the behaviors of governments,
federations, players and staffs, and fans is expected to get involve in addressing the
challenges caused by the climate crisis. Green technology is supposed to be adopted in
sport especially sport mega-events including their infrastructure. The Formula E which is
the only net zero-emission race is one of the examples in sport industry demonstrating
a green technology innovation. Furthermore, sport mega-event organizations, such as
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) have encouraged bidding countries to provide sustainable
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stadiums and other eco-friendly supporting infrastructure to host the FIFA World Cup and
the Olympic Games (Fermeglia, 2017).
As the actors in international relations are diverse in line with the increased global issues
in number, the roles of cities are becoming more important to address them especially
those related to climate crisis. Though cities only occupy 2% of the earth surface, they
consume 60-80% of global energy (Sodiq et al., 2019). It is also projected that the
population of cities will increase up to 6.9 billion by 2050, making up 70% of the world’s
population (Sodiq et al., 2019). The world’s cities are the main contributors of emissions
produced by urban mobility and industry. At the same time, they are at the forefront
exposed to the impacts of ecological deterioration-caused threats, such as coastline area
sinking, floods, diseases, and ecology-related social problems.
Such situation has encouraged cities to begin to adapt to climate crisis by transforming
themselves to be climate resilient cities. Hence, the development – not limited to sport
and leisure – driven by the sustainability norm has been inevitably adopted by city
governments. Thanks to the networks of cities, sustainable agenda can be better
championed by cities and cities – other than states and international organizations – are
now becoming norm entrepreneurs of environmental sustainability. In addition to the
role of such platforms – for example, the C40 Cities – the local initiatives related to
sustainability can diffuse to other cities (Ruiz‐Campillo, 2022).
Green Stadium and Race: Growing Global Trend
Inspired by the European modern stadiums like the Old Trafford in Manchester and the
Allianz Arena in München and followed by doubts as well as challenges caused by the
pandemic of COVID-19, the Jakarta International Stadium (JIS) was one of the ambitious
local projects by the Jakarta regional government which has been propagating
conversations among city dwellers and citizens across Indonesia. It is the first non-
athletic and multi-functional stadium applying retractable-roof technology in the country
and the second featuring such technology in Southeast Asia after the Singapore’s
National Stadium (Jakarta Post, 2021). Its capacity of 82,000 seats currently makes it
the largest retractable-roof stadium in Asia and the second-largest retractable-roof
stadium in the world, only after the T&T Stadium in the United States (Jakarta Post,
2021). The stadium’s construction was supervised by Buro Happold – a company
experienced with the construction of modern stadiums used for the European and the
World Cup tournaments – from the planning to the finishing stage which make it
compliant with the standards recommended by the FIFA (Jakarta Propertindo, 2022).
In addition to unique design and modern facilities, the JIS features environmental
sustainability, such as the minimizing of energy consumption through façade design,
restoring solar energy, recycling water sewage, and applying zero run-off system. In
domestic level, the JIS is currently the only stadium which has gained the “platinum
greenship” which is the highest green predicate for green buildings from the Green
Building Council Indonesia (Jakarta Regional Government, 2021a). The stadium was
purposively constructed in the area which would be gradually integrated with mass
transport system. It has been a common practice that modern stadiums which have
earlier adopted sustainability provide such limited parking areas that fans are encouraged
to use public transport means instead of private vehicles. Thus, sports and leisure
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activities do not contribute to producing emission and causing traffic congestion in the
cities.
Even though green stadiums are still not immensely popular in Indonesia today, as
argued by Jakarta Governor Anies Rasyid Baswedan at the interview session with the
CNN Indonesia, the JIS was intentionally built not only for today purpose but also for
future relevance (CNN Indonesia, 2021). Since cities are becoming norm entrepreneurs,
it is believed that green innovation will be the future characteristic of modern stadiums
in sustainable cities. Furthermore, the pressures or demands for adoption and diffusion
of pro-environmental features to sport infrastructure have been rising in some areas
across continents (Kellison & Hong, 2015). In this case, the Jakarta regional government
attempts to catch the momentum of such feature infrastructure as a global trend within
its initiative providing a green stadium as a new icon for the city.
In addition to the stadium, the Formula E has been a new attraction in Jakarta. The
Jakarta E-Prix is one of the Formula E series held in the city after officially securing the
ticket to host the race for five consecutive years, from 2020 to 2024. Diplomacy for
hosting the global motorsport event was conducted in 2019 through a series of
negotiations and finalized in New York City after Governor Anies attended and became a
speaker at the World Cities Summit Mayors Forum in Medellin, Columbia (Ramadhan et
al., 2022). However, the pandemic of COVID-19 forced the Jakarta regional government
to renegotiate the schedule and it can eventually be conducted for three consecutive
years, from 2022 to 2024.
The Fédération International de l’Automobile (FIA) – the global governing body of
motorsport – has put more efforts to emphasize environmental, socio-economic, and
safety aspect of motorsport (Robeers & Van Den Bulck, 2018). In term of environmental
aspect, the creation of the Formula E by the FIA is a breakthrough for future motorsport
events. Officially known as the ABB FIA Formula E World Championship, the idea of the
world’s all-electric single-seater race was initiated in 2011 and came to reality in 2014 in
which Beijing first hosted the race (FIA Formula E, 2022). The founding mission of the
championship is to promote sustainable mobility through the races in the world’s most
iconic cities (FIA Formula E, 2022). As cities are the main producers of emissions caused
by fossil fuel vehicles, the Formula E is designed to encourage better and cleaner world’s
cities through the transformation towards electric vehicles. Through the emergence of
the Formula E, motorsport has worked on a significant initiative to be more
environmentally and socially sustainable (Robeers & Van Den Bulck, 2018).
Not only is the Formula E still the world’s race which is integrating green innovation, but
it is also claimed the world’s fastest growing motorsport series (FIA Formula E, 2022).
The trend is demonstrated by the rising interests of on-site spectators and online viewers
as well as the more races and cities across continents which participate to host the
motorsport championship since its inception. While the Season 8 has recorded a 20%
rise in accumulative audience compared to previous year (Sport Business, 2022), the
incoming Season 9 of the Formula E is projected to have a calendar of 18 races in more
than ten world’s cities (FIA Formula E, 2022). Despite that the Formula E is still behind
the fossil fuel Formula 1 in term of fame, it is believed that the electric motorsport is the
characteristic of future generation in which environmental sustainability will be becoming
more and more inevitable.
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When the Jakarta regional government announced that the FIA finally approved its
bidding as a host of the formula E in 2019, the criticisms and doubts have arisen around
the project since then, from whether the race was able to bring attractiveness nationally
and internationally as it was not as popular as the Formula 1 nor the Moto GP, to whether
Jakarta was able to carry out such global event as it was the first time a city in Indonesia
self-initiated the world’s net zero-emission race. However, as the norm of sustainability
has been embraced and integrated to Jakarta’s development planning, the Formula E
becomes important to symbolize the green transformation in the city. In addition, the
Formula E provides the host cities opportunities to create branding by “having
technologically green cars racing around iconic cityscapes” (Sturm, 2018).
While the Formula E presents a future characteristic of green sports, the JIS is a future
characteristic of green buildings. The JIS is expected to promote resilient infrastructure
in the city. On the other hand, the Jakarta E-Prix is expected to promote renewable
energy. Both refer to the innovations which comply with the norm of sustainability and
have been a rising global trend. Such green stadium and race are tangible elements
which act as the media to self-brand Jakarta. From the tangible elements, as argued by
Auladell (2014) they are shifted to people’s emotion that Jakarta is transforming to be a
green and global city in which experiences of sustainability and global characteristic can
be found. Such process has involved both formal and informal image communication as
suggested by Kavaratzis (2004). Not only has the Jakarta regional government promoted
them actively, but the pros and cons conversations on conventional and social media
have also helped spread the ongoing transformation message.
More than Just Green Stadium and Race: Promoting Local Development
Jakarta which is one of the world’s mega-cities and the only Indonesia’s city with the
provincial status has been conducting its para-diplomacy actively, including in the form
of city branding. As city branding means creating differentiation (Hulberg, 2006), the
Jakarta regional government has been attempting to show the city to be different from
its surroundings. In term of development not only as a center of business and culture,
but the city has also been projecting to ambitiously adopt sustainability to its urban
planning. The results on implementation of environmental sustainability to public policies
are becoming tools which position the city to be distinguished from others. As one of the
largest mega-cities either by size or by population in the southern hemisphere as well as
the capital of one of the world’s largest democracies, Jakarta is the center of national and
global attention. This status eases the Jakarta regional government to function city
branding as the creation of good image on as well as the spread of message about the
progress the city has made as argued by Hankinson (2004) that brands can be seen as
perceptual entities and communications.
As the purpose of city branding is to promote local development, the Jakarta regional
government needs relevant signs or symbols which represent such development. Building
the green stadium and hosting the green race are the efforts to demonstrate the green
development in the city. That the JIS is still the only stadium offering sustainable
technology with the highest grade of green building predicate in the domestic level and
the Jakarta E-Prix is still the only global net zero-emission motorsport hosted in Indonesia
can bring about perception from its audiences that Jakarta is the most progressive region
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in the country in term of commitment to sustainability and is seen from outside to be
capable of providing the prestigious mega-structure and sport mega-event rising as a
global trend at home.
Both have been the new icons which represent the sustainable sides of the city and this
is in line with the cost reduction dimension of brands as argued by Hulberg (2006).
Instead of introducing all sides of development, the Jakarta regional government has
decided to pick a couple of icons which can represent the whole city. Among the
landscapes and events existing in the city, the ones which are related to sport like
stadium and race are still the most familiar and the most easily recognized by its
audiences. In addition, landscapes strategies, infrastructure projects, and events posses
a vital role as the primary city-brand communication as suggested by Kavaratzis (2004,
2009).
Green transformation is the local development that the Jakarta regional government
would rather promote within its city branding. In other words, it is the main message
behind the greening stadium and race. That both have been attracting attention among
domestic and international audiences is just a shared part of the whole transformation
Jakarta wishes to introduce. Having several challenges due to climate crisis like rising
sea level, flooding, and glasshouse effect as well as long-lasting problems rooted in the
city like air pollution and congestion, the Jakarta regional government has begun to
embrace sustainability as the solutions to tackle them. The environmentally sustainable
policies have been taken to transform Jakarta to be a climate resilient city. Based on the
“Jakarta Climate Resilient City: Best Practices Compilation 2021” published by the Jakarta
regional government, the actions to face the climate crisis challenges can be grouped to
several categories as the following (Jakarta Regional Government, 2021a):
Table 2. Jakarta’s Action Plan to Face Climate Crisis
Categories
Actions
Sustainable transport and
mobility
- MRT and LRT development
- Cycling infrastructure
- BRT service expansion and e-bus
- Pedestrian facilities improvement
- Public transport integration
- Private vehicles emission test
- Low emission zone (LEZ)
- Paratransit transformation
Waste management
- “Jakarta is aware of waste” campaign
- E-waste management
- Jakarta Recycling Centre
Renewable energy usage
- Rooftop solar panel installation
- Green building implementation
- Energy efficiency campaign
Climate adaptation
- Climate kampong
- Coastal protection
Green open spaces
extensification
- City parks development (transforming gardens to parks)
Source: Jakarta Regional Government (2021a)
To mitigate the climate crisis at the local level, Jakarta has formulated several policies,
such as sustainable transport and mobility, waste management, renewable energy
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usage, climate adaptation, and green open spaces extensification. These policies have
been being implemented through several action plans, starting from transport
infrastructure to city parks development which are aimed for social purpose as the third
urban public spaces in addition to climate crisis mitigation in the city.
Among those efforts, the most significant and the most apparent transformation in
Jakarta is the urban transport and mobility. The Jakarta regional government has been
restructuring the transport and mobility in the city by embracing a new paradigm of
development called transit-oriented development (Jakarta Regional Government,
2021a). The narrative of the new development is to prioritize pedestrians which are then
followed by cyclists, public transport riders, and private vehicle users. Stepping up such
narrative, the provision and construction of facilities must follow the needs of
pedestrians, cyclists, and public transport riders ahead of private vehicle users.
Considering this paradigm, the revitalization and construction of pavements, bike lanes,
transit areas along with their supporting facilities must be the priorities of city decision
makers. It is the opposition of car-oriented development which has been contributing to
the city air pollution and stressful traffic congestion for many years since city dwellers
rely on private vehicles to support their mobility.
The transit-oriented development is strongly supported by the policy to incorporate all
transport modes in Jakarta to a common system called the “Jak Lingko.” The transport
integration system not only incorporates the network and facilities, but it also integrates
the payment system (Jak Lingko Indonesia, 2022). Thanks to the transport integration
complemented with supporting facilities, there has been an increase in mass public
transport riders in the city, for instance, the Bus Rapid Transits (BRTs) reached a million
daily riders in 2019 (Magnusson & Rachmita, 2021). The number of public transport riders
is expected to keep increasing, becoming an indicator that the city transformation is on
the right track. That the more people would prefer public transport means the less air
pollution and traffic congestion take place in the city. With the current transport system,
the Jakarta regional government targets to increase the share of public transport riders
up to 60% by 2029 (Jak Lingko Indonesia, 2022). Moreover, Jakarta has decided to drop
its emission to 30 % by 2030 and targeted the city to be free of emission by 2050 (Jakarta
Regional Government, 2021a).
The city development needs communicating well so that it will be able to create a good
image to the Jakarta regional government and the city, not only among domestic but
also among international audiences. Framing the progress in the city related to
sustainable development – not limited to the stadium and event – has been an important
part in governing the city. Thus, Jakarta has played an important role in providing good
example of green transformation in the country particularly and among the world’s
developing cities generally. What the Jakarta regional government has been working on
is in line with Kavaratzis’ city branding concept referring to the “application of branding
to the city development” (dos Santos, 2021).
International recognitions that have been gained by Jakarta is believed to strengthen the
city branding effort. Jakarta used to be among the world’s ten most congested city before
2020. TomTom International released a report “TomTom Traffic Index 2020” telling that
Jakarta could escape the notorious grouping of the 10 worst congested cities in 2020
(TomTom International, 2020). Since then, Jakarta has been showing its good
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performance in decreasing the traffic jam level among the world’s mega-cities. Thanks
to the innovation in urban mobility including its commitment to providing decent bike
lanes for cyclists, Jakarta was awarded the first position in the Sustainable Transport
Award (STA) by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) in 2021
(ITDP, 2021). Jakarta is the first city in the Southeast Asia to have received the
prestigious award. In addition, the Transformative Urban Mobility Initiative (TUMI), which
is based in Germany and has initiated the policy implementation of sustainable urban
mobility in many cities, included Jakarta Governor among the “21 Heroes” in 2021 for
the effort to create fair, affordable, and inclusive transportation in the time of global
challenge of COVID-19 (TUMI, 2021).
Local development-driven city branding contributes to facilitating more interaction and
maintaining relationship, especially between the Jakarta regional government and foreign
entities like the world’s city leaders and international organizations as suggested by
Kavaratzis (2009) and Hankinson (2004). At the same time, both interaction and
relationship strengthen prevailing city branding. Governor Anies has actively carried out
on-spot diplomacy towards those entities to introduce several pilot projects integrating
sustainability in the city. For instance, in the separate moments Governor Anies invited
the British Secretary of State for International Trade, Rt. Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan and
Vice President of the European Investment Bank, Mr. Kris Peeters and the Europe Union
Ambassador, HE Vincent Piket to have a short tour of the MRT riding and street walking
around the area of Sudirman-Thamrin to promote the sustainable transport and mobility
in the city (Baswedan, 2022; Luerdi, 2022b). Also, Governor Anies has recently invited
and guided a tour of the U20 leaders and the C40 Cities delegates at the side event of
the U20 Mayors Summit at Kota Tua (Jakarta’s Old Town) which has been designated as
a low emission zone (Antara, 2022b). The places introduced are the examples of current
green transformation as well as the expected representation of all Jakarta in the future.
Such green development can be realized through global-local collaboration between the
Jakarta regional government and various stakeholders, such as governmental and non-
governmental organizations, business entities, think-tanks, and local communities as
frequently well-sounded in the tagline “city of collaboration.” Jakarta has emphasized
collaboration as an approach in its sustainable development and currently the city has
several collaboration partners, such as the C40 Cities, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability,
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Coalition of Pedestrians, and others
(Jakarta Regional Government, 2021b). Furthermore, as often claimed by the city policy
makers, there have been increasing roles of local communities in the city development
as city branding is supposed to be a bottom-up policy. The participations of communities
are necessary in the act of branding the city, making it different from that of branding
the destinations (Jelinčić et al., 2017).
As transformation to be a sustainable city is a long-term goal which requires continuity,
the Jakarta regional government needs to widen its local development by enhancing more
global-local collaborations. For example, following Rt. Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan’s visit
in the city, Governor Anies and a few officials of the Jakarta’s transportation enterprises
visited a few European countries for stepping up potential sustainable transport
collaborations. During their visit to London, in addition to sharing the current
development in Jakarta with the British business entities, PT. MRT Jakarta and the
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Crossrail International signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the MRT
investment and development (Luerdi, 2022b). On the other hand, PT. Transjakarta and
the Switch Mobility Limited signed an MoU on busses electrification (Luerdi, 2022b). PT.
MRT Jakarta and the European Investment Bank also signed another MoU on the MRT
investment in Luxembourg (Baswedan, 2022).
The Mass Rapid Transits (MRTs) are still the backbone of transit-oriented development
and transport integration policy. Jakarta has had a long-term plan for several the MRTs
construction projects which will relate to all kinds of transport modes in the city. On the
other hand, the provision of massive electric busses is needed to help reach the middle-
term emission cut-off and the long-term net zero-emission target in the city. Jakarta has
a plan to electrify all transport modes within the Jak Lingko system, not only the MRTs
and the BRTs but also the microbuses by 2030 (Jakarta Regional Government, 2020).
Both projects are expected to accelerate sustainable urban transport and mobility
ambition by implementing sustainability principle. Local development can drive new
collaborations in addition to deepening current collaborations thanks to a series of good
examples the city has demonstrated. Looking at what the Jakarta regional government
has done through its collaboration practices, as argued by Helbrecht (cited in Kavaratzis,
2004) that city branding leads to collaboration can be represented by the case of Jakarta.
From the above discussion, greening stadium and race has been a promotional effort by
the Jakarta regional government to uphold the commitment to the norm of sustainability.
Both stadium and race are the current global trend as well as examples of green
development which have been attracting attention among domestic and international
audiences. While the JIS aims to introduce green building implementation, the Jakarta
E-Prix is an energy efficiency campaign in the city. They have a role to provide a good
image to the whole city attached in city branding activity. In other words, city branding
as a para-diplomacy by the Jakarta regional government in this paper is to forward a
message that Jakarta is transforming to be a green and global city. As para-diplomacy is
a “form of political communication” as suggested by Kuznetsov (2015), through which
city branding of Jakarta aims to pursue various benefits. The city development is
projected to double tourists, investments, and capitals, going parallel with the progress
the city can provide to its audiences. This is line with s few studies suggesting
sustainability is the determinant of territorial or urban attractiveness (Boivin & Tanguay,
2019; Servillo et al., 2012).
Ambition To Be a Green and Global City
That Jakarta has an ambition to be a global city can be seen through the rhetoric well
sounded by the Jakarta regional government officials, including and more often by
Governor Anies. On many occasions like discussion fora and inauguration events, the
tagline “Jakarta Global City” and “Jakarta Kota Global” have been delivered to Jakarta’s
public. For instance, at the recent city anniversary celebration, Governor Anies vowed
that Jakarta has been entering the era of global city as the city consistently provides
international standard infrastructure, implements massive digital technology in
governance, hosts global events, and gains international recognitions for its significant
development (Jakarta Regional Government, 2022a). The taglines are also popular in
social media with the hashtag #JakartaKotaGlobal and #JakartaGlobalCity. Furthermore,
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looking at sustainability-driven global trend applied in the city development, Governor
Anies once declared the ambition that Jakarta leads in sustainable transportation (Antara,
2022a) in addition to becoming one of the world’s greenest mega-cities (Modern
Diplomacy, 2019).
Strongly linked to economic geography, global cities are often associated with the product
of globalization as the main driver of global economy and the push of economic
interdependence among countries. Global cities are believed to function as “critical
governance nodes in global production networks” (Parnreiter, 2019). However, global
cities no longer act solely as the hubs of economy and investment referring to “elite
cities” as there have been various global challenges as well as changes and demands.
Global cities today also act as hubs of sport and tourism, education and culture,
innovation and technology, and politics. Since global cities are the hubs of human
interactions, they are melting pots of diverse nations and cultures. In addition to hosting
global events, global cities are home to international organizations, business entities, and
think-tanks. It is widely known that global cities have soft power referring to the
capability of attracting and influencing audiences both foreign governments and non-
governments. Furthermore, Lee (2016) notes that environmental attractiveness is one
of dimensions forming soft power which affects international business, tourism, and
migration.
However, there has been rising awareness that cities – including those widely known as
global cities – not only act as the world’s development engine (Balbim, 2016), but they
also contribute to causing global problems like climate crisis and resources scarcity due
to their intolerable glasshouse gas and huge energy consumption. They are deemed
responsible to take part of addressing the problems parallel with the rising city roles.
Even current climate change governance is the evolution of city interventions through
policy experiments by city governments to have begun since late 1980s and early 1990s
(Bulkeley & Broto, 2013).
Sustainability has become a key issue as a new urban agenda among cities as well as a
grand strategy to be resilient to face global challenges. Environmental sustainability
particularly has been a common principle demanded by people in the cities to be
articulated in city development policies (Kellison & Hong, 2015). Even those which have
been recognized as today high-ranking global cities like London, New York City, and
Tokyo, the city governments are attempting to implement sustainability to their local
development. Considering this phenomenon, being global and green are two things which
will be well-attached in the future. In other words, environmental sustainability can be
one of the future indicators – not only economic power – to label a city to be a global city
which has important role in tacking climate crisis through local green development.
Jakarta’s intention to become a new green and global city has been followed by the
constructions and revitalizations of public facilities and the hosting of international events
which pave the city transformation. While modern and internationally recognized facilities
are needed to facilitate human interactions in the city, environmental sustainability is
necessarily applied as a current global trend. Through facilities and events as city-brand
communication (Kavaratzis, 2004, 2009), Jakarta has been attempting to communicate
its transformation to not only its local but also international audiences. Among such
infrastructure and events, the JIS and the Jakarta E-Prix are the most attractive and well-
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resonated with which the Jakarta regional government expects to help spreading the
message on the city transformation to be a green and global city.
While the most conversations on stadiums in Indonesia are still restricted to whether the
main fields complying with the FIFA’s guideline to host official matches, the JIS provides
more features such as retractable roof, non-athletic track, and green technology like
stadiums in developed cities in which sport has become a promising industry. According
to Daily Mail report, the JIS is one of the ten most luxurious modern stadiums in the
world along with other prominent stadiums, such as the World Cup’s Lusail Stadium in
Qatar, the upgraded Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid, the Stadio Della Roma in
Rome, and others (Daily Mail, 2020). All the stadiums in the list have similarity, that is
applying green technology in their designs to anticipate future relevance.
The JIS is projected to host international football matches which will be able to seat many
fans in the future. In addition, the stadium is designated to be a stadium tourism
destination since stadium tourism is a growing area within sports tourism (Edensor et
al., 2021). The practice of promoting stadiums as the tourist attraction has been a
common practice by the regional governments especially in the cities whose sport
industry has developed well. The stadium is also expected to generate the surrounding
economy as infrastructure – as practiced in many global cities – should not be erected
for only one specific purpose but multi purposes. As argued by Governor Anies, the JIS
is built not only for facilitating football games but also for generating and distributing
economic development in the city as well as changing the culture of urban mobility from
relying on private vehicles to using public transport modes (CNN Indonesia, 2021).
Jakarta hosted one of the Formula E’s Season 8 races in June 2022. Though it was the
first time the city hosted such race, the Formula E Operation (FEO) claimed that it has
made the record-breaking as the most successful race in the Formula E history as it
attracted the most online live viewers in addition on-spot spectators compared to other
Formula E races (FIA Formula E, 2022). Thanks to the achievement, Jakarta is allowed
to host doubleheader races in the next Formula E’s Season 9. As one of the motorsport
events most covered by media in the world, Jakarta like other host cities definitely takes
advantage of media exposure to promote itself and get wide attentions globally (Sturm,
2018). The Jakarta E-Prix has impacted both tourism and economic sector in the city. In
addition to having more tourists to visit Jakarta, as studied by the Institute for
Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF) the race contributed to the economic
impact worth IDR 2.63 trillion to the city on the race day (Tempo, 2022).
As easily recognized by audiences, the existence of the mega-structure like the JIS and
the sport mega-event like the Formula E are expected to position Jakarta equal to other
global cities. They can be evidence that Jakarta is able to provide the global standard
infrastructure as well as global events at home. As a global city acts as a hub of human
interaction, the JIS and the Jakarta E-Prix are in line with the city’s ambition to be a
global hub of sports tourism (Luerdi, 2022a). Thus, more tourists are expected to make
their visits to Jakarta and more economic impacts are expected to gain in which city para-
diplomacy or city branding has a role in internationalizing the city as suggested by
Auschner et al., (2020).
Not only the stadium and the racetrack, but other forms of infrastructure also get
attention like cultural centers, public transportation, transit areas, parks, and others to
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support the city’s transformation. Most of them are designed as multi-functional third
public spaces – the spaces referring to other than homes and offices – which emphasize
environmental sustainability and inclusiveness as argued by Governor Anies during the
public lecture on the “Transformation of Jakarta 2017-2022: Ideas, Narratives, and
Works” aired by the CNN Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2022). The hard infrastructure
provision is believed to gradually change people’s behavior in the city as global citizens
since global cities are not only about hard infrastructure, but also about soft infrastructure
as suggested by Governor Anies (CNN Indonesia, 2022).
As a global city has the power of attraction, for example, in term of attracting investment
other than by direct diplomacy, the Jakarta regional government has been attempting to
offer several regional projects to investors through the Jakarta Investment Forum (JIF)
(Jakarta Investment Center, 2022). The JIF has been a platform to connect the city policy
makers and potential investors to sustain its transformation to be a global city through
green investments. The JIF is annual forum conducted by the Jakarta regional
government to ensure that Jakarta is a friendly investment destination and to persuade
both domestic and foreign investors to participate in the city’s green projects by providing
insight on the development the city has made. The progressive changes in the city in
term of green development and the role of city branding as a promotional effort are
expected to make Jakarta as one of the most popular investment destinations in
Indonesia.
To keep the future continuity of policies for sustainable development and maintain a
series of achievements that have been made in the city, the Jakarta regional government
has institutionalized the commitment in a form of the 2022 Gubernatorial Regulation
Number 31 on the Jakarta’s Spatial Detail Planning (Jakarta Regional Government,
2022b). The regulation is literally aims to accelerate the transformation of Jakarta as a
center of business and a global city which is transit- and digital-oriented, emphasizing
the importance of integrating sustainability to the city development (Jakarta Regional
Government, 2022b). The aspect of sustainability specified in the regulation includes not
only environmental sustainability but also another value like social justice that city
development is supposed to inclusively benefit for all city dwellers. The regulation should
be a guidance for the city decision makers and stakeholders in consistently transforming
Jakarta to be a green and global city.
Not only do global cities have soft power to attract tourists, investments, and capitals for
local development, but they also have interest in extending their role in the international
level in addressing global issues (Acuto, 2013b). One of global issues the cities are trying
to address is sustainable urban development to face climate crisis. In this case, cities
attempt to emphasize the importance of sustainability as a norm and sustainable
development as a common goal not only among cities but also towards national
governments. For instance, by the G20 Summit held in November 2022 in Bali, Indonesia,
the U20 – one of the G20 pillars consisting of a few cities of the G20 member countries
co-chaired by Jakarta – deliberated and formulated some recommendations on urban
development particularly and clean energy transition and climate change adaptation
generally to national governments of the G20 (Fathun, 2022; Luerdi, 2022b).
The international networks of cities, such as the U20, C40 Cities, UCLG, and others have
become opportunity structures in addition to the sustainability norm for Jakarta to project
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its para-diplomacy. Furthermore, strong local leadership in implementing sustainability
at home contributes to gaining international visibility and recognition (Ruiz‐Campillo,
2022). Jakarta as one of the mega-cities within the platforms – under the leadership of
Governor Anies – has shown its rising commitment to environmental sustainability at the
local level as well as its active engagement in the global level. The active membership
strengthened by local initiatives has paved Jakarta to play its international role in
addressing sustainability-related issues. Following the announcement of Jakarta’s
achievement as the most innovative city in the 2021 Sustainable Transport Award in
October 2020, Governor Anies together with Governor Yuriko Koike of Tokyo was elected
to become the C40 Cities steering committee in December 2020, leading the city
organization and assisting to give directions to member cities in addressing climate crisis
(C40 Cities, 2020).
The Jakarta regional government as often represented by Governor Anies has been
plotted to be one of the main speakers in many international fora of cities, delivering the
ideas and narratives of urban sustainability as well as sharing the best practices of
sustainable development conducted by Jakarta. For instance, Governor Anies talked
about carbon neutrality advancement, city resilience, and initiatives to anticipate climate
crisis at the forum of C40 Cities Mayor and the UN Secretary General, which were then
approved to be taken for further policies (Fathun, 2022; Luerdi, 2022b). Through the
forum, Jakarta attempted to raise awareness of the important role of cities in tackling
the global issues and put cities as the important partner of the UN. Speaking before the
world’s cities and leaders has helped raised the influence and extended the role of Jakarta
in international politics. Such increasing role cannot be separated from the city branding
effort and vice versa. Based on the city branding concept used in this paper, creating
brands by Jakarta also functions as value enhancers – enhancing sustainability – towards
not only local but also international audiences as suggested by Hankinson (2004).
Meanwhile, the leader’s behavior like vision on green development does matter in city-
branding communication as proposed by Kavaratzis (2004, 2009).
While the world’s cities are attempting to make progress gradually by adopting
sustainability to their urban development as well as restructuring themselves to be
global, London and Singapore could currently be the world’s most recognized green and
global cities at the same time. Jakarta is still believed to be not yet as advanced as both
cities in term of green development and global attraction. However, the Jakarta regional
government has demonstrated the efforts to transform the city to achieve the status as
one of the greenest cities and one of the most recognized global cities in the future. Not
only has the city made significant progress in urban transport and mobility as previously
discussed in this paper, but Jakarta has also become one in the “2018/2019 Top 50 Smart
Cities Governments” among the world’s 140 cities as studied by Eden Strategy Institute
(Eden Strategy Institute, 2018). The governments in global cities are widely known to
have applied digital technology massively to manage urban problems and resources.
Considering its current local development, international recognitions, and increasing
global engagements, this paper suggests Jakarta is one of the world’s emerging green
and global cities.
Sustainability has been a global agenda among global communities, but thanks to
globalization cities like Jakarta can hardly restrict themselves from such issue. From the
discussion in this section, it is known that Jakarta attempts to promote its local
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development to bring a message that the city is transforming to be a green and global
city. The act of promoting such development referring to city branding is the form of
para-diplomacy considering dos Santos’ study (dos Santos, 2021). Integrating
environmental sustainability to the local development through local polices as well as
pursuing the status of being a green and global city by the Jakarta regional government
can be the efforts to fulfill local specific needs as suggested by Hocking (1993). Even
though Jakarta’s diplomacy in this paper is more “functionally specific and targeted” and
often “opportunistic and experimental” which differentiates it from state diplomacy as
suggested by Keating (2013), it has not demonstrated a contradiction against the
national government’s foreign policy. Instead, what Jakarta has done and achieved can
be another promotional tool for nation branding and acceleration of national program of
clean energy transition in the country.
Conclusion
City branding seen as para-diplomacy by the Jakarta regional government is an effort to
create new identity or regional characteristic of the city. Building a mega-structure like
the JIS and hosting a sport mega-event like the Formula E symbolize the urban green
transformation as a local development. As the main communication tools complying with
the global norm and trend, both are expected to present a bigger picture of current
development that Jakarta is transforming to be a green and global city which is in turn,
offering either material or non-material advantages. That “green” and “global” are two
characteristics which will be like a two-sided coin in the future is a belief as well as
ambition the Jakarta regional government embraces and pursues. Learning from the case
of Jakarta with its progressive adoption of sustainability especially under the leadership
of Governor Anies, cities have capabilities of implementing global norms at home as well
as to project their role beyond national borders. In fact, local initiatives in addition to
leadership in the cities encourage more city global engagement and contribution to tackle
the climate crisis.
There is an intersection between global, national, and urban challenges, which is that
almost all global and national problems can be found in the cities. However, cities can be
sources of solution to the problems as they are home to national economic development,
technology and innovation, and resources. Current trend shows that cities especially
mega-cities in both developed and developing world hardly prevent themselves from
current global issues like climate crisis. This paper suggests that the role of cities through
either city branding to advance local development as a local need particularly or para-
diplomacy which contributes to addressing climate crisis generally become more relevant
in the future. Many cases of cities worldwide have shown that city leadership seems to
be more aggressive than national leadership in sustainability transformation since
national governments have more restrictions than do city governments. Therefore, city
development should be capitalized to nation branding and national policies are supposed
to encourage cities – in the case of Indonesia, not limited to Jakarta and other big cities
– to significantly integrate sustainability to their urban planning. Thus, cities can be pilot
projects of national green transformation.
The findings in this study confirm the previous literature that sustainability is now the
shared concern and global agenda of cities, especially those well exposed to global city
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164
networks. The cities which enjoy progress in term of sustainability at home tend to
expand its role in the global stage through para-diplomacy and at the same time attempt
to advance current local development by enhancing global-local collaboration. City
branding becomes necessity strengthened by the progressive implementation of
sustainability and through which cities are able to internationalize such local
development. However, this study contributes to revealing that the city in the global
south also attempts to catch up with the global norm and modernity by, for example,
introducing an environmentally friendly mega-structure and a net zero-emission sport
mega-event which has missed in the literature.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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GAME CHANGE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: THREE INTERTWINED PERSPECTIVES
ON SINO-EQUATOGUINEAN COOPERATION
YU MA
captainarthur@126.com
Ph.D. candidate at the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University
of Macau (China). He has received a master’s degree in Chinese-Portuguese Interpreting from
the Macau Polytechnic University and a Bachelor of Portuguese language and literature from
Beijing Foreign Studies University. He is currently working as a Chinese-Portuguese translator
and interpreter in the Supporting Office of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation
between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao). Previously, between 2012
and 2018, he worked as a Foreign Affairs manager and Portuguese language translator in the
Department of International Cooperation of the China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC)
headquarters (Beijing). His current main area of interest and research is the Portuguese-speaking
countries
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
eurofor1152@gmail.com
Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal in
2010. From 2016 to 2017, he took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state
monopolies in China — One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded the
Institute of European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major
component of the Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he
was the Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of
Humanities at the University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From 2018 to 2023 he was the
Associate-Dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City
University of Macau. He is currently Associate Professor with Habilitation in International
Relations at Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Macau (China). His most recent books
are: Steps of Greatness: The Geopolitics of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges,
Development and Promise of Timor-Leste (2019), City University of Macau; The Belt and Road
Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan;
Geopolitics of Iran (2021), Palgrave Macmillan; The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021),
IGI Global; Disentangled Visions on Higher Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023),
Peter Lang Publishers; and The Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics
(2023), Palgrave Macmillan. Leandro is a member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign
Relations), which was established in 1996 as a center for studies in International Relations at the
Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract
The Republic of Equatorial Guinea (EG) joined the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation
between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao) in 2022, becoming the
tenth member-state. This occurred during the 2022 Extraordinary Ministerial Conference,
after it acceded to the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 2014. Since
2015, China and EG have been intensifying their bilateral cooperation after establishing a
comprehensive cooperative partnership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China, 2015). In 2019, the two countries signed a Belt and Road Initiative (B&RI) MoU during
the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, and initiated a strategic approach for bilateral
cooperation. Consequently, considering the uniqueness of EG as a Portuguese-speaking
Country (PSC) and as the newest member of Forum Macao, this paper poses and answers the
following research question: What will be the impact of Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation in
light of EG’s recent accession to FM? Methodologically, the research uses qualitative data
supported by triangular referencing, including official and non-official sources, namely official
statistics, academic papers, and media reports, to look into the bilateral Sino-Equatoguinean
relations under the B&RI Lusophone framework, as well as the fact that EG is a CPLP member-
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Game change in the Gulf of Guinea:
three intertwined perspectives on sino-equatoguinean cooperation
Yu Ma and Francisco José Leandro
171
state. Accordingly, the methodologic rationale focuses on the uniqueness of EG as one of the
Lusophone countries and relates it to the Chinese B&RI at three levels: domestic, regional
and global. This paper is organized as follows: (1) Introduction; (2) The uniqueness of EG as
a PSC; (3) The B&RI and the Lusophone Countries; (4) Cooperation between Equatorial
Guinea and China; (5) Conclusion – The Future of Sino-Equatoguinean Cooperation.
Keywords
Republic of Equatorial Guinea; People’s Republic of China; Belt and Road Initiative;
Portuguese-Speaking Countries; Forum Macao
Resumo
A República da Guiné Equatorial (GE) tornou-se membro do Fórum para a Cooperação
Económica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Fórum de Macau,
doravante designado por FM) em 2022, tornando-se o décimo estado a fazê-lo. A integração
oficial da GE, decorreu à margem da Reunião Extraordinária Ministerial do Fórum de Macau
em 2022, após o país ter aderido à Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) em
2014. Desde 2015, a China e a GE têm vindo a intensificar a cooperação bilateral desde o
estabelecimento das relações de parceria de cooperação abrangente (Ministério dos Negócios
Estrangeiros da República Popular da China, 2015). Em 2019, os dois países assinaram o
Memorando de Entendimento sobre a Iniciativa Uma Faixa Uma Rota (B&RI, em sigla inglesa)
durante a segunda edição do Fórum Faixa e Rota em Pequim e iniciaram desde já uma
abordagem estratégica na cooperação bilateral. Por conseguinte, tendo em consideração a
singularidade da GE como País de Língua Portuguesa e o facto de ser o mais recente membro
do FM, este artigo coloca e responde à seguinte questão central de investigação: Qual será o
impacto da cooperação Sino-Equatoguineense à luz da recente adesão da GE ao FM?
Metodologicamente, a investigação utiliza dados qualitativos sustentados por referências
triangulares, incluindo relatórios oficiais e não oficiais, estatísticas oficiais, documentos
académicos e notícias dos meios de comunicação social, para analisar as relações bilaterais
Sino-Equatoguineenses no âmbito da B&RI nos países lusófonos. Desse modo, a
fundamentação qualitativa metodológica centra-se na singularidade da GE como um dos
países lusófonos que se envolve na B&RI Chinesa em três níveis: doméstico, regional e global.
O presente artigo apresenta a seguinte estrutura: (1) Introdução; (2) A singularidade da GE
como um dos PLP; (3) B&RI e os Países Lusófonos; (4) Cooperação entre a Guiné Equatorial
e a China; (5) Conclusão - o Futuro da Cooperação Sino-Equatoguineense.
Palavras-chave
República da Guiné Equatorial, República Popular da China, Iniciativa “Uma Faixa Uma Rota”,
Países de Língua Portuguesa, Fórum de Macau
How to cite this article
Ma, Yu; Leandro, Francisco José (2023). Game Change in the Gulf of Guinea: three intertwined
perspectives on sino-equatoguinean cooperation, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations,
Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.10
Article received on February, 6 2023, accepted for publication on April, 4 2023
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three intertwined perspectives on sino-equatoguinean cooperation
Yu Ma and Francisco José Leandro
172
GAME CHANGE IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: THREE INTERTWINED
PERSPECTIVES ON SINO-EQUATOGUINEAN COOPERATION
YU MA
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
Introduction
As an emerging regional and perhaps also a global power in the 21st century, People’s
Republic of China (hereafter China) has enhanced its comprehensive national strength
considerably since its reform and opening-up policy dating back to the late 1970s. During
the past decade, one of China’s most prominent approaches to “national rejuvenation”
and to strengthening its presence in the international community has been the Belt and
Road Initiative (hereafter B&RI). The 2013 B&RI is a Chinese foreign affairs flagship
multi-layered initiative, designed to intensify its global presence, and an access policy
with a global reach, connecting not only markets in Asia and Europe, but also in Africa,
the South Pacific, and South America.
Since 2013, we have noticed an increasing number of academic papers discussing the
geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the B&RI on a global scale. The B&RI is a
comprehensive development strategy covering all areas that contribute to development.
It is also a comprehensive security strategy that spans all decisive and secondary
engagement areas at different levels, and is in line with long-term, systematic strategic
planning (Leandro, 2018: 344). However, there is a gap in studies associated with China–
Lusophone countries relations, particularly pertaining to Equatorial Guinea (hereafter
EG). Although all of the Portuguese-speaking Countries (PSC) (with the exception of
Brazil), including EG, have joined the B&RI (2022), the number of academic publications
focusing on EG in the English language is scarce, and there has been even less discussion
on B&RI cooperation between China and EG. This is especially important in the context
of the fact that EG joined the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), as
well as China’s economic and commercial cooperation platform with the PSCs — the
Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking
Countries (Forum Macao).
The framework mentioned above shapes this paper, which intends to shed light on the
cooperation between China and Equatorial Guinea (EG) as a new member of the CPLP
and Forum Macao based on the B&RI framework. Beginning with an introduction on EG,
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the paper then draws attention to the country’s unique geopolitics, economy, and identity
in the second section. The third section reviews the B&RI and its implementation in the
past decade, with a special focus on the PSCs; the lens shifts in Section 4 onto EG’s
cooperation with China before and after the launch of the B&RI. Finally, in the Conclusion,
the paper presents three major impacts of B&RI cooperation between China and EG,
focusing the discussion on the South Atlantic on a basis of the multiple challenges in the
context of the B&RI framework.
1. Equatorial Guinea as a Portuguese-Speaking Country
Equatorial Guinea is a small African state in the Gulf of Guinea between two larger states
— Gabon to the south, and Cameroon to the north, and bordered to the west by the
South Atlantic Ocean. Interestingly, the coat-of-arms displayed by the Equatorial Guinea
national flag, contains two very interesting elements. On the one hand, a silk-cotton tree,
which represents the location were the first treaty between Portugal and the local rules
was signed. On another hand, the six-pointed yellow stars, representing the fact that EG
is made up of a mainland territory (River Muni) and five islands: Elobey-grande, Elobay-
pequeno, Corisco, Annobón, and Bioko - the last being the largest and is where the capital
Malabo is located (Map 1). Annobón, the country’s only island located in the Southern
Hemisphere, gives EG a significant maritime dimension as it significantly extends EG’s
exclusive economic zone. Indeed, EG is the only country in the world that sets its capital
not on its mainland but on the main island. In fact, the islands of Annobón (Ilha do Ano-
bom) and Bioko were first colonized by Portugal in 1474. Perhaps because of the
Portuguese’s desire to create a large Brazil while pursuing and maintaining an African
coastal presence (Gulf of Guinea) to facilitate trade, in 1778, Queen Maria I of Portugal
and King Charles III of Spain signed the Treaty of El Pardo, thereby settling the two
kingdoms’ dispute caused by alleged violations of the Treaty of Tordesillas in today’s
Brazil. As a consequence, Queen Maria agreed to cede the islands of Annobón and Bioko
(named Fernão Pó during Portuguese rule) to King Charles, as well as the Guinea coast
between the Niger and Ogoue Rivers. The islands were officially renamed and recognized
as Fernando Poo, and came to be included in the possession of the Spanish Crown, with
the aim to develop a substantial presence in the West African slave trade network.
From 1778 to 1810, affairs of EG were conducted by the vice-royalty of Rio de la Plata in
Argentina. From 1926 to 1959, EG was known as Spanish Guinea, and became a province
in 1959. From 1960 to 1968, the decolonization of EG commenced, with EG becoming an
independent republic in 1968, and in 1970 establishing diplomatic relations with China
as well as joining the Non-aligned Movement (hereafter NAM). Since its independence,
EG has had only two presidents: Francisco Macías Nguema, and his nephew, Teodoro
Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has ruled since 1979. Indeed, Teodoro Obiang has been
president of EG for more than 40 years. In 2022, he was re-elected for a sixth term with
94.9 percent of the votes (GEGW, 2022), and became the longest-serving national leader
in the world.
The Map 1 shows the geopolitical features of EG in the Gulf of Guinea, namely a triangular
rea approximately 69,369 km2 in size, located at the heart of the Gulf of Guinea. With
EG’s city Bata and islands of Bioko and Annobón as vertices, we can trace out a triangular
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area that also encompasses the two main islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. One of the
sides of the triangle links Malabo with Bata, a second side connects Bata and Annobón,
and the third side joins Malabo with Annobón.
Map 1 – General Geographical Features of Equatorial Guinea
Sources: Paulo Gonçalves (2023) Rights Purchased
World Atlas, https://www.distance.to/ and https://www.submarinecablemap.com/
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This last edge is also where Santo António (capital on the island of Príncipe) and São
Tomé, along with Malabo and San Antonio de Palé (Capital of Annobón), are located.
Together with other countries located around the Gulf of Guinea, EG has since the 15th
century been tenuously inserted into the emerging South Atlantic network — an
important portal to West and Central Africa. Vessels and people carry raw materials and
resources (especially petroleum) in and out of the Gulf of Guinea, connecting between
Europe and the Americas. EG therefore has a geopolitically important location — it
dominates the access to the Gulf of Guinea (especially in conjunction with São Tomé and
Príncipe), provides easy access to Central Africa as it sits between Gabon and Cameroons,
and facilitates access to the South Atlantic. In the PSC context, EG, São Tomé and
Príncipe, and Angola are all situated in the same general area
Therefore, as a PSC, EG has been perceived by China as a potential partner to facilitate
access to Central Africa and to support maritime operations. This is the leading reason
why China is considering building a second naval base in Africa (its first in the Atlantic).
According to The Maritime Executive (2022):
“In Equatorial Guinea, the Chinese likely have an eye on Bata. Bata already
has a Chinese-built deep-water commercial port on the Gulf of Guinea, and
excellent highways link the city to Gabon and the interior of Central Africa (…)
Bata is the largest city and Bata port is one of the largest seaports in the
mainland of Equatorial Guinea (…). With modern facilities and two long
commercial piers (530 meters and 550 meters), it can easily handle any
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) combat vessels. Additionally, the Port
is situated adjacent to an oil facility, making it favourable for refuelling
operations. It also has an extensive warehouse area and intermodal yard,
which would be useful for re-supply operations.”
Table 1 – Port of Bata (EG)
Source: Adapted from Arete Africa (2022)
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Several news outlets such as Dialogo Americas (2023), Poder Naval Brazil (2023), and
Wion News (2023) are reporting Chinese interest in building not only a Chinese naval
base in Bata (EG) but also a second one in Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego (Argentina). If
both of these projects move forward, China will have established four overseas naval
bases — namely, in addition to Bata and Ushuaia, the Ream naval base in Cambodia,
and the Djibouti international naval base — which will give China a significant presence
in the South Atlantic, allowing it a permanent presence in the Atlantic-Pacific passage,
bringing it closer to Antarctica. China selected Djibouti to establish its first major overseas
military base, as its location is sitting on one of the world’s most important chokepoints
for maritime trade. In the same line of reasoning, Bata location facilitates access to South
Atlantic, Gulf of Guinea and central Africa. Indeed, the strategic position of EG also gives
vital access to the markets of both West and Central Africa, as EG connects the two. The
Luba Freeport of Bioko Island is one of the most important logistics centers for the
growing oil and gas industries in the Gulf of Guinea, with more competitive customs
duties and expansion potential than other congested land ports in the region. Meanwhile,
Bata’s seaport facilitates land access to northern Gabon and Congo, as well as to south
Cameroon. Therefore, we believe that Bata deep seaport, the largest in EG, will be the
most likely location of the new China overseas naval base. In fact, China engineers have
already made significant improvements to the port facilities. Bata seaport currently has
surplus capacity and has a dedicated basin for the Equatoguinean Navy. Thus, in line of
this reasoning, it is probable that China will extend and improve the existing naval
facilities or even build brand new facilities adjacent to the existing port (Table 1).
In the 1980s, the discovery and exploitation of petroleum and natural gas drastically
changed EG's economic structure. In 2016, EG had the highest Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita in all of Africa. According to IMF’s world economic outlook data, it was
€ 8,618 in 2017 and € 8,590 in 2018, and was strongly influenced by the evolution of
the price of a barrel of oil and national production (Embassy of Equatorial Guinea in
Brussels, 2016). The main oil producers of the Gulf of Guinea, namely Angola, the
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria account for 4.2% of the world’s
production and 2.9% of the world’s proved reserve in 2020 (BP, 2021). In 2017, about
59% of EG's GDP, 96% of its exports, and 80% of its government revenue pertained to
petroleum (World Bank, 2019). The importance of the oil sector led the country to accede
to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2017.
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As depicted in Table 2, oil and cocoa productions have fluctuated with a general
decreasing trend, even if excluding the 2020–2021 pandemic period. As EG is blessed
with rich and high-quality natural resources, the backbone of its economy has historically
been formed out of three commodities — cocoa, coffee, and timber. In 1967, the
production of cocoa was 46,200 tons, reaching the highest point in EG history (Embassy
of Equatorial Guinea in New Delhi, 2020). Unfortunately, EG’s 2021 cocoa production was
weak and there was an overall declining production trend.
In relation to oil and natural gas, according to statistics from OPEC and the Ghanaian
Government1, EG currently ranks sixth among the largest producers of crude oil in Sub-
Saharan Africa, after Angola, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Ghana, with a
production of 43,397 thousand barrels per day (mbbl) (CEIC, 2022). In 2021, EG oil
reserves were estimated to hold approximately 1,100 million barrels, and 39 billion cubic
meters of natural gas (OPEC, 2022). In EG, the oil industry is dominated by a number of
players such as Exxon Mobil, Marathon Oil Corp, Kosmos Energy, and Noble Energy, all
of which being The United States of America (U.S.) oil companies, although European
and Chinese players such as Total of France and China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) CPLPparticipate in the industry, but with relatively marginal roles (Estaban,
2010a). Guinea Ecuatorial de Petróleos (GEPetrol), EG’s national oil company, owns small
shares in key fields and manages the state’s participation as a shareholder in production-
sharing agreements and in joint ventures with other international oil companies. GEPetrol
is also responsible for oil licensing, marketing, as well as hydrocarbon policy and its
implementation.
Apart from hydrocarbons and cocoa, EG also has abundant mineral, timber, and fishery
resources. Compared to its relatively small land territory, EG’s exclusive economic zone
has a vast area of 312,000 km2 (Map 1), 11 times larger than its land area and
representing considerable potential for developing a blue economy. In addition, the
fishery resources are also top ranked in the global scale in terms of both quality and
quantity.
The history and geopolitics giving it a unique profile, EG has been building up its identity
in both domestic and external relations. In addition to Portuguese, the country has other
languages as well as Spanish as its official languages2. Like the majority of the African
countries, EG is home to multiple ethnic groups — such as the Fernandinos, the Fang,
and the Bubi — each of which has its own language (Lipski, 2004: 116–117). The principal
ethnic group in Rio Muni is the Fang, and the dominant indigenous group on Bioko is the
Bubi. In Fernando Poo (Bioko), pidgin English has generally been preferred by the Bubi
and Ferdinandinos, but in Rio Muni, the principal language for inter-ethnic communication
is, in theory, Spanish, though, given the political and social hegemony of the Fang group,
the Fang language is also vying for that lingua franca status (Lipski, 2004, p. 117).
Malabo is also home of the Fernandinos — descendants of pidgin English–speaking freed
slaves from Sierra Leone and Liberia who arrived in Fernando Poo in the 19th century,
as well as a handful of natives of São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabo Verde, and other African
1
Ghana is not an OPEC member state, but is one of the leading producers in the Gulf of Guinea.
2
Equatorial Guinea is the only African nation with Spanish as an official language.
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nations. “This pidgin language, known as pichi, pichinglis or broken inglis, constitutes the
true lingua franca of Fernando Poo/Bioko (Lipski "Pidgin English")” (Lipski, 2004, p. 117).
According to Fajardo (1993), the high proportion of Spanish speakers in EG is largely
attributable to the efforts of the Spanish educational system, through which the Spanish
government imposed an exclusive use of Spanish as the colonial language from 1778 to
1810 and from 1844 to 1968. Unlike the Portuguese language in Guinea-Bissau and São
Tomé and Príncipe, Spanish did not become a creole language in EG. Lipski (2004) argued
that the most important factor of the non-creole status of Equatoguinean Spanish is that
in the African territories, “there never occurred the massive linguistic and ethnic
fragmentation that resulted from the Atlantic slave trade”, because “contact with Spain
was never broken off”, resulting in an insufficient time for any significant linguistic
changes to take place. Nowadays, more than 85% of Equatoguineans speak Spanish,
and not only is Spanish the medium of instruction but it is also a compulsory subject for
students (Gomashie, 2019).
For the Portuguese language, since 2010, it has become EG’s third official language (the
legislature amended Article 4 of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea in a bid to become
a member of Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, CPLP), and the government
of Equatorial Guinea (EG) has made an effort to increase its usage in day-to-day
communication, though with little success. In practice, Portuguese is still rarely spoken
or used, as Cristina Abeso Mangue, the national coordinator for Lusophony at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and currently the first delegate of Equatorial Guinea to Forum Macao,
concedes, “The coordination is defined, but Portuguese still needs to be introduced into
the education system” (DN, 2018). However, this does not mean that the Portuguese
language has little relevance to the country. EG first encountered the Portuguese in
1472–1474, long before the colony was given to Spain in 1778. Interestingly, on Ano
Bom Island (Annobón), about 6,000 residents speak Fa d'ambu, a Portuguese-derived
creole similar to the dialects spoken in São Tomé and Príncipe (Agostinho, 2021).
As explained, despite being a PSC and having Portuguese as one of its official languages,
EG is still dominated by Spanish speakers, and Portuguese is seldom used, which is a
unique case among the PSCs. Considering the historical relations with Spain, Portugal,
and the British colonies in West Africa, EG has successfully implemented the strategy to
connect as many regional political and economic blocks and language communities as
possible to reach more markets not only in West Africa but also in Europe, Asia, and the
Americas. Apart from joining the OPEC (2017) as a main oil producer of Africa, the
country also managed to become a member of a number of international organizations
such as the Organization of African Unity — today's African Union (1968), the
International Monetary Fund (1969), the Non-Aligned Movement (1970), the Africa, the
Caribbean and the Pacific Group (APC Group) (1975), the Organization of Ibero-American
States (OEI) (1979), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (1983),
the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (1986), Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) (1989), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)
(2001), the CPLP (2014), and the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (2019).
EG joined Forum Macao in 2022 as its tenth member (Table 3) but has yet to join the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact, EG has requested to enter the WTO since 2007,
with a working party and the terms of reference already established in 2008, but the
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process of acceding to the WTO is far from complete. As of 2022, the latest development
on EG's accession to the WTO was a memorandum on the foreign trade regime, prepared
by the working party (WTO, 2022). These accessions show a political push for regional
and global integration as well as a particular interest for the Gulf of Guinea, the PSC and
China.
Founded in 1996, the CPLP had only seven initial full members, namely, Angola, Brazil,
Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Timor-
Leste, once gaining independence in 2002, became the CPLP’s eighth member state. EG’s
entrance to CPLP took a long course and its admission was quite controversial, mainly
because of the partial and limited fulfilment of its commitment to reaching the
requirements and sharing the values of CPLP (Sá, 2015). The first step of EG’s accession
took place in 2004, when the President of São Tomé and Príncipe, Fradique de Menezes
invited President Teodoro Obiang Nguema to participate in the CPLP’s 5th Summit in São
Tomé (Seibert, 2009). In that summit, member states of the CPLP discussed the
possibility of EG’s integration as an observer, and adopted a resolution to firstly create
an observer status within the institution. In 2005, the CPLP created the status of an
associated observer, which was granted to EG in 2006. However, to become a full
member of the Lusophone community, EG had to make Portuguese its official language.
As mentioned, historically EG was once colonized by the Portugal, and the Fa d'ambu is
a Portuguese-derived creole widely spoken today on the island of Annobon. Considering
this inherent condition, in 2007, the Equatoguinean government began to adopt the
Portuguese language, which was later approved in 2010 via a presidential order. In
November of 2011, Portuguese’s status as EG’s third official language went into effect.
Apart from the language perquisite, EG also had to demonstrate goodwill in terms of
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as values
shared by every member state of the CPLP. Hence, the country joined a growing abolition
of death penalty movement on the African continent and carried out its last judicially
sanctioned execution in 2014 (DPIC, 2022). In July 2014, EG was admitted as a full
member of the CPLP during the 10th summit in Dili, and, finally in 2022, EG abolished
capital punishment.
The accession of Equatorial Guinea to CPLP is considered reciprocal for both sides. The
integration had underlying political and legal challenges, and was driven by the potential
for market advantages. On one hand, the challenges could be associated with the
Portuguese language’s status in EG and EG’s democratic standards. On the other hand,
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both CPLP and EG wished to expand their market access (including the oil market),
international influence, and regional engagement. Indeed, it “seems to have been
fundamental for the entry of the Spanish-Speaking country and for strengthening the
CPLP as an oil producing bloc” (Sá, 2015). After EG’s accession, the country made some
effort to play an active role in the CPLP. In 2021, Malabo organized the first business
summit promoted by the Business Confederation of the Community of Portuguese-
language countries (CE-CPLP), which “consolidated [EG’s] integration” into the CPLP (CE-
CPLP, 2021).
2. B&RI and Lusophone Countries
In 2013, China launched the B&RI, which is composed of the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. The B&RI is broader in scope than the
ancient Silk Road and the “Going out” policy of China (Escobar, 2015). It focuses on Asia,
Europe, and Africa, but is also open to other partners; it sets up six economic corridors
on the Eurasian continent, but expects to establish stronger links with Africa through,
namely, the China–Indian Ocean–Africa–Mediterranean Blue Economic passage and its
extension to Lusophone countries. The B&RI can be interpreted as a global and
consecutive strategy of China to use strengths that it has accumulated through over 40
years of reforms and opening-up to gain access to worldwide markets and resources.
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It not only plays a vital role in China’s integration into the world economy, but also acts
as the country’s most important instrument to advance its geopolitical and geo-strategic
interests and reshape its position in the international community. The proposal and
implementation of B&RI signal a significant shift in China’s foreign policy from “keeping
a low profile” (from 1978 to 2012) to “striving for achievement” (since 2013), as Chinese
President Xi Jinping proposed the ideas of realizing China’s renaissance and “Chinese
dream”. Despite being considered a vague concept initially, the B&RI has been
continuously implemented through creating a series of fundamental instruments in the
past ten years. It sets a five-pillar — namely, policy coordination, infrastructure
connectivity, trade facilitation, financial cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges —
objective of regional multilateral cooperation, covering political, economic, and cultural
areas (Zhang, 2018: 328). Table 4 depicts some of the results related to the five
intertwined goals.
With regard to the Portuguese-speaking countries, which spread over four continents,
they all occupy geo-strategic positions in the context of the maritime component of the
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B&RI, as they facilitate market access and regional engagement. Remarkably, with the
exception of Brazil, until July 2022, all PSCs, including EG, have signed a cooperation
document (MoU) of the B&RI. Brazil, though not having signed a B&RI MoU, holds a
positive view on the initiative and continues to deepen existing cooperation with China.
Indeed, the former Ambassador of Brazil to China, Paulo Estivallet de Mesquita asserts:
“We don't see the necessity to sign a memorandum of understanding.
Probably due to cultural differences, our understanding is that it is a rather
general document based on which we will take some actions in the future.
However, given that there is already such good, intensive and concrete
cooperation between Brazil and China in investment, trade and other
businesses, we do not see the need for such a document between the two
countries, nor do we see it as a prerequisite for Brazil's participation in the
"Belt and Road” initiative” (Global Times, 2019).
Regarding the implementation of the B&RI in the PSCs, Table 5 depicts the results of the
five pillars of the initiative, showing a poor level of contribution from EG, as the country
has only initiated its participation in Forum Macao in April 2022, and its full CPLP
membership only dates back to 2014.
However, this does not mean that the cooperation between China and EG is limited or is
not worth mentioning. Quite the contrary, we shall see in the next section that the two
countries’ cooperation has been considered strategic and fruitful, particularly after the
launch of the B&RI.
3. Cooperation between Equatorial Guinea and China
The cooperation between EG and China has been ongoing since the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1970. In this section, we observe the bilateral cooperation before
and after the launch of the B&RI, introducing its privileged areas and key projects
organized into two stages.
a) Before the launch of the B&RI: Initially, bilateral cooperation between EG and China
had been dominated by Chinese aid in several sectors, namely infrastructure, health,
and training. Enhanced by the establishment of the Mixed Commission for Economy
and Trade Cooperation between the two countries in 1996, various projects were
carried out. China committed itself to the following projects: (1) to build 2,000 km of
roads; (2) to build 10,000 social houses; (3) to build the largest hydroelectric plant in
Djiblo with an installed power of 120 MW, which would be responsible for 90% of the
power supply of EG’s mainland; (4) to build Bioko Island’s public electric grid; and (5)
to build the Malabo Gas Power Plant.
In 2007, the larger Chinese aid project — the new Central Office of Equatoguinean
Television — was inaugurated. A number of other diplomatic and symbolic projects
were also completed, such as the construction of the new headquarters of the Ministry
of Energy, the Presidential building, Parliament, Treasury, the Ministry of Labour, the
new Bata football stadium, the Mongomo stadium, and the Vocational Formation
Centre Nana Mangue. According to the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office
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of China’s Embassy in Equatorial Guinea (2013), there were 23 Chinese enterprises
carrying out and following up on projects in Equatorial Guinea. These enterprises
included 17 engineering contractors, three foreign investment enterprises, and three
labour service companies. More than 40 projects were under construction or had
signed contracts. These contracts brought into EG a number of Chinese operators,
such as China Dalian International Economic & Technical Cooperation Group, China
Road & Bridge Corp, China National Machinery IMP. & EXP. Corp, Sinohydro
Corporation, ZTE Corporation, and China Overseas Engineering Group.
Apart from infrastructure, health and training have also been key areas of the bilateral
cooperation. According to the Embassy of China in Equatorial Guinea (2012), China
has sent 26 medical teams to EG, and Chinese doctors worked in the Malabo Regional
Hospital and Bata Regional Hospital. In addition, the Chinese government has granted
eight five-year undergraduate scholarships and four postgraduate scholarships per
annum to Equatoguinean students since 1977.
b) After the launch of B&RI: Recently, bilateral cooperation has expanded into energy,
infrastructure, trade and investment, culture, Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT) and healthcare (vaccination). After 2017, with the creation of the
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, bilateral interchange has been
extended to security-coordination. According to the General Administration of
Customs of China, bilateral trade between EG and China has seen a significant growth
since 2016. The trade doubled in 2017 compared to the level of 2016, and culminated
in 2018 in a 38.18% year-on-year growth, then dropped 19.3% in 2019 and plunged
30.98% in 2020 due to the COVID-19 outbreak, finally recovering in 2021 with a
growth of 5%. Nevertheless, the volume in 2021 is still 92.06% higher than the level
of 2016. Imports from China kept pace with the evolution of the total trade volume,
whereas exports to China remained steady at 0.13 billion U.S. dollars (GACC, 2022).
Table 6 shows the dynamics in bilateral trade between 2017 and 2022, and the year
2022 can be interpreted as “encouraging” in terms of future perspectives.
Since 2017, energy cooperation has played a key role in the bilateral trade between the
two countries, as China’s participation in the Equatoguinean oil industry began to get
results by production share, representing more than 60% of EG’s export to China. Crude
oil imports from China rose steadily from 2017 to 2020, peaking at more than 3 million
tons, then falling drastically by 47.97% in 2021 mainly due to the reduction of production
and declining oil prices. In 2022, two Chinese companies signed a framework agreement
to build a modular refinery in EG with the capacity to process 20,000 barrels per day to
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184
produce asphalt, plastic, and other petroleum derivatives. The project is expected to
attract an investment of 450 million U.S. dollars (GACC, 2022).
Table 7 depicts the evolution of oil exports from EG to China. If we do not consider the
period between 2020 and 20213 or new investments in this sector, then oil exports from
EG to China are expected to increase substantially within the next five to ten years. After
2013, China continued to build infrastructure, power plants, new government buildings,
and a new hospital. The headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs project was
completed in 2015 by the TOP International Engineering Corporation of China. In the
same year, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China signed an infrastructure
agreement worth $2 billion with EG to provide financial support to the Equatoguinean
government and Chinese companies operating in the country. Commencing in 2016 and
concluding its first phase in 2018, the Bicomo hydropower station renovation project has
been conducted by China Railway’s 14th Bureau with a total investment of RMB 43 million.
The project aims to replace four units of the hydropower station to ensure local power
supply. Finally, the new Niefang Hospital of EG was completed in December 2022 and
was renamed the “China–Equatorial Guinea Friendship Hospital”.
New areas of cooperation in culture, ICT and health also achieved varying results. In
2014, the Centre for Language Education and Cooperation of China signed a cooperation
agreement with the National University of Equatorial Guinea to establish a Confucius
Institute, which was inaugurated later in 2015. In 2015, during his official visit to China,
President Teodoro Mbasogo donated a primary school to Jinping County of Yunnan
Province to be named the “China–Equatorial Guinea Friendship Primary School”. The
school was completed in 2016, the same year that China began to develop a large-scale
training program called the “Thousand Talents Training Program”. The program lasted
for five years and trained 200 technicians per year. In 2018, a new fibre-optic connection
(Ceiba-2) (Map 1) was implemented by Huawei. This project used Huawei Marine’s
leading-edge Wavelength Division Multiplex (WDM) and Optical Transport Network (OTN)
technologies, and the 290 km system featured a design capacity of 8 Tbps and linked the
capital of Malabo to Bata. “The system enables EG to connect to larger submarine cable
systems including WACS, SAT-3, and MainOne via Kribi (Cameroon), eventually providing
access to a vast European network. It will also provide restoration and redundancy routes
3
The two years are considered atypical due to COVID-19 pandemic.
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185
for existing traffic on Ceiba-14 and the African Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable
branch to Bata” (Huawei, 2015). It is important to highlight that in the area of technology
and communications, EG can have a significant regional role, as it hosts the headquarters
of the South-South Triangular cooperation office, and is a member of the Organization of
African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS). Both organizations are very interested in
promoting digital sovereignty in Central Africa.
The mission of sending Chinese medical teams to EG remains active. By the end of 2022,
China had sent 32 medical teams with a total of 586 doctors to work in hospitals in
Malabo and Bata. At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, Equatorial Guinea donated
two million U.S. dollars to China in February 2020, to support the country’s fight against
the pandemic. China reciprocated by sending two batches of vaccines to EG in 2021.
Besides the areas mentioned above, institutional cooperation between EG and China has
begun to draw more attention from the rest of the world. As mentioned previously, EG
signed a B&RI MoU in 2019. In that same year, the 5th Mixed Commission for Economy
and Trade Cooperation between China and EG was held in Beijing, while EG also
participated actively in the first edition of China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo (CAETE)
held in Changsha in Hunan Province of China. EG was also at the Coordinators’ Meeting
on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation. In 2020, the two countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations. In 2021, Equatoguinean President Obiang sent
a congratulatory letter to President Xi Jinping on the 100th anniversary of the founding of
the Communist Party of China. In 2022, EG became the 10th member of Forum Macao,
and is expected to play an increasingly active role in cooperation between China and
other PSCs by leveraging the multilateral cooperation mechanism. On 30 November
2022, the Delegate of Equatorial Guinea to the Permanent Secretariat of Forum Macao
(Cristina Mangue Abeso), began her duties, being the first representative, after the
accession of EG to the Forum Macao, which took place at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting of 10 April 2022.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to economic and institutional cooperation, in recent
years, the two countries have also begun to discuss the potential of developing a regional
coordination cooperation, particularly on maritime security. It has been reported that
China plans to establish a permanent military installation in EG. If the project is
implemented, EG will be the second African strategic country after Djibouti where China
has established a naval base, a fact that will have strong and profound geopolitical
implications on South Atlantic security particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. All these results
show that bilateral cooperation between the two countries remains overwhelmingly
positive. As President Obiang asserted in a message to China in 2021:
“Equatorial Guinea has always regarded China as its most important strategic
partner, and sincerely appreciates China's offering of valuable assistance,
including COVID-19 vaccines. Equatorial Guinea will continue to firmly adhere
to the One-China policy, firmly support China's positions on issues concerning
China's core interests, and firmly uphold multilateralism. Equatorial Guinea
4
The Ceiba-1 cable system is a 287 km submarine cable, which directly connects Malabo and Bata in
Equatorial Guinea.
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supports and will actively participate in the Belt and Road Initiative and the
Global Development Initiative, and is ready to work with China to enhance
bilateral cooperation in various areas as well as cooperation within the FOCAC
framework.” (Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de
Guinea Ecuatorial, 2021)
In 2022, China Central Television (CCTV) — China’s “mouthpieces of the Party, the
government and the people” — broadcast an interview with Equatoguinean President
Obiang in “Leaders Talk”, in which he highlighted the relevance of cooperation with China
as follows:
“I think that the development of Africa should start with the Africans
themselves, the African leaders should think first of all about the
transformation of their own states… that is why Equatorial Guinea approved
the road map for cooperation with China, it was precisely because China is
the first partner that is helping Equatorial Guinea in particular and African
countries in general. Therefore, between China's cooperation and the internal
development of African states, this (B&RI) is the remedy that can bring Africa
out of underdevelopment, out of the misery of poverty that African states are
experiencing today. In this sense, we recognise the enormous support that
China is giving financially to help the development of African countries.”
(CCTV, 2022)
Based on these observations from their bilateral engagement before and after the launch
of B&RI, we perceive that cooperation between China and EG has been transformed into
more intensive partnership. Indeed, after the launch of the B&RI, cooperation between
China and EG has become strategic to both parties, and is expected to continue to grow
in the future.
Conclusion: The Future of Sino-Equatoguinean Cooperation
This paper has posed and answered the following research question: What will be the
impact of Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation in light of EG’s recent accession to FM?
It is believed that the strategic cooperation between EG and China will deepen and
existing areas of trade and development will further expand to capitalize on the trust
between them built over the long term. In addition, more new cooperation in areas such
as maritime security, major infrastructure, sovereign digital cooperation, education,
health, tourism, and blue economy will likely be identified and developed. The U.S. and
European Union’s (EU) cooperation models put a strong emphasis on “good governance
and anticorruption initiatives”. On the contrary, “Chinese policy is very flexible to the
rules of the game preferred by its interlocutor” (Estaban, 2010a) — such is believed to
be the essence of China’s “non-interference” principle and has been recognized and
welcomed by EG authorities. As President Xi Jinping emphasized during his telephone call
with President Obiang in 2021: “China will, as always, firmly support Equatorial Guinea
in safeguarding its national sovereignty, exploring its own development path and
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promoting more fruitful friendship and cooperation between the two countries in various
fields" (Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Guinea Ecuatorial,
2021). The Chinese cooperation policy which deviates from the EU's conditional
cooperation is particularly appealing for the current government of EG. Therefore, the
main impact of future Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation can be categorized into three
intertwining perspectives: (1) domestically; (2) regionally; and (3) globally.
(1) Domestically, the three-year-old pandemic has had a profound impact on the
global economy, the escalating geopolitical tension between Ukraine and Russia, and
climate disasters, energy crisis, and a potential food safety concern, resulting in a
fundamental economic shift and unstable situation that will be more severe than
expected, i.e., a “darkening outlook”. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects
(2023) has said that “Global growth is expected to decelerate sharply to 1.7 percent in
2023 — the third weakest pace of growth in nearly three decades, overshadowed only
by the global recession caused by the pandemic and the global financial crisis”. In this
difficult downward scenario, trade and investment between EG and China have been
severely affected. Hit by COVID-19, both China and EG are experiencing a strenuous
recovery. According to the World Bank, China’s GDP growth in 2022 is expected to be
only 2.7%, while EG is estimated to have a 3.2% growth (Word Bank, 2022a and c).
Moreover, though EG is among the richest countries in Africa with a per capita GDP of
US$8,462 in 2021 due to its oil industry (Word Bank, 2022b), the majority of the people's
standard of living has not considerably increased, and farming is still the most common
occupation. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Country Report No.
22/267 (2022), EG is facing a series of development risks, such as an expected decrease
in economy starting in 2023 due to a decline in hydrocarbon output, a stalled structural
reform plan, inadequate governance, considerable corruption risks, low business
confidence, a fragile banking system, domestic inflation, and risks of food insecurity
caused by the Ukraine crisis of 2022. As for China, the country’s growth outlook in 2023
is subjected to significant risks, and deeper structural reform is needed to achieve a more
balanced, inclusive, and sustainable growth (Word Bank, 2022c).
As pointed in the 2021 Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) Guide —
Equatorial Guinea, a Chinese investor guide made by the Ministry of China, apart from
projects under construction, “the flow of Chinese FDI in Equatorial Guinea in 2020 was -
$49.12 million; by of the end of 2020, the stock of Chinese FDI in Equatorial Guinea was
$340 million. Currently, China has no large-scale investment projects in Equatorial
Guinea” (Ministry of Commerce of PRC, 2022), but the political alignment between
Malabo and Beijing looks promising. However, it is important to bear in mind that Teodoro
Obiang has been in power since 1979. Obiang’s 40-year regime and his Democratic Party
of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) with absolute advantage in Equatoguinean politics have
been severely criticized for corruption, authoritarianism, and human rights violations
(Williams, 2011). Since Teodoro Obiang became 80 years old in 2022, his sixth re-
election will likely be his last, which will raise the question of political transition in the
coming years, and that can be a turning point in Sino-Equatoguinean relations, depending
on the outcome of that transition of power. Consequently, there are four expected
domestic impacts resulting from Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation: (1) support of
economic recovery in the post-pandemic era; (2) support of developing the oil and gas
industries; (3) a positive image of China-EG association based on the social impact of
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representative projects and the economic contribution from major infrastructure
projects; (4) uncertainty of the next cycle of political transition and its effects on
cooperation sustainability in the long run.
(2) Regionally, China's cooperation with PSCs in the South Atlantic, particularly with
Brazil, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, and EG, will facilitate a stronger Chinese presence
in the area, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. The growing involvement of EG in the CPLP
and arrival of the country’s representative to FM will bring new opportunities to reinforce
trade among CPLP member-states but mainly between China and the PSCs. Considering
that in 2022, the Government of São Tomé and Príncipe has granted to the Safebond
consortium a 30-year concession to build the Fernão Dias Seaport, and that China is
expected to improve the infrastructure of the seaport of Príncipe, China will re-center
and expand its presence in the Gulf of Guinea with EG being the regional hub.
Furthermore, EG is expected to hold the CPLP presidency (which rotates among member
states) and set its agenda, which can be used to push for more trade, investment, and
development cooperation. As the death penalty has been abolished with a new Criminal
Code coming into effect in late 2022, EG will continue to play an active role in political
cooperation with other CPLP members, particularly in building international legitimacy.
With EG’s participation in Forum Macao, the country can gain new access to markets by
leveraging the role of The Macao Special Administration Region (MSAR)PRC as an
extended platform for China and the PSCs. Within the regional dimension, the two pillars
of future cooperation between China and EG are expected to shift from “infrastructure
connectivity” to “policy coordination” in the context of the B&RI’s five-pillar approach. A
potential shift can also be observed by China extending an invitation to EG to join the
Global Development Initiative (2021), a new global public product of China that further
extends the B&RI's reach. EG is expected to play a role, supported by China, in
developing digital sovereignty in Central Africa. Consequently, we can expect five
regional impacts resulting from Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation: (1) EG is expected to
increase its role in international organizations (such as Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, FOCAC and OACPS), as leveraged by Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation; (2)
EG is expected to support multilateralism with Chinese characteristics as an innovative
approach to new forms of cooperation; (3) EG’s CPLP membership will provide a boarder
platform for multilateral economic and commercial exchange with all member states of
Forum Macao (FM); (4) EG’s FM membership will provide a supplementary platform for
bilateral economic relations with China; (5) Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation under the
B&RI framework will give China a regional positioning, presence, and access, considering
its relational role in the context of EG, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Angola.
(3) Globally, in addition to future domestic and regional impacts, Sino-Equatoguinean
cooperation has constantly been criticized for benefiting only the politically and
economically privileged classes of EG and the national strategy of China itself, while
“Chinese aid does not contribute to improve their living conditions” (Estaban, 2010b).
Negative and questionable voices have emerged ever since, although in the
implementation of various mega-projects China has indeed fulfilled its social
responsibility in the form of numerous donations and construction of supporting facilities.
As tensions between China and the U.S. continue to mount, China will continue to be
perceived as “a systemic competitor, rather than a partner”, and Sino-Equatoguinean
cooperation is part of that global game. Consequently, the Sino-Equatoguinean layer will
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189
add to the Chinese’s global engagement as it will support the accession of EG to WTO,
as well as a political alignment at the International Monetary Fund and United Nations
General Assembly.
The potential of Sino-Equatoguinean maritime security cooperation, which is considered
a significant move of “China’s Pan-African security architecture”, will be a strong concern
for the U.S., and perhaps for Brazil and Angola as well (Tanchum, 2021). In this line of
reasoning, the oil and gas maritime exploration and the perspectives of a new Chinese
naval base in EG will bring not only a new focus of maritime geopolitical tension but also
a new push for the fight against sea piracy.
Despite facing a number of challenging aspects in the future, both China and EG are
committed to developing a deeper and more pragmatic cooperation under the “principle
of multilateralism, dialogue and consultation and non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries” (Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Guinea
Ecuatorial, 2020). Considering the domestic, regional and global perspectives, it is
reasonable to conclude that the bilateral cooperation between China and EG is expected
to continue to deepen and diversify under the B&RI framework, with especial emphasis
on digital and maritime cooperation. China is now developing a strategy for the Gulf of
Guinea, in which Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation operates in conjunction with Sino-
Angolan and Sino–São Toméan cooperation.
EG’s accession to CPLP and membership of FM have been seen by China as a game-
changing opportunity, not only to step up its engagement in the South Atlantic and access
to Central Africa as part of its globalness (and global vision), but also to offer concurrent
models of cooperation in relation to the EU and the U.S. Furthermore, from the Chinese
standpoint, its EG partnership has a strategic sense, encompassing a new competitive
regional engagement with major global players. The number of Chinese economic agents
operating in EG associated with the oil and gas industry as well as in other sectors —
namely, communications, media, logistics, fishing, maritime research, education and
training, and security — are expected to increase, and infrastructure projects with
symbolic diplomatic value (not with economic endeavor) will likely continue.
Likewise, EG’s accession to the CPLP and FM membership have been perceived by EG
also as a game changer in the regional positioning of the country vis-à-vis its neighbours,
and as a new source of political legitimacy for current leadership. The weight obtained
with its partnership with China allows EG to endeavour to accede to the WTO, and to be
more active in gaining and utilizing its memberships in international organizations,
namely, the CPLP, AU, OACPS and AfCFTA. Furthermore, from EG’s viewpoint, its Chinese
partnership leverages a small archipelago state to the condition of a functional regional
power in the Gulf of Guinea.
To summarize the impact of Sino-Equatoguinean cooperation, we identify a clear two-
fold answer to our research question: on the one hand, future Sino-Equatoguinean
relations will leverage the political legitimacy of the current establishment, but
uncertainties associated with the political transition in EG will endure; on the other hand,
by reinforcing its presence in the South Atlantic through EG, China will gain access to
markets in Central Africa (digitalization, oil and gas included) and extend its influence on
a number of international organizations, for example the CPLP.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023)
195
POLEMOLOGY OF CENTRAL AFRICA (1990-2020)
HENRIQUE MORAIS
hnmorais@gmail.com
Degree in Economics from Universidade Técnica de Lisboa / Instituto Superior de Economia e
Gestão. Master's degree in International Economics from ISEG. PhD in International Relations:
Geopolitics and Geoeconomics from Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa. He works at Banco de
Portugal (Portugal) where is Head of Innovation and Support Division of Markets Department. He
was a Consultant for the Portuguese Post Office (CTT), Chairman of the Executive Committee and
Director of Invesfer S.A., a company of the REFER Group, and Director / CEO of CP Carga. He
teaches at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (in the Departments of Economics and Business
Sciences and International Relations) and on the MBA in Corporate Finance at Universidade do
Algarve. He is also a member of the Foreign Relations Observatory of UAL, where he has been
involved in various research projects, as well as assiduous participation in the various editions of
Janus - International Relations Yearbook.
Abstract
In this article, we propose a holistic approach to conflict, delimiting the geographic space to
a sub-region
1
, Central Africa, while keeping active the communicating vessels that derive from
ethnic mobility and the fluctuation of territorial borders.
The ethnic issue, geopolitics, and the resources curse seem to us to be more appropriate
explanatory factors of conflict than the religious issue, linked to Islam, or the idea of "failed
states”.
The processes of externalization and factionalism, the diffuse and dispersed dynamics of
alliances, their fluidity according to various alignments, extraversion and policefalia are only
visible characteristics of State`s disorder and chaos that has not disappeared, but simply
feeds, through a hybrid phenomenon (the post-colonial State), from fragmented social
structures for an economy of predatory accumulation.
Keywords
Central Africa; Conflict; Resources; Ethnicity; Religion
Resumo
Neste artigo propomos uma abordagem holística da conflitualidade, delimitando o espaço
geográfico a uma sub-região, a África Central, embora mantendo ativos os vasos
comunicantes que derivam da mobilidade étnica e da flutuação das fronteiras territoriais.
A questão étnica, a geopolítica e a “maldição” dos recursos parecem-nos fatores explicativos
da conflitualidade bem mais apropriados do que a questão religiosa, ligada ao Islão, ou a ideia
dos “Estados falhados”.
Os processos de externalização e de faccionalismo, a dinâmica difusa e de dispersão das
alianças, a fluidez das mesmas obedecendo a vários alinhamentos, a extraversão e a
policefalia não são mais do que características bem visíveis da desordem e do caos do Estado
que não desapareceu, mas que simplesmente se alimenta, através de um fenómeno híbrido
(o Estado pós-colonial), das estruturas sociais fragmentadas para uma economia de
acumulação predadora.
Palavras-Chave
África Central; conflitualidade; recursos; etnicidade; religião
1
We have chosen to consider Central Africa a sub-region, although aware that the classification is not
unanimous, and many authors consider Central Africa a region.
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Henrique Morais
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How to cite this article
Morais, Henrique (2023). Polemology of Central Africa (1990-2020), Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.11
Article received on January, 23 2023, accepted for publication on March, 3 2023
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POLEMOLOGY OF CENTRAL AFRICA (1990-2020)
HENRIQUE MORAIS
Conflict in Central Africa: from religion to ethnicity and to politics
The south of the Sahara religious problem can be considered polysemic because of the
way in which the two main monotheistic religions, Christianity, and Islam, penetrated the
subcontinent. In fact, it was a slow process that lasted several centuries, probably also
related with the syncretism typical of animist religions.
Religion, although armed groups claim, for example, to have a Salafist or Pentecostal
allegiance, has over time been a somewhat marginal phenomenon in African political
crises. The eruption of crises, rather than being primarily associated with religious
phenomena, has been related, directly or indirectly, to political claims identified with
ethnic cleavages and their interests.
For all these reasons, it was somewhat surprising that Sub-Saharan Africa became part
of the international agenda regarding religiously motivated terrorism. We refer to the
attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998, perhaps
the harbinger of an even more impactful event, the September 11 attacks in New York.
It does not seem to be an ideological agenda behind the conflict in Africa, and often the
belligerent forces will not hesitate to use revenues from some sort of trafficking to acquire
weapons. Moreover, perhaps this relative absence of ideology in conflict may have been
due to the way in which African societies have been militarized, involving regular forces,
militias, and rebel groups in a disorderly interweaving of functions, according to a logic
of indiscipline and distortion of the ethical code of combatants.
In this context, war in Africa is a massifying phenomenon that has devastated the
continent in an unprecedented way, starting with the introduction of industrial weaponry
and the bureaucratic and territorialized conception of the nation-state based on the
ethnicization of identifications and political affiliations (Bayart, 2018: 109). In other
words, ethnic cleavage is behind the creation of armed groups as well as political
formations in situations where the war scenario gives way to political convergences
initiating electoral processes.
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Establishing a relationship between the phenomenon of conflict and ethnicity, the
interethnic problem is diffuse and may be subnational or transnational, following a logic
of geometric and systemic chaos (Mashimango, 2015)
2
.
In Central Africa, and especially in the Great Lakes region, the ethnic mosaic is very
fractious, a situation intensified by the "geological scandal" that constitutes the East of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with implications for the processes of systematic
rearrangement of alliances in the face of the differentiated strategies of the belligerents.
The ethnic issue and the associated conflict also characterize the coastal strip of Central
Africa, as exemplified by the massacres of the Laris ethnic group in the Pool region in
southern Congo, perhaps because the coastal states have, to some extent, very similar
characteristics to those of the Great Lakes region from an ethnic point of view.
The ethnic problem, inherited from the colonisation, can consequently be manipulated
according to strategies with multiple scopes and motivations, with tragic consequences,
as evidenced by the constant massacres of civilians in rural areas and particularly in
refugee camps.
Despite the recognition of these phenomena of manipulation, the importance of the
identity issue in the emergence of conflict seems indisputable. The identity problem,
which is closely related to ethnocentrism and ethnic cleavages, is directly related to an
overvaluation of the individual and the community to which he belongs. There is a
shyness, a closing in oneself, which is proper to community values passed on from
generation to generation, in communities, tribes, clans, or united and undivided ethnic
groups.
From a political point of view, although the story is more remote, perhaps we can start
it in 1990 with the civil war in Rwanda.
The civil war in Rwanda was driven by the friendly regime in Uganda, both sponsored by
the US. The objective was twofold: on the one hand, to redraw the borders left by the
Europeans and to control the mines in Eastern Congo-Kinshasa (Péan, 2010: 327-338)
and on the other hand, through the armed movement led by John Garang (the Lord's
Resistance Army)
3
, to prevent the influence in the Horn of Africa of the Islamic regime in
Khartoum. Although we must be cautious about the term "redraw the borders," we can
easily understand its meaning considering an ethnic reconfiguration that involved the
coming to power of the Tutsi minority in Rwanda and Eastern Congo.
Peace attempts through the Arusha agreements failed, and in 1994, after the
assassination of the Rwandan president, Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) took
power. It is from here, and a little later with the end of Mobutu regime in 1997, that the
atmosphere of hostility will become more volatile, until the so-called "Great African War"
between 1998 and 2003.
Two changes in the Western side were important to the reconfiguration of the geopolitical
map of the sub-region, namely Bill Clinton's change in policy towards Africa and François
2
Geometric chaos refers to a logic of the variable geometry of conflict, which will be discussed elsewhere in
this article.
3
This movement had its bases and funding sources in the Great Lakes region and claims in South Sudan.
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Mitterrand's La Baule speech in 1990, promoting the end of one-party rule and opening
the door to national conferences throughout the Francophonie.
The factors linked to the identity problematic exposed above, accelerated by the historical
process, will create between two ethnic groups with different origins the conditions for a
genocidal vision, as exemplified by Rwanda.
The "Hutu revolution" was the trigger for the diaspora and ostracization of the Tutsi
minority, in the face of porous borders where refugees from both sides circulate through
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this context, in
April 1994, the shooting down of the plane carrying the Hutu President (J. Habyarimana)
was only a pretext for creating an environment conducive to the "Hutu power" of the
Interahamwe militias and the beginning of the genocide, with the death of almost one
million people in about two months.
There are various explanations about what happened in those tragic weeks: official views
of Tutsi victimization, comparing what happened to this ethnic group to the fate of the
Jews during the Holocaust, following the propaganda disseminated by the FPR after the
genocide (Braeckman, 1994; 1996), or even the idea of the double genocide (Péan, 2010
and Rever, 2020, among others), soon dubbed by the official discourse as "denialist."
The humanitarian mission of Operation Turquoise itself was considered by the official
view as a farce, a way to protect and let genocidaires escape.
Subsequent events will make the "facts" of the official version falter. In 1996, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) invades the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, a year
later Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)
enters Kinshasa victorious. In October 1997, the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) regained
power in Brazzaville by force of arms and with the support of regular Angolan troops.
Meanwhile, between 1998 and 2003, the largest armed conflict in Africa took place,
involving eight states and about twenty-five armed movements, and causing about five
million deaths. The door was open for the Balkanization of the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Movements like the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) or The
March 23 Movement (M23, now almost extinct), among others, continued to spread terror
through provinces like Kivu or Kasai.
The twists and turns of geopolitics also played their part.
During the 1990s, as noted above, we witnessed a somewhat troubled diplomatic and
political relationship between the two mains out of Africa actors, that is, they were the
difficult years of coexistence between Washington and Paris (Tedom, 2015: 24-37).
In the twenty-first century, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) began
to gain prominence, especially evident in the case of China, after joining the World Trade
Organization. Beijing's "thirst" for raw materials has led to a new approach for Central
African countries, the so-called "winner-winner" relationship, in short, the ability to
secure essential resources for the Asian dragon's growth in exchange for infrastructure.
Although China gains real ascendancy in Africa, notably through trade, becoming Africa's
first trading partner since 2015, the ambivalence in its relationship with the West,
between competition and cooperation regarding penetrating African markets, is at least
ambiguous (Niambi, 2019).
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The latest bilateral agreements between Paris and Beijing point to a trilaterally approach
in Central Africa, in a perspective between budgetary and financial resources, which in
the Chinese case are overwhelming, and experience and technology that can be offered
by the French, following the trend of multilateralism of the last twenty-five years.
But the truth is that both the Hexagon and the "Middle Empire" continue to favor bilateral
relations with the various states of the sub-region. The Sino-Congolese contract in the
mining sector is proof of this, through the supply of rare and strategic minerals in the
provinces of Katanga and South and North Kivu and was even strongly criticized by the
International Monetary Fund, on the grounds that it could worsen the Democratic
Republic of the Congo's external debt.
In conclusion, to the endogenous factors of conflict, namely the ethnic issue, we can also
add the problems inherent to the effects on a mostly rural population of income
economies where exports are based on two or three commodities, as well as promiscuity
and lack of transparency in state affairs, coupled with poor governance
4
.
The result is invariably a lack of social cohesion and consequent insecurity, as the idea
of "living together" is called into question. All this is a catalyst in the climate of
exacerbated violence that is the common denominator of most Central African states.
The case of the Great Lakes region is only a symptomatology or, if you like, an etiology
of the latent aggressiveness of predation, whether it has economic, political, or ethnic
origins.
The former UN Secretary-General said in 2007: "About half of all armed conflicts and
nearly three-quarters of all peacekeeping forces are in Africa. This is because millions of
Africans are still at the mercy of brutal regimes" (quoted by Bangui, 2015: 132, own
translation).
The scenario of repeated convulsions for decades in countries such as the Central African
Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have become recurrent, involving
several states and the United Nations. In those two countries violence has become
chronic, preventing the state from ensuring the integrity of the territory.
From 1998 to 2014, the Central African Republic had thirteen external peacekeeping
interventions. In 2014, two more intervention forces were created, one by the European
Union ("European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic"), in
complementarity with the French contingent, which withdrew in 2016, and another by
the United Nations ("United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Mission for the
Stabilization of the Central African Republic"), which replaced the previous African Union
contingent.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, also after non-transparent elections that gave
Joseph Kabila a third term in office, there was an upsurge in war activities in the east of
the country. A UN Security Council resolution had to be resorted to again, and an
additional force ("United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo") was created to try to neutralize the M23 rebels.
4
Several Non-Governmental Organizations (such as Transparency International) refer to the ill-gotten assets
of the clans in Equatorial Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon, in power for several decades, assets
derived from embezzlement of public funds.
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Conflict and identity issues
The new post-war world order created supranational instances in the areas of both
economics and international law. However, for example regarding the intangibility of
borders and the principle of non-interference, the founding charter of the United Nations
presents several paragraphs in its articles that are, to say the least, unclear or even
equivocal (Lagot, 2021: 26).
In particular, the principle of "the right to self-determination of peoples" is very difficult
to articulate with the dispersive multidimensionality of identity phenomena. Ethnic
identification does not obey the artificial borders inherited from the colonial period; the
feeling of belonging to a certain linguistic group, with its own culture, a common history
in which a collective memory is shared, and even a well-defined genealogy and
mythology is what brings about the feeling of community.
And behind this feeling of belonging are repressed relationships and affections that derive
from different socioeconomic statuses and that generate frustrations toward those who
are different. There is a regressive projection and a libidinal investment that can be
aggressive. This aggressiveness, manipulated through kinship and lineage relationships,
very often results in conflict, aggravated by political structures in an embryonic state.
In other words, it is not biological traits or even social status that define and delimit
ethnic barriers, nor is it supposed to be a state that is perfectly artificial and that does
not represent the populations, not by a long shot. Ethnic identification has much more to
do with cultural (mythology, cosmologies, and kinship rules) and socioeconomic (land
tenure, classlessness) characteristics of the different human groups.
From this perspective, the question of the Hamitic origins of the Tutsi, which gives them
a superior status, as opposed to the supposed “bantuization” of the Hutu majority or the
Twa, is an effusion created by the Belgian administration, trying to divide to rule. The
animosity between the differentiated communities comes from an ancestral problematic
that stems from three asymmetric factors, the access, distribution and sometimes even
scarcity of land, the differentiated economic activities of each group
(farmers/pastoralists; sedentary/nomadic) and, finally, demographic pressure (vide,
among others, Senarclens, 2016: 148).
In addition, there is an underlying issue that relates to the domestic economy of clan or
lineage societies. The extent of the problem will be in the symbolic power of chieftaincies
and the social status that is not derived from wealth but from prestige. This is the second
invariant that we can find and that has no parameter of comparison with the industrial
societies of advanced economies.
The kinship ties typical of secular traditions have loosened with the mobility of
populations due to demographic pressure and climate change. It is no longer possible to
regress to the idyll of classless, labor less societies in an environment where, with a very
low level of technology, one can perfectly well satisfy consumption needs (Sahlins, 1976:
43-63).
The categories of "poverty" and "social insecurity," which are often linked to the
phenomenon of war, begin to make sense during resistance to colonial empires and in
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post-colonial reality. Politics would thus be, inverting Clausewitz's aphorism, the pursuit
of war by other means.
We would have to distinguish within the political economy and the legal formula of
sovereignty two separate meanings of domination, contract-oppression, and war-
repression, the two being linked, respectively, to political law and war (Foucault, 1997:
15-19). The subordination of politics to war becomes evident, the latter being a
continuous process that would lead us, through the submission/insurgency dynamic, to
the concept of class struggle (Terray, 1999; Sibertin-Blanc, 2013:. 144-148). In this way,
we would distinguish, altering Clausewitz's precepts, as mentioned above, a passage
from the state of war to the apparatus of capture (in essence, the emergence of the
State) and to what Deleuze defined as being "Urstaat"
5
.
And from class struggle, by transposition, we would move to biopolitics with race warfare
and state racism. In other words, if the phenomenon of war precedes political philosophy
through the inversion of the two concepts in power relations, then violence has an
archeology and a phylogenesis that are at the base of the political-military crises in sub-
Saharan Africa, where power relations and hierarchies are not a cephalic, but
polycephalic. Thus, there is a division and segmentation of power that makes it disperse
and diffuse (Rey, 2017: 193).
The paradigmatic case of what we are saying is another Central African country, wedged
in the center of the continent, whose fluidity of borders and geographic space create
another geo-system from the point of view of violence: Chad.
Crossed in the middle of its territory by the Sahelian strip, to the north is the Sahara and
to the south the savannah, in the southern area ethnicities with Christian and animist
religions predominate, in the northern areas much of the population is Islamic. It borders
the Central African Republic to the south, Sudan to the east, particularly Darfur, Libya to
the north, and Niger to the west.
Lake Chad is a geostrategic confluence region, as it borders several states. It serves, for
example, as a rear base for the Boko Haram terrorist movement that is very active in
northeastern Nigeria. The base for the Barkhane operation's general staff for the Sahel
is established in N'Djamena.
The regime, neo-patrimonial (based on cotton and hydrocarbon revenues), like most
regimes in black Africa, has ended up squandering export revenues, further aggravating
the already long civil war. Also as in most African states, President Idriss Déby, who died
in 2021, was already going into his sixth term with over thirty years in power.
The idea that the craft of arms creates an anomie that spreads to civil society is not
absolute. In a predatory accumulation economy, loyalties are fluid and fragmented
pushing the various actors into a non-linear logic of alliance composition. On the other
hand, there is a crystallization of identities that goes beyond ethnicity. From this stem
the tendency of regular forces and fighters from the various rebel factions, mostly
composing themselves into loosely organized militias, especially when there is no
regional support, in this case from neighboring countries (Libya, Sudan, and Central
5
Urstaat means "State of Ur" referring to a city in Babylon, the cradle of the first civilization and the beginning
of history, if we assume that history begins with writing.
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African Republic) or the former colonial power (France), to a well-known phenomenon,
the warlord insurgency. (Debos, 2013: 104-108)
The story would have to start further back, with the formation of the Frolinat still in the
1960s. In the following decade, to quote the same author: " While the Frolinat of the
1970s was part of the anti-imperialist movement, the rebellions of the 1990s and 2000s
display, with varying degrees of clumsiness, their commitment to democracy or, less
often, to development." (Debos, 2013: 94, own translation). Signs of the times? The
truth is that the Frolinat branched out into a series of party organizations with their
respective armed arms. The Patriotic Salvation Movement (PSM) itself, which brought
Idriss Déby to power in 1990, followed this same path.
Chad's relationship with Sudan and the Darfur region is very similar to that between, for
example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The porosity
of the borders, the ethnic and identity loyalties based on clan and kinship are quite
analogous.
The resources curse
The beginning of the current scientific debate about the relationship between the
existence of natural resources in a country/region and the outbreak of armed conflict
6
is
due to the work of Collier and Hoeffler, namely through the Greed and Grievance in Civil
War Model
7
.
At the time a rupture occurred with the traditional approach of political science, which
associated the onset of a rebellion with the materialization of grievances/claims powerful
enough to motivate individuals to violent forms of protest (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004:
564). This rupture was not even initiated by Collier and Hoeffler, this model appearing
rather as an attempt to approximate the traditional approach of political science, in which
rebellion had a motive (the claim) and an explanation (the atypical claim), with the
approaches closer to economics, which saw in the motive greed - rebellion would be an
industry that generated profits from looting (Grossman, 1999: 269-270), and in the
explanation the existence of atypical opportunities.
Collier and Hoeffler's reference to Hirshleifer's approach (1995 and 2001), which
classifies the possible causes of conflict into preferences, opportunities, and perceptions,
is very curious (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 564). Collier and Hoeffler have stuck to
defining a set of variables (proxies) that illustrate motives (claims/claims) and
opportunities (greed), thus attempting some reconciliation between political science and
economics, without abandoning their positivist epistemology and deductive methodology.
However, this approach to Hirshleifer's "perceptions" "the introduction of perceptions
induces the possibility that motives, and opportunities are being misperceived" (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004: 564) is likely to be a recognition of the usefulness of an approach
that also incorporates an inductive and qualitative component.
6
The scientific debate began by being more general, not least because Collier and Hoeffler's Gains and Claims
model presented a broad set of explanatory variables for the outbreak of civil war. Later, one of the variables
in question, the endowment of natural resources, would itself become a line of research.
7
We will freely use the translation of complaint or claim for the original expression "grievance".
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One hundred and sixty-one countries were analyzed in the period between 1960 and
1999, and seventy-nine civil wars were identified, defined as the occurrence of an internal
conflict that causes at least one thousand deaths per year, of which at least 5% are
elements of rebel and government forces. In four Central African countries such episodes
were identified (Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad) and, in a logic
of extraversion, three more countries of the Great Lakes, namely Rwanda, Burundi, and
Uganda, closely linked to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to
Nigeria, whose northeast borders Chad.
The model presented a wide range of opportunity/greed variables, including natural
resources, diaspora remittances, foreign support, opportunity cost in income, conflict
capital, and military capacity, all illustrated by metrics
8
. It also contemplated so-called
claim/claim variables, namely religious/ethnic hatred, political repression, political
exclusion, and economic inequality
9
.
Collier and Hoefler found that models based on opportunities for rebellion have plenty of
explanatory robustness, which is not the case for models constructed from claim
variables, where statistical relevance is significantly lower (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p.
587).
They revealed that the availability of financial means is a way to create opportunity for
rebellion, i.e., the existence of significant primary product export revenues and emigrant
remittances increase the risk of conflict: it was after all the "curse" of resources.
The indicators of grievances have little statistical significance, except for ethnic political
exclusion and ethnic hatred, particularly when one ethnic group is dominant. In
conjunction with the conflict-unfriendly effect of ethnic and religious diversification, this
may mean that diversification decreases the risk of conflict relative to more
homogeneous societies, if there is no dominance relationship of one religion and/or
ethnicity (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 588).
Finally, a note on population and the time that has elapsed since the last conflict, which
have in common that they can be indicators of opportunity or claim (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004: 588-589). A higher population seems to be more often conducive to conflict, while
an increase in the length of time a country has been at peace tends to make it less likely
that new episodes of conflict will arise.
In conclusion, opportunity as an explanation for conflict risk is consistent with the
economic interpretation of rebellion being motivated by greed. It is also consistent with
the claim motivation, insofar as the perception of the claim may be generalized across
societies and diffused over time. But the claims that motivate rebels may not be entirely
related to the larger concerns of inequality, political rights, and ethnic or religious identity
8
These metrics were, respectively, i) commodity exports versus gross domestic product; ii) emigrants living
in the US versus the total population of the country; iii) civil wars that arose in the Cold War period versus
total civil wars; iv) income per capita, young males with secondary education versus total students, GDP
growth per capita; v) time since last conflict (in months) and vi) mountainous terrain, forest cover, social
fractionalization (ethnic and religious), population density, population concentration, and population in
urban areas.
9
With indicators such as i) ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and polarization; ii) democracy;
iii) ethnic dominance; iv) income inequality and land ownership inequality.
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(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 589), in other words, rebels may use a claimant discourse to
explain a conflict they initiated with one main goal: greed.
The intellectual debate was very much centered on the issue of natural resources. Indeed,
the existence of a statistical correlation between natural resource endowment and the
incidence of civil war was initially interpreted as evidence that natural resource
abundance would make armed conflict more likely (Samset, 2009).
This conclusion launched several topics of analysis (Samset, 2009), of which perhaps
only one is most relevant at this point: is there really a correlation between natural
resources and violent conflict?
Some empirical tests of the model (notably Fearon, 2005) found no significant causal
relationship between civil war and a high share of commodity exports in a country's gross
domestic product, which was precisely one of the explanatory variables used by Collier
and Hoeffler.
Fearon (2005: 503-505) concludes that "there is no clear evidence that high levels of
primary sector commodity exports cause a high risk of civil war," although he
acknowledges the existence of a more significant causal relationship between oil
endowments and conflict. Indeed, the association between civil war and resource
endowment results "from oil being the main component of primary commodity exports
and substantial oil production being associated with civil war risk." Fearon adds that "the
existence of oil allows one to anticipate the risk of civil war not because it provides an
easy source of funding to start a rebellion, but probably because oil-producing states
have a relatively low organization/capacity for intervention in relation to their high level
of per capita income, making control of the country or region a tempting prize."
This argument also finds support in the work of De Soysa (2002: 407) when he states
that "the relative availability of natural resources is unrelated to conflict, although the
availability of mineral resources is a significant predictor of conflict," as well as in Ross
(2004: 352) who finds no correlation between commodity endowment and the onset of
civil wars.
Although the existence of a correlation between natural resources and civil wars has not
been confirmed by most subsequent studies, the truth is that Collier and Hoeffler's model
paved the way for a vast literature that relates some types of natural resources (namely
oil and other minerals) with particular aspects of the conflict, namely its onset or duration
(Samset, 2009 and Ross, 2004, among others). And it has also generated additional
discussion about the nature of the relationship that exists between some of the
exogenous variables (indicators of opportunity and claim) and the endogenous variable,
that is, the civil war or, more generally, the episodes of conflict.
The question remains: are variables such as the endowment of natural resources what
causes civil wars or, on the contrary, is it the escalation of violence that induces the
increase in exports, precisely to finance the conflicts? In this regard, we highlight the
work of Mitchell and Thies (2012), in an approach dubbed by themselves as "two-way
relationsship between natural resources and civil war" (Mitchell and Thies, 2012: 218)
that focuses on the cases of oil, diamonds and fishing catches. Two conclusions are drawn
from this empirical test: civil wars do tend to reduce the oil and diamond resources of
the countries in conflict but, on the other hand, there is an increase in fish resources,
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due to the reduction in catches associated with the mobilization of fishermen to war
(Mitchell and Thies, 2012: 238). They conclude that "we also show that the effect of civil
war on resources may depend on the characteristics of the resources and nature of the
conflicts" (idem)
10
.
The type of data to be used in empirical tests of this type of model is still a matter of
academic discussion. Since it was concluded that not all natural resources are likely to
be linked to conflict phenomena, then why not remove them from the sample and place
the analysis only on episodes of conflict that occur in countries that export primary
products likely to provoke these conflicts, notably oil and other minerals?
Conclusion
Much of the literature about conflict in Central Africa considers this phenomenon to be a
direct consequence of so-called "failed" states.
We have tried to rebut this thesis. We even prefer the term "fragile" states to avoid the
idea of their collapse. Our idea is that these states live on war as a sine qua non of
politics.
Other approaches are based on the religious issue as the most likely cause for conflict in
those territories.
We also do not think that the religious issue is the central reason for the conflict.
Rather, we believe that the causes are to be found in ethnic and identarian aspects,
politics, and economics.
The processes of externalization and factionalism, the diffuse and dispersed dynamics of
alliances, their fluidity according to various alignments, extraversion, and polycephaly
are only visible characteristics of the disorder and chaos of the state that has not
disappeared, but that simply feeds, through a hybrid phenomenon (the postcolonial
state), on fragmented social structures for an economy of predatory accumulation.
Almost all Central Africa entered the new century in "iron and fire".
On the one hand, the political and economic framework is directly related to
development, in conjunction with the role of international organizations. On the other
hand, identity problems, as we have seen, are not objectively affiliated with the definition
of the states that emerged from decolonization.
These seem to us to be the main factors for understanding the dynamics of conflict in
that geographical area.
The objective of this analysis was to try to establish a causality of the phenomenon of
war and interpret it in a cause-effect relationship. These are the basic assumptions of
polemology.
The irenology has already come out of the scope we have proposed. It would be
opportune to do so to find solutions that could lead us to a new phase in the history of
the African peoples. A history that does not begin with the passage of the Europeans,
10
This subject has been discussed by several other authors, with special reference to Roos (2004).
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because the idea of "peoples without a history" is a myth, much less coherent than all
the mythology of societies of oral tradition.
Perhaps we are also led to reflect on North-South relations. The conquests of science and
technology, law, political institutions, economic models, and manifestations of art tell us
nothing about the social organization of those who cannot be proud of such
achievements. In the 1920s, Marcel Mauss, heir to Durkheimian sociology and founder
of French ethnology, said that the West would have to reflect itself in the mirror and be
attentive to the teachings revealed through observation on the ground (Mauss, 2012, p.
219-248). Exoticism and archaism, I think we all agree on. As for the delay, it always
depends on the perspective.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023)
209
POLEMOLOGIA DA ÁFRICA CENTRAL (1990-2020)
HENRIQUE MORAIS
hnmorais@gmail.com
Licenciado em Economia pela Universidade Técnica de Lisboa / Instituto Superior de Economia e
Gestão (ISEG). Mestre em Economia Internacional pelo ISEG. Doutor em Relações Interncionais:
Geopolítica e Geoeconomia pela Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa. Quadro do Banco de Portugal
(Portugal), onde desempenha funções de Coordenador da Área de Inovação e Suporte do
Departamento de Mercados. Fui Presidente da Comissão Executiva e Administrador da Invesfer
S.A., uma empresa do Grupo REFER, e ainda Administrador e Diretor Executivo da CP Carga.
Professor na Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, UAL (nos Departamentos de Ciências Económicas
e Empresariais e Relações Internacionais) e no MBA em Corporate Finance da Universidade do
Algarve. É ainda membro do Observatório de Relações Exteriores da UAL, onde tem estado
envolvido em vários projectos de investigação, bem como na participação assídua nas várias
edições do Janus - Anuário de Relações Exteriores.
Resumo
Neste artigo propomos uma abordagem holística da conflitualidade, delimitando o espaço
geográfico a uma sub-região
1
, a África Central, embora mantendo ativos os vasos
comunicantes que derivam da mobilidade étnica e da flutuação das fronteiras territoriais.
A questão étnica, a geopolítica e a “maldição” dos recursos parecem-nos fatores explicativos
da conflitualidade bem mais apropriados do que a questão religiosa, ligada ao Islão, ou a ideia
dos “Estados falhados”.
Os processos de externalização e de faccionalismo, a dinâmica difusa e de dispersão das
alianças, a fluidez das mesmas obedecendo a vários alinhamentos, a extraversão e a
policefalia não são mais do que características bem visíveis da desordem e do caos do Estado
que não desapareceu, mas que simplesmente se alimenta, através de um fenómeno híbrido
(o Estado pós-colonial), das estruturas sociais fragmentadas para uma economia de
acumulação predadora.
Palavras-Chave
África Central; conflitualidade; recursos; etnicidade; religião
Abstract
In this article, we propose a holistic approach to conflict, delimiting the geographic space to
a sub-region, Central Africa, while keeping active the communicating vessels that derive from
ethnic mobility and the fluctuation of territorial borders.
The ethnic issue, geopolitics, and the resources curse seem to us to be more appropriate
explanatory factors of conflict than the religious issue, linked to Islam, or the idea of "failed
states”.
The processes of externalization and factionalism, the diffuse and dispersed dynamics of
alliances, their fluidity according to various alignments, extraversion and policefalia are only
visible characteristics of State`s disorder and chaos that has not disappeared, but simply
feeds, through a hybrid phenomenon (the post-colonial State), from fragmented social
structures for an economy of predatory accumulation.
Keywords
Central Africa; Conflict; Resources; Ethnicity; Religion
1
Optámos por considerar a África central uma sub-região, embora conscientes de que a classificação não é
unânime e muitos autores consideram a África Central uma região.
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Polemologia da África Central (1990-2020)
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Como citar este artigo
Morais, Henrique (2023). Polemologia da África Central (1990-2020). Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations, Vol14 N1, Maio-Outubro 2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última
consulta, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.11
Artigo ecebido em 23 de Janeiro de 2023, aceite para publicação em 3 de Março de 2023
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POLEMOLOGIA DA ÁFRICA CENTRAL (1990-2020)
HENRIQUE MORAIS
A conflitualidade na África Central: da religião à etnicidade e à política
O problema religioso a sul do Sahara pode ser considerado polissémico devido à forma
como penetraram as duas principais religiões monoteístas, o cristianismo e o islamismo,
no subcontinente. Na verdade, tratou-se de um processo lento, que durou vários séculos
e a que não são alheios os sincretismos próprios das religiões animistas.
A religião, por muito que grupos armados se afirmem, por exemplo, de obediência
salafista ou pentecostal, foi ao longo dos tempos um fenómeno de certa forma marginal
nas crises políticas africanas. A irrupção das crises, mais do que associada
prioritariamente a fenómenos religiosos, esteve relacionada, de forma direta ou indireta,
a reivindicações políticas identificadas com clivagens étnicas e os seus interesses
particulares.
Por tudo isto, foi algo surpreendente que a África Negra passasse a fazer parte da agenda
internacional no que diz respeito ao terrorismo por questões religiosas. Referimo-nos aos
ataques às embaixadas norte-americanas em Nairóbi e em Dar es Salaam, em agosto de
1998, quiçá o prenúncio de um ainda mais impactante acontecimento, isto é, os
atentados do 11 de setembro em Nova Iorque.
Também não parece existir um programa ideológico por detrás da conflitualidade em
África e, frequentemente, as forças beligerantes não hesitarão em utilizar receitas
provenientes de um qualquer tipo de tráfico para adquirir armamento. Aliás, talvez esta
relativa ausência de cariz ideológico na conflitualidade possa ter sido propiciada pela
forma como se processou a militarização das sociedades africanas, envolvendo, numa
trama desordenada de funções, forças regulares, milícias e grupos rebeldes, obedecendo
a uma lógica de indisciplina e de distorção do código deontológico de quem combate.
Neste contexto, a guerra em África é um fenómeno massificador que devastou o
continente de forma inédita, a partir da introdução do armamento industrial e da
conceção burocrática e territorializada do Estado-nação com base na etnicização das
identificações e filiações políticas (Bayart, 2018: 109). Ou seja, a clivagem étnica está
por detrás da criação de grupos armados, bem como de formações políticas nas situações
em que o cenário bélico dá lugar a convergências políticas iniciadoras de processos
eleitorais.
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Estabelecendo uma relação entre o fenómeno da conflitualidade e a etnicidade, verifica-
se que o problema interétnico é difuso, podendo ser infranacional ou transnacional,
obedecendo a uma lógica de caos geométrico e sistémico (Mashimango, 2015)
2
.
Na África Central, e em especial na região dos Grandes Lagos, o mosaico étnico é muito
fraturante, situação potencialmente agravada pelo "escândalo geológico" que constitui o
Leste da República Democrática do Congo, com implicações nos processos de
recomposição sistemática de alianças face às estratégias diferenciadas dos beligerantes.
A questão étnica e a conflitualidade a ela associada também caracteriza a faixa costeira
da África Central, como são exemplo os massacres da etnia Laris na região do Pool no
sul do Congo, quiçá porque os Estados costeiros possuem, em certa medida,
características muito semelhantes às da região dos Grandes Lagos do ponto de vista
étnico.
A problemática étnica, herdada das colonizações, pode, consequentemente, ser
manipulada em função de estratégias com múltiplos alcances e motivações, com
consequências trágicas como o comprovam os constantes massacres sobre civis em
zonas rurais e particularmente em campos de refugiados.
Independentemente do reconhecimento daqueles fenómenos de manipulação, parece
indiscutível a importância da problemática identitária no aparecimento da conflitualidade.
Ora, a problemática identitária, muito relacionada com o etnocentrismo e as clivagens
étnicas, está diretamente relacionada com uma sobrevalorização do indivíduo e da
comunidade à qual pertence. Há um retraimento, um fechar-se sobre si próprio, que é
próprio dos valores comunitários passados de geração em geração, em comunidades,
tribos, clãs ou etnias unas e indivisas.
Do ponto de vista político, embora a história seja mais remota, talvez possamos iniciá-la
em 1990 com a guerra civil no Ruanda.
A guerra civil no Ruanda foi impulsionada pelo regime amigo do Uganda, ambos
apadrinhados pelos EUA. O objetivo era duplo: por um lado, redesenhar as fronteiras
deixadas pelos europeus e controlar as minas do Leste do Congo-Kinshasa (Péan, 2010:
327-338) e, por outro lado, através do movimento armado liderado por John Garang (o
Lord's Resistance Army)
3
, impedir a influência no Corno de África do regime islâmico de
Cartum. Embora tenhamos de ser cautelosos em relação à expressão “redesenhar as
fronteiras”, podemos facilmente entender o seu significado à luz de uma reconfiguração
étnica que passava pela chegada ao poder da minoria Tutsi no Ruanda e Leste do Congo.
As tentativas de paz através dos acordos de Arusha falharam e, em 1994, após o
assassinato do presidente ruandês, a Frente Patriótica do Ruanda (FPR) de Kagame
tomou o poder. É a partir daqui, e um pouco mais tarde com o fim do mobutismo em
1997, que o ambiente de hostilidade se vai tornar mais volátil, até à chamada “Grande
Guerra de África”, entre 1998 e 2003.
Duas mudanças no campo ocidental foram fundamentais para a reconfiguração do mapa
geopolítico da sub-região, nomeadamente a alteração da política de Bill Clinton para
2
O caos geométrico remete-nos para uma lógica de geometria varável da conflitualidade, que será abordada
noutro ponto deste artigo.
3
Este movimento tinha as suas bases e as suas fontes de financiamento na região dos Grandes Lagos e
reivindicações no Sul do Sudão.
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África e o discurso de La Baule de François Mitterrand, em 1990, promovendo o fim do
monopartidarismo e abrindo as portas para as conferências nacionais em toda a
francofonia.
Os fatores ligados à problemática identitária atrás expostos, acelerados pelo processo
histórico, vão criar entre duas etnias com origens diferentes as condições para uma visão
genocida, como é exemplificado pelo Ruanda.
A "revolução Hutu" desencadeou um enquadramento propício para a diáspora e a
ostracização da minoria Tutsi, perante fronteiras porosas em que os refugiados de ambos
os lados circulam pelo Ruanda, Uganda, Burundi ou República Democrática do Congo.
Neste contexto, em abril de 1994, o abate do avião que transportava o Presidente Hutu
(J. Habyarimana) foi apenas um pretexto para a criação de um ambiente propício ao
"poder Hutu" das milícias Interahamwe e ao começo do genocídio, com a morte de quase
1 milhão de pessoas em cerca de dois meses.
Existem várias interpretações acerca do que se passou naquelas trágicas semanas:
visões oficiais de vitimização Tutsi chegando a comparar o grupo étnico à sorte dos
judeus durante o Holocausto, na sequência da propaganda difundida pela FPR após o
genocídio (Braeckman, 1994; 1996), ou ainda a ideia do duplo genocídio (Péan, 2010 e
Rever, 2020, entre outros), logo apelidada pelo discurso oficial como "negacionista". A
própria missão humanitária da Operação Turquoise foi considerada pela visão oficial
como uma farsa, uma forma de proteger e deixar fugir os genocidas.
Os acontecimentos posteriores vão fazer vacilar os "factos" da versão oficial. Em 1996,
a Frente Patriótica do Ruanda (FPR) invade o Leste da República Democrática do Congo,
um ano depois a Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), de
Laurent Kabila, entra vitoriosa em Kinshasa. Em outubro de 1997, o Partido Congolês do
Trabalho (PCT) retoma o poder em Brazzaville pela força das armas e com o apoio de
tropas regulares angolanas.
Entretanto, entre 1998 e 2003, deu-se o maior conflito armado de África, em que
participaram oito estados e cerca de vinte e cinco movimentos armados, e que provocou
cerca de cinco milhões de mortos. Estava aberta a porta para a balcanização da República
Democrática do Congo. Movimentos como o Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-
Goma) ou o The March 23 Movement (M23, atualmente quase extinto), entre outros,
continuaram a disseminar o terror por províncias como o Kivu ou o Kasai.
As voltas e reviravoltas da geopolítica também desempenharam o seu papel.
Durante os anos noventa, como assinalado anteriormente, assistimos a uma relação
diplomática e política algo conturbada entre os dois principais atores extracontinentais
intervenientes, isto é, foram os anos difíceis da coexistência entre Washington e Paris
(Tedom, 2015: 24-37).
Na viragem do século, Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e Africa do Sul ( BRICS) começam a
ganhar protagonismo, especialmente evidente no caso da China, após a adesão à
Organização Mundial do Comércio. A “sede” de matérias-primas por parte de Pequim
levou a uma nova abordagem para os países da África Central, a chamada relação
"ganhador-ganhador", resumidamente, a capacidade de assegurar recursos essenciais
para o crescimento do dragão asiático em troca de infraestruturas.
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Embora a China ganhe real ascendente em África, nomeadamente através do comércio,
tornando-se, desde 2015, no primeiro parceiro comercial de África, a ambivalência na
sua relação com o Ocidente, entre competição e cooperação no que diz respeito à
penetração nos mercados africanos, é no mínimo ambígua (Niambi, 2019).
Os últimos acordos bilaterais entre Paris e Pequim apontam para um trilateralismo com
a África Central, numa perspetiva entre recursos orçamentais e financeiros, que no caso
chinês são avassaladores, e experiência e tecnologia que podem ser oferecidos pelos
franceses, seguindo a tendência do multilateralismo dos últimos vinte e cinco anos.
Mas a verdade é que tanto o Hexágono como o "Império do Meio" continuam a privilegiar
as relações bilaterais com os diversos Estados da sub-região. O contrato sino-congolês
no sector mineiro é bem prova disso, por via da oferta de minerais raros e estratégicos
nas províncias do Katanga e do Sul e Norte Kivu, chegando mesmo a ser fortemente
criticado pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional, com a alegação de que poderia agravar a
dívida externa da República Democrática do Congo.
Em conclusão, aos fatores endógenos à conflitualidade, nomeadamente a questão étnica,
poderemos ainda acrescentar os problemas inerentes aos efeitos sobre uma população
maioritariamente rural de economias de renda em que as exportações se baseiam em
dois ou três produtos de base, bem como à promiscuidade e falta de transparência nos
negócios do Estado, aliadas à má governação
4
.
O resultado é invariavelmente a falta de coesão social e a consequente insegurança, visto
que a própria noção do "viver juntos" é posta em causa. Tudo isto configura um
catalisador no clima de violência exacerbada que é o denominador comum da maior parte
dos Estados da África central.
O caso extremo da região dos Grandes Lagos é só uma sintomatologia ou, se quisermos,
uma etiologia da agressividade latente própria da predação, tenha ela origens
económicas, políticas ou étnicas.
O antigo secretário-geral da ONU dizia em 2007: "Environ la moitié des conflits armés et
près des trois quarts des forces de maintien de la paix se trouvent en Afrique. Ceci parce
que des millions d'africains sont encore à la merci de régimes brutaux" (citado por
Bangui, 2015: 132).
Os cenários de convulsões repetidas durante décadas em países como a República Centro
Africana e a República Democrática do Congo tornaram-se recorrentes, envolvendo
diversos estados e as Nações Unidas. Naqueles dois países a violência tornou-se crónica,
impedindo o Estado de assegurar a integridade do território.
De 1998 a 2014, a República Centro Africana teve treze intervenções externas de
manutenção de paz. Em 2014 foram criadas mais duas forças de intervenção, uma da
União Europeia (“European Union Military Operation in the Central African Republic”), em
complementaridade com o contingente francês, que se retirou em 2016, e outra das
Nações Unidas (“Missão Multidimensional Integrada das Nações Unidas para a
4
Várias Organizações não Governamentais (como a Transparency International) referem-se aos "bens mal
adquiridos" pelos clãs da Guiné Equatorial, do Congo-Brazzaville e do Gabão, no poder há várias décadas,
bens provindos de desvios de fundos públicos.
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Estabilização da República Centro-Africana”), que substituiu o contingente anterior da
União Africana.
Na República Democrática do Congo, também após eleições pouco transparentes que
deram um terceiro mandato a Joseph Kabila, registou-se uma recrudescência das
atividades bélicas no Leste do país. Foi necessário recorrer novamente a uma resolução
do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, tendo sido criada mais uma força (“United
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”) para
tentar neutralizar os rebeldes do M23.
A conflitualidade e a problemática identitária
A nova ordem mundial do pós-guerra criou instâncias supranacionais tanto nas áreas da
economia como do direito internacional. No entanto, por exemplo no que diz respeito à
intangibilidade das fronteiras e ao princípio de não ingerência, a carta fundadora das
Nações Unidas apresenta várias alíneas nos seus artigos que são, no mínimo, pouco
claras ou mesmo equívocas (Lagot, 2021: 26).
Em particular, o princípio do "direito à autodeterminação dos povos" é muito difícil de
articular com a pluridimensionalidade dispersiva dos fenómenos identitários. A
identificação étnica não obedece às fronteiras artificiais herdadas do período colonial, o
sentimento de pertença a um determinado grupo linguístico, com uma cultura própria,
uma história comum em que se partilha uma memória coletiva, e ainda uma genealogia
e uma mitologia bem definidas é que faz eclodir o sentimento comunitário.
E atrás deste sentimento de pertença estão relações e afetos mais ou menos recalcados,
que derivam de estatutos socioeconómicos diferenciados e que geram frustrações para
com aqueles que são diferentes. Há uma projeção regressiva e um investimento libidinal
que pode ser agressivo. Essa agressividade, manipulada através de relações de
parentesco e de linhagem, resulta muito frequentemente em conflitualidade, agravada
por estruturas políticas em estado embrionário.
Ou seja, não são os traços biológicos ou mesmo o estatuto social que definem e delimitam
as barreiras étnicas, nem supostamente um Estado que é perfeitamente artificial e que
não representa, nem de perto nem de longe, as populações no seu conjunto. A
identificação étnica prende-se muito mais com características culturais (mitologia,
cosmologias e regras de parentesco) e socioeconómicas (regime de propriedade da terra,
ausência de classes) dos diferentes grupos humanos.
Nessa perspetiva, a questão das origens hamíticas dos Tutsi, que lhes confere um
estatuto superior, por oposição à bantuização suposta da maioria Hutu ou dos Twa, é
uma efabulação criada pela administração belga, dividindo para melhor reinar. A
animosidade entre as comunidades diferenciadas vem de uma ancestral problemática
que deriva de três fatores assimétricos, o acesso, a distribuição e por vezes até a
escassez de terras, as atividades económicas diferenciadas de cada grupo
(agricultores/pastores; sedentários/nómadas) e, por último, a pressão demográfica
(vidé, entre outros, Senarclens, 2016: 148).
Além disso, existe uma questão de fundo que se relaciona com a economia doméstica
das sociedades clânicas ou de linhagens. A dimensão do problema estará no poder
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simbólico das chefaturas e no estatuto social que não deriva da riqueza, mas sim do
prestígio. É a segunda invariante que podemos encontrar e que não tem nenhum
parâmetro de comparação com as sociedades industriais das economias avançadas.
Os laços de parentesco próprios das tradições seculares afrouxaram com a mobilidade
das populações devida à pressão demográfica e às alterações climáticas. Já não é possível
regredir até ao idílio das sociedades sem classes e sem trabalho num meio em que, com
um nível tecnológico muito baixo, se podem perfeitamente satisfazer as necessidades de
consumo (Sahlins, 1976: 43-63).
As categorias de "pobreza" e de "insegurança social", que estão muitas vezes ligadas ao
fenómeno da guerra, começam a fazer sentido durante a resistência aos impérios
coloniais e na realidade pós-colonial. A política seria assim, invertendo o aforismo de
Clausewitz, a prossecução da guerra por outros meios.
Teríamos de distinguir dentro da economia política e da fórmula jurídica da soberania
dois significados separados de dominação, o contrato-opressão e a guerra-repressão,
estando os dois ligados, respetivamente, ao Direito político e à guerra (Foucault, 1997:
15-19). A subordinação da política à guerra torna-se evidente, sendo esta última um
processo contínuo que nos levaria, pela dinâmica submissão/insurgência, para o conceito
de luta de classes (Terray, 1999; Sibertin-Blanc, 2013: 144-148). Desta forma,
distinguiríamos, alterando os preceitos de Clausewitz, como referido anteriormente, uma
passagem do estado de guerra para o aparelho de captura (no fundo, o surgimento do
Estado) e para aquilo a que Deleuze definia como sendo “Urstaat”.
5
E da luta de classes, por transposição, passaríamos para a biopolítica com a guerra de
raças e o racismo de Estado. Por outras palavras, se o fenómeno bélico antecede a
filosofia política através da inversão dos dois conceitos nas relações de poder, então a
violência possui uma arqueologia e uma filogénese que estão na base das crises político-
militares da África subsaariana sendo que as relações de poder e as hierarquias não são
acéfalas, mas sim policéfalas. Assim há uma divisão e uma segmentação do poder que o
torna disperso e difuso (Rey, 2017: 193).
O caso paradigmático daquilo que estamos a afirmar é outro país da África Central,
enclavado no centro do continente, cuja fluidez das fronteiras e o espaço geográfico criam
outro geo-sistema do ponto de vista da violência: o Chade.
Atravessado a meio do território pela faixa saheliana, a norte fica o Sahara e a sul a
savana, nas zonas meridionais predominam as etnias com religiões cristã e animista, nas
zonas setentrionais a maioria da população é islâmica. Faz fronteira a sul com a República
Centro Africana, a leste com o Sudão, particularmente com o Darfour, a norte fica a Líbia
e a oeste o Níger.
O lago Chade é uma região de confluência geoestratégica, pois delimita vários Estados.
Serve, por exemplo, de base de retaguarda para o movimento terrorista Boko Haram
que está muito ativo no Nordeste da Nigéria. A base do Estado-maior da operação
Barkhane para o Sahel está estabelecida em N'Djamena.
5
Urstaat significa “Estado de Ur” referente a uma cidade da Babilónia, berço da primeira civilização e do
começo da história, se assumirmos que a história começa com a escrita.
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O regime, neopatrimonial (com base na renda do algodão e dos hidrocarbonetos), como
a grande maioria dos regimes da África negra, acabou por delapidar as receitas das
exportações, agravando ainda mais a já longa guerra civil. Também como na maioria dos
Estados africanos, o presidente Idriss Déby, falecido em 2021, já ia no seu sexto mandato
com mais de trinta anos no poder.
A ideia de que o ofício das armas cria uma anomia que se propaga à sociedade civil não
é absoluta. Numa economia de acumulação predadora, as lealdades são fluídas e
fragmentadas empurrando os diversos atores para uma lógica não linear de composição
de alianças. Por outro lado, há uma cristalização das identidades que vai para além da
etnicidade. Daqui decorre a tendência das forças regulares e dos combatentes das
diversas fações rebeldes, compondo-se na maioria das vezes em milícias pouco
organizadas, sobretudo quando não há apoio regional, neste caso dos países vizinhos
(Líbia, Sudão e República Centro Africana) ou da antiga potência colonial (a França), para
um fenómeno bem conhecido, a warlord insurgency. (Debos, 2013: 104-108)
Invariavelmente, a história teria de começar mais atrás, com a formação do Frolinat
ainda nos anos sessenta. Na década seguinte, citando a mesma autora: "Alors que le
Frolinat des années 1970 s'inscrivait dans la mouvance anti-impėrialiste, les rébellions
des années 1990 et 2000 affichent, avec plus ou moins de maladresse, leur attachement
à la démocracie ou, moins souvent, au développement." (Debos, 2013: 94). Sinais dos
tempos? A verdade é que o Frolinat se ramificou numa série de organizações partidárias
com os seus respetivos braços armados. O próprio Mouvement Patriotique du Salut
(MPS), que levou Idriss Déby ao poder em 1990, seguiu esse mesmo caminho.
A relação do Chade com o Sudão e com a região do Darfour é muito semelhante com o
que se passa, por exemplo, entre a República Democrática do Congo, o Ruanda, o
Burundi e o Uganda. A porosidade das fronteiras, as lealdades étnicas e identitárias com
base no clã e no parentesco são bastante análogas.
A maldição dos recursos
O início do atual debate científico acerca da relação entre a existência de recursos
naturais num país/região e o desencadear de conflitos armados
6
deve-se aos trabalhos
de Collier e Hoeffler, nomeadamente através do Modelo de Ganância e Reclamação na
Guerra Civil
7
.
Na altura ocorreu uma rutura com a abordagem tradicional da ciência política, que
associava o início de uma rebelião à materialização de reivindicações/reclamações
suficientemente poderosas para motivar os indivíduos para formas violentas de protesto
(Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 564). Esta rutura não foi sequer iniciada por Collier e Hoeffler,
surgindo este modelo antes como uma tentativa de aproximação da abordagem
tradicional da ciência política, em que a rebelião tinha um motivo (a reivindicação) e uma
explicação (a reivindicação atípica), com as abordagens mais próximas da economia, que
6
O debate científico começou por ser mais geral, até porque o modelo Ganâncias e Reclamações de Collier
e Hoeffler apresentava um conjunto alargado de variáveis explicativas para o surgimento da guerra civil.
Posteriormente, uma das variáveis em causa, a dotação de recursos naturais, viria a configurar, em si
mesmo, uma linha de investigação.
7
No original, “Greed and Grievance in civil War”, sendo que utilizaremos de forma livre a tradução de
reclamação ou reivindicação para a expressão original “grievance”.
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viam no motivo a ganância - a rebelião seria uma indústria que gerava lucros do saque
(Grossman, 1999: 269-270), e na explicação a existência de oportunidades atípicas.
É aliás muito curiosa a referência de Collier e Hoeffler à abordagem de Hirshleifer (1995
e 2001), que classifica as possíveis causas do conflito em preferências, oportunidades e
perceções (Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 564). Collier e Hoeffler mantiveram-se fiéis à
definição de um conjunto de variáveis (proxies) que ilustram os motivos
(reivindicações/reclamações) e as oportunidades (ganância), tentando assim alguma
conciliação entre a ciência política e a economia, sem abandonar a sua epistemologia
positivista e a sua metodologia dedutiva. No entanto, esta aproximação às “perceções”
de Hirshleifer “a introdução das perceções induz a possibilidade de os motivos e as
oportunidades estarem a ser erradamente percecionadas” (Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 564)
será provavelmente o reconhecimento da utilidade de uma abordagem que incorpore
também uma componente indutiva e qualitativa.
Foram analisados cento e sessenta e um países, no período entre 1960 e 1999, tendo
sido identificadas setenta e nove guerras civis, definidas como a ocorrência de um conflito
interno que provoca pelo menos mil mortes por ano, das quais pelo menos 5% são
elementos das forças rebeldes e do governo. Em quatro países da áfrica Central foram
identificados esses episódios (Angola, Congo, República Democrática do Congo e Chade)
e, numa lógica de extraversão, mais três países dos Grandes Lagos, nomeadamente o
Ruanda, Burundi e Uganda, muito ligados à conflitualidade na República Democrática do
Congo, para além da Nigéria, cujo Nordeste faz fronteira com o Chade.
O modelo apresentou um vasto conjunto de variáveis de oportunidade/ganância,
nomeadamente a nível dos recursos naturais, das remessas da diáspora, do apoio
exterior, do custo de oportunidade nos rendimentos, do capital de conflito e da
capacidade militar, todas elas ilustradas por métricas
8
. Contemplou também as
chamadas variáveis de reivindicação/reclamação, isto é, o ódio religioso/étnico, a
repressão política, a exclusão política e a desigualdade económica
9
.
Collier e Hoefler constataram que modelos baseados nas oportunidades para a rebelião
têm bastante robustez explicativa, o que não ocorre com os modelos construídos a partir
de variáveis de reivindicação, em que a relevância estatística é significativamente mais
baixa (Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 587).
Em particular, revelaram que a disponibilidade de meios financeiros é uma forma de criar
oportunidade para a rebelião, isto é, a existência de significativas receitas de exportação
de produtos primários e as remessas de emigrantes aumentam o risco de conflito: era
afinal a “maldição” dos recursos.
Os indicadores de reivindicações têm pouca significância estatística, com exceção da
exclusão política por questão étnicas e do ódio étnico, nomeadamente quando uma etnia
tem a dominância. Em conjunto com o efeito desfavorável ao conflito da diversificação
8
Essas métricas foram, respetivamente, i) exportações de produtos primários face ao produto interno bruto;
ii) emigrantes que vivem nos EUA face à população total do país; iii) guerras civis surgidas no período da
Guerra Fria face ao total das guerras civis; iv) rendimento per capita, jovens masculinos com ensino
secundário face ao total de alunos, crescimento do PIB per capita; v) tempo desde último conflito (em
meses) e vi) terreno montanhoso, cobertura de floresta, fracionamento social (étnico e religioso), densidade
populacional, concentração da população e população em áreas urbanas.
9
Com indicadores como i) fracionamento étnico, fracionamento religioso e polarização; ii) democracia; iii)
domínio étnico; iv) desigualdade de rendimento e desigualdade de posse de terras.
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étnica e religiosa, tal pode significar que a diversificação diminui o risco de conflito em
relação a sociedades mais homogéneas, desde que não exista uma relação de dominância
de uma religião e/ou etnia (Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 588).
Por último, uma nota sobre a população e o tempo que decorreu desde o último conflito,
que têm em comum o fato de poderem ser indicadores de oportunidade ou de
reivindicação (Collier e Hoeffler, 2004: 588-589). Uma população mais elevada parece
propiciar mais frequentemente o conflito, enquanto o aumento do tempo em que um país
está em paz tende a tornar menos provável que surjam novos episódios de
conflitualidade.
Em conclusão, a oportunidade como explicação para o risco de conflito é consistente com
a interpretação económica da rebelião ser motivada pela ganância. É também consistente
com a motivação da reivindicação, na medida em que a perceção da reivindicação possa
ser generalizada às sociedades e difundida no tempo. Mas as reivindicações que motivam
os rebeldes podem não estar totalmente relacionadas com as grandes preocupações de
desigualdade, direitos políticos, e identidade étnica ou religiosa (Collier e Hoeffler,
2004: 589), ou seja, os rebeldes podem utilizar um discurso reivindicativo para explicar
um conflito por eles iniciado com um objetivo principal: a ganância.
O debate intelectual foi muito centrado na questão dos recursos naturais. Na verdade, a
existência de uma correlação estatística entre a dotação de recursos naturais e a
incidência de guerra civil foi inicialmente interpretada como uma evidência de que a
abundância de recursos naturais tornaria os conflitos armados mais prováveis (Samset,
2009).
Esta conclusão lançou vários tópicos de análise (Samset, 2009), dos quais neste
momento talvez seja mais relevante apenas um: existe mesmo uma correlação entre os
recursos naturais e os conflitos violentos?
Alguns testes empíricos ao modelo (nomeadamente Fearon, 2005) não encontraram uma
relação de causalidade significativa entre a guerra civil e um elevado peso das
exportações de produtos primários no produto interno bruto de um país, que era
justamente uma das variáveis explicativas utilizadas por Collier e Hoeffler.
Fearon (2005: 503-505) conclui que “não há uma evidência clara que elevados níveis de
exportações de mercadorias do setor primário causem um alto risco de guerra civil”,
embora reconheça a existência de uma relação causal mais significativa entre as dotações
de petróleo e a conflitualidade. Aliás, a associação entre a guerra civil e a dotação de
recursos resulta “do petróleo ser o principal componente das exportações de bens
primários e uma produção substancial de petróleo estar associada ao risco de guerra
civil.” Fearon acrescenta que “a existência de petróleo permite antever o risco de guerra
civil não porque fornece uma fonte fácil de financiamento para o arranque da rebelião,
mas provavelmente porque os estados produtores de petróleo têm uma
organização/capacidade de intervenção relativamente baixa face ao seu elevado nível de
rendimento per capita, tornando o controlo do país ou da região um prémio tentador”.
Este argumento encontra ainda suporte nos trabalhos de De Soysa (2002: 407) quando
afirma que “a relativa disponibilidade de recursos naturais não está relacionada com o
conflito, embora a disponibilidade de recursos minerais seja um previsor significativo do
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conflito”, bem como em Ross (2004: 352) que não encontra correlação entre a dotação
de produtos primários e o início das guerras civis.
Embora a existência de uma correlação entre os recursos naturais e as guerras civis não
tenha sido confirmada por grande parte dos estudos posteriores, a verdade é que o
modelo de Collier e Hoeffler abriu caminho a uma vasta literatura que relaciona alguns
tipos de recursos naturais (nomeadamente o petróleo e outros minerais) com aspetos
particulares do conflito, nomeadamente o seu início ou a sua duração (Samset, 2009 e
Ross, 2004, entre outros). E gerou também uma discussão adicional sobre a natureza da
relação que existe entre algumas das variáveis exógenas (indicadores de oportunidade e
de reivindicação) e a variável endógena, isto é, a guerra civil ou, de uma forma mais
geral, os episódios de conflitualidade.
Resta a interrogação: são variáveis como a dotação de recursos naturais que causam as
guerras civis ou, pelo contrário, a escalada de violência é que induz o aumento das
exportações, justamente para financiar os conflitos? A este propósito, destacamos o
trabalho de Mitchell e Thies (2012), numa abordagem apelidada pelos próprios de “two-
way relationsship between natural resources and civil war” (Mitchell e Thies, 2012: 218)
que se centra nos casos do petróleo, diamantes e capturas de pesca. Deste teste empírico
retiram-se duas conclusões: que as guerras civis tendem efetivamente a fazer reduzir os
recursos de petróleo e de diamantes dos países em conflito mas, por outro lado, assiste-
se a um aumento dos recursos piscatórios, pela diminuição das capturas associada à
mobilização de pescadores para a guerra (Mitchell e Thies, 2012: 238). Concluem assim
que “we also show that the effect of civil war on resources may depend on the
characteristics of the resources and nature of the conflicts” (idem).
10
É ainda campo de discussão académica o tipo de dados a utilizar nos testes empíricos a
este tipo de modelo. Uma vez que se concluiu que nem todos os recursos naturais são
suscetíveis de terem uma ligação aos fenómenos de conflitualidade, então porque não
retirá-los da amostra e situar a análise apenas nos episódios de conflitualidade que
ocorram em países que exportam os produtos primários suscetíveis de provocar esses
conflitos, notavelmente o petróleo e outros minerais?
Conclusão
Grande parte da literatura sobre o tema da conflitualidade na África Central considera
esse fenómeno como uma consequência direta dos chamados estados "falhados".
Tentámos rebater essa tese. Preferimos até a expressão Estados "frágeis" para evitar a
ideia de colapso dos mesmos. A nossa ideia é que esses Estados vivem da guerra como
uma condição sine qua non da política.
Outras abordagens baseiam-se na questão religiosa como causa mais provável para a
conflitualidade naqueles territórios.
Também não nos parece que seja a questão religiosa o motivo central para a
conflitualidade.
10
Este assunto foi debatido por vários outros autores, com uma especial referência para Roos (2004).
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Pelo contrário, julgamos que as causas deverão ser encontradas nos aspetos etno-
identitários, na política e na economia.
Os processos de externalização e de faccionalismo, a dinâmica difusa e de dispersão das
alianças, a fluidez das mesmas obedecendo a vários alinhamentos, a extraversão e a
policefalia não são mais do que características bem visíveis da desordem e do caos do
Estado que não desapareceu, mas que simplesmente se alimenta, através de um
fenómeno híbrido (o Estado pós-colonial), das estruturas sociais fragmentadas para uma
economia de acumulação predadora.
Quase toda a África Central entrou no novo século a "ferro e fogo".
Por um lado, o enquadramento político e económico está diretamente relacionado com o
desenvolvimento, em articulação com o papel das organizações internacionais. Por outro,
os problemas de identidade, como vimos, não se filiam objetivamente na definição dos
Estados saídos das descolonizações.
Parecem-nos serem estes os fatores principais para perceber as dinâmicas da
conflitualidade naquele espaço geográfico.
O objetivo desta análise foi tentar estabelecer uma causalidade do fenómeno da guerra
e interpretá-la numa relação causa-efeito. São estes os pressupostos básicos da
polemologia.
O estudo irenológico já saí fora do âmbito a que nos propusemos. Seria oportuno fazê-
lo para que se pudessem encontrar soluções que nos levassem para uma nova fase da
história dos povos africanos. Uma história que não começa com a passagem dos europeus
pois a ideia de "povos sem história" é um mito, bem menos coerente que toda a mitologia
das sociedades de tradição oral.
Talvez sejamos também levados a refletir sobre as relações Norte-Sul. As conquistas da
ciência e da tecnologia, o Direito, as instituições políticas, os modelos económicos e as
manifestações da arte nada nos dizem à cerca da organização social daqueles que não
podem orgulhar-se de tais proezas. Nos anos 20 do século passado, Marcel Mauss,
herdeiro da sociologia durkheimiana e fundador da etnologia francesa, dizia que o
Ocidente teria que refletir-se no espelho e estar atento aos ensinamentos revelados
através da observação no terreno (Mauss, 2012: 219-248). Exotismo e arcaísmo, penso
que estamos todos de acordo. Quanto ao atraso, depende sempre da perspetiva.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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224
POLITICS AND RITUAL INFANTICIDE: A READING OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY
IN GUINEA-BISSAU FROM POLITICAL THEORY
CLAUDIA FAVARATO
claudiafavarato@edu.ulisboa.pt
She is a postdoctoral research fellow with the Humboldt Foundation, based at the University of
Bayreuth (Germany). She worked as assistant lecturer at ISCSP, of the University of Lisbon; she
obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science and a MS in African Studies from the latter University. In
addition to a MS in International Politics and Diplomacy (University of Padua), she worked as
visiting researcher at SOAS (University of London).
Her main research interests are in political theory and philosophy, with special emphasis on the
notions of humanness, political relations, and political community in African and communitarian
political thought
Abstract
This analysis takes on the ritual infanticide of the criança-irân as an explanatory framework
for the recurrent political instability in Guinea-Bissau, using the concepts of humanness and
political community. The infanticide is a ritual practice connected to the belief in the existence
of spirit-children: some babies are believed to be spirits (irân) encased in human flesh. Thus,
these beings are neither human nor spirits. This culturally embedded conceptualisation of
humanness challenges liberal and communitarian notions on human nature, personhood, and
individualism, along with their articulations on the structure of the political community.
In my analysis, I consider how this understanding collide with the underpinning of the state –
formally, a semi-presidential republic modelled upon the demo-liberal model. I emphasise
how the state lacks an organised, coherent, and continued reaction to the practice and the
belief. The state’s inertia evades the liberal predicaments and legal provisions, which
criminalise any infanticide as unlawful termination of a human life. However, politicians, rulers
and academics are aware of the phenomenon, and even share the belief in the existence of
these “hybrid” humans. Hence, the analysis questions which the relevance and the resilience
of endogenous conceptualisation of humanness and political community underpinning the
state’s response, and their articulations on the strengthening of a stable political sphere.
Keywords
criança-irân; humanness; political community; Guinea-Bissau; political instability
Resumo
A presente análise aborda o ritual do infanticídio da criança-irã como quadro explicativo da
instabilidade política recorrente na Guiné-Bissau, tendo por base os conceitos de humanidade
e comunidade política. O infanticídio é uma prática ritual ligada à crença da existência de
crianças-espírito: acredita-se que alguns bebés são espíritos (irã) envoltos em carne humana.
Assim, estes seres não são nem humanos nem espíritos. Esta conceptualização culturalmente
enraizada da humanidade desafia as noções liberais e comunitárias sobre a natureza humana,
a personalidade e o individualismo, juntamente com as suas articulações sobre a estrutura da
comunidade política.
Na análise, é considerada a forma como este entendimento colide com os fundamentos do
Estado - formalmente, uma república semi-presidencial modelada segundo o sistema demo-
liberal. Sublinho como o Estado carece de uma reacção organizada, coerente e continuada à
prática e à crença. A inércia do Estado escapa aos predicados liberais e às disposições legais,
que criminalizam qualquer infanticídio como interrupção ilegal de uma vida humana. No
entanto, políticos, governantes e académicos estão conscientes do fenómeno e até partilham
a crença na existência destes seres humanos "híbridos". Assim, a análise questiona qual a
relevância e a resiliência da conceptualização endógena de humanidade e da comunidade
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Politics and ritual infanticide: a reading of political instability in Guinea-Bissau from political theory
Claudia Favarato
225
política subjacente à resposta do Estado, e as suas articulações no reforço de uma esfera
política estável.
Palavras-chave
criança-irân; humanidade; comunidade política; Guiné-Bissau; instabilidade política
How to cite this article
Favarato, Claudia (2023). Politics and ritual infanticide: a reading of political instability in Guinea-
Bissau from political theory, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October
2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.12
Article received on November, 18 2022, accepted for publication on February, 17 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Politics and ritual infanticide: a reading of political instability in Guinea-Bissau from political theory
Claudia Favarato
226
POLITICS AND RITUAL INFANTICIDE: A READING OF POLITICAL
INSTABILITY IN GUINEA-BISSAU FROM POLITICAL THEORY
CLAUDIA FAVARATO
Introduction
Meninu ki ka ta pedur. Kil meninu padido ku kabesa garandi. Meninu ki ka ta padidu
diritu
1
. Many are the paraphrases used by Bissau-Guineans to refer to the meninu di irân.
The latter, also called criança-irân in the version closer to Portuguese, denotes those
babies who are not regarded to be humans, because of their deviant physical appearance
or mental development. Instead, these babies are believed to be spirits (irân) encased
in human flesh. The ontological essence of the criança-irân – neither human nor spirit –
casts them in a peculiar, liminal space of the political community, for they are excluded
from it. In other words, the hybrid nature of the meninu di irân is taken as an exception
from the normative order and from the ontology of the human constituting the polity.
The criança-irân stands as a signifier of conceptualisations of humanness and the political
community, and further sufficing principle of endogenous political thought. It speaks of
a polity ordered upon communitarian tenets and underpinned in its own conceptualisation
of humanness. The spirit-child phenomenon synthetises local, endogenous understanding
of the political, highlighting the latter’s distance and independence from the formal model
underneath the state. For this reason, my analysis uses the criança-irân phenomenon as
an explanatory framework for political instability in Guinea-Bissau.
I argue that the foundational discrepancies between state and endogenous powers are
to blame for the unsuccessful establishment and strengthening of a stable and univocal
political sphere in the country. To ground my critique, I analyse the state’s reaction to
the belief and practice (ritual infanticide) of the criança-irân. In agreement with the legal
provisions and liberal ideas that sustain the formal political order, the phenomenon
should be criminalised and denounced tout court while vigorous action taken for its
eradication. Withal, no organised or coherent action against the phenomenon seems to
be taken by the state.
An extensive study of the literature in political theory and political philosophy, especially
in the subfields of comparative, African and decolonial approaches, supports my analysis.
With the final purpose to understand if and how endogenous conceptualisation of
humanness and political community are maintained in the state order, I examine the
1
The baby who is not a human (person). The baby born with a big head. The baby who was not born right.
Translation from Kriol by the author.
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state’s reaction to the criança-irân phenomenon through interviews with local informants.
The interviews were conducted online (Lisbon-Bissau) between November and December
2020. The results of the qualitative and interpretive analysis are reported in the text as
excerpts in the original language (Portuguese), with translation by the author available
in the footnotes.
The paper contains five sections, including this introduction. Firstly, I first present a
synthetic account of the Bissau-Guinean conceptualisation of humanness, emphasising
its interrelatedness to the principles and boundaries of the political community. Having
drawn a characterisation of the political principles the criança-irân stands for, I consider
discrepancies and compatibilities between these and the underpinnings of the state –
formally, a semi-presidential republic modelled upon the demo-liberal model. I use the
state’s reaction to the phenomenon of the spirit-child as element of analysis. In the fourth
section, I outline how the mismatched maintenance of endogenous principles in unproper
institutional frame gives rise to political instability. The fifth and last section sums up the
paper’s findings, in lieu of conclusion.
1. Spirit children, humanness, and political community
The deeper political significance of the criança- irân rests on the normalcy of the
phenomenon as part of the endogenous polity. The indigenous political orders include,
albeit in the form of the exception or Homo Sacer (Agamben, 1995), the non-human
beings as a regular element of the polity. Such normative normalisation of the spirit-
children phenomenon evades not only generally accepted conceptualisation of
humanness but also exceeds the canons of political subjecthood established by main
doctrines such as liberalism or communitarianism. These non-human babies question the
very idea of humanness.
The criança- irân are beings whose humanness in completely denied because their
biological body hosts a spirit rather than a soul. The depictions provided by the
interviewees is quite clear on this point:
“[n]ão é um ser natural, normal, não é, não é uma pessoa humana, porque
são espíritos ancestrais que têm que voltar às suas origens. Ou porque é irân,
ou porque é uma cobra”
2
;
“[a]h, tomem cuidado, porque esta criança não é normal, é irân! Portadora
de mau espírito”
3
referred two NGOs workers
4
.
Rejected from the human community, the meninu di irân is not considered part of the
semi-physical (Menkiti, 2004b) realm of the spirits either. Local ontology generally
2
“[s]/he are not a natural being, normal, s/he is not a human person, because they are ancestral spirits who
ought to go back to their origins. Or because s/he is an irân, or because s/he is a snake”. From the online
interview with Ana Muscuta Ture, on 24 December 2020.
3
“Be careful, because this child is not normal, s/he is irân. It has a bad spirit.” From the semi-structured
interview with Carlos Laudolino Medina, in Bissau, 20 October 2016.
4
The excerpts reported do not reflect opinions or beliefs of the two workers but were part of their answer to
characterize who or what a criança-irân is.
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conceives of body-less entities, such as spirits or ancestors, as actors who can actively
and rightfully partake to human affairs in the physical world
5
. In spite of their ontological
difference, spirits and dead ancestors are welcome in the human community; their
interaction is considered positively and even sought for at times. Instead, the criança-
irân are regarded a threatening presence among humans. Their existence comes across
as a jeopardy or a disruption to the human community (Einarsdóttir, 2004; Jao, 2003),
causing their disappearance through ritual infanticide practices
6
.
The ritual infanticide is not as spread as the belief in the existence of the spirit-children,
as the extensive data gathered by the Portuguese NGO Fundação Fé e Cooperação (FEC)
attest. The physical disappearance of those babies regarded spirit is confined to fewer
ethnical groups and geographical areas than the national total (Gonçalves, 2015).
Instead, the belief in the existence of these babies finds more acceptance throughout all
of Guinea-Bissau, regardless of age, education or religious differentiation (Gonçalves,
2015). The high adherence to the belief points toward grounding bases other than
cosmology for the criança- irân phenomenon.
The existence of the non-human babies does not proceed solely from, nor is explicable
merely with reference to animist grounds. The criança- irân is a term of reference with
deeper political significance. They epitomise a political reality conceived in its own terms,
according to the local conceptualisation of humanness. The latter eschew both the liberal-
inspired rationalistic notion and the moral-oriented communitarian idea of the human
person.
Liberal and libertarian theories underpin human nature to the inner rationality that
distinguishes human beings from other forms of life. In this regard, the instance of
“having and being a body” (Habermas, 2003) exemplifies the intrinsic bond existing
between one’s rational and one’s physical side. These theories hardly conceive of entities
other-than-physical, or which exit the dualistic physical-metaphysical scheme, grounding
the entitlement to partake in the political community in rationalistic and individualistic
criteria.
On the other hand, Afro-communitarian theories reduce the centrality of rationality, in
favour of relational and moral notions of personhood. These consider relationality and
reciprocity as constituting and necessary traits that makes a human being a person
(Gyekye, 1997; Matolino, 2018; Menkiti, 1984, 2004a; Tschaepe, 2015). Reciprocation
according to culturally defined moral standards draws the thin line that separates humans
from persons: while the former represents a biological and given life condition, the
second defines the humane mode of life shaping the social and the political. Therefore,
persons live their existence in a relational net of mutual dependencies grounded on duties
and cooperation (Ikuenobe, 2015; Masolo, 2010). However, would one fail at acquiring
or developing personhood (Gyekye, 1997; Ikuenobe, 2018; Menkiti, 1984, 2004a), one
5
It should be noted that there is no uniformity among the several ethnical groups inhabiting the country;
moreover, differences are registered also within the same ethnical group or among families. While
traditionally animist people like the Pepel consider that irâns to take part in many aspects of daily life,
including politics, others, like the Fula or the Nalú, do not allow for spirits’ interference with social and
political affairs.
6
The primary aim of the ritual practices is to assess the human nature of the infant. The modes which the
humanness-test is performed vary, ranging from enduring starvation trials to abandoning in the wilderness
to taking the baby to the sea (Carreira, 1971a, 1971b; Einarsdóttir, 2004; Jao, 2003). The latter is overall
considered the final and most definitive proof of the baby’s nature.
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remains a “plain” human: non-persons are not full members of the social and political
community yet retain their human dignity. Hence, the Afro-communitarian moral-
performative idea of personhood does not suffice to understand the notion of humanness
underneath the Bissau-Guinean spirit-children.
The latter finds its rationale in local and culture-embedded ontology. Admittedly,
ontology speaks of a broad category which complete discernment is a complex
philosophical task. Aimed by the purpose to interpret the idea of humanness, my analysis
considers political subjecthood and temporality. These two elements intertwine to form
a threefold base, built upon the crisscross of subjects, time, and space.
As briefly mentioned above, Bissau-Guinean ontology extends political subjecthood to
body-less or semi-physical entities, such as spirits and dead ancestors. This same
criterium applies to define who constitutes the djorson (Kriol term for kindred, loosely
translated): the ties of the extended family are not limited to living members but include
also dead individuals who maintain capacity for agency in the physical world (Brown,
2004). Accordingly, the definition of political subject becomes an a-temporal notion,
comprising the realms of the physical and of the semi-physical.
The notion of temporality complements the a-temporality of the political community, as
it grants the past a central role in the temporal scale. In contrast to an almost non-
existent future (Rettová, 2016) – as the uncertain time that has yet to happen – the past
epitomises a constitutive and explicative moment (Nanque, 2017a, 2017b). What
occurred provides the foundations for what is today, in a literal and figurative way: the
present is the temporal station that grounds on what has been and preserves what was
through periodical reproduction. What is more, the past also is entitled central
topographical relevance. Whether one consider long gone or recent times, the past
represents the epoch in which the founding fathers conquered or settled in their people’s
land, in their tchon. The bonding of people, land and time not only originated the djorsons
(Nanque, 2017a) but also set in motion the wheel of time, the ignition of the a-temporal
community bonded in this threefold ontology.
The bond to the a-temporal community, sealed in the djorson’s related ideas of time and
space, determines one’s political humanness. While this seems to come as a given from
the argument above, the phenomenon of the criança-irân attests to the boundaries of
the political community. The spirit-children occupy a liminal space in such configuration
of the human and political order: their lack of bonds to the kindred inhibits their belonging
to the a-temporal community, insofar as their metaphysical nature detach them from the
spatial-temporal continuum. In turn, their liminality allows for their disposability; being
outcasted from the polity, the meninu di irân are not endowed with the human and
political dignity other individuals are.
The ontological grounds of the indigenous polity speak for a conception of the political
that foresees the presence of these liminal non-human as part of its normative order.
The exceptionality of the criança-irân, due to their hybrid nature which pulls them apart
from both humans and spirits, places them outsides the boundaries of the a-temporal
and semi-physical political community. Therefore, according to these tenets, the death
of these babies is generally accepted or tolerated, as it is no more than the disappearance
of a being void of any human or political weight.
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2. Guinea-Bissau state’s reaction to the criança-irân
The ontology shaping indigenous political thought in Guinea-Bissau determines the
normalcy of the criança-irân existence. That is, the a-temporal, past-centred and
organicist political community can accommodate, in normative terms, entities whose
political humanness is denied in toto. Such denial suffices the exclusion of these babies
from the threefold grounds establishing the political community: djorson, tchon and past-
centred temporality. The spirit-children do not justify or build the boundaries of the
political community; thus, they are not a sine qua non element of the polity. The
endogenous conceptualisation of the polity would remain virtually unchanged in its
foundational characters would the phenomenon of the criança-irân not be present. In this
sense, the spirit-children phenomenon substantiates a symbolical term of reference, one
case that conveys the deeper significance of a political universe.
The understanding underpinning the indigenous configuration of humanness and power
contrasts with the tenets underneath the Guinea-Bissau state. These formally adhere to
the principles of the modern state and the inherent notion of humanness and individual
that sustain it. Liberal (and libertarian) theories conceive humanness as an ontological
status grounded on the autonomy of a rational and atomistic individual; these characters
in turn grants the subject’s freedom and independence (Ajei, 2016; Levinas, 1991).
Therefore, the individual appears as the primary unit and the last aim of the liberal
political system: as a citizen, each human carries the ultimate parcel of the nation’s
sovereign power (Agamben, 1996; Arendt, 1958), while their rights are object of utter
protection (Ajei, 2016).
Admittingly, the brief characterisation of liberal political humanness provided above is
reductive. The main purpose of this exposition is to emphasise how the grounds
underneath the state-liberal and the endogenous conceptualisation of humanness, along
with their related theorisations of the political community, differ. From such
distinguishability the central puzzle of my analysis emerges: which and how tenets of
endogenous political configurations are maintained in the state order? The antagonism
or intermingling of these principles speaks for the coherence (or lack of it thereof) of a
political order, in which the institutional configurations should match its underpinning
principles.
The phenomenon of the criança-irân provides a useful analytical tool to inquire on these
underpinnings, in light of the referential political significance it carries. Keeping this in
mind, my analysis looks at the response from Guinea-Bissau state to the belief and ritual
practice performed against the meninu di irân. The underlying assumption is that
responses and actions undertaken by the state can shed light on the accepted idea of
humanness and its forthcoming reverberation on the order of the polity.
From a legal standpoint, Guinea-Bissau condemns acts of infanticide as any other
termination of human life, ex article 110 of the Penal Code. This condemnation applies
to all felonies, regardless of who commits it or of any cultural or religious reasons. Despite
this prohibition, of which any average Bissau-Guinean citizen is aware
7
, few cases are
7
This awareness often appeared in the interviews I conducted in Guinea-Bissau in 2016 and 2019. Many
respondents would answer my questions merely according to legal provisions, or they straightforwardly
stated that in these days less ritual specialist would admit performing the ritual infanticide in order not to
compromise the legality of their actions.
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reported or ever reach legal trial. Moreover, the slow and heavy judicial machinery
prevents justice from reaching a final verdict, leaving us with a scarcity of material
available.
The aura of taboo surrounding the criança-irân prevents many people from reporting the
phenomenon or the performance of the ritual to authorities. It is believed that speaking
of the spirit-children phenomenon brings misfortune; hence, it is not generally publicly
discussed.
“[P]orque é mito, é tabu aqui, todo mundo acredita que é uma crença então
[…] é um assunto que não é muito falado”
8
states the President of the Association for the People with Disabilities of Guinea-Bissau
(FAPD-GB), Vladimir Sano.
The mystery surrounding the criança-irân is held responsible also for its missed
recognition in public policies and for the lack of state action to confront the phenomenon.
“[O] Estado, o Estado não reage porque não tem informações. Ou faz… faz-
se de não saber. Mas eu acho que não tem informações. Não tem
informações. Ou tem, não quer, não quer revelá-las. São duas as coisas. Mas
para mim, eu acho que não tem informações neste sentido. Sabe que existe
o fenómeno, mas não se sabe quantas pessoas são mortas, por dia, por mês,
não se sabe exatamente o que se está a passar sobre este assunto”
9
.
Notwithstanding the little official information available, all my interviewees (state
officials, academics, and NGOs workers) are well-aware of what the two-words definition
“criança-irân” stands for. Not once I had to clarify what the object of the interview was,
indicating a general and broad awareness of what the phenomenon entails. Moreover,
many interviewees associated the criança-irân to children born with disabilities without
any prompt from my side, as the excerpt emphasise:
“[…] se a criança nasce com deformações, as famílias matam. As famílias
matam. Estes que estás a chamar que é criança-irân”
10
.
State officials remark that the known yet unspoken of phenomenon is an element of
“tradition”, an instance that “já vai caindo em desuso, em desatualidade”, manifesting
8
[B]ecause it is a myth, it is taboo here, everybody beliefs that it is a belief, hence […] there are not many
conversations about it.” From the online semi-structured interview with Vladimir Sano, 17 November 2020.
9
[The] state, the state does not react because it does not have information. Or … Or it makes out it does not
know. It makes out id does not know. But I think it does not have the information. It has no information.
Or it has, but it does not want to reveal it. There are two options. But, in my opinion, I believe it does not
have any information on the matter. It knows the phenomenon exists, but it does not know how many
[children] are killed per day, per month, it is not known exactly what is going on this matter.” From the
online semi-structured interview with Rui da Fonseca, 10 November 2020.
10
[…] if the baby is born with malformations, the families would kill [him/her]. Would kill [him/her]. These
that you are mentioning that are the criança-irân.” From the online semi-structured interview with Rui da
Fonseca, 10 November 2020.
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itself merely as a problem “reconduzido a zonas recônditas do país”
11
. Thus, the depiction
places in stark contrast the state and the idea of “modernity” it stands for with the native-
traditional traits ordering the cultural and political spheres. In this light, the limits to
state sovereignty – which do not extend over the totality of the geographical extension
of the country – enable the continuation of the spirit-children phenomenon in those areas
where the state is little or not at all present.
The PAIGC’s (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) centripetal
move that led to state’s centralisation in the first years after independences is responsible
for today’s gap between the rural and urban areas of the country (see Forrest, 2003,
2016). This structure deprives the state of any efficiency and resourcefulness in its
peripheral executive branches, such as the comités de tabanca. In turn, the lack of state’s
effective power translates to failure in policies implementation and sluggish response to
the reported instances of criança-irân. It often occurs that the state is not aware of the
existence of those babies who are accused of being spirit and then disappear:
“[how the state] pode saber se existe uma criança aqui nesta casa. Passam
dois meses, já não existe, não vai encontrar esta criança lá, não existe lá,
ninguém pode dar explicação, ninguém procura saber, ninguém faz… nada.
Já foi levado na floresta, ou deixado no mar, e ninguém responsabiliza por
isso. Estado? Deve assumir, deve criar mecanismos fortes para a condenação
destes infratores, deste tipo de atos”
12
.
The slowness of state institution to respond to reported cases of spirit-children is not the
only factor hampering an efficient response to the phenomenon. On the one hand, the
Guinea-Bissau state does not possess the means to implement regulation on children
rights nor to protect children who are considered non-human.
“[É] um posicionamento no papel, volto a dizer, não é que o Estado não tenha
tomado já medidas etc., há diplomas aprovados a nível da Assembleia
[Nacional Popular], mas o mecanismo de controle da sua implementação na
prática, da sua execução na prática, nas zonas de risco, e porque são zonas
recônditas, esse mecanismo de controle é que não existe. A lei existe. Agora,
a aplicação da lei, quem é que vai controlar isto?”
13
.
11
“is already disuse, it is behind time”, manifesting itself merely as a problem “circumscribed to remote areas”.
From the online semi-structured interview with Olívio Pereira, 23 November 2020.
12
“[How the state] can know that a baby [criança-irân] is born here, in this house. Two months go by, s/he
does not exist anymore, you will not find that baby there, s/he does not exist, nobody can explain. Nobody
wants to know, nobody does anything. S/he was already taken to the forest, or abandoned to the sea, and
nobody takes responsibility for this. The state? It should take responsibility and create strong mechanisms
to condemn those who commit this sort of acts.” From the online semi-structured interview with Vladimir
Sano, 17 November 2020.
13
[I]t is a posture on paper, I repeat, it is not that the state has not adopted any measures, etc., there are
decrees approved by the [National Popular] Assembly, but the control mechanism of its implementation in
practice, in the high-risk areas, and as they are remote areas, this control mechanism does not exist. The
laws exist. But the application of the law, who has control over it?”. From the online semi-structured
interview with Olívio Pereira, 17 November 2020.
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On the other hand, there is no clear or open condemnation of the criança-irân
phenomenon. Mirroring the posture adopted by the average citizen, the state refrains
from publicly speaking about the criança-irân.
“[P]elo menos publicamente, mas é um assunto que, que mesmo nas
discussões sobre as práticas nefastas, criança-irân... é... é pouco, é pouco
discutido, que está pouco, espécie de tabu, que... que quase não surge nas
discussões”
14
.
This omission impacts a de facto condemnation of the phenomenon or of the ritual
infanticide practice.
The infanticide of the criança-irân is not commonly listed among the harmful and
prejudicial practices occurring in the country, denounced by human rights activists and
NGOs. Therefore, state’s condemnation of the ritual infanticide appears as a mere implicit
addendum to the broad condemnation of all practices that harm human dignity or
endanger the individual’s physical integrity or safety. Many of the interviewees read the
absence of a clear position as a symptom of weakness, due to the
“falta [é] vontade políticas, o que falta é, digamos, um plano de Estado”
15
.
The state lacks any open or strong stand on the criança-irân phenomenon. Combined
with scarcity of information, sluggish and ineffective action, the Guinea-Bissau state
appears inert and silent on the spirit-children phenomenon.
3. A young and hybrid political configuration
The silence and inertia characterising the Guinea-Bissau state response to the criança-
irân speaks of a political order that regards the phenomenon a taboo, a topic that “está
fora da mesa”
16
in most political talks. On this regard, the state’s posture conflates with
that showcased from indigenous powers. Both political orders look at the criança-irân as
a phenomenon which existence is undeniable, yet it is not confirmed, accepted nor
condemned. However, while the outcome of their response does not diverge, their
underpinning motives do.
Indigenous political powers react with tolerance toward the infanticide of the non-human
babies. A variety of equally valid reasons underlies their position. Often indigenous
powers cannot do anything more than facing a done deed, as the decision over the fate
of the spirit-child belongs primarily to the baby’s family.
14
[A]t least publicly, but it is a matter that, that even in discussions about harmful practices, criança-irân eh…
Eh… it is hardly discussed, it is a little, kind of a taboo, that… that almost never comes up in conversations”.
From the online semi-structured interview with Mamadou Jao, 16 December 2020.
15
“lack of political will, lack of, let’s say, a state plan”. From the online semi-structured interview with João
Có, 10 November 2020.
16
“is not on the table”. The interviewee, Alsana Negado (online semi-structured interview conducted on 23
November 2020), at the time Chief Executive of Local Powers at the Ministry for Territorial Administration
and Local Power, referred to the exclusion of the spirit-children issue from the talks on indigenous
authorities’ formal recognition by the state.
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“Normalmente, a família desfaz-se da criança mesmo ao nascimento. Matam-
no, abandonam-no... e pronto. Mas, portanto, não pode ser, o regulo pode
não estar de acordo, mas também não tem muita coisa a dizer”
17
.
Whether the indigenous chief agrees with the performance of the ritual or not, they might
choose to allow it as a means to foster their legitimacy:
“estas crianças, [they] acreditam que são irâns! Então devem ser afastados
senão vão fazer mal a sociedade. Quando é assim, o poder tradicional [...]
querem ter o apoio da população para que se diga que eles é que defendem
a população. Porque esta posição do poder tradicional depende sempre da
legitimidade que tem”
18
.
In some cases, the authorities are said to partake themselves in the practice, as
“são eles que são chamados para tratar daqueles rituais. Então eles também
são cúmplices. Participam. Concorrem com o infanticídio”.
19
The diversity in reactions from the indigenous powers points to one common trait, that
being tolerance toward the occurrence of the ritual infanticide. Their tolerance conveys a
twofold message: on the hand, it signals the hindrance to publicly approve or support
the practice because of legal prohibition; on the other hand, it affirms the inclusion of
the non-human babies in the normal order of the polity, which inhibits indigenous
authorities from banning or condemning the infanticide. While the belief in the existence
of non-human babies does not consequently imply their infanticide, the criança-irân are
regarded as a liminal case of normality in the indigenous political thought. Hence,
indigenous powers’ stand corroborates and is coherent with the underpinning tenets of
the polity over which they hold sway.
Differently, state’s silence and inertia does not conform with its putative principles,
grounded in liberal theories, and its correlate notion of rationalistic individualism. This
sort of response does not suffice assumptions on the acceptance of the spirit-children
existence as normal political entity as it occurs in the indigenous polity. Nonetheless, it
emphasises the syncretism between formal-liberal and indigenous conceptualisation of
humanness existing in the political order of the state. Thus, the state appears as a polity
in which diverse principles coexist and intermingle, merging the formal and, to a certain
extent, exogenous with the informal and endogenous.
17
Normally, the family gets rid of the child right after birth. {They] kill him/her … and that is it. But, then, it
is not right. The regulo can be not in agreement, but there is not much he can say. There is not much he
can say.” From the online semi-structured interview with Olívio Pereira, 17 November 2020.
18
“this criança-irân, [they] believe they are irâns! They, they must be removed, otherwise they will harm the
society. When it is so, the traditional powers […] they want to hold support in the population so that it will
be said that they do, they defend the population. Because this position in the traditional power always
depends on the legitimacy it is endowed with.” From the online semi-structured interview with Fode Mane,
28 November 2020.
19
“they are called to perform the rituals. Hence, they are all accomplices. They are accomplices. They
participate. They partake in the ritual of infanticide.” From the online semi-structured interview with Vladimir
Sano, 17 November 2020.
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Considered through such lenses, the criança-irân epitomises a phenomenon that sheds
light on the Africanisation occurring in the young state of Guinea-Bissau. In this
perspective, the term Africanisation denotes a bi-directional process of reciprocal
influence between the endogenous and the exogenous, the formal and the informal, the
state and indigenous powers, paving the way toward the establishing of an own
normative political order (Chabal, 1992). In this process, different elements are
constantly negotiated and reviewed among the polity’s members. These include
conceptualisations of humanness, but also those on power relations and legitimate
authority, among others. The philosophical system a person recognises oneself with is
likely to affect their ontological and epistemological understandings; hence, it shapes
grounding political conceptions accordingly, regardless of institutional configurations in
place.
The distance existing between the principles undergirding indigenous political power and
the state are responsible for engendering the hybridism that characterise the Guinea-
Bissau state to date. As the analysis through the lenses of the criança-irân demonstrate,
state and indigenous powers relate to diametrically different ideas of humanness and
political community yet their response to the spirit-children phenomenon culminate in
alike outcomes. The latter coincidence strengthens the syncretic character bonding the
two political orders, which are united in a continuity of power relations notwithstanding
institutional differentiation.
The syncretism in the principles creates hybridism in the practice. The state appears as
a political order governed under unclear rules, for the inconformity between legal and
executive prescriptions with their actual realisation. Moreover, the coexistence of diverse
grounding political principles – such as the notion of humanness – causes evident
mismatches between political expectations and political actions. These mismatches are
not circumscribed to the response to the criança-irân phenomenon; they are pervasive
of all spheres because they signal the inconformity between principles and political
configurations.
The formal state exerting sovereignty in Guinea-Bissau today is not apt to accommodate
the principles underpinning the indigenous polity, nor it is constructed to satisfy the
latter’s demands of a political configuration. It is in this hybrid distortion that instability
arises. In the void that the mismatch between principles and configurations create,
political opportunism flourish, granting the opportunity for economic and social
extraversion through political and extra-political means, as well as misappropriation of
power or abuses of the majoritarian democratic system to serve one-sided interests.
Conclusions
My analysis argues for an understanding of political instability in Guinea-Bissau as the
result of a flagrant lack of coherence between principles and political configurations. I
demonstrated how the syncretic presence of principles underpinning the indigenous polity
in the space of the state becomes an element that engenders hybridism and can cause
or cooccurs with instability. To ground my theoretical analysis, I used the phenomenon
of the criança-irân to emphasise the coexistence of diverging notions of humanness and
political community in the political order of the state. The phenomenon was employed
instrumentally as a term of reference for a broader political understanding. The state’s
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silent and inert reaction to the ritual infanticide practice emphasises that it embraces
indigenous political notions while not giving those any representation in its
configurations. This mismatch is partly responsible and conducive to situations of political
instability.
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OBSERVARE
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A RELEVÂNCIA DA APE PARA O ESTUDO DA POLÍTICA EXTERNA:
O CASO DA ADESÃO DE PORTUGAL À CEE
FLÁVIO BASTOS DA SILVA
flaviobsilva2000@gmail.com
Mestrando em Relações Internacionais na Universidade Lusíada, Porto (Portugal), licenciado em
Estudos Europeus, Estudos Lusófonos e Relações Internacionais, Universidade Lusófona,
Centro Universitário do Porto
Resumo
A Análise de Política Externa (APE) é um sub-field dentro das Relações Internacionais, que, tal
como a própria disciplina, surgiu após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, num cenário de intensa
proliferação dos estudos acerca da realidade internacional. Foi neste movimento de afirmação
desta nova disciplina, acompanhado pela crescente relevância da política externa, quer para
os Estados, quer para as RI, que o próprio estudo da política externa se desenvolveu e
autonomizou, através do surgimento da APE. Dotada de uma metodologia inovadora e
procurando realizar uma análise mais profunda do que a abordagem tradicional, a APE centrou
o objeto de estudo no decisor e nas causas que realmente o levaram a adotar uma dada
decisão. Neste artigo, iremos procurar expor a relevância da Análise de Política Externa e, para
isso, recorreremos a um estudo de caso: a adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias.
Finalizada em 1986, a adesão à CEE foi o culminar de um longo processo de adesão que se
iniciou em 1976/77, quando o I Governo Constitucional, liderado por Mário Soares, enviou o
pedido de adesão. É aqui, no envio do pedido de adesão, que encontramos o centro da decisão,
e, portanto, é também aqui que o nosso estudo se vai centrar. Recorrendo à APE, observamos
que, por detrás desta decisão, não encontramos como motivação somente o interesse
nacional, como uma análise tradicional poderia sugerir, mas sobretudo pressões, perceções e
ideais que se traduzem na vontade do decisor. Desta forma, a adesão de Portugal à CEE foi,
mais do que resultado da Estrutura, resultado da perceção e idiossincrasia da Agência, cuja
caracterização é apresentada neste artigo.
Palavras-chave
Portugal; Comunidade Económica Europeia; Política Externa; Análise de Política Externa;
Relações Internacionais
Abstract
Foreign Policy Analysis is an innovative tool within International Relations, which, like the
discipline itself, emerged after the Second World War, in a scenario of intense proliferation of
studies about the international reality. It was in this movement towards the affirmation of this
new discipline, accompanied by the growing relevance of foreign policy, both for States and
for IR, that the study of foreign policy itself developed and became autonomous, through the
emergence of the APE. Endowed with an innovative repertoire and seeking to carry out a
deeper analysis than the traditional approach, the APE moved the object of study to the
decision maker and to the causes that really led him to adopt a given decision. In this article
we will seek to expose the relevance of the Foreign Policy Analysis, and, for that, we will resort
to a case study: Portugal's accession to the European Communities. Completed in 1986, joining
the EEC was the culmination of a long membership process that began in 1976/77, when the
First Constitutional Government, led by Mário Soares, sent the application for membership. It
is here, in sending the application for membership, that we find the center of the decision, and
therefore, it is here that our study will also focus. Using the APE, we observe that, behind this
decision, we do not find only national interest as a motivation, as a traditional analysis might
suggest, but above all pressures, perceptions and ideals that translate into the will of the
decision maker. In this way, Portugal's accession to the EEC was, more than a result of the
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A relevância da APE para o estudo da política externa: o caso da adesão de Portugal à CEE
Flávio Bastos da Silva
239
structure, a result of the perception and idiosyncrasy of the agency, whose characterization is
presented in this article.
Keywords
Portugal; European Economic Community; Foreign Policy; Foreign Policy Analysis;
International Relations
Como citar este artigo
Silva, Fávio Bastos da (2023). A relevânca da APE para o estudo da política externa: o caso da
adesão de Portugal à CEE, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N1, Maio-Outubro
2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última consulta, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.14.1.13
Artigo recebido em 8 de Janeiro de 2023 e aceite para publicação em 24 de Fevereiro de
2023
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A relevância da APE para o estudo da política externa: o caso da adesão de Portugal à CEE
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A RELEVÂNCIA DA APE PARA O ESTUDO DA POLÍTICA EXTERNA:
O CASO DA ADESÃO DE PORTUGAL À CEE
FLÁVIO BASTOS DA SILVA
Introdução
No relacionamento entre os Estados, a política externa assume-se enquanto um
instrumento indispensável. Sendo uma política pública, esta tem como missão
materializar a vontade do Estado, através do decisor político, só que, ao contrário das
demais políticas públicas, a política externa versa, não para o interior, mas para o exterior
das fronteiras. Esta especificidade da política externa levou os realistas a considerarem-
na como uma política pública especial. Mas partindo do quadro da Ciência Política para o
as Relações Internacionais (RI), apercebemo-nos que classificar a política externa como
uma política pública é redutor. Não que ela não seja uma política pública, mas antes por
ser muito mais do que isso. A política externa não só afeta o Estado que a adota como
todo o Sistema Internacional. Por isso, mais do que um meio necessário ao
relacionamento interestatal, esta é o derradeiro instrumento à disposição dos Estados
para atuarem dentro do Sistema Internacional, para cooperarem, para imporem a sua
vontade além-fronteiras. Nas palavras de Freire (2011: 13), a política externa “projecta
interesses e objectivos domésticos/internos para o exterior”, sendo “uma ferramenta
essencial no posicionamento dos actores no sistema internacional”. Já segundo o
Dicionário de Relações Internacionais, a política externa é “a actividade pela qual os
Estados agem, reagem e interage (…) uma actividade de fronteira cruzando dois
ambientes – o interno e o externo”, pelo que, ambos os meios, são “o pano de fundo,
com base no qual as directrizes da política externa são delineadas” (Sousa, 2005: 144).
Enquanto instrumento essencial para a relação entre Estados e para o posicionamento
destes no Sistema Internacional, a sua importância divide-se entre a sua missão
enquanto política pública e o seu papel dentro das relações internacionais, tanto no
quadro empírico, como no quadro científico. Com o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, a
política externa – impulsionada pela crescente necessidade de relacionamento entre os
Estados, assim como pela própria valorização e reforço das Relações Internacionais
enquanto área de estudo – conseguiu adquirir uma progressiva relevância. Porém, o seu
estudo ainda era muito limitado. Foi graças aos trabalhos inovadores de diversos teóricos
que surgiu a Análise de Política Externa (APE), impondo uma diversificação das
abordagens adotadas pelas RI na compreensão e análise do seu objeto de estudo. Com
isto, o estudo da política externa passou para um campo autónomo dentro das Relações
Internacionais, a APE, que, dotada de um reportório inovador, procurou ir mais longe do
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que a abordagem tradicional, desviando o foco de análise da origem e resultado da
decisão para a própria decisão em si.
Assim, o presente artigo tem como objetivo expor a relevância da Análise de Política
Externa para o estudo das Relações Internacionais, aplicando-a a um caso concreto, a
adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias, ou melhor, a decisão de Portugal em
aderir às Comunidades.
A adesão de Portugal à Comunidade Económica Europeia (CEE), em 1986, foi o culminar
de um processo de definição da política externa portuguesa no período pós-
revolucionário, permitindo ao país adotar um novo rumo de política externa. Por isso,
podemos afirmar que, dentre toda a história da política externa portuguesa, este seja
um dos acontecimentos mais marcantes, dado os seus impactos, mas sobretudo o seu
significado – a europeização de Portugal.
Deste modo, o foco deste artigo será descobrir a composição e caracterização da Agência
portuguesa aquando da decisão de Portugal em aderir à Comunidade Económica
Europeia, assim como as razões por detrás da mesma. O presente artigo será, por uma
questão de pragmatismo, dividido em três partes: uma primeira onde será realizada um
estudo sobre a relevância e inovação da APE; um segundo onde será apresentada e
decisão, assim como a conjuntura (doméstica e internacional) da época, isto é, a
Estrutura; e, finalmente, uma terceira onde o objetivo será aplicar os métodos da APE à
referida decisão, identificando a Agência e as suas motivações.
A análise de Política Externa (APE)
As Relações Internacionais, enquanto disciplina, são um feito bastante recente, e cuja
origem remonta ao pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Foi ainda no período entre guerras, que
o estudo das relações internacionais se começara a desenvolver graças às propostas
idealistas de Woodrow Wilson, resultando na criação das primeiras cátedras destinadas
ao estudo da política internacional. Apesar disto, não podemos falar de RI enquanto
disciplina ou em teorias das relações internacionais antes das décadas de 1940 e 1950,
pois só aí é que se iniciou o estudo sistematizado das relações internacionais, muito
graças à Teoria Realista. Os anos seguintes são de intensa proliferação no estudo da
política internacional e, a par deste, também no estudo da política externa, que
rapidamente se assume enquanto um subfield dentro das RI (Mendes, 2020). O estudo
da política externa acaba por se conseguir afirmar através das suas abordagens próprias,
como a Análise de Política Externa, resultando numa rutura com a abordagem tradicional
e de pendor realista. A partir daqui os académicos apercebem-se, sucessivamente, da
importância do estudo da política externa no seu entendimento da política internacional,
dado que a política internacional é nada mais do que ‘a soma das políticas externas dos
Estados’. Neste sentido podemos definir política externa como o “conjunto de decisões e
acções de um Estado em relação ao domínio externo” (Magalhães, 1995: 23), ou então
como “an activity of the State with which it fulfils its aims and interests within the
international arena” (Petric, 2013: 1).
Através da APE surge uma nova abordagem no estudo da política externa, por via de
diversos trabalhos pioneiros, dos quais podemos destacar: Decision-Making as an
Approach to the Study of International Politics (1954), de Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck
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e Burton Sapin; Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International
Politics (1957), de Harold e Margaret Sprout; Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy
(1964), de James Rosenau; e Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
(1971) de Graham Allison.
Esta nova abordagem surge na esteira do debate Agência/Estrutura, que há muito que
vem opondo os académicos de Relações Internacionais e que se foca “em saber qual é o
factor determinante do nosso mundo social: a ‘agência’ (as acções dos atores ou a sua
capacidade de actuar) ou a ‘estrutura’ (as vastas restrições no âmbito das quais os
actores agem, tais como a anarquia ou a sociedade internacional, o capitalismo global ou
o direito internacional)” (Brown & Ainley, 2012: 117). Neste sentido, a APE vem contribuir
para este debate, analisando o impacto que tanto a Agência como a Estrutura têm na
política externa dos Estados.
A grande proposta da APE é centrar o estudo da política externa na Agência, entendida,
não como o Estado, mas antes como o decisor político, rejeitando a abordagem
tradicional, e tipicamente realista, que entendia o Estado enquanto ator unitário. Nas
palavras de Snyder, Bruck e Sapin (2002: 59), “the state is its decision-makers”, pelo
que o que importa analisar é quem está por detrás da decisão, identificando a Agência,
assim como as verdadeiras razões que a justificam. Deste modo podemos destacar que
o grande objeto de estudo da APE são as “decisions taken by human decisionmakers with
reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state”
(Hudson, 2014: 4), e que procuraram ser explicadas através dos “factors that influence
foreign policy decisionmaking and foreign policy decisionmakers” (Hudson, 2014: 6). O
estudo em APE exige que, a par da Agência, identifiquemos a Estrutura e as ideias e
valores associados a uma dada decisão.
De forma sintética podemos apresentar a essência da APE através de três grandes
contributos que esta trouxe para o estudo da política externa. Primeiro, a existência de
uma interligação entre a política externa e a política interna. Até então o realismo
considerava a política externa como totalmente independente da política interna e daquilo
que se passava dentro do Estado, sendo somente uma resposta deste face ao ambiente
internacional. Com a APE esta conceção é posta em causa, sendo substituída pela crença
de que a política externa é também influenciada por fatores internos, tais como os
comportamentos da própria sociedade, e os ideais dos decisores políticos. Por outro lado,
a APE também veio pôr fim à conceção do Estado enquanto um “ator unitário e coerente
que prossegue objetivos claros de acordo com um interesse nacional objetivo” (Mendes,
2020: 74), remetendo, assim, o foco de análise do Estado para o decisor, em virtude da
política externa ser o resultado, não do interesse nacional – compreendido em termos de
objetivos supremos e permanentes do Estado como elemento unitário – nem de uma
decisão que cabe ao Estado, como se este se tratasse de uma entidade capaz de decidir
por si só, mas sim de uma decisão que cabe aos decisores políticos e que é influenciada
por diversos fatores, desde o entendimento destes acerca do interesse nacional, às
pressões – externas ou internas – ou até às suas próprias motivações. Por fim, a APE
também veio contrariar a noção de que o Estado é um ator racional, e que, portanto, a
política externa, na sua formulação, depende exclusivamente de critérios racionais. Mais
uma vez, para a APE, ela depende tanto das motivações do decisor, como das pressões
que este pode sofrer e que nada podem ter de racional. Na realidade, a APE conseguiu
opor-se às ideias de racionalidade dentro da política externa e ao primado do interesse
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nacional de tal maneira que o próprio realismo já foi obrigado a concordar com a
importância destas mudanças. Olhamos para o Neorrealismo e observamos uma
evolução do Realismo Clássico na direção do reconhecimento da complementaridade
entre o interno e o externo, ou então para o Realismo Neoclássico, e temos uma diferente
perceção acerca do papel do decisor, que o realismo de Morgenthau nem suponha.
Em direção à evolução e advogando que a decisão em política externa não é totalmente
racional e depende muito mais do que do interesse nacional, a APE veio, de forma
ousada, alargar o estudo da política externa à análise de diversos fatores, como o meio
interno, as ideias do decisor, ou até mesmo de processos organizacionais, políticos e
burocráticos como teorizou Allison, permitindo-nos entender o que (ou melhor, quem)
verdadeiramente se encontra na tomada de cada decisão. Para tal, a APE exige que
partamos a caixa negra, de forma a conhecermos os reais decisores e as reais
motivações. Desta forma, e como esclarece Mendes (2020: 77), “para além dos fatores
sistémicos e estruturais, o que é decisivo é estudar a Agência dos decisores”, ou seja,
importa atender ao “contexto” em que se formula a decisão, assim como às “ideias e
perceções” do decisor. Para isto, a APE atende, no seu estudo, a diversos níveis de
análise, nomeadamente, “indivíduos, burocracias, sociedades, sistema internacional”
(Mendes, 2020: 77).
Com a APE, o decisor, e em especial o seu psicológico, ganham, pela primeira vez, real
relevância. Os novos estudos da política externa vão procurar explicar a decisão partindo
dos aspetos psicológicos do próprio decisor, assim como da forma como estes o
influenciaram e, por conseguinte, influenciaram a própria decisão. Neste sentido, Harold
e Margaret Sprout (1969) dividem o universo da decisão em dois ambientes, o psicológico
e o operacional. Quando nos referimos a ambiente psicológico, falamos das ideias, das
perceções, das motivações pessoais do decisor, que moldam a sua visão do mundo. Já o
ambiente operacional é o ambiente dito real, composto pelo meio interno e externo,
sendo aquele onde a decisão se materializa e opera. Estes dois ambientes nem sempre
são congruentes, dado que a análise que o decisor faz do ambiente interno e externo
nem sempre é a mais correta, ou pelo menos aquela que interpreta corretamente a
realidade envolvente. Aqui reside a razão para, no estudo da política externa, ser
especialmente importante atendermos ao aspeto psicológico e à forma como este molda
a perceção do decisor. Como apontam Harold e Margaret Sprout (1969: 49),
“the first step in linking environmental factors to policy-making decisions is
to find out how the given policy-maker, or policy-making group, conceives the
milieu to be and how that unit interprets the opportunities and limitations
implicit therein with respect to the ends to be accomplished”.
Nesta linha, podemos assumir que “os fatores ideacionais (perceções, ideologias,
crenças, identidades)” são especialmente importantes, dado
“que, por um lado, influenciam de forma substancial a disposição dos
decisores políticos relativamente à escolha de determinadas alternativas, e
por outro, são eles que influenciam a forma como os decisores definem
problemas e alternativas” (Mendes, 2017: 27).
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Assim, os fatores percetivos e ideológicos, ao condicionarem a visão do decisor, têm um
profundo impacto na decisão em si, o que faz cair por terra a visão tradicional de que a
política externa é decidida somente em razão da pressão estrutural, ou tendo somente
por base o interesse nacional. São as perceções e “interpretações” (Mendes, 2017: 27)
que o decisor constrói que moldam a sua visão da realidade, e, por conseguinte, moldam
a própria cena internacional. Ainda neste domínio, Snyder, Bruck e Sapin (2002: 76)
afirmam que os “decision-makers operate in a highly particular and specific context”,
pelo que é importante atendermos aos condicionamentos e influências que o meio lhes
impõe, assim como à sua própria idiossincrasia, sendo essencial “[the] re-creation of the
‘world’ of the decision-makers as they view it” (Idem: 59), através do entendimento da
perceção, das escolhas e das expectativas do decisor.
Mais tarde Allison também defendeu esta visão, ao afirmar que, mesmo que a política
externa possa ser uma resposta (ou ação) do Estado face à realidade internacional, a
decisão cabe sempre a decisores políticos, que não são independentes do que os rodeia,
e que, por isso, deve-se estudar o processo de tomada de decisão para, aí, encontrar as
motivações que levaram a com que se decidisse de uma determinada maneira. Surgem
assim, alguns modelos de análise, se bem que muito ligados ao estudo da política externa
como uma política pública, por um lado, o Modelo do Ator Racional – este modelo não foi
desenvolvido por Allison, mas antes apresentado de forma sumaria por este, como o
modelo que a maioria dos estudiosos seguia à época, e que ainda era muito associado
aos pressupostos realistas de que a decisão é sempre dominada por critérios racionais –
e, por outro, o Modelo da Política Burocrática e o Modelo da Política Organizacional.
Também James Rosenau aprofundou esta conceção, considerando que o decisor é
influenciado por um conjunto de inputs internos e externos, mas, mais do que isso, que
tanto o meio interno como o meio externo interagem, formando processos de linkage –
entendidos enquanto “any recurrent sequece of behavior that originates in one system
and is reacted to in another” (Rosenau, 1969: 45) – que condicionam, ainda mais, o
decisor. Ainda, neste sentido, Putnam apresentou o seu modelo de negociação em dois
tabuleiros, afirmando que, o decisor, mais do que enfrentar, simultaneamente, pressões
do meio interno e do meio externo, tem de mover duas negociações políticas para chegar
a uma decisão em cada um destes planos.
Concluindo, podemos afirmar que a Análise de Política Externa surgiu com o intuito de
contestar o papel atribuído pelos realistas, no estudo da política externa, ao interesse
nacional e à Estrutura (externa), assim como a própria ideia de racionalidade na decisão.
Para os realistas, a política externa era simplesmente influenciada por questões externas,
não sendo mais do que uma resposta, natural e quase que automática, do Estado às
pressões da Estrutura. A APE veio, por um lado, alargar este conceito de Estrutura do
meio externo ao meio interno – assumindo, inclusive, interdependência entre ambos,
como demonstraram Putnam e Rosenau – e, por outro lado, demonstrar que além da
Estrutura outras variáveis importam, como as ideias e perceções do decisor, permitindo,
assim, aprofundar o estudo da política externa. A APE surge, desta forma, como uma
abordagem mais alargada e abrangente de entender a decisão em política externa,
propondo um novo modo de análise mais capaz do que as tradicionais teorias das
relações internacionais que não são capaz de explicar, na sua totalidade, muitos dos
fenómenos da política internacional. A política externa é formulada através de diversos
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ambientes e englobando vários fatores, sofrendo diversas influências, que nenhuma
teoria das relações internacional é suficientemente capaz de interpretar, pelo que a APE
propõe, através dos seus modelos teóricos, uma “abordagem complementar que
enriquece o nosso entendimento da política internacional” (Freire, 2011: 18).
A estrutura e a decisão de Portugal em aderir à CEE
Durante séculos, a trajetória da política externa portuguesa focou-se na dicotomia entre
a Terra e o Mar. Com a Revolução dos Cravos (1974), Portugal inicia um percurso de
redefinição das suas prioridades de política externa. Mais uma vez, repensa-se a opção
política de Portugal no quadro da dicotomia entre a Terra – agora representada pela
Europa comunitária –, e o Mar – identificado com a opção atlântica. No período imediato
da Revolução, a integração de Portugal no projeto europeu não era um dos objetivos a
alcançar. Na realidade, “quer o programa do MFA, quer os documentos programáticos
que se seguiram, apontaram sempre para outras metas e outros destinos, nem sempre
condizentes com a adesão às Comunidades Europeias” (Almeida, 2005: 269).
Estrutura Internacional: A détente
A década de 1970 é uma época particularmente importante na história da Guerra Fria.
São diversas as alterações estruturais que ocorrem no Sistema Internacional, e que são
acompanhadas de mudanças na economia e no comércio internacional (Westad, 1995),
assim como de uma vaga revolucionária que atinge a Europa do Sul, desde Portugal até
à Grécia. Esta é a época da détente, uma fase da Guerra Fria que se prolonga desde a
década de 1960 até a década de 1980 (Westad, 1995). Esta fase é marcada, apesar de
tudo, por um desanuviamento entre os Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e a União
Soviética (URSS). Por um lado, porque os conflitos internacionais durante a década de
1960, sobretudo a Crise dos Mísseis de Cuba, impeliram a necessidade de um maior
apaziguamento entre as duas superpotências, mas, por outro porque cada superpotência
tivera de lidar com problemas internos, sobretudo a União Soviética, cujo
enfraquecimento marcara muito este período. Como nos apontam Kaspi & Duroselle
(2014: 281), “a política externa de Kruchev conduzira a crises, e os seus êxitos não
tinham sido evidente”, pelo que quando este é substituído por Brejnev, em 1964, o seu
sucessor segue uma via diferente, procurando “um relativo desanuviamento
internacional” (Idem: 282), o que criou um cenário internacional mais calmo, permitindo
um reforço do poder americano. A détente também ficou marcada pelo reforço da
superioridade tecnológica e económica norte-americana. Vale recordar que 1969 foi a
data da chegada do Homem à Lua, impulsionando a Corrida ao Espaço. Em oposição ao
poderio americano, a União Soviética via o seu crescimento económico abrandar, ao
mesmo tempo que a contestação dentro da Europa do Leste crescia, com a Roménia a
demonstrar vontade em escapar à esfera de influência de Moscovo, recebendo visitas de
Estado de De Gaulle (1968) e Nixon (1969), e com a Checoslováquia a tentar uma
liberalização, que obrigaria a uma forte resposta por parte da URSS (Kaspi & Duroselle,
2014). Mas os Estados Unidos da América também não foram imunes a problemas. Na
transição entre a década de 1960 e 1970, os EUA eram humilhados na Guerra do
Vietname, levando a opinião pública a manifestar-se, criando um difícil cenário político
que o escândalo Watergate (1972) intensificou. Ainda neste período tinha lugar a Rutura
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Sino-Soviética, em virtude das divergências ideológicas criada por Mao, permitindo com
que, anos mais tarde, os EUA, através da Diplomacia Triangular de Kissinger, passassem
a relacionar-se com a China Comunista, abrindo-a ao mundo. Por outro lado, esta fase
fica, também, marcada pela afirmação dos países do Terceiro Mundo no palco
internacional, assim como pela eclosão de vários conflitos regionais, como a Segunda
Guerra Israelo-Árabe (1967) e a Guerra do Yom Kippur (1973), em que a União Soviética
e Estados Unidos apoiaram fações distintas. O final da guerra ficou marcado pela
contenda entre ambas as superpotências, sobretudo com a URSS a ameaçar intervir do
lado egípcio face à superioridade israelita.
Dentro do espaço europeu, a détente ficou marcado por um primeiro alargamento da
CEE, em 1973 (Dinamarca, Irlanda e Reino Unido) e pela aproximação entre o Ocidente
e o Leste europeu. Num primeiro momento através do entendimento entre a RDA e a
RFA, motivado pela Ostpolitik de Willy Brandt, e, posteriormente, pelo diálogo entre as
duas Europas através da Conferência de Segurança e Cooperação na Europa (CSCE).
Apesar dos “resultados (…) muito dececionantes” (Kaspi & Duroselle, 2014: 366), a CSCE
permitiu o contacto regular entre a Europa democrática e a Europa comunista, reforçando
o desanuviamento quer no continente, quer entre o Bloco Ocidental e o Bloco Soviético.
A détente foi, assim, um período marcado por uma política de desanuviamento entre as
superpotências que se traduziu em tentativas e acordos de desarmamento, como o SALT
I (1972), e onde tanto os EUA como a URSS enfrentaram diversos desafios internos e
externos, mas que, apesar de tudo, permitiram um melhor entendimento entre o
Ocidente e o Leste. Tanto soviéticos, sob a figura de Brejnev, como norte-americanos,
representados por Johnson, Nixon e Carter, reconheceram que o desanuviamento era o
melhor caminho rumo à paz e segurança, deixando bem claro que não tinham qualquer
interesse em entrar em conflito um com o outro.
Estrutura doméstica: conjuntura política e o pedido de adesão
Em 1977, data do pedido formal de adesão, Portugal era uma jovem democracia. Tinham
passado apenas três anos desde a Revolução de 1974 e a nossa Constituição tinha sido
aprovada há menos de um ano. Relativamente ao I Governo Constitucional, que tomara
posse em julho de 1976, havia a esperança, tanto interna como externa, de que fosse
capaz de assegurar a estabilidade que o país tanto necessitava, definindo um rumo de
política interna e de política externa que permitisse a Portugal crescer e desenvolver-se.
Os anos anteriores haviam sido marcados por uma grande instabilidade e constantes
lutas políticas. Os Governos Provisórios procuraram responder aos objetivos do
Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA), sintetizado pela famosa expressão ‘democratizar,
descolonizar e desenvolver’. Apesar disso, e ainda que o I Governo Provisório fosse
liderado por um político moderado, denotou-se uma crescente instabilidade política e
social no país, motivada sobretudo pelas discordâncias políticas entre os principais
partidos: Partido Comunista Português, Partido Socialista, Partido Popular Democrático e
Partido do Centro Democrático Social. A predominância crescente da ala radical do MFA
e do PCP – sobretudo com os II, III, IV e V Governos Provisórios, liderados por Vasco
Gonçalves – agravou o delicado cenário político do país, impondo uma viragem à
esquerda. Este foi o período do Processo Revolucionário Em Curso (PREC), onde se
procedeu à planificação da economia e a extensas nacionalizações. É também nesta
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altura que a instabilidade política e social atinge o seu auge com a tentativa de Golpe de
Estado de Spínola a 11 de março de 1975, o famoso episódio do ‘Verão Quente’ (1975)
e a tentativa de Golpe de Estado do 25 de novembro, por parte da esquerda radical, que
terminou com o PREC. A partir daí o país começou a estabilizar e o VI Governo Provisório,
colhendo o apoio norte-americano e europeu, foi capaz de regressar à trajetória de
abertura internacional que o I Governo Provisório tinha tentado.
Durante os Governos Provisórios, o posicionamento relativamente ao rumo da política
externa que Portugal deveria seguir não foi constante, oscilando, como defende Alice
Cunha (2013: 384-386), entre uma orientação terceiro-mundista, ou a aproximação ao
bloco Soviético, ou a manutenção no Mundo Ocidental, representada pela aproximação
aos EUA e aos países da CEE. Entretanto, iam existindo aproximações à então
Comunidade Económica Europeia, em especial durante os Governos em que Mário Soares
se encontrava como Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Este foi o caso do I Governo
Provisório, onde Portugal procurou uma aproximação aos demais países da CEE em
matéria de cooperação económico-comercial, chegando mesmo a haver uma declaração
do então Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Mário Soares, onde claramente se
demonstra o interesse de Portugal em negociar com este bloco, apesar de “a adesão não
[ser] (…) possível na altura” (Cunha, 2013: 389-390).
As convicções europeístas do I Governo Provisório rapidamente saem goradas quando o
II Governo Provisório adota uma postura diferente, impondo uma “viragem à esquerda”
(Cunha, 2013: 390) e preferindo o diálogo com os países terceiro-mundistas e do Leste
europeu. Esta postura mantém-se nos seguintes Governos Provisórios, havendo,
inclusive, uma “rejeição de qualquer hipótese de associação à CEE” (Cunha, 2013: 393),
até que com o VI Governo Provisório, liderado por Pinheiro de Azevedo, Portugal altera
substancialmente a linha que vinha seguindo, e, mesmo mantendo uma postura
socialista, decide por uma nova aproximação à CEE, renegociando os acordos já
existentes e permitindo o reforço da ligação de Portugal com os países desta organização.
Esta posição é fortalecida pelo golpe de 25 de novembro de 1975, que travou os “avanços
da esquerda” (Cunha, 2013: 392), permitindo a inserção do país no seio das economias
de mercado. A partir daí, é desfeita qualquer hipótese de alinhamento ao Bloco do Leste,
mas continuam as dúvidas se Portugal deve ou não aderir à CEE e ao Bloco Ocidental.
Já em 1976, Portugal começa a conseguir uma “estabilização da democracia”, ao mesmo
tempo que se vai aproximando dos outros países da Europa Ocidental, mas sem se
presumir, sequer, qualquer “hipótese de adesão à CEE” (Cunha, 2013: 396). É neste
contexto que Portugal consegue estabelecer novos protocolos com a Comunidade.
A transição democrática não foi livre de pressões externas, tanto por parte dos EUA,
como da URSS e dos países da Europa Ocidental. Relativamente aos Estados Unidos,
estes sempre demonstraram o seu desagrado relativamente à incorporação de membros
do PCP na governação do país, mesmo com o I Governo Provisório. Através de Kissinger,
os EUA adotaram uma política bastante dura para com o rumo do processo
revolucionário, o que ficara conhecido como a ‘Teoria da Vacina’, i.e., Kissinger acreditava
que “Portugal estava perdido para o comunismo e devia ser isolado, servindo assim de
lição a outros que pudessem estar tentados a seguir o mesmo caminho” (The American
Academy of Diplomacy, as cited in Sá, 2009: 312). Por oposição, Frank Carlucci,
embaixador norte-americano em Portugal, considerava indispensável o apoio dos EUA à
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democratização do país. Só mais tarde é que Carlucci convence Kissinger a apoiar as
forças democráticas em Portugal, resultando no “afastamento definitivo de Vasco
Gonçalves” (Sá, 2009: 434).
Em relação à Europa Ocidental, foram diversas as forças políticas a demonstrarem-se
solidárias com o país, apoiando-o no processo de transição através do auxílio aos partidos
portugueses. Aqui destacam-se as contribuições dos socialistas europeus ao Partido
Socialista (PS) de Mário Soares, culminando na criação do Comité de Amizade e
Solidariedade para a Democracia e Socialismo em Portugal. Neste apoio Willy Brandt,
chanceler alemão, teve um profundo impacto, sobretudo tentando “convencer Kissinger
que Portugal não era uma causa perdida” (Sá, 2009: 390). Posteriormente, o Estado
Português também recebeu ajuda financeira da Comunidade Económica Europeia para
apoiar o seu desenvolvimento. Quanto à União Soviética, Brejnev apoiou financeiramente
o PCP, o que preocupara a administração norte-americana. Apesar de tudo, os EUA
acreditavam que a URSS não tinha total controlo sobre o PCP nem estava interessada
em intervir em Portugal.
Após, em 1976, ser eleito o I Governo Constitucional, liderado por Mário Soares e com
José Medeiros Ferreira como Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, “a opção europeia foi
assumida politicamente” (Vicente, 2013: 40), estando, assim, “introduzida a formulação
de uma opção de política externa com o foco principal virado para o continente europeu”
(Chaves, 2013: 41). Logo com o início da atuação do executivo de Soares, Portugal
consegue novas aproximações à CEE, chegando mesmo a afirmar-se, através do Ministro
dos Negócios Estrangeiros, José Medeiros Ferreira, a “intenção de solicitar o pedido de
adesão” (Chaves, 2013: 42). A adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias foi pedida
em 1977, pelo então Primeiro-Ministro, Mário Soares, e pelo Ministro dos Negócios
Estrangeiros, José Medeiros Ferreira. Este foi o culminar de uma ideia que há muito
existia em Portugal, havendo, inclusive, tentativas de adesão ainda durante a ditadura
de Salazar, mas que somente se materializaram com a democratização do regime e com
o I Governo Constitucional, que, pela primeira vez, demonstrou real interesse político em
fazer parte do projeto de integração europeia. Após o périplo de Mário Soares pela
Europa, passando por várias capitais europeias, incluindo Londres – capital do Reino
Unido, que viria a “assumir a presidência em exercício do Conselho de Ministros” (Cunha,
2018: 72) – o Governo de Soares conseguiu com que a Assembleia da República, a 18
de março de 1977, votasse “favoravelmente a entrega do pedido de adesão” (Cunha,
2018: p.75), o que viria a acontecer a 28 de março do mesmo ano, numa carta enviada
pelo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, José Medeiros Ferreira, cabendo a entrega ao
embaixador António de Siqueira Freire.
A adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias inaugura um novo rumo da política
externa portuguesa, ou o que Severiano Teixeira (2010: 55) apelida de novo “modelo de
inserção internacional” alicerçado na “Europa”, no “Atlântico” e nas “relações pós-
coloniais”.
Motivações e o papel do decisor na adesão de Portugal à CEE
A opção da Agência portuguesa em enviar, em 1977, o pedido de adesão de Portugal às
Comunidades Europeias, encontra-se fundamentada num conjunto de motivações, quer
estruturais, quer ideológicas e pessoais, que moldaram a perceção do decisor.
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Como causas que, à partida, poderiam ser tidas como as principais, encontramos os
condicionamentos estruturais internos, nomeadamente as debilidades económicas e
democráticas do país e a deterioração do seu poder internacional. No quadro económico
e democrático, Portugal era um país pobre, atrasado e com um projeto de
democratização que era constantemente ameaçado, pelo que a adesão às Comunidades
Europeias era uma opção lógica para desenvolver o país e para proteger o jovem regime
(Cunha, 2018: 77-80). Neste sentido, era considerado “interessante e necessário que
Portugal integrasse um bloco económico tecnologicamente evoluído”, de forma a
potenciar as empresas e o mercado nacional, garantindo o acesso a “mercados externos
para os produtos portugueses, nomeadamente para os têxteis” (Chaves, 2013: 41). Por
outro lado, tanto a projeção do poder, como a própria postura internacional de Portugal
encontravam-se ameaçadas pelo fim do império, impelindo a com que Portugal se
juntasse a um bloco forte, tornando-se, assim, capaz de redefinir o seu papel “no mundo
e garantindo a defesa dos [seus] interesses permanentes” (Chaves, 2013: 42). Devemos
recordar que Portugal já não era mais uma potência colonial, já não tinha a extensão e
conseguinte projeção internacional que o império lhe dava, pelo que era necessário
encontrar um novo meio de assumir uma posição de relevo no xadrez internacional e a
aproximação à Europa apareceu como uma, senão a única, opção viável. Aliás, partindo
do pressuposto de que o decisor sabia que “haveria lugar a um novo alargamento da
CEE”, de “que a Espanha iria também pedir a adesão” e de que haveria “uma
aproximação dos PALOP à Convenção de Lomé”, era obvio e fundamental para o país
adaptar-se e acompanhar as mudanças que se avizinhavam, sob pena de ficar “numa
posição internacional frágil, sem qualquer influencia, quer face ao bloco das Comunidades
Europeias, quer face ao ex-ultramar” (Chaves, 2013: 41). Externamente, o mundo
enfrentava uma nova fase da Guerra Fria, a détente, marcada por um desanuviamento,
mas onde nem os EUA nem a URSS demonstravam clara vontade em interferir na
definição da política portuguesa. Aliás, durante muito tempo os Estados Unidos optaram
pela ‘Teoria da Vacina’, e mesmo depois de garantida a democratização e das relações
normalizadas, não se notou qualquer influência norte-americana na adesão portuguesa
à CEE.
Fora as motivações impostas pela Estrutura, outras importaram, nomeadamente a
perceção do decisor, tal como nos apontam Snyder, Bruck e Sapin (2002). Assim, vemos
que foi graças à convicção do decisor de que a Europa unida representava uma
oportunidade única para o país, que o levou, mais do que por força da própria Estrutura,
em requer a adesão do país ao projeto de integração europeu. Neste sentido, foram não
tanto as circunstâncias, mas a perceção do decisor relativamente a estas que o levam a
adotar certas decisões. Desta forma, o decisor estava seguro de que era absolutamente
necessário para Portugal a sua integração na Europa comunitária. Aliás, Mário Soares,
em entrevista ao The Times, afirmou que se isso não tivesse acontecido teria sido um
“desastre” para o país, dado que, face às “dificuldades financeiras a recusa poderia
conduzir a um renascer do autoritarismo” (The Times, as cited in Vicente, 2013: 40).
Em discurso oficial na Assembleia da República
1
, dias antes de enviar o pedido de adesão,
Mário Soares identifica como motivações a necessidade de “vencer a crise e dar ao povo
português o nível de vida a que tem direito” e a “busca de uma nova identidade nacional”,
1
Assembleia da República. (1977). Diário da Assembleia da República I Legislatura, 1ª Sessão Legislativa,
88 (março): 3011-3034. https://debates.parlamento.pt/catalogo/r3/dar/01/01/01/088/1977-03-18
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ao mesmo tempo que se concede a “Portugal o lugar que merece na cena internacional”,
graças ao vazio que a descolonização e a queda do Império trouxera para o país.
Passados 28 anos desde o envio do pedido de adesão e exatamente 19 anos desde a
entrada na CEE, Mário Soares, em discurso na cerimonia comemorativa da assinatura do
Tratado de Adesão
2
, reconhece que as principais razões por detrás da sua decisão em
levar Portugal para junto das Comunidades Europeias foram “a consolidação da
democracia”, mas “também o reconhecimento de que o ciclo imperial tinha terminado
com a descolonização”, o que, aliás, seria fulcral para uma reaproximação entre Portugal
e os seus ex-domínios coloniais.
Além da perceção do decisor, é visível que, também os seus ideias tiveram impacto na
decisão. Na verdade, a importância concedida aos ideais e à idiossincrasia do decisor são
temas recorrentes em APE. Partindo desta assunção, é importante analisarmos até que
ponto os ideias europeístas se encontravam inseridos na cabeça do próprio decisor, aqui
assumido como Mário Soares. Revisitando a sua vida, em especial a sua juventude, é
claro que o europeísmo em Mário Soares foi desde sempre muito evidente e o próprio
nunca deixou de o referir, tanto quando enfrentava o Estado Novo em território nacional,
como quando se encontrava exilado. Aliás, o próprio beneficiou muito do seu exilio para
crescer intelectualmente, e, com isso, para reforçar a sua admiração e paixão pela
Europa.
O interesse e a confiança de Mário Soares para com o projeto de integração europeia
começam-se a evidenciar ainda na década de 60, após o seu afastamento do PCP. A
partir daí, Soares passa a basear as suas aspirações para Portugal no “modelo político
da Europa Ocidental” e nos seus “valores”, “vendo na Europa padrões de vida aplicáveis
e exemplares para Portugal” (Sebastião, 2010: 22-24).
Na década de 70, já exilado em França, Mário Soares aposta na internacionalização da
recém-criada Acção Socialista Portuguesa, através de “encontros mais frequentes com
as lideranças europeias”, provando a existência em Portugal, de uma oposição socialista
ao regime, “na linha do pensamento europeu” (Sebastião, 2010: 24-25). Podemos
assumir que a ASP era um mecanismo que personificava e materializava o pensamento
político de Soares. A partir daí, observamos um fortalecimento crescente do interesse da
ASP, e, por conseguinte, de Mário Soares, pelo projeto europeu, iniciando cedo
“contactos com organizações ligadas à unificação da Europa” (Sebastião, 2010: 34). A
proximidade entre os socialistas portugueses e as forças de integração europeia reforça-
se muito ao longo da década de 70, mas já antes havia contactos com o Movimento
Europeu e o Movimento Federalista Europeu, junto do qual “Soares manteve uma
intervenção ativa”, demonstrando claramente a sua postura e “às suas ideias pró Europa”
(Sebastião, 2010: 34-36). Nos anos seguintes, a “ASP faz também tentativas de
aproximação com a Comunidade Europeia, chegando a conseguir assento como
observadora nos VIII e IX Congressos do Bureau dos Partidos Socialistas da Comunidade”
(Sebastião, 2010: 38). Era, portanto, já evidente o interesse de Mário Soares
relativamente a uma futura participação de Portugal no projeto europeu.
2
Soares, M. (2005). Discurso de Mário Soares na Cerimónia Comemorativa da Assinatura do Tratado de
Adesão. http://www.fmsoares.pt/mario_soares/textos_ms/001/3.pdf
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No Portugal já em vias de se democratizar, e nas vésperas das eleições de 1976, o PS,
em plena campanha eleitoral, expunha as suas ideias para um Portugal desenvolvido e
democrático, e para tal não abdicava da defesa da integração do país no projeto
comunitário. Liderado por Mário Soares, seu fundador e então Secretário-Geral, o PS
organizou, entre os dias 13 e 14 de março, no Porto, um congresso para expor as suas
ideias quanto à Europa. Intitulado A Europa connosco, este foi não só o tema para esta
cimeira no Porto, como foi o “mote da campanha eleitoral” do partido
3
. Mais do que isso,
também foi a forma perfeita para Mário Soares definir “um objetivo fundamental caso
ganhasse as eleições: a adesão à CEE” (Cunha, 2018: 68). Podemos, portanto, afirmar
que, aqui, encontra-se consubstanciada toda a ideia de enviar o pedido de adesão de
Portugal à CEE, pelas mãos do partido criado e liderado por Mário Soares, e o seu
principal ideólogo.
Nesta campanha que precedeu as eleições de 1976, o programa eleitoral do PS
“privilegiava os grandes pilares estruturantes de um Estado Social, que pretendia edificar
em Portugal”2, e para alcançar isso mesmo, definiu “como condição essencial para o
desenvolvimento do país, a adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias”2.
Após a tomada de posse do novo executivo, e em plena apresentação do Programa de
Governo na Assembleia da República, a 2 de Agosto de 1976
4
, Mário Soares afirma a
dedicação da sua governação para com a “opção europeia”, reafirmando a sua intenção
de requerer “a integração de Portugal na Comunidade Económica Europeia”. Em posterior
discurso na Assembleia da República, a 18 de março de 1977
5
, dias antes de enviar o
pedido de adesão, Soares volta a salientar “a firme intenção do Governo português de
pedir a adesão plena às Comunidades Europeias”.
Em entrevista ao jornal britânico The Times, a 11 de fevereiro de 1977
6
, o então já
Primeiro-Ministro, Mário Soares chega mesmo a afirmar-se como “um patriótico, mas
também partidário de uma Europa”, defendendo a existência de “uma Europa política
com reais instituições supranacionais de tal modo que calculo que a entrada dos países
do Sul da Europa representa uma enorme contribuição para esta Europa”.
Sumariamente, podemos concluir que a convicção europeísta cresceu em Mário Soares
durante o seu exilio de Mário Soares, que, numa primeira face, lhe permitiu fundamentar,
graças ao apoio dos partidos socialistas de toda a Europa, a sua alternativa ao
Salazarismo, mas que, numa face posterior, levou Soares a defender a entrada de
Portugal nas Comunidades Europeias, tanto pelos seus ideais como pela convicção de
que está será a única hipótese do país sobreviver e poder se desenvolver. A conceção de
que a ideia partiu, portanto, de Mário Soares, encontra-se claramente fundamentada,
mas não nos é possível apontar o então Primeiro-Ministro como o único decisor, na
medida em que, apesar de ser este o responsável pelo pedido de adesão, ele nunca
esteve sozinho, vendo-se apoiando por um largo aparelho de onde participava o seu
partido, em especial o seu Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, José Medeiros Ferreira,
3
Partido Socialista. (NA). Exposição “A Europa Connosco”. https://ps.pt/exposicao-a-europa-connosco/
4
Assembleia da República. (1977). Diário da Assembleia da República I Legislatura, 1ª Sessão Legislativa,
17 (agosto): 399-438. https://debates.parlamento.pt/catalogo/r3/dar/01/01/01
5
Assembleia da República. (1977). Diário da Assembleia da República I Legislatura, 1ª Sessão Legislativa,
88 (março): 3011-3034. https://debates.parlamento.pt/catalogo/r3/dar/01/01/01
6
Entrevista de Mário Soares ao The Times, de 11 de fevereiro de 1977, as cited in Vicente (2013, p.40)
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encarregue de escrever “o draft do programa de Governo”
7
, tendo lá deixado a sua
“impressão digital, sobretudo no que diz respeito ao pedido de adesão à CEE”6. Assim, e
apesar do papel inequívoco de Mário Soares – que chegou mesmo a declarar “Somos
europeus, sentimo-nos europeus e queremos, nós, portugueses, que o nosso país faça
finalmente ouvir a sua voz e participe ativamente na construção da Europa”
8
– é obvio
que também Medeiros Ferreira é uma personagem com alguma importância dentro da
decisão. Aliás, tendo, inclusive, vindo a afirmar ser ele “o responsável pela tomada de
decisão, a 4 de fevereiro de 1977”6. Neste sentido, é possível concluir que Medeiros
Ferreira foi o responsável pelo envio do pedido de adesão, mas tal necessitou,
obviamente, da concordância do Chefe de Governo e líder do partido, Mário Soares, um
convicto europeísta e sempre defensor da adesão de Portugal às Comunidades. Assim,
Mário Soares acaba por ser a personalidade de decisão que se destaca, dado que, por
maior que tenha sido a vontade e a participação de Medeiros Ferreira, este estava sempre
dependente da decisão de Soares, líder do executivo. Neste sentido, Mário Soares chega
mesmo a declarar, no seu discurso na cerimónia comemorativa dos 20 anos desde a
assinatura do tratado de adesão de Portugal à CEE, em 2005, que havia sido por sua
iniciativa que o país requereu a adesão, ao afirmar “os motivos que me levaram a
requerer a adesão à CEE”
9
.
Posto isto, podemos afirmar, sem dúvida, que foi graças “à acção e vontade política do
1.º Governo Constitucional, chefiado pelo Dr. Mário Soares, e que vence as outras
correntes de opinião existentes, que Portugal envereda definitivamente por esta linha de
alianças internacionais e por este caminho da construção europeia” (Chaves, 2013: 42).
Considerações finais
A Análise de Política Externa é, hoje, uma ferramenta de grande importância para o
estudo e compreensão da decisão em política externa, indo mais longe do que a
abordagem tradicional e permitindo conceder uma especial atenção ao papel
desempenhado pelo decisor, nomeadamente à perceção e aos ideais deste. Tal
importância não pode ser negada e encontra-se bastante fundamentada no presente
estudo da decisão de Portugal em aderir às Comunidades Europeias. Uma decisão onde
os condicionamentos estruturais importaram, mas onde a perceção e a idiossincrasia do
decisor foi mais relevante. Apesar da existência de algumas suposições de pressão
externa, nomeadamente norte-americana, para Portugal aderir à CEE, e, assim, optar
definitivamente pela aproximação ao Ocidente, o presente artigo não as aprofundou por
não se encontrarem suficientemente corroboradas. Assim, cai por terra a visão
tradicional, que definia a política externa como uma resposta do Estado face à conjuntura
internacional. Fica assim comprovada a relevância da APE no estudo da política externa.
No respeitante à decisão de Portugal em aderir à CEE, em concreto, estando finalizada a
investigação, a APE impõe-nos um olhar baseado no papel desempenhado pela Agência
7
Castanheira, J., & Silva, M. (2012, 28 de julho). "Sentia-me capaz de exercer qualquer cargo". Expresso.
https://expresso.pt/actualidade/sentia-me-capaz-de-exercer-qualquer-cargo=f742244
8
Partido Socialista. (NA). Exposição “A Europa Connosco”. https://ps.pt/exposicao-a-europa-connosco/
9
Soares, M. (2005). Discurso de Mário Soares na Cerimónia Comemorativa da Assinatura do Tratado de
Adesão. http://www.fmsoares.pt/mario_soares/textos_ms/001/3.pdf
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253
(decisor) e pela Estrutura (doméstica e internacional), mas também pelas ideias e
valores.
Quanto à Agência, podemos concluir claramente que é composta pelo Primeiro-Ministro
do I Governo Constitucional, Mário Soares, assim como pelo seu então Ministro dos
Negócios Estrangeiros, José Medeiros Ferreira. O papel de Mário Soares é inegável. Foi
graças ao seu trabalho durante os primeiros Governos Provisórios que foi possível para
Portugal se aproximar das Comunidades Europeias e foi ele que, enquanto fundador e
líder do Partido Socialista, tomou a decisão de, primeiramente, definir como objetivo
eleitoral do PS a adesão à CEE, e, em segunda instância, de enviar, a 28 de março de
1977, o pedido de adesão. Sem dúvida que as suas ideias europeístas influenciaram tanto
o rumo político do PS como a trajetória política seguida pelo I Governo Constitucional,
por si presidido, desde a tomada de posse até ao envio do pedido de adesão. Enquanto
líder do PS e enquanto Primeiro-Ministro nunca escondeu as suas pretensões em que
Portugal aderisse à CEE e isso foi constantemente visível. Mas, além de Soares, também
José Medeiros Ferreira tem lugar na Agência desta decisão, se bem que com um papel
ligeiramente menos preponderante, dada a primazia de Soares dentro do executivo. De
qualquer modo, Medeiros Ferreira foi o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros aquando do
envio do pedido de adesão, foi responsável, em conjunto com Soares, pelo programa
eleitoral do partido, e foi ele o responsável pelo envio da carta com o pedido formal de
adesão.
Ao nível da Estrutura, podemos afirmar que aqui ganha especial relevo a conjuntura
interna. Ou seja, a base estrutural da decisão deve-se principalmente às circunstâncias
que existiam dentro do próprio país, dado o fator externo ter sido menos relevante.
Analisando a conjuntura externa da época, EUA e URSS concordaram com o
desanuviamento. Durante os Governos Provisórios, denotaram-se interferências de
ambos: da URSS através das ligações com o PCP e com a fação mais radical do MFA; e
dos EUA que evoluíram da ‘Teoria da Vacina’ para uma posição mais ativa nos últimos
Governos Provisórios. Apesar disso, não podemos assumir qualquer pressão de nenhuma
superpotência na decisão de Portugal em aderir à CEE. Ademais, tanto os EUA como a
URSS estavam ocupados com os seus próprios problemas, e, quanto a esta última,
Brejnev sabia que interferir diretamente na política de um Estado-membro da NATO não
seria aceitável para os EUA, podendo pôr em causa a détente. Quanto à CEE e aos seus
membros, também não se denotou pressão. É certo que existiram ajudas financeiras ao
país e aos partidos portugueses, e é evidente que havia consciência, por parte de Mário
Soares, de que um novo alargamento poderia existir, mas não existem registos de que
qualquer tipo de pressão direta possam ter sido exercidas. Quanto à Estrutura interna,
constatamos, por sua vez, diversos fatores que podemos apontar como pressões sobre
o decisor, nomeadamente a debilidade económica, política e social que o país enfrentava
no rescaldo da Revolução. Em 1976-77, Portugal era uma jovem democracia frágil, que
se via ameaçada por fações comunistas e fascistas dentro do próprio país, e que,
portanto, precisava de ajuda para se solidificar, aparecendo a CEE como um garante de
estabilidade. Por outro lado, o decisor sabia perfeitamente que o país necessitava de se
desenvolver economicamente e de recuperar o atraso e as Comunidades Europeias já
haviam provado ser um modelo bastante bem-sucedido nesse domínio, pelo que a
adesão de Portugal era vista como uma forma de combatermos o subdesenvolvimento
do país.
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254
Por fim, no respeitante às ideias e valores, ou seja, aos aspetos ideacionais do próprio
decisor, é de destacar não só os ideais europeístas de Mário Soares como a sua perceção
acerca da Estrutura. Conforme analisado, Mário Soares foi um profundo adepto dos
princípios de uma Europa unida e solidária e via-a não só como um modelo de sucesso,
mas sobretudo como um projeto do qual gostaria de que Portugal fizesse parte. Fora a
contribuição destas ideias, a perceção de Mário Soares acerca da necessidade de Portugal
se desenvolver económica e politicamente e de se inserir num bloco para reforçar o seu
prestígio internacional, aparecendo a CEE como uma possibilidade, foi mais importante
do que a necessidade em concreto. Desta forma, mais do que qualquer importância que
a Estrutura (interna e externa) possa ter tido, e tal como salienta a APE, terá sido a
perceção do decisor o que mais motivou a decisão. Referimo-nos à perceção acerca da
conjuntura externa, isto é, do sistema internacional, e da conjuntura interna (política,
social e económica) que rodeava o decisor, tendo em conta a indefinição de rumo
nacional resultante da dissolução do Império e pela conseguinte necessidade de Portugal
escolher um bloco, sob a pena de ficar mais isolado e sem ativos que lhe garantissem
uma suficiente projeção do poder.
Em conclusão, podemos propor um modelo de análise baseado na interação existente
entre a Agência, a Estrutura e as ideias e valores, onde a Agência portuguesa – composta
por Mário Soares e José Medeiros Ferreira – agiu sobre a Estrutura, mas mais
determinada pelas suas ideias e perceções do que propriamente por qualquer
condicionamento estrutural. Ainda antes de chegar ao poder, Mário Soares, já
demonstrava a sua convicção para com o projeto de integração europeia, pelo que as
pretensões do decisor há muito que já estavam delineadas, acabando por se materializar
quando Soares chega ao poder e observa uma conjuntura que, segundo ele, seria
favorável à aplicação das mesmas. Logicamente que houve pressões e influências
sistémicas que facilitaram – e de certo modo até permitiram – a decisão, mas estas não
impuseram qualquer obrigação à Agência, na medida em que esta já tinha a ideia
europeia muito bem definida. Portanto, os condicionamentos da Estrutura só vieram criar
as condições perfeitas para que o decisor, Mário Soares, conseguisse concretizar as suas
pretensões. Deste modo, importaram mais as ideias e valores por detrás da decisão do
que as pressões interpostas pela Estrutura. Assim, concluímos que a Agência decidiu,
maioritariamente, por força das suas próprias convicções, da sua idiossincrasia.
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OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023)
257
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OLIVE SECTOR IN THE IBERIAN COUNTRIES:
THE APPROACH OF A NEW REALITY
ANTÓNIO DUARTE SANTOS
ajsantos@autonoma.pt
CARS – Center for Economic Analysis of Social Regulation, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
(Portugal)
SANDRA CRISTINA RIBEIRO
sribeiro@autonoma.pt
OBSERVARE- Observatory of Foreign Relations, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (Portugal)
Abstract
The agrifood sector is a sector that, in the context of the global economy, has been registering
an intrinsic potential to build, rather than deplete, natural capital. It supports daily and long-
term well-being, contributing to economic and social development and, therefore, natural
systems. The olive oil subsector has assumed a gradual economic importance in recent years
due to the growth in production. However, this phenomenon has not changed Portuguese
consumption habits too much, unlike Spain, as we will see. The olive oil line is a strategic
route in both countries' agricultural policy and economy. In Portugal and Spain this sector has
registered a high level of investment and production, despite the expectation of a certain price
stability. The Circular Economy is a recent concept, but it has long been present in the agrifood
sector. The creation of “return circuits” in agriculture is inspired by the mechanisms of natural
ecosystems and is an integral part of these same cycles. From the statistical analysis used,
we conclude that there are several ways that the olive sector contributes to the circularity of
the economy.
Keywords
olive sector; olive oil production; consumption habits; economic circularity.
Resumo
O sector agro-alimentar é um sector que, no contexto da economia global, tem vindo a
registar um potencial intrínseco para construir, em vez de esgotar, o capital natural. Apoia o
bem-estar diário e a longo prazo, contribuindo para o desenvolvimento económico e social e,
consequentemente, dos sistemas naturais. O subsector do azeite tem assumido uma
importância económica gradual nos últimos anos devido ao crescimento da produção. No
entanto, este fenómeno não alterou muito os hábitos de consumo dos portugueses, ao
contrário de Espanha, como veremos. A fileira do azeite é uma via estratégica na política
agrícola e na economia de ambos os países. Em Portugal e Espanha este sector tem registado
um elevado nível de investimento e produção, apesar da expectativa de uma certa
estabilidade de preços. A Economia Circular é um conceito recente, mas há muito que está
presente no sector agro-alimentar. A criação de "circuitos de retorno" na agricultura inspira-
se nos mecanismos dos ecossistemas naturais e é parte integrante desses mesmos ciclos. Da
análise estatística utilizada, concluímos que são várias as formas como o sector do azeite
contribui para a circularidade da economia.
Palavras chave
sector do azeite; produção de azeite; hábitos de consumo; circularidade económica.
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Characterization of the olive sector in the Iberian countries: the approach of a new reality
António Duarte Santos and Sandra Cristina Ribeiro
258
How to cite this article
Santos, António Duarte; Ribeiro, Sandra Cristina (2023). Characterization of the olive sector in the
Iberian countries: the approach of a new reality, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations,
Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.14
Article received on October, 14 2022, accepted for publication on March, 5 2023
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Characterization of the olive sector in the Iberian countries: the approach of a new reality
António Duarte Santos and Sandra Cristina Ribeiro
259
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OLIVE SECTOR IN THE IBERIAN
COUNTRIES: THE APPROACH OF A NEW REALITY
ANTÓNIO DUARTE SANTOS
SANDRA CRISTINA RIBEIRO
Introduction
The entry of Spain and Portugal to the European Union (EU) corresponded to a
remarkable crusade that resulted in a robust edifice that gradually faded away due to the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Agriculture in both countries began to have
agricultural constraints consequent from the CAP because of changes in pricing policy
and agricultural markets, the integration of the two countries into the European Monetary
System and adaptations to the new European agrarian legislation (Avillez, 2015; Ardavín,
2008). As the prices of Iberian agricultural products were higher than those of the EU,
the two countries went through a process of price harmonization with relevant changes
in the marketing channels. The macroeconomic impacts were mainly marked by
inflationary processes, economic growth, and the counterproductive effects on the
respective trade balances since 1986. Therefore, the CAP has troubled the Portuguese
agricultural sector, to which was added the low value of agricultural productivity and the
displacement of labour for the services sector and not so much for the industrial sector,
which “was no longer able to absorb the work released by agriculture” (Amaral; 2021:
268) from 1996 onwards. Before, in 1980, Portugal and Spain signed a bilateral trade
agreement to reduce customs tariffs, including the agricultural sector, which served as a
preparation for the two countries for subsequent accession to the EU in 1986 (Costa et
al.; 2011: 401). With Spain's accession to the EU, the country also registered a new
phase of changes in its productive structure that generated fluctuations in the labour
market with the displacement of labour from the primary sector to industry and, later, to
services. As in Portugal, labour productivity increased less in the agricultural sector. An
undeniable fact is that the whole economy starts with agriculture, which, step by step, is
transformed into a set of sectoral activities, although, paradoxically, the primary sector
ends up representing little in the Gross Value Added. As for the specific branch of olive
oil in general, price variations are the main cause of the repercussions on the sector's
gross margins. Higher prices and margins for quality oils mean a lower elasticity of
demand in the face of fluctuations in other contiguous goods such as oils (Torres-Ruiz et
al., 2012: 7). According to Stempfle et al. (2021: 2),
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António Duarte Santos and Sandra Cristina Ribeiro
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“olive oil represents a very relevant agri-food system in the Mediterranean
region, accounting for 87% of the 11.5 million hectares dedicated to olive
trees (Olea europea L.) worldwide, 86.6% of whom is devoted to olive oil
supply”.
In this context, the aim of this study is to characterize the olive oil sector in Portugal and
Spain and the relationships that, at the commercial level, are established between them.
We also intend to demonstrate the importance that this sector has for the Iberian
Peninsula, as well as the tendency to use the Circular Economy also in the agricultural
sector.
1. Linear and Circular Economy: the really sustainable way to produce
In the field of economic science, the circular economy (CE) model has gained increasing
prominence in the transformation of sectoral systems that constitute the various
industries. The exposition of the circular economy “proposes a shift towards a new way
of satisfying the needs of society” (Borrello et al.; 2020: 20), clearly pointing to a path
that corrects the inadequate actions of economic agents towards to alter them or change
course. For Eurostat (2021),
“the circular economy aims to maintain the value of products, materials and
resources for as long as possible by returning them into the product cycle at
the end of their use, while minimizing the generation of waste”.
Estrada (2021) was very energetic in advocating for Spain a kind of State pact for olive
groves, with special emphasis on improving their productivity. To reconsider the olive oil
industry is to reinvent the future of this agri-food commodity in a purpose of cooperation
between ecological systems and economic variables, a situation that exists from planting
to harvest, but which still brings problems of desirable environmental adequacy for all
the actors involved (Cembalo et al.; 2020). In contrast, in the traditional production
model, that is, in the linear economy, raw materials are used to produce final products
that, after being consumed, become disposable items. The circular economy is a new
model of sustainable production that is born in contrast to the current model of the linear
economy. It could be a possible solution “in the transition to circular food systems, that
is, food systems that implement the principles of the circular economy” (do Canto; 2021:
2), in fact, in the wake of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. On the
other hand, the time variable is a precept to be analysed and managed in the transitions
to the agri-food circular economy and possible support to the parties involved and
interested. Agro ecological (crop and harvest), agro industrial (food processing) and
consumption (food purchase) subsystems of agrifood supply chains are investigated to
address the main challenges for the transition towards the CE. Policy makers have the
mission to monitor market policies, national or community, and the market itself and its
agents provide a public service in helping to ensure the transparency of markets. The
aim of the article is to generate a useful analytical framework for practitioners and public
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policy makers using macroeconomic variables as shown later. The linear economic model
follows the pattern shown in Figure 1. It considers extraction, transformation, use and
disposal. It will not be difficult to continue with high waste results with the continuation
of this model (Wilts et al., 2016). The linear model is based on the premise that resources
are abundant, available, easy to obtain and cheap, therefore, disposable.
Figure 1 – The Linear Economic Model
Source: Wilts et al. (2016).
The linear economy has been considered a form of economic organization that tends to
be unfeasible. The linear economy (LE) is a form of organization of society based on the
increasing extraction of natural resources, in which products made from these resources
are used until they are discarded as waste. In this form of economy, the maximization of
the value of the products is given by the greater amount of extraction and production.
This is because, in the long term, the planetary limits will have reached an unsustainable
level of maintenance of this model. It is a result of the industrial revolution and evolution
and has not evolved since. Humanity is already experiencing the unsustainability of the
linear economy with the growing scarcity of resources, with reflections on increased
pollution and human and environmental vulnerability to this pollution. But there is an
alternative to the LE that must be presented as a new form of social, economic, and
financial organization: the circular economy (CE). In the linear economy, the uncertainty
about the availability of resources for the maintenance of the productive and consumption
system is increasingly growing, given the existence of limits of the planet and the
population. It is almost a revisiting of the Malthusian theory of the 18th century during
the industrial revolution. Fluctuation in commodity prices (raw commodities) significantly
increases average prices. This not only causes problems for producers and buyers of raw
materials, it also increases risks in the market, making investments in the supply of
materials less attractive. This can guarantee a long-term increase in raw material prices.
There are a number of industries that make extensive use of critical materials in their
production activity, e.g. metallurgical industry, computer industry, electronics industry,
electrical equipment industry and the transport industry. Dependence on harmful
materials makes companies dependent on fluctuations in market prices for materials, not
being able to make predictions, thus becoming less competitive than competitors less
dependent on these materials. Due to the increase in commercial activities, the
interdependence of products has become stronger and stronger. For example, countries
with water scarcity but excess crude oil and trade in oil, after being processed, for the
food sector results in an interconnection between these commodities in the market. In
addition, the production of goods depends on water and fuel. Because of this
interdependence, the scarcity of a raw material would have a widespread multiplier
impact on prices and the availability of more goods. Another less benevolent aspect of
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the linear model has to do with externalities, that is, with the social, economic, and
environmental effects indirectly caused by the sale of a product or service. This means
that externalities are born in the economy and can be negative or positive for society.
Buchholz et al. (2017) referred the idea that externalities boil down to the difference
between private costs and social costs or between private profits and social profits. If we
were to put the positive and negative externalities produced by the effects of the linear
economy on a scale, the negative ones would certainly have the greatest weight. They
involve damage to ecosystems and a reduction in the shelf life of products. Continuing
with the linear model leads to the creation of waste. During the production processes,
from consumption to the disposal of products, large flows of materials are generated that
are not used but burned or left in any garbage dump. This results in less need for quality
products can be used for the long term which encourages consumers to buy new products
even faster. In the LE, sustainability is enhanced by a focus on eco-efficiency. This implies
maximizing the economic gain that can be realized with a minimized environmental
impact. There is, therefore, an alternative to the linear economy that must be presented
as a new form of social, economic, and financial organization: the EC exemplary.
The shift to a circular economy is essential to deliver the resource efficiency plans
established, e.g., under the Europe 2020 Strategy, for smart, sustainable, and inclusive
growth (Wilts et al., 2016). Thus, it becomes crucial to rethink the entire process that
forces a paradigm shift that includes the CE. Going to the origin of the concept of Circular
Economy, it appeared in 1966 with the British economist Kenneth Boulding in his work
“The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth”. In the same article, Boulding (1966: 7-
8) argued that
“man must find his place in a cyclical ecological system which is capable of
continuous reproduction of material form even though it cannot escape having
inputs of energy”.
Later, environmental economists Pearce et al. (1989) explained the change from the
traditional open economic system to the circular system, because of the thermodynamic
law that dictates the degradation of matter and energy. Differences in olive-to-oil
conversion strategies, based on a broader bioeconomy perspective, can be broken down
into different ingredient and product categories, potentially leading to additional income
for producers. Different conversion strategies based on a broader bioeconomy
perspective are valued, that is, they are converted into new, marketable, value-added
products. The different conversion strategies based on a broader bioeconomy perspective
can be divided into different biomass upgrade categories, specialty molecules, food, feed,
ingredients, bio-based industrial materials, biofertilizers and bioenergy, with different
priorities.
Figure 2 shows the biomass value pyramid. Biofertilizers and biomaterials have the most
value, followed by food and feed ingredients. The greatest added value of the smallest
volume is achieved within the fine chemicals or pharmaceutical (health and lifestyle)
sector.
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Figure 2 - The Biomass Value Pyramid
Source: Donner et al. (2021: 4)
National regulations for the production of olives with disposal of by-products, especially
for wastewater from mills, exist in several countries such as Spain, Italy or Portugal, but
not in all olive oil producing countries, and also not for all types of waste of olives, such
as, e.g., leaves, twigs and branches (Donner et al, 2021: 3-4). Although traditionally
olive waste and by-products are scattered on land or used for compost, animal feed,
energy or heat, a lot of research has been done to develop new and higher value-added
biotechnological recovery pathways. According to Stempfle et al. (2021: 1)
“While creating promising new value chains, radically new ways of handling
organic streams can result in drastic decreases of loss and waste production,
inputs requirements, virgin, and non-renewable resources usage, and
environmental footprint”,
according to the principles of CE. A CE feeds back its own development and thus closes
the loop. It is a regenerative economic model that aims to minimize waste and maximize
resources. This sustainable economic approach uses a “repair, reuse, recycle” production
model, which contrasts sharply with the traditional linear “take, make, dispose” model.
Figure 3 – The Simple Production Cycle of the Circular Economy
Source: edX Courses (2022).
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Thus, “waste”, which would otherwise approach the end of its useful life in the linear
cycle, which would normally go to landfill or incineration, remains in the production cycle
through our circular strategies. This is what Figure 3 shows.
Source: Based on Abreu (2018: 57). Own elaboration.
One such event is the solutions to reuse waste from oil mills. The production of olive oils
starts from the desire to apply the knowledge acquired in the production of olive oils of
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great quality and variety. Thus, producers seek olive oils to be the expression of the land.
From multiple varieties, e.g., Arbequina, Cobrançosa, Cordovil, Frantoio, Picual, Galega,
Carrascanha, Blanqueta, Redondil, originating from their properties or from partnerships
with olive growers, producers seek to value the indigenous varieties of their regions. All
olive oils, exclusively of the extra virgin or virgin type, are produced using natural
methods and entirely traditional processes, preserving the pure juice of the olives. This
ancestral knowledge is the fundamental basis of the Mediterranean diet, which was
declared a World and Intangible Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2013. The obsession
with the quality of the oil begins in the phase of the fast transport of the olives to the
mill. To optimize this process, the constructions have recently been carried out taking
into account some old techniques, using rammed earth for the walls and cork for the
roof. This makes it possible to maintain natural cooling. When arriving at the mill, the
olives are duly chosen and separated according to quality and origin. Subsequently, the
production of olive oil is followed as exemplified in Figure 4.
After the production process, the oil is stored in insulated vats with different volumetric
capacities, awaiting the subsequent bottling. The CE cannot be seen only as an
appropriate approach to waste management, but as an approach capable of restoring the
resilience of the planet and at the same time producing economically increasing returns,
as well as shared social benefits for the communities where it will be applied (Scheel,
2016). It is therefore essential to innovate in business models and if this is done correctly,
we will create countless opportunities. In this way, waste will be seen differently, starting
to be seen as opportunities for value creation and not as something disposable.
The olive oil industry currently has technological solutions for the reuse of practically all
the waste it produces, from biomass production to animal feed. The production of olive
oil results in olive pomace, pits, leaves and rutted water or wet pomace, which are a
“very complex environmental problem”, given that they have a pollutant load 200 to 400
times higher than that of domestic sewage (Olicer, 2022). On average, the olive season
in Portugal alone produces wastewater equivalent to the sewage of 2.5 million people
(Olicer, 2022). There are several treatment processes, from less expensive, such as
retention and evaporation ponds, to more expensive ones, such as biological, thermal,
and physical-chemical treatment. Now, most of the residues from the oil mills are being
sent to the refinery industry, which removes the remaining oil from the wet pomace for
the production of pomace oil, with the remainder being used for burning. All these
residues started to be used in a system of transformation into solid fuel and biomass for
domestic or industrial boilers. There are also other ways to reuse mill waste. For example,
in 2011, there were works in progress aimed at valuing the olive leaf in animal feed
(Consalvo et al., 2011). The results obtained then indicated a strong potential for
application in diets for rabbits and ruminants. There may be other solutions to improve
water treatment, waste, and greater production efficiency, using solar energy sources to
produce olive oil (Monteleone et al., 2014), (Chávez-Dulanto et al., 2020). The olive oil
sector has, in fact, undergone a great evolution in recent decades and technology today
provides many answers for practically all waste. However, these technologies and
solutions still have a relatively high cost. Olive leaves are fibrous and poorly digestible,
especially in terms of crude protein, and therefore promote very poor rumen
fermentation. However, when fresh, they have a superior nutritional value and can be
successfully included as a supplement in the animal diet (Consalvo, 2018). As part of a
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bioeconomy project, with a view to providing a more global solution to this waste, the
University of Trás-os-Montes and Alto Douro developed the BioCombus project that uses
the by-products of olive harvests and transforms them into biomass, which can be used
as solid fuel for domestic boilers. The process of the BioCombus project mixes waste from
oil mills with waste from the Cork Industry, obtaining, as a final product, a solid biofuel
with great potential for recovery, high calorific value and which does not constitute an
environmental problem.
“It is a global solution because we are doing a treatment to comply with the
law and in addition we are creating commercial added value “,
emphasizes the study (National Rural Network, 2022). In recent years, the supervisory
authorities have controlled the oil mills and the registered ones are less and less non-
compliance with the operating rules, from licensing to waste treatment. For example, in
Portugal, the “Lagareiro 2015” operation, carried out by the Nature and Environment
Protection Service, was ongoing and ran until January 31, 2016.
An overview of the olive oil market in Iberian countries
The scope of the CE model synthesizes a series of important schools of thought,
highlighting, for example, the work performance of Walter Stahel, energy in circular
economies to eliminate waste according to William McDonough, biomedical learning with
cultivation Janine Benyus's resilient approach to food ecology, Reid Lifset's vision of
industrial ecology, Thomas Graedel's mainstay in the ecosystem, L. Hunter Lovins and
Paul Hawken’s conception of natural capitalism, and Gunter Pauli's blue economy
approach. In agribusiness as a whole and more specifically in the oilseed sector,
combating losses and waste requires a differentiated look at operational, production and
consumption practices, leading to changes in the entire production chain of companies,
here emphasizing the olive oil producers (Mor et al., 2021). One of the main changes
relates to the transformation of losses and waste, or any type of waste, into something
useful and reintroducing it into the value chain. This concept is the basis of the design of
the EC, as we have seen. If we assume that the production of olive oil takes place in an
oligopoly market, an increase in demand can lead to a reduction in prices because in a
more robust market like this, especially in Spain, sooner or later it will induce innovations
and, in theory, the entry of more efficient suppliers in production and, therefore, lower
margins due to the effect of competition (Jaravel, 2018: 557). Therefore, looking for
sustainability in both agribusiness and the food industry is much more than just concern
for the environment. In terms of production, Portugal made an extraordinary quantitative
and qualitative leap. The quality of the olive oil is nationally and internationally confirmed,
having become a reference exporting country with the merits that this has implied in the
trade balance. Structurally, Portugal is on the right path by investing in quality, thus
offsetting its deficit in scale at European level. Portuguese olive oil has a notable presence
in Brazil, representing around two thirds of exports, built, and consolidated over the years
thanks to brands and consumers who value the origin of the product (Olive Emotion;
2018). In the remaining markets, competition from the most important European
producers, especially Spain and Italy, is immense. Spain and Italy are references for
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customers and consumers in terms of the origin of olive oil. Brands originating in Spain
have built a robust relationship in different geographies, with emphasis on the United
States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Kyger; 2019). It is easy to say, but
the difficult thing is to execute and to enter the distribution of the various geographies
requires time and a strong capacity to invest. As for Portuguese olive oil, this is a solid
obstacle to overcome due to the shyness of Portuguese brands due to the country's scale
effect. The alternative is to use a strategy of affinity with consumers and a selective
distribution due to the shy quantity effect. There is, therefore, much to do in Portugal
compared to Spain.
A Portuguese consumes an average of seven litres of olive oil per year, which compares
with nine in Spain, ten in Italy and sixteen in Greece (Cruz; 2020). In Portugal, the main
type of olive oil that is consumed is extra virgin, which is the highest quality. Therefore,
for the Iberian countries, apart from the size of the difference in the area of useful
cultivation, only with quality is it possible to expand consumption, conquer new
consumers and seek to penetrate even more in the various markets. There are immense
opportunities to enhance the Iberian olive oil category, if not only the quality is
maintained but also the appreciation of experience, be it production or consumption.
The methodological analysis and the effects on olive macro-relations
We gathered statistical information from Eurostat data which, according to this
organization, are “agricultural statistics produced in the form of an agricultural census”
(Eurostat, 2020). With the selected data, we define the variables to be considered and
evaluate their performance and, later, their interpretation and behaviour. From the
analysis performed, the following graphs were created using RStudio Team (2020).
RStudio is an integrated development environment (IDE) for the R language (R
Development Core Team, 2008), a programming language for statistical and graphics
computing. To create these graphs, the Geom point function was used. This function adds
a layer of points to a plot, which allows you to create Scatter Plots.
Table 1 – Variables considered
Variables
Trade Balance for Spain
Agricultural Account for Portugal
Agricultural Account for Spain
Olive Oil
Production for
Portugal
Private
Cooperative
Industrial
Constant Prices for Spain
Constant Prices for Portugal
Olive Oil Production for Portugal
Olive Oil Production for Spain
Trade Balance for
Portugal
Service Exportation
Goods Exportation
Service Importation
Goods Importation
Source: own elaboration.
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These graphs are typically representations of two or more variables arranged in a graph.
The data is represented as a collection of points, where each point represents the
individual value of each of the components of the data set using Cartesian coordinates
(X, Y). The Scatter Plot is used to observe and demonstrate relationships between
variables, such as checking how one variable can influence another.
In the study, we considered fourteen variables that are shown in Table 1, adjusted as
per our own elaboration. As for the Trade Balance for Spain variable, as shown in Graph
1, it reached the highest value as a percentage of GDP in 2016. Since then, the values
have been decreasing, except for the year 2019, when it rose 0.3 % compared to 2018.
Comparing 2020 with 2016, the value is less than half of that presented in 2016. Still in
Graph 1, we can see that Spain had its lowest value in 2010. The values increase until
2013, with the largest difference between 2012 and 2013. From 2013 to 2015 it drops,
reaching the highest percentage value of the GDP in 2016, declines again and rises
slightly in 2019.
Graph 1 – Trade Balance for Spain
Source: own computation.
Regarding the metric used through the Constant Prices variable, according to Graph 2,
for Portugal the year 2020 was one of the years with the lowest values, and in 2011 and
2012 they were even lower. The year 2015 was the year with the highest price value. As
for Spain, 2020 was the year in which the highest value was recorded since 2011. The
lowest value was recorded in 2012 and decreases were recorded again from 2013 to
2014 and from 2014 to 2015.
As an ex-ante note, and as we will see later, we found that in the same years there were
drops in the values for the Agriculture Account variable. For Portugal, the values
remained more or less constant over the years. Spain did not have such an evident trend.
Until 2015, we found that in odd-numbered years the values were higher than in even-
numbered years. This pattern was inverted from 2015 onwards, when even years had
higher values than odd years.
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Source: own computation.
Regarding the variable Olive oil production for Portugal, production at a particular level
remained the most persistent over the time analysed. Clearly, industrial production was
the most representative, both for each year and in the data set over all the years. In
even years there was always a drop in production, with the biggest drop in 2020, in early
2020 due to confinements, but later the pandemic did not influence Portuguese foreign
trade (Amador et al; 2021). The year 2012 was the year with the worst production at
the private and cooperative levels. The behaviour of this variable can be seen in Graph
3.
Graph 3 – Olive Oil Production in Portugal
Source: own computation.
Overall, olive oil production in Portugal was higher in the private sector. At the
cooperative and industrial level, production remained more or less stable, with greater
expression at the industrial level. This does not prevent the sector's competitiveness in
Graph 2 – Constant Proces for Portugal and Spain
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the future from depending on a more effective organization of the distribution chain,
seeking to obtain quality oils, an element that is a necessary, although not sufficient,
requirement to obtain a better evaluation of the oils produced.
Let’s now look at the performance of the variable Olive Oil Production for Portugal and
Spain via Graph 4. In 2017 and 2019 Portugal managed to increase production and Spain
decreased but for the years 2018 and 2020 this situation is reversed with Spain producing
more.
Clearly Spain has a much higher production than Portugal, both in terms of geographic
scale and in terms of cultivated area. About 95% of the world's olive-growing area is
concentrated in the Mediterranean Basin, with the European Union being responsible for
67% of the world's olive oil production and for 53% of the world's olive oil consumption
(European Commission; 2020). Portugal produces about 1% of the world's olive oil
production. In the agri-food sector, olive oil represented, e.g., in 2015, about 6.8% of
Portuguese exports (GPP, 2017). Spain exported around 79.1% and imported 12.3% in
November 2021 (Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, 2021).
Graph 4 – Olive Oil Production for Portugal and Spain
Source: own computation.
The performance of the Agricultural Account for Portugal and Spain variable, which is
shown in Graph 5, is very similar to that shown in Graph 4, which shows the behaviour
of the Olive Oil Production for Portugal and Spain variable. For Portugal the lowest value
was in 2011 and the highest in the agricultural account was reached in 2015, decreasing
afterwards until 2020. For Spain there were ups and downs. The highest value was
reached in 2020. In 2014 and 2015 the values were very close. ES-PT and PT+SP reflect
the difference and the sum, respectively, of the agricultural accounts between the values
of Spain and Portugal. Both options serve to compare how the two countries can or cannot
influence each other, that is, to understand whether they can influence each other
positively or negatively.
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Graph 5 – Agricultural Account for Portugal and Spain
Source: own computation.
As in Graph 2, which reflects the variable Constant Prices for Portugal and Spain, there
was a trend until 2015 in odd years with higher values than in even years, which was
later reversed. When we calculate the difference or the sum of the agricultural accounts,
we see that Portugal does not have a great influence on the accounts of Spain because
it also has a lower production and naturally proportional to the available cultivated land.
Let's see the behaviour of the Trade Balance for Portugal variable in Graph 6. For the
year 2020, all imports and exports dropped due to the pandemic. We imported much
more goods than we were able to export, mainly between 2010 and 2013. From 2012 to
2016, we approximated the import and export values of goods, even though we import
more than we export. In services, the situation is reversed. There is a correlation that
has been expressed, as we export more, we also end up importing more. This trend is
more significant from 2012 onwards for imports and exports of goods and for services
we see that since 2010 this has happened.
Graph 6 – Trade Balance for Portugal
Source: own computation.
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In the Portuguese case, the trend is explained by the fact that when exports increase,
imports also increase in terms of goods. However, in services we export more than we
import. According to Eurostat, in 2018, Portugal was the third country that most exported
this product among the 28 Member States, after Spain and Italy (Eurostat, 2019).
However, most (63%) of the olive oil exported by Member States is imported by their
neighbours. Also, from this point of view, Spain and Italy dominate exports. The variables
Comparison between Imports and Exports of Goods and Comparison between Imports
and Exports of Services, expressed in Graphs 7 and 8, confirm the trend observed when
we analyse the performance of the Trade Balance for Portugal variable, shown in Graph
6.
Graph 7 – Comparison between Import and Export of Goods
Source: own computation.
Graph 8 – Comparison between Import and Export of Services
Source: own computation.
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Thus, it is possible to see in these Graphs that regardless of whether they are imports or
exports of goods or services, and as we wrote before, when exports increase, imports
also increase. With regard to olives for olive oil, after a year of off-season, flowering was
beneficial, giving rise to a significantly higher fruit load than that achieved in the previous
2019-2020 campaign, according to the National Statistics Institute (INE, 2021:20). In
Portugal and Spain, since the beginning of our analysis, there has been an increasing
weight of intensive and traditional rainfed olive groves, after prolonged droughts, as well
as an increasing weight of irrigated olive groves, with positive effects on production and
productivity.
Discussion of results
As can be seen from the graphs above, Spain has a higher olive oil production than
Portuguese production. This difference may be because Portugal has a smaller land
available for production or the fact that it is more specifically dedicated to the quality
produced and there is no quantity, like Spain, all as a result of the problem of scale
existing between the Iberian countries.
Table 2 – Statistical measures
Source: own elaboration
Table 2 shows a synthesis for all variables under analysis using measures of central
tendency, such as the mean and median, measures of dispersion that allow determining
the degree of variation of the values in relation to the mean, such as standard deviation
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and variance, as well as measures of relative position, using, in this case, percentiles.
This table allows numerical confirmation of the observations made from the above
graphs. There is a spread between the values of the variables Trade Balance for Spain
and Private Olive Oil Production for Portugal, which means that there can be much higher
and much lower values within each variable. The values are more unanimous among
them when referring to the remaining variables, which have a coefficient of variation
below 0.5. The values of the selected variables are quite different from each other in
relation to the others > 0.5. Agricultural Account for Portugal is the variable that presents
the most constant growth, this is proven, if we check the values in the percentiles, which
allows us to have an idea of how the ordered data of the sample are divided. In this case
it is divided into 5 equal parts of 25%. The variable on the production of olive oil in
Portugal in the private sector is the one that presents the highest value in terms of the
coefficient of variation, this means that it is the variable that presents the most different
values in relation to the average, thus demonstrating that it does not have a set
homogeneous data, as evidenced by graph 4.
Conclusions
The linear economy combined with the increase in the world population has caused a
growing demand for raw materials, many of them scarce and finite. In addition to the
dependence of some EU countries on other countries for the raw materials needed, the
extraction and use of these raw materials increases energy consumption and CO2
emissions with a major impact on the environment. In this follow-up, the circular
economy emerges, constituting a new model of sustainable production that is born in
contrast to the current model: the linear economy. This change is also felt in the
agricultural sector, particularly in the olive oil sector. In recent years, the Olive Oil Sector
has assumed a growing economic importance not only in the Iberian context, but also
internationally, as can be confirmed by the indicators presented that illustrate the recent
evolution of the sector and its main current characteristics.
In terms of volume, it is clear that olive oil production is lower in Portugal, even with
irregular periods. Spain has a much higher production, although with more fertile years
than others. The Agricultural Account for Spain variable showed several oscillations, and
it is always much higher than Portugal. Portugal exports more services and imports more
goods. Spain has a trade balance with sharp growth between 2010 and 2013 and a sharp
decrease between 2016 and 2018, with the result that the year with the highest value in
terms of percentage of GDP was in 2016. In terms of Constant Prices for Portugal, they
remained constant, but for Spain there are instabilities.
Therefore, along with all existing diplomatic efforts between Portugal and Spain, we
believe that for the specificity of this agricultural product and given the existing relations
that these should be maintained, or even encouraged. The existence of greater links
between Portuguese and Spanish companies should also be promoted, taking advantage
of the leverage that the existing geographical proximity can effectively provide.
We believe that our study contributes to the literature on the Iberian Peninsula olive oil
trade. The economic importance of the Iberian olive oil sector has good prospects for
future developments, albeit at a slower rate of growth than in the last decade. It can be
leveraged through the establishment of partnerships that allow the sharing of risks, the
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expansion of the range of products and the strengthening of the competitive position in
foreign markets, without jeopardizing the independence of the participating entities, thus
promoting internationalization.
In the future, we intend to extend our analysis to the new productive processes of this
product, a subject that we have already addressed in this article, to be able to analyse
whether this new reality implied any change in terms of the results obtained.
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OBSERVARE
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NOTES AND REFLECTIONS
PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE BASED ON
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGIES
1
OTABEK PIRMATOV
pirmatov.otabek.89@inbox.ru
Assistant Professor of the Department of Civil Procedural and Economic Procedural Law,
Tashkent State University of Law (Uzbekistan), Doctor of Philosophy in Law (PhD)
Introduction
Digital evidence is fundamentally different from physical evidence and written evidence.
Securing physical evidence is primarily to prevent it from being lost or difficult to obtain
in the future.
Compared to traditional evidence, electronic evidence is fragile, easy to change and
delete, and difficult to guarantee its authenticity. For example, data on a personal
computer may be lost due to misuse, virus attack, etc. During the preparation of the
case, the video can be deleted in order to hide the facts. In fact, most electronic evidence
is stored in a central database. If the database is unreliable, the validity of the data is
not guaranteed. Obviously, how to ensure the authenticity and integrity of digital
evidence is very important when storing it.
Because digital evidence is created by special high-tech, it is easier to change it in
practice. More attention should be paid to its authenticity. Digital evidence is more likely
to be tampered with in practice.
The main methods of digital evidence storage (pre-trial provision) in civil court
proceedings are as follows:
1) sealing or closing the means of keeping the original of evidence;
2) printing, photographing and sound or visual recording;
1
This text is devoted the issues of evaluation of digital evidence based on blockchain technologies in civil
court proceedings. The article states that since it is not possible to change and delete evidence based on
block-chain technology, contracts based on blockchain technology and documents issued by government
bodies are considered acceptable evidence by the courts. It is highlighted that the usage of evidence based
on block-chain technology in conducting civil court cases will prevent the need for notarization of digital
evidence by the parties in the future.
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Otabek Pirmatov
280
3) drawing up reports;
4) authentication;
5) provision through a notary office;
6) storage through block-chain;
7) casting a time stamp (time stamp).
Block-chain is a database where data is securely stored. This is achieved by connecting
each new record with the previous one, resulting in a chain consisting of data blocks
("block chain" in English)—hence the name. Physically, the blockchain database is
distributed, allowing authorized users to independently add data. It is impossible to make
changes to previously stored data, as this action will break the chain, and it is
"immutability" that makes the block-chain a safe and reliable means of storing digital
records in public databases
2
.
Officially, the history of “blocks and chains” begins on October 31, 2008, when someone
under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto mentioned the blockchain in a white paper (base
document) about the network of the first cryptocurrency - bitcoin. The fundamental
principles for applying decentralization and immutability to document accounting were
laid down as early as the 1960s and 1970s, but the closest to them are the works of
scientists Stuart Haber and W. Scott Stornett, who in 1991 described a scheme for
sequentially creating blocks in which a hash is located. The technology was even
patented, but for its time it became a Da Vinci helicopter - there was no technical
possibility to implement the idea, and interest in it disappeared. The patent expired in
2004, just four years before Satoshi and his white paper appeared
3
.
1. Literature review
S.S. Gulyamov defines block-chain as follows: blockchain (chain of blocks) is a distributed
set of data, in which data storage devices are not connected to a common server. These
data sets are called blocks and are stored in an ever-growing list of ordered records. Each
block will have a timestamp and a reference to the previous block. The use of encryption
ensures that users cannot write to the file without them, while the presence of private
keys can only modify a certain part of the blockchains.
In addition, encryption ensures synchronization of all users' copies of the distributed
chain of blocks (Gulyamov, 2019: 114).
Primavera De Filippi and Aaron Wright (2018) point out that block-chain technology is
different from other electronic evidence because it cannot be forgotten. The technology
itself has evidential value for the judicial system.
Markus Kaulartz, Jonas Gross, Constantin Lichti, Philipp Sandner define block-chain
technology is getting increasingly renowned, as more and more companies develop
blockchain-based prototypes, e.g., in the context of payments, digital identities, and the
2
https://www.gazeta.uz/uz/2022/08/26/blockchain-technology/
3
https://www.forbes.ru/mneniya/456381-cto-takoe-blokcejn-vse-cto-nuzno-znat-o-tehnologii
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281
supply chain. One use case of blockchain is often seen in the tamper-proof storage of
information and documentation of facts. This is due to the fact that records on a block-
chain are “practically resistant” to manipulation as a consequence of the underlying
cryptography and the consensus mechanism.
If a block-chain is used for storing information, the question arises whether the data stored
on a block-chain can be used as evidence in court. In the following article, we will analyze
this question
4
.
According to Alexey Sereda, the correct usage of blockchain technologies will eliminate
the need for lawyers to perform certain mechanical tasks to a significant extent: checking
counterparties, contacting other experts (bodies), the need for notarization, etc. All this
allows lawyers to focus their efforts on solving other more important tasks
5
.
Vivien Chan and Anna Mae Koo define blockchain is a decentralized and open distributed
ledger technology. Electronic data (e.g. in a transaction on an e-shopping platform, the
transaction time, purchase amount, currency and participants, etc.) will be uploaded to
a network of computers in “blocks”. Since the data saved in a blockchain is stored in a
network of computers in a specific form and is publicly available for anyone to view, the
data is irreversible and difficult to be manipulated.
Anyone who has handled an online infringement case knows the race against time in
preserving evidence. However, screenshots saved in PDF formats are easy to be
tampered with and are of scant probative value before the Chinese courts, unless
notarized. Making an appointment with, and appearing before a notary is another time-
consuming and expensive process.
With blockchain, these procedures can be simplified and improved in the following ways:-
1. E-evidence can be saved as blockchain online instantaneously without a notary
public;
2. Cost for generating blockchain evidence is lower than traditional notarization;
3. Admissibility of block-chain evidence has been confirmed by statute and many courts
in China because of the tamper-free nature of block-chain technology;
4. Possible combination of online monitoring and evidence collection process: with
blockchain technology and collaboration with different prominent online platforms
(e.g. Weixin), it is possible to automate online monitoring of your intellectual
property—blockchain evidence is saved automatically when potential infringing
contents are found
6
.
According to Matej Michalko, in the previous trials of dispute cases, evidence preservation
usually requires the involvement of a third-party authority such as a notary office, and
relevant persons are required to fix the evidence under the witness of the notary. With
the more frequent use of electronic evidence, most of the third-party electronic data
preservation platforms have investigated the pattern of “block-chain + evidence
4
www.jonasgross.medium.com/legal-aspects-of-blockchain-technology-part-1-blockchain-as-evidence-in-
court-704ab7255cf5
5
https://blockchain24.pro/blokcheyn-i-yurisprudentsiya
6
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1631e87b-155a-40b4-a6aa-5260a2e4b9bb
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282
collection and preservation”, which is applying blockchain technology to the traditional
electronic evidence preservation practice (i.e., uploading the preserved evidence to a
block-chain platform). If it is necessary, you can apply online for an expert opinion from
the judicial expertise center. (Michalko, 2019: 7).
Today, the task of providing electronic evidence before the court is carried out by
notaries.
Data recorded on a blockchain is in essence a chronological chain of digitally signed
transactions. Thus, admissibility of block-chain evidence is highly correlated to
acceptance of electronic signatures in a legal setting. Not all electronic signatures provide
the same level of assurance. (Murray, 2016: 517-519).
The usage of this technology when concluding transactions or receiving any official
documents from the state greatly simplifies the process of proof, as it allows to track the
entire history of changes made to the information stored in the blockchain. It also reliably
protects them from illegal attempts to tamper or forge. Such evidence will be nearly
impossible to challenge, although the risk of hacking or fraudulent activity remains.
Second, if the court session is conducted using video conferencing, the blockchain can
be easily used by the participants in the court session. Given the development of remote
technologies caused by the coronavirus pandemic, this situation must be taken into
account. Thus, thanks to the use of blockchain, it is possible to significantly reduce the
time for consideration of cases in courts, increase the transparency of court proceedings
and ensure the necessary confidentiality of information.
If the contracts concluded by the parties are based on the blockchain technology or if the
state authorities draw up their documents based on the blockchain technology, then it
would be possible to evaluate the blockchain technology as evidence by the courts. Now
in our country, government bodies are signing their documents with Q-code.
According to Boris Glushenkov, the successful implementation of the blockchain will also
change the courts: firstly, there will be no need to make decisions for concrete things.
Second, evidence changes: electronic evidence is viewed with skepticism in courts.
Maybe blockchain can change that
7
.
In civil litigation, evidence was evaluated as evidence only if it met each of the criteria of
relevance, admissibility, and reliability. Likewise, numerical evidence must meet the
requirements of relevance, acceptability, and reliability of evidence evaluation criteria.
Failure to evaluate digital evidence with one of the evidentiary evaluation criteria may
result in its inadmissibility as evidence in court.
According to Yuhei Okakita, In civil litigation, any form of evidence can generally be
submitted to the court. That is, the court accepts not only physical documents but also
digital data as evidence. Of course, civil procedure laws vary from country to country,
but electronic evidence is recognized in many legislations such as the EU, the United
States, or Japan. Since it can be said that blockchain certificates are a kind of digital
data, it should be accepted in most courts as admissible evidence.
7
https://blockchain24.pro/blokcheyn-i-yurisprudentsiya
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283
So, you can submit the certificate to the court. However, the question is how judges
evaluate the evidence. Let's to through an example relevant for e.g. the German or
Japanese system: in these systems, it is up to the discretion of the judge to decide
whether the certificate will be taken into consideration. If the judge believes the
authenticity of the certificate, it will become the basis of the judgment.
Let's suppose that the claim of a defendant in a dispute could be validated with the data
certified with a blockchain transaction. The judge decides on the authenticity of the
submitted evidence based on the opinions of both parties. The defendant will explain the
concept of blockchain immutability achieved with the consensus mechanism, and the
other party will argue the possibility that the information on the blockchain has been
tampered with. After the judge considers both stories and takes a position regarding the
authenticity of the information, s/he will make a decision accordingly
8
.
According to Zihui (Katt) Gu, For the blockchain evidence to be admissible, the
authenticity of the source of the electronic data must first be confirmed, whether through
examination of the original or comprehensive consideration of all the evidence at hand
9
.
The admissibility of digital evidence is one of the problems of judicial evaluation of
evidence in civil litigation.
In ensuring the admissibility of electronic evidence in foreign countries, transferring it to
the blockchain software or evaluating the evidence in the blockchain software as
admissible evidence is of great importance.
According to Van Yojun, if blockchain technology can be applied to any digital evidence,
regardless of whether it is a criminal or civil trial, the general expected benefits can be
achieved, including: ensuring the integrity and accuracy of data, preventing the
tampering of data or evidence, increasing the transparency of legal proceedings, Court
proceedings are easy to follow, accelerated and simplified
10
.
2. Issues of application of blockchain technology in the legislation of
foreign countries
The Federal Government of the United States has not exercised its constitutional power
to implement legislation regulating the admissibility of blockchain evidence in court.
Thus, states enjoy residual power to implement their own legislation. The Federal Rules
of Evidence establish a minimum requirement in what is referred to as the ‘best evidence
rule which establishes that the best evidence must be used at trial. Rule 1002 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence states “An original writing, recording, or photograph is required
in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise”.
Several states have regulated blockchain through introducing their own legislation and
rules, particularly with regard to the regulation of cryptocurrency – or as termed by
various legislators, virtual currencies. New York kickstarted legislative developments in
8
https://www.bernstein.io/blog/2020/1/17/can-digital-data-stored-on-blockchain-be-a-valid-evidence-in-
ip-litigation
9
http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/blockchain-based-evidence-preservation-opportunities-and-concerns/
10
https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/130752
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284
the USA through the regulation of virtual currency companie, and eventually several
states followed suit, with 32 states implementing their own rules and regulations. The
states of Illinois, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Arizona, New York and Ohio have
passed or introduced legislation which specifically regulates the admissibility of
blockchain evidence in court
11
.
In April 2018, 1 22 member states signed the Declaration for a European Blockchain
Partnership (EBP) in order to “cooperate on the development of a European Blockchain
Services Infrastructure.”2 With its ambitious goal of identifying initial use cases and
developing functional specifications by the end of the year, the EBP should be an
important catalyst for the use of blockchain technology by European government
agencies
12
.
In October 2018, discussions were underway among the Azerbaijani Internet Forum (AIF)
for the Ministry of Justice to implement blockchain technology in several departments
within its remit. Currently, the Ministry provides more than 30 electronic services and 15
information systems and registries, including “electronic notary, electronic courts,
penitentiary service, information systems of non-governmental organizations”, and the
register of the population, among others. Part of the AIF’s plans is to introduce a “mobile
notary office” which would involve the notarization of electronic documents. Through this
process, the registry’s entries will be stored on blockchain which parties will be able to
access but not change, thus preventing falsification. Future plans also include employing
smart contracts in public utility services such as water, gas and electricity
13
.
Blockchain technology is a new way to build a network. Today, almost all service systems
in the Internet system work on the basis of a centralized network, that is, the data
warehouse is located on a central server, and users receive data by connecting to this
server. The main difference of blockchain technology is that there is no need for a central
server and all network participants have equal rights. The network database is kept by
each user.
One of the main reasons why evidence based on blockchain technology is considered
admissible by courts is that blockchain technology is transparent, that is, it is not affected
by the human factor.
According to the Decision of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated July 3,
2018, "On measures to develop the digital economy in the Republic of Uzbekistan":
− basic concepts in the field of "blockchain" technologies and principles of its operation;
− powers of state bodies, as well as process participants in the field of "blockchain"
technologies;
− measures of responsibility for using "blockchain" technologies for illegal purposes.
The State Services Agency of the Republic of Uzbekistan has decided that starting from
December 2020, the country's registry offices will operate based on blockchain
technology. However, as of today, this system has not yet been launched. It would be
11
https://blog.bcas.io/blockchain_court_evidence
12
https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/reports
13
https://blog.bcas.io/blockchain_court_evidence
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appropriate if the documents issued not only by registry authorities, but also by tax
authorities, cadastral departments, transactions concluded by notary offices, and most
importantly, decisions of district and city mayors and reports issued by electronic auction,
e-active, would be accepted based on blockchain technology.
Agreements concluded by notary offices in civil courts, decisions of district and city
mayors, and reports issued by electronic auction serve as the main written evidence
confirming ownership rights.
Due to the widespread involvement of information technologies in all spheres of social
life in our country, the above bodies are also moving to receive documents in electronic
form.
Also, distribution of electricity based on blockchain technology is being carried out in
Uzbekistan based on South Korean technology. Perhaps, in the future, electricity
contracts in our country may be concluded on the basis of blockchain technology.
3. Discussion
With the development of the Internet and information technology, digital data has
gradually become an important part of the evidence system in civil court cases, which
cannot be ignored. Among all types of digital data, blockchain evidence is a relatively
new type.
A proper blockchain is not a proof itself, but a technical implementation method of
storing, transporting and correcting digital data.
Blockchain is just a storage technology, the purpose of which is to ensure the authenticity
and reliability of digital data. The most important thing is to determine the authenticity
of the digital data.
Improvements in blockchain technology can make electronic documents flow more
quickly and improve the efficiency of their assessment in courts. However, compared to
the traditional notarization method of securing electronic evidence, blockchain-based
evidence storage lags behind. That is, there are not enough normative legal documents
on the implementation of blockchain technologies in the field of justice. Notarization,
which has become a means of preventing falsification of electronic documents, is rarely
used in legal practice, because notarization of electronic evidence requires excessive time
and money for the parties.
It includes digital signatures, reliable time stamps and hash value verification to prove
the authenticity of the submitted data using blockchain technology. Parties must be able
to demonstrate how blockchain technology has been used to collect and store evidence.
Due to the decentralization of information in the blockchain network, it is very difficult
for hackers to exploit. Additionally, since each block contains the hash of the previous
block, any transaction within the blockchain is done by changing it.
Check Hash Value: After computing any electronic file using hash algorithm, only one
hash value can be obtained. If the content of the electronic file changes, the resulting
hash value will also change. The uniqueness and non-repeatability of the hash value
ensures the immutability of electronic files.
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286
The verifier can use the hash value written to the blockchain to verify the original data
to verify that the data is valid and has not been tampered with.
Encrypting evidence can also ensure its safe storage. At a basic level, encryption uses a
secret key to ensure that only those with access can read the file by encrypting the file's
contents.
It is possible to prepare documents based on blockchain technology in applications such
as SharpShark, SynPat, WordProof, Waves, EUCD, DMCA.
The main reason why evidence based on blockchain technology is considered acceptable
evidence in foreign countries is its technological structure. We can see the following
unique features of it:
- at the discretion of one of the parties, it is not possible to change and add (falsify
and destroy) documents based on blockchain technology;
- documents based on blockchain technology are a technology resistant to hacker
attacks, which means that electronic evidence based on blockchain technology
cannot be tampered with by third parties;
- in blockchain technology, there is no need for a central server, and all network
participants have equal rights. A network database stores every user in it.
The lack of possibility of falsification and alteration of the evidence based on blockchain
technology makes it considered acceptable evidence by the courts.
According to the civil procedural law, the admissibility of the evidence must be confirmed
by certain means of proof according to this law.
In order to ensure the admissibility of electronic evidence, it is appropriate to create
electronic documents, electronic transactions using blockchain technology, and to
improve the legislation in this regard.
The following features of blockchain evidence should be considered:
1. To review the authenticity of the blockchain evidence. Specifically, it means that the
court should examine whether the blockchain evidence is likely to be tampered with
in the process of formation, transmission, extraction and display, and to the extent
of such possibility.
2. To review the legitimacy of the blockchain evidence. Specifically, it means that the
court should examine whether the collection, storage and extraction methods of
blockchain evidence comply with the law, and whether they infringe on the legitimate
rights and interests of others.
3. To review the relevance of blockchain evidence. Specifically, it means that the court
should examine whether there is a substantial connection between the blockchain
evidence and the facts to be proved
14
.
14
https://www.chinajusticeobserver.com/a/when-blockchain-meets-electronic-evidence-in-china-s-internet-
courts
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287
Conclusion
Blockchain storage solves the problem of securely storing digital data. In a sense,
blockchain storage is an authentication or auxiliary storage method. Currently,
blockchain storage is a more indirect authentication method.
One of the peculiarities of blockchain technology in legal science is that the use of this
technology when concluding transactions or obtaining any official documents from
government authorities greatly simplifies the process of proof. Due to this, the blockchain
allows to track the entire history of changes made to the data stored in the "data" and
reliably protects against illegal attempts to tamper with or falsify the data. Such evidence
would be nearly impossible to challenge, but the risk of hacking or fraudulent activity
remains, albeit partially. Second, if court hearings are held online, the possibility of
blockchain use by court hearing participants will increase even more. Thus, due to the
use of blockchain, it is possible to significantly reduce the time of consideration of cases
in civil courts and to increase the transparency of judicial processes and ensure the
necessary confidentiality of information.
Because public offering of goods and services on social networks has become popular in
our country. Purchase of goods and services on social networks is carried out through
mutual correspondence. Correspondence in the social network can be deleted or
changed. This creates problems in evaluating social network correspondence as evidence
in civil courts.
The adoption of blockchain technologies by social networks may also lead to the use of
social media correspondence as evidence in courts in the future.
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yurisprudentsiya
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Otabek Pirmatov
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How to cite this note
Pirmatov, Otabek (2023). Problems of evaluation of digital evidence based on blockchain
technologies. Notes and Reflections in Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 14, Nº
1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
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NOTES AND REFLECTIONS
CHINA AND MOROCCO: IMPROBABLE PARTNERS?
NIV HORESH
niv.horesh@gmail.com
Associate Professor at Western Sydney University (Australia). He is a China specialist with over
20 years of experience ranging across the private sector, public service and academe. Between
2000-2003, he lived and worked in Beijing, and has been visiting different parts of the Chinese-
speaking world regularly since. Over the course of his academic career, Niv has held teaching
and research positions at Hebrew University, China Agricultural University, the University of New
South Wales, and the University of Nottingham. He gave keynote presentations of his research
around the world including at Oxford University, NYU Stern School of Business and UCLA. Niv's
research incorporates four main strands in the following order: Chinese History, World Monetary
History, PRC Political Economy, and PRC Foreign Policy with emphasis on the Middle East. His
latest book is China’s Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: How History Complicates Beijing’s Global
Outreach (Routledge, 2022).
If Chinese foreign policy acumen in the Middle East is manifest in China’s ability to bypass
Shi'a-Sunni rivalries between Iran and Saudi Arabia, then in North Africa this policy is
surely paralleled by China’s ability to remain neutral in the Western Sahara conflict, with
a slight tilt in favour of Morocoo
1
. Moreover, China has always kept a balanced foreign
policy between rivals Algeria and more pro-Western Morocco even though the latter did
not possess large oil reserves and had less of an anti-colonial legacy to boast. Morocco
despite its deep seated ties with France, and more recently with the US, established
diplomatic ties with China at the height of the Cold War, as early as 1958. It was only
second to Egypt in doing so within Africa as a whole, yet Egypt challenged the West,
fostering a strategic alliance with Moscow under Gamal ‘Abdel Nasser
And China today is already the third largest trading partner of Morocco
2
. Since 2018,
China’s footprint in the Moroccan market includes trade, infrastructure development,
finance and banking, tourism and manufacturing. As a trade partner, China sets itself
apart from Western competitors by casting itself as an advocate of non-interference in
1
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/02/expanding-sino-maghreb-relations/3-morocco-and-china-
pragmatic-relationship [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
2
This paragraph is based on Olimat, Muhamad S. (2016). China and North Africa Since World War II: A
Bilateral Approach, Chapter 6. Lexington
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the internal affairs of its partners whereas the human-rights record often blights Western
trade relations with various Africa countries
3
.
The turning point in bilateral relations occurred following King Mohammed VI’s 2016
three-day visit to Beijing which saw the signing of some 30 agreements. Thereafter,
relations were upgraded to “strategic partnership”. Relations principally bore fruit, when
the Chinese-invested Tangier Med Port complex became the largest container port in
Africa, and Huawei began setting up 5G facilities there and elsewhere in the country.
Then, it was announced that Rabat would see the establishment of the Tangier Tech City,
which would bring in two hundred Chinese-owned factories in the next ten years
4
. To
boot, a Chinese cultural centre was opened in Rabat as early as 2018, and in the same
year three Confucius Institutes were set up in Rabat, Casablanca and Tangier
5
.
Few reports in the Moroccan press have dealt with concerns that Morocco’s newfound
strategic ties with China might harm relations with Washington. In January 2022,
commentator Mohammed Mamouni Al-‘Alawi published for example an article in the
online platform of Al-Arab, in which he suggested ties with Beijing were designed to
attract new diversified investment to Morocco. ‘Alawi argued that Morocco still granted
the US the title of its most important ally while Washington valued the vital role Morocoo
played for example in the area of economic growth in Africa, the Middle East peace
process, the fight against global terror and inter-faith dialogue
6
.
Another anonymous leader article of the same month was published in the US-based Al-
Hurra headlined “Will the rapprochement with China affect relations with the US?”. It
opined that Rabat must prioritize its relations with Washington, which included not just
an economic but a military dimension as well. Relations with China were merely seen as
a diversification of Rabat’s foreign policy portfolio
7
.
Yet the ties between China and Morocco go back to fabled traveler Ibn Battuta (1304-
1368 CE), a fact that is not lost on promoters of these relations
8
. Otherwise, there is
much more scholarly material about Sino-Algerian ties perhaps partly as a result of the
Cold War legacy when Algeria was ideologically much more left wing
9
. This Research Note
is aimed at closing part of the gap. In general terms, it has to be understood in this
context that even though Morocco lacks oil it has a strategic location for Chinese supply
3
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/beijing-strengthens-its-presence-in-the-maghreb/ [Viewed 19 Feb
2023]
4
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/beijing-strengthens-its-presence-in-the-maghreb/ [Viewed 19 Feb
2023]
5
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/10/c_137595617.htm [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
6
https://alarab.news/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%A7-
%D9%8A%D8%A4%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9 [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
7
https://www.alhurra.com/morocco/2022/01/07/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A8-
%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%A4%D8%AB%D8%B1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9%D8%9F [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
8
Mackintosh-Smith, Tim (2016). The travels of Ibn Battutah. Macmillan.
9
Bouchiba, Nasser (2021). Taarikh Al-‘Alakat Al-Maghrebiya Al-Siniya (2018-1958). Dar Al-Aman.
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291
chains, straddled as it is between Europe and Africa. Thus, pragmatism typifies Sino-
Moroccan relations due to the latter tilt to the West
10
.
Covid set back people-to-people relations. Indeed, in 2022 Morocco imposed a complete
ban on arrivals from China
11
. Yet two years earlier Royal Air Maroc inaugurated direct
regular flights between Casablanca and Beijing, which were poised to increase the
number of Chinese tourists visiting Morocoo. Moreover, since King Muhammed VI’s 2016
visit to Beijing, Morocoo has been trialing a visa waver scheme for Chinese tourists
12
.
Covid affected tourisms everywhere but, critically, Chinese state-owned behemoth
Sinopharm allowed Morocoo to use its knowhow to develop its own local vaccine
13
. And
trade features are about to change too; traditionally Morocco exported citrus to China,
while Chine exported tea to Morocco yet the flows have since become much more
technological and infrastructural on the Chinese side. The main products that Morocco
exports to China nowadays are Raw Copper, Calcium Phosphates, and Zinc Ore
14
. There
is also growing Moroccan interest in Chinese military hardware
15
.
Tangier aside, the infrastructural “trophy” projects for China in Morocoo are the
construction of Africa’s tallest skyscraper in Rabat, which will feature an ecological
design; a grand theater as well as the national archives building and the archaeological
museum. Moreover, as mentioned, the Chinese company Haite is constructing an
industrial city near Tangier. Yangtse automobile has invested in the Tangier industrial
city to produce electric cars for export to Europe, amid the advanced nearby port. And
generally there is a flow of car manufacturers from Algeria to Morocoo
16
. The Chint Group
is otherwise engaged in building the Noor 2 and Noor 3 solar parks near Marrakesh, which
are projected to be the largest in the world. Completed projects include the China Railway
Engineering Group 950-meter bridge between Rabat and Sale
17
.
A growing number of Chinese auto-parts companies are investing in Morocco, given its
proximity to French automakers' supply chain, including China's Nanjing Xiezhong Group,
and CITIC Dicastal. And in 2017, BYD which is backed by Warren Buffett became the
largest Chinese automaker to set up shop in the Tangier industrial city, promising to
create 2500 jobs
18
. The King Mohammed VI Tangier tech city project will include some
200 Chinese firms in all sectors as well as Moroccan government and private companies,
10
https://www.ankasam.org/china-morocco-relations/?lang=en [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
11
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/morocco-ban-arrivals-china-over-covid-surge-2022-12-31/ [Viewed
19 Feb 2023]
12
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/09/282388/royal-air-maroc-to-inaugurate-casablanca-beijing-
direct-flight-january-16 [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
13
https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-and-china-strengthen-their-relations-strategic-policies;
https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/bri/moroccos-laprophan-chinas-sinopharm-sign-healthcare-
cooperation-pact-f4e9fe2r [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
14
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/01/10/morocco-upgrades-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-
financing-investment-agreements/ [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
15
https://www.theafricareport.com/268839/morocco-china-why-rabat-is-buying-arms-from-beijing/
[Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
16
https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/morocco-chinas-gateway-to-africa;
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183433.htm [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]; Pairault, Thierry
(2018). “La Chine dans la mondialisation: l’insertion de la filière automobile chinoise en Algérie et au
Maroc”. Revue internationale des économistes de langue française, pp. 133-150.
17
https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/china-has-quietly-carved-out-a-foothold-in-north-africa/ [Viewed 19
Feb 2023]
18
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/12/235934/renault-peugeot-chinese-car-byd-morocco
[Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
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292
led by China Communications Construction Company LTD, with expected completion of
the city in 2027. The complex will host ultimately companies in automotive, aerospace,
textile, electronics, and machinery on the 2000-hectare site
19
.
***
The treatment of Morocoo in the Chinese official press is usually positive, and there is
hardly any provocative reporting on the crisis in Western Sahara
20
. Instead, there is
emphasis on Morocco as a South-South economic partner, and island of stability in the
Maghreb region. On its part, the Moroccan media rarely reports on issues sensitive to
China like the plight of Uighurs, Taiwan independence, or Tibet
21
. It should also be added
in this context that Morocco has arrested Uighur activists on its soil at PRC request
22
.
In another piece for Al-Arab, Alawi opined that the world was ruled by more “brutal”
(kaswah) powers than Morocoo or China, and that the strategic partnership between the
two countries will help maximize the available opportunities as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), and fulfill its lasting progress; China and Morocoo were keen to bridge
the economic gap between them, and China will encourage its big companies to invest in
the region which has seen growth in recent years
23
.
Moroccan opposition online newspaper Lakome (“To You”) is a sole voice publishing
articles critical of China like that of Tarek Lisawi, in the context of the muslim minority in
China
24
:
“It is worth noting that most of the small national minorities are concentrated
in the periphery provinces of China and its borders near the borders with
neighboring countries. These minorities have suffered through historical
periods from “chauvinist policies”
by the “Han” majority, until some of them came to extinction…
In January 2022 Morocco has become the first country in North Africa to sign the
Implementation Plan of Jointly Building the BRI with China
25
.
19
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2022/07/350464/morocco-signs-agreement-to-start-mohammed-
vi-tangier-tech-city-project [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
20
Liu Dongning 刘东宁and Ma Lirong 马立蓉>>中国主流媒体对摩洛哥报道研究>>北方工业大学学报, 第32 卷第6 期
2020 年12 月, pp. 39-44
21
https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/morocco-chinas-gateway-to-africa [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
22
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/28/morocco-authorities-arrest-uyghur-activist-at-chinas-
request [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
23
https://alarab.news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-
%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%8C-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-
%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%BA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9-
%D8%A8%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1 [Viewed 19 Feb
2023]
24
https://lakome2.com/opinion/256586/ [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
25
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1245226.shtml [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
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Tarek Lisawi has also opined on China’s grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framing it
as a debt trap
26
:
China is looking to enhance access to its exports to various countries of the
world, by pumping investments in infrastructure and transportation sectors,
through the Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the “Silk Road” for the
twenty-first century…
Although more than 8 years have passed since the launch of the initiative, its details still
suffer from severe ambiguity, at the theoretical and operational levels, as most of its
news is dominated by propaganda and promotional character... This obscurity and
ambiguity has increased with the outbreak of the "Corona" epidemic, which has affected
economic and moral damage to China. Without a doubt, China's soft power is at stake,
and China is required to restore its damaged image, as a result of Western propaganda
in general and America in particular, which made the virus linked to China, namely the
“Chinese virus.”...Therefore, we believe that partnership with China under the
circumstances and the current conditions do not serve the development of the developing
countries participating in the “Belt and Road” project….
The total volume of trade between China and Morocco was worth about US$ 5 billion in
2020, a 2% increase year-on-year despite Covid, while Chinese investment stock in
Morocoo was worth around 400 million US$ the same year
27
. Most investment is in
infrastructure, mobile parts, telecommunications and fisheries
28
. But opposition to BRI is
also driven by the fact that Morocco runs a gaping trade deficit with China.
In the Moroccan press, pieces on trade and investment competition between France and
China in Africa rarely appear. But this anonymous piece in Al-Arab strikes precisely that
note
29
:
At a time when China has succeeded in devoting itself as a partner to most of
the Arab countries in the Middle East, Beijing is still strongly competing with
the European Union countries in the Maghreb region…China is a first trading
partner for Algeria, Mauritania and Libya, but it lags behind to third place in
Morocco and Tunisia…Unlike Algeria and Mauritania, and to a lesser extent
Libya, China has not yet been able to overtake France and Spain in their trade
with Morocco, and France and Italy with regard to Tunisia, as it ranks third in
the level of transactions, but the growth of its trade with the two countries is
increasing…China is trying to consolidate its economic and political presence
26
https://lakome2.com/opinion/258270 [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
27
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1246500.shtml [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
28
https://www.maroc.ma/en/news/belt-and-road-initiative-opens-new-era-cooperation-between-morocco-
and-china-chinese-official-0 [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
29
https://alarab.news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%86-
%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-
%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AB%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA
[Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023), pp. 289-294
Notes and Reflections
China and Morocco: improbable partners
Niv Horesh
294
in the Maghreb through the Belt and Road Initiative, and through strategic
partnership and comprehensive strategic partnership…And if the United
States and Russia dominate the arms market in the Maghreb countries,
Chinese weapons are beginning to find their way to the region, albeit
modestly, as Algeria is the largest importer of Chinese weapons in the region,
especially drones, naval vessels and electronic warfare systems.
Lakome also published a leader article in praise of the Chinese development model
30
:
And a nation that cancels its past harms its present and its future, and the
Chinese lesson is truly a clear-cut remedy for getting out of the state of non-
development and instability…
In summary, China and Morocoo seem to be forging strategic partnership in the face of
Morocco’s alliance with France and the United States. But the partnership is shaped by
global supply chains which hanker after Morocoo as a cheap labour hub in close proximity
to Europe, via superior port links, and typified by relative political stability. There seems
to be less Chinese interest in Morocoo as a gateway to French speaking Africa although
this proposition is moot. That BYD is invested by Buffett shows the complexity of
transnational manufacturing chains in the automotive industry. And that Huawei has not
been ousted from participating in Morocco’s 5G infrastructure shows Morocco is willing to
risk the wrath of its traditional Western friends to maintain the partnership with China.
It even begun considering the purchase of Chinese-made weapons. The question is
whether this newfound partnership will last if US-China relations deteriorate. Ultimately,
for Morocoo, this is a partnership based on pragmatism, not one designed to replace
warm relations with the West.
How to cite this note
Horesh, Niv (2023). China and Morocco: Improbable Partners? Notes and Reflections in Janus.net,
e-journal of international relations. Vol. 14, Nº 1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] on date
of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.02
30
https://lakome2.com/opinion/234231 [Viewed 19 Feb 2023]
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023)
295
NOTAS E REFLEXÕES
REFLEXÕES SOBRE O PAPEL DE XI JINPING DURANTE A GUERRA
DA UCRÂNIA: A LEGITIMIDADE DE UM LÍDER EM
RESSURGIMENTO NA BUSCA DA PAZ E AS CONSEQUÊNCIAS NA
ORDEM INTERNACIONAL
DANIEL DA COSTA LARA LEITÃO
d.lara.leitao@outlook.com
Mestrando em Relações Internacionais, na Especialidade de Estudos de Segurança, da Paz e da
Guerra, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (Portugal). Licenciado em Estudos de Segurança pela
Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias. As principais áreas de interesse são a
cooperação em Intelligence, conflitualidade geopolítica na Ásia-Pacífico, segurança em Angola e
Cibersegurança.
Após a investida militar da Rússia na Ucrânia, e com a densificação do conflito, surgiu
uma incógnita no seio da comunidade internacional sobre quem será o mediador efetivo
para alcançar um acordo de paz entre as duas partes beligerantes diretas da guerra.
As várias tentativas e iniciativas com objetivo de encontrar uma solução preliminar para
a redução da escala do conflito falharam. Desde os encontros entre Kuleba e Lavrov,
passando pela iniciativa de Erdogan e o contributo da Turquia no acordo dos cereais, à
intenção de Lula da Silva em mediar o conflito, poucos efeitos foram produzidos na
persecução da paz.
Se existe, na generalidade, a ideia de que só os Estados Unidos da América detêm a
capacidade de colocar um fim à guerra, a China surge agora como ator que visa contrapor
essa conceção de uma América pacifista. Recentemente, a China apresentou um plano
de paz com 12 pontos. O ponto mais relevante no plano da pacificação, solicita o fim das
hostilidades.
Se por um lado, Washington envia uma mensagem clara sobre o que interpreta desse
plano, a China envia duas mensagens no plano interno e no plano internacional. No plano
interno, visa reforçar ainda mais a liderança de Xi Jinping enquanto líder revolucionador
e modernizador. No plano internacional, a China pretende claramente mostrar ser capaz
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 295-299
Notas e Reflexões
Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da Ucrânia
Daniel da Costa Lara Leitão
296
de promover a paz e a estabilidade global, substituindo países que são responsáveis por
fazê-lo internacionalmente.
Apesar de ser um plano vago, Pequim deixa implícito que toda a negociação tem uma
base, e que esta poderia ser útil para se chegar a um consenso. Contudo, esse plano foi
prontamente rejeitado a partir da Casa Branca. “There are 12 points in the Chinese plan.
If they were serious about the first one, sovereignty, then this war could end tomorrow”
(Blinken, 2023). Surge, a partir de Washington, a ideia não só de que Pequim não tem a
legitimidade para procurar a paz entre duas partes beligerantes, mas também que a
intenção de Xi Jinping é uma atuação conjunta com Vladimir Putin para alterar os
parâmetros da atual ordem mundial.
Apesar de a presente reflexão deixar implícito que os EUA não pretendem abdicar da
dianteira num caminho para a paz, é também justo referir que, na nossa visão mais
realista, “China sees the war in Ukraine as a big problem” (Campbell, 2023). Se podemos
considerar como facto todas as iniciativas de Pequim, em alcançar a paz, é também
pertinente dizer que tal intenção ameaça a liderança de uma ordem liberal, encabeçada
pelos Estados Unidos da América. Esta ideia surge, sobretudo, no seguimento do
restabelecimento das relações diplomáticas entre o Irão e a Arábia Saudita, e das
possíveis consequências que dessa reaproximação possam advir no golfo pérsico.
E se é pertinente fazer uma abordagem a este marco diplomático da China, o que salta
à vista é uma consequência para países como a Arábia Saudita, Índia e Paquistão: “The
United States doesn’t want its partners doing business with Tehran” (Kugelman, 2022).
Estando praticamente todos os canais de comunicação cortados entre Washington e
Moscovo, a quase aversão de Washington a uma aproximação do seu competidor chinês
configura-se como praticamente automática. Entre argumentos e contra-argumentos
transversais às várias partes envolvidas, desde os Estados Unidos, OTAN, Rússia e China,
“our thinking is necessarily clouded by the suffering that Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s aggression has inflicted on the people of Ukraine” (Westad, 2022: 1).
Sendo o posicionamento de Xi Jinping cada vez mais central na guerra da Ucrânia, tal
como o seu fulgor no cenário internacional, é também cada vez mais evidente um cenário
de competição, dinâmicas e interações não só entre os contendores, mas também entre
aqueles que aparentemente querem fazer a paz.
A guerra é, atualmente, marcada pela crescente competição e cada vez menos por apelos
à redução na escala do risco. Entre apelos do Secretário Geral das Nações Unidas, e
resoluções de um grande número de países, a tensão e alteridade intensifica-se não com
o outro mas com os outros. Wang Yi, frisou na Conferência de Segurança em Munique
que
“human society must not repeat the old path of antagonism, division and
confrontation, and must not fall into the trap of zero-sum game, war and
conflict” (Yi, 2022).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Notas e Reflexões
Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da Ucrânia
Daniel da Costa Lara Leitão
297
Mas estarão todas as partes envolvidas interessadas em ganhos mútuos? Se China e
Rússia “share similar goals”
1
, os Estados integrantes da ordem liberal rejeitam uma
ordem una global, partilhada com estados autoritários. Não existe compatibilidade,
atualmente, no sistema internacional. Rússia e China, na base de uma cooperação
estratégica alargada pretendem alcançar um multilateralismo com dinâmicas e valores
diferentes do multilateralismo vigente.
No seu artigo intitulado “Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia
Friendship, Cooperation and Common Development”, Xi Jinping é afirmativo ao dizer que
os dois países trabalharam juntos rumo a um mundo multipolar
“and a greater democracy in international relations. We have been active in
practicing true multilateralism, promoting the common values of humanity,
and championing the building of a new type of international circumstances
(…)” (Jinping, 2023).
Com a visita de 20 de março de 2023, Xi Jinping afirma-se, definitivamente, como player
central numa nova arquitetura do sistema internacional. Um sistema internacional com
múltiplas interações e cada vez mais competitivo.
Nessa dinâmica de competição, surgem ainda questões que acrescentam nebulosidade a
um panorama cada vez mais difuso. A empreitada de Xi, alavancada pela parceria com
Putin, ganha força pela multiplicidade de iniciativas bilaterais e multilaterais. A nível
económico e militar, a título de exemplo, a Organização para Cooperação de Xangai
congrega a Índia, Paquistão, China, entre outros países. Durante o período de guerra,
especialmente, a aproximação de Pequim a Moscovo poderá não só alimentar a perceção,
do ponto de vista de algumas lentes teóricas das Relações Internacionais, de que Xi
Jinping conduz agora uma política externa ambígua face ao tema da Ucrânia. O seu
pendor para o lado russo é visto como um caminho para o enfraquecimento, para a perda
de força do avanço chinês na corrida àquilo que é ainda uma incógnita: quem será o líder
da ordem internacional? Que regras e que valores? Que alianças predominantes e,
sobretudo, que relação entre Estados Unidos da América e China?
Se por um lado, é difícil prever em que moldes se irá compor a ordem internacional, por
outro,
“pundits and policymakers have described the emerging world in a variety of
ways: multipolar, polycentric, non-polar, neo-polar, apolar, post-american,
G-zero, and no one’s world” (Acharya, 2014).
A ideia de que o mundo segue numa crescente ordem diversificada, ganha consistência.
E em contexto de guerra, a ambiguidade por nós referida torna os caminhos a seguir
mais estreitos e perigosos. Por onde irá a China? Por onde irá a História? Não sabemos
se Xi Jinping ambiciona realmente um plano de paz, ou se tenciona usar a guerra da
Ucrânia para se fortalecer. Mas se existe, desde o dia 24 de fevereiro do ano transato,
grande incerteza quanto ao cenário estratégico, as opções que vão sendo tomadas por
1
Declaração de Xi Jinping no encontro com Vladimir Putin durante a visita a Moscovo
https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-03-20-23/index.html
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 295-299
Notas e Reflexões
Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da Ucrânia
Daniel da Costa Lara Leitão
298
Xi Jinping parecem causar mais um dilema existencial. Como irão os Estados Unidos
responder a várias frentes, simultaneamente?
Quanto ao apoio, ou não, de Xi a Putin as dúvidas dissiparam-se quase na totalidade, no
âmbito da visita a Moscovo após a emissão do mandado de prisão a Vladimir Putin.
“In terms of Chinese interests, this might not turn out to be quite as successful
a strategy as Xi assumes, at least not in the long run” (Westad, 2022: 4).
Mas é possível que a China ganhe vantagem estratégica em qualquer dos cenários da
guerra. Apesar de haver outas leituras, que mui respeitamos.
No entanto, no nosso entendimento, a China poderá ter um aliado cada vez mais forte
caso haja um vencedor no plano militar: a Rússia. Em caso de derrota russa, que será o
cenário ideal para a estabilidade na Europa, a dependência da Rússia face à China
aprofundar-se-á. O grande dilema da China, será uma Rússia enfraquecida. Talvez seja
esse o fator que possa descodificar a parceria “sem limites” entre Pequim e Moscovo, e
da diplomacia chinesa com caráter ambíguo.
A China encontra-se decidida a alcançar o caminho da prosperidade e da multipolaridade.
“As the world’s second-largest economic power, China intends to play an
important role in shaping the global economic norms” (Xuetong, 2022: 8).
Passado pouco mais de um ano, as forças motrizes capazes de promover a paz
prevalecem num caminho de ineficácia. Embora essa ineficácia se possa atribuir, em boa
parte, às convicções de um agressor, tanto a União Europeia como a OTAN têm
recentemente apresentado soluções exclusivamente no plano militar.
Enquanto as vias de comunicação com o Kremlin se estreitam, o mediador com mais
proximidade de Vladimir Putin parece estar disposto a estabelecer uma parceria quase
inabalável. Não se trata de amizade, mas de interesses comuns. A China e a Rússia
desejam um sistema internacional diferente, com uma configuração mais alargada e
igualitária. Enquanto isso, a guerra torna-se cada vez mais uma incerteza. Resta saber
o posicionamento de Xi Jinping face ao conflito propriamente dito, e o que será feito para
travar o conflito.
Referências
Acharya, A. (2014). A Multiplex World. Em The End of American World Order (p. 1). Polity
Press. Obtido em 21 de Março de 2023, de ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-7247-2
Blinken, A. (2023). U.S. dismisses China’s Ukraine peace proposal as an attempt to
distract. Obtido em 18 de Março de 2023, de Politico:
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/24/united-states-china-ukraine-00084384
Campbell, C. (2023). Why China, Russia’s Biggest Backer, Now Says It Wants to Broker
Peace in Ukraine. Obtido em 2023 de Março de 20, de Time:
https://time.com/6257398/china-russia-ukraine-war-peace-talks/
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (Maio-Outubro 2023), pp. 295-299
Notas e Reflexões
Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da Ucrânia
Daniel da Costa Lara Leitão
299
Jinping, X. (2023). Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia Friendship,
Cooperation and Common Development. Obtido em 20 de Março de 2023, de Xinhua:
https://english.news.cn/20230320/208baba76dc14ed78d308bfa32b9d4e2/c.html
Kugelman, M. (2023). What the China-Brokered Saudi-Iran Deal Means for South Asia.
Obtido em 20 de Março de 2023, de Foreign Policy:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/16/china-saudi-iran-deal-south-asia-pakistan-india-
oscars-rrr/
Westad, O. A. (2022). The Next Sino-Russian Split? Beijing Regret Its Support Will
Ultimately Come to Regret Its Support of Moscow. Obtido em 20 de Março de 2023, de
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2022-04-05/nextsino-russian
Xuetong, Y. (2022). China's Ukraine Conundrum. Why the War Necessitates a Balancing
Act. Obtido em 21 de Março de 2023, de
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-02/chinas-ukraine-conundrum
Yi, W. (2023). Wang Yi Attends the 59th Munich Security Conference and Delivers a
Keynote Speech. Obtido em 20 de Março de 2023, de Embassy of the People's Republic
of China in the Republic of the Philippines: http://ph.china-
embassy.gov.cn/eng/chinew/202302/t20230220_11027395.htm
Como citar esta Nota
Leitão, Daniel da Costa Lara (2023). Reflexões sobre o papel de Xi Jinping durante a guerra da
Ucrânia: A legitimidade de um líder em Ressurgimento na busca da paz e as consequências na
ordem internacional. Notas e Reflexões in Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Vol. 14,
Nº 1, Maio-Outubro 2023. Consultado [em linha] em data da última consulta,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.03