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VOL16 N2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

VOL16 N2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and Contemporary

Dynamics

DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and

Contemporary Dynamics – Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni,

– pp. 2-8

ARTICLES

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry - Jorge

Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes – pp. 9-31

Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions - João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago – pp.

32-54

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection of

Statecraft and Strategy - Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires – pp. 55-79

Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation - Carlos Rodrigues – pp. 80-98

The Chinese Diaspora in Portugal: A Transnational Paradiplomatic Ecosystem in Sino-

Portuguese Relations - João Simões, Andreia Sofia da Silva – pp. 99-125

Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic

and Cultural Cooperation - Yinkangni Wang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro – pp. 126-156

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights

from China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana - Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro –

pp. 157-190

Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers and the

Global South - Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

– pp. 191-216

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February 2026

EDITORIAL

YICHAO LI

liyichao@zjnu.edu.cn

Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University (China). She received a Ph.D. from the

Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University of Macau (China) in

2021. She also received a Master’s degree in comparative civil law (in Chinese) from the

University of Macau (China) in 2018. In 2020, she was awarded the Institute of European Studies

in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-Europe

Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2021 to 2022, she has been a postdoctoral

researcher at the Centre for International Studies, ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal. Since 2023, she

has been an assistant research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal

University, China. Her current research interests are the Belt and Road Initiative, Portuguese-

speaking countries, and Sino-African relations. Her latest publication stands as: Li, Y., Leandro,

F., da Silva, J. T., & Rodrigues, C. (eds.). (2025). The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa

Relations: Legacies and the New International Order. Palgrave MacMillan. Costa, C. M., & Li, Y.

(2025). Evolving Africa–EU Relations: Changes in Discourse from the Cotonou Agreement to the

Samoa Agreement. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études

africaines, DOI:10.1080/00083968.2024.2438370. Yichao Li is a member of OBSERVARE

(Observatory of Foreign Relations), established in 1996 as a center for studies on International

Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8588-

1043

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

University of Macau (China). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations

from the Catholic University of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program

Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint

Joseph in Macau, China. From 2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for

Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he

is an Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social

Sciences, University of Macau, and Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and Public Affairs.

His recent publications include: Is China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave Macmillan and The

Palgrave Handbook on Geopolitics of Brazil and South Atlantic (2025), Palgrave Macmillan.

Francisco Leandro is a member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign Relations), established in

1996 as a centre for studies on International Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon,

Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828

WANG YINKANGNI

yinkangniwang@gmail.com

University of Macau (China). She is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Macau. Her academic

trajectory began with an undergraduate exploration of the geopolitical implications of the Russia-

Ukraine war for China, which ignited her interest in global strategic dynamics. During her

Master's studies, she delved into the practical aspects of governance through research on e-

government in Macau. Situated at the intersection of China and the Lusophone world, Macau

served as a bridge, leading her to specialize in Sino-Portuguese relations within the framework of

digital geopolitics. Her current research interests lie at the confluence of e-governance,

geostrategy, and the unique role of functional powers like Portugal in shaping international

cooperation. https://orcid.org/0009-0000-7194-0022

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

How to cite this article

Li, Yichao, Leandro, Francisco José B. S. & Yinkangni, Wang (2026). Editorial. Portugal and China

in International Relations: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics. Janus.net, e-journal

of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 2-8.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126ED

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

PORTUGAL AND CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND CONTEMPORARY DYNAMICS

YICHAO LI

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

WANG YINKANGNI

This special issue of JANUS.NET, e‑journal of International Relations, comes to light at a

moment of profound disruption in the international rules‑based order, marked by

heightened geopolitical fragmentation, strategic rivalry, and the reconfiguration of global

power structures. Against this setting, the study of Sino‑Portuguese relations constitutes

not only a timely empirical focus but also a valuable academic opportunity to reassess

how medium and small states navigate uncertainty, complexity, and systemic

transformation within the international system.

In the context of the national interest of the Portuguese Republic, relations with China

acquire particular strategic relevance. Portugal has frequently been characterized as a

“special friend” of the People’s Republic of China in Europe (Wise, 2020) and, at times,

even described as “China’s best friend in the European Union” (Wejchert, 2021, p. 3).

Such labels invite critical scholarly reflection, moving beyond diplomatic rhetoric to

interrogate the structural, strategic, and normative dimensions that underpin this

relationship. They also open analytical space to assess how Portugal’s historical legacies

with Portuguese‑speaking countries across Africa, Latin America, and Asia, its Atlantic

and maritime orientation, and its membership in the European Union interact with and

shape China’s evolving global strategy. Examining these intersecting factors allows for a

more nuanced understanding of Portugal’s agency within asymmetrical partnerships and

highlights how bilateral relations are embedded within broader regional, multilateral, and

geoeconomic frameworks.

The evolving dynamics of international relations between Portugal and China constitute

a compelling field of scholarly inquiry, shaped by deep historical legacies, growing

economic interdependence, and sustained strategic diplomatic engagement. The

Sino‑Portuguese relationship is distinctive in comparative perspective, as it is rooted in

several centuries of exchange and interaction, most notably embodied in Macao - a

former territory under Portuguese administration and now a Special Administrative

Region of the People’s Republic of China. Macao continues to function as both a symbolic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

and practical bridge between the two countries, reinforcing cultural affinity, institutional

familiarity, and economic connectivity.

The formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, followed by Portugal’s accession

to the European Union, further consolidated Portugal’s position as a reliable regional and

international partner. These developments enhanced its attractiveness as a destination

for foreign investment and cooperation, particularly for non‑European actors seeking

stable access points to the EU market. In recent decades, Chinese investment in Portugal

has expanded significantly, encompassing strategic sectors such as energy, healthcare,

real estate, insurance, infrastructure, and finance (Leandro and Li, 2025, p. 108).

Portugal occupies a distinctive position within the European Union, not only due to its

extensive maritime heritage but also because it administers one of the largest Exclusive

Economic Zones in Europe. This maritime dimension underscores Portugal’s

long‑standing orientation toward global connectivity and outward engagement, which has

historically facilitated its interaction with Asia. Within this context, the establishment of

the first Sino‑Portuguese “blue partnership” in 2017 represents a notable innovation in

bilateral cooperation, one that China has since replicated with other partners, reinforcing

Portugal’s role as a policy laboratory and strategic intermediary.

In 2005, Portugal and China formally established a comprehensive strategic partnership,

marking a significant deepening of bilateral relations. This partnership was further

consolidated in 2018 through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Belt

and Road Initiative, under which Portugal became the sole Western European participant.

These institutional milestones have provided a stable framework for the sustained growth

of bilateral trade, increased Chinese investment in Portugal, and the intensification of

diplomatic engagement. Political alignment has also been evident in multilateral contexts,

most notably through China’s support for António Guterres’ candidacies for United

Nations Secretary‑General in 2016 and his re‑election in 2021. Collectively, these

developments reflect Beijing’s perception of Portugal as a strategically positioned

gateway for engaging with the European Union, leveraging Portugal’s political credibility

within EU institutions, its open investment posture, and its historical and linguistic ties

with Lusophone countries. As such, Sino‑Portuguese relations extend beyond narrow

bilateralism and are increasingly embedded within broader geopolitical and geoeconomic

frameworks. 2025 marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive

strategic partnership between China and Portugal. Diplomatic exchanges between Lisbon

and Beijing have remained stable and constructive, characterized by regular high‑level

visits and a shared commitment to expanding cooperation across economic, political,

cultural, and multilateral domains.

Portugal continues to maintain strong diplomatic relations with all Portuguese‑speaking

countries at both bilateral and multilateral levels, most notably within the framework of

the Community of Portuguese‑Speaking Countries. This dense network of historical,

linguistic, and institutional ties constitutes a central asset in the context of

Sino‑Portuguese relations, as it positions Portugal as a privileged interlocutor between

China and Lusophone spaces across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. From Beijing’s

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

perspective, these connections enhance Portugal’s value as a facilitator of engagement

with regions of strategic importance within the Global South.

Recent geopolitical and economic developments - such as Timor-Leste’s accession as the

11th Member State of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 26 October

2025 (ASEAN, 2025) and the deepening of EU–Mercosur relations, culminating in the

signing of the Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and the Interim Trade Agreement (iTA) on

17 January 2026 (European Commission, 2026) - have further strengthened the

integration of Portuguese-speaking countries into key regional economic communities.

These dynamics have significantly expanded the global projection of the Portuguese

language, facilitating access to a vast market of nearly three billion consumers across

Europe, South America, Africa, and Asia. In this context, language functions not merely

as a cultural or historical bond but as a strategic resource underpinning economic

diplomacy, regulatory mediation, and transregional cooperation.

Within Sino‑Portuguese relations, this linguistic and institutional architecture has

particular relevance, as China has increasingly leveraged Macao and Lusophone platforms

to advance commercial, financial, and diplomatic initiatives. By anchoring its engagement

with Lusophone countries through Portugal and Macao, China benefits from established

trust networks and institutional familiarity, while Portugal reinforces its intermediary role

between Europe and the Global South. This configuration enhances the geopolitical and

geoeconomic relevance of Lusophone spaces within an increasingly multipolar and

interconnected international order, while also illustrating how small and medium‑sized

states can exercise agency through networked diplomacy.

In addition, the prospects for trilateral Sino–Portuguese cooperation merit closer

analytical attention, particularly in the context of strategically significant infrastructure

projects such as the Lobito Corridor in Angola and the Guarujá Tunnel in Brazil. These

initiatives exemplify how China, Portugal, and Lusophone partner countries can leverage

complementary strengths in financing, technical expertise, historical connectivity, and

regulatory mediation. The Lobito Corridor has the potential to enhance regional

integration in Southern Africa by improving transport efficiency between mineral‑rich

inland areas and Atlantic ports, while also positioning Angola as a logistical hub in

Sino‑African trade networks (Lobito Corridor, 2024, p. 9). Similarly, the Guarujá Tunnel

project highlights opportunities for cooperation in complex urban infrastructure,

combining Chinese engineering capacity with Portuguese institutional and linguistic

brokerage and Brazilian local knowledge (Macao News, 2025). Together, these cases

illustrate how trilateral frameworks can move beyond bilateral dynamics, contributing to

sustainable development, economic diversification, and strategic connectivity across the

Global South.

This special issue of JANUS.NET, e‑journal of International Relations, entitled “Portugal,

China, and International Relations”, invited contributions that critically examine the

historical, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the Sino‑Portuguese bilateral

relationship. Contributors were encouraged to explore how interactions between Portugal

and China shape broader processes of global governance, regional integration, and the

formation of transnational networks.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

The thematic scope of the special issue included, but was not limited to, the following

areas of inquiry: 1) the role of the Macao Special Administrative Region in fostering

connectivity, education and language policies as instruments of soft power, scientific and

technological cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and paradiplomacy; 2) Sino‑Portuguese

foreign relations, with particular attention to issues of fragility, cultural relations, and

bilateral cooperation; 3) diasporas and education as vectors of transnational exchange

and mutual influence; and 4) an additional dossier featuring a study on Brazil’s economic

complexity, which contributes to situating the economic trajectories of Brazil and China

within the broader context of the Global South.

Collectively, these contributions advance scholarly understanding of the evolving

dynamics of Portugal–China relations and their wider international and comparative

significance. By engaging with a diverse range of political, economic, and cultural themes,

this special issue offers a nuanced analysis of how Portugal and China navigate the

complexities of an increasingly multipolar world order. The articles gathered here not

only shed light on bilateral interactions but also situate them within broader processes of

global governance, regional integration, and transnational connectivity, thereby

contributing to ongoing debates in international relations theory and comparative

diplomacy.

Importantly, this special issue also provides a platform for a number of early‑career and

emerging scholars, several of whom are publishing in a peer‑reviewed academic outlet

for the first time – all papers were double peer-reviewed and passed the similarity check.

By fostering scholarly inclusion and intellectual renewal, the issue reflects a commitment

to mentoring new academic voices and broadening the field of inquiry on Portugal–China

relations. In doing so, it underlines the value of intergenerational dialogue in academic

research and highlights the role of academic journals as spaces for both rigorous

scholarship and capacity‑building. Ultimately, the insights generated in this issue speak

not only to bilateral relations but also to wider debates on global interdependence, South–

South dynamics, and the evolving architecture of the international system.

References

ASEAN. (2025). Forging a New Era: Timor-Leste Admitted into ASEAN.

https://asean.org/forging-a-new-era-timor-leste-admitted-into-asean/

European Commission. (2026). EU-Mercosur agreement - EU Trade - European Union.

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-

and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement_en

Leandro, F. J. B. S. & Li, Y. (2025). Global Partners Not Contiguous Neighbors: The

Potential of Sino-Portuguese Cooperation. In Li, Y., Leandro, F., da Silva, J. T., Rodrigues,

C. (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa Relations. Plagrave Macmillian.

Lobito Corridor. (2024). The Lobito Corridor: What It Is and Why It Matters.

https://www.lobitocorridor.org/_files/ugd/9fa7ad_700894b8a8b9427faec094b5fbd0f5fc

.pdf

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 2-8

Editorial. Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

Yichao Li, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Wang Yinkangni

Macao News. (2025). A Sino-Portuguese consortium wins a major Brazilian tunnel

project. Retrieved from https://macaonews.org/news/lusofonia/santos-guaruja-tunnel-

mota-engil-cccc-brazil/

Wejchert, M. (2021). China’s influence in Portugal: A friend in need? European Council

on Foreign Relations.

Wise, P. (2020, 20 January). Lisbon rebuffs claims Portugal is China’s ‘special friend’ in

EU. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/862c633e-393b-11ea-a6d3-

9a26f8c3cba4

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

HEDGING UNDER PRESSURE: PORTUGAL’S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE U.S-

CHINA RIVALRY

JORGE TAVARES DA SILVA

jorge.tavares.silva@ubi.pt

He is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences and

Humanities, University of Beira Interior (UBI), and an Integrated Researcher at the Portuguese

Institute of International Relations (IPRI-NOVA), NOVA University of Lisbon. He is a founding

member of the Observatory of China (Portugal), a member of the Association of Chinese Political

Studies (ACPS), and serves on the Editorial Board of Tempo Exterior (Spain). His scholarly work

includes numerous articles and book chapters published in international outlets, with research

primarily centered on the political, economic, and social transformations of contemporary China.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2526-4745

TOMÉ RIBEIRO GOMES

tome.ribeiro.gomes@ubi.pt

He is an Invited Assistant Professor of International Relations at both the Faculty of Social

Sciences and Humanities, University of Beira Interior (UBI, Portugal), and the Institute of Political

Studies, Catholic University of Portugal (UCP). He earned his PhD in 2025 in History, Security

Studies, and Defence from the Centre for International Studies, ISCTE – University Institute of

Lisbon, and holds an MA in Governance, Leadership, and Democracy Studies from the Institute of

Political Studies, UCP. His research interests encompass strategy, geopolitics, and transatlantic

relations. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3787-8661

Abstract

This study aims to analyse Portugal's position within the Sino-American rivalry, charting its

evolution in the context of a ‘golden era’ of Chinese investment amid a financial crisis and a

perceived (partial) abandonment by the United States, Portugal’s traditional great-power ally.

For a small European state, a member of the European Union and NATO, the central challenge

lies in balancing long-standing transatlantic commitments with the economic opportunities

offered by China. The fracture between the Global South and the institutional commitments

to the EU and the U.S during the Trump era has necessitated subtle political manoeuvring.

We argue that Portugal’s behaviour towards China from the 2008 financial and economic crisis

to 2019 constitutes a case of ‘hedging’ and consider the question of whether this was the

result of a strategy or an ad hoc search for new foreign partnerships. We conclude that while

hedging occurred and that there is some indication of strategic thought from Lisbon

policymakers, in practice it was always cautious and the country continued to prioritise

alignment with the EU and the U.S.. Historical commitments, the liberal democratic legacy,

shared values, defence alliances, and the collective European project place Portugal generally

closer to this political framework, which tends to constrain its relations with Beijing, without

precluding occasional cooperation. However, we also find indications that Portugal’s hedging

has had a strategic dimension. This question warrants consideration because it is still ongoing:

Within the current international framework, does Portugal continue to pursue a hedging

strategy toward China, or has it embarked on a gradual and deliberate disengagement from

political relations with Beijing?

Keywords

hedging Strategy, Portugal, China, United States.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

Resumo

Este estudo analisa a posição de Portugal no contexto da rivalidade sino americana,

delineando a sua evolução durante a chamada “era dourada” do investimento chinês, ocorrida

em simultâneo com a crise financeira e com a perceção de um (parcial) afastamento por parte

dos Estados Unidos, o tradicional aliado de grande poder de Portugal. Para um pequeno Estado

europeu, membro da União Europeia e da NATO, o desafio central reside em equilibrar os

compromissos transatlânticos de longa data com as oportunidades económicas oferecidas pela

China. A fratura entre o “Sul Global” e os compromissos institucionais com a UE e com os EUA

durante a era Trump exigiu manobras políticas subtis. Argumentamos que o comportamento

de Portugal em relação à China, desde a crise financeira e económica de 2008 até 2019,

constitui um caso de hedging, e colocamos a questão de saber se tal resultou de uma

estratégia deliberada ou de uma procura ad hoc de novas parcerias externas. Concluímos que,

embora tenha ocorrido hedging e exista alguma indicação de pensamento estratégico por

parte dos decisores em Lisboa, na prática esse alinhamento foi sempre cauteloso, mantendo

o país a prioridade no alinhamento com a UE e com os EUA. Compromissos históricos, a

herança liberal democrática, valores partilhados, alianças de defesa e o projeto europeu

coletivo colocam Portugal, de forma geral, mais próximo desse enquadramento político, o que

tende a limitar a relação com Pequim, sem impedir, contudo, episódios pontuais de

cooperação. Todavia, identificam se também indícios de que o hedging português possui uma

dimensão estratégica. Esta questão permanece relevante porque o processo continua em

curso: no atual enquadramento internacional, Portugal continua a prosseguir uma estratégia

de hedging em relação à China ou iniciou uma desvinculação gradual e deliberada dos laços

políticos com Pequim?

Palavras-chave

Estratégia de hedging, Portugal, China, Estados Unidos.

How to cite this article

Silva, Jorge Tavares da & Gomes, Tomé Ribeiro (2026). Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign

Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier

- Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics,

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 9-31. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.1

Article submitted on 31st October 2025 and accepted for publication on 8th January 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

HEDGING UNDER PRESSURE: PORTUGAL’S FOREIGN POLICY AND

THE U.S-CHINA RIVALRY

JORGE TAVARES DA SILVA

TOMÉ RIBEIRO GOMES

Introduction

Portugal underwent one of the most significant tests of its post-1974 democratic

consolidation Between 2011 and 2015, a period marked by a severe economic decline,

social unrest, and political volatility. In 2011, the aftershocks of the 2008 global financial

crisis led to a bailout that forced the country to adopt unpopular austerity measures and

an array of politically unpalatable reforms under the close supervision of the European

Central Bank (ECB), European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). While Europe was facing financial difficulties, the United States was shifting its

strategic priorities, posing a further challenge for Lisbon. The following year, Washington

announced a drawdown of American forces stationed in the Azores, at Lajes Air Base, the

cornerstone of the Luso-American relationship since the early Cold War. The much-

vaunted idea that Portuguese foreign policy was ‘Euroatlantic’ thus found itself under

question on both counts: the European dimension was strained by the conditions imposed

by European institutions, and the American by Washington’s unwillingness to rethink the

downsizing of Lajes or, failing that, to compensate Portugal with some other military

investment in the Azores. It seemed that Portugal had nowhere to turn.

That same year, 2012, Xi Jinping came to power as the Paramount Leader of the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). Xi quickly made his mark on the PRC’s foreign policy. The new

leader, wrapped in the political slogan of the “China Dream” and “national rejuvenation”

embarked on a wave of nationalist exaltation that promised to re-establish China to the

centre of global power. Shortly after becoming General Secretary of the Communist

Party of China, Xi embraced the inevitability of China’s path of progress: “The tide of the

world is surging forward. Those who submit to it will prosper and those who resist it will

perish” (Xi, 2013). A systemic rivalry between the U.S and China became a defining

feature of the international system. At first glance, no one would doubt that Portugal

would remain firmly by the side of the U.S. However, China’s global soft-power offensive

enticed many European states. For Portugal, the timing could hardly seem better, as the

PRC had the resources and the will to provide much needed investment to the Portuguese

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest related to the research,

authorship, or publication of this study.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

economy and even, perhaps, lend some prestige to Portuguese diplomacy. In 2018, Xi

Jinping visited Portugal to much fanfare and resulting in the signature of seventeen

agreements, among them a promise of partnership on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

(Brito and Villalobos, 2018).

However, the ‘golden age’ in relations between Lisbon and Beijing appeared to lose its

shine after 2019. This deterioration in Portugal-China relations after Xi Jinping’s visit

seems to be a response to the first Trump administration’s (2017-2021) shift in U.S

strategy regarding China, which it identified clearly as a ‘systemic rival’. Indeed, the

intensification of Sino-American competition has become one of the central axes of

contemporary international politics, with direct repercussions for Europe and its member

states. Portugal now faces a situation in which it must delicately balance its commercial

engagements with PRC against its long-standing Atlantic ties. Understanding the position

Portugal finds itself in and its options going forward requires understanding the nature

of Portuguese behaviour towards China during that golden age.

While International Relations (IR) are often centred on the distribution of power among

major actors, they frequently overlook an analysis of smaller or less powerful states.

However, examining the positioning of small states – both in size and in power -- such

as Portugal, is of great importance if we hope to understand the dynamics of the

international system (Long, 2022), if for no other reason than that and even “Great

powers’ positions in the world are constituted in large measure by their relationships with

small states...” (Long, 2022, p. 170). Specifically, the ways in which small states behave

will lend or withhold dominant powers the legitimacy, or authority, to act as rule-makers

in the international arena (Lake, 2009, pp. 7-11). Small states may adopt different

strategies in their asymmetric relations with great powers: balancing, bandwagoning,

and hedging. In the first case, small states pursue alliances with other actors to preserve

their autonomy and security without compromising independence. In the second, the

state seeks a close external alliance, accepting the influence and leadership of a dominant

power and subordinating itself to its strategic orientations.

Hedging is more common in uncertain or volatile geopolitical contexts, where the balance

of power remains fluid. In this third scenario, the state opts for an intermediate solution,

avoiding the extremes of balancing and bandwagoning. Relations are maintained flexibly

with multiple actors, and partnerships are diversified. The intelligent management of

strategic options may enable a small state to navigate, rather than merely endure, the

rivalries among great powers. It need not necessarily act as a pawn, but rather as a pivot

in the strategic games of larger powers, capable of choosing among various strategies,

including alignment with a third power, the maintenance of neutrality, or hedging to

ensure its survival as an independent unit while pursuing mutual gains (Efremova, 2019).

The central question of this paper is thus to analyse Portugal’s positioning within the

framework of tensions between China and the U.S.. Given the current competitive

international landscape, has Portugal been following a hedging approach toward the PRC,

or has it engaged in a gradual and intentional political decoupling from Beijing? To tackle

this question, we call upon diplomatic and economic data points such as instances of

defence cooperation, state visits, foreign investment, statements from policymakers, and

strategic documents. These are presented as part of an interpretative narrative of the

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

relationship of Portugal with the U.S. since the end of the Cold War, Portugal within the

EU since 2008, and Portugal with China since 2012.

The paper proceeds as follows: first, we define hedging behaviour and identify some of

its main characteristics; second, we provide a cursory history of Luso-American relations

since the end of the Cold War until the Euro area crisis, namely the period during which

Portugal was under bailout conditions (2011-2014); third, we turn to the Portugal-China

relationship between the crisis and COVID-19; finally, we consider the position of

Portugal vis-à-vis the U.S.-China rivalry and whether its behaviour can be classified as

hedging.

The Politics of Ambiguity: Hedging in an Era of Great Power Rivalry

As Max Weber noted, power consists in the “probability that one’s own will can be

imposed… even against any resistance” (Weber in Han, 2017, p. 18). Yet power does not

necessarily require an act of command, and the acceptance – or refusal –of obedience is

itself an act of freedom. In other words, a small actor may possess both the interest and

the willingness to be commanded (Han, 2017). The less powerful may be constrained by

their structural conditions, but they often still have a choice. Tom Long (2017) identifies

three main sources of small-state influence in world politics: (1) particular-intrinsic,

which results from the small state’s own geography, economy, military might, and other

assets, (2) derivative, which stems from its relationship with a great power, and (3)

collective, which is harnessed when small states band together to achieve greater

influence.

IR theory has concerned itself mainly with the second type, derivative power.

Traditionally, it found that small states can shape their alliance behaviour towards great

powers in two main ways. These two different kinds of alignment behaviour that states

adopt when faced with shifts in the balance of power: Balancing and bandwagoning.

States can either side with the stronger power or coalition (bandwagoning) or with the

rising, but as yet weaker, power (balancing). While the choice is often dictated by the

desire to avoid or counter a threat, even unthreatened states can balance or bandwagon

as they seek new opportunities in the international realm (Schweller, 1997). This model

of alignment behaviour seemed well suited to the Cold War system, when the central

strategic question for small and medium powers was often seen as a choice of whether

to align with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019, p. 367).

However, these two types of alignment have proved less useful to explain the post-Cold

War world. Consequently, in the 1990s and especially the early 2000s IR scholars

developed the concept of hedging to define a new and increasingly common type of

behaviour (Kuik, 2016, pp. 500-501). As Asian states adapted to the rising power of the

PRC, many noted how they opted to ‘hedge their bets’ by engaging with China in various

policy areas while attempting to keep their relationship with the U.S. intact (Chung,

2004; Goh, 2005; Medeiros, 2005). By the mid-2010s, it could be argued that hedging

was “the central tendency in Asian international relations” (Jackson, 2014, p. 331).

Rather than a straightforward choice between bandwagoning with the U.S. and its allies

against a rising China versus joining China to balance against American predominance,

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

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February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

many small and medium powers adopted a more complex alignment strategy, especially

in Southeast Asia (Chung, 2004; Goh, 2005; Kuik, 2008; 2016; 2021; 2024; Lim &

Cooper, 2015; Murphy, 2017; Ciorciari, 2019; Liao & Dang, 2020). As American

retrenchment became more evident and PRC’s economic influence extended farther

afield, the dynamics of hedging were also identified in the Middle East (Salman, Pieper &

Geeraerts, 2015; Telci & Rakipoğlu, 2021; Bakir & Al-Shamari, 2025). More recently,

some authors have posited the existence of hedging behaviour in Europe (Wivel, 2008;

Song, 2022; Zaborowski, 2024; Tunsjø, 2025).

Some of the themes common to these studies are a shifting balance of power,

multipolarity, the increasing uncertainty in strategic affairs, and the fear of abandonment

by the traditional great-power ally, the U.S.. They also share the assumption that states

behave as rational actors. Nevertheless, there is considerable theoretical plurality in the

IR literature about hedging. The wider debate around ‘alignment strategies’ is important

for neo-realists in the mould of Waltz (1979), for whom the distribution of military power

in the international system is the main factor influencing state behaviour. However, the

alignment lens is not exclusive to the structural variant of realism. Balancing,

bandwagoning, and hedging are also useful categories for scholars employing a

relational, rather than structural, view of power relations; one in which states are seen

as engaging with each other across multiple networks, not all of them related to military

capability (Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery, 2009).

This multi-dimensional perspective offers the possibility that states may align with a

stronger power on security issues but diversify away from it on other topics, such as

economic and cultural ones (Jackson, 2014; Kuik, 2016). The usefulness of considering

non-security issues is reinforced by the fact that, as mentioned above, states align with

others in pursuit of goods other than security. Just as balancing and bandwagoning

behaviours can occur even when there is no immediate or foreseeable threat to a state

(Schweller, 1997), so too can states hedge to pursue opportunities to increase their

power and pursue non-security goods (Wivel 2018). Indeed, hedging may be less

common on security-related issues, since that could lead to the incumbent great power

pressuring the hedging state to declare its allegiance and abstain from dealing with a

rising great power.

Such an outcome would defeat the purpose of hedging, which is essentially about

avoiding a stark choice. The verb ‘to hedge’ has its origins in the idea of building a fence,

or a palisadeto shield oneself from possible losses or risk (Online Etymology Dictionary,

2025). It is most commonly used to name a financial strategy in which “one makes an

investment to offset a potential loss in a companion investment” (Morewedge, Tang &

Larrick, 2016, p. 983). The idea is to diversify an investment portfolio in such a way as

to protect “an individual’s finances from being exposed to a risky situation that may lead

to loss of value”, since “the losses will be mitigated by gains in another investment” (CFI,

2025). Kuik (2008; 2016) notes that in international relations, hedging involves not only

the ‘risk-contingency’ aspect familiar from financial strategy, but also a ‘returns-

maximising’ dimension. The crucial point of hedging is that states try to do both at the

same time (Kuik, 2016, p. 505).

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

In line with this view, we define hedging as a type of behaviour in which a small or

medium power diversifies its diplomatic relationships by deepening political, economic,

or security ties with a great power other than that with which it is already aligned, while

attempting to preserve that traditional great-power relationship. Hedging need not be a

well thought out strategy, but even when it is, there will still be a desire to avoid

opposition from the traditional ally. This both explains why states rarely declare they are

hedging (Kuik, 2021, pp. 301-302), and distinguishes it from other alignment behaviours

(balancing or bandwagoning), allowing the state to obtain something from a third power

that it would be unlikely to get from its traditional ally without having to make a

dangerous all-in bet on the future distribution of power. In this way, hedging allows a

state to deal with systemic uncertainty. There are thus at least three interesting questions

when considering a possible case of hedging: First, is a given state exhibiting hedging

behaviour? Second, if so, is there strategic intent behind the hedging behaviour, and if

so, what is that intent; i.e., what is the strategic effect desired? Third, what is driving

the hedging behaviour?

First, assessing whether a behaviour constitutes hedging is a demanding analytical

exercise. Since states rarely if ever admit to hedging, scholars will have trouble finding

confirmatory evidence in the form of strategic documents, speeches, or interviews by

policymakers. This is why we prefer to look at hedging as a behaviour rather than a

strategy, which would presuppose a conscious plan, rather than being the result of ad

hoc actions. For example, a European state may seek Chinese investment simply because

it needs that investment for domestic political reasons, without anticipating that the U.S.

might perceive those deepening economic ties as a problematic action. Such a

misunderstanding is more likely to happen when governments function without

bureaucratic structures that effectively give strategic direction to their actions, allowing,

for example, the Minister for Economic Affairs to act autonomously without due

consideration to the foreign-policy issues that lie outside its are the remit. In such cases,

hedging behaviour results not from a ‘grand-strategic’ decision, but from disparate

sectoral policies.

When there is a strategic design, hedging may be intended to keep open the possibility

of switching allegiance if the balance of power ever shifts decisively. We could call this

an “insurance” strategy (Kuik, 2016; 2021), designed to kick in only after the traditional

great-power ally falters (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019, p. 368). Alternatively, hedging may

be thought of a means of signalling dissatisfaction to the traditional great power ally (Lim

& Cooper, 2015, pp. 697-698). Using the network lens mentioned above, state A would

be leveraging its ties with state B in order to show state C that has more value than C

presently accords it. It is also conceivable that decision-makers think of hedging in both

ways: simultaneously as an insurance policy against the risk of ‘abandonment’ (Snyder,

1984) by a great power, and as a way of signalling their value as an ally and therefore

reduce the likelihood of being abandoned.

Regardless of the strategic intent behind hedging behaviour, the relationship between

small /medium powers and great powers remains central to the concept, which leads us

to the question of the systemic drivers of hedging. It is especially when a revisionist great

power is making its impact felt on the international system that states of more limited

means are incentivised to engage in hedging (Murphy, 2017). Thus, Kuik (2021) regards

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

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Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

the behaviour of great powers as the origin of hedging, as “it is the uncertainties

stemming from their actions that push the weak to hedge” (Kuik, 2021, p. 300).

However, great-power behaviour may also push in the opposite direction: Today, the

room for manoeuvre that allows states to pursue a hedging strategy appears to be

shrinking, as many small and medium states face greater pressure from great powers to

declare their alignments and stick to them (Korolev, 2017).

Indeed, the general absence of hedging during the Cold War can be ascribed to the

‘tightness’ of the distribution of power in the bipolar world (Wagner, 1993). The unipolar

order of the post-Cold War world may have created incentives for hedging, as the lack of

great-power rivals to the U.S. made the hegemon less anxious to control the relationships

of weaker states, resulting in a ‘loose’ distribution of power. Today, an increasing

multipolarity can be thought of as expanding the menu for states looking to diversify

their relationships; alternatively, however, the same dynamics can make the U.S. more

intent on preventing its traditional allies from allowing rivals, particularly China, to gain

influence in their economies or infrastructure networks.

Even if the international system is slipping from unipolarity to multipolarity, that need

not equate to a ‘looser’ distribution of power. As power becomes more evenly distributed,

the former hegemon faces incentives to pressure weaker states to align more closely

with it, not just in security-related matters, but also in other areas of policy in which its

rivals may begin to chip away at its influence. Hence the current trend of “geoeconomics”,

a post-Cold War concept created to account for the use of economic tools in the service

of strategic objectives (Luttwak, 1990; Blackwill & Harris, 2016). The U.S.-China rivalry

has been increasingly seen as a geoeconomic struggle playing out in the domains of

foreign investment (Beeson, 2018), infrastructural control (Munn, 2020), and

technological innovation and diffusion (Zhang, 2024).

On the receiving end of these great-power outreaches are the small and medium states

who accept investment in their economies, let third parties build or own critical

infrastructure in their territories, and participate in the development and diffusion of

leading-sector technologies. Again, these decisions are not necessarily made on the basis

of a grand-strategic vision of how the state should position itself in the international

system. Domestic drivers can be just as important; after all, as Kuik (2021) puts it,

“Creating jobs, delivering economic growth, ensuring stability, managing internal

conflicts, and/or winning elections are (…) vital pathways to preserving the ruling elites’

legitimacy and enhancing their authority” (p. 310). Ceteris paribus, these domestic goals

become more difficult to achieve under certain systemic conditions, namely when the

international system is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, which amplifies the

risks that states must reckon with when devising policy.

Luso-American relations from the end of the Cold War to the financial

crisis

Derivative power (Long, 2017) – originating from a small state’s relationship with a great

power – has been essential for Portugal’s survival over nine centuries. The country’s

limited means and exposure to Atlantic politics via a long coastline and two oceanic

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Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

archipelagos has historically made it particularly keen to adapt to the policy of whichever

great power dominates Atlantic sea lanes, often perceiving that alliance as a

counterweight to excessive dependence on continental powers, especially Spain

(Teixeira, 2010). For a long time, that meant siding with Great Britain, with whom

Portugal could draw on an alliance said to date back to the 14th century. After World War

II, the focus shifted to the U.S., and the careful management of the Luso-American

relationship became a central concern of policymakers in Lisbon. During the Cold War

they were generally successful in that task: It is perhaps impossible to explain how

Portugal managed to hold on to vast colonial possessions in Africa until 1975 without

accounting for the political, financial, and at times military support extended by the U.S.,

mainly in return for access to Lajes Air Base, in Terceira Island (Gomes, 2025).

The end of the Cold War and the beginning of America’s unipolar moment (Krauthammer,

1990/1991) in 1989-1991 brought widespread uncertainty about the role that the U.S.

would play in the world. Portuguese decision-makers had reason to worry, as Lajes Base,

in the Azores, had been instrumental to American force projection and maritime

surveillance for decades (Mendes, 2018). In return for basing access, Portugal received

American economic and military assistance in non-trivial amounts (Cooley & Spruyt,

2009). Lajes was seen as the “cornerstone” of Luso-American bilateral ties (Lima, 2016,

p. 85), which were believed by many in Lisbon to amount to a “special relationship”

(Vasconcelos, 1990, p. 51). As Robinson (2016) put it, “Any potential removal of Lajes

from this relationship” would be “an existential crisis for Portugal’s role in NATO” (p.

137), a key pillar of its foreign policy.

As the Cold War ended and Soviet submarines disappeared from North Atlantic waters,

the Azores immediately lost much of its relevance to American and NATO maritime

surveillance (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009, p. 133). If a hegemonic U.S. could also dispense

with Lajes as an enabler of force projection, then there would be little to differentiate

Portugal from other European allies and – particularly worrying for Lisbon – from Spain,

its larger neighbour which was now also in the EU and NATO and hosted U.S. forces at

important military bases (Gillespie & Youngs, 2000). The situation was similar in many

ways to the danger of irrelevance that threatened Portugal in 1907, after Great Britain

and Spain signed the Pact of Cartagena (Teixeira, 2017, pp. 441-442, 469).

This time, however, decisionmakers in Lisbon had more options. In a unipolar world,

hedging was not a real possibility, since there were no great powers other than the U.S.

with which Lisbon could engage. But deepening European integration meant that the

European Union (EU), as it became in 1993, could perhaps provide Portugal with security,

prosperity, and diplomatic agency. Two main schools of thought came to dominate

foreign-policy debates in Lisbon: Atlanticists and Europeanists (Teixeira, 2017, p. 570).

Others saw the Lusophone world as a third strategic vector: By acting as a bridge

between these three regions, they believed, Portugal could not only maintain these three

strategic orientations simultaneously but even increase its profile in all three (Robinson,

2016, pp. 144-145). Regional crises often motivated American military intervention,

offering Lisbon opportunities to assert its status as a trusted ally by extending diplomatic

and, via Lajes Base, logistical support. Such was the case of the 1990-1991 Gulf War,

during which Lajes provided a platform for American tankers (Cruz, 2019, p. 217) and

cargo aircraft (Matthews & Holt, 1992, pp. 125-126).

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

At the same time, the ‘Europeanisation’ of Portugal continued apace. Since joining the

European Economic Community in 1982, integration had gradually pulled the focus of

Portuguese foreign policy to the Old Continent, creating the potential for friction between

Lisbon and Washington whenever there were serious transatlantic disagreements.

Besides being a member of the EU, Portugal also supported initiatives to deepen

integration, including in the realms of security and defence through frameworks such as

the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Western European Union (WEU)

(Vasconcelos, 1990, 53; Teixeira, 2017, pp. 570-71) and later the Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) However, Portugal resisted “supranationalisin” its security and

defence policy, insisting on an intergovernmental approach to these matters within the

EU and continuing to bet on NATO’s as the main framework for defence issues (Robinson,

2016, p. 143).

The financial quid pro quo model of American basing access to the Azores, which in the

1980s had delivered some $40 million yearly to Portugal (Cooley & Spruyt, 2009, p. 133),

was finally abandoned in 1995. The U.S. Congress was keen to phase out its ‘rent-for-

access’ deals as it thought these allowed countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Portugal,

to squeeze American coffers by periodically threatening with the expulsion of U.S. forces

(Clarke & O’Connor, 1993, p. 441). A new framework, the Defence and Cooperation

Agreement, was signed by the U.S. and Portugal in 1995. It completely replaced financial

compensations with a process of regular consultations through meetings of a Permanent

Bilateral Commission, in which representatives from the U.S., Portugal, and the

autonomous government of the Azores would seek ways to deepen cooperation in the

realms of the military, defence industry, commerce, and scientific research (Diário da

República, 1995, arts. III, VI, VII).

Henceforth, Portuguese decision-makers had to be particularly attentive to American

handling on regional conflagrations, but by the end of the 1990s they appear to have

made a series of mistakes. They seemed to undervalue the lessons from NATO’s first out-

of-area operation, the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993,

and misread later American interventions, first in the Middle East in 1998 and again in

the Balkans in 1999, as confirmation of the usefulness of Lajes Base, when in fact they

could be seen as showing the exact opposite (Monjardino, 2001). In hindsight, the belief

in the usefulness of Lajes and the strength of the supposed ‘special relationship’ with the

U.S. may be interpreted as a manifestation of the Portuguese policy elite’s fear of

‘abandonment’ (Snyder, 1984) by its great-power ally. By refusing to face facts and

retaining a belief in the ability of its diplomats to persuade American decisionmakers,

Portugal worked itself into a vulnerable position.

Given all of this, it is not surprising that Portugal should be emphatic in its support after

the U.S. suffered the traumatic attacks of 11 September 2001. In the ensuing invasion

of Afghanistan, Portugal not only allowed Lajes Base to be used by the U.S. Air Force for

transport and tanker operations but also contributed to the war effort with military

equipment and civilian personnel, and special ops units (Tirpak, 2003, p. 27; Lima,

2013a, pp. 67-68). The 2003 invasion of Iraq proved a more contentious issue in

transatlantic relations and within Portuguese society and political elite, but Portugal still

adopted a proactive stance in support of U.S. plans to topple Saddam Hussein without a

UN mandate. In March 2003, Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso

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Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

managed to position the country as a relevant ally by hosting a summit in Lajes Base

that brought together the heads of government of the U.S. and its leading backers in

Western Europe: the UK, Spain, and Portugal (Guardian, 2003). Portugal did not send

troops to Iraq, but members of its military police (GNR) helped to train the new Iraqi

police force.

The assessment of Portugal’s role would prove contentious given the unpopularity of the

Iraq War (Lança, 2017). However, its support of the U.S. may have averted the risk of

Spain staking out a position as the preferred Iberian ally of the U.S., a scenario akin to

that of the 1907 Pact of Cartagena (see above) and one which Portuguese diplomacy had

always feared (Sá, 2016, p. 561). The rift caused by the Iraq War and the global war on

terror continued to cause irritation between the U.S. and its European allies until the

2008 election of Barack Obama to the White House helped to generate goodwill towards

the U.S. in Europe. The incoming president’s promise of a more multilateral approach to

foreign policy came as a relief to European capitals, and his approval ratings remained

high in the Old Continent for years to come, even if U.S.-European divergence continued

on many crucial issues (Nielsen, 2013).

The high hopes for transatlantic relations during Obama’s tenure were somewhat dented

by his administration’s announcement of the ‘pivot to Asia’ – the idea that the rise of

China and other Asian economies meant that the U.S. would from then on transfer its

foreign-policy energies from the Atlantic to the Pacific (Clinton, 2011). In January 2012,

the ‘Asian pivot’ was translated into defence policy in the Defence Strategic Guidance,

which stated the aim of “reducing defence spending by about $487 billion over 10 years”,

with the savings to be achieved partly through “a shift in geographical priorities toward

the Asia and the Pacific region (...) while retaining emphasis on the Middle East” (Dale

and Towell, 2013, pp. 1-2).

Despite that and other signals that the ‘Asian pivot’ was not a theoretical exercise, but

rather an actual strategic shift, Portuguese decision-makers still showed themselves

shocked and surprised by the American decision in November 2012 to downsize the U.S.

forces based at Lajes (JN, 2012a). With an expected reduction of military personnel from

around 760 to just 169 by 2014 (GEE, 2016, p. 17), the downsizing was perceived as

shaking the very foundations of the Luso-American relationship. The fear of

‘abandonment’ had finally come to pass in a concrete, unignorable manner. Lisbon’s

diplomatic strategy was to attempt to revert the decision or at least obtain from the U.S.

the installation of some alternative military infrastructure on the island. It achieved

neither, managing only to delay the drawdown by a year (Gomes, 2025, pp. 311-313).

It finally went ahead in 2015, to the general alarm of Portuguese and Azorean authorities

over the impact on the economy of Terceira Island, where U.S. forces at Lajes Base

employed more than 700 locals and generated significant economy activity (GEE, 2016,

p. 36).

The blow to Luso-American relations and to Portugal’s prestige could not have come at a

worse moment, as the country had been embroiled in a financial and economic crisis for

some years. The crisis had first broken out among U.S. financial institutions in 2007 and

had gone global by the following year. In the Euro area it took the form of a sovereign

debt crisis lasting from 2009 to as late as 2018 (in Greece). In Portugal, the worst of the

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 9-31

Hedging under Pressure: Portugal’s Foreign Policy and the U.S-China Rivalry

Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

crisis was felt between 2011 and 2014, when the country implemented austerity

measures, government budget cuts, and public sector reforms to meet the conditions for

a €78 billion bailout. The painful fiscal adjustment programme, enforced partly by

European institutions, was deeply resented by the majority of the Portuguese public

(Moury and Freire, 2013).

With other European partners also beset by financial and economic difficulties – especially

Spain, Portugal’s main trade partner (INE, 2014) – it is natural that Lisbon should turn

to the U.S. for economic opportunities. By 2013, Portugal had a €1156 million trade

surplus with the U.S. (Leão and Nogueira, 2014, p. 5) and most of its exporting sectors

were well placed to benefit from increased access to the U.S. market if the proposed

U.S.-European trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP), went ahead (Leão and Nogueira, 2014). Since trade negotiations are long and

complex processes, those benefits might not come in time to help Portugal out of its

crisis, but in any case, the TTIP foundered when Donald Trump became president in 2017

and quickly initiated a trade dispute with the EU (Bilal and Imran, 2019, pp. 3-4, 16-17).

With no help coming from either Europe or the U.S., Portugal decided to look farther

away for investment and economic growth.

China and Portugal after the 2008 Economic Crisis

The 2008 global financial crisis placed Portugal in a state of economic fragility that

persisted in the following years. It was marked by high indebtedness, prolonged

recession, and growing dependence on external assistance. As the EU proved unable to

find effective solutions to the financial predicament – particularly in the peripheral regions

of Southern Europe – countries such as China emerged as alternative sources for

economic revitalization. Since the mid-1990s, the EU had been setting the rules for the

West’s relationship with China, in an example of the ‘Europeanization’ of Member States’

foreign policies (Michalski, 2013). After Tiananmen, these were the years of “constructive

engagement”, a concept used by the European Commission in 1995 (Möller, 2002).

Bilateral relations followed this pattern, with ties dominated by the economic agenda

rather than political issues.

In this, Brussels revealed structural weaknesses. In its relationship with China, the EU’s

position was dominated by the major European powers, particularly Germany. Germany

assumed the role of the “engine of Europe,” driving massive exports of machinery and

automobiles to China while purchasing cheap oil from Russia. Berlin became the indirect

decision-making centre of the European economy, leaving Portugal and other Southern

European countries in a vulnerable position, with diminished competitiveness (Münchau,

2024). Later, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, Europe became a preferred

destination for Chinese investment in the West, with Portugal standing out as a major

recipient of capital inflows (Le Corre & Sepulchre, 2016).

The “wave of Chinese investment” across Europe gained momentum and reached

Portugal mainly through the acquisition of equity in state-owned or private companies,

primarily in the banking, insurance, and energy sectors (Ferreira-Pereira and Duarte

2021). Between 2011 and 2014, quantitative data indicate that Portugal ranked among

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Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

the top five European countries in terms of Chinese investment relative to the size of the

economy (Araújo, 2024). Despite some analysts’ surprise, Portugal also signed a

strategic partnership with China, with its ties to the wider Lusophone world –

encompassing over 220 million Portuguese speakers – regarded as geopolitically

significant for Beijing (Le Corre, 2018).

Diplomatic ties between Portugal and China had always operated within a framework of

good relations and this was strengthened by the successful transfer of Macau’s

administration to China in 1999. High-level meetings continued, even though economic

exchanges between the two sides remained relatively modest, in contrast with other

European countries such as Germany. The investment bubble changed these

circumstances. In 2011, it was announced that China Three Gorges (CTG) had acquired

a 21.35% stake in Energias de Portugal (EDP) for around €2.7 billion; the following year,

State Grid (SG), part of the same group, purchased a 25% stake in Redes Energéticas

Nacionais (REN) for approximately €387 million (EDP, 2011; Campos and Vicente, 2016).

The investment from CTG, a Chinese state-owned energy company established in 1993

during the construction of the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, marked the

beginning of Portugal’s ‘golden era’ of Chinese investment (Silva, 2020).

Xi Jinping’s visit to Portugal on 4–5 December 2018 served to consolidate bilateral

cooperation. Portugal and China signed 17 bilateral agreements, with a focus on business

and financial cooperation, at the Palace of Queluz. The Prime Minister, António Costa,

sought to attract Chinese investments for partnerships with Portuguese companies,

particularly in the industrial sector, rather than for asset acquisitions. Portugal was also

indebted to China for its support of António Guterres’ candidacy for UN Secretary-General

in 2016. The Portuguese Prime Minister considered this support “decisive,” personally

expressing gratitude to the Chinese head of state during his official visit: “I take this

opportunity to thank the People’s Republic of China for its clear and firm support for

António Guterres’ candidacy for the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations”

(Portuguese Government, 2016).

The 2018 visit also resulted in a memorandum of understanding on the BRI, particularly

the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” component, in which Portugal showed interest in

participating. In the business sector, agreements were signed between Banco Comercial

Português (BCP) and UnionPay. Another agreement signed was between Huawei and the

Altice Portugal, the largest telecommunications provider in the country, for the roll out

of 5G cellular networks. Huawei, founded in the late 1980s by Ren Zhengfei, a former

officer of the People’s Liberation Army, had become one of the world’s most influential

technology companies. Competing with major global players such as Cisco and Ericsson,

Huwaei’s ascent has significantly intensified competition in the sector (Li, 2017). In

higher education, plans were made to open a new Confucius Institute at the University

of Porto and to establish a Chinese Studies Centre at the University of Coimbra. In late

April 2019, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa reciprocated Xi’s visit with a two-day trip

to Macau, where he met the Chief Executive, Chui Sai On. His visit also included

participation in the second Belt and Road Forum, a clear signal of Portugal’s engagement

in the Chinese mega-project (Silva, 2020).

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Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

Another area of mutual interest was the Atlantic, where Portugal’s main source of

geopolitical leverage lies. The ‘Portuguese sea’ holds enormous potential – energetic,

commercial, logistical, financial, and, above all, political (Lima, 2016). Naturally, Portugal

sought to attract investment into its maritime-port sector. For this purpose, the Minister

for the Sea, Ana Paula Vitorino, undertook a trip to China in June 2018. In May the

following year, Minister Vitorino accompanied a delegation that included the Minister of

Natural Resources of the People’s Republic of China, Lu Hao, to the Port of Sines. This

visit, which took place within the framework of the Oceans Meeting 2019, aimed to

showcase the operations and potential of this port infrastructure, the new investment

opportunities at the port of Sines, and the potential role of Portugal and Sines in the BRI

(Silva, 2020). Promoting the port of Sines to Chinese investors, the minister emphasized

that “[it is] impossible for China to reach Europe without passing through the

westernmost country of Europe,” highlighting the need to extend the Maritime Silk Road

to this final piece of the puzzle (Silva and Pereira, 2020). The aim was to enhance the

future second container terminal, named Vasco da Gama, at the deep-water port of

Sines, as well as to expand the existing Terminal XXI – developments that would allow

the Portuguese port to accommodate even larger container ships. Portugal’s strategy was

to establish Sines as a leading port at the strategic crossroads between the Mediterranean

Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

Chinese interest in the Azores was also evident, though not openly acknowledged due to

China’s competitive stance with the U.S. (Rodrigues and Silva, 2020). Since 2012, there

were clear signs – although cloaked in traditional Chinese diplomatic symbolism – that

indicated China’s interest in the Azores, even if political actors cautiously denied this.

That year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a five-hour stop in Terceira Island, where

Lajes Base is located. The discussions paved the way for the potential creation of a

Portuguese-Chinese research center focused on marine sciences, involving the University

of the Azores. In 2014, Xi Jinping also stopped in Terceira, where he met the President

of the Regional Government of the Azores (Lusa, 2014). In 2016, Premier Li Keqiang

made a two-day visit, which reportedly led to “worries” among Washington policymakers

(Ames, 2016).

In 2017, a delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and the

Chinese Academy of Sciences visited the Azores to assess the islands’ potential for the

development of joint projects (Macao Forum, 2017). Among the scientific, business, and

political sectors, a dynamic network of contacts and interactions emerged, although the

results fell short of expectations initially raised. Specifically, the International Atlantic

Research Center (AIR Centre) was established, involving the regional government, the

University of the Azores, and the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT). The AIR

Centre brought together several international partners from the Atlantic basin, but left

out China, which did not invest in the project (Silva, 2020).

The post-financial crisis period of deepening bilateral ties between China and Portugal

had its high-water mark in 2019. Regarding the state of bilateral relations in that year,

Ambassador José Augusto Duarte stated:

In a single word: Excellent. To elaborate, despite Portugal and China having

a long-standing relationship of dialogue and mutual understanding, initiated

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in 1513 and without a single military conflict, it has been in the past 40 years

that contacts between the two countries have intensified substantially, with

all Presidents of both countries exchanging bilateral visits since 1980, the

successful negotiations for the return of Macau, and more recently, the

growth of economic relations—both in trade and investment (Duarte, 2019).

However, 2020 would bring new challenges for Europe-China relations due to a global

pandemic that disrupted the flow of globalization. COVID-19 not only interrupted routine

foreign-policy initiatives, but also introduced contentious issues in interstate relations,

including vaccine development and provision, disparate travel restrictions and lockdown

policies, and even giving rise to a ‘blame game’ over the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus

(Cabestan, 2022; Loh and Loke, 2024). Nevertheless, trade with China still provided

Portugal with an expanding outlet for exports in 2021 (p. 88).

Dancing with the Powers: Lisbon between Brussels, Washington, and

Beijing since 2019

If we take Portuguese foreign policy to be predominantly “Euroatlantic” since 1976, when

it became a liberal democracy, then there could not but be a sense of existential crisis in

2012-2015. This period saw the coincidence of America’s Asian pivot – made very real

for Portugal with the downsizing of the forces at Lajes Field – and the rigorous treatment

at the hands of European institutions during the Eurozone crisis. The acronym TINA –

standing for “There is no alternative” was used for austerity policies in several EU

countries, Portugal included, but it seemed to also apply to foreign policy. But perhaps

there was an alternative, and investment and prestige could be found elsewhere. Given

that, as we have seen, the alternative came in the shape of China, a rival great power to

the U.S., making Portugal’s receptiveness to Chinese advances a case of hedging.

Thus, it was within the constraints of a small state whose traditional diplomatic

alignments are faltering that Portugal sought to diversify its diplomatic economic

partnerships, albeit without any desire to burn bridges with its Euro-Atlantic partners. As

a member state of the EU and a founding member of NATO, Portugal has tended to align

closely with the U.S. in strategic, political, and military terms, but both in 2012-2015 and

in the post-pandemic period this alignment has recently proven contextual and moderate.

Uncertain that it could continue to draw on a supposed ‘special relationship’ with the U.S.

as a source of derivative power, Portugal has increasingly valued European “strategic

autonomy”, an idea also supported by Chinese diplomacy. But European policy towards

China has also shifted following COVID-19 pandemic, increasingly framing China as a

systemic rival, a perspective in many ways justified by China’s global ambitions and by

Trump’s own ‘America First’ agenda, which ushered in frequent great-power clashes.

In this context, China – its role in the international system and its relations with different

states – quickly became the focus of public debate, while at the same time its image in

many parts of the world began to deteriorate (Pew Research Center, 2020). This

increasingly negative perception of China resulting from the COVID-19 ‘blame game’ was

also evident in the Portuguese case, though not to the same extent as in U.S.. This may

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Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

have influenced the Portuguese government to adopt a more cautious approach in its

relations with China (Fernandes et al., 2022). Even before the pandemic, the EU had

been on the same path as a response to the pressure from the Trump administration.

The European Commission’s EU-China Strategic Outlook stated clearly that:

China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a partner for cooperation

with whom the EU has aligned objectives, a negotiation partner with whom

the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the

pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival in promoting

alternative governance models (European Commission, 2020).

In practice, however, Portugal and other states did not adhere completely to the EU’s

new line on China. The rift started to become noticeable in the Euro area crisis. As shown

by Raimundo, Stavridis and Tsardinidis (2021), the perception of a harsh treatment at

the hands of European institutions led to a relative ‘de-Europeanization’ of Portuguese

foreign policy. The authors demonstrate this precisely through Portugal’s approach to

China, which started to diverge from the EU mainstream by deepening ties with China,

albeit not as overtly as Greece and always attempting to separate political and economic

issues (p. 444).

Indeed, Portugal’s hedging behaviour was carefully limited, as it continues to prioritize

its relations with liberal democracies that have pluralistic political systems, hold free

elections, and uphold the rule of law. It does not make its privileged presence in Macau

over the centuries a differentiating factor, instead following the same diplomatic line as

the EU. It remains committed to defending the liberal international order and the

institutions that support it, and does not support revoking the current international order,

promoting illiberal values, or advocating for global “dedollarization”. Despite this,

Portugal maintains important economic relations with China, even though China has a

one-party authoritarian regime, with strong police control and very limited individual

freedoms. Beijing has reintroduced the ‘strongman’ leadership model in the figure of Xi

Jinping, to the detriment of political institutionalization (Tsang, 2024). Lisbon has stepped

back from its initial cooperative stance, now expressing some reservations. One example

is Lisbon's more cautious position regarding certain technologies, such as 5G.

European institutions adopted a cautious approach to China, balancing engagement with

security and emphasizing coordinated transatlantic strategies. Technological competition

became one of the main focal points, as the U.S. and China compete over next-generation

wireless networks and the development of leading-edge Artificial Intelligence. China has

invested heavily to achieve strategic leadership and develop a self-sufficient domestic

tech industry, while collaborating with foreign partners for expertise and market access.

These technologies raise concerns about data security, espionage, and manipulation,

especially since Chinese private companies are legally aligned with state interests,

including intelligence and military objectives, at a time when societies seek to limit digital

disinformation.

In Portugal as in many other European countries, Huawei became the focus of the tussle

between the U.S. and China over communications infrastructure (Tang, 2022). Portugal’s

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leading telecoms operator signed a memorandum of understanding for the development

of 5G networks in the country (Huawei, 2018). In a visit to Portugal in December 2019,

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned the country against the “security risk” of

allowing Chinese Huawei into its telecommunications system, to which Chinese diplomacy

responded by accusing the U.S. of “Cold War mentality” (DN, 2019). The U.S. stepped

up the pressure over the following year, with several U.S. officials, including the

Ambassador, prodding Portugal to reject Huawei involvement in any part of its

communications network (Lusa and Público, 2020). Eventually, Lisbon bucked to

American pressure and aligned with European policy on the issue through a 2023

deliberation of the High Council for Cyberspace Security

declaring 5G technology to be

a “high risk” matter from which countries not belonging to the EU, NATO, or the OECD

should be excluded as partners (PCM, 2023).

Thus, Portuguese hedging was curbed as the government clearly began to shift its

previous relationship with China, aligning more closely with the Euro-Atlantic axis.

Reports began to be published, and information disseminated about the dangers of

Chinese technology, fuelling public concern. The 2018 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI,

2019) ranked Portugal 42nd globally and 25th in Europe, a relatively modest position. By

comparison, Spain ranks 7th globally and 5th in Europe; the U.S. is 2nd worldwide,

following the United Kingdom, while China ranks 25th globally. The 2020 Annual Internal

Security Report (RASI), submitted to the Portuguese Parliament in March 2021,

mentioned an increase in state-sponsored cyber-espionage originating from China and

Russia (Portuguese Government, 2020).

Conclusion

Framed by the chronology of Portugal’s relationship with the U.S. and of Portugal’s

difficult relationship with the EU during the Euro area crisis, the ‘intensification’ of

Portuguese-Chinese dialogue certainly appears to be prompted by the simultaneous

failure of the two pillars of Portugal’s Euroatlanticist foreign policy; in other words, a case

of hedging. Thus, Portugal’s position in the contemporary world is divided between its

long-standing diplomatic commitments and the new opportunities for cooperation with

rising powers. In a context marked by competition between China and the U.S., smaller

and less powerful actors such as Portugal are compelled to carefully manage their

external relationships. The country’s alignment with the liberal democratic sphere, and

particularly with Washington, forms the foundation of its foreign relations. Due to the

physical, political, and cultural distance – despite centuries of interaction – Portugal’s

relationship with Beijing is less evident and close. It does not appear that it has ever

been China’s intention to converge with Western political values and models, and for that

reason, the relationship will always remain of secondary importance.

The Euro area crisis, which coincided with a difficult period in Luso-American relations,

created the conditions for the country to pursue a somewhat different path. Its closer

relationship with China, however, was one of occasional and transactional opportunities

rather than a structural partnership. The two nations belong to distinct political spheres

Conselho Superior de Segurança do Ciberespaço.

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Jorge Tavares da Silva, Tomé Ribeiro Gomes

that are now on a collision course, even though Lisbon’s openness to the Global South

remains intact. This outcome appears to support the idea that hedging is becoming more

difficult to carry out in a world where great-power conflict is more intense. Portugal did

not abandon any of its traditional relationships, and the dominant narrative about its

foreign policy remained that of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’. However, Portugal also welcomed

China’s soft-power advances, receiving investment in areas critical to national security,

such as the electric grid, potentially sowing the seeds of future vulnerability to pressure

from the rising systemic rival of the U.S.. From these circumstances, it appears that the

main driver of that hedging behaviour was the economic and financial crisis. If that were

all – if Portugal was only seeking resources for domestic reasons – the idea that Portugal

was not strategic about its hedging would be strengthened.

However, it should not be forgotten that in 2012-2015 the U.S. had downsized their

military presence in the Azores and showed little openness to the attempts of Portuguese

diplomacy to find alternatives to it. If the feeling of being (at least partly) abandoned by

its traditional great-power ally influenced in Portugal’s decisions regarding the deepening

of ties of China, then an external driver is added to the more obvious domestic

motivation. One indication of this is the way in which the outreach to China was used by

policymakers to improve their negotiating position vis-à-vis the U.S. over the Lajes Base

issue. After the announcement of the American drawdown, national newspaper Público

retroactively interpreted Wen Jiabao’s visit a few months earlier as a useful

demonstration of Chinese interest in using the base themselves (Lourenço, 2012). After

diplomatic efforts failed and the downsizing went ahead in 2015, the President of the

Azorean Regional Government, Vasco Cordeiro, gave an interview to national broadcaster

RTP where he was asked whether if the country might “think about delivering Lajes to

China as a way to put pressure on the Americans”. He rejected any military use by

Chinese forces but pointedly did not do so for civilian uses (RTP, 2015), suggesting that

China had indeed become a trump card in negotiations with the U.S..

In this account, hedging appears as a conscious, and therefore strategic, choice. Whether

that strategy was one of ‘signalling’ to the U.S. that Portugal had value as an ally, or one

of seeking an ‘insurance policy’ against complete abandonment for the U.S. – or indeed

both – is a question worthy of future scholarly attention. Answering it matters not only

for the burgeoning academic literature on hedging and its use by European small states,

but also because, after COVID-19 and now faced with a more unilateral U.S. foreign

policy, Portugal may be tempted to resume its hedging behaviour towards China. If Prime

Minister’s Luís Montenegro’s trip to China in September 2025 is any indication, this

question will continue to demand an answer in the coming years.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

HYBRID ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS IN MACAO SAR: BETWEEN

NAPOLEONIC AND CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS

JOÃO CARLOS CORTESÃO FARIA

joao.faria@ipleiria.pt

He is an Invited Assistant Lecturer at the School of Technology and Management, Polytechnic of

Leiria (Portugal). He is currently a doctoral candidate in Public Administration at the Institute of

Social and Political Sciences, University of Lisbon, where he is supported by an FCT–CCCM

doctoral fellowship (ISCSP-ULisboa). His research is funded by the Foundation for Science and

Technology (FCT) through the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre Doctoral Grant

(PRT/BD/154975/2024). His scholarly interests lie at the intersection of public administration,

governance, and the evolving institutional dynamics linking Portugal, Europe, and the Lusophone

world. https://orcid.org/0009-0007-7986-175X

ANABELA RODRIGUES SANTIAGO

Anabela_Santiago@iscte-iul.pt

She holds a PhD in Public Policies from the University of Aveiro. She is a Researcher at the Centre

for International Studies (CEI) of Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (Portugal) and an

external researcher at GOVCOPP (Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies), University of

Aveiro. Her work focuses on global governance, international policy diffusion, and the European

Union’s scientific diplomacy toward the Global South, including Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

She is an active member of COST Action SiDnet – Science in Diplomacy Network, where she

contributes to the development of analytical frameworks for understanding EU scientific

diplomacy. In addition, she is a member of COST Action CHERN – China in Europe Research

Network (WG1), through which she has participated in several international research missions

and training initiatives, including: i) a scientific mission mapping Chinese investments in the

agri-food sector (University College Cork); ii) the CHERN Training School China Scholarship and

Policy Advice: Reaching Out to Policy-makers (European Commission, Brussels); and iii) a

scientific mission mapping Chinese health-related projects associated with the Belt and Road

Initiative in Europe (University College London). Her research portfolio reflects a sustained

engagement with contemporary geopolitical, economic, and diplomatic relations between Europe

and China, as well as broader transformations in global governance. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-3897-0323

Abstract

Macao is a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, governed by the

principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems’. With a Portuguese historical legacy lasting more than

400 years, which continued until December 1999, we consider that the Region has a very

particular model of public administration and is undergoing a gradual process of administrative

reform, which is the subject of this article. Its public administration is not limited to a linear

continuation of the Portuguese period, nor is it a simple transposition of the administrative

model of the People's Republic of China; rather, it is a hybrid configuration, in which the

Napoleonic legacy (of Portuguese origin) provides a resilient legal-administrative support,

recontextualized by a post-1999 political-administrative logic associated with the Chinese

administrative tradition (of Confucian origin). The results point to a configuration in which the

legal and administrative support remains predominantly Napoleonic (legalism, uniformity,

legal and administrative control mechanisms), while the political logic shows Confucian traits

(centrality of the executive, vertical accountability and primacy of stability). We conclude that

Macao exhibits a relatively stable hybrid model, resulting from the coexistence and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 32-54

Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

recombination of distinct (but also similar) administrative traditions, with incremental

adaptations that preserve the inherited legalistic basis and simultaneously reinforce political

coordination mechanisms typical of the Chinese context.

Keywords

Administrative traditions, Macao SAR, One Country, Two Systems, Napoleonic and Chinese

tradition.

Resumo

Macau é uma Região Administrativa Especial da República Popular da China, regida pelo

princípio de “Um País, Dois Sistemas”. Com um legado histórico português com mais de quatro

séculos, que perdurou até dezembro de 1999, consideramos que a Região apresenta um

modelo de administração pública particularmente singular e atualmente em processo gradual

de reforma administrativa — objeto central deste estudo. A sua administração pública não

constitui uma mera continuidade linear do período português, nem resulta de uma simples

transposição do modelo administrativo da República Popular da China; trata‑se, antes, de uma

configuração híbrida, em que o legado napoleónico (de matriz portuguesa) fornece um suporte

jurídico‑administrativo resiliente, recontextualizado por uma lógica político‑administrativos

pós‑1999 associada à tradição administrativa chinesa (de origem confuciana). Os resultados

apontam para uma configuração na qual o enquadramento jurídico‑administrativo permanece

predominantemente napoleónico (legalismo, uniformidade, mecanismos de controlo jurídico

e administrativo), enquanto a lógica política revela traços confucianos (centralidade do

executivo, responsabilização vertical e primazia da estabilidade). Concluímos que Macau

apresenta um modelo híbrido relativamente estável, resultante da coexistência e

recombinação de tradições administrativas distintas - embora também similares - com

adaptações incrementais que preservam a base legalista herdada e, simultaneamente,

reforçam mecanismos de coordenação política típicos do contexto chinês.

Palavras-chave

Tradições administrativas, RAEM de Macau, Um País, Dois Sistemas, Tradição napoleónica e

chinesa.

How to cite this article

Faria, João Carlos Cortesão & Santiago, Anabela Rodrigues (2026). Hybrid Administrative

Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese Administrative Traditions. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 32-54.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.2

Article submitted on 3rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 12th January

2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 32-54

Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

HYBRID ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITIONS IN MACAO SAR:

BETWEEN NAPOLEONIC AND CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE

TRADITIONS

JOÃO CARLOS CORTESÃO FARIA

ANABELA RODRIGUES SANTIAGO

1. Introduction

In recent decades, public administration reforms have established themselves as key

instruments for modernizing the state, with a view to improving the efficiency,

effectiveness, transparency, integrity and quality of public services. In this context, the

Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) is particularly relevant: the transfer of

administration to China (20 December 1999), negotiated following the Sino-Portuguese

Joint Declaration (1987), presented the MSAR with the challenge of preserving

institutional continuity and stability, while adjusting structures, practices and public

policies to the new political and socio-economic conditions.

The singularity of Macao's public administration results from an unusual historical and

institutional overlap. On the one hand, over centuries, the region consolidated an

administrative model associated with the Napoleonic tradition, characterized by legalism,

procedural formalism, centralization and a legal-administrative regime. On the other

hand, the post-1999 period has intensified the influence of the Chinese administrative

tradition, marked by a strong primacy of executive power, hierarchy and state-centric

coordination, with a political-administrative relationship that is often more fused than

separate. Comparatively speaking, the case of Macao suggests that the “hybridity” in

SARs should be specified by the traditions in interaction. Unlike Hong Kong – often read

as a hybrid dynamic between Anglo-Saxon administrative institutions and Chinese

governance – in Macao, hybridity results from the combination of a Napoleonic legal-

administrative legacy and Chinese mechanisms of political-administrative coordination.

This study therefore has the following main objective: to understand how Napoleonic and

Chinese traditions have conditioned and shaped this process, contributing to the

contemporary configuration of a hybrid model of public governance in the MSAR. The

research question focuses on: how do Napoleonic and Chinese traditions influence

Macao's public administration, making it a hybrid case?

The results show that Napoleonic and Chinese administrative traditions influence

administrative reform in Macao not as parallel legacies, but as interacting mechanisms.

The Napoleonic legacy provides a resilient legal-administrative infrastructure – legalism,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 32-54

Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

uniformity, procedural predictability and strong legal scrutiny – through which reform

tends to advance incrementally and stabilize institutionally. At the same time, post-1999

political and administrative logics have reconfigured the exercise of authority and the

way accountability is organised: the centrality of the executive, the fusion of politics and

administration, and a predominantly vertical chain of accountability structure the conduct

of reform, leadership control, and administrative coordination. The result is a relatively

stable hybrid configuration, in which legal continuity sustains capacity and predictability,

while vertical coordination conditions priorities, elite control, and practical limits on

participation and democratic accountability.

2. Administrative Traditions: Concept and Administrative Hybridity,

Dimensions

For Peters (2008), an administrative tradition can be understood as “an historically based

set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature

of appropriate public administration within society” (p. 118). Administrative traditions

have roots that go back centuries and continue to influence current administrative

behavior. It is important to note that, although rooted in the past, administrative

traditions are not static (Peters, 2021). They interact with new ideas, constraints and

political dynamics, producing patterns of change over time (Painter & Peters, 2010b).

Peters (2021) argues that, despite their historical origins, traditions have contemporary

relevance and continue to influence the patterns of public bureaucracies. As Painter and

Peters (2010a) and Peters (2021) point out, administrative traditions impose paths of

development (path dependence) that explain why different countries, subject to similar

international pressures for reforms inspired by management models, follow different

reform trajectories conditioned by their institutionalized legacies.

In the field of comparative public administration science, several authors have identified

families of countries that share similar administrative traditions due to common historical

and cultural experiences (Heady, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2025; Painter & Peters, 2010a).

Painter and Peters (2010b), for example, classified national bureaucracies into four major

families: Anglo-Saxon, Napoleonic (or continental European), Germanic, and Nordic

(Scandinavian), to which they add the administrative traditions of post-colonial Latin

America, South Asia, and Africa, East Asia, the Soviet Union, and the Islamic world.

Recent literature recognizes that classic “families” of administrative traditions do not

always accurately capture the empirical diversity of administrative systems. In Jugl’s

(2025) study, administrative traditions are reconceptualized and measured in two

dimensions – citizen orientation and structural concentration –, which appear to be

largely independent, allowing for empirical observation of multiple combinations of

characteristics and relevant variation within the supposed families. Despite this, the

author shows that much of the literature continues to operationalize administrative

traditions through categorical classifications (“families”), often with little empirical

transparency, which limits systematic comparison and the identification of more nuanced

patterns.

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In theoretical terms, a hybrid administrative tradition describes an administrative system

that combines elements from different families or historical-administrative legacies. Jugl

(2025) observes that administrative traditions often exhibit a hybrid nature and openness

to exogenous ideas. In fact, the literature on public administration recognizes that:

Traditions are likely to be hybrid and more complex than what is suggested

by the AT families and the previous focus on paradigmatic cases; and while

hybridity is acknowledged in the theoretical discussion on AT (...) it has

hardly been studied empirically in comparative public administration (Jugl,

2025, pp. 13–14).

Precisely because hybridity refers to variable combinations of attributes – and not just to

belonging to a “family” – it becomes analytically useful to break down administrative

tradition into dimensions. In Tradition and Public Administration (2010a), Painter and

Peters propose a comparative framework to clarify the concept of administrative

traditions, operationalizing it through four analytical dimensions: (i) State and Society;

(ii) Law vs. Management; (iii) Administration and Politics; and (iv) Accountability.

The first dimension (State and Society) encompasses both the conceptualization of the

State (whether understood as an organic entity or as a contractual construct) and the

role it assumes in relation to society and the economy. This includes contrasting models

such as a centralized and interventionist State versus a limited State oriented toward

safeguarding market guarantees. Traditionally, comparative analyses have highlighted,

for instance, the organic conception of the State prevalent in continental traditions, where

the State is regarded as the embodiment of the common good and vested with legitimate

authority to shape societal structures. This stands in sharp contrast to the more

contractual perspective characteristic of Anglo-Saxon traditions, in which the State is

conceived as the outcome of a social agreement, with functions narrowly defined and

constrained by societal consent.

This dimension is critical because it reflects foundational assumptions about sovereignty,

legitimacy, and the scope of governmental authority. The organic view, rooted in

continental European thought, tends to emphasize hierarchical integration and normative

unity, positioning the State as a moral and political agent responsible for articulating

collective interests and ensuring social cohesion. Conversely, the contractual paradigm,

deeply embedded in liberal Anglo-American traditions, prioritizes individual autonomy

and market mechanisms, framing the State as a neutral arbiter whose legitimacy derives

from consent rather than transcendental notions of the common good. These divergent

conceptions have profound implications for administrative design, policy-making, and the

balance between regulation and freedom, shaping not only institutional architectures but

also the normative expectations of governance within different cultural and historical

contexts.

The second dimension (Law vs. Management) lies in the role conception of the

administrative systems: the juridical administrator who applies codified law with

procedural correctness (strong in Napoleonic/Germanic traditions) versus the managerial

administrator who prioritizes results, efficiency, and organizational performance (strong

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in Anglo-American traditions). This dimension is particularly significant because it reveals

the normative foundations and operational priorities of administrative systems. A

legalistic orientation, deeply rooted in continental European and Napoleonic traditions,

emphasizes procedural correctness, predictability, and the supremacy of law as a

safeguard of legitimacy and equality before the State. In such systems, administrative

discretion is minimized, and compliance with codified norms is considered the

cornerstone of public integrity. Conversely, managerial approaches, inspired by Anglo-

American pragmatism and reinforced by the doctrines of NPM, privilege outcomes over

processes, advocating for flexibility, innovation, and performance metrics as drivers of

administrative effectiveness (Painter & Peters, 2010a; Peters, 2021). This shift from rule-

bound administration to results-oriented governance reflects broader transformations in

public sector paradigms, including the diffusion of private-sector management techniques

and the growing emphasis on accountability through measurable outputs rather than

formal adherence to legal norms. The tension between these two orientations continues

to shape contemporary debates on administrative reform, efficiency, and democratic

legitimacy (Painter & Peters, 2010a; Peters, 2021).

The dimension of “Administration and Politics” addresses the degree of politicization

within the civil service and the structural relationship between political and administrative

spheres. It asks to what extent political actors (such as elected officials and parties)

shape the internal functioning of public administration, particularly regarding

appointments, career progression, and bureaucratic decision-making. As Peters (2021)

emphasizes, this dimension is crucial for distinguishing administrative traditions. In

contractarian systems, such as those within the Anglo-American tradition, the normative

ideal is a clear separation between politics and administration, grounded in principles of

neutrality, merit, and permanence. The British civil service model exemplifies this

approach, conceiving the bureaucracy as an instrument of law rather than an extension

of partisan authority. Conversely, organic conceptions of the State, typical of Napoleonic

or patrimonial traditions, foster more permeable boundaries between politics and

administration. In these contexts, political control over the bureaucracy is often

institutionalized through patronage or systems such as the spoils system, historically

prevalent in the United States (Painter & Peters, 2010a; Peters, 2021). This dimension

also reflects contemporary tensions. Reforms inspired by NPM have introduced

performance-based accountability and contractual appointments, challenging the

traditional separation of roles. However, historical institutionalist perspectives

underscore the resilience of inherited patterns: administrative traditions act as “default

options,” shaping the trajectory and interpretation of reforms.

Finally, “Accountability” reflects how the bureaucracy is held responsible for its actions

and decisions. Mechanisms of accountability vary across administrative traditions and

can be broadly categorized into legal/formal controls and political/public controls.

Legalistic approaches emphasize compliance with codified norms and hierarchical

supervision, enforced through instruments such as administrative courts, audit courts,

inspectorates, and internal procedural rules. In contrast, political and societal

mechanisms rely on parliamentary oversight, media scrutiny, and civil society

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engagement, prioritizing transparency and responsiveness (Painter & Peters, 2010a;

Peters, 2021).

As developed by the same authors, further distinction concerns the timing of

accountability:

− Ex ante accountability involves preventive measures, such as prior

authorization or legal review before administrative action (e.g., the role

of the Conseil d’État in Napoleonic systems).

− Ex post accountability occurs after decisions are implemented, through

audits, judicial review, parliamentary inquiries, or electoral processes.

This dimension is critical for understanding variations in governance, as it shapes the

incentives and behaviour of public officials, influences administrative culture, and

determines the degree of openness and trust between State and Society.

These four dimensions proposed in 2010 provided an initial analytical framework for

comparing and contrasting administrative families. However, subsequent research has

broadened this set of attributes to capture additional relevant characteristics. In his most

recent work, Administrative Traditions: Understanding the Roots of Contemporary

Administrative Behavior (Peters, 2021), the author retained the original axes while

incorporating further elements to offer a more comprehensive view of administrative

traditions.

Among the additions, four dimensions stand out.

The fifth dimension concerns the orientation of public administration toward authority

versus service to citizens. This attribute, referred to by Peters as the “Administration

versus Service” dimension, examines whether public officials primarily conceive of

themselves as executors of laws and programs defined by political leaders (the classical

administrative function) or as service providers oriented toward meeting the needs and

expectations of citizens as “clients” of public services. This dimension, introduced in

Peters’ 2021 book, reflects the influence of recent paradigms such as citizen-oriented

management and the concept of public service motivation, even though it remains

relatively underexplored in the literature. It signals a normative shift from a state-centric,

rule-bound conception of administration toward models emphasizing responsiveness, co-

production, and user satisfaction. These developments challenge traditional bureaucratic

identities and raise governance-related questions about the balance between legality,

efficiency, and democratic legitimacy.

The sixth dimension is “The Career”. This dimension refers to the extent to which public

employment constitutes a distinct civil service career, clearly differentiated from political

careers and private-sector employment, and to whether officials tend (or not) to remain

in government for most of their working lives.

The seventh dimension is “State and Society II” that is, the legitimate role played by

societal actors (e.g., interest groups, experts, and citizens) in shaping public policy, both

in its formulation and implementation.

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The eighth and final dimension is “Uniformity”. Uniformity refers to the extent to which

the State can ensure that public administration applies policies and procedures in a

similar way across the entire territory, limiting variation between services and regions.

3. Napoleonic and Chinese Administrative Tradition

In the case of the Macao Special Administrative Region, for example, we consider the

coexistence between the Napoleonic administrative tradition (as Macao was a territory

under Portuguese administration for more than four centuries) and the Chinese

administrative tradition (with origins dating back to the Qin dynasty) explains not only

how changes were implemented, but also the resistance and adaptations that occurred

over time – allowing us to analyze the case of the Macao Special Administrative Region

as a cluster of the coexistence of two administrative traditions.

Table 1 summarizes the similarities and differences between the Napoleonic and Asian

(Confucian, which was largely influenced by China) administrative traditions. This allows

us to illustrate how the overlap of these two administrative traditions – the European

legal and organizational structure and the values and mechanisms of Chinese

administration – manifests itself in the administrative practice of the Macao Special

Administrative Region

Table 1 - Napoleonic and Asian (Confucian) Traditions

State tradition

Napoleonic

Asian (Confucian)

Law vs. management

Organic

Administration and politics

Law

Mixed

Administration or service

Fused

State and society II

Administration

Uniformity

Mixed

Pluralist/illegitimate

Accountability

Uniform

Source: Authors based on Peters (2021, p. 162)

3.1 Napoleonic Administrative Tradition

Our analysis refers to the Napoleonic model, developed in France in the 18th and 19th

centuries, which influenced southern European countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy,

and Greece (Painter & Peters, 2010a). This model reflects the influence of the

Enlightenment, especially Rousseau's theory of democracy and Montesquieu's separation

of powers (Ziller, 2003). In these systems, the law serves as a tool of the State to

organize and control society, not just to resolve conflicts between individuals. Public

administration is heavily regulated by a legal hierarchy that includes the Constitution,

laws, regulations, and other norms, which consequently exercise strict control over what

civil servants can do, through specialized courts (Painter & Peters, 2010a; B. G. Peters,

2008).

Our analysis didn’t include the element “career”.

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The French State is centralized and technocratic, playing an important role in nation-

building. Senior positions in public administration are held by an administrative elite who

were educated at prestigious schools. These officials often transition from public service

to political office seamlessly, as their roles are clearly defined by law. In southern

European countries, there is a great deal of legal formalism, or many rules and

procedures. However, in practice, informal arrangements are often used to achieve

objectives. This encourages clientelism, patronage, nepotism, and sometimes corruption.

Additionally, appointments are highly politicized, and many public positions are used as

political favors. This contributes to an excess of civil servants and a less professional and

less efficient administration (Painter & Peters, 2010a; B. G. Peters, 2008).

Thus, the Napoleonic administrative tradition is characterized by an organic conception

of the State, in which the State is invested with legitimate power to exercise authority

over society. It is also characterized by a highly centralized and hierarchical state

structure with little room for interest groups to intervene in the public policy-making

process. This intervention is even seen as illegitimate. Additionally, it is a tradition

marked by the primacy of formalism and legalism, or the principle of legality, which

shapes administrative action around legal norms (Painter & Peters, 2010b; Peters, 2008).

3.2 Chinese Administrative Tradition

China has the oldest and most deeply rooted administrative system in the world. Its

origins date back to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) through a highly bureaucratic system

that is considered one of the most enduring elements of Chinese civilization (Dwivedi,

2003). The Chinese administrative tradition reflects a long history of centralization and

hierarchical control, shaped by cultural values and philosophies rooted in Confucianism

and legalism (Dong et al., 2010; Dwivedi, 2003).

Painter e Peters (2010b) argue that the Confucian administrative tradition combines

philosophical ideas with practices of the Chinese empire, and it is possible to verify that

the Confucian administrative tradition (principles of virtue, meritocracy, rituals, and

reciprocity) is, for Painter and Peters (2010b), the ideological matrix that gave rise to

the Chinese administrative tradition. Although the Chinese administrative tradition has

undergone numerous “reinterpretations” (Yuan, Ming, Qing, Republic, Maoism), Cheung

(2010b) notes that the Confucian core has persisted in people's mindsets.

The Confucian administrative tradition combines philosophical ideas with Chinese

imperial practices. During the Han era, scholars began to integrate into the State as

mandarins, linking the central government to local authorities. In Confucianism, ritual

and reciprocity-maintained order better than laws. Relying on virtuous men could lead to

favoritism, but meritocracy prevailed: scholars were recruited through imperial

examinations, assessing literacy and knowledge of the classics. Despite this,

examinations could fail or be corrupted (Painter & Peters, 2010a). Despite the destruction

of imperial institutions by the republican revolution and the communist regime, the

Confucian core – especially moral leadership, hierarchical relationships, and the ruler's

obligation to cultivate virtue – remained in the mindsets of Chinese cadres. Even in Mao's

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restructuring, cadres were evaluated for their moral integrity and paternalistic style. It

was only after the reforms of the late 1970s that these values came to be presented as

“socialist virtues,” but their impact on administrative culture remained unquestionable.

The influence of continental Europe on Chinese administration became particularly visible

from the late 19th century onwards, when the need to modernize the State was

recognized (Cheung, 2010). Inspired by French legal codes and the Prussian bureaucratic

model, Chinese reformers adapted principles such as the uniform codification of laws and

the creation of ministries organized by function (Painter & Peters, 2010b). Thus, a

continental-style legal system was introduced that coexisted with the Confucian tradition

of hierarchy and meritocracy (Peters, 2021) which we can analyse in Table 2.

Table 2 – Asian traditions (Confucian), European Transplants

Transplant

Confucian

Continental Europe

Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam

[to this set we add Macao]

Anglo-American

Hong Kong, Singapore

Source: Authors based on Peters (2010b), p. 26)

China's administrative tradition continues to evolve, especially in the context of reforms

that began at the end of the 20th century. These reforms maintain centralization and

hierarchical principles as basic foundations while incorporating modernization and anti-

corruption mechanisms. The goal is to strengthen ethics in public services and increase

the efficiency of public administration (Alsancak et al., 2022; Cheung, 2010; Dong et al.,

2010).

4. Methodology

The research is based on a qualitative design, structured as a case study of the Macao

SAR, understood as an institutional configuration where elements of the Napoleonic

administrative tradition (legacy of Portuguese administration) and the Chinese

administrative tradition (of Confucian origin) coexist and combine.

Specifically, the analysis is organized according to the seven dimensions we identified in

the literature, allowing us to observe whether the MSAR is closer to a Napoleonic model,

a Confucian model, or a combination of the two. The grid is applied to the following

dimensions: (i) State–society I; (ii) law vs. management; (iii) administration and politics;

(iv) administration vs. service; (v) State–society II; (vi) uniformity; and (vii)

accountability

The evidence strategy is predominantly documental and bibliographical, combining: (a)

academic literature on administrative traditions and administrative reforms; (b) legal-

institutional and governance references relevant to the political-administrative design of

In our analysis, we chose to exclude the dimension “The Career”, since, in Peters’ original framework (2021),

this dimension is not used in the comparison of European and Asian administrative traditions (see p. 162).

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the MSAR; and (c) secondary information supporting the bibliographical references. This

triple approach allows us to sustain a dimensional reading without relying on a single

source or a single type of evidence.

The point is, hybridity shouldn't be seen as a static mix of “Portuguese” and “Chinese”

traits. Administrative traditions have historical roots, but remain open to recombination

under new political constraints and under the influence of ideas of modernization;

therefore, the decisive point is to understand how competing logics are activated,

reconciled or hierarchized in different arenas of governance. Based on this premise, we

treat Macao's hybridity as an empirical question: across the seven dimensions, we

identify observable indicators associated with Napoleonic legalism and Chinese political-

administrative coordination, examining how their interaction shapes path dependence in

the MSAR.

Finally, it is important to highlight a methodological limitation: as this is primarily a

documental and conceptual analysis, the study focuses on characterizing the model and

its logic, and could be further developed in subsequent works using additional methods

(e.g. interviews with managers and technicians, observation of implementation, analysis

of administrative processes) to test in greater detail how hybridity translates into

administrative routines and concrete public policy outcomes.

5. Discussion and results

Based on the theoretical framework and the data collected, the assumptions that Macao

harbours characteristics from two major administrative traditions – Napoleonic and

Confucian (Chinese) – resulting in a hybrid model are confirmed. In this section, we

discuss the dimensional results of the analysis, examining each of the seven dimensions

in the context of Macao, in light of administrative traditions. In each dimension, we

identify the aspects that correspond to the Portuguese/Napoleonic legacy, those that

reflect Chinese/Confucian influence, and how the interaction between the two shapes the

current policies and administration of the MSAR.

Table 3 - Napoleonic and Confucian (Chinese) traditions: Macao’s positioning

Aspect

Macao as hybrid

configuration tradition

Justification

State tradition

Organic

Strong executive; priority given to

stability/order (“One Country, Two

Systems” with central oversight).

Law vs.

management

Mixed elements law

Rule-based culture; incremental

modernisation (simplification,

e-government, performance management).

Administration

and politics

Fused

Appointments and control of senior

management by the Chief Executive;

criteria of trust/political loyalty.

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Administration

and service

Administration with

service elements

“Serving the people” and improvements in

service (one-stop, quality letters), but

formalistic/bureaucratic routines persist.

State and

society II

Mixed, tending to

limited

Many advisory councils and dense

associations, but with a government

agenda and limited autonomy (risk of

formal consulting).

Uniformity

Uniform

Small region; lack of autonomous local

power; common procedures/statutes

(uniformity “from within”).

Accountability

Predominantly legal

with mixed elements

Predominance of legal and ex post control:

courts (including Administrative Court) +

CACC + Audit Commission; more limited

political-democratic scrutiny.

Source: Authors3

5.1 State and Society - I

According to Yee (2001), the transition and institutional design of the MSAR are based

on a strongly state-centric model of governance: the process is led by Beijing in

cooperation with pro-China economic and associative elites, while the population remains

largely in a political culture of “subjects”, valuing stability, order and government

leadership. This combination of a strong executive, elite consensus and paternalism

reinforces the idea of a Special Administrative Region that combines Napoleonic centralist

organicism with the Chinese administrative tradition of benevolent authority (Castellucci,

2012). Indicators of this are evident in multiple aspects.

Constitutionally, the Basic Law of Macao confers significant powers on the Chief

Executive, a single-person body that accumulates the functions of head of government

and concentrates executive power. The Chief Executive is not elected by universal

suffrage, but chosen and appointed by the Central People's Government of China

(Gouveia, 2012). The legitimacy of the Macao SAR government does not come from

universal suffrage, but from a process defined by the central authority (Beijing),

reinforcing the notion of a tutelary State: ultimately, it is the Chinese State that delegates

authority to the Macao government (Gouveia, 2012). However, within Macao, this

authority is exercised in a Napoleonic manner and centralized (Chou, 2004; Peters,

2021).

Another indicator of the organic and centralizing character of the Macao Region is the

absence of significant challenges to its authority or movements that question the

prominent role of the government. Research indicates that, even after the transition,

Macao's civil society remained relatively weak and submissive, with high levels of trust

or, at least, passive acceptance of authority on the part of citizens (Ho, 2015; Kwong,

2011). As Choi (2011) points out, relations between Macao and the Central Government

have been marked by cooperation, but it is clear that the national interests defined by

The authors present the results based on Table 1, structured according to the analytical dimensions proposed

by Peters (2021).

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Beijing take precedence in the strategic guidelines of the Macao SAR. This means that

Macao is part of a framework of sovereignty in which the State (in this case, the Chinese

State through its local representative) retains the right and duty to govern the territory

according to broader national objectives, which take precedence over local requests.

There was therefore no contractualist or liberal reorientation of the Region after 1999;

on the contrary, Macao's autonomy was designed to strengthen national unity and the

stability of the Chinese State.

Understanding (the organic nature of the State) as an entity with its own will and

interests, above particular groups, is also evident in official discourse that justifies

reforms or policies by appealing to the global public interest. The 2025 Government

Action Lines, for example, mention goals such as “raising governance capacity” and

“strengthening awareness of the big picture” among civil servants, which suggests that

they are expected to think of the administration as a whole serving the common good,

rather than segmented by sectoral interests. This rhetoric echoes the French tradition of

service to the intérêt général (Chevallier, 1975), with the difference that in Macao such

general interest is also aligned with the strategic guidelines defined by Beijing (e.g.,

economic diversification, social stability, patriotism).

5.2 Law vs. Management

Macao's administrative structure preserves a strong legal tradition, inherited from the

Napoleonic model (based on its Roman-Germanic roots), where legality is central to

administrative action. This legal tradition is evident in the maintenance of the

administrative law system, the hierarchical administrative organization and the

supremacy of written law (Godinho, 2016; Xinyu, 2016).

Under Portuguese administration, Macao operated under a legal system based on the

European continental model – the Administrative Code (Torrão, 2016), the Penal Code,

the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, laws and regulations (Mendes, 2013) – and the

local bureaucracy was accustomed to formal procedures, paperwork and strict

compliance with legal regulations (Bolong, 2011).

With the transition to China approaching, the need to modernize administration by

incorporating public management concepts was identified (Lam, 2011). Not

coincidentally, this period coincided globally with the spread of New Public Management

(NPM) (Bouckaert & Pollitt, 2011). Thus, as early as the 1990s, and intensifying after

1999, the case of Macao revealed a path of balance between the legalistic heritage of the

Portuguese system and international pressures to adopt modern management practices

after the transition period (Kei, 2005; Lam, 2011).

As described by Yu (2011), Edmund Ho's government (1999-2009) introduced

competitive recruitment systems and periodic performance evaluations, in addition to

investing in professional training for civil servants, measures characteristic of a

managerial approach aimed at improving the quality of public service. These reforms

denote the incorporation of NPM principles – meritocracy, performance-based human

resource management, management skills development – signaling a shift from purely

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legal-bureaucratic administration to one concerned with results and efficiency (Bouckaert

& Pollitt, 2011).

Another example is the digitalization and simplification of administrative procedures,

which began in the 2000s and sought to reduce excessive red tape and streamline the

provision of public services (Choi, 2011). Integrated service centers, e-government

platforms and more user-oriented processes (one-stop services) were created,

highlighting management's concern with service quality and policy effectiveness (Yu,

2011).

These initiatives are reflected in government discourse: successive Chief Executives have

emphasized the importance of modernization and administrative efficiency in their Policy

Addresses. For example, during the Chui Sai On administration (2009–2019), “e-

governance” and “administrative simplification” programs were launched to improve

internal efficiency and convenience for citizens. According to the Government Action

Guidelines for the 2020 financial year, both the Public Administration and the legal

system of Macao, which have been in operation for more than two decades, show signs

of maladjustment in the face of socio-economic changes in the Region – demonstrating

limitations in their ability to respond to the new demands of society and, as a result,

progressively falling short of the population's expectations in terms of the effectiveness,

efficiency, transparency and quality of public services (Mota, 2019).

In conclusion, Macao has transitioned from a predominantly procedural legalistic

administration to a legalistic administration with management features. Legal norms and

procedures continue to guide state action (and legitimize decisions before the law), but

there is greater concern with performance, quality and efficiency, evident in

administrative reforms and government discourse. This synthesis highlights the hybrid

nature of the system: the Napoleonic tradition provided the legal-bureaucratic backbone,

while the contemporary influence of New Public Management and the pragmatism of the

Chinese administrative tradition brought in elements of public management. The result

was a gradual improvement in efficiency (for example, Macao has high levels of

government effectiveness according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators

(Government Effectiveness dimension). The score rose from 55.98 (percentile) in 1998

to 72.44 in 2010, reaching 73.04 in 2022, reflecting a continuous improvement in the

perception of the quality of public services, policy formulation and implementation, and

government credibility).

5.3 Administration and Politics

During the Portuguese colonial period, especially in the final decades (1980–1999),

Macao did not have a fully democratic system: The Governor, appointed by the President

of the Portuguese Republic, concentrated executive powers and relevant legislative

powers, assisted by a only partially elected council and a Legislative Assembly with a

mixed composition, resulting from direct and indirect suffrage, with a strong presence of

organized interests (Cardinal, 2008; Shiu-Hing, 1989). In this context, management

positions in the administration were often filled by political appointment.

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Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

Yee (2001) characterizes the Portuguese administration in the final decades as an

executive-centered and politicized system: The Governor and under-secretaries were

political appointments and, although directors and deputy directors were formally career

civil servants, many were recruited from Portugal on a contractual basis and linked by

personal relationships to the under-secretaries, tending to leave when their “patrons”

were replaced. This pattern reinforced the politicization of top appointments and

constrained the progression of local staff. There was thus politicization of appointments

at the top, which is consistent with characteristics often associated with the Napoleonic

administrative tradition: permeability between political and administrative careers, the

presence of a logic of ‘spoils’ and the politicization of senior positions (Ongaro, 2010).

However, after the transition of Macao's administration to China, the top ranks of the

administration – secretaries, directors of services and other senior positions – came

under the direct control of the new Chief Executive (Basic Law of the Macao SAR, arts.

45, 50 (6)), and indirectly under the influence of Beijing (Chou, 2013).

Political loyalty has thus become an explicit criterion: senior officials in Macao are

expected to be politically reliable to the Central Government (Yee, 2014). This suggests

the persistence of political interference in the bureaucracy – a feature compatible with

the Chinese administrative tradition, insofar as the boundaries between politics and

administration tend to be more porous and the bureaucracy remains strongly subordinate

to political leadership (party-state) and also observable in the Napoleonic tradition

(Cheung, 2010; Christensen & Fan, 2018; Painter & Peters, 2010a).

In recent years, some secretaries have been recruited from civil society figures –

businesspeople or professionals with backgrounds outside senior civil service – reflecting

the importance of economic and associative elites in the MSAR’s ruling coalition (Kwong,

2017). However, their selection does not follow any logic of party distribution, not least

because Macao is, as Lou and Tang (2023) note, a society without political parties, but

rather the personal and political trust of the Chief Executive and the requirement that

the main leaders be “patriots who love the country and Macao”, as emphasized in official

statements.

5.4 Administration and Service

In the context of Macao, the administrative culture inherited from the Portuguese period

was close to a hierarchical and unprofessional bureaucratic model, in which the

administration saw itself primarily as an instrument of government and political control,

rather than as a service to citizens (Bolong, 2011). As Lo (1995) describes, the civil

service before the transition was characterized by inefficiency, low levels of education

among many employees, endemic corruption, frequent reorganizations, recruitment and

promotion based on political patronage, and intense conflict between departments, to

the extent that Macao's bureaucracy could be considered ‘from a Weberian perspective,

underdeveloped and backward’ (Hing, 1995, p. 116).

After 1999, in the context of the international spread of public administration reforms

and drawing explicitly on the experiences of the US, the UK, Hong Kong and Singapore,

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Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

the discourse on the need to “serve the people” and cultivate a citizen service mentality

began to take hold in Macao (Kei, 2005). During Edmund Ho's first term (2000–2004),

despite the difficulties already analyzed, this translated into initiatives to improve public

services, such as the simplification of administrative procedures, the creation of

integrated one-stop public services, the introduction of Quality Charters and quality

management systems, and the strengthening of training for civil servants in customer

service and modern management skills (Kei, 2005).

However, there remains a cultural gap between the official discourse of ‘government at

the service of the people’ and the routines of many career civil servants, trained in a

traditional administrative culture. Ho Iat Seng himself, in his 2020 Policy Address, set as

a goal ‘strengthening the service awareness of civil servants’ and ‘correcting the service

attitude, avoiding bureaucratic practices,’ which implies recognition that behaviors

marked by formalism and a predominant concern with compliance with internal rules

continue to exist, rather than proactive resolution of citizens' problems.

However, it should be noted that Macao's economic prosperity – largely supported by the

expansion of the gaming sector and the associated increase in public revenues – has

enabled the Government to strengthen, in certain areas, the provision of social services

and benefits (namely, public/subsidized healthcare provisions and the

expansion/planning of public housing), as well as to institute universal cash transfers to

residents through the Wealth Partaking Scheme launched in 2008 (Kwong, 2013; Lok,

2011).

Macao continues to adopt a more pronounced public service perspective, without,

however, abandoning its inherited formalism. Thus, there is a certain tension between

the persistence of complex procedures and documentary requirements (a classic

bureaucratic trait) and the growing orientation towards making life easier for

citizens/customers. The Chinese administrative tradition, which values harmony and

avoids confrontation, also encourages officials to be helpful and solve citizens' problems

in order to maintain social order – which, in this respect, converges with the notion of

service. In short, administration or service in Macao is becoming increasingly ‘service-

oriented’, albeit within the limits of a bureaucracy still regulated by strict legality.

5.5 State and Society - II

Historically, under Portuguese administration, Macao developed limited forms of

corporatism: the Portuguese government, especially from the 1980s onwards,

institutionalized councils and advisory bodies that included representatives of economic

and community interest groups. The Consultative Council itself was composed of

members appointed by the Governor, representatives of municipal bodies and

representatives of interest groups (Luz, 2000), which reinforced the logic of functional

integration of economic and associative elites in the governance of the territory (Chou,

2015; Lou, 2004).

After 1999, Macao maintained – and even expanded – the structure of advisory bodies

inherited from the Portuguese period, now having dozens of sectoral advisory councils

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Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

(education, health, tourism, administrative reform, among others), created under the

Basic Law to consult society on different policies. However, as Wang and Li (2023) show,

decision-making remains concentrated in the Executive Council and the councils directly

dependent on the Chief Executive, with the Government deciding on the creation of

bodies, convening meetings and setting the agenda, while many councils and the general

public intervene only passively, which means that consultations run the risk of becoming

a mere formality.

Until 2017, Macao had an exceptionally large number of associations - approximately

7,000 - resulting in a remarkably high density of organizations relative to its population

(Macao Youth Federation, 2020). However, existing research indicates that this pattern

of associativism reflects a specific corporatist model of state–society relations.

Historically, participation in associations has served as the primary channel for political

engagement in Macao, as individuals seldom act independently in the political sphere

(Kai Chun, 2012). The government, both during Portuguese administration and in the

Macao SAR, co-opted the leaders of the main associations as representatives of

community interests, in an informal corporatist arrangement. As one analyst points out,

“relations between associations and the government have characteristics of corporatism:

[…] associations have no autonomous will, while influences on civil society are weak” (p.

133). In the most recent period (since 2019), Ho Iat Seng’s official rhetoric on

administrative reform has emphasized the need to “listen to society” and “enhance

transparency”, possibly in response to the recommendations of international reports and

the context of Hong Kong after the 2019 protests.

Thus, the Region coexists with a semi-state civil society, where the main associations act

as conduits for government policies to the population, rather than channeling

independent pressure from the people to the Region. The relationship between the State

and society – particularly with regard to the participation of interest groups, social

organizations and citizens in the public policy process – in Macao has mixed

characteristics, but tends more towards the statist and controlled model, close to the

traditional Napoleonic model and, in a way, even more restrictive, in line with the

Confucian view that autonomous interventions by civil society are illegitimate.

5.6 Uniformity

With regard to the uniformity of the administrative apparatus and its degree of

decentralization, Macao has a highly uniform and centralized structure, which is

consistent with both the Napoleonic tradition (centralized unitary states) (Peters, 2021)

and the Chinese model (unitary state with strong central control) (Cheung, 2010).

In fact, Macao, being a region with a small geographical area and population, does not

have a local political-administrative level with true autonomy (the former municipalities

were abolished and replaced by an advisory body with no political power) (Faria, 2023).

Public services, civil service statutes, administrative procedures and service delivery

mechanisms are largely common across the territory, promoting a high degree of formal

equality in terms of access and equal treatment of citizens (Bolong, 2011; B. Kwong,

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Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

2011; Yu, 2011). This configuration is consistent with the Napoleonic tradition (Ongaro,

2010) inherited from the period of Portuguese administration, in which regulatory and

administrative uniformity is anchored in the law, in the administrative career and in the

predictability of procedures (for example, the Macao Administrative Procedure Code

(essentially derived from the Portuguese code) establishes principles of equality,

impartiality and uniformity in the conduct of administrative proceedings) (Torrão, 2016).

In the post-1999 period, this situation did not change substantially; in fact, during

negotiations on the future of Macao, this option of maintaining and adapting local

legislation became known as the “localization of laws”, i.e. their continuity under Chinese

administration, but anchored in the MSAR’s own legal system. (Mendes, 2013).

Based on Alsancak et al. (2022), who characterize the People's Republic of China as a

system with a highly centralized bureaucracy and strict control over local governments,

the MSAR can be seen (like Hong Kong), from the perspective of the political center in

Beijing, as an exceptional institutional arrangement: a Special Administrative Region that

has a high degree of autonomy from the Beijing administration. In terms of Peters' theory

(2021), we can argue that Macao therefore combines high intra-regional uniformity,

consistent with the Napoleonic tradition (of the Portuguese legacy), with low uniformity

at the Chinese state level, since it embodies a solution of internal institutional pluralism.

This dual position – uniformity “inside”, diversity “outside” – is central to understanding

the hybrid nature of Macao’s governance model and how continental European legacies

and the political logic of the PRC are articulated within it.

5.7 Accountability

Applying the accountability aspect to Macao, the starting point is to understand that

accountability is organized primarily around legal and administrative mechanisms, rather

than political-democratic control mechanisms in the classical sense. From a political-

institutional point of view, the Basic Law establishes a fairly vertical chain of

accountability

− The Chief Executive is accountable to both the Central People's

Government and the Macao SAR;

− The Government must obey the law and be accountable to the Legislative

Assembly, presenting policy reports, implementing the approved budget

and responding to questions from Members of Parliament. However,

given that the Chief Executive is chosen by a restricted electoral college

and only some of the Members of Parliament are elected by direct

suffrage, political accountability is based more on a logic of upward

accountability (to Beijing and the local political and administrative elite)

than on direct accountability to the voters.

Cf. articles 45.º, 47.º and 65.º of the Basic Law of MASR and respective annexes I and II.

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Hybrid Administrative Traditions in Macao SAR: Between Napoleonic and Chinese

Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

At the legal and administrative level, accountability is strongly law-based and ex post.

Macao's courts, including the Administrative Court, exercise control over the legality of

administrative acts and sub-legal regulations, ensuring that the Administration acts in

accordance with the law and offering citizens means of appeal against illegal or unfair

decisions.

The Macao SAR also has two central pillars of specialized accountability, as provided for

in the Basic Law itself:

− the Commission Against Corruption (CACC), which operates

independently and whose Commissioner reports to the Chief Executive,

with the dual mission of fighting corruption and acting as an ombudsman,

investigating complaints of illegality or maladministration and

recommending changes to procedures and systems (Chang, 2011);

− the Audit Commission (AC), which is also independent, conducts financial

and value-for-money audits of the Administration, contributing to

accountability for the use of public funds, although its Director is

politically accountable to the Chief Executive and not directly to the

Legislative Assembly (Tan, 2011).

Both combine classic ex post control functions with a growing role in prevention and

advice, close to what Peters (2021) describes as recent attempts to strengthen

accountability through NPM-inspired reforms (performance audits, system improvement,

promotion of integrity).

We can therefore say that in Macao, accountability is based primarily on internal,

legalistic, judicial and administrative accountability, typical of the Napoleonic tradition,

reinforced by specialized control bodies (CACC, AC, courts), and only partially on a logic

of pluralistic and societal political accountability. By way of illustration, according to the

Worldwide Governance Indicators (Voice and Accountability dimension), Macao's

percentile score was 59.17 in 1998, rising to 69.26 in 2019, but fell again to 57.96 in

2024, suggesting a deepening of the limitations on political participation and democratic

accountability over the last decade.

This configuration contributes to a hybrid model: a strong emphasis on legality and

administrative integrity, combined with a political structure in which accountability is

exercised mainly “upwards” (Beijing and the Chief Executive) and less “outwards”

(citizens and public opinion).

6. Conclusion

At this point, we believe that our analysis supports the view that Macao is a hybrid model

in which two administrative traditions coexist and influence each other. On the one hand,

there is a Napoleonic framework, with elements such as the primacy of Portuguese law

and legal-administrative formalism, a high degree of administrative uniformity, and the

prevalence of legal control and review mechanisms. On the other hand, there is a political

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Administrative Traditions

João Carlos Cortesão Faria, Anabela Rodrigues Santiago

logic compatible with the Chinese administrative tradition, marked by the centrality of

the executive, the fusion of administration and politics, and accountability patterns that

are more vertical (‘upwards’) than pluralistic (‘outwards’). We also note that there are

several arrangements that belong to both administrative traditions, resulting in

arrangements that interact.

In terms of the aspects outlined by Painter and Peters (2010) and Peters (2021), the

study highlights: (i) an organic and Region-centric government; (ii) a “law vs.

management” axis that tends to be legalistic, but with the incremental incorporation of

administrative modernization practices and a focus on results; (iii) permeable boundaries

between politics and administration; (iv) an incomplete transition from “administration”

to “service”, with efforts to improve service and simplification, but persistence of

formalistic routines; (v) consultative and relatively limited civic participation; (vi) strong

centralization and administrative uniformity; and (vii) mainly legal-administrative

accountability, reinforced by specialized bodies, with limitations on political-democratic

scrutiny.

In terms of its contribution, we consider that the study shows that the MSAR should not

be seen as a simple continuation of the period of Portuguese administration or as a mere

importation of the PRC's administrative model: it is a hybrid configuration, in which the

maintenance of the legal and administrative framework coexists with a political and

symbolic reconfiguration aligned with priorities of stability and central governance.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN CHINA: PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE POLICY

AT THE INTERSECTION OF STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

LUÍS FILIPE PESTANA

luis.pestana@ipor.org.mo

He completed his bachelor’s degree (2010) and master’s degree (2013) in International Relations

at the Catholic University of Portugal. Since 2021, he has been enrolled in a Ph.D. program in

Political Science at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas. His research focuses

primarily on ideology and the Chinese education system, with additional interests in language

policy and China’s foreign policy. He has resided in China since 2014, having taught Portuguese

at Harbin Normal University (2014–2016) and Beijing Normal University (2016–2023). He

currently works for the Instituto Português do Oriente (IPOR, Portugal), serving as the institute’s

delegate for Mainland China at its Beijing office. He also holds the position of Education and

Culture Attaché at the Embassy of Portugal in Beijing. In addition to teaching Portuguese, he

supports the organization of cultural activities, facilitates connections between IPOR and other

Camões Institute focal points across Asia, and assists the Embassy in various education- and

culture-related functions.

LUÍS PIRES

luispires@um.edu.mo

He is a Senior Instructor in the Department of Portuguese at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities,

University of Macau (China). He holds a degree in Classical Languages and Literatures from the

University of Lisbon and a Master’s in Portuguese as a Non-Native Language from the Open

University of Portugal. His academic and professional trajectory includes five years as a

Portuguese language lecturer at Tianjin Foreign Studies University, following an invitation from

the University of Lisbon. Subsequently, he was appointed by the Camões Institute to Shanghai

International Studies University, where he lectured for four years. He later served as Attaché for

Education and Culture at the Portuguese Embassy in Beijing, concurrently coordinating the local

delegation of the Portuguese Institute of the Orient (IPOR). Luís Pires earned his Ph.D. in

Portuguese Studies, with a specialization in Language Policy, from the Open University of

Portugal. His research interests focus on language planning, linguistic diplomacy, and the role of

Portuguese in multilingual contexts, particularly within the framework of Sino-Lusophone

relations.

Abstract

This study examines the ideological foundations of foreign language education in the People’s

Republic of China, arguing that language planning is inseparable from the state’s ideological

strategies and international engagement. Drawing from a historical perspective that traces

the evolution of Chinese education from the late imperial period to the present, it

demonstrates how educational policy has consistently subordinated intercultural exchange to

national interests. Foreign language instruction, rather than reflecting openness or pluralism,

is deployed as a strategic instrument, valued for its developmental utility while subject to

strict ideological boundaries. The analysis focuses on the political role of education as a means

of regulating access to foreign knowledge and maintaining internal cohesion. In this context,

foreign languages are approached not as cultural bridges, but as managed resources:

imported for diplomatic and economic advantage yet carefully contained to avoid ideological

disruption. This dynamic is exemplified by the case of Portuguese, whose rise in China’s

academic landscape reflects wider geopolitical and economic shifts rather than cultural

demand or educational reform. Its institutional expansion aligns closely with China’s foreign

policy interests, especially in relation to Lusophone countries and the symbolic role of Macau.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

By situating language policy within the ideological architecture of the Chinese state, the article

contributes to the study of international education as a form of statecraft. It also underscores

the importance of aligning language promotion strategies - such as those pursued by Portugal

- with the internal logics and constraints of partner countries. In doing so, it responds to the

goals of this special issue by offering a critical, historically grounded account of Sino-

Portuguese engagement through the lens of ideology, education, and global positioning.

Keywords

Ideology and Education, Language Policy, Portuguese as a Foreign Language, China.

Resumo

Este estudo examina os fundamentos ideológicos do ensino de línguas estrangeiras na

República Popular da China, argumentando que o planeamento linguístico é inseparável das

estratégias ideológicas do Estado e do seu posicionamento internacional. A partir de uma

perspetiva histórica que acompanha a evolução da educação chinesa desde o final do período

imperial até à atualidade, demonstra-se que a política educativa tem, de forma consistente,

subordinado o intercâmbio intercultural aos interesses nacionais. O ensino de línguas

estrangeiras, longe de refletir abertura ou pluralismo, é mobilizado como instrumento

estratégico, valorizado pela sua utilidade para o desenvolvimento, mas confinado a limites

ideológicos estritos. A análise centra-se no papel político da educação enquanto mecanismo

de regulação do acesso ao conhecimento estrangeiro e de preservação da coesão interna.

Neste enquadramento, as línguas estrangeiras não são concebidas como pontes culturais,

mas como recursos geridos: importados por razões diplomáticas e económicas, porém

cuidadosamente controlados para evitar potenciais perturbações ideológicas. Esta dinâmica é

exemplificada pelo caso da língua portuguesa, cujo crescimento no panorama académico

chinês reflete transformações geopolíticas e económicas mais amplas, e não uma procura

cultural intrínseca ou uma reforma educativa. A sua expansão institucional alinha-se

fortemente com os interesses da política externa chinesa, particularmente nas relações com

os países lusófonos e no papel simbólico de Macau. Ao situar a política linguística na

arquitetura ideológica do Estado chinês, esta investigação contribui para o estudo da educação

internacional como forma de “construção do estado”. Sublinha, igualmente, a importância de

alinhar estratégias de promoção linguística - como as desenvolvidas por Portugal - com as

lógicas internas e as restrições dos países parceiros. Deste modo, responde aos objetivos

deste número temático ao oferecer uma leitura crítica e historicamente fundamentada do

envolvimento sino‑português através das lentes da ideologia, da educação e do

posicionamento global.

Palavras-chave

Ideologia e Educação, Política Linguística, Português Língua Estrangeira, China.

How to cite this article

Pestana, Luís Filipe & Pires, Luís (2026). Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language

Policy at the Intersection of Statecraft and Strategy. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and

Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 55-79.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.3

Article submitted on 13rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 22nd January

2026.

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

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Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN CHINA: PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE

POLICY AT THE INTERSECTION OF STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

LUÍS FILIPE PESTANA

LUÍS PIRES

Introduction

Foreign language education in China has long mirrored the state’s evolving engagement

with the outside world. While English has remained dominant, other languages have

gained traction according to shifting political and economic interests. Among these,

Portuguese presents a compelling case, due not only to its unique historical entry into

China’s linguistic landscape but also because of its association with strategic partnerships

across the Lusophone world.

This comes at a time when the Chinese leadership has embarked on a decidedly more

ideological approach to education. Drawing lessons from classical Chinese philosophy and

incorporating elements of Marxism-Leninism, Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics for a New Era attempts to produce a form of harmonious society,

by which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the sole unifier of the Chinese people.

Portuguese as a foreign language, which is directed at foreign nationals who are not from

the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), thus faces new challenges.

The present paper offers a broad evolution of the concept of harmony and how it has

been used during different stages of Chinese history. Furthermore, the CCP’s ideology

has been increasingly pushed into the education system since 2012, as a way of creating

a harmonious society Under-Heaven, starting with the Chinese youths. This, conversely,

leads to a new evaluation of different possibilities for PLE to adapt to the current

ideological education environment in a time of great uncertainty.

Building Social Harmony in the Era of Xi Jinping: The Role of Education

Philosophical Origins of Harmony

The concept of harmony (he 和) is ever-present in Chinese history. During the pre-Qin

dynasty period, Chen (2018, p. 43) states that social and political upheaval was the norm.

Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this study..

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

Pines (2023) describes how the decline of the Zhou dynasty (1046 to 256 BC) resulted

in a power struggle to achieve unity under a new leadership. The 4th century BCE

furthered this status quo during the Warring States period (Zhanguo 战国, 453–221 BC).

Pines (2023) indicates that:

“As wars became bloodier and more devastating, and with no adequate

diplomatic means to settle the conflicts in sight, most thinkers and statesmen

came to an understanding that unity of “All-Under-Heaven” (tianxia

天下

) was

the only means to attain peace and stability” (Pines, 2000).

This greatly influenced philosophers of the time who searched for the ideal form of

harmony. Li (2008, pp. 423 & 424) further confirms this statement, elaborating that

harmony pre-dates Confucius. Citing Shi Bo, a scholar-minister of the Western Zhou

(1046–771 BCE), harmony is achieved by means of the five flavours and six measures

of sound. Yan, Li & Fu (2021, p. 57) further illustrate how Shi Bo viewed this concept as

a way of congregating different perspectives to formulate new ones. This “harmony

without uniformity”, which focuses on achieving an equilibrium between different

perspectives, is also promoted by the Chinese government (China Keywords, 2024), as

this article will later illustrate.

The Warring States period thus produced a series of schools of thought, each with their

epistemology and solutions to create greater harmony. Of the One Hundred Schools, four

are of particular interest to this study and are considered among the most influential of

Chinese philosophies: Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism and Mohism. The first of these,

Confucianism, has generally garnered more attention as still contributing to the guiding

principles the CCP follows to this day. In the Confucian Classic Shi Jing (诗经), harmony

is an ideal that encapsulates a balanced relationship with other people and nature. In the

Yue Ji (乐记), following up on Shi Bo’s statements, music plays an integral role in

promoting morals. Li (2008, p. 425) further states:

“Confucius considered harmony fundamentally necessary. In the Confucian

view, music more than anything else captures the essence of harmony. Music

is the process of bringing a plurality of sounds into concord. (…) In the

Confucian view, music has this powerful positive effect on people because it

is intrinsically harmonizing".

Harmony is not exclusive to Confucian thought, on the contrary. In Daoism it plays a

central role, as Chen (2018, p. 42) clarifies. For Daoists, there are three main forms of

harmony: natural harmony (tian he 天和), human harmony (ren he 人和), and the

harmony of the heart-mind (xin he心和). They are all integrated to form their own

philosophy, one that is centred on humans’ relation to the spirit and not merely attached

to societal and political affairs (Chen, 2018, p. 43).

Legalism, another philosophy of the “Hundred Schools”, also concerns itself with this

concept. In the Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang reminds the reader that change is part

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

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Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

of society and that coercion is the only force capable of leading a knowledgeable people

(Pines, 2023). To construct harmony, therefore, morals are not enough, as Confucianists

would believe. Han Fei who, alongside Shang Yang, is one of the main Legalists, claimed

that morality guided human interaction in the past because it was an era of abundance.

As resources became more limited due to population growth, Han contended, just like

Shang, that coercion was necessary to create harmony Under Heaven. The essence of

this thought led Qin Shihuang’s

approach to governance: a highly centralized

government which resulted in brutal takedown of those that deviated from the laws of

the land (Pines, 2000; Pines, 2023)

. The argument can also be made that the PRC has

used legalism as a means to achieve harmony. Mao Zedong and his followers believed

that legalists could contribute to the construction of a new nation. The Great Leap

Forward, as Tanrikut (2024) explains, was characterized by a combination of Marxism-

Leninism and legalism.

Finally, Mohism promotes harmony through a combination of impartial concern for those

All Under Heaven and the existence of an authoritarian centralized government backed

up by a bureaucratic system. The leader, as Fraser (2024) indicates, should be

enlightened and guided by virtue. In the eyes of Mohists, education promotes a social

conformity based on ethical principles that everyone will follow. Furthermore, political

issues can be resolved through debate, as dialogue leads to objective solutions (Fraser,

2024).

The Fall of the Qing and the Republican Era (1911-1949)

Different solutions to establish some sort of socio-political order were tried and tested

throughout Chinese history and well into the last years of the Qing dynasty and the

Republican era. Liang Qichao, one of the key modernizers of Chinese sociology, sought

out to prepare the nation for a new era. As such, Liang envisioned a social harmony that

incorporated elements of Western and Chinese thought. As Liu (2020, pp. 65-66) states,

Liang was profoundly influenced by Kang Youwei, his mentor and a great critic of classic

Chinese philosophy, studied Western thinkers including during his academic years in

Japan and followed his mentor in attempting to reform Confucianism. As Jin (2023) points

out, the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) propelled a young Liang to a path of

modernizing China. Crucially, in 1898, Liang and Kang launched the Hundred Day’s

Reform period, an attempt to save the imperial rule, that ended being suppressed by

conservative forces (Jin, 2023). Nonetheless, this did not mean rejecting the past, on the

contrary. Kang Youwei’s New Text Confucianism proposed to preserve the essence of

Confucius and Mencius while adapting it to a new political environment. Fairbank (2006,

p. 229) further indicates that Kang wished for Confucianism to become the national

religion of China, a firm commitment to the “new nation’s” connection to its past.

Liang, however, would stray away from his mentor, thanks to his interaction with Yan Fu,

abandoning the idea that Confucianism should be protected at all costs (Liu, 2020: 81-

First emperor of the Qin dynasty, Qin Shihuang ruled from 259 to 210 BC.

Legalism fell out of favor from the Han dynasty onward

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Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

83). For Liang, in the end, Chinese philosophy, and Western thought should give way to

a new form of balance and harmony. The end of the imperial era, however, brought

significant changes to the Chinese political sphere.

The fall of the Qing, a dynasty long in decline as evident from the Opium Wars and the

Taiping rebellion (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 201-206) gave way to the rise of

republicanism. For Sun Yat-sen it was an opportunity to

“(…) dismantle the Manchu rule that had governed China for more than two

and a half centuries and had become, particularly in the nineteenth century,

an object of scorn and frustration to much of the Chinese citizenry” (Chang

& Gordon, 1991, pp. 21-22).

This was a particularly novel concept in China at the time, considering how industrial

development was at the center of republican policies. As Barrington Moore (1966, pp.

177-178) explains, the urbanization efforts of the early 20th century resulted from the

disintegration of the social order of the countryside and the emergence of commerce in

the coastal areas

. For Sun Yat-sen, this served as a basis to create a new form of

nationalism, one that repudiated cosmopolitanism or universalism (Sun, 1924, pp. 26-

28) while drawing inspiration from a distant past. Sun Yat-sen famously repurposed

Tianxia 天下 or All Under Heaven, the Zhou dynasty’s sinocentric cosmos (Zhao, 2019),

calling it Tianxia weigong 天下为公. For Sun, the concept of Great Harmony was relevant,

as Chen (2011) illustrates. A key part of the Book of Rites (Liji 礼记), the Datong 大同

was essential to the socio-political harmony of the past. The Tianxia weigong, as Sun

proposed, was a rebranded version intended to make All Under Heaven serve the people

(Chang & Gordon, 1991, p. 129; Chen, 2011)

The following decades were marked by constant inner turmoil. Yuan Shikai’s rule during

the Beiyang government period was characterized by ever-lasting disputes among

different cliques and warlords (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 249-251). By the time

China had finally established itself as a somewhat unified country, the initial pressure and

later invasion by the Japanese Empire meant that the Kuomintang (KMT) leaders would

be incapable of asserting their form of harmony. The situation became even more dire

with the ascension of the CCP as the main rival to the KMT. Once the former defeated the

nationalists, Mao Zedong set his sights to guide the nation to socialism. While the first

few years were distinctively not socialist (Blecher, 2019, p. 155)

, similarly to the New

Economy of the Soviet Union, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution

repudiated China’s philosophical heritage, Confucianism being particularly targeted as an

enemy of progress. However, a strong argument can be made that legalism did exert

some influence on Mao’s policies, for two main reasons. Firstly, both legalism and Maoism

required strong, centralized and authoritarian leadership. Secondly, the law was

Yet, the country was clearly lacking in machinery: of around 20 000 factories, China only possessed 363 with

machines.

Up until the Great Leap Forward the Chinese economy retained some elements of capitalism as it was still not

ready to embrace socialism, given its lack of development.

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Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

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Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

supposed to be the main guiding principle, even if it drove to major injustices committed

against the people (Tanrikut, 2025).

The CCP and the Birth of a New State Ideology

Mao Zedong had, thus, formulated his own version of Marxism while retaining a

connection to China’s philosophical past. According to Paul (2021, p. 265), the CCP’s

ideology combines elements of the Communist Manifesto, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism

and traditional Chinese philosophy. From Leninism, the paramount leader extracted the

party vanguard and violent revolution concepts. However, the lack of an industrial base,

led Mao in search of supporters among peasants. At the time, 89.36% of the Chinese

population lived in the countryside, and only recently this trend has flipped in the opposite

direction (Xinhua, 2019

). With the peasantry behind him, Mao embarked on his fight

against oppressive foreign forces. Ideologically, in conclusion, the CCP formed its own

basis fully adapted to the country’s context. Lenin asserted that the Marxist class struggle

was key to achieving a communist society (Touchard, 1961, p. 476 & 495-501), believing

that the proletariat’s power would lead to the fall of the bourgeoisie and, eventually, to a

classless society (Lenin, 1977, pp. 8-9).

For Mao Zedong, it was this combination that allowed to create a sense of unity, both

against the Japanese and the KMT. As such, ideology may have a congregating effect,

and it evolves through time. Arendt (1953, p. 316) defines ideology as the logic of an

idea in constant motion and transformation. This is precisely how it is possible to define

China’s state ideology, that is, a process that has developed through decades with every

leader adding new elements to it, as a response to the specific circumstances of their

time.

Crucially, Mao understood the importance of education as a means of imposing the will

of the CCP. As such, ideological and political education has, since Maoist times, become

a mainstay of the PRC’s education system. Post-1949, the state narrative centered on

the Century of Humiliation (百年国耻 bǎinián guóchǐ), not only as way of reminding the

Chinese people of the oppression at the hands of foreign powers, but also of how classical

thought and old ideas were culprits of the country’s downfall (Wang, 2008, p. 789).

Afterwards, the discourse shifted towards the class struggle. According to Wang (2008,

p.789), the Communist leadership wished to direct the youth’s rage towards the

bourgeoisie and landlords that still dominated and held part of the country’s wealth. And

yet there were concerns that thought would become overly stifled by the CCP’s ideological

guidance. Nikita Kruschev’s attack on Josef Stalin let the Soviet Union to loosen its grip

on the population. Taking note on these developments Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai

launched the Hundred Flowers Movement (1956-1957) intending to encourage

intellectuals to criticize the government and help implement reformed policies. However,

the Campaign ended as soon as criticism became perilous to the Party and its legitimacy

as leading force of the nation. King (2012) accurately states that the subsequent Anti-

The rural population in 2018 was 40,42% of the total.

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Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

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Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

Rightist Campaign of 1957 resulted in the re-education or execution of thousands of

critics.

The CCP in this context portrayed itself as the vanguard of the people against the

perceived oppressive forces. The triumph of the Chinese people was tied to the success

of the Party, even when Mao was publicly criticized after his death in 1976. The victorious

CCP was continuously supported by state-led media. The People’s Daily, for instance,

remarked it was crucial to firmly embrace ideological education (抓紧思想教育). Chen

(2021) also explains that this was understood as a necessary effort to find scapegoats

for the country’s backwardness. The traditional targets were, as the author exemplifies,

violent attacks perpetrated by the enemy, Chiang Kai-shek or to stimulate the unity of

the peasantry, the core of the CCP’s class struggle and united front.

The Cultural Revolution further exemplifies how the Mao period pushed for greater

ideological strength in the education system. According to Wang (1975, p. 760), the

education reforms of the time sought to ensure greater “political conscious” of students,

as well as provide training that could be useful to China’s industrial and agricultural

output. For this to be achieved, decision-makers understood that education had to spread

nationwide. However, the re-education of intellectuals placed a massive strain on college

education, as its greatest thinkers were under constant threat of public criticism or of

being sent to villages and factories to work (Chandra, 1987, p. 130). Ideologically, the

regime intended to create a uniform critical mass supported by the lowest strata of

society. When the new enrolment policy was rolled out in 1972, as Leff singles out (2019,

p.12), access to higher education depended on ideological knowledge and not academic

achievements, thus making education subservient to politics. Other reforms were

introduced to enhance the ideological presence in education:

“Along with appointing Communist Party cadres to high ranking

administrative positions in the universities, political ideology dominated the

higher education curriculum. Textbooks used during the Cultural Revolution

were entirely rewritten in accordance to the new political doctrine in place.

The students and faculty members were required to visit the factories and

communes to learn from the laboring class and peasants” (Leff, 2019, p.13).

As mentioned before, ideological education is not a novelty in present-day China. The

Republican authorities, after the fall of the Qing, focused their attention on the Century

of Humiliation. Starting with the first Opium War, this period was marked by the steep

decline of the last imperial dynasty. For about 100 years, foreign powers were responsible

for carving up the Chinese territory under the threat of warfare or imposed via unequal

treaties, the first of which being the treaty of Nanjing (1842) (Lesaffer, 2025). This

discourse continued in Taiwan after the expulsion of the KMT from the mainland (Wang,

2008, p. 789). In search of new targets, the CCP identified the class struggle against

oppressive forces as key to settling the Party as the vanguard. (Wang, 2008, p. 789). In

Beijing, as Peng (2023, pp. 1033-1035) clarifies, there was the perception that there

were certain segments of society still “contaminated” by bourgeois education. The

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Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

resulting policies that the Cultural Revolution heightened the desire to rid the country of

such interference, particularly in urban areas.

Post-1989: Reforming Ideological and Political Education

The year 1989 was a turning point. Deng Xiaoping acknowledged the investment in

ideological education had not sufficed (Zeng, 2016, p. 115). Furthermore, the leading

class of the Party were also fearful of losing legitimacy. After decades of building a

unifying image of themselves, Zhang (2008, p. 788) alludes, the Mandate of Heaven was

on the verge of being led astray.

Chen (2021) broadens this analysis, as the PRC prioritized the implementation of

ideological and political education in the entire teaching process (把思想政治教育贯彻在全

部教育过程中). Deng Xiaoping and the proponents of the Reform and Opening policies paid

little attention to political and ideological education. From the beginning this was

understood as a way of distancing the CCP from the excesses of the past. Now that the

nation was surging because of economic prosperity and non-isolationism, ideology took

the backseat. Callahan (2006, p. 85) determined that between 1947 and 1990 national

humiliation related books were not published. However, the opening of the PRC brought

along a few unintended consequences. Prior to 1989, the lack of focus on the ideological

education was conducive to potential internal instability. This compounded in 1989 with

the events at Tiananmen Square, leaving Deng Xiaoping to conclude that

“one of the greatest failures of the CCP leadership during the Reform and

Opening up period was not considering political-ideological education as a

priority”.

As such, the crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 resulted in a

renewed ideological fervour with particular focus on the education system. In 1992,

Deng’s Southern Tour was not only devised to relaunch the country’s economy, but also

to assert the CCP’s position as sole representative of the Chinese people. The State

Education Commission published the “Reform and Development of Education in China

Program”. At its core, it highlighted that patriotism should be the most important value

for the PRC. In 1994, 95% of Beijing’s primary and high school students had already

watched patriotic movies recommended by the State Education Commission, as part of

the “Circular on Carrying Out Education of Patriotism for Primary and Secondary Schools

Through Out the Country via Good Films and TV Series” (Zhao, 1998).

Ideological work was, as such, well underway with further contributions from the Ministry

of Education and the Communist Youth League’s Central Committee. New courses were

created, for example, “Marxism Basic Principles” or “Introduction to Maoism and

Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (Chen, 2021). Books and

teaching materials were also targeted. Published in April 1990, The Indignation of

National Humiliation served as a remembrance of the events of the First Opium War,

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Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

reinstating the Century of Humiliation as central to the CCP’s ideological discourse against

domestic and foreign threats (Callahan, 2006, pp. 186-187).

During Hu Jintao’s time as the Secretary General of the CCP, in October 2004 the CCP

Central Committee and the State Council published Opinion on Further Strengthening

and Improvement of Ideological and Political Education for College Students (关于进一步

加强和改进大学生思想政治教育的意见). As Chen (2021) elaborates

“That document stated that “strengthening and improving the ideological and

political education of college students is an extremely urgent and important

task,” and that “raising their ideological and political character” was

necessary in order to “cultivate them into the builders and successors of the

socialist cause with Chinese characteristics”.

Nonetheless, ideological education was perceived to have become stagnant. Chen (2021)

confirms this hypothesis by analysing the number of occurrences of the term sizheng 思

政

, from 1994 to 2021, in the People’s Daily, the CCP’s main media mouthpiece. Of the

766 occurrences, 700 correspond to the time since Xi’s takeover in 2012. Obedience to

the Party, while crucial, was no longer enough to form harmony and ensure a cohesive,

unified popular front. During Xi Jinping’s stewardship, though, circumstances have

shifted.

Current Ideological Trend Under Xi Jinping

Presently, Xi’s Thought is the last iteration of the PRC’s ideology. Introduced in the CCP

Constitution in 2017, it highlights the historical role of the Party in unifying the people.

As an extension of the path created by Mao Zedong, it encompasses the armed forces,

technological innovation, ecology or the improvement of Chinese people’s livelihood. Its

presence is crucial for Xi and the country’s leadership which, in turn, makes it

fundamentally necessary to be taught at every level of the education system (Xinhua,

2024). In other words, Xi’s thought must be studied and interiorized from an early age

as to ensure that harmony is produced with the Party at the center of the Tianxia.

The CCP, therefore, acted when the new government took power in 2012. One of Xi

Jinping’s main objectives as the Paramount Leader of the People’s Republic of China is to

further the efforts of establishing a form of social harmony under the helm of the CCP.

As discussed, the concept of harmony is not foreign or a novelty in the realm of political-

philosophical Chinese thought. However, the Communist rule has presently a clear view

on what that harmony should look like, and it should be at the centre of the order Under

Heaven. As Tatlow suggests (2018), the CCP views itself as the inheritor of the

tianchao 天朝, “heavenly empire,” the actual ruling force that governed all matters

Tianxia. President Xi Jinping has embraced his role as the “emperor”. During the

celebration of Confucius’ 2565th anniversary, Xi highlighted that the current ruling class

Shortened version of sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu (思想政治教育) or ideological and political education.

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is a successor to those responsible for actively promoting Chinese tradition (Tatlow, 2018:

p.6). However, this does not simply mean that China is attempting to replicate the

harmonious society of imperial times. As aforementioned, the ideological fingerprint of

the CCP is ever-present as it promotes a kind of social order with little to no trace of

foreign influence. The Document 9, a communiqué that spread among Party members

in April 2013, offers a deeper glance into the perceived perils exposure to Western ideals.

Broadly speaking, Document 9 outlines seven political threats to the CCP-led harmony,

namely, promoting Western-style constitutional democracy, universal values that weaken

the Party, civil society unrest, neoliberalism, Western-style media, historical nihilism and

negative views on the CCP and New China and putting into question the Reform and

Opening process (ChinaFile, 2013). As such, it called for Party leaders all over the country

to pay close attention to these perceived threats and enhance ideological work through

education. These set of guidelines have, therefore, garnered attention by the Chinese

leadership. Education, as Xi (2014, p. 93) himself declares is an important means to

ensure a harmonious society (Stanzel et al., 2017, pp. 4-7). Teaching materials play a

key role. In August 2021, Han Zhen, head of the Textbook National Committee,

concluded that Xi Jinping’s Thought about Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the

New Era would become part of basic, vocational and higher education. This statement

came after new guidelines from the Ministry of Education that expected Marxist beliefs

to become stronger among Chinese youth, as well as strengthening the path, theory,

system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Global Times, 2024).

National unity is crucial for the CCP’s national interests and education is at its core, as

the Patriotic Education Law determines (CLT, 2023b).

From a discourse perspective, the ruling party has pushed this concrete narrative as a

means of ensuring not only that the Communist leadership is necessary, but also that

there should be no foreign interference when it comes to domestic issues. Back in 2014,

the General Office of the Party Central Committee and the State Council advocated for

stronger control over the education system (Fu, 2024). Xi clarified, in 2019, during a

speech to professors and educators of political ideology and theory, that political-

ideological education is irreplaceable and bestowed responsibility on educators to

enlighten students in the relevance of socialism with Chinese Characteristics, party

theories, institutions and culture. Fu (2024) clarifies that higher education particularly

targeted

“Specific measures included strengthening political training sessions for

faculty and standardizing textbooks across disciplines, particularly in the

social sciences”.

In 2021, a nationwide inspection was conducted at 31 universities to assess the

effectiveness of ideological teaching. Two top-tier institutions, Tsinghua University and

Peking University, were criticized for their inefficiencies in promoting the CCP’s thought

(Liu, 2021).

Language teaching has also been repeatedly targeted, particularly relating to the

English’s weight in the gaokao, the annual university entry exam. Since 2012 the National

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People’s Congress (NPC) and the China People’s Political Consultative Conference

(CPPCC) have received proposals to reduce the importance of English when it comes to

evaluating the gaokao (Leung, 2023). While these proposals and opinions have not, for

the most part, translated into actual changes in the college admissions process (Fu, 2024;

Leung, 2023

), it signals a growing desire from policymakers to diminish the status of a

foreign subject, while highlighting greater ideological work.

From a legal standpoint, the Chinese government has also set forth a series of laws that

aim to promote national unity. The Patriotic Education Law (CLT, 2023b), approved in

October 2023 and rolled out on January 1st, 2024, is part of broader legislation that

includes the Counter-espionage Law (CLT, 2023a), the revised National Security Law (CLT

2015) and the Hong Kong National Security Law (Lam, 2020). To the Chinese authorities,

these documents intend to create a CCP-led social harmony that isolates society from

external influence.

Of particular relevance to this study, the 2024 Patriotic Education Law (CLT, 2023b)

represents a renewed effort to recentre the role of political and ideological instruction.

Through this legislation, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to cultivate an educational

environment in which students—from kindergarten through university—are

systematically exposed to, and expected to develop proficiency in, Xi Jinping Thought.

As mentioned before, Xi’s presidency has been marked by a thought isolationism as it

pushes away Western liberal democracy values and norms. The rejection of these

elements also extends to democracy in its liberal form. The whole-process people’s

democracy, as showcased in its eponymous white paper (SCIO, 2021), is, from the

Chinese perspective, a more inclusive and direct form of democracy. In short, the election

process in China starts at the local level. From there, elected officials are able to select

members of parliament at municipal level and so forth, up the National People’s Congress,

China’s top legislative body (SCIO, 2021). Candidates are not exclusively members of

the CCP and there have been elected officials from the other nine political parties that

form the United Front.

The Patriotic Education Law derives from government documents, such as the 2016

Ministry of Education directive or the CCP Central Committee and State Council’s 2019

patriotic education directive (Department of Education, 2024), instructing all education

departments of every teaching level at the Provincial tier to implement the patriotic

education. Article 6 of the law explains what patriotic education is:

- CCP’s, New China’s, Reform and Opening, socialism development and Chinese

people’s history;

- socialism with Chinese characteristics system, CCP’s accomplishments and the lived

experience of the people’s unity;

- the Chinese people’s culture, as well as the revolutionary and advanced socialist

cultures;

The Beijing government has downgraded English in the gaokao.

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- basic knowledge of the constitution, national and ethnic unit, national security and

defence;

- martyrs, heroes and model citizen as symbols of the spirit of the people and the spirit

of the times;

- other content rich in patriotic sentiment (CLT, 2023b).

Ideologically, the PRC is invested in ensuring a certain level of uniformity of thought. Yet

the expectations of the Chinese population may be distinctive to what the government

desires, in part, because there is difficulty to change deeply engrained believes. Focusing

on access to higher education, Chinese parents greatly invest in guaranteeing that their

children have a better chance of reaching of the top universities of the country. Besides

extra classes, even during weekends, guardians enroll students in extra-curricular

activities from music to sports, in an attempt to give an edge to these students.

Conversely, some policies go against the parents’ interests. The double reduction (双减政

策shuāng jiǎn zhèng cè) which sought to alleviate the number of extracurricular classes

and the amount of homework given to school students, ended up with several private

tutoring institutions ceasing operations (Zhao, Shi & Wang, 2024). This, in turn, led

parents to seek alternatives in the black market.

Furthermore, the State Council has tried to condition what career path the Chinese youth

may choose which, in turn, only leads to more panic among parents. The high school

entry exams, zhongkao (中考), have become increasingly subject of attention. In July

2023, 15,4 million students took part in this examination and only 50% of the examinees

were allowed to move on to “regular” high schools that lead to university. The bottom

half either entered the job market or chose vocational training (Li, 2023). However, fear

of failure is a systemic issue in Chinese society, as Liu (2020) explains, given that there

is a focus on the “science of success” (chenggong cue 成功学) as a counterpoint to the

“science of failure” (shibai xue 失败学).

For the CCP, adapting to the market conditions does not seem to eliminate the necessity

of promoting stronger unity through ideology. Major developments in AI, digital literacy

and STEM (Global Times, 2024) are examples of such a statement. The STEM Education

Action Plan 2029, launched in 2018, promotes better training of educators to use STEM

tools in their teaching and train future teachers (Hu, 2024: 77 e 78), while integrating

moral values in their practice (Global Times, 2024).

Yet this does not eliminate a series of challenges that any society is facing with the advent

of Artificial Intelligence. According to Yang (2021), 70% of what is taught in college can

be learned more efficiently by AI. The author considers that this technology has forced

Chinese leaders and society, described as a stable and static status quo, to revolutionize

its education system. In essence, social harmony is now facing new trials.

As a response, the CCO Central Committee and the State Council have already begun to

act. In January 2025, the new 2035 education action plan was presented and includes

strong political and ideological leadership, talent competitiveness, scientific and

technological basis, welfare assurances, social synergy and international influence.

Education Vice-minister Wu Yuan stated that in September 2024 that 1673 new

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bachelor’s degrees were established, while 1670 were suppressed for not being in tune

with the PRC’s strategic goals and the country’s social and economic development. Since

2012, 21000 bachelor’s degrees have been created, as opposed to 12000 that were

suspended or cancelled in the same period (Xinhua, 2025). In this year’s Two Sessions,

the discourse focused on innovation and talent attraction capable of producing native

technology, while reducing foreign dependency and incorporating Xi’s Thought in the

education system.

The generation that reached adulthood during XI’s time in power (post-1990) has

experienced the brunt of China’s social issues that are now widespread. The CCP, in its

effort to create a social harmony firmly distinct from the West, has used ideology to fuel

the fight against child obesity, effeminate masculinity, LGBT movements and feminism.

However, the real-world problems that young college graduates tackle daily, from

dwindling wages to high unemployment rates, has at times driven the citizens meant to

be the future of the country to certain behaviours contrary to what the CCP expects.

Cultural and social phenomena, such as “lay flat” or “let it rot” (Lu, 2024), encapsulate

the youth’s state of desperation and willingness to embrace indifference regarding their

future.

Language Policy and Foreign Language Education in China

Language, Ideology, and the Chinese State

Within the ideological apparatus that has long underpinned Chinese education, foreign

language instruction occupies a highly strategic position. Rather than representing

intercultural openness, it has been governed by the political logics of state-building and

ideological regulation, the evolving and shifting priorities of the state, that consistently

subordinate linguistic and cultural exchange to national interest, that is, as a means of

acquiring useful knowledge to support developmental objectives. (Mao & Min, 2004; Gil,

2016) Ultimately, foreign language education in China is functionally open but

ideologically bounded. As Ricento (2006) argues, language policy always reflects

underlying power structures.

This relationship is articulated through the concept of ‘language import and export’ (Pires,

2024), which situates language education within the broader framework of the political

economy of language (Grin, 2006) and foreign language planning (Payne, 2007). In this

view, foreign languages are imported as strategic resources (Ruíz, 1984) that serve

national goals in diplomacy, trade, and technological advancement, yet are carefully

managed to prevent ideological disruption. Conversely, exporting national languages

functions as a means of projecting soft power and enhancing international status.

Through such linguistic exchanges, states seek to accumulate both material and symbolic

capital, positioning language not merely as a medium of communication but as an

instrument of political influence and global prestige.

As we will see in more detail below, the case of Portuguese language education (PLE) in

China exemplifies this dynamic. Introduced in the early 1960s, its institutionalization was

driven not by organic academic interest or cultural proximity, but by geopolitical needs

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and ideological alignment. Its expansion has tracked closely with China’s global

positioning and state priorities, from its engagement with Lusophone liberation

movements in the Cold War era to its pursuit of new strategic partnerships in the 21st

century.

Historical Trajectories: From the 19th Century to 1949

The emergence of foreign language education in China was not the result of voluntary

openness but of external pressure (Feng & Adamson, 2019). It began in the 19th century,

following a series of military defeats that underscored the need for urgent modernization.

Western languages, especially English, became strategic tools for accessing scientific and

technical knowledge from abroad. Yet this engagement was deeply ambivalent. While

foreign expertise was needed, the threat of ideological subversion loomed large.

The Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing period embodied this tension. As

Adamson (2002, p. 234) explains, its guiding slogan - “study China for morality, the West

for utility” - reflected a model of selective appropriation: foreign languages were

embraced only to the extent that they served national development. Language was

treated as a neutral medium, stripped of cultural depth, and valued purely for its

functional utility. This instrumental logic persisted into the Republican era. According to

Feng & Adamson (2019), while government policies encouraged foreign language

learning to support scientific and technical advancement, they also coexisted with waves

of cultural protectionism and antiforeignism. Throughout this period, language policy

privileged strategic benefit over intercultural dialogue, a framework that would carry

through the foundational decades of the PRC.

Portuguese Language Education Under the People’s Republic

The early decades of the People’s Republic saw the consolidation of foreign language

education as a state-directed and ideologically mediated endeavour. Portuguese, in

particular, entered the curriculum not through linguistic diversity initiatives, but through

Cold War-era foreign policy recalibrations, where Russian was initially the privileged

language (Ning, 2021). Following the Sino-Soviet split, China intensified engagement

with Africa and Latin America, many of whose liberation movements operated in

Portuguese. This led to a targeted need for specialists who could serve state objectives

abroad.

In 1960, the first formal Portuguese language program was launched at the Beijing

Broadcasting Institute, selected for its role in external propaganda rather than linguistic

prestige. That same year, the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages initiated a short-

term intensive course in Portuguese, later expanded to a full degree. These programs

were designed to produce translators, journalists, and diplomats for use in state media

and foreign service, often tied directly to ideological dissemination (Li, 2012). Training

was also carried out in Macao under the auspices of the Nam Kwong Commercial

Company, illustrating the strategic use of external sites for politically aligned language

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instruction (Choi, 2012). These efforts culminated in the 1964 “3000 Talents Plan”, a

seven-year initiative to build diplomatic translation capacity in key foreign languages.

However, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought a dramatic reversal. Foreign

languages were recast as vehicles of ideological contamination, and institutions where

foreign languages were taught were denounced as counter-revolutionary (Li, 2012).

Language programs were suspended, foreign materials banned, and trained professionals

side-lined. As Mao & Min (2004) note, this period exemplifies the cyclical, even pendular,

nature of Chinese language policy, where moments of pragmatic openness give way to

ideological retrenchment.

Rehabilitation of foreign language teaching began cautiously in the 1970s, in tandem with

China’s re-entry into global diplomacy. Portuguese programs resumed in Beijing and

Shanghai, though their expansion remained limited and ideologically constrained. By the

1990s, Portuguese remained marginal, confined to a few institutions and serving

narrowly defined state purposes. As Li (2015) observes, this long stagnation would be

abruptly broken in the 2000s by a ‘volcanic eruption’, that is, an explosive growth of the

number of students and courses of Portuguese in China’s higher education.

Contemporary Developments and Enduring Structures

The 21st century witnessed a sharp turn in Portuguese language education. Between

2000 and 2020, the number of universities offering Portuguese in Mainland China rose

from three to over forty (André, 2019; Pires, 2022; Jatobá, 2020). This shift was

catalysed by several overlapping factors: China’s accession to the WTO; the emergence

of Brazil and Angola as strategic partners; the founding of Forum Macao in 2003; and

new educational policies encouraging universities to diversify their degree offerings (Ye,

2014; Castelo & Ye, 2020). Portuguese suddenly became attractive due to its perceived

market value and low initial institutional cost. Yet this growth occurred without a formal

guiding policy. As Jatobá (2020, p. 184) argues, it amounted to a “tacit policy”, shaped

more by political and economic signals than by educational planning. This flexibility

allowed rapid expansion, but also introduced problems of quality control, faculty training,

and curricular fragmentation (Ye, 2014; Liu, 2017).

Even as market responsiveness increased, the ideological framing of language education

remained intact. Policy documents continued to stress alignment with national priorities.

Portuguese was promoted not for its cultural richness, but for its strategic usefulness.

Decisions like the 2011 withdrawal of preferential exam policies reinforced the message

that language programs would be supported only as long as they served state-defined

goals (Liu, 2017). This expansion also revealed structural asymmetries. As of 2023, over

half hundred institutions in Mainland China and its SARs offered Portuguese courses

(Pires, 2024), with estimates of student enrolment range between 5,100 and 6,400, and

about 300 teachers nationwide. (Pires, 2022; Castelo & Ye, 2020). Yet staffing levels,

academic qualifications, and postgraduate opportunities vary widely. As of 2020, only 6%

of Mainland teachers held doctorates, compared to a more qualified and experienced

teaching corps in Macao (Castelo & Ye, 2020).

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Macao occupies a pivotal position as both a geopolitical bridge and an academic centre

within China’s Portuguese language education system. Yet, until 1999, Portuguese was

the language of the ruling class, public services and Law (Teixeira e Silva & Lima-

Hernandes, 2014, pp. 63 & 64). Cheng (2020, p. 186) states that there was no defined

language policy in Macao during Portuguese rule. More than four centuries of rule had

only led to the creation of two separate societies. As Cheng (2020, p. 187) further points

out:

“(…), the influence of the Portuguese language hardly spread beyond the

public domain. In other fields, such as commerce, education and cultural life,

Portuguese was not commonly used in Macao society, either because the

Portuguese administration deliberately refrained from making Portuguese the

official language outside government business, or because governmental

inefficiency impeded the expansion of the official language policy beyond the

public domain”.

However, the local government did make significant advances during the 1990’s that

greatly impacted Portuguese language teaching to this day. The creation of the University

of Macau and the Polytechnic Institute of Macao (now Polytechnic University of Macao) is

still seen as having an impact in the competitiveness of those that learn Portuguese

(Teixeira e Silva & Lima-Hernandes, 2014, pp. 70). Furthermore, the Macao Special

Administrative Region’s is based on the Portuguese one. Cheng (2020, p. 197) further

states it is necessary for the legal system to remain bilingual, as a way of not only

remembering the territory’s history but also of protecting the Portuguese language.

Its institutions provide structured professional development for Mainland instructors

through master’s and doctoral programs, intensive summer training, interpretation

courses, and scholarly conferences. These institutions also act as instruments of cultural

diplomacy, operationalizing Macao’s formal role as China’s designated platform for

Lusophone cooperation. In this dual capacity, Macao integrates educational leadership

with strategic function, aligning language education initiatives with Beijing’s broader soft

power objectives, particularly within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

From Language Policy to Ideological Control

Despite quantitative gains, significant challenges remain. The absence of standardized

curricula, the uneven distribution of faculty expertise, and reliance on Macao all point to

the fragility of the system. As in earlier decades, foreign language education remains a

tool of statecraft: flexible in form, but rigid in function. Locals identify more closely with

the PRC (Geddes, 2020), an element that is present even among younger generations.

Li, Ieong, Wong et. al. (2025, pp. 566 & 567) found that University of Macau students

have an easier time accepting the official ideology of the CCP, as well as balancing the

existence of a national identity that does not eliminate the presence of a local identity.

The authors also signal to the fact the current circumstances are not static:

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“Notably, as the Hong Kong and Macao governments actively promote

patriotic education, which has been significantly shaped by the official

ideology in Mainland China in recent years, this spectrum pattern is better

treated as dynamic rather than static, as it may change over time. This

spectrum pattern could provide insights for school stakeholders to rethink

how to better equip youths for the complex world through patriotic education”

(Li Ieong, Wong et. al., 2025, pp. 567 & 568).

Patriotic education, therefore, is viewed as key element to promoting national unity

through the Xi Jinping thought. In 2024 the local government announced that new

courses would be offered at Macao schools to foster a strong national with China, as well

as promote “excellent Chinese culture” (Pereira, 2024; The Macao News, 2024). Then

chief executive Ho Iat Seng stated that the Patriotic Education Law would ensure national

security and the without it, Macao would not continue in its path of development and

solidity (Pereira, 2023). His words have been closely replicated, through calls to use

patriotic materials in strengthen Macao’s integration with the Greater Bay Area region

(Ho, 2025) and to increase education investment as a way of not only spearheading

technological development, but also construction of a stable national identity.

Other institutions have responded to the government’s push to embrace patriotic

education as a crucial part in solidifying Macanese society and integrating into the CCP’s

tianxia. The Women’s General Association of Macao, for instance, called the local

government to commit to promoting patriotic education among young people (Marques,

2025), as a way a solidifying the patriotic spirit the Macanese people with the framework

of the “One Country, Two Systems” (Newsdesk, 2024).

History has been at the core of the discussion. Beijing’s intent revolves around creating

a narrative that not only reminds Macao and Hong Kong youths of the country’s past

under foreign oppression but also attempts to generate a stronger sense of belonging to

China under the help of the CCP. Production of teaching materials, for instance, was a

point of contention. Macao SAR DSEDJ, since 2019, has encouraged schools to adopt

history manuals produced by the People’s Education Press, a Mainland China publisher.

Several academics questioned whether this would limit a more pluralistic comprehension

of history (JTM, 2016).

Conclusion

Stemming from centuries of tradition, the CCP has attempted to create a new form of

social harmony. Based on Xi’s Thought, the PRC intends to create a space where the

Communist leadership is placed at the centre. These efforts are not new since 1949 and

yet Xi’s presidency has pushed ideological and political education further than previous

generations of Communist rulers. Universities have been particularly targeted leading to

greater insularity from the outside world. Nonetheless, there is still a disconnect between

the ideological objectives of the state and the needs and concerns of Chinese youth. High

unemployment and a lack of willingness to engage in the “rat race” that is required to

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reach a high-status position in society counteract the CCP’s intention of having a cohesive

force moving in the same direction. Furthermore, greater investment in fields like STEM

and AI places greater pressure on language courses to become attractive to young college

students.

The case of Portuguese in China exemplifies the intersection between foreign language

education and geopolitical strategy. From its marginal beginnings as a tool of diplomatic

necessity to its current status as a language of opportunity and employability, Portuguese

has found a distinct space within China’s linguistic landscape. Its continued success will

depend on sustained investment, institutional collaboration, and the evolving priorities of

China’s engagement with the Lusophone world.

At the same time, this trajectory highlights a critical insight for international language

policy: the promotion of a foreign language, whether for cultural outreach, soft power, or

commercial gain, cannot be disentangled from the ideological and institutional structures

of the host country. In China, where language planning is tightly coupled with political

priorities, foreign language education remains a carefully managed enterprise. The

development of Portuguese has advanced not through cultural affinity, but through

strategic calibration - serving diplomatic, commercial, and ideological functions within

China’s state-led educational framework. For Portugal, this underscores the need for

foreign policy and language promotion strategies that are attuned to the recipient

country’s political economy and ideological parameters.

In this regard, Macao holds particular relevance. As both a symbolic link and an

operational platform, Macao facilitates the linguistic and institutional bridge between

China and the Lusophone world. Its comparative academic strength, cultural familiarity,

and geopolitical positioning make it a critical node for expanding Portuguese language

education in East Asia. More broadly, the case of Portuguese in China offers a window

into the complex interplay between language, ideology, and international relations, an

interplay that defines, and will continue to shape, the evolving dynamic between Portugal,

China, and the wider Lusophone sphere.

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OBSERVARE

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL:

INSIGHTS FROM PORTUGAL–CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COOPERATION

CARLOS RODRIGUES

cjose@ua.pt

He is an Associate Professor with Habilitation in the Department of Social, Political and Territorial

Sciences at the University of Aveiro (Portugal), and an Integrated Researcher at the Research

Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (GOVCOPP) and at the Centre for

Research in Higher Education Policies (CIPES). He holds a PhD in Social Sciences, a Master’s

degree in Innovation and Development Policies, and a Bachelor’s degree in Regional and Urban

Planning, all from the University of Aveiro. His research focuses on public policies for

development and territorial inequalities, and he also conducts scholarly work in the field of Asian

studies, particularly on science, technology and innovation policies, the internationalization of

higher education, and European Union–Asia relations. He is the author and co-author of several

scientific publications and has extensive experience participating in research projects and

knowledge transfer activities at both national and international levels. https://orcig.org/0000-

0001-6403-6959

Abstract

This study provides a critical appraisal of the evolving relationship between Portugal and China

in the domain of science and technology (S&T). It challenges functionalist and technocratic

approaches to international S&T cooperation by advancing an extended analytical framework

inspired by Shilliam’s conceptualisation of the “modern international”. The article argues that

S&T cooperation is shaped not only by institutional arrangements and policy instruments, but

also by historically constituted hierarchies, colonial and semi-colonial legacies, and

asymmetries in power, resources, and epistemic authority. The study concludes that the

“modern international” provides a fruitful framework to capture the historical depth and

political complexity of contemporary S&T cooperation between a global innovation

powerhouse and a semi-peripheral European country.

Keywords

Portugal, China, International S&T cooperation, Cooperation for Science, Knowledge power

asymmetries, Historical global hierarchies.

Resumo

Este estudo oferece uma avaliação crítica da evolução da relação entre Portugal e a China no

domínio da ciência e tecnologia (C&T). O artigo desafia abordagens funcionalistas e

tecnocráticas à cooperação internacional em C&T, avançando um quadro analítico ampliado

inspirado na conceptualização de Shilliam sobre o “internacional moderno”. Argumenta se que

a cooperação em C&T é moldada não apenas por arranjos institucionais e instrumentos de

política pública, mas também por hierarquias historicamente constituídas, legados coloniais e

semi coloniais, e assimetrias de poder, recursos e autoridade epistémica. O estudo conclui

que a noção de “internacional moderno” constitui um enquadramento fecundo para captar a

profundidade histórica e a complexidade política da cooperação contemporânea em C&T entre

uma potência global de inovação e um país europeu semi periférico.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 80-98

Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

Palavras-chave

Estratégia de hedging, Portugal, China, Estados Unidos.

How to cite this article

Rodrigues, Carlos (2026). Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–

China Science and Technology Cooperation. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and

Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 80-98.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.4

Article submitted on 3rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 28th January

2026

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 80-98

Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL:

INSIGHTS FROM PORTUGAL–CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COOPERATION

CARLOS RODRIGUES

Introduction

This research offers a critical appraisal of the evolving relationship between Portugal and

China in the realm of science and technology (S&T). It focuses on the cooperative

interactions between a small, underfunded S&T system, marked by several structural

limitations, and a global innovation powerhouse supported by a large, well-funded and

carefully planned systemic context (Pisani et al., 2025; Sun and Cao, 2024). Differences

in size and power invite a challenge to the adequacy of a purely functional and

technocratic analysis of S&T cooperation between the two countries, which, in the end,

would provide a neutral portrait of a tendentially balanced cooperative dynamics. By

contrast, this paper seeks to move beyond functional and technocratic perspectives in

order to examine how systemic asymmetries shape cooperation. In addition, it endeavors

to shed light over the underlying political dimensions, which unfold across the hierarchical

structures of globalized knowledge production.

This analytical context, in turn, raises theoretical challenges that mainstream approaches

to international relations may be unable to resolve. In broad terms, realist, liberal and

constructivist models, as articulated by authors such as Waltz (1979), Keohane (1984),

and Wendt (1992; 1995), do offer powerful insights into state behavior, yet limited in

their capacity to disentangle the complex and diverse dynamics of international S&T

cooperation. Is cooperation primarily a matter of power and competition, or part of a

broader effort to empower states pursuing national interests in a troubled world? The

realist perspective risks overlooking the persistence of cooperation despite rivalries,

geopolitical tensions or power asymmetries. Even amid intense geopolitical confrontation,

as in the case of the Cold War, Soviet and American scientists and research centers

cooperated in order to advance knowledge in specific fields, particularly space-related

research (Krige, 2019). Furthermore, the view, as in Waltz (1979, p. 98), that “variation

of structure is introduced, not through differences in the character and function of units

[of international political systems], but only through distinctions made among them

according to their capabilities”, focus on the effects of structure on cooperation between

nations, overlooking important historical and epistemic dimensions. Is cooperation

Conflict of Interests: The author declares that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this study.

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 80-98

Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

important because it reduces the risk of international conflict by generating mutual gains

within a framework of strong institutions, rules and laws? The liberal approach may leave

in the shadows crucial political and cultural dimensions affecting S&T cooperation,

particularly due to its emphasis on institutional efficiency in mitigating problems arising

from imbalances in power, resources, capacities and policy priorities. According to

Keohane (1984, p. 51), cooperation “occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the

actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”.

This reasoning, although relevant to understand how cooperation can be ignited and

maintained, does not say much about the determining historical configuration of

preferences and the persistence of structural inequalities. Is cooperation a socially

constructed process underpinned by a widely shared set of rules, values and

expectations? The constructivist perspective, although powerful to analyze how identities

and cultures shape S&T-related international networks, may obscure the constraining

effects of intense technological competition among states and blocs. Wendt (1992, p.

395) argues that “anarchy is what states make of it” in order to bring identity and social

structure into the discussion. However, the author leaves the historical constitutions of

international relations and cooperation in the shadow. Moreover, and perhaps decisively,

these mainstream theories, - largely developed under the influence of Western

philosophy, political theory and history (Acharya and Buzan, 2010) - tend to be

ineffective in addressing the impact of the “ideational and perceptual forces which fuel,

in varying mixtures, both Gramscian hegemonies, and ethnocentrism and the politics of

exclusion”, as the same authors argue (Acharya and Buzan, 2010, p. 2). Hence, this

paper tests an extended frame of reference that allows, on the one hand, going beyond

a conception of international relations as solely shaped by power, institutions, or norms,

and, on the other hand, avoiding a Eurocentric theoretical bias. This concern echoes the

problem identified by Shilliam (2010, p. 5): “That the colonial condition has been more

the normal rather than exceptional historical path to modernity is woefully ignored in

theories and approaches to IR that tend to bolt imperialism and colonialism onto existing

frameworks and narratives that center upon an idealized European experience”.

The paper embeds the specific case of Portugal–China S&T relations within a framework

in which knowledge generation and technological development, transfer and exchange

are intertwined with history, power and dependency relations and global governance.

This ‘embedding’ not only legitimizes the extended framework as analytical reference but

also paves the way to bring Portugal’s colonial past into an account of interaction between

a global innovation powerhouse - underpinned by large-scale investments in research

and development, technology transfer and scientific diplomacy - and a small European

Union member state seeking to position itself strategically as a connector between Europe

and the Global South.

From a methodological point of view, the study follows a dominant qualitative, critical-

historical approach grounded in an interpretive effort underpinned by the ‘modern

international’ framework. Accordingly, the interpretative stance underpinning the

analytical strategy is informed by historical and postcolonial political economy

perspectives. Rather than seeking causal generalization, the study aims to contextualize

empirical patterns within broader structural, historical, and geopolitical dynamics shaping

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and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

international S&T cooperation. Qualitative data were collected through documentary

analysis of bilateral agreements, memoranda of understanding, policy documents,

institutional reports, and official communications produced by Portuguese, Chinese, and

Macanese authorities, as well as by universities and funding agencies. Media reports and

institutional websites were also analyzed, namely to identify concrete cases of

cooperation, joint research centers, and funding initiatives. Although eminently

qualitative, the paper also resorts to data resulting from bibliometric analysis of co-

authored scientific publications indexed in the SCOPUS database and joint research

projects described in the CORDIS database. Publication and project counts, disciplinary

distribution, and relative weight within Portugal’s international collaboration profile were

analyzed for the period 2019–2025.

S&T Within the Modern International: Making the Case for Portugal and

China

Is the extended ‘modern international’ frame of reference fit to inform the study of

international S&T cooperation? Shilliam (2021) describes the international as something

that cannot be reduced, as realist theories tend to do, to a neutral, timeless space of

competitive interactions between states. Rather, it is the outcome of an evolutive process

shaped by historical circumstances (e.g. colonialism, race, slavery) (ibid.), as well as by

what Dube (2017, p. 76) terms “temporal and spatial hierarchies of modernity”. The

modern, in Shilliam’s view (2017, p. 76), emerges from the recognition that international

relations, both as a field of scholarly inquiry and as practice, developed alongside

European modernity, which itself was constructed through empire and colonial

subjugation, laying the foundations for a global configuration of unbalanced modernities.

Bringing Shilliam’s propositions to the domain of international S&T cooperation implies

the assumption that history is a determining factor in understanding the changing

imaginations, mechanics, politics, policies and practices of cooperation between scientific

and technological systems. This approach aligns with Wallerstein (1984)

conceptualization of a hierarchically structured world-system constituted by core, semi-

peripheral, and peripheral contexts. However, although the convergence in underlining

the historical production of global inequalities and the uneven distribution of scientific

and technological capacities, Shilliam’s ‘modern international’ places stronger emphasis

on colonial hierarchies imposed by imbalances in epistemic power. Accordingly, it

facilitates the reading of the transformation dynamics behind the former colonial

Portugal’s positioning as a semi-peripheral country within Europe, and China’s transition

from a semi-colonial condition to a core technological actor.

The co-evolution of scientific modernity and European colonial expansion resulted in a

divide between certain ‘developed’ states, positioning themselves as producers of

knowledge, developers of new technologies and centers of innovation, and other

‘developing’ states, cast as followers and passive users of knowledge and technologies

created by the former. Within this uneven hierarchical context, S&T cooperation becomes

a collaborative yet asymmetrical relationship between advanced mentors and latecomer

apprentices. This imbalance is far from being something of the past, as demonstrated by

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and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

the burgeoning literature on the subject (e.g. Ishengoma, 2016; Cherry et al., 2018) and

the examples of Europe–Africa cooperation provided by Nordling (2015, p. 24): “the

Nairobi Industrial Court agreed that six Kenyan doctors in an international research

partnership had been systematically passed over for promotion and training, whereas

their European colleagues had flourished”, and “African scientists say that they often feel

stuck in positions such as data collectors and laboratory technicians, with no realistic

path to develop into leaders”. The argument, therefore, is that a form of colonial

continuity persists - often rhetorically reframed as “mutual heritage” or “shared history”

(Oancâ, 2025) - underpinned by a paternalistic approach that ultimately risks

reproducing further scientific and technological dependency.

However, contrary to what a superficial discussion of S&T uneven hierarchies might

suggest, Europe does not stand as the sole cradle of what we nowadays call science. This

becomes evident when examining the decisive historical contributions made by Arab

civilizations (e.g. astronomy, medicine, chemistry, mathematics) and by China (e.g.

printing, paper, gunpowder, mathematics, astronomy). Accordingly, questions arise

regarding the extent to which a framework centered on colonial legacies can be

straightforwardly extended to regions such as China or the Arab world, both of which

were at the forefront of technological development and innovation until at least the 13th

and 16th centuries respectively. In China’s case, however, the 19th and early 20th

centuries, although not configuring formal colonization as experienced in Africa or South

Asia, reflect a semi-colonial condition. As Reinhardt (2018) argues, China was not

formally colonized, yet it was clearly dominated by external powers. The Opium War of

1840, culminated in the victory of British imperial forces and the signing of the Treaty of

Nanjing, which, in brief, compelled China to handover Hong Kong to the British Crown

and to open several coastal cities to foreign residence and trade (Wright, 2011). This

traumatic episode underpins the contemporary discourse of the “Chinese Dream of

National Rejuvenation”, as expressed by Xi Jinping: “The Chinese nation is a great nation.

With a history of more than 5,000 years, China has made indelible contributions to the

progress of human civilization. After the Opium War of 1840, however, China was

gradually reduced to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society and suffered greater ravages

than ever before. The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to

great pain, and the Chinese civilization was plunged into darkness. Since that time,

national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese

nation”

The Chinese Revolution and the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949 brought this

period of “humiliation” to an end. In this sense, China’s revolutionary transformation

aligns with the propositions of the “modern international” unveiling the possibility of

resisting colonial and semi-colonial legacies and their inherent uneven hierarchies

(Shilliam, 2011). Science and technology, deemed as crucial to modernizing the formerly

“humiliated” nation, became a strategic priority. The Communist Party called to “march

towards science”, under Chairman Mao’s motto: “Now that the relations of production

Speech by Xi Jinping at the ceremony marking the CCP centenary, July 1, 2021. Retrieved from

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/202107/01/content_WS60dd8d8ac6d0df57f98dc459.html.

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and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

have changed, it is necessary to increase productivity. Without science and technology,

productivity cannot be improved”

With planned science already well established and accepted in the country, namely due

to the Sino-Japanese War and Soviet influence (Wang, 2015), China launched a twelve-

year S&T plan in 1956. The Long-Range Plan for Scientific and Technological

Development (1956–1967)

, described as “the most celebrated of China’s past S&T

plans” (Sun and Cao, 2021, p. 5), laid the foundations for modern scientific development.

It forged a “triple alliance between workers, scientists and administrators” (Yamada,

1972, p. 502), meant to support the Great Leap Forward’s industrialization ambitions and

a self-reliant scientific system. Although the “hopelessly utopian” Great Leap Forward

strategy (Schoenhals, 1992, p. 591) and the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, - with

its “distinctly anti-scientific tone” (Wu and Sheeks, 1970, p. 462) - produced serious

setbacks, these experiences informed later reforms. From 1978 onwards, under Deng

Xiaoping’s leadership, science and technology were repositioned at the core of China’s

modernization and development trajectory:

“The key to the four modernizations is the modernization of science and

technology. Without modern science and technology, it is impossible to build

modern agriculture, modern industry or modern national defense. Without

the rapid development of science and technology, there can be no rapid

development of the economy” (Xiaoping, 1978)

Strong centralized S&T planning and major policy initiatives - such as the 863 Programme

(1986), the 973 Programme (1997), Made in China 2025 (2015), the National Key R&D

Programme (2016) and the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan

(2017) - have driven what Gewirtz (2019) describes as a new technological revolution.

Jabbour and Moreira (2023, p. 546) characterize this trajectory as a “New Projectment

Economy”, rooted in the “central role of China’s National System of Technological

Innovation since the second half of the twentieth century”.

China’s transformation into a global scientific and technological powerhouse

fundamentally challenges Western historical dominance in S&T and flattens the

hierarchies inherited from semi-colonial Western epistemic authority (Shilliam, 2015).

This ambition is encapsulated in Xinhua’s commentary on the 19th National Congress of

the CPC: “By 2050, two centuries after the Opium Wars, which plunged the ‘Middle

Kingdom’ into a period of hurt and shame, China is set to regain its might and re-ascend

to the top of the world”

Excerpt from a Mao Zedong speech in 1956 (Science and Technology Daily, July 7, 2012).

1956 - 1967年科学技术发展远景规划纲要 (1956—1967 Nián kēxué jìshù fāzhǎn yuǎnjǐng guīhuà gāngyào).

Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science, March 18, 1978. Retrieved from

https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/speech-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-national-

conference-on-science/.

Xinhua (2017). Commentary: Milestone congress points to new era for China, the world. Retrieved from

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702090.htm.

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Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

Portugal, now a small semi-peripheral European country, carries a colonial legacy that

situates it among the architects of persistent uneven global hierarchies. Its empire

stretched over Africa, Asia and South America. It was the outcome of an expansion

process that played a key role in the formation of the modern world system (Devezas

and Modelski, 2007). The same authors (Devezas and Modelski, 2007, p. 34) attribute

to the Portuguese two “very important transitions in the formation of the world system”,

namely, the “creation of a global network together with instruments of global reach [….]

and the emergence of some scientific commitment in system-building endeavor”. The

importance of science and technology would give structure to the Portuguese colonial

history, far beyond the decline at the end of Enlightenment, reaching the colonies’

independence, in the aftermath of the 1974 Carnation Revolution (Diogo and Amaral,

2012). Science functioned as an instrument of domination, as articulated in early

twentieth-century doctrines of the “science of colonization” (Costa, 2013).

Although Portugal shares this colonial trajectory with other European powers, its case

exhibits two distinctive features: the relative underdevelopment of its S&T system

compared with core European states, and its consequent subordinate position within

European knowledge hierarchies. Portugal thus occupies a dual position, both

reproducing colonial hierarchies and remaining subject to those imposed by a structurally

unequal Europe. Its persistent underfunding of S&T, dependence on EU resources and

precarious scientific careers exemplify this condition (Gago, 1990). As such, Portugal is

a good illustration of Shilliam’s (2011) argument that colonial hierarchies are uneven and

layered, i.e., they are much more than a simple North-South divide.

Mobilising Shilliam’s concept of the “modern international” in the analysis of Portugal–

China S&T cooperation entails treating scientific collaboration as a historically situated

and politically embedded process rather than a neutral exchange among formally equal

partners. Accordingly, this implies the examination of the ways colonial and semi-colonial

legacies shape contemporary epistemic hierarchies and expectations of expertise and the

analysis of asymmetries in material resources, institutional capacity, and agenda-setting

power. In addition, it requires an effort to positioning bilateral cooperation within broader

global governance structures and geopolitical configurations, as well as to tracing how

historical narratives - e.g., the national rejuvenation in China or the post-imperial

Europeanisation and Atlanticism in Portugal - inform policy choices and cooperative

practices. These operational threads guide the empirical analysis, linking observable

cooperation mechanisms to deeper historical and structural dimensions.

S&T Portugal-China Cooperation: A Brief Overview

There is a wide and long-established consensus on the centrality of international

cooperation in enhancing the capacity of supranational, national and subnational S&T

systems to respond to increasingly complex global challenges (Gerrard, 1996; Lacasa

and Vogelsang, 2024). For small S&T systems, such as the Portuguese one, international

cooperation often becomes a structural need, crucial for addressing challenges such as

limited funding and the lack of critical R&D critical mass, as well as for fostering

modernization and qualitative improvement. As Patrício (2010, p. 178) observes,

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“Portuguese policymakers, researchers, academic staff and students have become quite

aware of the benefits of internationalization”. She adds: “A new culture has emerged,

the culture that is needed for a country to fit into the new knowledge-based global

economy”.

China, in turn, while modernizing its internal R&D capacity, has deliberately mobilized

international S&T cooperation as an instrument to bridge the technological and innovation

gap with advanced Western economies and, ultimately, to drive its transformation from

a technologically dependent country into a global innovation leader. In the words of Cao

(2024, p. 2): “China has rapidly ascended to become one of the world’s leading nations

for scientific research. While observers frequently point to China’s measures to boost

domestic science as being responsible for this development, international collaboration

has been at least equally critical in China’s scientific rise”.

The first formal agreement between Portugal and China dates back to 1982, three years

after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Motivated by a “desire to

strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries and to promote their

cooperation in the fields of culture, science, technology, art, education and sports, on the

basis of mutual benefit” (Diário da República, 1982, p. 2957), the agreement identified

as priorities cooperation between higher education institutes, academic mobility,

reciprocal scholarship granting and exchange of academic theses, teaching materials,

books and data. At that time, individual contacts between academics constituted the

main vehicle of cooperation. Evidence of such exchanges can be found, for example, in

the collaboration in materials science between Lopes Baptista, Professor at the University

of Aveiro, and Yi Pan, Professor at Zhejiang University, evidenced by a significant number

of joint publications (e.g., Pan and Baptista, 1996; 2000). This case also illustrates the

subsequent process of institutionalization that followed these initially individual-driven

interactions. The Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation signed in 1993

established an action-oriented institutional framework, notably through the creation of a

joint commission responsible for defining priorities and overseeing implementation, which

remains in place. The main areas of S&T cooperation were further specified in the Joint

Declaration supporting the Global Strategic Partnership signed in 2005: information and

communication technologies, biotechnology and biomedicine, physics, space sciences,

materials science, the environment and oceanography. This framework was reinforced in

subsequent years through additional agreements, including the Memorandum of

Understanding in the Areas of Science, Technology and Innovation (2012) and sectoral

agreements such as the Protocol on Cooperation in Research and Innovation in the Field

of Marine Sciences (2014), culminating in the seventeen Memoranda of Understanding

signed in 2018 within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Among them, the

memorandum establishing the Portugal–China 2030 Science and Technology Partnership

introduced new fields of cooperation, including space-related research and the blue

economy.

China’s designation as a ‘systemic rival’ by the European Commission in 2019 (EC, 2019),

the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and pressure from the United States for Portugal to

choose between its Western allies and China (Rodrigues, 2023) can be seen as factors

that have troubled Portugal–China cooperation, particularly in S&T, as illustrated by the

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Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

Portuguese government’s decision to exclude Chinese firms from the development of 5G

networks. Rodrigues (2025, p. 198) refers to a “notable cooling of enthusiasm” after

2019. The same author (Rodrigues, 2025) adds that, in the case of Portugal, the cooling

effect, although visible in several domains, “did not relegate China to the category of

rival”. Accordingly, Portugal–China S&T relations may be described as sound yet

nuanced. Soundness is reflected in the joint establishment of research centers (Table 1),

joint research programmes and projects - including those promoted by the Portuguese

Foundation for Science and Technology and China’s Ministry of Science and Technology,

as well as EU-funded initiatives - and a substantial body of co-authored publications

(Table 2) produced through prolific cooperation between scientists in both countries, at

both individual and institutional levels.

Table 1. Portugal-China cooperation: Joint Research Centers

Year

Initiative

2017

International Joint Research Center for Marine Biology - Partners: University

of Algarve and Shanghai Ocean University

2018

CASS-UC Centre of China Studies - Partners: University of Coimbra (UC) and the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

2021

5GAIner - 5G + IA Networks Reliability Centre - Partners: Huawei, University

of Aveiro, IT- Institute of Telecommunications

2024

China-Portugal Joint Institute for Climate and Energy - Partners: China

University of Petroleum (Beijing) and IST- Instituto Superior Técnico

China-Portugal International Joint Laboratory in Herbal Medicines -

Partners: University of Lisbon (Faculty of Pharmacy) and Jiangxi University of

Traditional Chinese Medicine.

Sino-Portuguese Laboratory on Marine and Environmental Sciences -

Partners: Institute of Science and Environment (University of Saint Joseph Macao),

Portuguese Catholic University, Portuguese Institute for Sea and Atmosphere

(IPMA), and Institute of Oceanology (Chinese Academy of Sciences).

2025

Sino-Portuguese Joint Research Center for Sustainable Chemistry and

Materials - Partners: CICECO (University of Aveiro) and East China University of

Science and Technology.

China-Portugal Joint Laboratory on AI and Public Health Technologies -

Partners: INESC-ID, Guangzhou Laboratory, Guangzhou Medical University, and

Macao University of Science and Technology.

STARlab - Partners: University of Minho, University of Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro

and IAMCAS- Innovation Academy for Microsatellites Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Joint Laboratory in Artificial Intelligence for Healthy Longevity - Partners:

University of Coimbra and Macao Polytechnic University

Source: Author

As shown in Table 2, between 2019 and 2025 nearly 16,000 scientific articles indexed in

the SCOPUS database were co-authored by researchers working in Portugal and China,

representing approximately 4% of Portugal’s internationally co-authored output. During

this period, China ranked 10th among Portugal’s international scientific partners, in a list

led by Spain, the United Kingdom and Brazil.

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Carlos Rodrigues

Table 2. Portugal-China cooperation: co-authored papers (2019-2025)

Subject Area

Number

Engineering

2435

15,30%

Physic & Astronomy

2282

14,34%

Medicine

1490

9,36%

Materials Science

1269

7,97%

Computer Sciences

1014

6,37%

Environmental Sciences

898

5,64%

Chemistry

838

5,27%

Biochemistry & Genetics

791

4,97%

Biology

637

4,00%

Earth & Planetary Sciences

565

3,55%

Mathematics

536

3,37%

Chemical Engineering

512

3,22%

Social Sciences

446

2,80%

Energy

380

2,39%

Multidisciplinary

302

1,90%

Immunology & Microbiology

244

1,53%

Business & Accounting

200

1,26%

Psychology

176

1,11%

Pharmacology

174

1,09%

Neuroscience

158

0,99%

Economics & Finance

145

0,91%

Decision Sciences

139

0,87%

Health Professions

101

0,63%

Arts & Humanities

0,52%

Nursing

0,41%

Veterinary

0,16%

Dentistry

0,06%

TOTAL

15915

100,00%

Source: Scival Elsevier (n.d.)

Table 2 further indicates that more than 60% of these co-authored publications fall within

the fields of engineering, physics and astronomy, medicine, materials science and

computer science. Overall, cooperation appears strongly oriented towards technical and

applied sciences. This emphasis may be attributed to several factors, including China’s

innovation priorities, Portugal’s specialized expertise in these domains, and the objectives

of funding institutions. Moreover, the technical focus of early cooperative initiatives in

the 1980s appears to have shaped subsequent trajectories. A similar pattern is observed

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Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

in Horizon Europe projects (2021–2027) coordinated by Portuguese organizations with

Chinese institutions as associated partners. According to the CORDIS database,

approximately 15% of the 107 projects coordinated by Portuguese entities involve

Chinese partners. This represents a significant increase compared with the Horizon 2020

programme (2014–2020), during which Chinese participation was marginal, with only

four out of 672 projects.

In this context, the general cooling of EU–China relations in the field of S&T appears to

have had a less pronounced impact on Portugal–China cooperation than in some other

EU member states, where stricter eligibility rules for R&D funding, heightened

knowledge-security concerns and restrictions on Chinese researchers’ access to sensitive

research facilities produced a stronger deterrent effect (Cai and Zheng, 2025).

Nevertheless, there is evidence that the deteriorating geopolitical environment -

particularly the strained relations between China, the EU and the United States - has

influenced Portugal–China cooperation, primarily at the level of public discourse.

While collaboration on the ground has remained largely robust, it has been accompanied

by a weakening of its public and political articulation. The case of the “5GAIner — 5G +

AI Networks Reliability Centre”, established in 2021 at the University of Aveiro and

funded by Huawei, illustrates this dynamic. The laboratory, which provides “a 5G

experimentation environment for the different stakeholders taking part in the 5G

ecosystem” (Quevedo et al., 2023, p. 514), developed internationally recognized R&D

projects and maintained close ties with industrial firms and public organizations. It was

awarded with the “Huawei Corporate-Level Excellent Technical Cooperation Project 2022”

and received considerable public attention. However, the ban imposed in May 2023 by

the Portuguese government on the participation of companies headquartered in non-

NATO countries in 5G development - a decision that directly affected Huawei - apparently

changed the situation. Signaling a shift in the relational dynamics between Portugal and

China (Rodrigues, 2025), this decision, as expected, impacted on the S&T cooperative

dynamics involving Huawei and research organizations. The research objectives pursued

by the 5GAIner laboratory are still underpinning research activities at the University of

Aveiro, but no connection to Huawei can be established with basis on available

information.

Exploring the Extended “Modern International”

Science and Technology cooperation between Portugal and China, despite differences in

power and scale, may be regarded as a natural development within the globally shared

understanding that the internationalization of scientific and technological systems is of

fundamental importance. However, when the aim is to test the extended concept of the

“modern international” as a meaningful analytical framework for examining cooperative

dynamics between the two systems, this notion of “naturality” acquires important

nuances. These nuances are grounded in history, geography and politics, and are rooted

in Macao. In this sense, when interpreting the current status of Portugal-China S&T

cooperation through the “modern international”, Macao provides an effective analytical

path to go beyond the limited view of cooperation as motivated by any sort of functional

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and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

complementarity or convergence of interests. Rather, the current dynamics emerge from

historically constructed relations though which knowledge, power, and legitimacy have

circulated unevenly across colonial and post-colonial configurations.

Macao became a permanent Portuguese trading base in 1557 through a concession

granted by the Ming dynasty and was formally transformed into a colonial territory more

than three centuries later, following the signing of the Lisbon Protocol and the Sino-

Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce in 1887. Although never ratified, the

treaty conferred sovereignty over the territory upon Portugal. Portuguese colonial rule

persisted until 1976, when China gradually resumed certain sovereign powers within the

post-revolutionary Portuguese decolonization process, culminating in Macao’s handover

to China in 1999 and its incorporation into the “One Country, Two Systems” framework

as the second Chinese Special Administrative Region. The smooth and successful

negotiations during the transition period (1988–1999) are widely regarded as a key

foundation of the stable and mutually beneficial relations that endure today.

Historically, Macao has served as a crucial gateway between European and Chinese

cultures and systems of knowledge. As Soen (2004, p. 219) observes, “during the late

sixteenth and early seventeenth century Macao was a vibrant Portuguese trading center

where Europeans and Chinese exchanged products and knowledge… and became a

keystone in cultural exchange between East and West and China”. Its role as an entry

point for Western medical knowledge during the late Ming and early Qing dynasties (Wu

et al., 2024), European mathematical sciences (Jami, 2004), and Chinese pharmaceutical

knowledge transmitted to Europe (Golvers, 2018) exemplifies this mediating function.

Even in periods when Portuguese authority over Macao was severely contested,

particularly during the nineteenth century, the enclave “continued to function for China

as an important point of entry for Western ideas” (Edmonds, 1993, p. 5).

From the perspective of the ‘modern international’, Macao is providing support to

cooperative practices that can be deemed as embedded in older regimes of global

ordering and inherent uneven hierarchies. Hence, the framework provides the

understanding of Portugal-China S&T cooperation as a reconfigured continuation of

historically driven modes of international engagement that present unbalances,

mediation, and symbolic power as constitutive dimensions. As such, it is not a simple

matter of responding to the challenges of globalized science. This calls forth the need to

know more about the extent to which Macao continues to fulfil a mediating role,

nowadays under Chinese sovereignty. One central argument is that Portugal’s colonial

legacy - although now residual - has been reprocessed into symbolic capital (Ferraz de

Matos, 2020), providing significant leverage for the development of exchanges and

cooperative networks between China, Portugal and Portuguese-speaking countries. This

symbolic capital has been institutionalized, most notably through China’s establishment

in 2003 of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and

Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Forum Macao), which uses the Portuguese language as

a structuring element supporting Macao’s role as a platform linking China, Portugal and

their former colonies (as well as Equatorial Guinea).

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and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

Macao’s function as a bridging territory also extends to international S&T cooperation, as

formalized in the Framework Law for Science and Technology issued by the SAR

Legislative Assembly in 2000 and in the Administrative Regulation governing the Macao

Science and Technology Development Fund (FDCT) established in 2004. Notably, FDCT’s

institutional communications explicitly identify Portugal - alongside mainland China - as

a major partner in international S&T cooperation (FDCT, 2024). In addition to formal

agreements between the Portuguese government and the Macao SAR (e.g., the 2001

cooperation agreement), a range of policy instruments support collaboration, including

memoranda of understanding between FDCT and Portugal’s Foundation for Science and

Technology (FCT), (e.g., the 2017 agreement establishing joint R&D funding

programmes, researcher mobility schemes and joint dissemination initiatives). These

mechanisms have supported projects linking Portuguese and Chinese R&D organizations,

particularly in fields such as marine sciences and health technologies (Leandro and Li,

2025).

Institutional partnerships, - especially between higher education institutions in Macao

and Portugal, have long played a central role in fostering S&T cooperation and extending

it to Chinese partners. The University of Macau’s Vice-Rector for Global Affairs, Rui

Martins, who serves the institution since 1992, states that the university “shoulders the

mission of linking mainland China, Macao, and Portugal” (Leong et al., 2025, p. 25).

Similarly, the University of Saint Joseph’s initiative to establish a research alliance on

healthy ageing involving six Portuguese and two Chinese universities illustrates the

capacity of Macao-based institutions to generate cooperative networks.

While institution-driven cooperation has expanded, official funding mechanisms have

shown signs of contraction. Antunes (2025, p. 1117) notes that the only dedicated joint

funding programme involving FCT and FDCT, -launched in 2017-, has not issued new

calls since 2019. This contrasts with the continued prominence of China–Macao–Portugal

cooperation in official discourse. A partial explanation may lie in FDCT’s growing strategic

engagement with Brazil, as evidenced by the joint funding scheme negotiated with

FAPESP in 2024 and launched in 2025 (FDCT, 2025).

The substantial disparities in S&T capabilities and resources between China and

Portuguese-speaking countries, - including Portugal and Brazil-, invite a critical historical

interpretation that points to a reconfiguration of dependencies between former colonizers

and (semi-)colonized societies. China’s scientific and technological development

represents a form of epistemic sovereignty with growing influence over global knowledge

production (Qiu et al., 2025). Conversely, Portugal’s imperial decline has repositioned it

from a center of knowledge dissemination to an epistemically dependent semi-periphery

(Reis, 2020). This inversion creates new asymmetries within S&T cooperation and

requires, as Antunes (2025, p. 1117) argues, “special care in ensuring that this

collaboration is done between equals and reduces this asymmetry”.

Yet, Portugal’s colonial legacy also provides network and symbolic resources that

compensate, to some extent, for its peripheral position. These resources enhance

Portugal’s capacity to function as a gateway in international S&T cooperation, not only

towards the so-called Global South, particularly the Portuguese-speaking world, but also

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

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Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

towards Europe. This symbolic and network power, in turn, helps explain China’s strategic

interest in Portugal. Macao epitomizes the complexity of these layered historical,

symbolic and geopolitical dynamics.

A first and foremost finding concerns Macao’s persistence in assuming a mediating role

in Portugal-China S&T cooperation. Consequently, there is scope to argue that colonial

legacies are not residual, they are, rather, reactivated and institutionalized according to

the nature of change in geopolitical conditions. Macao’s mediation, though, occurs within

a context of asymmetric scientific capacity and power. In fact, while China is

strengthening its S&T system and soundly shaping global research agendas, Portugal

suffers from limited resources and power inherent to its semi-peripheral position within

the EU. Nevertheless, linear readings of dependency can be challenged, namely due to

Portugal’s historical ties, linguistic heritage, and institutional networks, which, namely in

the Portuguese-speaking world, foster forms of brokerage that may offset material

constraints. This duality made of enabling possibilities and structural constraints reveals

the ‘modern international’ as a productive frame of reference to deal with the tensions of

cooperation, hierarchy, and historical transformations.

Conclusion

This study has examined the evolving relationship between Portugal and China in the

field of S&T, moving beyond a purely functionalist and technocratic approach. While such

perspectives illuminate institutional mechanisms and measurable outcomes, they are

insufficient for understanding the deeper historical and structural forces shaping

cooperation. To address this gap, the study has tested an extended analytical framework

inspired by Robbie Shilliam’s conception of the modern international, which foregrounds

history and acknowledges the enduring influence of colonial and semi-colonial legacies in

structuring global science and technology.

China’s transformation into a global research and innovation powerhouse complicates

traditional colonial analytical assumptions. The historical narrative that cast Western

science as a civilizing gift has been unsettled by China’s capacity to challenge Western

epistemic dominance and reconfigure global hierarchies of knowledge production. At the

same time, Portugal’s post-imperial trajectory has repositioned it within the semi-

periphery of the global S&T system, weakening its capacity to reproduce former colonial

hierarchies.

Against this backdrop, Portugal–China Science and Technology cooperation emerges as

both asymmetrical and strategically significant. China views Portugal as a gateway to

Europe and Portuguese-speaking scientific spaces, while Portugal seeks expanded

funding opportunities, access to advanced research infrastructures and enhanced

international visibility through engagement with China. Macao stands as the most

tangible expression of this complex dialectic.

Despite geopolitical tensions and structural asymmetries, the analysis confirms the

relevance and analytical strength of a historical, colonial and post-colonial framework for

understanding contemporary S&T cooperation between nations.

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and Contemporary Dynamics

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Knowledge, Power and the Modern International: Insights from Portugal–China Science

and Technology Cooperation

Carlos Rodrigues

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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

THE CHINESE DIASPORA IN PORTUGAL:

A TRANSNATIONAL PARADIPLOMATIC ECOSYSTEM IN SINO-PORTUGUESE

RELATIONS

JOÃO SIMÕES

joaosimoes@cityu.edu.mo

Assistant Professor at City University of Macau (China). He holds a Ph.D. in Portuguese-speaking

Countries Studies from the same university, a Master’s degree in Chinese Studies from the

University of Aveiro, Portugal, and a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering

from the University of Lisbon, Portugal. Prior to his current role, he taught at Xi’an International

Studies University, China. His current research focuses on Lusophony and the interactions

between Portuguese-speaking countries and China, as well as energy geopolitics.

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1437-5527

ANDREIA SOFIA DA SILVA

andreiasofiasilva23@gmail.com

She holds a degree in Journalism from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of

Coimbra and a master’s degree in Contemporary History from the Faculty of Social Sciences and

Humanities at the Nova University of Lisbon (Portugal), where she is also pursuing her Ph.D. in

the same field. She works as a journalist for the daily newspaper Hoje Macau as a Portugal

correspondent and is the creator of the podcast Macau na Bagagem, a project focused on

collecting testimonies about Macau and its experiences. Her academic research primarily centers

on the 20th-century history of Macau, with a particular focus on the Estado Novo period. She is

the author of the book O Lápis Vermelho - A Censura do Estado Novo à Imprensa de Macau,

which examines the role and operations of the Press Censorship Commission in Macau during the

Estado Novo era, analyzing its impact on both Portuguese and Chinese newspapers.

https://orcid.org/0009-0002-0791-2961

Abstract

This study examines the Chinese diaspora in Portugal as a multi-layered transnational

paradiplomatic ecosystem shaping contemporary Sino-Portuguese relations, advancing

beyond Bongardt and Neves (2007) and Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008)’s tripartite model

of economic facilitation, network leverage, and cultural bridging. Through mixed-methods

analysis (document review, and community member interviews). Findings reveal three post-

pandemic evolutionary shifts: (1) economic diversification beyond traditional commerce into

technology and technology and traditional Chinese medicine (TCM); (2) institutional

innovation through organizations like the Liga dos Chineses and Câmara de Comércio

Portugal-China PME, brokering subnational partnerships, leveraging Macao/Hengqin as

strategic platforms for exchanges between China and Portuguese-speaking countries, and

pioneering initiatives like AI-driven TCM integration and Porto’s trilingual school; and (3)

platform amplification where state-created infrastructures enable trilateral ventures and

diaspora capital circulation. Despite challenges - including bureaucratic inefficiencies, and

generational engagement gaps - the community demonstrates adaptive resilience as

architects of relational infrastructure, sustaining bilateral ties through economic, cultural, and

institutional capital flows that redefine engagement beyond state-centric diplomacy.

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 99-125

The Chinese Diaspora in Portugal: A Transnational Paradiplomatic Ecosystem

in Sino-Portuguese Relations

João Simões, Andreia Sofia da Silva

100

Keywords

Chinese community in Portugal, Sino-Portuguese relations, paradiplomacy, diaspora capital,

Transnational entrepreneurship.

Resumo

Este estudo analisa a diáspora chinesa em Portugal como um ecossistema paradiplomático

transnacional e multiestratificado que molda as relações contemporâneas sino‑portuguesas,

ultrapassando o modelo tripartido proposto por Bongardt e Neves (2007) e Neves e

Rocha‑Trindade (2008), centrado na facilitação económica, na alavancagem de redes e na

mediação cultural. A partir de uma metodologia mista (revisão documental e entrevistas a

membros da comunidade), os resultados revelam três transformações evolutivas no período

pós‑pandémico: (1) diversificação económica para além do comércio tradicional, com

expansão para os setores da tecnologia e da medicina tradicional chinesa (MTC); (2) inovação

institucional através de organizações como a Liga dos Chineses em Portugal e a Câmara de

Comércio Portugal‑China PME, que promovem parcerias subnacionais, utilizam

Macau/Hengqin como plataformas estratégicas para as relações entre a China e os países de

língua portuguesa, e impulsionam iniciativas pioneiras como a integração de MTC baseada em

inteligência artificial e a criação da escola trilingue no Porto; e (3) amplificação através de

plataformas estatais que possibilitam empreendimentos trilaterais e a circulação de capital

diaspórico. Apesar de desafios persistentes - incluindo ineficiências burocráticas e lacunas de

envolvimento intergeracional - a comunidade revela uma resiliência adaptativa enquanto

arquiteta de infraestruturas relacionais, sustentando os laços bilaterais através de fluxos

económicos, culturais e institucionais que reconfiguram o envolvimento sino‑português para

além da diplomacia centrada no Estado.

Palavras-chave

Comunidade chinesa em Portugal, Relações sino‑portuguesas, Paradiplomacia, Capital da

diáspora, Empreendedorismo transnacional.

How to cite this article

Simões, João & Silva, Andreia Sofia da (2026). The Chinese Diaspora in Portugal: A Transnational

Paradiplomatic Ecosystem in Sino-Portuguese Relations. Janus.net, e-journal of international

relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and

Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 99-125.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.5

Article submitted on 31st October 2025 and accepted for publication on 2nd January 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 99-125

The Chinese Diaspora in Portugal: A Transnational Paradiplomatic Ecosystem

in Sino-Portuguese Relations

João Simões, Andreia Sofia da Silva

101

THE CHINESE DIASPORA IN PORTUGAL:

A TRANSNATIONAL PARADIPLOMATIC ECOSYSTEM IN

SINO-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS

JOÃO SIMÕES

ANDREIA SOFIA DA SILVA

Introduction

The year 2019 marked a symbolic apex in diplomatic relations between Portugal and the

People’s Republic of China (PRC), commemorating four decades since the establishment

of formal ties on February 8, 1979. This milestone triggered a series of high-profile

events, including an official reception hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Lisbon (Diário

do Povo Online, 2019) and an academic conference at the Museu do Oriente (Fundação

Oriente, 2019), reflecting the depth of bilateral engagement. These celebrations

honoured a relationship that emerged from decades of Cold War ambiguity, during which

Macao - and its politically connected Chinese elite - served as a critical, albeit shadowed,

conduit. As Alexandre (2023) notes, this group “maintained privileged relations with

communist Chinese authorities while exerting significant influence within Portuguese

administration in the enclave,” laying the groundwork for future ties.

High-level exchanges underscore the relationship’s strategic importance. President Xi

Jinping’s 2018 state visit to Portugal (Presidência da República Portuguesa, 2018) and

the 2024 visit of Zhao Leji, Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, who met

with President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Prime Minister Luís Montenegro (Observador,

2024), demonstrate sustained political commitment. Concurrently, China’s economic

footprint in Portugal evolved dramatically. While early Chinese immigration (post-1980s)

gravitated toward small commerce, Portugal’s Golden Visa program (ARI) catalysed a

transformative wave of investment and diversified entrepreneurship, shifting community

profiles from retailers to major investors in energy, finance, and technology.

The COVID-19 pandemic, however, exposed vulnerabilities. businesses with links to

China, particularly wholesale hubs like Varziela in Vila do Conde, faced temporary

closures and discrimination fuelled by the pandemic’s origins in Wuhan. Consumer

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest related to the research,

authorship, or publication of this study.

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João Simões, Andreia Sofia da Silva

102

avoidance of Chinese-owned stores prompted Lisbon’s municipality to launch anti-stigma

campaigns (Observador, 2020). Yet, the most significant recent friction emerged in

telecommunications security: Portugal’s 2023 decision - guided by the Superior Council

for Cyberspace Security (CSSC) - to exclude Huawei from its 5G infrastructure, citing

“high risk” for non-EU/NATO suppliers (Público, 2023), drew sharp criticisms. Bernardo

Mendia, Secretary-General of the Luso-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, condemned the

move as capitulation to “foreign interests,” arguing that it, without justification,

undermined centuries of successful cooperation (Público, 2024). Chinese Ambassador

Zhao Bentang echoed this, framing the exclusion as reflective of a “Cold War mentality”

(Expresso, 2024).

Despite such tensions, economic collaboration has persisted in robust ways, as evidenced

by China’s €2 billion investment in CALB’s lithium battery factory in Sines (Observador,

2025). In addition, the recent accelerated development of Macao as a strategic platform

between China and Portuguese-speaking countries - including the establishment and

growth of the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin (GMDCZH) - has

fundamentally reshaped the context.

Traditional scholarship on international relations, including studies of the bilateral

relationship between Portugal and China, has often prioritized the actions of

governments, official agreements, and high-level diplomacy as primary drivers shaping

the relationship. This focus risks overlooking less visible yet no less significant

contributions of non-state actors operating beneath and alongside formal state channels.

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted ties binding China and

Portugal, it is crucial to shift attention towards the enduring human connections fostered

by the Chinese community in Portugal.

Moreover, dedicated scholarly research focusing explicitly on the role of the Chinese

community in Portugal remains relatively scarce and outdated, often failing to capture

their contemporary dynamism and multifaceted contributions. Seminal research by

Bongardt and Neves (2007) and Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008) demonstrates that

the Chinese business community in Portugal is a significant, multi-faceted and dynamic

actor that facilitates relations between China and Portugal through providing three critical

functions: (1) facilitating trade and investment flows, (2) leveraging powerful networks

for market advantage, and (3) providing vital institutional and cultural bridging. This

multi-faceted role involves trade and economic facilitation through channelling exports

and foreign direct investment, utilizing network dynamics (notably guanxi) to consolidate

competitive positions within the European market, and engaging in institutional and

cultural bridging, thereby significantly strengthening the economic and diplomatic ties

between Portugal (and the European Union) and the People’s Republic of China. However,

those studies, dating from 2007 and 2008, now require updating to reflect the profound

transformations of the last years.

Recent changes within the Chinese community itself, along with evolving strategies and

influence of its representative institutions, rapid technological advancements and shifting

global economic dynamics, have introduced new dimensions to diasporic engagement

and influence. These developments create a need for contemporary research to re-

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 99-125

The Chinese Diaspora in Portugal: A Transnational Paradiplomatic Ecosystem

in Sino-Portuguese Relations

João Simões, Andreia Sofia da Silva

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examine the role, strategies, and impact of the Chinese community in Portugal, providing

an updated understanding of this essential actor in Sino-Portuguese relations.

This study seeks to address the following central question: How has the Chinese

community in Portugal evolved and what roles does it play in shaping contemporary Sino-

Portuguese relations, particularly in the post-pandemic era? To address this research gap,

this study employs a multi-method approach. Building on a review of academic literature,

it integrates critical analysis of official documents, to map the community’s demographic

evolution and institutional presence. This analysis is enriched by insights gathered

through semi-structured interviews with relevant members of the Chinese community,

including business leaders and association representatives, as well as scholars, capturing

grounded perspectives on their evolving roles and strategies, to complement a document-

based analysis. The interviews, conducted between February and July 2025, were carried

out in Portuguese and later translated into English by the authors to ensure accessibility

and accuracy.

This study is structured as follows: first, a conceptual approach to diaspora agency;

second, an overview of the Chinese community in Portugal and its current composition;

third, a detailed description and analysis of its principal contemporary roles in Sino-

Portuguese relations; fourth, a presentation and discussion of key insights derived from

the interviews; and finally, conclusions synthesizing the findings and discussing their

implications for understanding diaspora diplomacy and bilateral ties.

Diaspora Agency: A Conceptual Approach

Diasporas are increasingly recognized as influential agents in international relations. Far

from being static entities, contemporary diasporas function as dynamic, multi-layered

ecosystems that facilitate transnational engagement through entrepreneurial agency,

institutional brokering, and the strategic use of geopolitical and economic platforms. In

the analysis that follows, we will examine the multifaceted roles of diasporas, drawing on

key concepts that underscore their impact across various dimensions.

At the micro-foundational level, diasporas demonstrate their agency through

transnational entrepreneurship and network capital. Members of diasporas act as

transnational entrepreneurs, leveraging their unique positionality to bridge societies and

mobilize resources embedded within social networks (Brinkerhoff, 2016; Drori et al.,

2009). Social capital, including culturally specific forms such as guanxi - relational

networks rooted in reciprocity and trust - plays a critical role in enabling diaspora

entrepreneurs to exploit structural opportunities, such as market gaps or policy incentives

(Xin & Pearce, 1996). Portes (1998) defines social capital as resources embedded within

social networks. This facilitates cross-border trade, investment flows, and market

integration, underscoring their adaptability to shifting economic and policy landscapes

(Drori et al., 2009).

At the meso-structural level, diasporas extend their influence through paradiplomacy and

institutional brokering. Formal organizations within diasporas engage in paradiplomacy,

conducting international activities that parallel or operate independently of central state

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diplomacy (Kuznetsov, 2015; Lecours, 2008). Acting as institutional brokers (Saxenian,

2006), they mediate between home and host country actors, particularly at sub-national

levels like municipalities and businesses. Through activities such as facilitating

agreements, hosting delegations, and providing localized business intelligence, these

organizations contribute to decentralized diplomacy that prioritizes tangible socio-

economic outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2016).

On the macro-structural level, diasporas amplify their impact through platform leverage

and strategic intermediation. Contemporary diasporas strategically utilize institutional

and spatial platforms - such as special economic zones, cultural hubs, chambers of

commerce, and multi-lateral forums - to enhance their efficacy and reach (Gawer, 2014;

McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). By integrating into platform governance structures and

leveraging associated resources and incentives, they create new pathways for trade,

investment, knowledge transfer, and multi-lateral cooperation. These platforms, designed

to reduce transaction costs and generate network effects, serve as critical amplifiers of

diaspora influence.

Underlying all these dimensions is diaspora capital, a cross-cutting resource that

encompasses the unique reservoir of social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and

knowledge-based assets inherent to diasporas (Cohen, 2008; Elo & Riddle, 2016). This

capital enables entrepreneurial ventures, legitimizes institutional brokering, facilitates

cultural transmission, and enhances the effectiveness of platform engagement.

The multi-faceted roles of diasporas, as outlined above, operate as a multi-layered

transnational para-diplomatic ecosystem. This conceptual framework finds concrete

illustration in the specific context of Sino-Portuguese relations, where the Chinese

diaspora in Portugal represents a significant case study of diaspora agency in action.

A Community in Change

The Chinese community in Portugal exhibits distinct characteristics shaped by a

significant, complex historical evolution that spanned centuries, as well as

entrepreneurial dynamism and continued adaptation to policy and social contexts. While

often associated with modern migratory waves, the community’s presence traces back

remarkably far. Documented encounters began as early as the 16th century, “when three

Chinese were brought to Portugal as slaves,” predating the Portuguese kingdom’s

prohibition on the trafficking of Chinese slaves in February 1624 (Li, 2019). Subsequent

centuries witnessed more specialized, albeit still limited in number, arrivals, notably in

the 19th century with individuals like Lau-a-Teng and Lau-a-Pen, interpreters and

masters from Macao, who were brought to São Miguel Island in the Azores to teach tea

cultivation techniques (Li, 2019). While these early presences were sporadic and often

involuntary or tied to specific colonial projects, they form a foundational layer of historical

contact.

However, substantial growth began in the 1980s. Such migration, originating particularly

from regions such as Wenzhou and initially concentrating in urban centres like Lisbon,

Faro, and Porto, were characterized predominantly by male economic migrants engaging

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in entrepreneurship (Gaspar, 2017; Reis de Oliveira, 2003), often driven by aspirations

for prosperity, social mobility, and to fulfil filial obligations (Rodrigues, 2018). Since then,

however, the migrant communities have undergone significant transformation: they have

dispersed geographically across Portugal; their origins have diversified to include for

example Macao, Mozambique, and various regions of mainland China; and the proportion

of female has increased (Gaspar, 2017; Bongardt & Neves, 2014). Their complexity

continues to increase with the emergence of a 1.5 generation (those migrating as

children/adolescents) and a second generation (Gaspar, 2018).

It may be challenging to census the Chinese community in Portugal, as many immigrants

have acquired Portuguese nationality over the years and have ceased to appear in foreign

population statistics, and this transition complicates the process of accurately measuring

the diaspora, as recent data has shown: in 2023, Portugal hosted 1,044,238 legal foreign

residents (9.8% of the total population), up 34% from 2022 (PORDATA, 2024b), an

increasing trend that had begun in 2015. Within these foreign residents, holders of

Chinese (PRC) nationality constituted 2.5% (approximately 26,100 individuals), well

below figures pertaining to more dominant communities like that of the Brazilians

(28.9%) (PORDATA, 2024b). In 2022, the PORDATA reported (via Eurostat and National

Statistics Institute [INE] data) 798,480 foreign residents, among whom 3.3% were

Chinese nationals (about 26,400 people) (PORDATA, 2024a). In comparison, the 2021

census on Chinese nationals (excluding naturalized citizens) showed only 14,109

individuals (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2021). This difference suggests that

demographic assessment of the Chinese community in Portugal should be conducted with

caution due to the significant presence and impact of not only migratory shifts but also

naturalization: as noted by PORDATA (2024a), half a million foreigners acquired

Portuguese nationality between 2008 and 2022; in addition, there is statistical

underrepresentation of the community, compounded by individuals’ intra-European

mobility and generational integration (i.e., children born in Portugal to naturalized

Chinese immigrants become Portuguese citizens by birth).

The migratory streams through which the Chinese community in Portugal undergoes

significant diversification reflect evolving economic ties and educational opportunities.

One of the notable streams has been university students, with many of whom arriving

for short-term studies (typically one to two years) before returning to China seeking

employment, while some choosing to remain in Portugal for work or postgraduate studies

(Li, 2019). Another stream has been major Chinese investments in strategic Portuguese

sectors - such as energy (e.g., State Grid Corporation of China) and finance (e.g., Fosun,

Haitong) - that have been not only driving an influx of highly skilled technical

professionals and executives, but also accelerating business development in Portugal.

These professionals—some sojourning only briefly while others establishing longer-term

residency—often arrive alone initially, but subsequently bringing their families over via

family reunification. This pattern allows spouses to support business activities and

children to access the Portuguese education system. These children who immigrate

during their formative years (the so-called “1.5 generation”) often exhibit “a higher level

of education and better economic conditions” compared to earlier waves of migrants (Li,

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2019). They therefore represent a significant evolution in the community’s socioeconomic

profile and integration trajectory.

A defining characteristic of the Chinese community in Portugal is the exceptionally high

rate of entrepreneurship among Chinese immigrants in Portugal, the highest among all

immigrant groups (Oliveira, 2010; Reis Oliveira, 2021). This entrepreneurial drive is

attributed primarily to structural factors - notably access to capital, supportive legal and

policy frameworks, and dense co-ethnic networks - rather than cultural factors alone

(Reis de Oliveira, 2003; Reis Oliveira, 2021). Chinese business strategies rely heavily on

guanxi (Personal networks), family labour, transnational connections linking Portugal to

China and broader European markets, and sometimes engagement in the informal

economy (Bongardt & Neves, 2007; Reis de Oliveira, 2003; Góis et al., 2005). Chinese

entrepreneurs have proven highly adaptive and proficient at leveraging shifting

opportunity structures within Portugal, and proactively engaging with the global

economy, including China’s “Go Global” policy (Oliveira, 2010; Bongardt & Neves, 2014;

Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008).

Major policy shifts have reconfigured the community’s profile. Changes to immigration

laws following the 2008/09 economic crisis and the introduction of Portugal’s Golden Visa

program (ARI) have significantly altered migration patterns (Bongardt & Neves, 2014;

Amante & Rodrigues, 2020; Santos et al., 2023). The Golden Visa, in particular, has

attracted a new wave of affluent investors, distinct from earlier labour migrants. One

study reported that 46.1% of Chinese residents in Lisbon hold ARI status or belong to

ARI holder families (Amante & Rodrigues, 2020). This has led to increased internal

heterogeneity, a dualistic community structure (contrasting small traditional businesses

with large-scale investors), rising socio-economic inequality, greater internationalization,

and potentially less community cohesion (Bongardt & Neves, 2014; Santos et al., 2023).

Choi Hin Man, a prominent businessman and president of the Luso-Chinese Merchants

and Industrialists Association, highlighted the economic diversification beyond traditional

sectors:

The Chinese community in Portugal has diversified its economic activities

over the years. Besides traditional sectors such as retail (convenience stores,

restaurants, and import/export), there is growth in areas such as technology,

tourism, real estate, and financial services (Personal communication,

February 2025).

This shift has been influenced by policy changes, particularly the Golden Visa program.

Dinis Ka Chon Chan, a Macao-born legal expert and president of the Macao Students

Association in Porto, noted that recent restrictions on Golden Visas (limiting real estate

purchases in dense urban areas) have redirected investments to other regions or sectors,

such as renewable energy, agriculture, and start-ups, but bureaucratic hurdles at the

Agency for Integration, Migration and Asylum (AIMA, a government body responsible for

managing migration and asylum processes) have created uncertainty, leading some

investors to choose other countries (Personal communication, February 2025).

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Zheng Zhibin, director of the Chinese Community Support Centre in Lisbon, confirmed

the emergence of new economic activities such as real estate agencies and construction,

but highlighted those bureaucratic delays are a major deterrent for new migrants:

I think it’s more difficult to attract Chinese people to live here nowadays

because the system at AIMA is very slow. Even for those who want to buy a

house or invest in something, the process is extremely slow, and they can’t

get the [residence] card. Everything is very slow, and they can’t handle their

affairs, so they go to other countries and compare Portugal with other

countries. If there are places where the system is faster and where buying

or investing is more economical, the Chinese choose to go there, but they

continue to invest here. Portugal functions as an intermediate zone because

even if they want to go to other countries, it’s not as easy to obtain nationality

there. This is the same situation for Indians, Pakistanis, and Nepalese

(Personal communication, February 2025).

The community’s structure has become more heterogeneous, with Wang Suoying, a

prominent Chinese teacher who has been living in Portugal for several decades and is the

president of the Portuguese Association of Friends of Chinese Culture, noting

diversification in restaurant offerings (e.g., Korean and Japanese cuisine) and the rise of

tech-related businesses:

Many fruit shops and grocery stores have emerged. We have Korean and

Japanese restaurants owned by Chinese people. There is diversification in the

restaurant sector, as well as with grocery stores. Chinese companies have

been established by emigrants, and currently, there are two main types: we

have large investment companies like China Three Gorges, and other

companies created by Chinese people who have ventured into other areas

(Personal communication, February 2025).

Y Ping Chow, president of the League of Chinese in Portugal and the Portugal-China SME

Chamber of Commerce, emphasized the strategic push into technology and traditional

Chinese medicine (TCM), which represents a new phase of economic activities:

At the moment, we are trying to develop growth in the area of new

technologies, because last year the Zhuhai Science and New Technologies

Centre appointed our Chamber of Commerce [CCPC-PME] as its point of

contact in Portugal. The idea is to develop activities in the field of technology

and encourage Portuguese companies to invest in Zhuhai. In this sense, we

are pursuing a new type of investment in the sciences and technology sector.

Businesses in traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) are also developing, and

we will try to promote the idea of advancing TCM (Personal communication,

February 2025).

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Integration challenges persist, particularly for new families. Helena Yuan Dong, founder

of the CLAN Association for Youth Cultural and Educational Innovation, stressed language

barriers and the struggle to maintain cultural identity associated with immigrants who

are in the process of integrating into their new community: “We have to force [our

children] to open their minds to learn a new language, which is difficult for us... We must

maintain our nature” (Personal communication, February 2025). On the other hand,

Maria Fernanda Ilhéu, president of the Friends of the New Silk Road Association and a

professor with extensive experience in Macao, described the community as increasingly

integrated yet maintaining its identity, and observes that the community “has

modernized, gained value, and evolved towards other types of activities [...] the children

born here are engineers, architects, lawyers, and doctors” (Personal communication,

February 2025).

The outcome of such integration can be strongly influenced by age of arrival and

proficiency of the Portuguese language - early arrival and language acquisition facilitate

better educational outcomes, healthcare access, and social integration, while language

barriers are a major obstacle in these areas and are linked to higher early school dropout

rates (Gaspar, 2018; Aparício et al., 2023; Gaspar et al., 2021; Oliveira et al., 2007). The

1.5 generation generally integrates more successfully than their parents, though

involvement in family businesses can hinder educational and social integration for

younger members (Gaspar, 2018; Jin & Gómez-Pellón, 2023). In addition, co-ethnic

networks are vital for economic integration, job acquisition, and social support, especially

where language barriers persist but strong transnational ties are maintained (Oliveira,

2003a; Marques et al., 2005). Acculturation involves complex negotiations, with

traditional beliefs and practices often persisting alongside adaptation, leading to

intergenerational acculturation gaps and conflicts (Jin & Gómez-Pellón, 2023). This

complexity is also reflected in areas like the ambivalent cultural identity expressed by

subgroups like the Macanese diaspora (Gaspar et al., 2021).

The Chinese business community in Portugal plays a significant and multifaceted role in

facilitating relations between China and Portugal, particularly within the context of

economic globalization and EU-China ties. Seminal research by Bongardt and Neves

(2007) and Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008) provides a detailed analysis of this

community’s characteristics, dynamics, and strategic functions. A core function identified

by both studies is trade and economic facilitation. Bongardt and Neves (2007) have

documented the community’s dominance within Portugal’s service sector, especially in

retail and wholesale trade, and found that the community acts as a key channel for

Chinese exports into Portugal and, by extension, the broader European Union market

(Bongardt & Neves, 2007). Moreover, the community serves as a conduit for foreign

direct investment (FDI), channeling capital flows back to China (Bongardt & Neves,

2007). Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008) corroborate this notion, emphasizing the

community’s position as catalysts for economic flows and as vital entry points for Chinese

goods into the Portuguese market, as well as its role in mobilizing investment into China

(Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008). Both studies concur that these economic activities are

fundamental to strengthening bilateral economic relations between China and Portugal

(Bongardt & Neves, 2007; Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008).

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Central to the community’s business operations are network dynamics. Bongardt and

Neves (2007) highlight the critical importance of guanxi (personal and business

relationship) networks. These intricate networks, extending within Europe, enable the

community to leverage advantages of the European single market, consolidate their

competitive position, and facilitate cross-border business activities (Bongardt & Neves,

2007). Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008) similarly underscore the significance of these

business networks, describing the community as a significant link bridging Portugal and

China (Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008). Both studies emphasize that formal and informal

networks are instrumental in supporting business operations and facilitating market

integration (Bongardt & Neves, 2007; Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008).

Beyond economics, both studies recognize the community’s function in institutional and

cultural bridging. While Bongardt and Neves (2007) acknowledge this bridging role,

Neves and Rocha-Trindade (2008) provide a more explicit analysis of its institutional and

cultural dimensions. They describe the community as acting as “institutional brokers” and

agents of “para-diplomacy” (decentralized diplomacy) for Chinese provincial and local

governments, facilitating sub-national connections (Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008).

Additionally, the community serves as a source of valuable “economic intelligence,”

providing insights on business opportunities, market characteristics, and local business

culture to Chinese authorities (Neves & Rocha-Trindade, 2008). Both studies also note

the community’s contribution to cultural transmission, aiding in the dissemination of

Chinese culture within Portugal (Bongardt & Neves, 2007; Neves & Rocha-Trindade,

2008).

In sum, previous research by Bongardt and Neves (2007) and Neves and Rocha-Trindade

(2008) demonstrates that the Chinese business community in Portugal is a dynamic actor

that facilitates trade and investment flows, leverages powerful networks for market

advantage, and performs vital institutional and cultural bridging functions, significantly

strengthening the economic and diplomatic ties between Portugal (and the EU) and

China.

Institutional Framework

The preceding analysis of the Chinese community’s historical trajectory and

contemporary profile underscores not only its demographic and socioeconomic

transformation but also its increasing complexity and scope of activity. This evolution has

facilitated the development of more structured mechanisms for collective action and

representation. Consequently, the community’s agency as a diplomatic actor, operating

independently or alongside state channels - often termed para-diplomacy - is significantly

mediated through its formal institutions.

This section therefore examines the institutional framework, focusing specifically on the

Liga dos Chineses em Portugal (LCP), the Câmara de Comércio e Indústria Luso-Chinesa

para Pequenas e Médias Empresas (CCPC-PME), and the Portugal–Hong Kong Chamber

of Commerce and Industry (PHKCCI). It analyzes how these key organizations translate

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the community’s evolving presence and capabilities into concrete para-diplomatic

activities, influencing the dynamics of Sino-Portuguese relations.

The Liga dos Chineses em Portugal is a non-governmental organization (NGO) that

represents the Chinese community residing in Portugal. Established on June 20, 1991

and officially founded in 1997, its primary mission is to promote the integration of the

Chinese community into Portuguese society while fostering dialogue and cultural

exchange between the two communities. As a recognized representative at the High

Commission for Migration, the Liga plays a vital role in strengthening bilateral relations

between Portugal and China. It facilitates business opportunities, supports the

internationalization of Portuguese companies entering the Chinese market, and serves as

an intermediary in commercial partnerships. Additionally, the Liga organizes cultural

events such as Chinese New Year celebrations, and collaborates with municipalities to

establish partnerships that highlight Chinese traditions in Portugal. Through its extensive

network, the organization continues to build bridges between the two nations, ensuring

cultural dissemination, business collaboration, and community integration.

The Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China Pequenas e Médias Empresas (CCPC-PME) is a

specialized bilateral trade association dedicated to fostering and supporting commercial

relations specifically between Portuguese and Chinese small and medium-sized

enterprises (SMEs). Headquartered in Lisbon, its core mission is to act as a vital bridge,

facilitating market entry, promoting networking opportunities, and providing tailored

services to help SMEs from both Portugal and China navigate the complexities of cross-

border trade. The chamber offers practical support such as market intelligence, business

matchmaking, trade missions, and advisory services, all aimed at creating mutually

beneficial partnerships and enhancing the visibility and success of its SME members

within the dynamic Portugal-China economic corridor. It serves as a crucial platform for

smaller businesses seeking to engage effectively in this important bilateral relationship.

Maria Fernanda Ilhéu emphasized these associations’ function as cultural and economic

bridges and not political propaganda: “What these associations do [is] nothing political:

they organize parties, lunches, dinners, and receive people from China”; they serve as

“emissaries” for Chinese provincial authorities, helping organize visits and promote

economic opportunities (Personal communication, February 2025). Y Ping Chow

reinforced this non-ideological stance: “We do not do propaganda for Beijing. What we

want is to promote Chinese culture and develop relations with China” (Personal

communication, February 2025). In this regard, Choi Hin Man observes: “The Chinese

community plays an indirect diplomatic role, facilitating dialogue between the two

countries” (Personal communication, February 2025). Rather than engaging in ideological

advocacy, the community focuses on creating opportunities for cooperation. The

associations also provide vital support for cultural events and business networking. Wang

Suoying added that the associations distribute gifts from Chinese provincial governments

during festivals and help coordinate visits by Chinese delegations, which focus on

economic promotion rather than political messaging (Personal communication, February

2025).

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The para-diplomatic activities of the Liga dos Chineses em Portugal and CCPC-PME involve

extensive subnational cooperation, as evidenced by these key initiatives:

1. Municipal cooperation agreements: CCPC-PME facilitated the signing of a

memorandum of understanding for friendly cooperation between Nan’an, Fujian

(China) and Maia (Portugal). This agreement aims to strengthen economic, trade,

and cultural ties, leveraging Maia’s strategic position as a gateway to Europe. The

ceremony involved municipal officials and association representatives (Câmara de

Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021).

2. Provincial delegation exchanges: A delegation from Hunan Province (China) visited

Portugal, on invitation by the Liga dos Chineses, to study the diaspora and promote

economic cooperation. This included meetings with diaspora associations, visits to

Chinese businesses in Vila do Conde, and support for establishing a Hunan Natives

Association in Portugal (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). Similarly,

a delegation from Henan Province (China) visited the CCPC-PME and met with Vila

Nova de Gaia officials to discuss cooperation in trade, culture, agriculture, and

tourism (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021).

3. City-specific industrial and tech partnerships: An official delegation from Zhongshan

(China) visited Alenquer Municipality and signed a cooperation protocol with CCPC-

PME (represented by Y Ping Chow) and Zhongshan’s Science and Technology

Department. This focused on bio-pharmaceuticals and health industries (Câmara de

Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2025b). In addition, Changchun (China), a major

industrial hub, visited Porto and signed a cooperation agreement with the Instituto

Superior de Engenharia do Porto (ISEP), which focuses on automotive innovation

(especially EVs) and cultural exchanges like wushu promotion (Câmara de Comércio

Portugal-China PME, 2021).

4. Business association linkages: CCPC-PME met with the Wuxi SME Association (China)

to explore new international cooperation paradigms, emphasizing technological

innovation, renewable energy, and finance (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China

PME, 2025b). They also visited Tianjin to discuss cold chain logistics projects and

mineral imports (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021), and explored

energy storage opportunities in Xiamen (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME,

2021).

5. Platform development in strategic zones: CCPC-PME played a key role in delegations

visiting the GMDCZH, promoting its role as a platform for CPLP countries. This

included meetings with the Macao Chief Executive and signing agreements to

establish representative offices like the Centro de Cooperação e Intercâmbio de

Ciência e Tecnologia China-PLP Delegação no Porto (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-

China PME, 2021; Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021).

6. Cultural and creative city diplomacy: CCPC-PME hosted a delegation from Yangzhou

(China), a UNESCO Creative City (Gastronomy), during the UCCN Annual Conference

in Braga, discussing cultural exchange and investment opportunities (Câmara de

Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021).

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7. Institutional partnerships: CCPC-PME signed a cooperation agreement with the

Escola Superior de Hotelaria e Turismo do Porto (ESHT) to facilitate market entry for

CPLP products in Hengqin/Macao/China and support Macao’s tourism hub

development (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). They also

established the Associação de Cooperação Amigável para PME in Qinhuangdao, Hebei

(China) to support SME internationalization (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China

PME, 2021).

8. Political/diplomatic support: The Liga dos Chineses em Portugal actively engages in

supporting the political-diplomatic positions of the People’s Republic of China and its

Special Administrative Regions, demonstrating its role as a key representative body

for the diaspora. This involvement includes organizing events addressing core

national interests such as Taiwan policy and Macao’s governance. In 2022, the

League coordinated a significant protest outside the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon opposing

then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. During this event, League

President Y Ping Chow articulated its purpose to Hoje Macau: “We just want to show

Americans it’s not worth provoking war in the Pacific because we Chinese are a

peaceful people, and this is how we want to solve problems” (Hoje Macau, 2022).

Furthermore, the League has publicly endorsed political processes within Macao,

notably backing Ho Iat Seng’s 2019 candidacy for Chief Executive. Chow emphasized

this support, stating: “The Chinese League, as most members are from Zhejiang,

gives its support and would like to promote his [Ho Iat Seng’s] visit to the country.

His election can benefit relations between the Government and Chinese residents in

Portugal, and can also bring great benefits to the community” (Hoje Macau, 2019).

These actions highlight the League’s function in mobilizing overseas Chinese support

for Beijing’s strategic objectives and regional leadership aligned with its interests.

These activities demonstrate that the Liga dos Chineses and CCPC-PME serve as crucial

intermediaries, facilitating direct engagement between Chinese provinces/municipalities

and Portuguese subnational entities. Their focus spans economic cooperation (e.g.,

industrial parks, electric vehicles, health technology, energy storage), trade promotion,

cultural exchange, and educational partnerships. While these para-diplomatic efforts

significantly strengthen the people-to-people and economic ties underpinning Portugal-

China relations, political advocacy appears notably sporadic and non-prioritized within

their agendas. As noted by Maria Fernanda Ilhéu (Personal communication, February

2023), both organizations remain predominantly oriented toward economic cooperation

objectives.

Ilhéu emphasizes that the political stance of Portuguese businesspeople or associations

is largely irrelevant to the Chinese when doing business: “For the Chinese, culture isn’t

politics. It’s the way the rules of coexistence are navigated. If you tell me that some

associations might have someone involved in politics behind the scenes, yes. But what

these associations do has nothing political about it: they organize parties, lunches,

dinners, welcome people coming from China to Portugal.” She further clarifies:

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There might be an idea that the Chinese want us to be communists, but to

begin with, they themselves aren’t communists anymore. They respect the

Chinese Communist Party, which is completely different from being

communist. Secondly, they couldn’t care less about what we Portuguese are

politically. I’ve told them many times that I am a member of the PSD [Social

Democratic Party] and have nothing to do with communism. I’ve said this

directly to several people. They react the same way; this information means

nothing to them. What matters is the relationship with me, what we agree

on, and what we are going to do. In their country, they want to belong to the

party to succeed in life. Here, they are very far from promoting communism.

While the LCP and CCPC-PME exemplify the community’s established institutional agency

within Portugal, a significant evolution in its bridging function has emerged in recent

years, driven by political and economic shifts at the macro-level. This evolution centres

on strategically leveraging Macao's unique historical and institutional position and the

accelerated development of the GMDCZH as platforms to facilitate Sino-Portuguese

relations. This new role is fundamentally a result of China’s intensified focus on

integrating Macao into its national development strategy - particularly the Greater Bay

Area initiative and Macao’s positioning as a Commercial and Trade Cooperation Service

Platform between China and Portuguese-speaking countries - alongside the creation of

the Hengqin zone in 2021 to foster deeper economic integration and diversification.

Consequently, the next section examines how the Chinese community in Portugal, often

working through or alongside its institutions, actively utilizes these specialized platforms

to create novel pathways for trade, investment, and diplomatic engagement between

Portugal and China.

Another entity emerging in Portugal-China economic relations is the Portugal–Hong Kong

Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHKCCI). Established in 2019, this private non-

profit organization facilitates bilateral trade, business relations, and cultural-academic

exchanges between Portugal and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (PHKCCI,

n.d.). It has actively promoted high-level meetings between Hong Kong executives and

Portuguese entrepreneurs, exemplified by its July 3, 2025 Lisbon summit co-organized

with the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Brussels, Guangdong–Hong Kong–

Macao Greater Bay Area Development Office, and Hong Kong SAR government. The event

featured Winnie Ho (Hong Kong Secretary for Housing) and Maisie Chan (Commissioner

for Greater Bay Area Development). As co-founder Bernardo Mendia emphasized, the

summit aimed at “building stronger connections between Portugal and Hong Kong” and

showcasing the “immense potential for international collaboration” in the Greater Bay

Area (Personal communication, July 2025).

Hong Kong has strategically engaged Portugal to advance its economic agenda, including

Innovation Secretary Sun Dong’s March 2025 visit to “explore business opportunities”

through meetings with Portuguese political, business, and technology leaders (Hoje

Macau, 2025a). This follows earlier diplomatic efforts like the June 2024 appeal by Hong

Kong’s Secretary for Financial Services to remove Hong Kong from the EU tax haven list,

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citing compliance with European guidelines (Público, 2024).

Beyond the entities mentioned above, it is important to note other associations founded

by the Chinese community in Portugal that also engage in organizing economic

cooperation events. Examples include the Associação de Comerciantes e Industriais Luso-

Chinesa em Portugal (Luso-Chinese Association of Merchants and Industrialists in

Portugal) and the Associação de Empresas Chinesas em Portugal (Association of Chinese

Companies in Portugal). The Associação de Sociedades Chinesas em Portugal (Association

of Chinese Societies in Portugal) was also founded in 2016 (Forum Macao, 2016).

The year 2025 was marked, moreover, by the organization of a large-scale commercial

event in Lisbon on September 19th, which brought 22 Chinese companies to the

Portuguese capital. The initiative, held at the Lisbon Congress Centre, was organized by

some entities mentioned in this study and aimed to “present Macao’s business

environment and the advantages of the service platform” for commercial cooperation

between China and Portuguese-speaking countries. The session also served to analyze

“Portugal’s investment and business environment” (Hoje Macau, 2025b).

Returning to the testimony of Maria Fernanda Ilhéu, the economist noted that as early

as 2023, there were already more associations due to the growth of the Chinese

community in Portugal. She also observed entities linked to sectors less typical in

Portugal-China relations, such as tourism:

Yes [there are more associations], but that’s normal, because there are also

more Chinese people. It’s understood that people should associate for various

reasons. […] This community’s mindset is well-intentioned, and its role is

cultural and economic. I mentioned the lady [Lily Yang, CEO of GREATOPUS

International Travel Service] who organized the president of Dalian’s trip to

Portugal. She is a businesswoman who even goes unnoticed in Portugal, but

runs a large tourism company. She brings Chinese tourists to Portugal from

various parts of the world - Singapore, Canada, Australia, Taiwan, and also

from mainland China. She lives in Portugal (Personal communication,

February 2025).

Leveraging Macao, Hengqin and the Lusophone Space

Macao’s historical function as a Lusophone bridge is formally recognized under China’s

“one country, two systems” framework. As President of CCPC-PME Y Ping Chow

acknowledged: “Macao has done a good job in these relations” (Observador, 2023).

However, Chow critically noted that the outcomes have fallen short of the potential:

“Although Forum Macao was created [...] in my opinion, much more could be done”

(Observador, 2023). This assessment underscores the need for enhanced implementation

of Macao’s diplomatic mandate.

Hengqin complements Macao by providing physical space and policy frameworks for

commercial and technological collaboration. The strategic use of Macao and GMDCZH has

enhanced the diaspora’s role in Sino-Portuguese relations. In 2024, CCPC-PME was

formally designated a “Global Investment Partner” by the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth

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Cooperation Zone in Hengqin (CCPC-PME, 2024e). This role involves promoting Hengqin’s

institutional advantages to attract foreign investment in technology, traditional Chinese

medicine (TCM), and cultural tourism (CCPC-PME, 2024e). Chow positions Hengqin most

crucially as “the gateway for companies from Portuguese-speaking countries” in China, a

role that capitalizes on its integration with the Greater Bay Area market (CCPC-PME,

2024g).

Collaborative Mechanisms

1. Tech innovation: A September 2024 agreement established a Hengqin liaison office

between CCPC-PME and the China-Portuguese Speaking Countries Sci-Tech Exchange

Center, formalized during the Guangzhou-Zhuhai-Macao Innovation Corridor

roundtable (CCPC-PME, 2024f). This facilitates scientific exchange, talent

development, and industrial application across Lusophone markets.

2. Digital talent: CCPC-PME brokered a tripartite agreement (April 2024) between

Macao University of Science and Technology’s Faculty of Humanities and Arts,

Portugal’s Yacooba Labs, and itself to export Portuguese digital talent (Web3,

blockchain, gaming) to Asian markets (CCPC-PME, 2024h).

3. SME integration: CCPC-PME established seven consultancies in Hengqin representing

CPLP nations (e.g., Brazil, Angola) to guide businesses entering China while aiding

Chinese enterprises in Lusophone markets (CCPC-PME, 2024g).

CCPC-PME explicitly connects these hubs: It serves as a “link between Portuguese-

speaking countries through Portugal, to connect with Macao and even with mainland

China” (Silva, 2023). Policy tailwinds, like Hengqin’s 25 measures supporting CPLP

cooperation (e.g., tax incentives, innovation funding), further enable this ecosystem

(CCPC-PME, 2024c). The focus sectors include TCM - where Chow envisions integrated

management platforms linking Portuguese clinics with Hengqin institutions - and tech-

driven exhibitions (CCPC-PME, 2024g).

In sum, Macao provides cultural and diplomatic capital, while Hengqin offers scalable

economic infrastructure. Chinese community institutions like CCPC-PME operationalize

this synergy, transforming geographic advantages into tangible scientific,

entrepreneurial, and investment cooperation between Portugal, China, and the broader

Lusophone world.

Y Ping Chow has spearheaded initiatives to establish trilateral commercial structures. A

key development was the formal creation of the first Portugal–Guinea-Bissau–China

chamber of commerce in Lisbon on April 14, 2023 (Silva, 2023). Chow views Portugal as

a strategic platform for expanding these connections, explicitly stating the ambition to

create similar chambers with other Portuguese-speaking countries: “Beyond Guinea-

Bissau, the goal is to ‘try to create Portugal-Angola-China and so on’” (Silva, 2023). He

emphasized the CCPC-PME’s unique position to leverage existing relationships, noting

that Lusophone African countries “have a good relationship with China” and that the

chamber could “link between Portuguese-speaking countries through Portugal, to connect

with Macao and even with mainland China” (Silva, 2023). While acknowledging Macao’s

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official role in engaging the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Chow

suggested that diaspora-led initiatives could enhance outcomes beyond current

frameworks like Forum Macao.

The perspective from Lusophone partners underscores the initiative’s value. Carlos

Ramos, chairman of the installation committee for the new China–Portugal–Guinea-

Bissau chamber, described it as “an excellent initiative” for leveraging CPLP connections

to boost private sector engagement (Silva, 2023). He highlighted Guinea-Bissau’s

development needs and export potential (e.g., cashew nuts), stressing that “What we

need to give the country a greater boost is this connection with Chinese and Portuguese

companies, so that we can elevate ourselves and acquire the 'know-how’” (Silva, 2023).

This illustrates how the Chinese community’s institutional efforts address concrete

economic demands while strengthening multilateral ties.

Building on the analysis of institutional para-diplomacy and strategic platform leverage,

the following section demonstrates concrete applications of the Chinese diaspora’s

bridging role within two rapidly evolving and strategically significant sectors: healthcare

and education. Focusing on traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and education, it

examines how diaspora institutions, exemplified by the Câmara de Comércio Portugal-

China PME (CCPC-PME), actively facilitate their integration, development, and

modernization within Portugal.

Pioneering New Frontiers: Wellness, Knowledge and Media

CCPC-PME has been instrumental in advancing the integration of traditional Chinese

medicine (TCM) into the Portuguese context through strategic partnerships and

institutional support. A significant milestone was the inauguration of the Plataforma

Hospital Medicina Chinesa (Chinese Medicine Hospital Platform) in Porto on February 15,

2025. This innovative project aims to consolidate TCM within the Portuguese healthcare

system. Crucially, CCPC-PME is a founding member of this platform (Hospital Medicina

Chinesa, 2025). The platform represents a major step in integrating millennia-old health

practices into Portugal, promising lasting community benefits and opening new avenues

for Sino-Portuguese collaboration in health and wellness (Hospital Medicina Chinesa,

2025; Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). Institutional backing, highlighted

by a message of support from the rector of the Wuhan University of Chinese Medicine,

underscores the transnational academic and professional networks facilitating this

integration (Hospital Medicina Chinesa, 2025).

Building on this foundation, CCPC-PME actively facilitated technological innovation in

TCM. On March 7, 2025, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in Porto

between Chi-násio—Hospital Medicina Chinesa (the Porto-based TCM research, diagnosis,

and treatment platform) and China Hengqin Herbizon Health Technology (a company

founded by a research team from the Macao University of Science and Technology). This

signing occurred with the collaboration of CCPC-PME (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-

China PME, 2021), and the agreement establishes a basis for cooperation in introducing

an innovative, artificial intelligence–based technology for TCM into Portugal and Europe.

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The primary objective is to enable the implementation of the Herbizon Traditional Chinese

Medicine Robot, which aims to modernize TCM practices (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-

China PME, 2021). This partnership, fostered with CCPC-PME’s involvement, signifies a

substantial advancement in merging technological innovation with traditional knowledge.

It actively promotes the evolution and modernization of TCM within the European

framework, positioning Portugal as a potential leader in this integration (Câmara de

Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021).

Complementing its role in advancing TCM, the Chinese diaspora in Portugal also plays a

crucial part in fostering deeper bilateral relations through strategic investments in

education and human capital development. A significant manifestation of this

commitment occurred on June 16, 2025, in northern Portugal. Facilitated by local Chinese

community associations and prominently amplified by CCPC-PME, this development

underscores the diaspora’s institutional capacity to mobilize resources and CCPC-PME’s

dual function as both a key communicator and enabler of impactful community initiatives.

In a move described as historic by CCPC-PME (2025b), the Chinese community resident

in northern Portugal formally assumed control of the Fundação Luso Internacional para a

Educação e Cultura na Zona Norte (Luso International Foundation for Education and

Culture in the Northern Zone). This transition involved the election of a new management

group led by local Chinese associations, with Y Ping Chow elected as President of the

board of directors (Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). The new leadership

immediately announced a major initiative - the launch of an international trilingual school

(Portuguese, English, and Mandarin) to be established in Porto. This educational project

is a direct response to the growing demand for multilingual education within the

community and the wider region. Its core objectives, as reported by CCPC-PME (2021),

are to:

1. Enhance educational quality through a rigorous international curriculum;

2. Strengthen cultural identity, particularly for young Luso-Chinese individuals, by

formally integrating Mandarin and Chinese cultural elements;

3. Promote the integration of Luso-Chinese youth into Portuguese society while

maintaining their heritage.

The project enjoys broad-based support, encompassing local community leaders, the

Confucius Institute at the University of Aveiro, and several Chinese language schools

(Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). This network of support underscores

the project’s significance and roots in the collaborative efforts between the diaspora

community and established educational and cultural institutions fostering China-Portugal

links. The new leadership of the Foundation has committed itself to reinforcing service to

the community specifically through the pillars of education, culture, and civic participation

(Câmara de Comércio Portugal-China PME, 2021). The establishment of the trilingual

school represents a concrete manifestation of this commitment.

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China’s growing investment footprint in Portugal extends beyond traditional sectors into

the media, serving strategic soft power objectives. This engagement manifests through

three key initiatives:

− Community-centric media: The 2019 launch of Ni Hao Portugal—a Lisbon-based

multimedia platform co-founded by Y Ping Chow (President of the Chinese League in

Portugal) and journalist Rogério Bueno de Matos—aimed to dismantle stereotypes

about Portugal’s Chinese community. As Matos stated, “Starting from the idea that

we like what we know and distrust what we don’t know, I saw an editorial opportunity

and social need to introduce the Chinese community to the Portuguese” (Hoje Macau,

2019). The project combined a digital portal with television programming focused on

business, cultural exchange, and diaspora life, seeking to foster mutual

understanding within Portugal before expanding to other Lusophone markets.

− Local media acquisition: Earlier Chinese entry into Portuguese media began with the

2015 acquisition of Iris FM (a regional radio station in Samora Correia) by

entrepreneur Liang Zhan. This purchase, initially met with community concerns about

relocation to Lisbon, evolved into a platform amplifying China-Portugal narratives.

Iris FM now features contents such as 30 representatives of Chinese-language media

from 18 countries going on a Tibet reporting tour, where they witness the remarkable

achievements of the new era on the snow-covered plateau and record vivid practices

of rural revitalization (Iris FM, 2025).

− Institutional platform building: The most significant development emerged in May

2025 when Guangdong’s state-backed Nanfang Media Group (owner of GD Today

and Iris FM) launched the “Greater Bay Area Chinese-Portuguese Media Content

Platform” in Lisbon. This initiative explicitly seeks to “reinforce media cooperation

and facilitate cultural content exchange between China and Portuguese-speaking

countries” while leveraging AI for digital dissemination (Hoje Macau, 2025a).

Nanfang Media Group chairman Liu Qiyu framed it as enhancing “civilizational

dialogue,” which coincides with the 500th anniversary of China-Europe diplomatic

relations and the 20th year of China-Portugal strategic partnership.

These investments reveal an evolution from community representation (Ni Hao Portugal)

to narrative influence (Iris FM) and finally institutional bridge-building (Nanfang’s

platform). Together, they seem to reflect a calibrated approach to shaping Portugal’s

media landscape through cultural diplomacy and strategic content partnerships.

Eyes on the Future: Pathways and Challenges

Economic diversification remains central to the diaspora’s future strategy. Y Ping Chow

outlines ambitious plans to establish startup investment funds and technology

collaboration platforms, emphasizing that “[they] are creating a fund to support tech

ventures and developing new scientific partnerships” (Personal communication, February

2025). The community’s role as mediators remains indispensable. Dinis Ka Chon Chan

highlights Portugal’s strategic importance: “What makes Portugal attractive to China is

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the political perspective... Portugal is seen as a friendly country or good mediator”

(Personal communication, February 2025). Maria Fernanda Ilhéu echoes this: “Portugal

is seen as a friendly country or good mediator, and it is interesting for China.”

Despite progress, challenges remain. Language barriers and bureaucratic inefficiencies

hinder integration. As Dinis Chan observes, “Those who already have the Golden Visa

remain in Portugal, but […] they do not speak the language. They are people who need

a lot of security, and making a high-risk investment is not an option for them” (Personal

communication, February 2025). He also notes bureaucratic delays: “The slowness of the

processes creates difficulties for people who want to come to Portugal (…) many lose

confidence in the system” (Personal communication, February 2025). Additionally, Y Ping

Chow expresses concern about generational engagement: “The second generation or

third [generation] no longer participates as much in the work of Chinese associations.

Perhaps because they are too integrated into the Portuguese community” (Personal

communication, February 2025).

These concerns align with findings from Li’s (2019) survey of 43 Chinese immigrants in

Portugal, predominantly from Zhejiang (76.74%), with 48.84% arriving between ages

13–17 (1.5-generation). The study reveals paradoxical identity patterns:

− Limited cultural knowledge: 81.4% reported only “knowing a little” about Chinese

history and traditions, while just 13.95% claimed deep cultural understanding,

leading to the conclusion that “most respondents lack comprehensive knowledge of

Chinese culture” (Li, 2019, p. 34).

− Strong cultural affiliation: Despite knowledge gaps, 72.09% identified “more” with

Chinese culture, and 60.47% primarily socialized with Chinese friends (vs. 32.56%

with multicultural friend groups).

The study attributes this to parental emphasis on cultural education, noting that “the vast

majority of 1.5-generation immigrants still maintain a Chinese cultural identity” while

pursuing integration into Portuguese society (Li, 2019, p. 37). However, their cultural

connection often remains superficial - maintained through contact with relatives in China,

Chinese media consumption, and ethnic social circles - with most retaining “the same

level of knowledge about Chinese culture they had when they immigrated” (Li, 2019, p.

41). This creates identity ambiguities, where some “remain confused about their cultural

identity,” while only a minority fully adopts a Portuguese identity.

Collectively navigating historical transitions, socioeconomic integration challenges, and

evolving geopolitical dynamics, the Chinese community in Portugal demonstrates

remarkable resilience and adaptability. As Maria Fernanda Ilhéu concludes, “The

community has a very positive energy” (Personal communication, February 2025). Their

ability to navigate challenges while fostering economic and cultural ties positions them

as a vital asset in Sino-Portuguese relations.

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Conclusion

This study set out to answer the central research question: How has the Chinese

community in Portugal evolved, and what roles does it play in shaping contemporary

Sino-Portuguese relations, particularly in the post-pandemic era? The findings reveal a

community transformed from historical intermediaries into a sophisticated, multi-layered

transnational para-diplomatic ecosystem. This ecosystem operates through three

interconnected dimensions, validating the proposed conceptual framework of diaspora

agency:

1. Foundation: Individual transnational entrepreneurs remain at the core of this

ecosystem, leveraging guanxi (relational networks) and transnational ties to facilitate

trade, investment, and market integration. Their adaptability, particularly in response

to shifting global economic conditions, underscores their foundational role in Sino-

Portuguese relations.

2. Structure: Institutions such as the Liga dos Chineses em Portugal (LCP), the Câmara

de Comércio Portugal-China PME (CCPC-PME) and the Portugal–Hong Kong Chamber

of Commerce and Industry (PHKCCI) normalize the diaspora’s agency as para-

diplomatic brokers. These organizations mediate between Portuguese and Chinese

stakeholders, creating frameworks for cooperation through trade missions, municipal

agreements, and cultural exchanges.

3. Amplification: The community strategically leverages state-created platforms such as

Macao’s Lusophone bridge and the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in

Hengqin. These state-backed platforms amplify the diaspora’s reach, reduce friction

in international collaborations, and foster new pathways for trilateral partnerships,

including initiatives in technology, traditional Chinese medicine, among others.

At the heart of this ecosystem lies diaspora capital, a resource that drives critical flows

across multiple domains:

− Economic: Investments in technology and startups.

− Knowledge: AI-driven innovations in traditional Chinese medicine and other sectors.

− Cultural: Trilingual education initiatives aimed at preserving heritage and fostering

integration.

− Institutional: Subnational agreements and collaborations that strengthen bilateral

ties.

In the post-pandemic era, the Chinese community in Portugal has not only demonstrated

resilience but has adapted to new realities with innovative economic activities,

sophisticated initiatives, and dynamic forms of relationship-building. More than resilient

intermediaries, the Chinese community has emerged as architects of relational

infrastructure—building bridges where formal diplomacy faces headwinds, creating new

spaces where the two countries converge through entrepreneurship rather than

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diplomatic channels, and proving that diaspora capital can transform geographic

proximity into geopolitical agency. In an era of strategic competition, this self-reinforcing

ecosystem offers a template for how transnational communities sustain cooperation

beneath - and beyond - the state.

This same dynamism and adaptability to new social and economic realities are confirmed

by economist Maria Fernanda Ilhéu (Personal communication, February 2023), who

observed: “The Chinese community, in general, has a positive characteristic: the speed

with which it adjusts to the surrounding environment. If the rules of the game change,

they don’t dwell on rules that no longer exist; they look at what they can do with them.”

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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SYNERGISTIC DYNAMICS OF SINO–PORTUGUESE PARTNERSHIP POLICIES:

IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION

YINKANGNI WANG

yinkangniwang@gmail.com

She is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Macau (China). Her academic trajectory began with

an undergraduate exploration of the geopolitical implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for China,

which ignited her interest in global strategic dynamics. During her Master's studies, she delved

into the practical aspects of governance through research on e-government in Macau. Situated at

the intersection of China and the Lusophone world, Macau served as a bridge, leading her to

specialize in Sino-Portuguese relations within the framework of digital geopolitics. Her current

research interests lie at the confluence of e-governance, geostrategy, and the unique role of

functional powers like Portugal in shaping international cooperation. https://orcid.org/0009-

0000-7194-0022

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic University

of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program Coordinator at the Institute of

Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From

2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking

Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he is an Associate Professor with

Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau, and

Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and Public Affairs. His recent publications include: Is

China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave Macmillan and The Palgrave Handbook on Geopolitics of

Brazil and South Atlantic (2025), Palgrave Macmillan. Francisco Leandro is a member of

OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign Relations), established in 1996 as a centre for studies on

International Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-1443-5828

Abstract

This study examines the synergistic effects of Sino-Portuguese economic cooperation and

cultural engagement from 2003 to 2024, with particular attention to the role of “guanxi” as a

relational framework. Drawing on qualitative analysis, the study explores how state-level

diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges have jointly fostered trust, reciprocity, and long-

term commitment. Evidence from state visits, cultural diplomacy programs, and educational

exchanges demonstrates how economic cooperation provides material foundations for cultural

engagement, while cultural exchange reduces communication barriers, fosters loyalty, and

enhances resilience in bilateral relations. The findings highlight that economic and cultural

cooperation do not operate in isolation but reinforce one another, generating outcomes

greater than the sum of their parts. By situating Portugal as a functional power and China as

a global actor, this research contributes to theoretical debates on relational international

relations and offers practical insights into how cultural capital and economic collaboration can

jointly shape sustainable partnerships.

Keywords

Portugal, China, Macao, Guanxi, Synergy Effects, Cultural Diplomacy.

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and Contemporary Dynamics

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Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic

and Cultural Cooperation

Yinkangni Wang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

127

Resumo

Este estudo analisa os efeitos sinérgicos da cooperação económica e do envolvimento cultural

sino português entre 2003 e 2024, com particular atenção ao papel do guanxi enquanto

enquadramento relacional. Com base numa análise qualitativa, o estudo explora de que forma

a diplomacia estatal e as interações interpessoais têm conjuntamente promovido confiança,

reciprocidade e compromisso de longo prazo. As evidências recolhidas - incluindo visitas de

Estado, programas de diplomacia cultural e intercâmbios educativos - demonstram que a

cooperação económica fornece as bases materiais para o envolvimento cultural, enquanto a

troca cultural reduz barreiras de comunicação, fomenta lealdade e reforça a resiliência das

relações bilaterais. Os resultados mostram que a cooperação económica e a cooperação

cultural não operam de forma isolada, mas se reforçam mutuamente, gerando impactos

superiores à soma das suas partes. Ao posicionar Portugal como um poder funcional e a China

como um ator global, esta investigação contribui para os debates teóricos sobre relações

internacionais relacionais e oferece contributos práticos sobre como o capital cultural e a

colaboração económica podem, em conjunto, moldar parcerias sustentáveis.

Palavras-chave

Portugal, China, Macau, Guanxi, Efeitos de sinergia, Diplomacia Cultural.

How to cite this article

Wang, Yinkangni & Leandro, Francisco José B. S. (2026). Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese

Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic and Cultural Cooperation. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical

Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 126-156.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.6

Article submitted on 23rd October 2025 and accepted for publication on 28th January

2026.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 126-156

Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic

and Cultural Cooperation

Yinkangni Wang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

128

SYNERGISTIC DYNAMICS OF SINO–PORTUGUESE PARTNERSHIP

POLICIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL

COOPERATION

YINKANGNI WANG

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

Introduction

The synergistic effects of Sino-Portuguese economic relations on bilateral trade and

cultural cooperation have grown increasingly significant in the context of globalization

and international diplomacy. As China exerts its influence through the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), its relationship with Portugal exemplifies a compelling model of

collaboration between a rising economic power and a traditional European partner. The

historical ties between these two nations, particularly through Macao, facilitate a unique

platform for cultural exchange, where economic interactions enhance cultural

understanding and bilateral cooperation.

China’s BRI has positioned Portugal as a strategic gateway to Europe, facilitating

infrastructure investments and cultural diplomacy initiatives. Leandro (2023) notes that

Sino-Portuguese relations have evolved over the last five decades, significantly

accelerating following the BRI's introduction in 2013. This relationship is characterized

by increased investments in infrastructure and shared cultural projects, fostering a robust

dialogue that strengthens ties in various domains, including education and cultural

exchanges (Leandro, 2023). Portugal's strategic location in Europe and its membership

in the European Union (EU) make it an attractive partner for China, which views Portugal

as a gateway to the broader European market (Leandro & Duarte, 2020). Sino-

Portuguese relations have deepened significantly since 2013, with Chinese investments

in Portuguese energy, finance, and infrastructure sectors exceeding €2.8 billion by 2021

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022). Concurrently, cultural

programs, such as Confucius Institutes in Portugal and Portuguese language centers in

China, have fostered people-to-people ties, enhancing mutual trust and institutional

collaboration. These dynamics align with Bourdieu’s (1986) theory of cultural capital,

Acknowledgement: This project was generously supported by the University of Macau under

MYRG‑GRG2025‑00011‑FSS – Social Representations of China in the Lusophone World. The authors also

acknowledge the use of Microsoft Copilot and DeepSeek in supporting the preparation of visual data

presentations and in enhancing the clarity and academic style of the manuscript; Conflict of Interests: The

authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this study.

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

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Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic

and Cultural Cooperation

Yinkangni Wang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

129

which posits that non-financial assets like education and social networks amplify

economic productivity. Similarly, Throsby (2001) posits that cultural industries are

distinctive in generating both economic value and cultural value, the latter encompassing

aspects like intangible heritage preservation.

The topic of the “guanxi” in Sino-Portuguese cooperation is an important starting point,

especially in the context of globalization, the exchange and integration of cultures of

different countries are becoming more and more frequent. In cross-cultural negotiations,

“guanxi” can facilitate smoother interactions by creating a foundation of trust and mutual

understanding (Chen & Chen, 2004). Furthermore, in the realm of international relations,

the concept of "functional power" has emerged as a significant area of study, examining

how power operates in specific functions and issue - areas. Functional power operates

through social relations and institutions, enabling actors to shape their circumstances

without resorting to force (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). This concept is crucial for

understanding how global governance is achieved and how states navigate complex

international issues. Portugal has emerged as functional power in international relations

by leveraging its historical legacy, cultural influence, and strategic partnerships.

Moreover, the significance of cultural diplomacy as a component of international relations

cannot be understated. The Portuguese-speaking community further amplifies these

interactions, positioning Portugal as a gateway for China into Europe while enhancing

cultural cohesion among Lusophone countries (Johnson, 2020). This multilayered

interaction emphasizes the importance of understanding the correlation effects of cultural

cooperation on economic ties as both nations navigate an increasingly interconnected

global landscape.

The relationship between China and Portugal has evolved significantly over the past

decades, with cultural engagement playing a crucial role in shaping economic

interactions. The research period from 2003 to 2024 is particularly significant due to

China's growing influence in Portuguese-speaking countries and the establishment of

strategic partnerships aimed at fostering economic collaboration (Leandro, 2025).

Methodologically, this study adopts a qualitative approach, building on frameworks from

“guanxi” theory, this research contributes to both theoretical and practical

understandings of international cooperation by addressing the underexplored synergistic

effects between cultural exchange and economic collaboration in the Sino-Portuguese

context. This study seeks to examine the interplay between economic and cultural factors

in the Sino-Portuguese relationship, addressing the following research question: What

are the synergistic effects of Sino-Portuguese cooperation on economic and culture in

both regions? By analysing existing literature and empirical data like policy documents,

this research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of how “guanxi” shapes

international relations and how “guanxi” create the synergistic effects of economic and

cultural dynamics.

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 126-156

Synergistic Dynamics of Sino–Portuguese Partnership Policies: Implications for Economic

and Cultural Cooperation

Yinkangni Wang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

130

2. Literature Review

2.1 Correlation of Economic Cooperation and Cultural Exchange

The correlation between culture and economy is rooted in classical sociological theories.

Max Weber (2017) posited those cultural values, such as the Protestant work ethic,

catalysed capitalist development by promoting thrift and industriousness. This

perspective was later expanded by institutional economists like Douglass North (1990),

who argued that informal cultural norms complement formal institutions in shaping

economic behaviour. Contemporary studies operationalize culture through dimensions

such as trust, individualism, and social capital, which are theorized to influence economic

productivity and innovation. The bidirectional relationship between culture and economy

complicates causal inference. While trust fosters economic cooperation (Lorenz, 1999),

economic stability can also enhance societal trust. Trommsdorff (2009) define culture as

intergenerationally transmitted values and beliefs, and this may affect economic

decisions, such as investment and entrepreneurship (Guiso et. al, 2006).

Cultural capital, understood as non-financial assets such as education, traditions, and

social networks, has been widely recognized as a driver of economic productivity. Throsby

(2001) argues that cultural industries, including the arts and heritage tourism, generate

significant economic value while simultaneously safeguarding intangible cultural heritage.

Empirical evidence supports this claim; for instance, UNESCO’s designation of World

Heritage Sites often correlates with increased tourism revenue and local employment

opportunities (Canale et al., 2019). Similarly, Florida’s (2011) “creative class” theory

posits that cultural diversity within urban environments fosters economic innovation,

suggesting that tolerant and culturally vibrant cities attract talent and stimulate

entrepreneurial activity. These perspectives underscore the interdependence between

cultural assets and economic development, highlighting the strategic importance of

cultural capital in shaping sustainable growth and competitiveness in a globalized

economy.

Regional studies within single nations mitigate endogeneity issues prevalent in cross-

country analyses. For example, in China, Confucian values emphasizing relational

networks (guanxi) correlate with enhanced trust in business transactions but also with

favouritism that distorts market efficiency (Yang & Wang, 2011). Similarly, Greece’s

cultural heritage-driven tourism illustrates how localized cultural assets can directly

stimulate economic sectors (Kostakis & Lolos,2024).

Globalization has intensified interactions between economic markets and cultural

exchange. Guillén (2001) argues that multinational corporations (MNCs) leverage cultural

hybridization, blending local and global practices, to enhance market penetration. For

instance, McDonald’s adapts menus to regional tastes, merging economic efficiency with

cultural sensitivity (Ali & Santos, 2025). Such strategies illustrate “glocalization,” where

global brands achieve synergies by respecting local norms (Ritzer, 2003). Conversely,

Rodrik (2011) warns that rapid economic globalization can destabilize cultural identities,

sparking resistance movements (such as anti-WTO protests). These tensions underscore

the fragility of economic-cultural linkage when power imbalances persist.

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2.2 Functional power

2.2.1 The Evolution of Power Concepts and Functional Power

Traditional power concepts in international relations often revolved around military and

economic might, commonly referred to as hard power (Morgenthau, 1948). However, as

the international system became more complex, scholars began to investigate other

dimensions of power. Functional power is closely associated with functionalism, a

theoretical approach that emphasizes cooperation and problem-solving in international

relations. David Mitrany (1948), a pioneer of functionalism, argued that international

cooperation in technical and non-political areas could foster peace and integration. This

idea has evolved into the concept of functional power, which refers to a situational

attribute or capability that enables a state to assume a power-related role or influence in

international affairs that exceeds expectations based on its conventional capabilities

(Leandro, 2025). Unlike traditional classifications of comparative power status - such as

measuring military or economic might - functional power is not a hierarchical ranking of

sovereign actors. Instead, it describes a context-dependent capacity, often associated

with smaller states, to shape or disrupt international systems through strategic

partnerships with major powers or other actors (Leandro, 2025). It operates by shaping

the capacities of actors to address shared challenges, often through technical, economic,

or social collaboration rather than direct political or military force (Imber, 2020).

2.2.2 Portugal as a Functional Actor in International Relations

Portugal’s deep historical and linguistic ties with Lusophone countries in Africa, Asia, and

South America have positioned it as a mediator and advocate for these regions in

international forums. This role has been institutionalized through the creation of the

Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in 1996, which Portugal helped

establish to strengthen cooperation among Lusophone nations. By leveraging its EU

membership and cultural capital, Portugal has consistently promoted the interests of

Lusophone partners in multilateral settings such as the United Nations, the European

Union, and Ibero-American Summits (Duarte et al., 2023; Mormul, 2020). These

relationships have allowed Portugal to act as a mediator between Europe and the Global

South, leveraging its historical ties to promote development and cooperation.

Portugal’s rich history and cultural heritage have served as a foundation for its cultural

power. Portuguese language and culture have spread globally, particularly in Portuguese-

speaking countries. In the economic realm, Portugal has been actively involved in

international trade and economic partnerships. Portugal has a diverse economy with key

sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing. Its strategic location in the

Atlantic has made it an important hub for maritime trade (Medeiros, 2024). Additionally,

Portugal's membership in the European Union has provided it with access to a large

market and opportunities for economic cooperation. Portugal's role in regional and global

initiatives has also been a subject of study. In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative,

Leandro & Li (2025) discusses how Portugal has engaged with China's BRI, particularly

in areas such as infrastructure development and port cooperation. This cooperation has

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not only brought economic benefits but has also increased Portugal's geopolitical

significance. Moreover, Portugal's participation in international organizations like the

United Nations has allowed it to contribute to global discussions on issues such as climate

change and sustainable development.

Portugal has emerged as a functional power in international relations by leveraging its

historical legacy, cultural influence, and strategic partnerships. In contemporary times,

Portugal’s membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO has further enhanced its

role in shaping international policies, particularly in areas such as maritime security,

transatlantic relations, and development cooperation. As a member of the European

Union (EU) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), Portugal plays

a significant role in promoting regional cooperation and cultural diplomacy. The CPLP has

been an important platform for promoting cultural cooperation and enhancing Portugal's

influence in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Beyond that, its commitment

to multilateralism and participation in international organizations, such as the United

Nations and NATO, underscores its influence in global governance. By fostering economic

ties and advocating for sustainable development, Portugal enhances its soft power and

contributes to global stability.

2.3 “Guanxi”

2.3.1 Definition of “Guanxi”

Interpersonal relationship (guanxi) is one of the major dynamics of Chinese society.

Guanxi is a Chinese word that can be translated as "relationship" or "connection”, and it

plays an important role in Chinese society, economy and culture. Guanxi is often defined

as a system of social networks and relationships that facilitate mutual benefits and

obligations (Chen & Chen, 2004). It is characterized by trust, reciprocity, and long-term

commitment. According to Park and Luo (2001), guanxi operates on both personal and

organizational levels, influencing decision-making processes and resource allocation in

Chinese businesses, emphasizing that guanxi is not merely a transactional relationship

but a deeply rooted cultural practice that fosters loyalty and cooperation. The Guanxi

network is characterized by iterative obligations that structure social and professional

relationships, rather than serving as channels through which influence flows directly (Qin,

2009). Historically, Guanxi has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, evolving from its

roots in imperial China to its contemporary relevance in the era of market reforms. In

the present context, relational logic continues to shape patterns of action, influencing

how individuals and organizations pursue their objectives. To achieve these goals

effectively, actors must engage in global affairs proactively, decisively, and responsibly.

Such engagement, however, should not be undertaken blindly; it requires careful

consideration of the broader macro-level dynamics of international interaction. Whether

in bilateral or multilateral settings, the specific circumstances and interests of all parties

involved must be considered to ensure constructive and sustainable outcomes.

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2.3.2 “Guanxi” in China

Guanxi (关系), a foundational concept in Chinese social and business interactions, is

characterized by reciprocal obligations (bao), relational trust (xinyong), and the

preservation of social dignity (mianzi). China's "guanxi" culture is embodied in various

social and business activities, such as entrepreneurs' private social capital, academic

network, workplace relationship circle, e-buying and sales relationship, gift exchange

relationship, innovation and export ability of enterprises, and voting behaviour. It is in

this setting that xinyong (trustworthiness) - the reputation for meetings one obligations

to others gains its significance as “the most valuable asset” in the transactional web

of guanxi. The heuristics of guanxi suggests that changes in material capabilities

themselves reveal patterns in world affairs only when assessed in the context of

interactions. However, the ethical implications of guanxi have also been debated, as it

can sometimes lead to favouritism or corruption (Luo, 2008). Barbalet (2017) examined

"guanxi" in China as a form of gift exchange from the perspective of social exchange

theory and explored the key role of social emotions in exchange, and how informal

relations in China can be understood as "guanxi" as an information institution, thereby

expanding the scope of the concept of informal institutions and enriching our

understanding of relationships. Collectively, the Chinese "guanxi" culture and its nuanced

manifestations in various social and business activities is enhancing the understanding

of this unique social and cultural fabric of China (Bian, 2018).

2.3.3 The Role of “Guanxi” in People-to-people Exchange

Social rules are human constructions, yet these very rules reciprocally shape and

constitute human behaviour and identity (Onuf, 1989). This dialectical relationship

highlights how everyday interactions, including informal exchanges, construct and

reinforce social orders. People to people exchange (P2PE) is broadly defined as "direct

interpersonal engagement that transcends formal state-led diplomacy" (Cull, 2008).

People-to-people exchange (P2PE), such as educational programs or diaspora networks,

function as "rules-generating communities" that transcend state-centric diplomacy. It

encompasses activities such as educational exchanges, cultural festivals, tourism, and

professional collaborations. P2PE can be situated within the framework of soft power,

where grassroots interactions can build transnational networks of influence that

complement traditional statecraft (Nye, 2004). Bhandari et al. (2011) notes that P2PE

like student mobility cultivate global citizenship by exposing participants to diverse

perspectives, reducing stereotypes, and fostering intercultural competence. In P2PE

diplomacy, guanxi enables informal trust-building.

2.3.4 How “Guanxi” Works in International Relations?

In the field of international relations, guanxi functions as a culturally embedded

framework that shapes the strategic behaviour of Chinese leaders and diplomats in

foreign policy-making. Unlike dominant Western paradigms, which tend to emphasize

formal institutions, codified norms, and legally binding agreements, guanxi prioritizes

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informal networks, trust-based interactions, and relational diplomacy as central

mechanisms for achieving political objectives (Qin, 2018). This relational approach

underscores the significance of personal ties and reciprocal obligations in sustaining long-

term cooperation, thereby offering an alternative lens for understanding China’s

engagement in global governance and bilateral negotiations. The application of guanxi in

diplomacy has been particularly evident in China’s foreign policy. For instance, China’s

engagement with African nations has often relied on building strong personal

relationships with local leaders, fostering trust and cooperation (Brautigam, 2009).

Similarly, “guanxi” has played a role in China’s bilateral relations with neighbouring

countries, such as Vietnam and South Korea, where historical and cultural ties are

leveraged to strengthen political and economic partnerships (Womack, 2006). These

practices highlight how “guanxi” serves as a tool for soft power and influence in

international relations. While guanxi offers strategic advantages, it also presents

challenges in the context of international relations. Critics argue that reliance on informal

networks can undermine transparency and accountability, potentially leading to

corruption or favoritism (Su & Littlefield, 2001). Additionally, the cultural specificity of

“guanxi” may limit its applicability in global settings, where diverse norms and practices

coexist (Fan, 2002). These challenges underscore the need for a nuanced understanding

of “guanxi” in international relations.

2.4 Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism, as both a policy framework and sociocultural reality, has been

extensively debated across disciplines. It broadly refers to the recognition and

accommodation of cultural diversity within a society. Multicultural citizenship supports

minority rights, enabling cultural preservation and exchange within liberal democracies

(Kymlicka, 2012). It fosters intercultural dialogue, which is essential for meaningful

cultural exchange. Modood (2017) highlights how multicultural policies legitimize cultural

pluralism, creating spaces for communities to share traditions and values. Vertovec

(2007) introduces the concept of “super-diversity,” noting that complex migration

patterns enrich cultural landscapes and stimulate exchange. Also, multicultural policies

can enhance civic engagement and intercultural interaction, particularly when supported

by inclusive institutions (Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad, 2008).

Recent studies underscore the practical impact of multiculturalism on cultural exchange.

In contemporary settings, multiculturalism continues to serve as a catalyst for cultural

exchange, particularly in educational and international contexts (Zalli, 2024). Zapata-

Barrero (2017) argues that interculturalism, as an evolution of multiculturalism,

emphasizes proactive engagement and reciprocal learning. Together, these perspectives

reveal that multiculturalism not only accommodates diversity but actively cultivates

cultural exchange. By legitimizing diverse identities and encouraging interaction,

multicultural frameworks contribute to global empathy, innovation, and cooperation.

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Table 1. What is “Guanxi”?

Term

Guanxi

Short

definition

A network of long-term, reciprocal, trust-based social relations

Core elements

Trust; reciprocity; mianzi (face); long-term commitment

Mechanisms

Gift exchange; mutual aid; information sharing; repeated interaction

Levels

Individual; organizational; state

Economic

functions

Reduces information asymmetry; lowers transaction costs

Diplomatic

functions

Builds interpersonal trust; facilitates institutional platforms

Observable

indicators

Number of high-level visits; cultural projects; investment flows

Research

measures

Survey trust scores; counts of exchanges; process-tracing of events

Risks

Favouritism; reduced transparency; corruption vulnerability

Policy

implication

Institutionalize exchanges; increase transparency; strengthen oversight

Practical

example

Macau as a cultural and commercial bridge between China and Portugal

Source: Authors

3. Methodology

This study examines the interplay between cultural engagement and economic

cooperation in Sino-Portuguese relations, guided by the central research question: How

do China and Portugal build their “guanxi,” and under a guanxi-based perspective, what

are the synergistic effects of this relationship on economic and cultural dimensions?

Employing a qualitative research design, the study examines how relational practices

influence bilateral cooperation, focusing on the period from 2003 to 2024. By analysing

cultural dynamics alongside economic initiatives, the research seeks to uncover the

extent to which guanxi operates as a facilitating mechanism for trust-building,

reciprocity, and long-term collaboration. Empirical evidence is drawn from two

interlocking data streams. First, official policy documents of understanding and strategic

plans published by Chinese and Portuguese authorities, Forum Macao, and CPLP provide

the institutional record and formal commitments that structure bilateral interaction.

Second, annual trade and economic statistics compiled from international trade

databases and national statistical releases are used descriptively to situate qualitative

inferences within a time‑series of bilateral flows and to identify temporal inflection points

for further investigation. This approach provides a nuanced understanding of how

informal relational frameworks complement formal agreements, shaping the trajectory

of Sino-Portuguese engagement in both economic and cultural spheres.

The research framework for this study is illustrated in Figure 1. Adopting a dual-level

perspective - national and individual - this study investigates how historical diplomatic

events and policy decisions have shaped the development of guanxi between China and

Portugal. It further examines how this long-term relational framework influences the

synergistic interaction between economic cooperation and cultural exchange. At the

national level, the analysis focuses on state-led initiatives, bilateral agreements, and

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institutional mechanisms that foster trust and reciprocity. At the individual level,

attention is given to interpersonal networks, professional ties, and cultural engagements

that sustain and deepen bilateral relations. This integrated approach provides a

comprehensive understanding of how guanxi operates as both a structural and relational

force, shaping the dynamics of Sino-Portuguese collaboration across economic and

cultural domains.

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework

Source: Authors

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The study acknowledges limitations inherent to qualitative, case‑based research,

including constraints on generalizability, potential reporting asymmetries in official

statistics, and limited access to confidential commercial decision records; these

limitations are addressed by explicitly delimiting inference boundaries, using process

tracing to strengthen correlational claims, and recommending future quantitative tests

to assess the generalizability of the mechanisms identified.

4. The Synergistic Effects of Economy and Culture and the "Guanxi"

Theory

4.1 Building “Guanxi” from State-to-state Level

The Sino-Portuguese state visits from 2005 to 2024 (Table 1) reflects a deliberate and

sustained cultivation of guanxi. Each visit served not only as a formal engagement but

also as a symbolic reaffirmation of mutual respect, continuity, and emotional resonance

(qing) between the two nations. Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio’s 2005 visit to

China laid the groundwork for deeper political trust, while President Hu Jintao’s 2010 visit

to Portugal demonstrated China’s support during the European debt crisis, embodying

the principle of reciprocity (bao). The 2014 visit by President Cavaco Silva to China

reinforced cultural and educational ties, expanding the interpersonal networks essential

to guanxi. President Xi Jinping’s 2018 visit to Portugal marked a strategic milestone, with

the signing of the Belt and Road Initiative memorandum - Portugal becoming the first

Western European country to do so - signalling long-term commitment and shared vision.

In 2019, President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa’s visit to China further deepened relational

trust through cultural diplomacy and economic cooperation. Most recently, the 2024

meeting in Lisbon between the Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress Standing

Committee and President Rebelo de Sousa reaffirmed institutional alignment and

legislative dialogue, extending guanxi beyond executive diplomacy into parliamentary

channels. Collectively, these visits illustrate how guanxi is built through repeated, high-

level interactions that blend formal agreements with symbolic gestures, fostering a

resilient and multidimensional Sino-Portuguese partnership.

The evolution of Sino-Portugal relations from 2003 to 2024 demonstrates a sophisticated

cultivation of "guanxi" that transcends mere diplomatic formalism (Table 2), building

instead a multi-level relational architecture anchored by Macao's unique role as a

Table 2. Key Sino-Portuguese State Visits

Year

Event

2005

Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio visits China

2010

Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Portugal

2014

Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva visits China

2018

Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Portugal

2019

Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa visits China

2024

Chairman of China's National People's Congress Standing Committee, meets with

Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa in Lisbon, Portugal

Source: Authors

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sanctioned platform for trilateral engagement. This process was initiated with the

strategic establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China

and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Forum Macao) in 2003, which institutionalized a

permanent channel for interaction that blends state and non-state actors. The

relationship was subsequently elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in

2005, a move that signalled deep political trust (xinren) and created a framework for

sustained high-level engagement, which was critically reinforced by Portugal's pivotal

decision to become the first Western European nation to sign a Belt and Road Initiative

Memorandum of Understanding in 2018. Through a series of deliberate state visits and

the fostering of sub-national diplomacy, particularly leveraging Macao’s historical and

cultural capital as a bridge, the two states have effectively constructed a resilient network

that facilitates not only economic and political cooperation but also deep people-to-people

exchanges, thereby transforming a historical bilateral connection into a dynamic and

multifaceted partnership capable of navigating the complexities of contemporary

geopolitics.

As an international cooperation mechanism, the establishment of The Forum for

Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries

(Macao) (Forum Macao) was originally intended to promote institutionalized cooperation

between China and Portuguese-speaking countries in economic, trade, and investment

fields, providing valuable experience and ideas for the institutionalization of the "Belt and

Road Initiative". The construction of the Forum Macao was a successful example of the

"far distant and close integration" strategy of the Macao Special Administrative Region,

which not only supported the moderate diversification of Macao's economy but also made

it an important component of the platform for economic cooperation between China and

Portuguese-speaking countries, promoting equal and mutually beneficial economic

exchanges and cooperation.

During this period, the operational mechanism of the Forum Macao gradually improved.

Through regular ministerial meetings, entrepreneur conferences, and professional

training activities, it provided a platform for exchanges and dialogues among government

officials, business leaders, and experts from various countries. The core of these early

policies and events was to build a multilateral cooperation framework, with Macao as the

pivot, radiating throughout the Portuguese-speaking community, thereby injecting new

Table 3. Key Sino-Portuguese Diplomatic Policy and Major Events

Year

Event

2003

Establishment of The Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and

Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macao)

2005

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

2016

Macao serves as the "one base, one platform, and one centre"

2017

Portugal and China have maintained a “blue partnership” aimed at reinforcing

collaboration in maritime and commercial projects

2018

Portugal formally joined China's Belt and Road Initiative

2024

Strategic Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation (2024–2027)

2024

China-Portuguese Speaking Countries Economic and Trade Expo (Macao)

Source: Authors

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vitality into the bilateral cooperation between China and Portugal. The establishment of

the Forum Macao itself reflected China's policy intention to establish a long-term and

stable partnership with Portuguese-speaking countries, especially Portugal. This

institutionalized cooperation mechanism laid the foundation for deeper economic and

cultural interactions and began to cultivate a "guanxi" network based on a common

platform and common interests. Especially the cooperation in response to the COVID-19

pandemic, further demonstrated the resilience and value of this "relationship" in times

of crisis, through joint responses to challenges, further consolidating mutual trust and

cooperation intentions (Verly-Miguel, 2024). The proposal of the BRI in 2013 brought

unprecedented development opportunities for the China-Portuguese partnership,

marking the entry of the bilateral cooperation into a new strategic stage. Portugal, as an

important gateway connecting the Atlantic and Africa, its strategic geographical location

makes it a key node of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Leandro,2023). Portugal

views the "Belt and Road Initiative" as an important opportunity to enhance its diplomatic

relations and its economic position within the European Union.

Under the framework of the "Belt and Road Initiative", the economic cooperation between

China and Portugal has shown a significant growth trend. Chinese investment in key

sectors of Portugal has increased significantly, covering energy, finance, infrastructure,

and other fields. China seeks economic benefits and builds organized global geopolitical

influence through providing global public goods and stable bilateral relations. This

indicates that China's investment in Portugal is not merely a commercial act, but has

deeper strategic considerations, aiming to build a more stable bilateral "relationship"

through economic cooperation.

Table 4. Major Events and its Impact

Events

Objective

The “Guanxi”

Strategy

Results

Forum

Macao

(Since

2003)

Promote economic and

trade cooperation

between China and

Portuguese-speaking

countries

Institutionalized

dialogue, multilateral

platforms, common

interests

Trade and investment

facilitation, strengthened

role of the Macao as

platform, and crisis

cooperation

The Belt

and Road

Initiative

(Since

2013)

Global interconnection,

infrastructure

construction, and

strategic cooperation

Long-term investment,

strategic partnership,

and geopolitical

influence

Energy financial

investment, expansion of

the digital economy, and

deepening of strategic

mutual trust

The Macao

One

Platform

Strategy

Connecting China with

Portuguese-speaking

countries and

promoting economic

diversification

Cultural affinity,

historical ties, and

central government

support

Cultural exchange hub,

tourism and leisure

centre, and regional

economic pivot

The

Guangdong-

Hong Kong-

Macao

Greater Bay

Area (GBA)

Policy

Regional integration

and innovative

development

Regional institutional

cooperation, resource

sharing, and

coordinated

development

The international influence

of Macao has increased,

its economy has become

more diversified, and the

innovation ecosystem has

been optimized.

Source: Authors

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During this period, the strengthening of the platform role of Macao, the emergence of

digital economy cooperation, the deepening of cultural and educational cooperation, and

the integrated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area

(GBA) collectively formed the multi-dimensional paths for the deepening of the

"relationship" between China and Portugal. In terms of culture and education, the "Third

Forum of the World Sinology Research Society" held by the University of Macao and the

Portuguese language cultural policies all highlighted the importance of cultural exchange

in the construction of the "relationship" (Feng & Ye,2020). Moreover, the integrated

development of the GBA enhanced Macao's regional status and international influence,

enabling it to play a more significant role in building a broader "guanxi" network (Tang

et al., 2024).

However, the economic and cultural cooperation promoted by the China-Portugal

partnership policy is not developed in isolation; instead, it presents a complex interaction

mechanism that jointly constitutes a profound synergy effect (Table 3). This synergy

effect enables the overall benefits of the bilateral relationship to exceed the sum of the

benefits of each part, embodying the core idea of the "guanxi", that is, through

interaction and coordination among the components, an overall effect beyond the simple

addition of individual parts can be generated.

4.2 Building “Guanxi” from People-to-people Level

China and Portugal have systematically built people-to-people "guanxi" through targeted

educational and cultural exchanges that leverage historical ties and create lasting

interpersonal connections (Table 4). Multiculturalism converts discrete people‑to‑people

activities into a durable mechanism for building guanxi by legitimizing plural identities,

structuring repeated intercultural contact, and institutionalizing reciprocity. By hosting

large-scale cultural and festival events, including traditional music and dance

performances, film festivals and art exhibitions, Macao has been transformed into a

vibrant living room for cultural exchanges between China and Portugal. Since 2018, the

Macao Special Administrative Region Government has successfully held the "Meet in

Macao - China-Portugal Cultural and Art Festival" consecutively

. Beyond Macao, these

exchanges extend to mainland Portugal through events like the "Cultural Market in the

Candlelight", which featured Chinese calligraphy and dragon dances, and the "China Day"

at the Lisbon International Handicraft Fair, making Chinese culture increasingly

accessible to the Portuguese public

. The educational bridge is fortified by Portugal's

active recruitment of Chinese students, with five major Portuguese universities

presenting their programs at the China Education Expo to establish formal academic

Liu, Z. Y. (2025, May). 中国式现代化与澳门经济发展—澳门在国家新发展格局中的战略定位与发展策略 [Chinese-style

modernization and Macao’s economic development – Strategic positioning and development strategies in the

national new development pattern]. 澳門經濟學會. Retrieved from

https://www.macaueconomy.org/downloads/research/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%BC%

8F%E7%8F%BE%E4%BB%A3%E5%8C%96%E8%88%87%E6%BE%B3%E9%96%80%E7%B6%93%E6%BF

%9F%E7%99%BC%E5%B1%95%E3%80%8B.pdf

Xinhua. (2017, July 11). Xi calls for building strong army through reform. Xinhua News Agency. Retrieved

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protocols, complementing the network of Confucius Institutes in Portugal that popularize

Chinese language studies

. Similarly, the Confucius Institute at the University of Porto -

established in partnership with Guangdong University of Foreign Studies - serves as a

key platform for promoting linguistic and cultural exchange through Chinese language

instruction and cultural workshops, thereby reinforcing an educational bridge between

the two countries. Complementing these efforts are targeted student mobility programs

designed for Chinese undergraduates specializing in Portuguese studies.

Concurrently, tourism initiatives such as Portugal’s pavilion at the ITB China fair,

supported by high-level diplomatic engagement, aim to stimulate human mobility, with

an ambitious target of attracting 500,000 Chinese tourists annually by 2026

. Between

the mid‑2010s and 2019, Portugal experienced steady growth in international visitors

and a notable increase in Chinese tourists. Official reporting cited a 16% rise in Chinese

guests in 2019, at a time when Portugal recorded a record 27 million total visitors that

year, signalling China’s emergence as an important source market (FM, 2020).

The pandemic produced the expected collapse in cross‑border travel in 2020, but the

recovery trajectory since 2022 has been strong globally and especially pronounced for

China after the lifting of strict travel restrictions: Chinese outbound departures surged in

2023, with government figures showing tens of millions of departures in the first half of

that year alone (Irwin-Hunt, 2023), reflecting a rapid normalization of outbound demand.

Portugal’s tourism statistics reflect an increasingly ambitious strategy to leverage the

sector’s post‑pandemic recovery. In the first quarter of 2024 alone, the country recorded

57,740 visitors from China, and authorities have since articulated targets of attracting

500,000 Chinese tourists and generating one million overnight stays by 2026 -

demonstrating a concerted policy effort to strengthen bilateral tourism flows (Portugal

Global, 2024).

Embassy of Portugal in Beijing. (2025). China Education Expo 2025. Retrieved from

https://pequim.embaixadaportugal.mne.gov.pt/en/the-embassy/news/china-education-expo-2025

Jing Daily. (2024, October 18). From heritage to luxury: Porto’s bid for Chinese tourism. Retrieved from

https://jingdaily.com/posts/from-heritage-to-luxury-porto-s-bid-for-chinese-tourism

Table 5. People-to-people Exchange

Mechanism

Event

Educational

& Language

Institutions

Five Confucius Institutes in Portugal (such as the University of Lisbon,

University of Coimbra); Portuguese language programs in mainland Chinese

universities.

Immersive

Cultural

Programs

Summer camps in China for Portuguese youth (such as the Instituto

Confúcio at the University of Porto); programs include language practice,

calligraphy, and visits to historical sites.

Historical &

Social

Integration

Centuries of Sino-Portuguese intermarriage and cultural blending in Macao,

creating a distinct Macanese community and shared cultural relics

Cultural

festivals

"Encounter in Macao" festival, Macao Arts Festival, Festival do Oriente

(Lisbon).

Source: Authors

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The tourism rebound both reflects and reinforces closer Sino‑Portuguese relations

because sustained people‑to‑people exchange builds familiarity, business networks, and

cultural ties that lower transaction costs for trade and investment and create

constituencies in both countries that favour deeper cooperation. In short, the tourism

statistics and official ambitions from 2015 through 2024 provide empirical evidence that

interpersonal connectivity is recovering and expanding, and that tourism is an active

channel through which Sino‑Portuguese relations are becoming more tightly integrated.

In addition, student mobility is not merely a flow of people; it is a mechanism for building

interpersonal networks that underpin guanxi when framed by multiculturalist institutional

practices. Chinese student presence in Portugal grew substantially in the 2010s, rising

from about 1,839 Chinese students in 2010/2011 to 4,053 in 2018/2019 (a +54.4%

increase), with notable growth in higher‑education and postgraduate enrolments (Ni Hao

Portugal, 2019); these mobility flows create repeated, institutionalized contacts that

multicultural policies can convert into durable guanxi.

In the Sino‑Portuguese case, cultural diplomacy instruments exemplify how

multiculturalist practices institutionalize respect for difference and thereby amplify the

trust‑building function of guanxi. Consequently, people‑to‑people guanxi in this bilateral

relationship is not only a product of informal reciprocity but is actively shaped and

sustained by multiculturalist institutions that translate cultural capital into predictable,

institutionalized channels for economic and diplomatic cooperation. Together, these

multifaceted and sustained interactions across culture, education, and travel create a

robust foundation of shared experiences and mutual appreciation, effectively cultivating

the deep social and relational capital that characterizes strong people-to-people "guanxi."

4.3 The Synergistic Effects

4.3.1The Economic Cooperation Based on Building “Guanxi”

Figures 2 & 3 show the bilateral trade data between China and Portugal from 1992 to

2024, revealing a demonstrable synergy between the establishment of high-level

diplomatic frameworks and the acceleration of economic exchange. The foundational

period (1992-2002) shows modest but stable growth (Figure 2), with total trade

increasing from approximately $44.0 million in 1992 to $307.8 million in 2002. This phase

established the basic commercial corridor between the two nations. A significant

structural shift occurred post-2003, coinciding with the establishment of the Forum

Macao. This institutional innovation provided a dedicated mechanism for engagement,

correlating with a notable surge: bilateral trade grew by 99% from $406.3 million in 2003

to $911.95 million in 2005.

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Figure 2. China-Portugal Bilateral Trade and Key Events (1992-2024)

Source: Authors based on UN Comtrade database using R Programming Language.

Figure 3. Portugal-China Bilateral Trade and Key Events (1992-2024)

Source: Authors based on UN Comtrade database using R Programming

Language.

https://comtradeplus.un.org/TradeFlow?Frequency=A&Flows=X&CommodityCodes=TOTAL&Par

tners=0&Reporters=all&period=2024&AggregateBy=none&BreakdownMode=plus

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144

The formal elevation of relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2005

marked a critical inflection point, embedding economic objectives within a broader

framework of political and strategic trust. The data indicates this commitment acted as

a powerful catalyst for exponential growth. In the three years following this agreement

(2005-2008), total trade volume nearly tripled, soaring from $911.95 million to an

unprecedented $2.31 billion. This period of rapid expansion underscores how a deepened

political commitment directly facilitated a more ambitious scale of commercial

interaction, building resilience that helped trade weather the global financial crisis, with

volumes recovering to $2.51 billion by 2010.

The most dramatic growth phase commenced in the 2010s, powered by a series of

targeted and complementary cooperative initiatives. The strategic enhancement of

Macao's role as a "One based, one centre, one platform" from 2016 and the launch of

the Blue Partnership in 2017 created specialized channels for maritime and commercial

collaboration. These were synergistically amplified by Portugal's formal participation in

China's Belt and Road Initiative in 2018. The integration into this vast connectivity

agenda is starkly reflected in the trade figures: from $5.99 billion in 2018, bilateral trade

climbed to a historic peak of $9.01 billion in 2022, representing a remarkable 50%

increase in just four years. This trajectory highlights how aligning bilateral economic

interests with a mega-strategic vision can unlock unprecedented growth.

The robustness and maturity of the trade relationship are further evidenced by its

performance through recent global challenges. Despite worldwide pandemic disruptions

and economic volatility from 2020 onward, Sino-Portuguese trade not only remained

stable but continued to scale new heights, demonstrating significant resilience. This

stability provides a strong foundation for the next phase of cooperation, as formalized by

the Strategic Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation (2024–2027) and the 2024 China-

Portuguese Speaking Countries Economic and Trade Expo in Macao. These new

institutional tools are proactively designed to guide future growth, moving the

relationship from a pattern of reactive growth following diplomacy to one of proactively

managed co-development.

The empirical evidence from 1992 to 2024 supports the thesis of a strong positive

correlation between diplomatic deepening and trade expansion. Each major diplomatic

event corresponds to a clear, measurable acceleration in the growth rate of bilateral trade

volumes. The “guanxi” has evolved from a simple, low-volume exchange into a complex,

high-value partnership where political frameworks actively shape and secure economic

outcomes. The consistently high trade levels maintained through recent turbulence and

the forward-looking nature of the 2024 Strategic Plan confirm that this synergy is now a

durable, institutionalized feature of Sino-Portuguese relations, ensuring that shared

diplomatic ambition will continue to be the primary engine for shared economic

prosperity.

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The analysis of the Harmonized System (HS) classification revision evolution (Figure 4)

reveals that the statistical framework for China-Portugal trade has undergone seven

iterations since 1992, closely synchronizing with international revision cycles. The shift

from a period of long-term stability (H0) to one of accelerated iteration (H1-H6) visually

underscores the increasing complexity and formalization of bilateral trade. The rapid

adoption of HS 2017 (H5) around 2017, coinciding with the deepening of bilateral

economic relations under the Belt and Road Initiative, demonstrates how modernized

rules infrastructure enabled the capture of more sophisticated trade flows. This provides

Figure 4. Evolution of HS Classification in China-Portugal Trade

(1992-2025) (percentage share of total value by HS)

Source: Authors based on UN Comtrade database using R Programming Language.

Figure 4A. Evolution of HS Classification in China-Portugal Trade

(1992-2025)

Source: Authors based on DeepSeek AI to create visuals

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a methodological lens through which the qualitative transformation of the economic

partnership can be understood.

Key diplomatic events correlate with noticeable trade accelerations (Figure 5). The 2005

"Strategic Partnership" announcement preceded significant trade expansion, while

President Hu Jintao’s 2010 visit to Portugal coincided with trade surpassing $2.8 billion.

The 2017 "Blue Partnership" initiative on ocean cooperation was launched during a period

of robust trade growth. These patterns suggest that political relations significantly

influence economic outcomes in this bilateral relationship.

China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Portugal has evolved in close connection

with key diplomatic milestones between the two countries (Figure 6), illustrating how

strengthened political relations can enhance economic cooperation. In the early 2000s,

FDI flows were minimal, often recorded at zero, despite the establishment of the Forum

Macao in 2003 and the elevation of ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in

2005. These foundational diplomatic steps laid the groundwork for future engagement

but did not immediately translate into significant investment, suggesting that institutional

frameworks require time to foster tangible economic outcomes.

Figure 5. HS Classification and Total China-Portugal Trade Value

(1992-2024) in millions USD

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A noticeable shift began around 2012, when FDI started to increase gradually,

culminating in a remarkable peak of USD 949 million in 2014. This surge coincided with

the state visit of Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva to China in the same year,

which reinforced bilateral trust and likely encouraged major Chinese investments in

Portugal’s energy, finance, and infrastructure sectors. The high-level engagement

appeared to serve as a catalyst, boosting investor confidence and accelerating capital

inflows.

Subsequent years saw sustained investment levels, supported by further diplomatic and

logistical advancements. In 2017, the launch of the Blue Partnership and the inauguration

of the first direct flight between China and Portugal enhanced maritime cooperation and

connectivity, facilitating trade and people-to-people exchanges. FDI remained substantial

during this period, reflecting how diversified forms of collaboration help maintain

economic momentum. President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa’s visit to China in 2019 further

solidified political ties, contributing to continued economic interaction despite global

uncertainties.

Looking ahead, the announcement of a new Strategic Plan in 2024 signals a shared

intention to deepen long-term cooperation. While recent FDI figures show some

fluctuation, the consistent pattern suggests that diplomatic engagement often precedes

or accompanies shifts in economic flows. This demonstrates that strengthened diplomatic

relations not only foster political trust but also create an enabling environment for cross-

border investment, thereby supporting the broader argument that diplomacy and

economic development are mutually reinforcing.

Figure 6. China’s FDI Flows to Portugal (2003-2024)

(Annual inward FDI from China to Portugal in millions USD)

Source: Authors based on OECD database using R Programming Language. Retrieved from

https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/inward-fdi-flows-by-partner-country.html?oecdcontrol-

chart-control-3cc634ae0b-var3=2023&oecdcontrol-chart-control-aa4877b865-

var6=CHN&oecdcontrol-chart-control-9813c4b8ed-var1=PRT

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4.3.2 The Promoting Effect of Economic Cooperation on Cultural

Exchanges

The deepening of economic cooperation has established a solid material foundation and

an expansive institutional platform for cultural exchange. The expansion of trade and

investment flows has directly facilitated increased cross‑border mobility, including

business travel, technical cooperation, and labour mobility. These forms of interaction

themselves constitute important channels of cultural exchange, contributing to the

dissemination, interaction, and mutual adaptation of cultural practices. Chinese

investment in Portugal not only introduces capital and technology, but also transfers

managerial practices and corporate cultures associated with Chinese enterprises.

Conversely, Portugal provides an entry point through which Chinese firms and their

organizational cultures engage with European markets and societal contexts.

Economic growth further enables cultural exchange by generating financial resources that

can be reinvested in cultural initiatives, such as heritage preservation, art and cultural

festivals, and educational exchange programs. In this regard, the Forum for Economic

and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese‑Speaking Countries (Forum

Macao) plays a significant facilitating role. While its primary mandate is to promote

economic cooperation, Forum Macao also offers financial support and institutional

platforms for cultural exchange initiatives. Moreover, its engagement in global health

cooperation, including the international promotion of traditional Chinese medicine,

underscores the extent to which such cultural initiatives are underpinned by sustained

economic collaboration.

Beyond material support, institutionalized mechanisms of economic cooperation also

enhance the infrastructural conditions for cultural exchange. As an economic cooperation

platform within the China–Portugal framework, conferences, exhibitions, and exchange

programs organized under the auspices of Forum Macao frequently incorporate cultural

components, thereby integrating economic objectives with cultural engagement. Macao’s

role as a commercial and diplomatic intermediary between China and

Portuguese‑speaking countries is further reinforced by its moderately diversified

economy, particularly the vitality of its tourism and leisure industries, which provide

important conduits for cross‑cultural interaction. Similarly, external policy frameworks

and regional integration constitute core drivers of Macao’s tourism symbiosis,

demonstrating how economic policies and regional connectivity directly support the

development of cultural tourism and, in turn, reinforce cultural exchange (Li et al., 2024).

4.3.2 The Enabling Role of Cultural Exchange in Economic Cooperation

Cultural exchange plays an indispensable enabling role in economic cooperation. It

creates a more favourable social environment for economic cooperation by enhancing

mutual understanding, building trust, and reducing communication costs. Firstly, cultural

understanding can effectively reduce "cultural discounts" and communication barriers in

economic cooperation, and reducing cultural discounts requires attention to information

dissemination, decoding, and identification. Through cultural exchange, people of the two

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countries can better understand each other's ways of thinking, values, and behavioural

norms, thereby reducing misunderstandings and frictions in business negotiations,

project management, and daily communication. When people of the two countries

establish emotional connections and mutual respect through cultural exchange, this trust

will naturally extend to the economic field. From the perspective of the "guanxi" theory,

this trust is beyond legal contracts and can effectively reduce transaction risks and

promote long-term cooperation. China builds its geopolitical influence by providing global

public goods and stable bilateral relations. The construction of "stable bilateral relations",

to a large extent, relies on the mutual understanding and trust brought about by cultural

exchange, which also indirectly confirms the driving effect of political and cultural

"guanxi" on economic cooperation.

Secondly, cultural exchanges serve as catalysts for new growth opportunities and

creative drivers of economic cooperation. Interactions between China and Portugal in

domains such as traditional arts, gastronomy, and design have the potential to generate

collaborative projects within cultural and creative industries. Macao exemplifies this

dynamic as a model of Sino-Portuguese cultural integration, where its distinctive cultural

hybridity functions as an economic asset capable of attracting tourism investment and

stimulating cultural industry development. Macao’s cultural policies, which emphasize the

preservation and promotion of Portuguese heritage, represent not only a commitment to

cultural safeguarding but also a strategic approach to leveraging cultural assets for

economic vitality. Furthermore, educational cooperation fosters language acquisition and

expands transnational networks, cultivating a pool of talent with cross-cultural

competencies. These individuals act as bridges in economic partnerships, facilitating

innovation, knowledge transfer, and the creation of sustainable collaborative

frameworks.

Table 6. The Synergistic Effects of the China-Portugal Partnership Policy on

Economic and Cultural Cooperation.

Dimensions

Economic

Cooperation

Cultural

Engagements

Synergistic Effects

The

“Guanxi”

mechanism

Interests linkage,

long-term

investment,

institutionalized

platform

Emotional

connection, mutual

understanding,

shared values

Economic cooperation

provides the "foundation" for

the "relationship", while

cultural exchange deepens

the "content" of the

"relationship".

Major

drivers

Market demand and

policy guidance (BRI,

China-Portugal

Forum)

Cultural diplomacy,

historical heritage,

educational

promotion

The policy integrates

economy and culture, jointly

driving the development of

"relationships".

Impact on

each other

Provide material

support, enhance

personnel exchanges,

and create a

cooperation platform

Reduce "cultural

barriers", build trust,

and provide creative

sources

Economy provides resources

for culture, while culture

creates an environment for

the economy.

Macao’s role

Business cooperation

service platform,

regional economic

hub

Cultural Integration

Center, Promoter of

Portuguese Culture

Macao is an amplifier and

core hub for the synergy

between economy and

culture.

Source: Authors

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150

The interaction between economic and cultural cooperation has generated a profound

synergistic effect, enabling the China-Portugal partnership to exhibit a comprehensive

and sustainable trajectory of development. This synergy manifests in several dimensions

(Table 5). Economic cooperation, facilitated through personnel exchanges and shared

interests, continuously expands and deepens the relational network between the two

countries. Concurrently, cultural exchanges foster mutual understanding and trust,

thereby enhancing the quality and resilience of these relationships. This mutually

reinforcing cycle creates a cumulative process of “relationship capital,” producing a

virtuous spiral of upward development. At the macro level, initiatives such as the Forum

for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries

and the Belt and Road Initiative exemplify this synergy. These frameworks not only

stimulate economic growth but also provide institutional guarantees and practical

platforms for cultural interaction, reinforcing the interdependence of economic and

cultural dimensions in bilateral cooperation. Macao's unique position within the China-

Portugal partnership makes it an amplifier of economic and cultural synergy. Macao is

not only an important platform for economic and trade exchanges between China and

Portugal, but also a living museum of cultural integration between the two countries. Its

positioning as a "World Tourism and Leisure Centre" and a "Platform for Business

Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries" enables it to integrate

economic functions with cultural functions. For instance, by holding international cultural

and artistic festivals, attracting tourists and artists from Portuguese-speaking countries,

it not only promotes cultural exchanges but also boosts the tourism economy. At the

same time, the Portuguese language education and promotion in Macao also provide

talent and cultural support for Chinese enterprises to enter the markets of Portuguese-

speaking countries. Macao should seize the opportunity of the Deep Integration Zone and

ride on the fast train of national development. This is precisely the hope that Macao can

better play its unique role in the coordinated development of economy and culture.

The success of the China-Portugal partnership policy lies in its comprehensive

consideration of the economic and cultural aspects. For instance, under the "Belt and

Road" initiative, not only are there infrastructure investments and trade exchanges, but

also emphasis is placed on cultural exchanges and the fostering of mutual understanding

among the people. This policy design aims to drive cultural exchanges through economic

cooperation, and then use cultural exchanges to nourish economic cooperation, thereby

achieving comprehensive and balanced development. The experience of regional

government cooperation also indicates that establishing a favourable institutional

environment, reasonable organizational arrangements, and regional cooperation rules is

a rational choice for achieving integration. The China-Portugal partnership has achieved

deep synergy in the economic and cultural fields through this institutionalized

cooperation. When economic and cultural factors achieve a deep synergy, the relationship

between the two countries will demonstrate greater resilience when facing external

challenges. Even when there are frictions in certain economic fields or global geopolitical

tensions intensify, the profound cultural understanding and trust foundation can play a

buffering role, preventing the relationship from deteriorating completely. The perception

of security threats can affect economic cooperation preferences, but the trust established

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through cultural exchanges between China and Portugal can, to a certain extent,

counteract this negative impact and maintain the stability of cooperation.

In general, the policy of the China-Portugal partnership has established a dynamic and

mutually reinforcing mechanism between economic and cultural cooperation, resulting in

a significant deep synergy effect. Economic cooperation provides a material foundation

and platform, facilitating personnel mobility and cultural exchange; while cultural

exchange enhances understanding, builds trust, and reduces communication costs,

providing strong social capital and favorable conditions for economic cooperation. Macao,

as the core hub of this collaborative process, further amplifies this effect. This deep

synergy of economic and cultural interaction not only improves the overall quality of the

China-Portugal relationship but also lays a solid foundation for the two countries to jointly

address global challenges and achieve common development in the future.

5. Conclusion

This study has conducted an examination of Sino–Portuguese policies and diplomatic

engagement from 2003 to 2024, assessing how these mechanisms collectively shape the

evolving nexus between economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Grounded in a

relational analytical framework, the findings demonstrate that accumulated trust,

reciprocity, and sustained commitment constitute a form of guanxi capital. This capital

functions alongside formal institutional arrangements to reduce transaction costs,

facilitate information flows, and stabilize mutual expectations. Although the study does

not establish a direct causal relationship, the analysis reveals a noteworthy correlation

between the growth of guanxi capital and the intensification of bilateral economic and

commercial activity, suggesting that relational dynamics and economic interactions have

evolved in mutually reinforcing ways over time. Within this perspective, the synergistic

effects of cooperation are observable across both national contexts. Returning to the

central research question - How do China and Portugal construct guanxi, and what

synergistic effects does Sino–Portuguese cooperation generate across the economic and

cultural spheres in both regions? - the study advances three principal conclusions.

First, at the economic level, diplomatic events and bilateral mechanisms have

institutionalized opportunities for trade, investment, and infrastructure development.

These platforms and the “guanxi” built expand personnel exchanges, diversify sectoral

linkages, and deepen network density, thereby strengthening the relational architecture

that underpins cross-border commerce.

Second, at the cultural level, sustained exchanges cultivate mutual intelligibility and

trust, enhancing resilience within the bilateral relationship. Macao’s unique position, as a

locus of Sino–Portuguese cultural hybridity and a policy emphasis on Portuguese

heritage, illustrates how symbolic assets and cultural policies function as economic

resources, attracting tourism and catalysing cultural-industry development. Importantly,

multiculturalist activities and practices do not merely accompany cultural exchange, they

actively shape the conditions under which guanxi can be institutionalized and scaled. By

legitimizing plural identities, creating institutional venues for intercultural encounter, and

embedding cultural exchange within informal cooperation agendas, multiculturalism

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increases the salience and durability of relational capital, thereby making economic

cooperation more resilient to adversity and more amenable to long‑term commitments.

Third, the synergy across economy and culture operates as a virtuous cycle: economic

cooperation finances and platforms cultural engagement, while cultural engagement

reduces communication costs, mitigates “cultural discount,” and widens the social base

for joint ventures. In both regions, this mutual reinforcement translates into higher-

quality partnerships, enhanced adaptability to uncertainty, and more sustainable

development trajectories.

Looking ahead, future research should employ longitudinal mixed methods to trace the

quantitative and qualitative evolution of guanxi capital, examining how trust generated

by cultural interactions translates into measurable reductions in contractual and

coordination costs. Further inquiry might also examine sectoral pathways, such as

renewable energy, fintech, and creative industries, through which economic

collaborations produce new cultural content and exchanges, thereby renewing the stock

of guanxi and consolidating the cooperative ecosystem over time.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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TOWARDS A MEASURABLE AND INCLUSIVE THEORY OF STATE FRAGILITY:

CROSS‑REGIONAL INSIGHTS FROM CHINA, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, AND

BOTSWANA

QI ZIZHENG

mc45860@um.edu.mo

She holds a Bachelor’s degree from the EHL Hospitality Business School in Lausanne,

Switzerland. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Relations and Public

Policy at the University of Macau (China). Her research interests include Chinese foreign

policy, the renewable energy sector, Global South development, and Sino‑European relations.

https://orcid.org/0009-0007-8098-1601

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic

University of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program Coordinator at

the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint Joseph in

Macau, China. From 2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for Research

on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he is an

Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social

Sciences, University of Macau (China), and Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and

Public Affairs. His recent publications include: Is China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave

Macmillan and The Palgrave Handbook on Geopolitics of Brazil and South Atlantic (2025),

Palgrave Macmillan. Francisco Leandro is a member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign

Relations), established in 1996 as a centre for studies on International Relations at the

Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828

Abstract

This study advances a more contextually grounded understanding of state fragility by

integrating a wide range of institutional indicators within a neoclassical realist framework,

while deliberately moving beyond the narrow epistemic assumptions that have traditionally

guided dominant assessments of state performance. Rather than drawing on uniform models

derived primarily from Euro‑Atlantic institutional experiences, the analysis adopts a

cross‑regional comparative approach that is sensitive to diverse political cultures, historical

trajectories, and governance practices. The selected cases - China, Portugal, Brazil, and

Botswana - constitute a deliberately heterogeneous set of political regimes and developmental

trajectories. Methodologically, the study conceptualizes, operationalizes, and measures state

fragility through a multidimensional indicator framework that captures variations in

institutional capacity, societal resilience, and policy adaptability. The analysis specifies the

scoring rules, weighting schemes, and aggregation procedures applied to each indicator, and

addresses issues of construct validity and cross‑case comparability in the context of

cross‑regional analysis. By reframing state fragility as a condition that cannot be meaningfully

assessed through universalized or externally imposed benchmarks, this study contributes to

a more inclusive and context-sensitive theoretical framework. It advances scholarly debates

on state performance and international relations while also offering policy-relevant insights

for decision‑making processes that require attentiveness to regional specificities, historical

trajectories, and locally articulated governance priorities within a changing global order. The

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Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

158

study nonetheless acknowledges important methodological limitations. Meaningful

comparison across the selected cases remains challenging due to their fundamentally different

historical contexts and developmental starting points. In addition, several indicators are

necessarily calibrated based on analytical judgment in order to capture variation across

dimensions, which introduces a degree of subjectivity into the evaluative process. Within this

framework, a strong state is defined as one characterized by institutional robustness and a

demonstrated capacity to respond effectively to domestic challenges. Conversely, a weak

state is conceptualized as a political system marked by systemic failure and institutional

incapacity across multiple dimensions of the analytical framework.

Keywords

State Fragility, Brazil, Portugal, China and Botswana.

Resumo

Este estudo promove uma compreensão da fragilidade do Estado, integrando um conjunto de

indicadores institucionais num enquadramento neo‑realista, ao mesmo tempo que se afasta

deliberadamente das pressuposições epistemológicas que tradicionalmente orientam as

avaliações dominantes sobre o desempenho do Estado. Em vez de recorrer a modelos

uniformes derivados sobretudo de experiências institucionais euro‑atlânticas, a análise adota

uma abordagem comparativa trans‑regional sensível a diferentes culturas políticas, trajetórias

históricas e práticas de governação. Os casos selecionados - China, Portugal, Brasil e

Botswana - constituem um conjunto heterogéneo de regimes políticos e trajetórias de

desenvolvimento. Metodologicamente, o estudo conceptualiza, operacionaliza e mede a

fragilidade do Estado através de um quadro multidimensional de indicadores que capta

variações na capacidade institucional, resiliência da sociedade e adaptabilidade das políticas

públicas. A análise especifica as regras de pontuação, os esquemas de ponderação e os

procedimentos de agregação aplicados a cada indicador, abordando igualmente questões de

validade de construto e de comparabilidade entre casos no contexto de uma análise

trans‑regional. Ao redefinir a fragilidade estatal como uma condição que não pode ser avaliada

de forma significativa por intermédio de padrões universalizados ou de referenciais externos

impostos, este estudo contribui para um quadro teórico mais inclusivo e sensível ao contexto.

Avança o debate académico sobre desempenho estatal, oferecendo simultaneamente

contributos relevantes para políticas públicas, particularmente em processos de decisão que

exigem atenção às especificidades regionais, às trajetórias históricas e às prioridades de

governação articuladas localmente num sistema internacional em transformação. O estudo

reconhece, no entanto, limitações metodológicas importantes. A comparação substantiva

entre os casos permanece desafiante devido às diferenças profundas nos seus contextos

históricos e pontos de partida de desenvolvimento. Além disso, vários indicadores necessitam

de ser calibrados com base em juízo analítico para captar variações entre dimensões, o que

introduz um grau de subjetividade no processo avaliativo. Neste enquadramento, um Estado

forte é definido como aquele que apresenta robustez institucional e capacidade demonstrada

de responder de forma eficaz a desafios internos. Em contrapartida, um Estado fraco é

conceptualizado como um sistema político marcado por falhas sistémicas e incapacidade

institucional em múltiplas dimensões do quadro analítico.

Palavras-chave

Fragilidade do Estado, Brasil, Portugal, China, Botswana.

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and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

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Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

159

How to cite this article

Zizheng, Qi & Leandro, Francisco José B. S. (2026). Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of

State Fragility: Cross‑Regional Insights from China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 157-

190. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.7

Article submitted on 3rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th January

2026.

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

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and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

160

TOWARDS A MEASURABLE AND INCLUSIVE THEORY OF STATE

FRAGILITY: CROSS‑REGIONAL INSIGHTS FROM CHINA,

PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, AND BOTSWANA

QI ZIZHENG

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

Introduction

Among the key challenges in global governance, fragile states emerge as a critical

concern worldwide, as Kofi Annan stated in his speech on peacebuilding, one of the

significant difficulties today is the problem of unstable nations. Later as he emphasised

more for the shared duty to reinforce and restore this broken fabric for global peace and

stability (Annan, 2009). This concern is also echoed in media and policy discourse. For

instance, Xinhua News highlights the importance of understanding fragile states by citing

real-world examples, such as the large-scale instability in South Africa and ethnic clashes

in Ethiopia. These incidents have repeatedly highlighted the vulnerability of certain

nations, rendering them fragile and inadequate in their ability to address and mitigate

geopolitical risks. This can often lead to a state prone to political and economic disruption

in severe cases and chaos (Xinhua News, 2021).

In scholarly literature, the concept of state fragility is widely used but remains contested

and multidimensional (Ferreira, 2016). Currently, scholarly discourse frequently engages

with concepts such as state collapse, stagnation, regression, and the fragility of political-

administrative structures (Ficek, 2022). Despite its presentence of the term in academic

articles, there is still no universally accepted definition of it. Some approaches focus on

the inability of the state to maintain territorial control and deliver basic services from the

government, while others put more emphasis on the deeper institutional weaknesses,

such as poor governance and a lack of legitimacy (Ferreira, 2016). Moreover, fragility

can be quantified by numbers using different models that are conducted by organisations.

The most commonly used empirical tools, like the Fragile States Index (FSI), attempt to

quantify fragility through comprehensive indicators such as the security apparatus,

economic decline and state legitimacy (THE FUND FOR PEACE, 2025). To further highlight

the ongoing debate is the measurement of the fragile state, scholars such as Baliamoune-

Acknowledgement: This project was generously supported by the University of Macau under Project

SGR2023‑00026‑FSS, Geopolitics of Brazil and the South Atlantic. The authors also acknowledge the use of

Microsoft Copilot in supporting the preparation of visual data presentations and in enhancing the clarity and

academic style of the manuscript; Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of

interest associated with this study.

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Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

161

Lutz and McGillivray critiqued the existing measurement frameworks for lacking

theoretical coherence, normative biases and geopolitical interest, and they proposed the

fuzzy set theory to improve the evaluation of the fragility (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008).

Ferreira also uses the articles to compare with different evaluation systems to conclude

the lack of solid theoretical foundations, which provides a gap that leads to the

widespread confusion between causes, symptoms and the quantitative outcome.

Meanwhile, the international organisations such as the IMF also contribute to the

categories of fragility with the need for a policy response, with the emphasis on the lack

of a theoretical approach for this concept (Cebotari et al., 2025). Recent scholarship

proposes a rethinking of fragility not only as a developmental issue but as a relational

and dynamic consideration which can be shaped by global power structures, historical

legacies, and transnational pressures (Ficek, 2022). This broader understanding calls for

a more refined analytical approach with a diverse portfolio of case studies that can

capture the institutional dimensions of fragility, beyond conventional metrics of territorial

control or service delivery.

This research conducts a comparative analysis of four countries, which include China,

Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana. In the field of international relations, the scholarship

widely recognises China as the 21st century’s most transformative development,

solidifying its status as a defining rising power (Jalil, 2019). Its rapid economic

development and global interactions have drawn attention not only to its external

influence but also to the internal governance challenges, including issues of policy

coherence and institutional legitimacy. Another rising power in the global south group or

the regional power is Brazil, and its global positioning blends foreign policy ambition with

domestic tension. However, this external engagement also reveals Brazil’s internal

conflicting conditions, such as the nation selling high-value goods like advanced aircraft.

Meanwhile, tens of millions struggle in poverty (Burges, 2013). In contrast, Portugal is a

democratic state within the European Union, and it offers a case of institutional fragility

shaped by economic dependency, bureaucratic inertia, and the constraints of

supranational governance (Magalhães, 2005 & De Sousa, 2001). Most importantly, as

McNamara states, the Eurozone crisis stripped policy autonomy from governments across

the state, and the lack of a unified European solution, Portugal faced intense pressure to

adopt investor and agency to ensure debt repayment (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015).

Finally, Botswana is often described as an African success story because it demonstrates

relative institutional resilience despite structural vulnerabilities from the government, and

it also achieves a relatively high ranking for the stable state among different indices from

organisations (Good, 1999). However, this internal governmental system tends to have

deeper structural vulnerabilities rooted in governance practices and economic

dependency. The 2024 general election, in which the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

lost power for the first time in nearly six decades. It revealed underlying fragilities in

public dissatisfaction with corruption, nepotism, and inequality, as well as the economic

stagnation linked to the declining diamond sector (Bello et al., 2024). This political shift

challenges the conventional narrative of Botswana’s stability, which guides us to bring

this state together with other cases to conceptualise and reconsider the term state

fragility.

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Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

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Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

162

Our study proposes the research question of how state fragility can be defined and

evaluated? As each state embodies distinct governance systems, development pathways

are displayed with the display of internal fragility. By systematically examining how these

states confront challenges related to policy coherence, institutional legitimacy, and

resilience, this study seeks to illuminate the differentiated expressions of state fragility

across varied sovereignty to form a common applicable model. The significance of this

research lies in the theoretical innovation and empirical breadth. Early studies often relied

on institutionalist frameworks, emphasising the erosion of state capacity, authority, and

legitimacy (Carment et al., 2009). By building on this theoretical foundation, political

legitimacy theory also added to the research on the fragility of the state to highlight the

role of citizen trust and regime credibility in sustaining state resilience (Rosvadoski-Da-

Silva et al., 2021). Meanwhile, Ware also argues that the trajectories of colonial legacies

and global inequalities should also be considered in the institutional weakness in the long-

term development patterns (Ware & Ware, 2014). Moreover, discourse analysis and

critical theories have been used in analysing the term of state fragility on international

intervention and governance reforms for a specific region (Grimm et al., 2014). We

believe that the neoclassical realism offers a compelling theoretical framework for

analysing state fragility. Unlike classical realism, which puts more emphasis on the power

and structural politics, it focuses on the systemic and domestic variables, which can help

us to evaluate the resilience and fragility of the state. Empirically, this study challenges

the conventional assumptions of the case selection. The selection of China, Portugal,

Brazil and Botswana enables a comparative analysis across region-specific or

performance-based studies. A case study approach is particularly appropriate for this

research, as it facilitates an in-depth examination of the institutional configurations,

policy dynamics, and legitimacy mechanisms in each state within the context. These

cases, selected for their contrasting political systems, developmental trajectories, and

unstable geopolitical environment, can uncover patterns and divergences that challenge

dominant narratives and contribute to a more differentiated understanding of fragility.

Literature Review

The term of great power competition firstly used as description on the Cold War rivalry

between the United States and the Soviet Union (Brands, 2022), and the great power

politics are fundamentally determined by relative power (Gilpin, 1981). While power is

typically conceptualized as a state's ability to shape global politics in accordance with its

interests, systematic measurement. However, there is a lack of unified method of

quantifying it as this comprehensive assessment would entail delineating a country's

specific interests and its exact influence across a virtually infinite number of international

occurrences (Nye, 1990). However, this research would like to shift the focus from the

understanding and evaluation of the traditional power of the influential outside to the

power inside of the state for the concept of state fragility.

This is a core concept in the study of state governance and international development,

the concept of State Fragility has undergone dynamic evolution in its definition and scope

throughout these past decades. The late 20th century marked a critical foundational

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Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

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period for related concepts. In 1982, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg took the lead in

focusing on the phenomenon of weak states in Africa. They argue that such states only

possessed a legal status as sovereign entities but lacked the capacity to effectively

exercise territorial control and governance functions (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). This

diverged sharply from Max Weber’s definition of a modern state as an actor with a

monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1948). This also leads to the current

research on state fragility from the perspective of governance capacity deficiency.

Aligned with the critique, Brock also argues that it overly equates fragility with a

breakdown in the state’s capacity to enforce control. Instead, it can be contended that

the core issue is systemic weakness in policy planning and implementation. It is rooted

in factors such as insufficient political will, bureaucratic inefficiency, weak institutions, or

conflict (Brock et al., 2013). In 1992, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner further proposed

the concept of the failed nation-state, which is a phrase that defines a state that can no

longer exist as a member of the international community, such as Somalia and Bosnia.

Furthermore, they also argue to advocate such states to be placed under UN trusteeship

(Helman & Ratner, 1992). Later, scholars like Robert Rotberg refined this framework,

and he argued that a nation-state fails when it is plagued by internal violence and ceases

to provide positive political goods to its citizens as a vacuum authority (Rotberg, 2002).

However, the connotation of fragile states itself was fragile in different contexts, and it

was subject to shifting interpretations across academic and policy contexts (Wang &

Chen, 2025). Nevertheless, the issue of state fragility gradually became a key focus of

foreign policy for developed countries and emerged as a critical topic in academic and

policy research (Kaplan, 2014). Scholars have sought to delineate the core traits of failed

states to clarify this contested concept, with Rotberg, Zartman, and other scholars

together summarising key characteristics of the loss of control of the state. It means the

state can no longer effectively assert authority over its geographic political boundaries.

Besides, the erosion of collective decision-making authority lacks the capacity to

formulate and implement comprehensive policies for the state. In addition, the state is

unable to provide basic public services such as healthcare, education, infrastructure and

security, and these elements are essential to sustain citizens’ livelihoods and well-being.

Crucially, it also represents a failure to fully participate in international affairs, which

includes an inability to uphold international obligations and acts as a recognised member

of the international community (Rotberg, 2002 & Zartman, 1995; Milliken & Krause,

2002). However, the failed state concept has been discussed in different opinions. As

Terry Call noted, it is overly broad and difficult to define precisely the failed state, which

can lead to a Conceptual muddle of different criteria in research and policy discourse

(Call, 2008). This conceptual ambiguity also leads to different evaluation systems.

Current researchers and institutions have developed a wide range of fragmented

frameworks to measure state fragility, and there is also a lack of standardisation,

resulting in significant discrepancies in empirical findings and frequent inaccuracies in

predictions (Zhu & Hao, 2017). As a result, the consensus on defining state fragility

remained elusive, with the term often used interchangeably with expressions like weak

performers, failing states, or failed states (Ferreira, 2016). Later, the concept of fragile

states gained international recognition in 2005, when the OECD Development Aid

Committee convened two high-level meetings, and it stated that the definition of a fragile

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Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

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state is a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement

policies (PPAIF, 2007).

Table 1 – What is state fragility?

Failed State

 Factors influencing state fragility as an internal and dynamic condition →

Strong State

Internal

External

Political Decision Making

Identity and

Participation

Needs

(Public Service)

Ability to

exercise

political

control and

commitment

Level of

internal

securitization

Efficiency of

the

institutional

decision-

making

process

Ability to

exercise the

monopoly of

the use of

force

Conflictual

social and

political

identities

Instable

social and

political

elites

Openness to

societal

participation

Level of

human

security

Ability to

address

the

evolution

societal

needs

Ability to

implement

a line of

political

and

economic

evolution

Ability to

provide

essential

public

services

Ability to

fully

participate in

foreign

affairs and

to be

perceived as

a security

threat

Diaspora’s

identification

and national

engagement

State is Non-Existent (Score=0)

Minimum Fragility (Sc

ore =240)

Source: Authors, based

on Appendix 1

After defining the fragile state, contemporary scholarship mainly focuses on identifying

the key correlates and drivers of fragility and finding a suitable measurement of the

fragile states. Carment and Samy argue that there is no direct association between

fragility and worse outcomes in conflict, human rights, democracy, or aid levels. Instead,

they assert that their analysis identified low human development through the UNDP’s

Human Development Index as the strongest correlate of fragility (Carment & Samy,

2009). This conclusion is also agreed by Patrick, who emphasised that the most severe

negative impacts of fragile contexts ultimately befall the states’ own populations (Patrick,

2006). Other scholars’ work has explored the structural and institutional drivers of

fragility. Migdal framed that the power of the state has to be concentrated in social

control. Capable states emerge as societies need to become relatively dependent on

state-provided services (Migdal, 1989). Building on this, Robinson and Acemoglu

highlighted elite capture as a critical driver. When power and wealth are dominant among

the elite, they neglect investments in basic public services. This can trigger a cycle of

civil war that erodes state capacity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). By contrast, Dutta and

Roy identified a mitigating factor for the fragile states. The higher transparency reduces

fragility by enabling free information flow. This empowers citizens to build trust in

government and political participation, which can address the legitimacy deficits that

often underpin vulnerability (Dutta & Roy, 2016). Chauvet and Collier anchored fragility

in the economic function system. They classify fragile or failed states as low-income

countries where poor economic policies, weak institutions, and deficient governance

make growth nearly impossible. The combination of poverty and stagnation significantly

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increases a country’s propensity for civil war, and this can be an influential factor in the

state's fragility (Chauvet & Collier, 2004). Despite the drivers of fragile state, scholars

also find particularity across regional scholarly traditions. Through the North American

literature, it has relied on the terms state failure and state collapse to describe severe

political crises in 1990s contexts like Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and

Afghanistan (Christensen, 2007). For the European and institutional literature, by

contrast, it eschews the failed state label, and it favours more nuanced terminology that

can avoid implying collapse. Sørensen argued that the term disrupted states refers to

entities that emphasise fragility as a dynamic, rather than a static condition. This

terminological shift also reflects deeper differences in how scholars conceptualise state

vulnerability. North American frameworks often focus on crisis severity, while European

and institutional work prioritises the potential for recovery and incremental improvement

(Sørensen, 1999). With the increasing importance of the multidimensional nature of

fragility, regional differences in how fragility is conceptualised further reflect the broader

scholarship to move beyond static, one-dimensional definitions. Currently, it has a shift

driven by growing recognition of fragility’s multidimensional nature, including drivers that

often lie beyond a state’s internal boundaries or control (Ware & Ware, 2014).

Meanwhile, fragile states are frequently framed as among the world’s security threats,

and this foundational assumption is highly contentious, as it lacks robust empirical

support (Brock et al., 2012; Carment & Samy, 2009; Nay, 2013; Patrick, 2006). The

challenge of this is the absence of a universal framework for measuring state fragility.

Scholars and international organisations have relied on a diverse array of assessment

tools, and each of them emphasises distinct dimensions of vulnerability. To address this

variability, this study draws on the combination of global and regional institutions’

measurement that balances comprehensiveness of the state’s portfolio. These include

the Fragile States Index (FSI), which was developed by the Fund for Peace, which

evaluates 178 countries across 12 social, economic, and political indicators (Fragile

States Index | the Fund for Peace, 2025). The Global Peace Index (GPI), which is

published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, quantifies peacefulness

based on measures of violence and militarisation (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025).

Moreover, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a tool

focused on low and middle-income countries that rates policy effectiveness and

institutional quality across 16 criteria (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment |

DataBank, 2025). In the context of African states, we also consider the African

Governance Index (AGI). As it is the regional indicator that assesses various aspects of

governance in Africa, it can provide a comprehensive evaluation of the state's governance

capabilities. We consider this to have great significance for measuring state fragility at

the regional level based on the regional context. Overall, by grouping analysis in these

widely recognised frameworks, our study seeks to mitigate the biases of a single

measurement tool and reflect the diverse dimensions of state fragility.

With the focus on empirical study, we complement realism’s analytical lens with insights

from widely recognised fragility measurement tools, each designed to quantify different

facets of state vulnerability. In this paper, we used neoclassical realism as the theoretical

framework with clear relevance to study state fragility. Neoclassical Realism (NCR)

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emerged in the mid-1990s to address post-Cold War gaps in structural realism with the

strict focus on power distribution to integrate domestic factors (Dyson, 2008; Wivel,

2005). This theoretical adjustment makes NCR uniquely suited to studying state fragility.

Unlike frameworks that attribute fragility to either focusing purely on systemic pressures

or isolated domestic failures. NCR captures the interplay between these two spheres, and

we believe this lies at the core of fragility. As Gideon Rose first framed it over two decades

ago, NCR posits that systemic power shifts set the stage for strategic change, which

depends on the domestic situation (Rose, 1998). As scholars further elaborated, the

state behaviour is shaped not solely by the anarchic nature of the international order,

but also by factors such as a state’s domestic institutional capacity, the perceptions of

its leaders, and its strategic culture (Lobell et al., 2009). This contextual focus avoids

reducing fragile states to simply labelling failed states, and instead takes into

consideration their vulnerability in unique historical, regional, and domestic dynamics.

Take the NCR as our research framework; it can fill a fragility research gap because it

avoids overemphasising systemic determinism and reducing fragility to domestic failures.

Meanwhile, it can provide theoretical tools to explain the different vulnerabilities exhibited

by different countries in the face of international pressure and internal political factors.

This model asserts more on vulnerability to the interplay of global structures, domestic

institutions, and contextual history consideration (Kitchen, 2010; Lobell et al., 2009).

As Acharya and Buzan argue, mainstream international relations theory remains largely

an abstraction derived from Western historical experience and political thought (Acharya

& Buzan, 2019). This Western‑centric orientation has important implications for research

on state fragility, which has traditionally relied on analytical frameworks, case studies,

and measurement tools grounded in Western models of state‑building, governance, and

security. Such approaches often understate the significance of factors central to many

Global South contexts, including colonial legacies, post‑independence economic

structures, and external intervention in domestic governance.

By moving beyond Western‑derived abstractions, this study addresses key limitations in

the existing literature. First, it demonstrates how state fragility manifests differently

across diverse historical and institutional contexts, including African, Asian, Latin

American, and European states. Second, through comparative analysis, it develops a

more comprehensive evaluative model that integrates multiple indicators across different

types of states. In doing so, the study contributes to a more inclusive and globally

grounded approach to theorising state fragility.

The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The methodology section outlines the

research design, including the construction of the evaluative framework, indicator

selection, data sources, and comparative techniques. The case analysis section examines

state fragility in China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana across the dimensions of the

proposed model. The conclusion synthesises the theoretical and empirical findings and

reflects on their broader implications for the conceptualisation of state fragility.

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Methodology

Comparative research methodology is a pivotal methodological approach for

interrogating the dynamics of state fragility. By systematically examining the institutional

indicators across a diverse set of states, we argue that the mechanisms through

institutional configurations can shape a state model’s fragility. Notably, as the cases that

we study have distinct political regimes, levels of economic development, and geopolitical

positions, we can form a more balanced model to consider the variation between states.

For instance, as a member state of the European Union, Portugal’s institutional

development has been subject to the EU frameworks, and thereby it can demonstrate a

relatively high degree of institutional resilience. By contrast, Botswana, despite its

resource-dependent economic structure, has sustained a comparatively low level of

fragility through the establishment of institutionalised fiscal governance mechanisms.

China, alternatively, has fostered institutional concentration via its political system. It

confronts challenges about regime legitimacy and administrative transparency. As

Ferreira states in the article, comparative studies should be built on the foundation of a

theoretical framework in order to avoid just comparing different indicators from the index

(Ferreira, 2016). We also argue against the idea of considering the state’s history and

the process of institutional evolution rather than static analysis (Ware & Ware, 2014). By

analysing multiple cases with diverse indices, we can validate findings across different

contexts to minimise the risk of overinterpreting data from a single case.

Our evaluation model is structured around six dimensions of state internal management,

with the evaluation criteria detailed in Appendixes 1 and 2. Drawing on neoclassical realist

theory, six indicators are used to assess state performance: the external regional and

global environment; economic resilience and vulnerability; social control and legitimacy;

monopoly of violence and territorial control; governance and institutional strength; and

foreign policy and international agency.

The external regional and global environment refers to the state’s capacity to respond to

potential risks arising both domestically and externally. Economic resilience and

vulnerability capture the degree of economic diversification, which is critical for mitigating

risks associated with dependence on a single market. Social control and legitimacy relate

to the state’s ability to ensure everyday public safety and reflect the capacity of public

service provision. The dimension of monopoly of violence and territorial control assesses

the extent of governmental authority over coercive instruments, such as military and

security forces, and is closely linked to governance and institutional strength. Finally,

foreign policy and international agency evaluate the state’s external engagement and its

capacity to influence international norms and values.

This study employs a comparative framework to assess state resilience and institutional

capacity across six equally weighted dimensions: (1) the external regional and global

environment; (2) economic resilience and vulnerability; (3) social control and legitimacy;

(4) monopoly of violence and territorial control; (5) governance and institutional

strength; and (6) foreign policy and international agency. Each dimension is

operationalized through specific indicators (Appendixes 1 and 2) evaluated on a

standardized 1–10 scale. Scores of 0–2 indicate critical weakness and instability; 2–5

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reflect below‑average performance; 5–7 denote average performance relative to other

states; 7–9 signify strong state resilience; and 9–10 represent excellent institutional

capacity and stability.

The scoring process follows a relative, context‑oriented approach tailored to cross‑state

comparison among the selected cases. While the framework aims to ensure analytical

rigor and transparency, it acknowledges inherent limitations, including the partial

subjectivity associated with qualitative indicators. The primary objective of this

methodology is therefore not to generate definitive rankings, but to facilitate systematic

comparison by highlighting relative strengths and vulnerabilities across diverse states.

Case Analysis

External Regional and Global Environment (ERGE)

Geopolitical Pressures

From our perspective, a state’s stability is determined by the resilience of its domestic

institutions for converting the external pressures into cohesion rather than

fragmentation. Based on our perception, we give the score of 9 to Portugal as its

organisational embeddedness within the EU and NATO framework. These institutions

guarantee Portugal's external security for ensuring the internal stability. China (6.5) is

positioned in the relatively stable range, which shows the pressures from territorial

disputes and the strategic rivalry of major powers, such as the United States. We argue

that China has substantial state capacity, especially for naval power and strategic

infrastructure investments such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which can manage well

in the competition and territorial disputes. Botswana (6) achieves a score in the relatively

stable section. Its domestic politics are quite stable, with the recent movement for

changing the ruling regime. This rating reflects the resistance to the uncertainties in the

near future in its regional environment. Brazil (5.5), as the regional power, receives its

score due to the non-traditional security issues and fluctuating regional influence. For

instance, Brazil's policy shifts on the Amazon conservation issue fluctuated with the

resources and priorities. It has fundamentally undermined the state's credibility and

efficacy in geopolitics.

Trade Barriers

It is derived from the International Trade Barrier Index (TBI) from THOLOS Foundation

(ITBI, 2025). Within this dimension, Singapore (2.79) represents the benchmark of

lowest and Indonesia (5.84) the highest. In order to standardise the comparison across

different dimensions within the framework, the original scores are linearly converted to

a 0-10 scale which is presented by the lower trade barrier with the high score on this

dimension. Portugal (7.4) is rated as a stable category of stable, which is the beneficiary

of the EU's highly open and commercial policy. Botswana (6.5) remains within a relatively

stable band, and it reflects its overall openness as a customs union member. However,

it also faces developmental constraints such as digital trade facilitation and services

trade. Both Brazil (2.8) and China (2.2) are categorised as less stable in our evaluation,

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and the reasons are distinct. Brazil's score is primarily influenced by its high tariff

protections, such as the Mercosur common external tariff framework. Brazil imposes a

35% high tariff on imported vehicles (Blenkinsop, 2025). Conversely, China's primary

constraints are not on the traditional tariffs but in market access barriers within service

sectors. For financial services, foreign ownership in securities and insurance companies

was capped at 51% in 2017 and 100% in 2020 (Qu, 2020). Although China has gradually

reduced its limitations in this area, significant barriers persist across other key service

industries, such as the value-added services that require operating under a joint venture

with a Chinese partner for telecommunication.

Regional Integration

The original data from the Asia-Pacific Regional Integration Index was linearly

transformed to our evaluation model by using the highest performer (Poland, 0.728) and

weakest performer (Sudan, 0.218) as benchmarks (Huh & Park, 2018). The results are:

Portugal 9.51, China 5.20, Botswana 3.10, and Brazil 2.43. However, we find significant

limitations as the index primarily measures the degree of socio-economic integration,

such as trade, investment, and infrastructure. In contrast, the scoring criteria of this

study emphasise access to the market, security mechanisms and decision-making for the

regionality. Consequently, we have calibrated the data by integrating with our perception.

China (6.5) is constructing its substantive capture to shape the influence. This influence

is demonstrated through its role in shaping regional trade rules via RCEP and financial

connectivity, the Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB. Most importantly, it also

participates in security coordination like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Secondly, Brazil (5.5) and Botswana (6.0) achieve relatively stable progress in their

regional integration action. As the dominant power in Mercosur, Brazil possesses

institutional privilege to core market access and decision-making power. However, it also

faces immense challenges of internal issues with policy volatility and implementation

failures. Conversely, Botswana primarily derives stable leading positions in African states.

It shares benefits from goods market access within the Southern African Customs Union

(SACU). Compared to Portugal's deep and institutionalised integration and China's

strategic, shaping engagement, both Botswana and Brazil have a limited profile in this

dimension.

Global Shocks Vulnerability

Our data comes from the ND-GAIN Index, which quantifies states' vulnerability to global

shocks with readiness and resilience (ND-GAIN Index, 2025). Portugal (6.2)

demonstrates the highest readiness and lowest vulnerability among the selection states.

It is consistent with its developed economy and membership in the EU's support

mechanisms. China (5.8) reflects the significant adaptive capacity due to its economic

size and institutional strength. Especially for COVID-19, it also faces the challenges of

both initial disruptions and subsequent external demand shocks. Brazil (4.7) and

Botswana (4.9) score within the "Less Stable" range, and they reveal higher vulnerability

due to factors such as economic structure and developmental constraints.

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Based on the complete scoring data (Tables 2 and 2A), Portugal emerges as the strongest

performer in managing the external regional and global environment, achieving the

highest total score (32). Botswana (24) and China (22) demonstrate moderate resilience,

while Brazil (20) appears relatively more vulnerable in this dimension. The scores indicate

significant variation in national capacities to navigate external pressures, with Portugal

showing notable strength in regional integration (10) and managing geopolitical

pressures (9).

Table 2 – Numerical Evaluation of the External Regional and Global Environment

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Geopolitical Pressures

Trade Barriers

Regional Integration

Global Shocks Vulnerability

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 2A – Visual Evaluation of the External Regional and Global Environment (ERGE)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Economic Resilience and Vulnerability (ERV)

Economic Diversification

The next indicator of economic diversification is an important factor in the sustainable

development for state’s economy. Meanwhile, it is also important for analysing the

stability of the state performance. Diversification of the markets and industries can

minimise the strategic dependence on a single industry and foreign markets. The raw

data we use is from the Global Economic Diversification Index as follows: China 8.6,

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Portugal 3.6, Brazil 3.2, and Botswana 1.8 (Global Economic Diversification Index, 2025).

We convert it according to our criteria. However, we think that Portugal’s economy is

specialised in interconnected, value-added services and manufacturing niches, which are

deeply embedded in complex European supply chains. This structure provides inherent

buffers of diversification to mitigate the vulnerability of economic crisis more than Brazil

or Botswana. Therefore, we adjust its score to 5.0 for its performance. China receives a

score of 8.6 because of its strategic industrial plan from the government and sustained

upgrading within global value chains. However, Botswana's low score (1.8) shows the

structural vulnerability due to its persistent dependence on diamond extraction.

Debt Sustainability

The following indicator is the Debt sustainability, and we agree that it can reflect a state's

capacity to deal with the balance between the public debt and fiscal flexibility. We choose

the index of debt-to-GDP ratios from the World Population Review (World Population

Review, 2025), and we use the Brunei (2.3%) and Sudan (272%) represent the extreme

numbers to convert our selection state’s performance from the scale of 0-10. Botswana’s

(9.1) score signifies its good fiscal management. Brazil and Portugal have a similar ratio

of 76.5% with a score of 7.3. These governments consider fiscal flexibility relatively less.

Specifically, Portugal is a member of the Eurozone, which can operate within a common

monetary framework. This system can further limit its own independent currency and

interest rate policies. Brazil also has the issue of high borrowing costs and economic

volatility. China has a high ratio of 88.3% (6.8), which shows the role as a major global

economy, where such debt levels could have broader systemic implications, with the

opportunities to respond to market demand.

Informal Economy Size

Informal economy size is an indicator of illegal economic activity within the control of

governance. If the government cannot control well, then it has the possibility of leading

to the fragility of the state due to poor management skills. Based on the raw data we

find on the Informal Economy Sizes from World Economics, we convert the score from 0-

10 for our framework (World Economics, 2025). China has the lowest level among the

four states at (12.1%, 9.1). It reveals a formalised economic system with relatively strict

rules from the government. It is related to the stronger institutional capacity. Especially

for the extensive digital governance systems in China, to ensure a high rate of

compliance. Portugal follows at (17.6%, 8), and this indicates a developed formal

economy. As it has a mature regulatory framework within the EU economy framework.

However, Botswana (28.7%, 6.6) and Brazil (33.4%, 5.8) reveal the large informal

sectors, which have problems in areas such as tax collection and labour market

regulation.

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Unemployment Rate

The next indicator is the unemployment rate from the World Population Review (World

Population Review, 2025). Within the selected mid-range economies of these four states,

there are significant structural divergences. Botswana's exceptionally high rate of

(23.1%, 3.3) contrasts with the other three states, and it has profound structural

challenges within its labour market, which can be linked to the economic diversification

efforts and demographic pressures. Brazil (7.6%, 7.8) and Portugal (6.4%, 8.2) exhibit

moderately elevated rates. Brazil currently has a labour market that reflects prevailing

economic slack. This consistency can indicate challenges rooted in structural factors, such

as a large informal sector. This informality creates a dual labour market, with the formal

sector having insufficient job creation, and a large, low-productivity informal sector that

acts as a buffer but does not generate good employment and social security. However,

following the Eurozone debt crisis and COVID-19, Portugal implemented a series of labour

market policies aimed at enhancing flexibility and job creation, especially for tourism and

services. By contrast, China's notably lower rate of 4.6% (8.7) demonstrates relative

labour market resilience. The Chinese labour market benefits from a large manufacturing

industry with a dynamic service sector, which can gather a significant portion of the

workforce. Additionally, state-led initiatives, such as vocational training programs to

support the key employment groups.

Based on the complete data (Tables 3 and 3A), China demonstrates the strongest overall

economic resilience with a total score of 34, excelling particularly in economic

diversification (9) and maintaining a low unemployment rate (9). Portugal follows with a

total score of 28, showing balanced performance across debt sustainability (7), informal

economy size (8), and unemployment (8), though it reflects moderate diversification (5).

Brazil ranks third with a score of 24, which performs well in unemployment (8) but

exhibiting limited economic diversification (3). Botswana scores lowest (21), and it

reveals a high reliance on narrow economic sectors (2) despite strong debt sustainability

(9). The results highlight varied structural economic profiles, and China showing the most

diversified and stable labour market. However, Botswana's economy appears most

vulnerable due to its lack of diversification.

Table 3 – Numerical Evaluation of Economic Resilience and Vulnerability

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Economic Diversification

Debt Sustainability

Informal Economy Size

Unemployment Rate

Total Score

Source: Authors

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Table 3A – Visual Evaluation of Economic Resilience and Vulnerability (ERV)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Social Control and Legitimacy (SCL)

Trust in Institutions

The indicator of trust in institutions, it demonstrates the level of trust from the public in

the governmental sectors. However, there is no unified standard measurement to

evaluate the state’s performance. Thus, we employ a combination of several

measurements with our perception. The data mainly from the Edelman Trust Barometer

for China (77%, score 7.7) and Brazil (51%, score 5.1) (2025 Edelman Trust Barometer,

2025), and OECD data for Portugal (51.8%, score 5.2). (Trust in Government, 2025)

Botswana is currently absent from the major indexes and surveys. Therefore, according

to our evaluation, we give a score of 4.0 for this state. As the state is in a conditional

trust paradigm for sustained democratic stability, with a strong anti-corruption policy.

However, this indicator is closely related to the corruption and unemployment index, as

this can lose the trust of the public. China (7.7) receives many trusts from the public,

and it is because of the stable governance. Brazil (5.1) shows moderate but fragile trust,

and it is constrained by informality and polarisation. Portugal (5.2) reflects cautious trust

from the citizens, especially due to the distrust from the post-Eurozone crisis within the

EU framework.

Social Progress

The next indicator within this dimension is the social progress, and we put it here as it

demonstrates the development of the society, which is crucial for citizens. We argue that

the failure of the state is based on the perceptions of people. AlTi Global Social Progress

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Index (SPI) focuses on the non-economic aspects of society's well-being (Global Social

Progress Index, 2025). We convert the raw scores to a 0-10 scale by using Sweden

(90.75) and South Sudan (26.5) as the upper and lower benchmarks. Portugal has the

highest score among the four states of 9.1 (SPI 84.63), and this aligns with the top-tier

society atmosphere. Meanwhile, it also provides high-quality education, medical care and

access to information. The other three states of Brazil (7.2), China (6.7), and Botswana

(5.7) together to generate the cluster for their similar scores. All of them have met with

the basic needs, but there is still room for improvement. Specifically, we assert that

Brazil’s score reflects the huge inequity in opportunity, such as educational accessibility

and formal employment across different regions. China's position indicates considerable

success in meeting material basics like food and shelter. However, it has shortcomings

in environmental quality and aspects of personal freedom. Botswana’s lower score

highlights the gaps between the social status, particularly in advanced education and

health management.

Civil Society Vibrancy

The next indicator for our evaluation is the index of Civil Society Participation. Then we

convert the raw data, the highest score of Norway and the lowest score of North Korea

as benchmarks (Civil Society Participation Index, 2025). We transform the results of the

group for Brazil (9.1), Botswana (8.9), and Portugal (8.2). We argue that their scores

align with the vibrant civil society atmosphere. This high-level performance is ensured

by the comprehensive legal protections. It can lead these organisations to act as a critical

agency between the state and the citizens. However, China's score (2.1) places it in a

different category compared with other states. This score is related to China's single-

party system. Under the framework of the Communist Party's comprehensive leadership,

it is constrained by the system of institutional guidance and legal regulation.

Freedom of Speech

Upon the last indicator that we have just analysed, the next indicator we measure is the

freedom of expression. (The Global Expression Report, 2025). We use North Korea (0)

and Denmark (94) as the lower and upper benchmarks to give the score of our selection

portfolio. Both Brazil (9.36) and Portugal (9.04) achieve nearly maximum scores out of

10 on the scale, and this indicates relatively complete legal protections in the public

sphere. We found out that Brazil’s high score benefits from the federal structure and

political polarisation of the system of autonomy. Portugal’s position aligns with the EU

norms, which give attention to human rights and freedom. Botswana (8.19) also achieved

the high score, and it reflects its relatively free media environment within the African

context. This performance is consistent with its reputation for democratic stability.

However, China's score (0.21) is exceptionally low. This is closely related to the

geopolitical system, where there are some restrictions on the media and public discourse.

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Quality of Life

In order to draw a comprehensive analysis picture for the social development progress

to link with the state fragility, we identify the original data from the quality-of-life index

(NUMBEO, 2025). We later quantify the original figure framework from 0 to 10, and the

number from Luxembourg serves as the top and Nigeria’s score at the bottom of our

grading. Portugal (7.6) stands in the upper position of the selection of states due to its

location and membership in the EU. It shows that this state has a well-established system

for welfare, which can further demonstrate the strong causal relationship between

institutional development and system stability with the well-being. Then, China (5.5) is

placed at the average position among all the states, and the score reveals its substantial

progress in poverty, basic education, and healthcare access issues through the effort of

the governmental strategic plan for each year. Although Botswana (5.1) and Brazil

(5.0) have similar scores, they do not share similar regional contexts. We identify that

the performance of Botswana is relatively good, especially in the Sub-Saharan African

region, due to its effective management of diamond revenues and political stability.

However, Brazil encounters the social issue of the middle-income trap. This is where

inequality and institutional weakness constrain the improvements in living standards.

Table 4 – Numerical Evaluation of Social Control and Legitimacy

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Trust in Institutions

Social Progress

Civil Society Vibrancy

Freedom of Speech

Quality of Life

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 4A – Visual Evaluation of Social Control and Legitimacy (SCL)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

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Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control (MVTC)

Presence of Non-State Armed Actors

We argue that the presence of non-state armed actors serves as a critical indicator of

internal security and state monopoly of violence, but there is no index to present the

result. Regarding this indicator, we create our own evaluation based on the non-state

armed groups and legitimacy from the state. Portugal (9) falls within the highest stability

section. The state maintains an unchallenged monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

The law enforcement and military institutions are robust, professional, and fully capable

of maintaining internal order without contestation. China (9) is also positioned in the

most stable category as the central government retains the power to control over

territory through a comprehensive and unified security system, so the state

demonstrates a high capacity to encounter any emergent armed challenges swiftly.

Botswana (8) ranks within the stable range. It demonstrates good performance,

especially in the African context of stability and controlling the territory with the state

security forces. It faces the challenges of conventional crime rather than these organised

armed actors. Brazil (5) is categorised as relatively stable, as there are several regions,

particularly in remote areas, that have experienced significant influence from powerful

drug cartels and organised crime factions. This shows a partial erosion of the state’s

monopoly on violence, and it positions Brazil in a distinctively more vulnerable position

compared to the other three states.

Crime Rate

If we look inside the society, it is important to evaluate the safety of the environment.

The safety of the environment includes two parts: one is the crime rate, and the other is

the police effectiveness rate, which we will demonstrate later. This crime rate analysis

reveals a significant divergence among the four states for their internal governance

efficiency and social cohesion (Crime Index by Country, 2025). China's (8.7) and

Portugal's (7.3) scores are situated within the stable category, and it shows the relatively

high living standards and the effective system for police to prevent people commit the

crime. Especially for China, the high score is linked with its comprehensive and

technological system to record and prevent the occurrence of crime. Conversely,

Botswana (4.6) and Brazil (2.5) fall into the less stable category within our table.

Botswana's score presents its high daily conventional crime that can damage the quality

of living for people. Brazil's low score highlights systemic failure, especially for the state's

fundamental inability to address violence with the ineffective rule of law in rural

territories. In such regions, organised crime not only dominates security but also

infiltrates local governance and economic activities.

Border Control and Mobility

Based on our perceptual assessment with the fragility grading framework, the Openness

Score (Openness Index, 2025) reveals the management efficacy among the four states.

Portugal (9) is perceived as the most stable, as its effective control within a trusted

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regional bloc within the EU, where borders facilitate safe movement. For instance, its

borders benefit from the EU's integrated border management system, and it includes the

coordinated operations under the Schengen framework. Besides, China (9) is also

assigned a high score due to its demonstrated capacity for stringent sovereign control.

This is evidenced by extensive technological surveillance infrastructure and highly

regulated ports of entry. We argue that this score captures strong physical control for its

visa policy, and meanwhile, we should also separate the score from the view of diplomatic

openness. Botswana achieves a score of 6.5, as we think the official borders are managed

effectively with standardised procedures and authority, which is a model for other states

in Southern Africa. However, the 6.5 score critically accounts for persistent vulnerabilities

such as the country's long border monitoring issue, and it leads to challenges such as

informal cross-border trade, small-scale smuggling, and illegal migration. Brazil (4)

highlights the significant gap between policy and actual border control. The vast

Amazonian borders are notoriously permeable, and it provides opportunities for

organised crime. State authority is selectively applied, with remote regions effectively

outside full governmental control.

Military and Law Enforcers Effectiveness

The military and law enforcement capacity scores for China, Portugal, Brazil, and

Botswana are based on a normalized evaluation aligned with global defence rankings for

2026, such as the Global Firepower Index (GFP, 2026). We use the United States as the

upper benchmark (10 points) and Bhutan as the lower baseline (0 points), and then we

convert the score to the selection state. China (10) demonstrates a leading global military

posture, and it characterized by substantial defence expenditure, advanced technological

modernization, and extensive strategic resources to ensure the significant power

projection and territorial defence capabilities. Brazil (9) reflects a strong regional military

presence in South America, with considerable personnel and conventional assets though

its overall capacity. Portugal (8) represents a capable and professional defence force

integrated within NATO structures. Although its relatively small in scale, its military

benefits from high training standards, interoperability with allies. Botswana (4) illustrates

a limited but functional military framework designed primarily for border security and

domestic stability and it is constrained by its resource priorities.

Based on the comparative evaluation (Tables 5 and 5A), China exhibits the strongest

overall monopoly of violence and territorial control, reflected in uniformly high scores

across all indicators, particularly in suppressing non-state armed actors and maintaining

secure borders. Portugal also demonstrates a robust and effective system, characterized

by strong law enforcement and border management. Botswana shows a moderate level

of state authority but faces challenges in reducing crime and enhancing police

effectiveness. In contrast, Brazil presents the most significant vulnerabilities, with

notably low scores in crime rate and border control, indicating substantial challenges to

its territorial authority and internal security despite a relatively higher institutional

capacity score.

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Table 5 – Numerical Evaluation of Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Presence of Non-state Armed Actors

Crime Rate

Boarder Control and Mobility

Military and Police Effectiveness

Boarder Control and Mobility

Source: Authors

Table 5A – Visual Evaluation of Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control (MVTC)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Governance and Institutional Strength (GIS)

Public Service Delivery

Service delivery is an important form of action from the government to the citizens, and

the service includes many kinds of them, such as the administrative registration, law

enforcement and so on. Based on the Public Service Index data by the organisation of

the Global Economy, we convert their data with the best score from Iceland (0.6) to 10,

while the Central African Republic's 10 represents 0 in our evaluation grading (The Global

Economy, 2025). Portugal’s high score (8.1) reflects that the system is widely accessible,

and it generally meets the requests from the citizens. China (5.5) in the band of relatively

stable indicates the gap of the system between service quality and accessibility.

Especially in the urban and coastal regions, they benefit from the relatively developed

infrastructure and system. However, the rural areas experience gaps which make the

system more complicated. Botswana’s score (4) points to poor quality in basic service

infrastructure and quality, despite its relative political stability. We argue that the public

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dissatisfaction here is very obvious with services such as healthcare, water, and

education’s limitations. Brazil’s score (3.3) draws our attention to the severe territorial

and social inequalities, especially in public service access. In a major urban centre, it

provides adequate services. However, in the rural regions with poor infrastructure, it

cannot meet the basic needs of people.

Bureaucratic Capacity

The next indicator is the Bureaucratic capacity, and we assert that it is a critical factor

when evaluating the state’s performance and resilience. However, there is a lack of a

unified existing framework to evaluate the states’ performance. Therefore, we create this

grading based on our understanding of professionalism, procedural efficiency and the

civil service system from the state. Portugal (8.5) shows a relatively strong system in

the civil service in terms of competence and effective operations. This can be exemplified

by its efficient platforms, such as the “Empresa na Hora” [speedy corporation] system,

which enables company registration to be completed within a short period. China (7.0)

‘s bureaucratic capacity presents the top-down policy implementation process with the

ability to execute the national projects efficiently. However, it has challenges

with complex administrative procedures that depend on regions in terms of local

governance. As Botswana’s score of 5.5 indicates a system that its civil service maintains

with basic operations, but it is struggled by procedural complexities such as the slow

implementation and transparency. Moreover, Brazil's score of 4.5 reveals a gap that is

affected by corruption and complex functionality. This systemic corruption frequently

happens, and it cannot be managed well by civil servants.

Corruption Levels

The assessment of corruption’s impact on the state economy must address its political

dimensions (Philp, 1997) because we believe that corruption in the governmental system

can affect the state’s stability. According to the corruption perceptions index from the

transparency international (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2025), we conclude the

scoring as Denmark’s 90, with the maximum score of 10, and South Sudan’s 8 as 0 in

our framework. Portugal and Botswana achieve the same corruption index of 57, which

corresponds to the score of 6 in our analysis. This score positions both states in the

relatively stable category. It indicates that corruption is perceived as a common

phenomenon in society. Although anti-corruption institutions and policies exist, their

effectiveness is limited and insufficient. China achieves a corruption index of 43, and it

converts the score of 4.3. It is positioned in the less stable section. This signifies that

corruption has become a pervasive phenomenon and may act as a required approach to

accessing public services. The score reflects that despite ongoing anti-corruption

promotion from the government, the possibility of corruption persists across multiple

sectors. Brazil receives the index of 34 with a score of 3.2 out of 10, which represents

the lowest score among the four states. It clearly points to a deeper, institutionalised

corruption. This indicates not only that corruption permeates all levels but also that public

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resources are often used as instruments for corruption. From a historical perspective,

there were several political corruption scandals makes the low trust from the public.

Decentralisation and Local Governance

Decentralisation presents the potential to strengthen the state’s cohesion to further

enhance the state’s stability. However, it also has the possibility of disintegration. We

find this indicator is based on the figure from the rule of law and judicial independence

of the World Justice Project (WJP Rule of Law Index, 2025). We convert the score with

Denmark (0.9) sets as 10 and Venezuela (0.26) as the minimum number of 0. Portugal

(6.4) represents the category of relatively stable states. This indicates the effective rule

within the law framework of the judicial institutions. However, the score also suggests

the difficulties, such as procedural delays and the gap between different places in the

state. Botswana receives the score of 5.3, which represents a quite significant state in

the Sub-Saharan African region. It reflects a basic legal system that maintains some

degree of judicial independence. The limitations are in the judicial capacity, accessibility,

and consistency in terms of service quality across regions. Brazil has a score of 3.8, and

it highlights the widespread problems such as judicial inefficiency and corruption in the

legal institutions, which can affect institutional trust. Although China (3.4) gets a similar

score to Brazil, it reflects another issue with the central authority of the limited judicial

independence among cities. Legal institutions in China are effective, but it does not have

full autonomy at the regional level.

Based on the comparative assessment of governance and institutional strength (Tables

6 and 6A), Portugal demonstrates the strongest overall performance with a total score of

29, which reflects high-capacity public service delivery and bureaucratic effectiveness.

China follows with a score of 20, characterized by substantial bureaucratic competence

yet constrained by lower decentralization and corruption control. Botswana achieves a

balanced profile with a score of 21, performing adequately in corruption control but

showing limitations in service delivery. In contrast, Brazil records the lowest score of 15,

indicating systemic institutional weaknesses, particularly in public service provision and

integrity mechanisms. These results highlight distinct governance models, ranging from

Portugal’s service-oriented and institutionally robust system to Brazil’s more vulnerable

and uneven administrative framework.

Table 6 – Numerical Evaluation of Governance and Institutional Strength

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Public Service Delivery

Bureaucratic Capacity

Corruption Levels

Decentralisation and Local

Governance

Total Score

Source: Authors

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Table 6A – Visual Evaluation of Governance and

Institutional Strength (GIS)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Foreign Policy and International Agency (FPIA)

Diplomatic Presence and Alliances

The combination of analysis on diplomatic presence and alliance is an indicator to show

the linkage between the state and the world to ensure political legitimacy. This indicator

is based on two quantifiable data from diplomatic networks and the multilateral

engagement. The raw figure is from global diplomacy index from Lowy Institute (Lowy

Institute Global Diplomacy Index, 2024). Based on the data, China receives a score of

10 out of the full score, which indicates a stable diplomatic network with a well-connected

network in each region globally. In key arenas like climate change and global

development agendas, it actively engages in comprehensive cooperation partnerships for

its national interests and governance models. Although we argue that Portugal has the

original score of 4.4, we have adjusted it to 9 in the most stable category. However, the

European Union membership influences geopolitics. As Portugal's foreign policy is deeply

embedded within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and it uses this rotating

presidency and NATO membership to prioritise its critical influence, such as the EU-Africa

strategic partnership. Both Brazil (7.5) and Botswana (2.5) have relatively less influence

compared with China and Portugal, but it has demonstrated quite different patterns for

the differences in the scores. As a regional leader, Brazil maintains a diplomatic network

with a focus on Latin America and major global powers. Although it is a leading power

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within Mercosur and BRICS, it lacks influence on other parts of the world, such as Asian

and European states. Botswana concentrates on the key neighbouring states, such as

South Africa, for resource allocation.

Soft Power and Diaspora Engagement

Based on the definition of the soft power is defined as the cultivation of good relationships

and attention between states through favourable policies, qualities, and actions

(Gallarotti, 2011). We argue that soft power can play an important role in the stability of

states, as soft power helps to secure a peaceful external environment for domestic

development. Our evaluation of the score is based on the data from global soft power

index of Brand Finance in 2025 (Global Soft Power Index, 2025). Portugal (5.3) shows

its limitation on global influence, but it has influence in the European region because of

its presidency of the European Union. Meanwhile, it gives a good example of culture and

education within the Lusophone area and Southern Europe because of its rich heritage.

China (8.9) ranks as the second state in the world for its soft power, and it shows major

strengths in the sectors of business, education and cultural influence. Dominant

platforms like TikTok that can reshape global media consumption, and companies like

BYD in electric vehicles and Shein in fast fashion, demonstrate their competitive

advantage in the global consumer market for China. Brazil (4.9) has a distinct and

influential cultural influence in the region, especially for its culture. However, it also

encounters challenges in governance, such as the issues with political instability,

corruption scandals, and urban security problems, and these can also damage its

international reputation. Botswana (1.8) has a positive reputation for governance within

its region in Africa, which also shows the limitation for the other parts of the world.

Basically, due to the limitation of the geopolitical influence, the state does not have major

global brands and a large engaged diaspora. This results in a vague international image

without the relative soft power leverage.

Ability to Shape and Respond to International Norms

There is tremendous power in a settled norm (Axelrod, 1986), and we believe that norm

is crucial for a state to legitimise its authority for stability. Therefore, we create an

evaluation criterion for indicating the stability and norm performance. China (9)'s score

reflects its position as a global leading player in the contemporary international order. As

a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it demonstrates a high

capacity in formulating international rules and norms, such as the Belt and Road Initiative

and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Furthermore, it strategically uses the

international forums to protect and expand its own interests, especially in the domains

of digital governance, cybersecurity, and climate diplomacy. These engagements make

it a stable agenda-setting power globally. Brazil (7) is classified as a proactive and

influential participant of the multilateral system. It is good at leveraging the existing

institutions to secure its own state interests, such as the agricultural trade in the World

Trade Organisation. We argue this score is recognised for the role of the constructive

regional leader with limited influence, the norms and regulations in a specific context,

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such as the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the climate change

agenda meeting. Portugal (6) signifies its status as a relatively stable actor within a rules-

based order shaped primarily by others, especially the European Union. As a member of

the European Union and NATO, Portugal's foreign policy is deeply embedded in its

framework, so we usually treat Portugal as an EU member state. We argue that Portugal

participates actively in international organisations, but its influence is selective as it

possesses limited discourse power compared with the other EU states. Its normative

contribution is mainly within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries due to

its colonial history. We argue that Botswana (4) is a rule-taker rather than a regional

power to shape the rules and norms in the region of Africa. The diplomacy of the state is

concentrated on core interests, especially for its resources. Based on the evaluation of

foreign policy and international agency (Tables 7 and 7A), China exhibits the most

substantial global influence with the highest total score of (28) across all indicators.

Portugal and Brazil are tied in total score (20) Portugal demonstrates strong diplomatic

alliances (9) but more moderate soft power (5). While Brazil shows a balanced capacity

with notable strength in shaping international norms (7). Botswana, with the lowest

aggregate score (9), reflects limited international agency, especially in soft power and

diaspora engagement (2).

Table 7 – Numerical Evaluation of Foreign Policy and International Agency

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Diplomatic Presence and Alliances

Soft Power and Diaspora

Engagement

Ability to Shape and Respond to

International Norms

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 7A – Visual Evaluation of Foreign Policy and International Agency (FPIA)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

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Conclusion

This study employs a comparative case analysis using a multidimensional analytical

framework to examine and assess the concept of state fragility across four cases:

Botswana, Brazil, China, and Portugal. These states were selected due to their distinct

political systems and differing geopolitical positions, which together provide a valuable

basis for illustrating variations in state stability. By comparing cases with diverse

institutional arrangements and international roles, the analysis seeks to demonstrate how

fragility and stability manifest across different state contexts.

The framework is constructed around six interrelated dimensions: external adaptability;

economic and social resilience; social control and legitimacy; monopoly of violence;

governance efficacy; and international agency. Based on this comparative assessment,

we define a “strong state” as one that scores the maximum value (10) across all

indicators, while a “weak state” is defined as one that scores the minimum value (0).

State fragility is conceptualized as a condition situated between these two ideal types,

reflecting varying degrees of institutional capacity and vulnerability.

Within this analytical framework, a strong or stable state is characterized by high levels

of resilience, adaptability, and effectiveness in the operation of its domestic institutions.

In a rapidly changing international environment, states are increasingly exposed to

external shocks and pressures. The capacity to anticipate, manage, and respond to such

pressures is therefore central to maintaining systemic stability and avoiding institutional

breakdown. This adaptive capacity is closely linked to state fragility: the more effectively

a state manages internal and external challenges, the lower its level of fragility.

Among the four cases examined, Portugal emerges as the closest approximation to a

stable state (Table 9). Its membership in the European Union and NATO provides

institutional safeguards against geopolitical shocks, as well as access to broader markets

and security guarantees. EU membership has also contributed to a diversified and

relatively balanced economy, a sustainable debt profile, high employment levels, and an

overall high quality of life. While instances of corruption exist, they do not appear to be

systemic within the civil service, indicating relatively effective rule of law and institutional

enforcement. In terms of international agency, Portugal maintains an extensive

diplomatic network, representing both national interests and those of the European

Union. Although its global influence remains limited, Portugal acts as a constructive

participant within the international normative framework and plays an active regional

role, particularly within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, especially in

areas related to economic cooperation and educational exchange.

By contrast, the concept of a weak state refers to a political system that experiences

severe failure and incapacity across multiple dimensions of the analytical framework.

Such states are typically unable to perform basic sovereign functions, often as a result

of sustained domestic pressures and loss of territorial control. However, none of the four

selected cases fully corresponds to this ideal-type category. In general terms, a weak

state is characterized by chronic instability, frequent territorial disputes, and an economy

dominated by monopolistic actors closely linked to political elites. Corruption within

governmental institutions undermines service provision, leading to dysfunction in basic

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Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

185

public sectors. Furthermore, the state lacks effective control over violence, with non-

state armed actors playing a significant role and international intervention - often through

organizations such as the United Nations - becoming necessary. Diplomatic isolation and

the absence of stable alliances further reduce international agency, rendering such states

largely passive recipients of externally driven negotiations.

Building on these conceptual benchmarks, this study defines state fragility as a condition

in which a state lacks the legitimacy and capacity required to function effectively while

withstanding both external pressures and internal challenges. Fragility should be

understood as an evaluative indicator of potential risk to overall systemic stability rather

than as evidence of state failure per se. Importantly, fragility does not imply the imminent

collapse of the state; rather, it signals an increased probability of crisis arising from

limited institutional capacity to respond effectively to shocks and stresses.

Table 9 – Comparative Visual Representation (All Scores)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

As this study conceptualizes fragility and stability as phenomena grounded in societal

perceptions, we developed an evaluative framework to illustrate variations in state

performance across selected dimensions. This framework, however, is subject to

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Regional Insights from

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Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

186

important limitations inherent in multidimensional measurement approaches. In

particular, the choice of indicators reflects our analytical understanding of state

functionality and may insufficiently capture the historical trajectories through which

states have evolved.

Moreover, it is important to emphasize that no state can be classified as either entirely

strong or entirely weak. State development is a dynamic and ongoing process, and any

assessment of fragility represents a temporally situated snapshot rather than a definitive

or permanent outcome. Each state’s fragility profile is closely shaped by its specific

historical, political, and social context, underscoring the fact that states do not begin

from a common baseline nor follow identical developmental paths.

By examining four analytically diverse cases, our objective is not to rank states along a

single continuum of fragility, but rather to generate a broader understanding of how

fragility manifests across different contexts. The selected dimensions and indicators

function as heuristic tools intended to clarify the concept, rather than as exhaustive or

deterministic measures. Consequently, underperformance in any single indicator or

dimension should not be interpreted as rendering a state wholly fragile, but rather as

highlighting specific areas of vulnerability within an otherwise complex and evolving state

structure.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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191

BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ACROSS

GLOBAL POWERS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

XIAN ZHANG

ac40317@um.edu.mo

She is an undergraduate student majoring Portuguese studies at University of Macau (China),

with a deep interest in geopolitics and regional studies. Her academic journey was first sparked

through coursework examining the political and cultural dynamics of Portuguese-speaking

nations. It was further solidified by the participation in summer research program on Geopolitics

of Brazil and the South Atlantic. Xian's research interests lie at the intersection of international

relations and geopolitics. She seeks to understand how the world operates through geopolitical

analysis. This drives her focus on the evolving dynamics between China and the Lusophone

world. Her natural curiosity about Portuguese-speaking countries, combined with her linguistic

background, fuels her exploration to these cross-regional relationships. It is her goal to

contribute meaningful insights into China-Lusophone geopolitical dynamics and to inform policy-

making processes in this region. https://orcid.org/0009-0009-8308-584X

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic University

of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program Coordinator at the Institute of

Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From

2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking

Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he is an Associate Professor with

Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau

(China), and Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and Public Affairs. His recent publications

include: Is China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave Macmillan and The Palgrave Handbook on

Geopolitics of Brazil and South Atlantic (2025), Palgrave Macmillan. Francisco Leandro is a

member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign Relations), established in 1996 as a centre for

studies on International Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828

ARTHUR DE DIEGO GARRIDO VIEIRA

arthurdediegorodrigues@gmail.com

He is an aspiring scholar with a keen interest in geopolitics and strategic studies. He embarked

on his academic journey with a sponsorship from the Rotary Club's Youth Exchange program in

Denmark during 2019-2020. This experience broadened his horizons and ignited his passion for

international affairs. From 2023 to 2025, Arthur received an International Scholarship to pursue a

Bachelor of Social Sciences in Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.

Specializing in International Public Affairs, he has immersed himself in the study of global political

dynamics and governance structures. His academic pursuits are complemented by his active

participation in various research projects and academic forums. Arthur's research interests lie at

the intersection of geopolitics and strategic studies. He is particularly fascinated by the strategic

interactions between nations and the geopolitical implications of global events. His work aims to

contribute to a deeper understanding of international relations and to inform policy-making

processes. With a solid foundation in social sciences and a passion for strategic analysis, Arthur

de Diego Garrido Vieira is poised to become a significant contributor to the field of geopolitics and

strategic studies. https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5541-5587

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February 2026, pp. 191-215

Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers

and the Global South

Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

192

Abstract

As the world’s tenth-largest economy, Brazil has witnessed a marked and sustained decline

in its economic complexity over the past three decades. This downward trajectory presents

significant challenges to the country’s ambition of assuming a more influential role in global

economic governance. Despite Brazil’s structural potential and geopolitical relevance, it

continues to face considerable obstacles in its transition towards high-income status. This

study addresses the following research question: How has Brazil’s economic complexity

evolved in relation to major global powers and the Global South? What factors have led to

the continuous decline in Brazil’s economic complexity? To explore this, we adopt a

comparative methodology that examines Brazil’s economic trajectory alongside both leading

global economies and prominent actors within the Global South. Using the Economic

Complexity Index (ECI) as the principal analytical framework, the research identifies critical

development gaps and strategic opportunities. Through case studies and cross-national

comparisons, our findings demonstrate that, despite notable political efforts to enhance

Brazil’s economic complexity, the country has yet to establish the necessary conditions to

reverse its long-standing decline. Brazil remains in an intermediate position, lacking the

technological sophistication and export diversification that typify high-complexity economies.

These insights underscore the urgent need for targeted industrial policies, innovation-led

strategies, and institution reforms, providing policy guidance for Brazil to reposition itself

within the global economic hierarchy and advance its development agenda.

Keywords

Economic Complexity, Brazil, Economic diversification, Global south, Economic Complexity

Index (ECI).

Resumo

Sendo a décima maior economia do mundo, o Brasil tem registado, ao longo das últimas três

décadas, um declínio marcado e sustentado na sua complexidade económica. Esta trajetória

descendente coloca desafios significativos à ambição do país de assumir um papel mais

influente na governação económica global. Apesar do seu potencial estrutural e da sua

relevância geopolítica, o Brasil continua a enfrentar obstáculos substanciais na sua transição

para o estatuto de país de alto rendimento. Este estudo responde às seguintes questões de

investigação: Como tem evoluído a complexidade económica do Brasil em relação às grandes

potências globais e ao Sul Global? E quais os fatores que explicam o declínio contínuo da

complexidade económica brasileira? Para tal, adotamos uma metodologia comparativa que

examina a trajetória económica do Brasil paralelamente às economias globais líderes e a

atores proeminentes do Sul Global. Recorrendo ao Índice de Complexidade Económica (ECI)

como principal enquadramento analítico, a investigação identifica lacunas críticas de

desenvolvimento e oportunidades estratégicas. Por meio de estudos de caso e comparações

transnacionais, os resultados demonstram que, apesar de esforços políticos significativos para

aumentar a complexidade económica do Brasil, o país ainda não estabeleceu as condições

necessárias para reverter o seu declínio persistente. O Brasil permanece numa posição

intermédia, sem a sofisticação tecnológica e a diversificação exportadora que caracterizam

economias de elevada complexidade. Estas conclusões sublinham a necessidade urgente de

políticas industriais direcionadas, estratégias baseadas na inovação e reformas institucionais,

oferecendo orientações de política pública que permitam ao Brasil reposicionar-se na

hierarquia económica global e avançar a sua agenda de desenvolvimento.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 191-215

Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers

and the Global South

Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

193

Palavras-chave

Complexidade Económica, Brasil, Diversificação Económica, Sul Global, Índice de

Complexidade Económica (ECI).

How to cite this article

Zhang, Xian Leandro, Francisco José B. S. & Vieira, Arthur de Diego Garrido (2026). Brazil’s

Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers and the Global South.

Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in

International Relations: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2,

February 2026, pp. 191-215. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.8

Article submitted on 3rd October 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th January 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 191-215

Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers

and the Global South

Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

194

BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ACROSS GLOBAL POWERS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH

XIAN ZHANG

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

ARTHUR DE DIEGO GARRIDO VIEIRA

Introduction

The Federative Republic of Brazil is widely recognized as a regional power and a

foundational member of the BRICS+ coalition (Esteves & Coelho, 2025). It maintains a

robust and strategic engagement with the Global South, positioning itself not only as an

integral actor within this geopolitical bloc but also as a regional leader with aspirations

for greater influence in the global economic system (Heine, 2025). In both contexts -

regional leadership and global ambition - Brazil’s status as an economic powerhouse is a

critical determinant of its international standing (Bernal‑Meza, 2019). Therefore, in order

to anticipate Brazil’s potential trajectory within the global economic arena, it is essential

to analyze its development through the lens of comparative economic complexity, which

offers valuable insights into the sophistication, diversity, and resilience of its productive

capabilities.

Economic complexity captures the depth of productive knowledge embedded within a

nation's economy, as evidenced by the diversity and sophistication of its export portfolio

- an indicator considered a strong predictor of long-term economic growth (Romero et

al., 2022). This type of embedded knowledge is tacit, context-specific, and difficult to

transfer across borders, making economic complexity a key driver of sustained

development and structural transformation (Teixeira, Missio & Dathein, 2022).

The Economic complexity index(ECI) has demonstrated considerable predictive power in

forecasting future GDP growth. Mealy et al. (2019) observe that “countries that increase

their economic complexity tend to experience higher future income growth,”

underscoring the ECI’s strategic relevance for policymakers. Similarly, Hidalgo and

Hausmann (2009) argue that “economic complexity is a better predictor of income levels

than many other commonly used indicators.” This correlation stems from the inherent

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest related to the research,

authorship, or publication of this study.

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195

adaptability and resilience of complex economies, which are better equipped to absorb

global shocks, reallocate production, and foster innovation.

Moreover, economic complexity acts as a catalyst for technological advancement and

industrial diversification. As Hidalgo (2021) emphasizes, “the accumulation of capabilities

enables countries to move into more sophisticated industries.” This process enhances

productivity, generates higher-value employment, and contributes to inclusive and

sustainable economic development.

As of 2023, the world’s ten largest economies by gross domestic product - namely, the

United States of America (USA), China, Germany, Japan, India, the United Kingdom (UK),

France, Italy, Canada, and Brazil - exhibit considerable variation in economic complexity,

as measured by the ECI. Japan ranks highest with an ECI of 2.43, reflecting its advanced

manufacturing base and technological sophistication (Hausmann et al., 2014). Germany

follows with an ECI of 2.01, underscoring its global leadership in engineering and

industrial exports. The UK (1.81), USA (1.51), and China (1.47) also demonstrate high

levels of complexity, driven by diversified and technologically advanced export

structures. France (1.26) and Italy (1.40) maintain moderate economic complexity,

benefiting from strong industrial sectors and globally competitive luxury goods industries.

In contrast, Canada (0.29) and India (0.45) exhibit lower complexity, indicative of a

greater reliance on natural resource exports and less diversified production capabilities.

Brazil, with an ECI of -0.16, ranks lowest among the top ten economies, highlighting its

dependence on commodity exports and limited industrial diversification. These disparities

in economic complexity have significant implications for long-term growth trajectories

and resilience to global economic shifts.

The ECI, developed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), measures the diversity and

sophistication of a country’s productive capabilities by analyzing the range and

complexity of its export products. Countries with higher ECI scores tend to possess more

advanced knowledge systems and institutional capacities, enabling them to innovate,

adapt to shifting global market dynamics, and sustain inclusive economic development.

The most effective institutional capacities are (Vu, 2022; Araujo, Azevedo & Ferreira,

2025): 1) Robust research and development (R&D) infrastructure, supported by

universities and public research institutions; 2) Efficient regulatory frameworks that

facilitate entrepreneurship and protect intellectual property; 3) Strategic industrial

policies that promote high-value sectors and incentivize technological adoption; 4) Skilled

labor force development, through vocational training and higher education aligned with

industry needs; 5) Public-private partnerships that foster collaboration in innovation and

export promotion; 6) Strong governance and coordination mechanisms, ensuring policy

coherence across ministries and agencies.

Empirical studies have demonstrated that economic complexity is strongly correlated with

future GDP growth. For instance, Albeaik et al. (2017) found that a one standard

deviation increase in an improved version of the index (ECI+) is associated with a 4–5%

increase in annualized economic growth, even when controlling for physical capital,

human capital, and institutional quality. Similarly, Yıldırım (2021) shows that productivity

estimates derived from complexity metrics align closely with country-level indicators such

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as GDP per capita, human capital, and governance quality, reinforcing the predictive

power of ECI for long-term development trajectories. Moreover, the multidimensional

approach to economic complexity - incorporating trade, research, and technological

outputs - provides a more comprehensive framework for forecasting growth. According

to the Observatory of Economic Complexity(2025), countries with higher ECI scores are

expected to outperform their peers in terms of GDP per capita growth over the next

decade, with Brazil, for example, projected to grow at an annual rate of 2.97% due to its

increasing complexity.

This study adopts a comparative approach to examine Brazil’s economic trajectory,

positioning it relative to major global powers and leading economies within the Global

South. Using the framework of economic complexity, it identifies key gaps and

opportunities in Brazil’s development strategy, with implications for its future role in the

global economic order.

Economic complexity offers a valuable lens for assessing a country’s developmental

potential, capturing both its current production structure and the underlying capabilities

needed for diversification and innovation. As Hausmann et al. (2014) note, “economic

complexity reflects the amount of productive knowledge in a society” while Mealy et al.

(2019) find that increases in complexity are strongly associated with future income

growth. The central aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence that can support

low-ECI countries in formulating targeted industrial policies. By highlighting the link

between productive capabilities and long-term growth, the research underlines the

importance of strategic investment in education, infrastructure, and innovation systems

to foster structural transformation and inclusive development.

Literature Review

The influential contribution of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) introduced a novel analytical

framework for assessing national economic development through the composition of

export baskets. Rather than evaluating exports solely by volume, their approach

emphasizes the diversity and sophistication of exported products, encapsulated in the

ECI. This index quantifies the embedded productive knowledge within an economy,

offering a robust metric for what development economists have traditionally recognized

qualitatively: sustainable economic growth necessitates the accumulation of layered

productive capabilities and institutional competencies (Felipe et al., 2012).

Central to this framework is the "product space" concept (Hidalgo et al., 2007), which

represents a global network where complex products occupy densely connected core

positions, while simpler goods remain in sparsely connected peripheral areas. This

structural configuration reflects path dependence in industrial upgrading: countries find

it easier to move into products that are closely related to their existing capabilities. The

ECI aggregates the complexity of a country's export portfolio, and nations with higher

scores are better positioned to diversify into more sophisticated products, creating a self-

reinforcing cycle of development. (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). This dynamic underscore

the strategic importance of fostering complexity in national production systems, as it

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facilitates entry into the dense core of the product space and promotes long-term

economic resilience and growth.

Brazil serves as a salient example of the constraints imposed by capability traps within

the framework of the product space. Empirical evidence suggests that economic

complexity exerts a significant positive influence on micro-regional economic growth

(Morais et al., 2021; Teixeira et al., 2022; Mewes & Broekel, 2022). Brazil’s Economic

Complexity Index (ECI) has shown no significant progress between 1995 and 2020,

accompanied by a relative decline in its global ranking. This stagnation and relative

setback in complexity evolution reflect the structural obstacles Brazil faces in industrial

upgrading and technological deepening. Andreoni & Tregenna (2020) further argue that

Brazil has experienced premature deindustrialization and has failed to achieve sustained

technological upgrading through effective industrial policy, making it a typical case of

being caught in a “middle-income technology trap.”Closer examination reveals that the

manifestation of Brazil’s complexity trap is not uniform across its territory. Recent studies

indicate that increases in economic complexity do not uniformly translate into regional

economic growth, thereby exposing limitations in the applicability of complexity theory

at the sub-national level (Cardoso et al., 2024; Morais et al., 2021). These findings

underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of how productive capabilities

are distributed and mobilized within a country, particularly in large, diverse economies

such as Brazil. They also highlight the importance of incorporating spatial and sectoral

heterogeneity into analyses of economic complexity, as national-level metrics may

obscure critical regional disparities in development potential.

This study addresses key gaps in the literature on economic complexity, particularly in

the context of Brazil. While the relevance of economic complexity for national

development and industrial upgrading is well established, three critical gaps remain.

First, there is a methodological comparative gap. Much of the foundational work on

economic complexity - such as the ECI and product space framework - has been applied

primarily to industrialized or export-oriented Asian economies. As a result, large,

resource-rich emerging economies like Brazil remain underexplored in comparative

analyses.

Second, a spatial and regional heterogeneity gap persists. Although Brazil is often cited

as a case of the middle-income trap, existing studies rarely account for internal disparities

across its diverse regions. National-level metrics may obscure significant sub-national

variations in industrial structure, institutional capacity, and innovation ecosystems.

Third, a data gap is manifest. Much of the literature relies on datasets predating 2014,

which may not reflect Brazil’s current economic structure or recent shifts in trade,

technology, and regional development policy. Updated empirical analysis is needed to

capture these changes and assess their implications for economic complexity.

This study focuses on addressing the first and third gaps by offering a comparative

analysis of Brazil’s economic complexity and incorporating more recent data to better

understand its evolving industrial capabilities.

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Methodology

This study adopts a mixed-method design to examine the dynamic complexity of the

Brazilian economy through a two-stage analytical integration. The first stage employs a

quantitative approach to map macro-level trends, while the second stage incorporates

qualitative analysis to contextualize and explain these patterns.

The initial quantitative phase analyzes Brazil’s ECI rankings, trade volumes, and

structural indicators alongside major global powers and selected Global South economies

for the period 2018–2023. This stage systematically identifies Brazil’s relative position

and trade performance trajectories. However, quantitative data alone cannot uncover the

underlying mechanisms driving these trends. Therefore, specific findings - such as

episodes of declining complexity, increased reliance on primary commodities, or export

performance gaps relative to comparator economies - inform the second, qualitative

stage. These findings shape guiding questions for the collection and interpretation of

academic literature, historical accounts, and Brazilian policy documents. This approach

enables the qualitative analysis to explain how observed trends emerged and to explore

associated policy frameworks, structural constraints, and historical pathways.

By integrating macro-level statistical evidence with in-depth contextual interpretation,

the study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding that transcends the

limitations of single-method approaches. This dual strategy ensures that conclusions are

both empirically grounded and enriched by historical and policy insights, offering a

nuanced explanation of the factors behind Brazil’s declining economic complexity.

Furthermore, comparative analysis is consistently employed throughout. Given Brazil’s

aspirations for greater influence in the global economic system, its trajectory is most

meaningful when assessed relative to major powers and other Global South economies.

Comparative inquiry also facilitates the identification of lessons from countries that have

successfully diversified their economic structures. While each nation exhibits unique

characteristics, examining their strategies and outcomes provides a valuable framework

for understanding the challenges and opportunities inherent in Brazil’s pursuit of a more

sophisticated and diversified economic model.

Brazil and the Global Economies

Despite its status as one of the world’s ten largest economies by nominal GDP (IMF,

2025), - behind Canada and ahead of Russia Federation - Brazil has experienced the

steepest ECI drop among its peer nations over the past three decades, revealing a

paradox of high gross domestic product coexisting with low productive sophistication.

This trend reflects Brazil’s overreliance on commodity exports and its limited capacity to

internalize and build upon high-complexity imports. The stagnation and subsequent

decline in export sophistication signal a weakening of the country’s underlying productive

capabilities.

Figure 1 presents a comparative analysis of Brazil and ten major global economies -

namely, the USA, China, Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, and

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Australia - in terms of their ECI between 1995 and 2023. The figure illustrates Brazil’s

relative position in product complexity rankings over time, highlighting its persistent

underperformance within this group. Since 1995, Brazil has consistently ranked third

from the bottom among these economies, initially occupying the 29th position globally.

Between 1995 and 2000, it was overtaken by China, and between 2010 and 2015, by

India - both countries that have significantly improved their economic complexity through

targeted industrial and innovation policies. The decline in Brazil’s relative complexity

became more pronounced from 2015 to 2023, with the gap between Brazil and its peers

widening substantially. Notably, Brazil has remained only marginally ahead of Australia,

a country traditionally characterized by its agricultural export base and relatively low

complexity. However, the gap between the two has steadily narrowed, underscoring

Brazil’s stagnation in productive knowledge accumulation.

Brazil’s deterioration in ECI rankings can be largely attributed to its overreliance on

primary commodities, which imposes structural constraints on the development of more

sophisticated productive capabilities. As shown in Table 1, Brazil’s export profile remains

heavily concentrated in low-complexity goods. Energy minerals, including crude

petroleum, are primarily exported to the US, India, and China. Soybeans - Brazil’s largest

export by volume - are predominantly shipped to China, while metallic ores are traded

with China, Japan, France, and Germany.

These commodities are consistently classified among the bottom five products in terms

of complexity (Hausmann et al., 2014), as they require a relatively narrow base of

productive knowledge and involve limited inter-sectoral linkages. This export structure

reflects a limited diversification of Brazil’s industrial capabilities and contributes to its

stagnation in economic complexity. The dominance of low-complexity exports not only

constrains innovation and value-added production but also limits Brazil’s ability to

transition toward a more knowledge-intensive and resilient economic model.

Figure 1. Comparison Between Brazil and the Major Global Economies (ECI)

Source: Authors, based on Harvard Kennedy School, atlas of Economic Complexity Rankings.

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We also notice Brazil has formed a three-level industrial chain externalization through

exports of soybeans (raw materials), soybean oil (edible oil), and soybean meal (feed

protein). Among them, soybeans dominate trade with China, while soybean meal enjoys

a competitive edge in the European market. These three products are in the high

proximity area within the product space and a typical case of path-dependent

upgrade. However, this industrial chain is still located in the sparse peripheral area of the

product space (agricultural cluster), far away from highly complex industries. While the

total export volume to these nine countries shows a fluctuating increase, this growth is

overwhelmingly driven by raw materials and agricultural products that need minimal

productive knowledge and little intricate interaction, makes its economic complexity

difficult to evolve. In contrast to Brazil’s declining export sophistication, the country’s

import profile is increasingly dominated by high-complexity goods from advanced

economies.

Table 1. Brazil's Exports by Top Economies by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)

Trading

Partner

Total Trade Volume

Major exported products

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2018

2023

USA

29.00

29.80

21.70

31.90

36.40

35.10

Gas turbines (1.93),

Semi-finished iron

(2.08),

Aircraft/spacecraft

(2.06)

Crude petroleum (4.78),

Semi-finished iron (1.68),

Aircraft/spacecraft (1.67)

China

64.10

63.60

68.10

88.20

90.20

105.00

Soybeans (27.20), Iron

ore (11.00), Crude

petroleum (14.40)

Soybeans (38.90), crude

petroleum (19.80),

iron ore (19.70)

Germany

5.52

5.21

4.64

5.62

7.58

6.40

Coffee (0.75), Soybean

meal (0.49), Gas

turbines (0.35)

Coffee (1.07), Soybean

meal (0.97), Copper Ore

(0.90)

Japan

6.46

7.14

6.08

6.51

7.35

9.32

Iron ore (2.90), Poultry

meat (0.71), Coffee

(0.33)

Iron ore (3.31), Poultry

meat (0.94), Corn (1.49)

India

4.23

2.96

3.04

4.93

6.49

4.91

Crude petroleum (1.16),

Raw sugar (0.54),

Soybean oil (0.54)

Soybean oil (1.30), Raw

sugar (1.23), Crude

Petroleum (0.67)

3.12

3.14

2.66

3.20

4.02

3.68

Gold (0.76), Soybeans

(0.16), hydrogen (0.16)

Gold (0.45), Soybeans

(0.34), Other prepared

meat (0.25)

France

2.98

2.92

2.17

2.62

3.66

3.06

Soybean meal (0.58),

Iron ore (0.43), Sulfate

chemical woodpulp

(0.31)

Soybean meal (0.82),

Crude petroleum (0.29),

iron ore (0.21)

Italy

3.84

3.41

3.16

4.16

5.28

4.57

Sulfate chemical wood

pulp (0.81), Coffee

(0.47), Iron ore (0.37)

Sulfate chemical woodpulp

(0.64), Coffee (0.70),

Soybeans (0. 63)

Canada

3.51

3.60

4.45

5.12

5.62

6.00

Aluminum Oxide (1.14),

Gold (0.34), Raw sugar

(0.31)

Aluminum Oxide (1.22),

Gold (1.61),

Aircraft/spacecraft (0.73)

Australia

0.51

0.50

0.53

0.60

0.80

0.81

Large construction

vehicles (0.09), Coffee

(0.05), Fruit juice (0.03)

Large construction

vehicles (0.17), Coffee

(0.10), Sulfate chemical

woodpulp (0.06)

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database

(OEC World, 2025).

Table 2 illustrates that the USA exports value-added industrial products to Brazil, while

China has significantly increased its exports of semiconductors. The share of automotive

components from Germany, Japan, and Italy has remained stable, and pharmaceuticals

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constitute major exports from Germany, India, and the UK. These products rank among

the top five in terms of complexity (Hausmann et al., 2014), requiring advanced

technological capabilities and specialized skills that are not closely aligned with Brazil’s

existing production structure.

Table 2 - Brazil's Imports by Top Economies by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)

Trading

partner

Total Trade Volume

Major imported products

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2018

2023

USA

33.80

36.30

28.90

41.40

51.60

39.90

Refined petroleum

(7.08), Gas turbines

(1.85), Coal briquettes

(1.23)

Refined petroleum (4.70),

Gas turbines (4.10), Coal

briquettes (1.68)

China

36.50

37.90

37.40

53.80

64.20

57.80

Special purpose ships

(3.36), Telephones

(2.31), Broadcasting

accessories (1.18)

Semiconductor devices

(4.09), Telephones

(3.35), Pesticides (1.61)

Germanyy

11.30

9.64

12.40

13.40

13.60

Motor vehicles (0.88),

Packaged

medicaments (0.65),

Nitrogen heterocyclic

compounds (0.50)

Nitrogen heterocyclic

compounds (0.73), Motor

vehicles (0.73), Packaged

medicaments (0.62)

Japan

4.79

4.63

4.08

5.19

5.46

5.19

Motor vehicles (0.84),

Cars (0.26), Engine

parts (0.17)

Motor vehicles (1.00),

Papermaking machines

(0.15), Engine parts

(0.12)

India

3.89

4.54

4.15

6.96

9.64

7.07

Non-retail synthetic

filament yarn (0.29),

Pesticides (0.38),

Motor vehicles (0.24)

Refined petroleum

(1.19B), Pesticides

(0.53), Nitrogen

heterocyclic (0.47)

2.72

2.40

2.69

3.20

3.34

Gas turbines (0.37),

Packaged

medicaments (0.16),

Refined petroleum

(0.14)

Gas turbines (0.41),

Packaged medicaments

(0.22), Cars (0.17)

France

5.45

4.43

4.09

4.46

4.78

5.41

Aircraft/spacecraft

(0.57), Gas turbines

(0.28), Motor vehicles

(0.32)

Gas turbines (0.69),

Aircraft/spacecraft (0.54),

Motor vehicles (0.24)

Italy

4.78

4.59

4.13

5.46

5.52

5.76

Motor vehicles (0.33),

Refined petroleum

(0.31), Combustion

engines (0.26)

Motor vehicles (0.40),

Vaccines (0.22),

Transmissions (0.15)

Canada

2.07

2.01

1.76

2.29

3.37

3.31

Potassic fertilizers

(0.81), Coal briquettes

(0.17), Gas turbines

(0.09)

Potassic fertilizers(1.95),

Aircraft/spacecraft(0.14),

gas turbines(0.13)

Australia

1.13

0.98

0.58

1.21

2.81

2.00

Coal Briquettes

(0.85), Raw aluminum

(0.05), Pesticides

(0.02)

Coal Briquettes (1.52),

Coke (0.22), Therapeutic

appliances (0.03)

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database

(OEC World, 2025).

Applying the product space framework (Hidalgo et al., 2007) to Brazil’s trade data reveals

a structural disconnect: Brazil’s agricultural and mineral exports occupy peripheral

positions in the global product network, far removed from the central nodes represented

by high-complexity imports such as semiconductors. This spatial and technological

distance results in a mismatch of skills, fragmentation of supply chains, and divergence

in innovation trajectories. Consequently, Brazil struggles to absorb and integrate external

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technologies into its domestic economy. If this pattern persists, Brazil risks long-term

disadvantages - paying premium prices for essential high-tech goods while exporting

low-value commodities and thereby limiting its prospects for income growth and

sustained economic prosperity.

Brazil and the Global South

Despite being the Global South's third-largest economy, Brazil exemplifies the complexity

trap facing middle-income countries, with its ECI ranking plummeting from regional

leader to bottom position over three decades. While Global South markets provide

important export destinations and revenues, Brazil remains trapped in its low complexity

export yet high complexity import pattern. The country has not leveraged these

partnerships to climb the complexity ladder yet, but there are emerging opportunities for

industrial diversification and economic complexity upgrading.

Figure 2 illustrates Brazil’s relative position in terms of product complexity rankings

compared to six major countries in Global South. This section narrows its focus to the

comparison with Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Turkiye,

excluding China and India due to listed data in section 3. Although Brazil was ranked

second among the countries of the global south in 1995 (below Mexico), it was surpassed

by rising Thailand during the period from 1995 to 2000. Subsequently, the decline in its

ECI continued to accelerate, and it was overtaken by Turkey after five years. The gap

then widened even further. From 2015 to 2023, the dropping was even more significant,

and it was successively surpassed by the fluctuating Indonesia and Argentina. At this

point, its economic complexity ranked 93rd, being the last position among these

countries. The continuous decline in the ECI ranking indicates that Brazil has not only

has failed to acquire new capabilities, but may also be losing its existing manufacturing

capabilities.

Looking closer to its trade profile, the trade pattern of the Global South strengthens

Brazil's export structure instead of diversifying it. Still, Brazil’s exports remain heavily

concentrated in low-complexity products. Table 3 shows raw materials account for a

significant proportion in Brazil’s export: raw sugar, raw cotton, iron ore, poultry meat

and soybeans emerged as key export commodities. Namely, soybeans appear in 5 out of

6 export destination countries. These products were also previously exported by Brazil

to the global economies. Rather than using Global South partnerships to diversify into

higher-complexity manufacturing, Brazil has simply replicated its commodity export

model across different markets, making limited progress in addressing the ECI decline.

Beyond trade patterns, the productive capacity hierarchy of Brazil exhibits systematic

deficiencies that explain its complexity decline. While the country possesses strong

natural endowments and basic extraction capabilities, its primary processing remains

incomplete, and intermediate manufacturing capabilities suffers from severe deficiencies

- particularly in automotive, machinery, electronics, and chemical production. This

creates a "missing middle" in Brazil's capability structure. However, isolated successes

like aircraft production represents a “leap away” from existing product clusters in Brazil,

but without the support of sequential capability building, may not be sustainable.

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Figure 2 – Comparison Between Brazil and Selected Countries of Global South (ECI)

Source: Data adapted from Harvard Kennedy School, atlas of Economic Complexity Rankings

Table 3 - Brazil's Exports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions

USD)

Trading

Partner

Total Trade Volume

Major imported products

(typical annual value range)

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2018

2023

Argentina

14.9

9.81

8.51

11.9

15.3

16.8

Cars (3.84), Motor

vehicles; Parts &

accessories (1.03),

Delivery trucks

(1.09)

Soybeans (2.04B),

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(1.70), Cars(1.40)

Indonesia

1.65

2.10

2.49

2.13

3.20

4.33

Soybean meal

(0.66), Raw tobacco

(0.13), Raw cotton

(0.26)

Soybean meal

(0.53), Raw sugar

(0.82), Iron ore

(0.21)

Mexico

4.50

4.90

3.83

5.67

7.11

8.59

Delivery

trucks(0.26),

Spark-ignition

engines (0.35),

Poultry meat (0.20)

Cars(1.1),

Soybeans(0.82),

Poultry meat(0.43)

Saudi

Arabia

2.10

2.03

1.89

2.74

3.98

4.42

Poultry meat (0.81),

Raw sugar (0.43),

Soybeans (0.12)

Raw sugar(1.76),

Poultry Meat(0.85),

Corn(0.36)

Turkiye

2.66

2.46

3.13

3.51

3.8

3.52

Soybeans (0.52),

Bovine (0.39), Semi-

finished iron (0.29)

Soybeans(0.97),

Iron ore(0.42),

Bovine(0.30)

Thailand

1.96

1.79

2.08

2.8

3.61

3.93

Soybeans (0.47),

Soybean meal

(0.90), Motor

vehicles; Parts &

accessories (0.05)

Soybean

meal(1.56),

Soybeans(1.40),

Crude

petroleum(0.50)

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database (OEC World, 2025).

37 43

54 59

100

1995 RANK 2000 RANK 2005 RANK 2010 RANK 2015 RANK 2020 RANK 2023 RANK

Brazil Argentina Indonesia Mexico

Saudi Arabia Thailand Turkiye

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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers

and the Global South

Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

204

Brazil's import patterns from Global South countries reveal both structural vulnerabilities

and emerging industrial integration opportunities. The composition of these imports

confirms Brazil's continued dependence on higher-complexity manufactured goods, even

within South-South trade relationships. Table 4 shows that Brazil imports manufactured

goods from all listed countries except Saudi Arabia, which primarily supplies energy

products. The country imports motor vehicles and parts from Mexico, Turkey, and

Thailand, computers from Mexico, and delivery trucks from Argentina. Brazil is importing

finished products rather than intermediate goods such as garments, textiles and food

processing that could be further processed domestically then re-exported. This approach

would create value-added production chains that connected to many product categories.

By failing to do so, Brazil misses opportunities for using specific capabilities relevant

within communities and therefore industrial upgrading through South-South cooperation.

Looking at the positive aspects: Firstly, Brazil maintains a positive trade balance with

most Global South partners, with total import volumes consistently lower than export

volumes; Secondly, Argentina stands out as Brazil's most significant Global South trading

partner, representing a complexity-enhancing bilateral relationship that demonstrates

Brazil's untapped upgrading potential. With Brazilian exports growing from $14.9 billion

in 2018 to $16.8 billion in 2023, and imports of $11.9 billion in 2023, this partnership

achieves the near-balanced trade flows that complexity theory associates with successful

industrial integration. Most significantly, Argentina absorbs $1.28-3.84 billion annually in

Brazilian automotive products alone - proving that Brazil possesses manufacturing

capabilities sophisticated enough to compete in regional markets when proper industrial

complementarity exists.

Brazil’s automotive trade with Argentina and Mexico illustrates successful intra-industry

specialization, which contributes to economic complexity and growth. Brazil exports cars,

motor vehicles, and parts to both countries, while importing delivery trucks, cars, and

accessories. These exchanges involve differentiated yet functionally related products,

allowing each country to specialize in distinct segments of the industry. The growing

export volume from Brazil to Argentina and Mexico reflects the benefits of deepening

industrial specialization.

Table 4 - Brazil's Imports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)

Trading

partner

Total Trade Volume

Major imported products

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2018

2023

Argentina

11.30

10.50

7.71

11.60

12.90

11.90

Delivery trucks

(2.50), Cars (1.87),

Wheat (1.31)

Delivery trucks

(2.48), Cars (2.24),

Wheat (0.82)

Indonesia

1.39

1.35

1.19

1.79

1.96

1.54

Coconut oil (0.18),

Rubber (0.16),

Motor vehicles;

parts & accessories

(0.13)

Coconut (0.22),

Palm oil (0.13),

Telephones (0.11)

Mexico

5.45

5.26

4.00

4.71

5.53

5.74

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.73), Cars (1.09),

Computers (016)

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.73), Cars (0.70),

Delivery trucks

(0.34)

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Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira

205

Table 4 - Brazil's Imports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)

Trading

partner

Total Trade Volume

Major imported products

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2018

2023

Saudi

Arabia

2.39

2.40

1.63

3.22

5.49

3.70

Crude petroleum

(1.68), Mixed

mineral or chemical

fertilizers (0.30),

Propylene polymers

(0.14)

Crude petroleum

(3.26), Mixed

mineral or chemical

fertilizers (0.52),

Refined petroleum

(0.60)

Turkiye

0.63

0.69

0.73

1.25

1.24

1.00

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.05), Raw iron

bars (0.03),

Carbonates (0.05)

Carbonates (0.10),

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.05), Synthetic

rubber (0.05)

Thailand

1.76

1.72

1.51

2.25

2.37

2.05

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.25), Rubber

(0.20), Engine parts

(0.10)

Motor vehicles;

Parts & accessories

(0.30), Rubber

(0.09), Engine parts

(0.09)

Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database (OEC World,

2025).

Analysis and Discussion

The fact that Brazil ranks among the world’s ten largest economies stands in stark

contrast to its declining performance in the ECI. Over the past three decades, Brazil’s

pronounced loss of ground in the ECI rankings among major economies highlights a

critical divergence: its high GDP coexists with a level of productive sophistication that

has failed to advance relative to global competitors. This downward trend reflects deep-

rooted structural weaknesses in Brazil’s industrial base and a persistent reliance on

import-intensive, low-complexity exports.

Figure 1 illustrates Brazil’s position relative to ten other large economies - namely, the

USA, China, Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Australia - since

1995. Brazil has consistently ranked near the bottom of this group. Despite maintaining

a trade surplus with China since 2019, which reached US$12 billion in 2024 and

accounted for 41% of Brazil’s total trade surplus (BCB, 2025), Brazil was overtaken by

China between 1995 and 2000, and later by India between 2010 and 2015. From 2015

to 2023, Brazil’s complexity gap widened further, approaching that of Australia - a

country similarly characterized by a commodity-dependent export structure (Mesquita,

Merlo, & Gremaud, 2021). This trajectory underlines the urgent need to address Brazil’s

limitations in productive knowledge accumulation and industrial upgrading. Without

strategic interventions to diversify its export base and strengthen innovation ecosystems,

Brazil risks remaining trapped in a cycle of low complexity and constrained development.

Table 1 indicates that Brazil's export report remains dominated by primary commodities.

Crude petroleum is exported mainly to the USA, India, and China, while soybeans -

Brazil's top export product - rose from $27.2 billion in 2018 to $38.9 billion in 2023,

mainly to China. Metallic ores are exported to China, Japan, France, and Germany. These

products are the simplest, with minimal productive information and minimal technological

contact (Hausmann et al., 2014). Brazil's three-step soybean value chain for exports -

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raw soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal - is an example of path-dependent

upgrading, with incremental innovation in a narrow technological niche (Araujo & Lima,

2006). Although soybean meal has gained competitiveness in the EU market, such a

chain remains embedded in the agriculture cluster of the product space outside central

nodes pertaining to high-complexity industries (Hidalgo et al., 2007). Overall export

volume growth is driven by low-complexity products, which limits Brazil's evolution

toward increasingly complex production.

On the other hand, the import composition of Brazil is increasingly comprised of high-

income economies' high-complexity goods. Aircraft and gas turbines are exported by the

USA, semiconductors by China, and motor vehicles' parts by Germany, Japan, and Italy

with regular shipments. Germany, India, and the UK also have prominent

pharmaceuticals. These are part of the top five highest in complexity (Hausmann et al.,

2014), requiring high-tech capabilities and special skills.

Despite being the third-largest economy in the Global South, Brazil has experienced a

pronounced decline in its ECI, falling from a regional leader to the lowest-ranked among

key Global South economies over the past three decades. In 1995, Brazil trailed only

Mexico in ECI, but was subsequently surpassed by Thailand by 2000, Turkiye by 2005,

and more recently by Indonesia and Argentina between 2015 and 2023. By 2023, Brazil

ranked 93rd globally, a position that reflects not only stagnation but also a potential

deterioration of existing productive capabilities (Britto, Romero, Freitas, & Coelho, 2015).

As illustrated in Figure 2, this trajectory underscores Brazil’s failure to capitalize on

South-South cooperation as a mechanism for industrial upgrading. Table 3 further

demonstrates that Brazil’s export structure remains heavily concentrated in low-

complexity products - such as soybeans, iron ore, poultry meat, raw sugar, and cotton.

The fact that soybeans appear as a major export to five of the six key Global South

partners exemplifies the replication of Brazil’s traditional commodity-based model, rather

than a strategic shift toward higher-complexity manufacturing (World Bank, 2015).

Brazil’s import patterns from Global South countries also reveal structural weaknesses.

Although Brazil maintains a trade surplus with most of its regional partners (Table 4), it

continues to import high-complexity finished goods - including motor vehicles,

computers, and delivery trucks - from Mexico, Turkiye, Thailand, and Argentina. Saudi

Arabia, by contrast, primarily exports energy commodities. Notably, Brazil’s import

basket lacks intermediate goods such as textiles and processed foods, which could

otherwise support domestic value-added production and re-exporting. This absence

suggests limited integration into regional value chains and reflects Brazil’s

underdeveloped productive linkages. As Moreira (2022) argues, Brazil’s industrial

structure lacks the coordination and capability-building mechanisms necessary for deeper

insertion into global value chains.

Brazil’s bilateral trade with Argentina stands out as a complexity-enhancing relationship.

Between 2018 and 2023, Brazilian exports to Argentina increased from $14.9 billion to

$16.8 billion, while imports reached $11.9 billion (Table 4). Argentina absorbs $1.28–

$3.84 billion annually in Brazilian automotive products, demonstrating Brazil’s capacity

to compete in regional manufacturing when industrial complementarity is present.

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Crucially, Argentina has recently surpassed Brazil in ECI rankings, underscoring the

urgency for Brazil to revise its industrial policy (Sert, 2017). Brazil’s automotive trade

with Argentina and Mexico exemplifies successful intra-industry specialization: Brazil

exports cars and motor vehicle components while importing differentiated products such

as delivery trucks and high-value parts. This division of labor enables each country to

specialize in distinct segments of the automotive sector, achieving economies of scale

and fostering innovation. As Fullerton, Sawyer, and Sprinkle (2011) note, intra-industry

trade yields greater benefits than inter-industry trade by stimulating innovation and

exploiting scale efficiencies. Despite isolated successes such as aircraft production,

Brazil’s broader productive structure suffers from a “missing middle.” While the country

demonstrates strength in natural resource extraction and basic processing, it lacks robust

intermediate manufacturing capabilities in sectors such as electronics, chemicals, and

machinery. Without sustained capability development, these successes remain

exceptions rather than indicators of systemic transformation (Hamaguchi, 2020). There

are three leading reasons to be considered and one additional aspect:

Firstly, Brazil's steady fall in the ECI is directly related to its own long-standing process

of deindustrialization. Since the 1980s, Brazil has suffered from what scholars have

described as "premature deindustrialization," where the manufacturing sector falls

behind before the economy has achieved high-income status. The experience has been

worsened by structural issues such as low productivity growth, fragile innovation

systems, and Dutch disease effects, most importantly caused by the real overvaluation

during commodity booms (Bresser-Pereira, 2018). Disorganization of Brazil's

manufacturing structure has limited it from diversifying its exports to more advanced,

knowledge-based industries, which directly affected its ECI performance (Kupfer, Ferraz

& Marques, 1995; Cano, 2011).

A critical factor in this trajectory has been the absence of a consistent and strategic

industrial policy. Brazil's shift toward market liberalization in the late 20th century,

particularly during the 1990s, marked a turning point in its development model. During

this period, many state-led industrial initiatives were dismantled, and no coherent

strategy was put in place to foster technological upgrading or strengthen domestic

production chains. This policy vacuum contributed to the erosion of productive

capabilities, limiting the country’s ability to move into more complex and knowledge-

intensive sectors - a key requirement for improving its position in the Economic

Complexity Index (Stemmler, 2019).

Compounding this institutional void, trade liberalization and financial openness

introduced additional structural challenges. The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and

1990s prioritized openness over strategic development, weakening Brazil’s industrial

structure. Iasco-Pereira and Morceiro (2024) show that these reforms led to a decline in

total factor productivity and manufacturing labor productivity, as liberalization was not

accompanied by policies to support domestic industry. Their empirical analysis reveals

that Brazil’s industrial sector lost its capacity to generate structural change, with the

country increasingly specializing in low-complexity activities. The lack of coordination

between liberalization and industrial development resulted in a national-level

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deindustrialization, constraining Brazil’s ability to sustain diversified and technologically

advanced economic activities - and ultimately, to climb the Economic Complexity Index.

In response to this scenario, recent efforts such as the Nova Indústria Brasil [The New

Industry of Brazil] policy represent a strategic attempt to reverse premature

deindustrialization and reinsert Brazil into more complex global value chains. The policy,

launched in 2024, emphasizes innovation, sustainability, and technological upgrading,

with BRL 300 billion allocated to support industrial transformation until 2026. It aims to

stimulate sectors with high value-added potential, such as health technologies,

electromobility, and digital infrastructure, while also promoting local content and green

industrialization. However, as Belloc (2014) cautions, the effectiveness of such policies

depends on the design of subsidy mechanisms and the ability to foster productivity-

enhancing firm entry. Without a firm commitment to rebuilding domestic industry and

aligning incentives with long-term development goals, Brazil risks establishing itself as a

commodity-dependent economy, deepening its structural vulnerabilities and limiting its

capacity to climb the economic complexity ladder.

Secondly, the privatization wave that commenced in the late 1980s and escalated in the

1990s under Collor and Cardoso governments was a revolutionary shift in the economic

trend of Brazil. Privatization was originally being justified on the basis of the reduction of

the external debt and efficiency, but it was exposed to disassembling major state-owned

enterprises (SOEs) without an appropriate industrial policy to cultivate national

champions (Silva, 2019). This was done in the 2000s and gained a new life in the 2010s

and 2020s, particularly under the financially tight agendas. This resulted in the industrial

climate of Brazil, especially in sectors like energy, telecommunications, and

infrastructure, which are all columns of economic complexity (Fagundes & Caciatori,

2020). The absence of a well-coordinated industrial strategy at the time of, and after,

privatization further entrenched the country's vulnerability to foreign shocks as well as

technological dependence.

Contrary to the expectations of traditional privatization advocates, the reforms failed to

generate the anticipated industrial dynamism. Rocha and Ruiz (2008) show that Brazilian

industries remained heavily reliant on production-intensive knowledge and lacked

integration with scientific and technological institutions, which are essential for

innovation. The privatized sectors did not reinvest sufficiently in R&D or technological

upgrading, and innovation was often limited to meeting regulatory standards rather than

pursuing breakthroughs. Guimarães (2004) further argues that Brazil’s state lacked the

institutional capacity and strategic coherence to replicate the success of developmental

states like Japan and Korea, which used privatization selectively and always within a

broader industrial policy framework. In Brazil, the absence of such coordination led to

fragmented innovation ecosystems and technological dependence on foreign actors.

Nolan (2018) adds that privatization, when not aligned with social and economic rights

frameworks, can erode the state’s ability to fulfill long-term development goals.

Moreover, the lack of mechanisms to ensure that privatization proceeds were reinvested

into productive sectors further entrenched Brazil’s vulnerability to foreign shocks and

reinforced its specialization in low-complexity exports. A telling example is Petrobras,

which, despite remaining partially state-owned, saw its strategic role diluted during

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liberalization, limiting its capacity to act as a sovereign agent of industrial transformation

and innovation (Zanotelli & Ferreira, 2021). These dynamics collectively undermined

Brazil’s ability to build the productive capabilities necessary for climbing the Economic

Complexity Index.

Finally, Brazil’s declining performance in the ECI can be attributed to a combination of

structural and institutional factors. The country’s export structure remains heavily

concentrated in primary commodities such as soybeans, crude petroleum, and iron ore.

These products rank among the lowest in complexity because they require limited

productive knowledge and minimal inter-sectoral linkages (Hausmann et al., 2014). This

overreliance on low-complexity exports restricts the development of more sophisticated

industries and limits opportunities for technological spillovers and innovation-driven

growth (Cardoso et al., 2024). Furthermore, Brazil has struggled to diversify its industrial

base beyond traditional sectors. Unlike countries that have successfully transitioned into

high-tech manufacturing or knowledge-intensive services, Brazil’s industrial upgrading

has been slow and uneven. This stagnation is partly due to weak innovation ecosystems,

limited investment in research and development (R&D), and insufficient integration into

global value chains (Mazzucato, 2023; Suzigan et al., 2020). In addition, there is

significant regional heterogeneity in economic complexity across Brazil. While some

states - such as São Paulo - possess relatively advanced industrial structures, others

remain dependent on agriculture and extractive industries. National-level ECI metrics

often mask these disparities, yet they contribute to the overall stagnation in complexity

when aggregated (Cardoso et al., 2024; Bandeira Morais, Swart, & Jordaan, 2021).

Additionally, Brazil’s economic complexity is further hindered by institutional and policy

constraints. These include inconsistent industrial policy, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and

limited support for innovation and entrepreneurship. Such barriers reduce the country’s

ability to accumulate productive knowledge and transition into more complex sectors

(Suzigan et al., 2020; Baer, 2020).

Brazil’s industrial landscape, though marked by structural challenges, includes several

niche sectors that have achieved notable global competitiveness through sustained

innovation and strategic policy support. The aeronautical industry, led by Embraer,

exemplifies this trajectory. Emerging from mid-20th-century state-led initiatives and

bolstered by institutions like ITA and CTA, Embraer has positioned Brazil as the third-

largest commercial aircraft manufacturer globally, integrating advanced engineering,

global partnerships, and a robust innovation ecosystem (Fonseca, 2010). In the electrical

machinery and automation sector, WEG S.A. stands out as a globally competitive firm,

with operations in over 135 countries and a strong focus on R&D, energy efficiency, and

industrial automation. Its ability to innovate and scale production has made it a key

player in the global market for electric motors and industrial solutions (Ministério de

Minas e Energia, n.d.). Additionally, EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research

Corporation) has played a transformative role in agricultural innovation, particularly in

tropical agriculture. Through cutting-edge research in biotechnology, precision

agriculture, and sustainable practices, EMBRAPA has significantly increased productivity

and enabled Brazil to become a global leader in agribusiness. Its international

partnerships and technology transfer initiatives further underscore its role as a driver of

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210

economic complexity and global competitiveness (IPEA, 2022). These cases illustrate that

Brazil possesses the institutional and technological foundations necessary for broader

industrial upgrading. By leveraging these successful models, the country can foster

innovation-driven growth across other strategic sectors of its economy.

In addition to these three reasons, stands the recent (2026) MERCOSUR–EU partnership

is expected to raise Brazil–EU trade by BRL 94.2 billion and add roughly BRL 37 billion to

GDP by 2044, while fostering regulatory cooperation and integration into European value

chains (Agência Brasil, 2024; Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2024). Translating

these gains into durable upgrading requires progress in human capital (skilled labor).

Brazil’s 2022 PISA scores - 379 (mathematics), 410 (reading), and 403 (science) -

remain below OECD averages, with fewer than half of students reaching baseline

proficiency in maths and science (Agência Brasil, 2023; Statista, 2025). These skill gaps

constrain the diffusion of tacit, production-specific knowledge that supports

diversification into higher value activities - knowledge captured by the ECI (Teixeira,

Missio, & Dathein, 2022). Empirical evidence from Brazil indicates that higher levels of

economic complexity are positively correlated with sustained growth and structural

transformation at subnational scales, particularly when industrial policies promote

strategic diversification toward technologically proximate and more sophisticated sectors

(Romero et al., 2022; Teixeira, Missio, & Dathein, 2022). Nevertheless, human capital

remains a decisive enabling factor for this transformation, as the accumulation of tacit

knowledge and advanced skills is essential for upgrading production capabilities and

sustaining complexity-driven development.

Accordingly, the MERCOSUR–EU framework should be coupled with targeted education

and training reforms - STEM curriculum strengthening, teacher professional

development, and vocational pathways aligned with EU standards - to build the

capabilities needed for complex manufacturing and services (Agência Brasil, 2023;

Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2024). By linking market access to human capital

upgrading, Brazil can move into products closer to the core of the product space, raise

its ECI, and convert trade liberalization into sustained competitiveness and inclusive

growth (Romero et al., 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022).

Conclusion

This study set out to examine how Brazil’s economic complexity has evolved in relation

to major global powers and leading economies within the Global South, and to assess

Brazil’s relative position in the global economic. The findings reveal a concerning

trajectory: despite rising trade volumes, Brazil has experienced a steady decline in

economic complexity, losing competitive ground both globally and regionally.

Although Brazil remains a major exporter, its trade profile has become increasingly

concentrated in low value-added goods, underscoring limited progress in integrating

productive knowledge into its industrial base. Structural and institutional barriers - such

as fragmented innovation ecosystems, inadequate logistics infrastructure, and

inconsistent industrial policies - have constrained the transformative potential of trade

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expansion. Consequently, Brazil has faced challenges in sustaining its leadership role

within the Global South and in ascending global value chains. However, it is necessary to

point out that this analysis has some limitations. This study mainly relies on the ECI,

which is a single measurement criterion. Although it is powerful, it cannot fully cover the

various determinants of trade patterns. Factors such as bilateral agreements, geopolitical

relations, logistics frameworks, and specific national demand structures - all of which are

key elements shaping a country's trade content and trading partners - are beyond the

scope of ECI's research. Moreover, although the comparison method has explanatory

value, it cannot encompass all the differences in scale, history, and resource endowments

of the studied economies. These limitations indicate that although the ECI effectively

diagnoses the trend of declining trade complexity, it is still necessary to combine more

in-depth and context-specific analyses to provide targeted policy recommendations.

Nevertheless, despite these enduring constraints, the country continues to host several

domestically developed niche industries that are both globally competitive and

technologically advanced. The success of Brazil’s globally competitive and technologically

advanced niche sectors demonstrates the country’s latent capacity for broader industrial

transformation. These sectors - such as aerospace, electrical machinery, and agricultural

innovation - not only exemplify the potential of targeted industrial policy and institutional

coordination but also serve as catalysts for upgrading other segments of the economy.

Their technological spillovers, supply chain linkages, and innovation ecosystems can

foster productivity gains and knowledge diffusion across less developed industries,

promoting a more diversified and resilient industrial base. By leveraging these strategic

sectors as models and anchors, Brazil can accelerate its structural transformation,

enhance its position in global value chains, and climb the ECI. This approach aligns with

recent calls for a renewed industrial strategy that integrates long-term innovation and

sustainability goals, aiming to reverse premature deindustrialization and restore the

country’s capacity for robust, inclusive growth (Feijó, 2025).

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