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VOL 16 N1, TD2

Dossiê Temático – Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

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Outubro 2025

VOL 16 N1, TD2

Dossiê Temático

Os vinte anos da união africana: passado, presente e futuro

DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425

Editorial. Os vinte anos da união africana: passado, presente e futuro – Rui Garrido,

Mojana Vargas, Yasmine Loza – pp. 2-5

ARTIGOS

Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest – Ilo

Allaye Diall, Youba Nimaga – pp. 6-25

An African Gordian Knot? Institutional and Operational Limitations in au Conflict

Prevention and Peace Intervention Initiatives – Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

– pp. 26-42

The Civil War in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and the African Union's Role in the Peace Process

– Thais Horn – pp. 43-60

Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa – Laetitia Koechlin – pp. 61-81

As Políticas Públicas para a Educação no Direito da União Africana – Rui Garrido, Mojana

Vargas – pp. 82-102

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Outubro 2025

EDITORIAL

RUI GARRIDO

rgarrido@upt.pt

Professor auxiliar na Universidade Portucalense (Portugal). Doutor em Estudos Africanos pelo

Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, mestre em Direitos Humanos pela Universidade do Minho

e licenciado em Ciências de Comunicação pela Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro. Pós-

graduado em Direito Internacional Humanitário pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de

Lisboa e foi auditor da Defesa Nacional no Instituto da Defesa Nacional. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-2585-2571

MOJANA VARGAS

mvargas@ccsa.ufpb.br

Professora associada da Universidade Federal da Paraíba – UFPB (Brasil) e coordenadora do

NEABI-UFPB (Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas Afro-Brasileiras e Indígenas) na mesma instituição,

além do projeto "Dimensões Étnico-Raciais nas Relações Internacionais". Doutora em Estudos

Africanos pelo Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, mestre em Relações Internacionais pelo

Programa San Tiago Dantas (Unesp-Unicamp-Puc/SP), Bacharel em História pela Universidade de

São Paulo (USP). https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5353-1938

YASMINE LOZA

Yasmine.loza@upt.pt

Doutora em Direitos Humanos e Ciências Sociais (2020), concluiu o mestrado em ‘Roads to

Democracy(ies)’, na área da ciência política e relações internacional (2015) ambos na

Universidade de Coimbra (Portugal). Licenciou-se na Universidade Americana do Cairo, Egito

(2012), especializando-se em Sociologia e em Psicologia. Yasmine realizou o seu pós-

doutoramento no Centro de Estudos Internacionais do Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (2021) e

foi bolseira de investigação no Instituto Jurídico Portucalense, na Universidade Portucalense

Infante D. Henrique, Porto, Portugal (2023). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7448-8016

Como citar este editorial

Garrido, Rui, Vargas, Mojana & Loza, Yasmine (2025). Editorial. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2 - Dossiê temático – Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

Passado, Presente e Futuro, Outubro 2025, pp. 2-5. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0425ED

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2

Dossiê temático

Os vinte anos da união africana: passado, presente e futuro

Outubro 2025, pp. 2-5

Editorial – Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas, Yasmine Loza

EDITORIAL

RUI GARRIDO

MOJANA VARGAS

YASMINE LOZA

O ponto de partida da reflexão

A integração regional no continente africano é amplamente complexa e está

profundamente enraizada no ideal pan-africanista de uma África Unida. A organização

regional que surgiu no rescaldo da libertação do colonialismo – a Organização da Unidade

Africana – era limitada em termos de integração política. Com o alvorecer do novo

milénio, a União Africana emergiu como uma organização política mais robusta que a sua

antecessora. O Acto Constitutivo da União Africana, adoptado em 11 de Julho de 2000 e

que entrou em vigor em 26 de Maio de 2001, marcou uma nova era para o processo de

integração africana. A primeira Cimeira da UA teve lugar em Julho de 2002. A União

Africana traz uma natureza institucional mais complexa e uma abordagem mais

intervencionista nos assuntos africanos. A UA consagra os direitos humanos e a paz como

princípios fundamentais da organização e visa promover a prosperidade para todo o

continente. Nos seus primeiros anos, a UA foi muito activa em termos de conflitos e

questões de segurança, trazendo uma nova arquitectura de paz e segurança para África

e mecanismos regionais para lidar com conflitos regionais. A Agência da UA a este

respeito é medida pela adopção de um Conselho de Paz e Segurança da UA, bem como

pela consolidação de uma Arquitectura Africana de Paz e Segurança (APSA). A União

também desenvolveu os seus quadros institucionais de direitos humanos e justiça, à

medida que a UA desenvolveu uma abordagem baseada nos principais tratados de

direitos humanos, reformas institucionais e na remodelação de uma Arquitectura de

Justiça Africana. Mas a resistência política e a intolerância em todo o continente

constituem ameaças reais ao respeito dos direitos humanos. A UA também adoptou

políticas e instrumentos jurídicos que abordam questões em áreas-chave, como o

desenvolvimento, a integração económica e jurídica, reforçando o seu papel como actor

regional chave em África. O recente acordo sobre a Zona de Comércio Livre Continental

Africana (ZCLCA) pode alavancar o desenvolvimento económico de África e expandir a

sua influência em todo o mundo. Entretanto, África ainda luta para combater a pobreza,

as violações dos direitos humanos, a prevalência da instabilidade política e as mudanças

inconstitucionais de regime são algumas das questões que atrasam a promessa de um

continente próspero e unido. Estas são algumas das questões às quais este número

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Dossiê temático

Os vinte anos da união africana: passado, presente e futuro

Outubro 2025, pp. 2-5

Editorial – Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas, Yasmine Loza

especial procurou dar resposta, fazendo uma avaliação dos primeiros vinte anos da União

Africana e os desafios para o processo de integração africana nas suas diferentes

dinâmicas.

Olhares sobre os vinte anos da União Africana

Os artigos selecionados para compor este número especial procuram trazer respostas a

essas e outras questões. Nos vinte anos de sua existência, as questões relacionadas à

segurança continental continuam entre as prioridades políticas da entidade e dos

analistas. Prova disso é o artigo apresentado por Diall e Nimaga, que se debruçam sobre

os mecanismos coletivos de segurança, em particular a Arquitetura Africana de Paz e

Segurança (APSA, na sigla em inglês), em paralelo à atuação da CEDEAO (ECOWAS, na

sigla em inglês), analisando a sua efetividade na prevenção e na resolução de conflitos

em nível continental e sub-regional e, identificando avanços e limitações dessa atuação.

Na mesma linha, o artigo de Afolabi e Kadoglu Chen, também analisa a Arquitetura

Africana de Paz e Segurança (APSA, na sigla em inglês), sob a ótica da avaliação do

Conselho de Paz e Segurança da União Africana (PSC, na sigla em inglês) e do

Departamento de Assuntos Políticos, Paz e Segurança da União Africana (AU-PAPS). Os

autores avaliam os diferentes mecanismos de ação e instrumentos normativos instituídos

para o funcionamento da APSA e apontam para a necessidade de mudanças estruturais,

não apenas dos mecanismos já existentes, mas também no aprofundamento da

supranacionalidade da UA e no reforço das capacidades da organização para enfrentar

as causas profundas dos conflitos entre os estados, que atualmente são bastante

limitadas, a exemplo dos Acordos de Pretória de 2022.

Fechando o tópico das questões de segurança e conflituosidade, o artigo de Horn traz

um estudo de caso sobre o conflito entre a Etiópia e os rebeldes da Frente de Libertação

do Povo do Tigray, próximo à fronteira da Eritreia. A autora avalia a atuação da União

Africana durante as negociações de paz, demonstrando que a atuação diplomática da UA

foi eficiente para provocar a abertura do diálogo entre as partes e o sucesso das

negociações representou um importante avanço da capacidade institucional de solucionar

conflitos. Entretanto, o artigo também discute a incapacidade de implementar

integralmente as ações pós-conflito, sobretudo o desarmamento e a desmobilização,

criando condições para a emergência de um novo enfrentamento.

O trabalho de Laetitia Koechilin acrescenta uma contribuição importante para a reflexão

mais ampla a respeito da atuação da União Africana nesses vinte anos de trajetória, ao

abordar um tema central na própria origem da entidade: o acesso dos povos indígenas

à justiça. A autora discute as muitas situações de discriminação e marginalização de

populações que não são reconhecidas efetivamente como cidadãs pelos estados nacionais

do continente e, consequentemente, ficam incapazes de proteger e acessar seus direitos.

Por meio de dois estudos de caso, Koechlin analisa os avanços e limites da União Africana

em sua função de promover justiça restaurativa para as populações indígenas e

tradicionais do continente, apesar do arcabouço normativo no campo dos Direitos

Humanos à disposição da entidade.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2

Dossiê temático

Os vinte anos da união africana: passado, presente e futuro

Outubro 2025, pp. 2-5

Editorial – Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas, Yasmine Loza

Fecha este dossiê, o trabalho de Garrido e Vargas, o qual aborda as políticas públicas

instituídas pela União Africana no campo da Educação. Entendendo a educação como um

tópico associado às necessidades de desenvolvimento económico e humano do

continente africano, os autores recuperam o conjunto das normas e diretrizes instituídas

pela UA para promover políticas educacionais em nível continental e sub-regional.

Concluem que, apesar do amplo enquadramento normativo e respetiva tradução em

políticas públicas abrangentes, o sub-financiamento da organização coloca desafios

significativos à implementação dessas políticas.

Este dossiê trouxe à discussão pontos diversos da agência da União em matérias tão

diversas da política africana. Estes trabalhos, ainda que circunscritos, são ilustrativos de

uma África plural, que carece de um resgate epistemológico e de uma reflexão académica

crítica sobre o continente.

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Octobre 2025

REGARD RETROSPECTIF SUR L’ARCHITECTURE DE PAIX ET DE SECURITE EN

AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST

ILO ALLAYE DIALL

ilodiall@yahoo.fr

Enseignant-chercheur à la Faculté de Droit Public de l’Université des Sciences Juridiques et

Politiques de Bamako (Mali).

YOUBA NIMAGA

youbanimagaj@yahoo.fr

Enseignant-Chercheur à la Faculté de Droit Public de l’Université Kurukanfuga de Bamako (Mali).

Résumé

La sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest, ainsi que sur l’ensemble du continent africain, demeure un

enjeu majeur pour la stabilité et le développement. Ce constat prévaut malgré la mise en

place, depuis les années 1990, de divers mécanismes juridiques et institutionnels, tant au

niveau continental avec l’Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA) qu’au niveau

sous-régional par la CEDEAO. Toutefois, un décalage persistant entre les objectifs affichés et

l’efficacité concrète des dispositifs reste observable, notamment face à l’émergence de

nouvelles formes de conflictualité telles que le terrorisme, les coups d’État ou les crises

institutionnelles. Dès lors, deux problématiques principales se présentent : dans quelle

mesure l’APSA, dont l’objectif est de promouvoir l’appropriation africaine des questions de

paix et de sécurité, parvient-elle effectivement à répondre aux situations de crise ? Et

comment les mécanismes ouest-africains, particulièrement ceux de la CEDEAO, peuvent-ils

être articulés de façon optimale avec le cadre continental afin de garantir une sécurité durable

et souveraine en Afrique de l’Ouest?

Mots clés

Sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest, Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA), CEDEAO,

UA, Gouvernance sécuritaire.

Abstract

Security in West Africa, as well as across the African continent, remains a major challenge for

stability and development. This reality persists despite the establishment, since the 1990s of

various legal and institutional mechanisms, both at the continental level with the African Peace

and Security Architecture (APSA) and at the sub-regional level through ECOWAS. However, a

persistent gap between stated objectives and the actual effectiveness of these mechanisms

remains evident, particularly in the face of emerging forms of conflict such as terrorism, coups

d’état, and institutional crises. Accordingly, two main questions arise: to what extent has

APSA, whose objective is to promote African ownership of peace and security issues,

effectively responded to crisis situations? And how can West African mechanisms, particularly

those of ECOWAS, be optimally articulated with the continental framework to ensure durable

and sovereign security in West Africa?

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Dossier Thématique - Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

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Octobre 2025, pp. 6-25

Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest

Ilo Allaye Diall, Youba Nimaga

Keywords

Security in West Africa, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), ECOWAS, AU,

Security Governance.

Comment citer cet article

Diall, Ilo Allaye & Nimaga, Youba (2025). Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De

Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL. 16, Nº. 1, TD

2 – Dossier thématique – “Os Vinte Anos da União Africana: Passado, Presente e Futuro”.

Octobre 2025, pp. 6-25. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425.1

Article reçu le 29 octobre 2024 et accepté pour publication le 24 juillet 2025.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2

Dossier Thématique - Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

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Octobre 2025, pp. 6-25

Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest

Ilo Allaye Diall, Youba Nimaga

REGARD RÉTROSPECTIF SUR L’ARCHITECTURE DE PAIX ET DE

SÉCURITÉ EN AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST

ILO ALLAYE DIALL

YOUBA NIMAGA

Introduction

L’article 15 du traité de l’UEMOA dispose que: «Les États membres se consultent en vue

de prendre en commun les dispositions nécessaires afin d’éviter que le fonctionnement

de l'Union ne soit affecté par les mesures que l’un d'eux pourrait être amené à prendre

en cas de troubles intérieurs graves affectant l’ordre public, de guerre ou de tension

internationale grave constituant une menace de guerre»? Faut-il entendre par là que

l’Union ambitionne de s’organiser en vue de maintenir un climat de paix et de sécurité

en son sein?

En effet, c’est lors du Sommet de l'UEMOA de 2007, qu’il a été retenu que «le

développement durable se construit dans la paix et la sécurité»

. Cette phrase est riche

d’enseignements et souligne toute la problématique de la sécurité dans une région qui

se veut intégrée.

Le concept de sécurité est très large. Il est pluridimensionnel et traduit un état

économique, alimentaire, social, politique, humain etc. La sécurité est l'état d'un sujet

(individuel et collectif) qui s'estime non menacé ou dispose de capacités de réponses

Sigles et abréviations: AES: Alliance des États du Sahel; ANAD: Accord de Non-Agression et d’Assistance en

matière de Défense ; APSA: Architecture de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique ; CADHP: Cour Africaine des Droits

de l’Homme et des Peuples ; CARIC: Capacité Africaine de Réponse Immédiate aux Crises ; CEAO:

Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (prédécesseur de la CEDEAO) ; CEDEAO: Communauté

Économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ; CEEAC: Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique

Centrale ; CIJ: Cour Internationale de Justice ; CPS: Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité (Union africaine) ; ECOMOG:

Force de Surveillance du Cessez-le-feu de la CEDEAO (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring

Group) ; FAA: Forces Africaines en Attente ; GIABA: Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le

Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique de l’Ouest ; MICOPAX: Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République

Centrafricain ; MINUSMA: Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali

MISMA: Mission Internationale de Soutien au Mali (sous conduite africaine, 2012–2013) ; ONU: Organisation

des Nations Unies ; OUA: Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (remplacée par l’UA en 2002) ; PNUD: Programme

des Nations Unies pour le Développement ; UA: Union Africaine ; UEMOA: Union Économique et Monétaire

Ouest Africaine ; ZLECAf: Zone de Libre-Échange Continentale Africaine.

Voir aussi la Déclaration de Lomé du 23 juin 1997, «… la Conférence des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement

rappelle le lien étroit entre la paix, la sécurité, la stabilité et le développement et réitère, dans cette optique,

la nécessité urgente de créer une Force africaine de paix… Les États membres affirment leur disponibilité à y

prendre part sous l’autorité de l’ONU et de l’OUA (UA)».

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Dossier Thématique - Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

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Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest

Ilo Allaye Diall, Youba Nimaga

satisfaisantes en affrontant des dangers réels ou anticipés

. Bien que l’Espace UEMOA

soit considéré comme la zone la plus intégrée de l’Afrique de l’Ouest,

l’on constate

toutefois, au sein des différents pays, des zones d'insécurité ou de fortes tensions. La

situation économique, pour être vigoureuse, contraste avec le manque de sécurité.

Cet aspect participatif que la Déclaration de l’Union appelle de ses vœux doit être compris

au sens large, c’est-à-dire, l’interdépendance dans le triptyque paix-sécurité

développement pour garantir une sécurité humaine aux ressortissants communautaires.

Pour faire échos à l’Avis de la CIJ, elle doit s’entendre non seulement sur le plan financier,

mais également militaire

. La budgétisation des opérations de maintien de la paix serait,

en soi, un élément propre à faire englober celles-ci dans l’objet de l’Union

. Une autre

des actions de l’Union réside dans l’établissement d’un mécanisme interne d’alerte et de

suivi des conflits par une résolution du 20 juillet 2003 adoptée par le Comité Inter

Parlementaire de l’Union qui considère que la recherche de la paix est un exercice collectif

régi par les règles et principes universellement admis de bonne gouvernance.

En dehors de ces déclarations d’ordre général, l’Union n’a pas, en tout cas dans ses textes

fondateurs, créé un système de défense collective propre à elle. Peut-être, les propos du

professeur TALL

peuvent-ils aider à la compréhension de cet état de fait ? Même s’il

pense que, quels que soient les caractères spéciaux ou avérés des arguments donnant

un poids à des mécanismes de l’UA ou de la CEDEAO, ils ne sauraient en tout état de

cause constituer des obstacles dirimants à la mise en place d’un chantier propre à

l’UEMOA. Il estime, en effet, que l’Union pourra s’inscrire, sans doute, dans les articles

52 et 53

de la Charte des Nations Unies et rester fidèle aux objectifs de la CEDEAO

Voir Pascal BONIFACE, «L'environnement de sécurité et le processus de construction de la paix en Afrique de

l'ouest». Étude réalisée en qualité de Consultant Indépendant, Octobre-Décembre 2006.

Propos tenus lors de la troisième réunion institutionnelle UEMOA-CEDEAO, les 7 et 8 février 2005 à

Ouagadougou.

Voir Avis in Affaire des Dépenses des Nations Unies (Réc. 1962).

Voir Alioune SALL, Les mutations de l’intégration en Afrique de l’Ouest : une approche institutionnelle. Éditions

L'Harmattan, 2006, p. 138.

Voir S. N. TALL, «Pour un cadre institutionnel, organique et juridique de la paix et de la sécurité dans l’espace

francophone ouest-africain (UEMOA)» p. 194, in L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique, bilan et

perspectives, Actes des colloques de Bordeaux et Ouagadougou des 30 novembre 2012 et 24-25 octobre 2013,

organisés par l’Université de Bordeaux (CERCADI-GRECCAP) et l’Université de Ouaga 2 (CEEI), M. F. NAUGARET

et L. M. IBRIGA (dir.), L’harmattan, 2014, p.312.

Cf. charte de l’ONU, articles 52 «(1) Aucune disposition de la présente Charte ne s'oppose à l'existence

d'accords ou d'organismes régionaux destinés à régler les affaires qui, touchant au maintien de la paix et de la

sécurité internationales, se prêtent à une action de caractère régional, pourvu que ces accords ou ces

organismes et leur activité soient compatibles avec les buts et les principes des Nations Unies. (2) Les Membres

des Nations Unies qui concluent ces accords ou constituent ces organismes doivent faire tous leurs efforts pour

régler d'une manière pacifique, par le moyen desdits accords ou organismes, les différends d'ordre local, avant

de les soumettre au Conseil de sécurité. (3) Le Conseil de sécurité encourage le développement du règlement

pacifique des différends d'ordre local par le moyen de ces accords ou de ces organismes régionaux, soit sur

l'initiative des États intéressés, soit sur renvoi du Conseil de sécurité…», et 53 «(1) Le Conseil de sécurité

utilise, s'il y a lieu, les accords ou organismes régionaux pour l'application des mesures coercitives prises sous

son autorité. Toutefois, aucune action coercitive ne sera entreprise en vertu d'accords régionaux ou par des

organismes régionaux sans l'autorisation du Conseil de sécurité; sont exceptées les mesures contre tout État

ennemi au sens de la définition donnée au paragraphe 2 du présent Article, prévues en application de l'Article

107 ou dans les accords régionaux dirigés contre la reprise, par un tel État, d'une politique d'agression,

jusqu'au moment où l'Organisation pourra, à la demande des gouvernements intéressés, être chargée de la

tâche de prévenir toute nouvelle agression de la part d'un tel État. (2) Le terme « État ennemi », employé au

paragraphe 1 du présent Article, s'applique à tout État qui, au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale, a été

l'ennemi de l'un quelconque des signataires de la présente Charte».

Voir préambule du traité de l’Union, paragraphe 1.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

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VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2

Dossier Thématique - Os Vinte Anos da União Africana:

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Octobre 2025, pp. 6-25

Regard Rétrospectif sur L’architecture de Paix et De Sécurité en Afrique de l’ouest

Ilo Allaye Diall, Youba Nimaga

Faut-il rappeler que tous les États membres de l’UEMOA sont aussi membres de la

CEDEAO, organisation plus vieille qu’elle.

En effet, la communauté internationale s’inscrit fortement aux côtés des organisations

régionales et les utilise, d’ailleurs très souvent, pour résoudre des crises ou des conflits

qui peuvent avoir des ramifications internationales. Pour bien comprendre ce phénomène

des Nations Unies, il est judicieux de se souvenir de l’Agenda pour la paix de Boutros-

Ghali. En fait, cet Agenda a été élaboré dans un contexte marquant des relations

internationales. Il s’agit de la fin de la guerre froide, le monde, bipolaire jusqu’alors,

entendait souffler dans la même trompette et profiter de cette deuxième chance de paix

universelle

que lui conférait la fin du risque d’un conflit mondial pouvant être déclenché

par un affrontement entre les superpuissances. Pour ce faire, il y a eu une réunion des

Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement de l’ONU au Conseil de Sécurité pour réfléchir à la

responsabilité du Conseil quant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales.

Faut-il le rappeler, cette instance suprême du système des Nations Unies, garante de la

sécurité et de la paix universelle a été bloquée pendant plusieurs décennies du fait de la

guerre froide

. Cette réunion fut sanctionnée par une Déclaration solennelle (S/23500)

qui a salué l’avènement d'une ère nouvelle porteuse de l'espoir de l'avènement d'un

monde plus sûr, plus équitable et plus humain, ainsi que les progrès accomplis vers la

démocratie et le respect des droits de l'Homme. Elle prend acte aussi des nouveaux

risques pour la stratégie et la sécurité résultant des changements survenus et

l'importance de renforcer et d'améliorer l'efficacité de l'ONU pour faire face aux nouveaux

défis auxquels la communauté internationale est confrontée

Ainsi, la Déclaration invita le Secrétaire général à élaborer une étude et des

recommandations «sur le moyen de renforcer la capacité de l'Organisation dans les

domaines de la diplomatie préventive

, du maintien et du rétablissement de la paix, et

sur la façon d'accroître son efficacité, dans le cadre des dispositions de la Charte

». Elle

Voir Emmanuel KANT, Projet de paix perpétuelle, Broché, éd. Nathan, coll. Les Intégrales de Philo, juillet

2006 ; voir Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (1758), à propos du doux commerce, édition établie par Laurent

Versini, professeur à la Sorbonne. Paris : Éd. Gallimard, 1995 (2 volumes : vol I : pp. 1 à 604 ; vol. II : pp.

605 à 1628.) Collection folio Essais, disponible sur http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1522/cla.moc.del8.

Voir Agenda pour la paix, Assemblée Générale, quarante-septième (47ème) session, point 10 de la liste

préliminaire (A/47/50), Rapport du Secrétaire Général sur l'activité de l'organisation A/47/277- S/24111

/Français du 17 juin 1992 : «Depuis la création de l'organisation des Nations Unies en 1945, plus d'une centaine

de conflits majeurs ont éclaté dans le monde, qui ont provoqué la mort de 20 millions d'êtres humains environ.

L'ONU est restée impuissante devant le nombre de ces crises en raison des vetos - au nombre de 279 - opposés

à l'action du Conseil de sécurité, qui illustrent bien les divisions de l'époque».

L'Agenda de la Paix du Secrétaire général B. Boutros-Ghali - Persée, https://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066-

3085_1992_num_38_1_3062.

Selon Christian SCHRICKE, la diplomatie préventive est une notion que Dag HAMMARSKJOLD avait déjà

développée dans ses introductions au rapport annuel du Secrétaire général. Voir Christian SCHRICKE, p. 4,

L'Agenda de la Paix du Secrétaire général B. Boutros-Ghali - Analyses et premières réactions. In: Annuaire

français de droit international, volume 38, 1992. pp. 11-31.

Voir Agenda pour la paix, op. cit. p. 6 : «La diplomatie préventive a pour objet d'éviter que des différends

ne surgissent entre les parties, d'empêcher qu'un différend existant ne se transforme en conflit ouvert et, si un

conflit éclate, de faire en sorte qu'il s'étende le moins possible. Le rétablissement de la paix vise à rapprocher

des parties hostiles, essentiellement par des moyens pacifiques tels que ceux prévus au Chapitre VI de la

Charte des Nations Unies. Le maintien de la paix consiste à établir une présence des Nations Unies sur le

terrain, ce qui n'a jusqu'à présent été fait qu'avec l'assentiment de toutes les parties concernées, et s'est

normalement traduit par un déploiement d'effectifs militaires et/ou de police des Nations Unies ainsi, dans bien

des cas, que de personnel civil. Cette technique élargit les possibilités de prévention des conflits aussi bien que

de rétablissement de la paix». Un autre terme novateur dans le droit international a vu le jour dans cet Agenda,

il s’agit de la consolidation de la paix, qui, après les conflits, est une action menée en vue de définir et d'étayer

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suggérait que l'étude porte notamment sur «l’identification des crises potentielles et

zones d’instabilité», la contribution des organisations régionales, les besoins en

ressources matérielles et financières, l'efficacité des plans et des opérations du

Secrétariat, l'usage de bons offices et autres fonctions que la Charte confère au

Secrétaire général. Après avoir souligné la résolution des membres du Conseil à prendre

des «mesures concrètes» pour renforcer l'efficacité de l'ONU dans les domaines du

désarmement, de la maîtrise des armements et de la non-prolifération, la déclaration est

conclue par l'expression de leur plein appui au nouveau Secrétaire général dans ses

efforts de renforcement de l'efficacité du système des Nations Unies, au moment où la

conjoncture mondiale est la plus propice à la paix et à la sécurité internationales qui ait

existé depuis la fondation de l'ONU. L’étude, du Secrétaire général, nommée a été

présentée devant l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU le 30 juin 1992, réalisant ainsi le vœu

du Conseil de sécurité pour que toutes les nations y participent

C’est ainsi qu’il fait appel au Conseil de sécurité pour réactiver le chapitre VIII de la

Charte et les exhorte à prévoir l’utilisation des organismes régionaux pour l’application

des mesures coercitives décidées, mais aussi une action coercitive propre à ces

organismes sous réserve de l’autorisation du Conseil. Pour pallier le manque de

définitions de ces organismes, Boutros-Ghali adopte une interprétation extensive de la

Charte et y reconnait les organisations créées par un traité, les organisations de sécurité

et de défense mutuelles, ou les organisations destinées à assurer le développement

régional, mais aussi les groupes d'États créés de façon ad hoc pour traiter d'une question

particulière, politique, économique ou sociale

. C’est dans ce contexte que les

organisations régionales africaines, en général, et ouest-africaines, en particulier, ont fait

siennes les préoccupations d’ordre sécuritaires

Étant donné qu’elle fait partie des benjamines de ces organisations, l’on comprend alors,

aisément, que l’UEMOA n’a fait que s’inscrire dans les objectifs sécuritaires de ses

devancières, notamment la CEDEAO, qui est la seule organisation d’envergure de l’Ouest

africain (seule reconnue par l’Union africaine comme Communauté Economique

Régionale de l’Afrique de l’Ouest).

Les situations de conflit qui sont répertoriées dans l’Ouest africain résultent de

l’enchevêtrement de facteurs ayant chacun leur propre logique. Réactualisation de

tensions séculaires non résolues, atteintes aux principes constitutionnels, migrations non

les structures propres à raffermir la paix afin d'éviter une reprise des hostilités. La diplomatie préventive vise

à régler les conflits avant que la violence n’éclate ; le rétablissement et le maintien de la paix ont pour objet

de mettre fin aux conflits et de préserver la paix une fois qu'elle a été instaurée. En cas de succès, l'une et les

autres -débouchent sur la consolidation de la paix après les conflits, contribuant ainsi à empêcher que les actes

de violence ne reprennent entre les nations et les peuples». pp. 6-7. L’on peut par la même occasion parler

d’une autre novation que constituent les unités d’imposition de la paix, «… je recommande que le Conseil

envisage de faire appel, dans des circonstances clairement définies, à des unités d'imposition de la paix dont

le mandat serait défini à l'avance. Ces unités, fournies par des États Membres, et composées de militaires qui

se seraient portés volontaires, seraient tenues en réserve. Il faudrait qu'elles soient plus lourdement armées

que les forces de maintien de la paix et qu'elles bénéficient d'un entrainement préparatoire approfondi dans les

cadres des armées nationales…», pp. 14-15.

Voir Christian Schricke, L'Agenda de la Paix du Secrétaire général B. Boutros-Ghali…, op. cit. p. 12.

Voir pour cette question en général le commentaire de l'article 53 de la Charte in «La Charte des Nations

Unies», éd. Economica/Bruyland, sous la direction de J.P. Cot et A. PELLET, cité par Schrike op. Cit. p. 10

En effet, le début des années de la dernière décennie du XXème siècle a vu un renouveau des organisations

sous régionales africaines par des réformes structurelles et institutionnelles importantes.

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contrôlées, conflits identitaires de minorités, banditisme, terrorisme etc, entre autres

sont les facteurs de naissance de ces conflits. Ils sont intranationaux tout en ayant une

dimension régionale par le biais des groupes armés terroristes se déversant dans des

pays voisins

. L’élargissement des frontières nationales à celui des organisations sous-

régionales d’intégration peut rendre encore plus difficile la lutte contre l’insécurité au sein

de l’espace communautaire. Cet état de fait impose une étude d’ensemble du système

de lutte contre l’insécurité en Afrique de façon générale, et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest en

particulier notamment à l’heure de la recomposition géopolitique de la région via le

partenariat et l’influence des nouvelles.

Ainsi, il ressort de cette analyse la problématique suivante : quel regard rétrospectif sur

la paix et la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest ?

Elle se justifie aisément au regard des cadres d'intégration économique en Afrique,

spécifiquement l’UEMOA et la CEDEAO. Les textes fondateurs du premier omettent

délibérément toute prévision d'un système autonome de défense collective, reléguant la

gestion des crises sécuritaires à la CEDEAO, elle-même intégrée à l'Architecture africaine

de paix et de sécurité (APSA) de l'Union africaine en tant que seule Communauté

Economique Régionale reconnue. Or cette délégation en cascade mérite d’être analysée,

car malgré la multiplication des mécanismes juridiques et institutionnels depuis les

années 1990, l'efficacité opérationnelle des organisations reste peu efficace. Ce qui invite

à s'interroger sur la capacité réelle des dispositifs continentaux (UA) et sous-régionaux

(CEDEAO/UEMOA) à répondre aux défis sécuritaires africains multiformes. Pour éclairer

cette problématique, il convient d'examiner les mutations normatives ayant façonné

l'APSA, d'analyser ses éventuelles lacunes capacitives compromettant ses ambitions,

d'étudier comment la CEDEAO et l'UEMOA adaptent leurs outils de prévention et gestion

des conflits aux nouvelles conflictualités (terrorisme, coups d'État), et de tirer des

enseignements des interventions déjà faites sur le continent et dans la sous-région ouest

africaine.

Ne prétendant pas l’exhaustivité, il sera juste question d’analyser les principaux

mécanismes mis en place pour lutter contre l’insécurité au niveau continental (1) et voir

comment le mécanisme régional de l’Afrique de l’Ouest s’articule avec les prescriptions

continentales (2). En effet, depuis le renouveau du modèle d’intégration des grands

ensembles régionaux africains, l’on assiste à une tentative d’appropriation du continent

des voies et moyens pour parvenir à résoudre par lui-même les innombrables conflits

qu’il voit inlassablement naître.

Lire OCDE/CSAO (2020), Géographie des conflits en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, Cahiers de l'Afrique de

l'Ouest, Éditions OCDE, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4b0abf5e-fr. Lire aussi Christian Sambou, Les conflits

armés ouest-africains: Sénégal, Mali et Côte-d’Ivoire. Lecture des guerres pour la reconnaissance. Science

politique. Université Paris-Saclay, 2021, p.487.

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I. L’Architecture de Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique, une œuvre de

l’Union Africaine

La sécurité a longtemps hanté les pays africains depuis l’aube de leurs indépendances. À

travers les grands ensembles régionaux qu’ils constituaient, ils ont tant bien que mal,

avec l’appui de l’ex-colonisateur, essayé de résoudre toutes les formes de menace

sécuritaire les touchant. Ces États nouvellement indépendants en quête de devenir des

Nations, ont été créés dans des situations périlleuses, marquées par des rivalités

idéologiques parfois contraires, essayeront d’organiser leur sécurité collective. C’est dans

ce contexte que les premières organisations régionales postcoloniales se mettaient dans

une posture de défense collective contre des troubles venus de l’étranger, posture qui

s’inscrivit moins dans une optique d’intégration supranationale en matière de défense,

mais plutôt dans des préoccupations défensives chargées de psychose

. Aujourd’hui, la

sécurité continentale est appréhendée à travers l’Architecture de Paix et de sécurité en

Afrique (APSA) dont les bases sont jetées par le Protocole relatif à la création du Conseil

de paix et de sécurité (CPS), adopté à Durban (Afrique du Sud) en juillet 2002, et entré

en vigueur en décembre 2003. Il est alors intéressant de comprendre les évolutions qui

ont conduit à son institution (A) mais aussi les éventuelles limites (B) qui l’empêchent

d’endiguer les problèmes sécuritaires du continent.

A. Historique et fondement juridico-institutionnel de l’APSA

Dans les années 1960, l’Union des États Africains (UEA), confrontée aux nombreux

mouvements d’indépendance, a envisagé la mise en place d’un système de défense

commun. Celui-ci devait permettre la mobilisation conjointe des ressources disponibles

afin d’assurer la protection de tout membre de l’Union en cas d’agression

. La

Conférence d’Addis-Abeba de 1963, qui vit la naissance de l’OUA, donna l’occasion à

Nkrumah (Premier Président du Ghana) de préconiser un système de défense commun

avec un Haut commandement africain en vue d’assurer la stabilité et la sécurité de

l’Afrique, ce qui fut sanctionné par l’établissement d’une Commission de défense par la

Charte, Commission

dont le rôle serait d’être un organe consultatif de préparation et

de recommandation pour la défense collective ou l’autodéfense des États membres contre

tout acte ou menace d’agression

L’inefficacité de la Commission de médiation, de conciliation et d’arbitrage conduisit très

vite l’OUA à imaginer des moyens palliatifs, au nombre desquels, il existe des

mécanismes ad hoc à travers des comités spéciaux et de petites structures portant le

Voir SALL, op. cit. p.133.

Idem.

En réalité il existait aussi une Commission de médiation, de conciliation et d’arbitrage instituée par l’article

19 de la Charte de l’OUA, «Les États membres s’engagent à régler leurs différends par des voies pacifiques. A

cette fin, ils créent une Commission de médiation, de conciliation et d’arbitrage, dont la composition et les

conditions de fonctionnement sont définies par un protocole distinct, approuvé par la Conférence des Chefs

d’État et de Gouvernement. Ce protocole est considéré comme faisant partie intégrante de la présente Charte».

Cette Commission recommanda en 1965 la création d’une Organisation africaine de défense indépendante

sur la base du volontariat des États. Voir de façon générale sur ces questions V. H. SIKONDO, La sécurité des

États africains dans le système international contemporain : aspect politiques, diplomatiques et juridiques,

Thèse Reims 1986 ; M. A. BARRY, La prévention des conflits en Afrique de l’Ouest : mythes ou réalités ?

Karthala, 1997. Cité par SALL, op. cit. p. 134.

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nom de commissions de conciliation crées par le Conseil des ministres. Il arriva même

que la Conférence des Chefs d’État

soit mise à profit pour dénouer des situations

tendues et conflictuelles

Il a fallu attendre les années 1990 pour que les réalités politiques changent et offrent un

vrai climat propice à l’organisation de réels mécanismes de défense africains. La

Déclaration du Caire de 1993 qui crée un Mécanisme pour la prévention, la gestion et le

règlement des conflits

, en est une illustration parfaite.

C’est dans ce contexte que l’Organisation pour l’Unité Africaine (OUA) fut transformée en

Union Africaine (UA), dont le processus a commencé lors du Sommet de Syrte de 1999

et s’acheva à Durban en mai 2002, pour reconstruire l’unité africaine avec pour ambition

de renouveler et consolider le projet de l’intégration politique et socio-économique du

continent, la défense de la souveraineté de ses États membres et la promotion de la paix

et de la sécurité

. Ce faisant, l’organe qui intéresse une étude de la sécurité en Afrique

se porte sur le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité (CPS), instituée, ceteris paribus, à l’image

du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU. À titre de comparaison, à part l’existence de membres

permanents et de membres non permanents, il comporte aussi quinze (15) membres.

Mais il y a la possibilité d’une certaine permanence par la prolongation de la durée

d’occupation du siège puisque les Etats sortants peuvent se présenter immédiatement

pour être de nouveau membre

. Pour rappel, lors des négociations pour définir le cadre

conceptuel et institutionnel du CPS, les États ambitieux comme le Nigéria voulaient

entièrement retenir la formule existante au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU mais

l’argumentation du président Konaré atténua ces positions

. L’aide des pressions

Selon, KPODAR «La politique de défense commune en Afrique » in L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en

Afrique op. cit. p. 33, l’échec de ces commissions/comités ad hoc s’explique par le fait qu’il a toujours été

difficile d’obtenir l’accord des États membres pour la tenue des rencontres régulières. C’est ce qui a justifié la

diplomatie des pèlerins solitaires de la paix.»

Voir Article 37 du Règlement intérieur de la Conférence des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement, «La Conférence

peut créer les comités ad hoc et autres groupes de travail temporaires qu’elle jugera nécessaires» et l’Article

36 du Règlement intérieur du Conseil des ministres, «le Conseil des ministres peut instituer tous comités ad

hoc et groupes temporaires de travail qu’il juge nécessaire». Il faut noter qu’à titre d’exemples de réussite de

ces Comités, l’on peut citer la Commission ad hoc sur le différend algéro-marocain qui a fonctionné de 1963 à

1967, le Comité ad hoc sur les différends interafricains créé en juillet 1977 qui a notamment réglé le conflit

entre l’Ouganda et la Tanzanie, le Comité des bons offices des huit sur le différend Somalie-Éthiopie créé par

la dixième session ordinaire de la Conférence en mai 1973, la Commission ad hoc présidée par le président

Kenyatta envoyée en 1964 au Congo (Léopoldville), au Congo (Brazzaville) et au Burundi, ou encore le Comité

permanent sur le Tchad dans les années 1980. Cité par Delphine LECOUTRE, p. 2 in L’Afrique contemporaine -

Eté 2004, pp. 131-162, Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine, clef d’une nouvelle architecture

de stabilité en Afrique? Plus loin elle fait un répertoire complet des causes de l’incapacité criarde du Mécanisme

(voir pp. 4-7). Ces remarques basées sur une étude réalisée en l’an 2000, pour l’International Peace Academy,

par Margaret Vogt et Monde Muyangwa (p. 32) arrive à la conclusion que, d’une part, l’OUA était restée un

acteur périphérique dans la plupart des conflits du fait de l’ampleur de la tâche, de son manque d’expérience

dans le domaine de leur gestion, des contraintes organisationnelles et financières, ainsi que de l’absence de

consensus international sur les rôles impartis respectivement à l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) et à

l’OUA ; et que, d’autre part, les principes consacrés par la Charte de l’OUA limitaient son rôle dans la gestion

des conflits dans la mesure où le respect de la souveraineté nationale entravait une intervention effective dans

les conflits internes.

Ce Mécanisme fut incorporé à l’OUA lors du Sommet de Lusaka en juillet 2001, cf. Rapport du Secrétaire

Général (EAHG/Déc.1(V)) ; AHG/Déc.160 (XXXVII) ; CM/2210 (LXXIV). Voir aussi DJENA WEMBOU : «A propos

du Mécanisme de l’OUA sur les conflits», RGDIP, 1994, pp. 377 et suivants.

Voir utilement https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ua-en-bref-fr-.pdf

Voir https://au.int/fr/cps

Allocution d’Alpha Oumar Konaré, président de la République du Mali, au XXXVIIe sommet de l’OUA, Lusaka,

9-11 juillet 2001, pp. 8-9., «… nous devons reconnaître que, dans toute entreprise commune, il y a une

locomotive et des wagons ; il nous faut admettre qu’il y a des pays leaders dont la part dans la répartition des

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internationales actuelles pour un renouveau du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU n’y est pas

étranger aussi. L’opposition, farouche, des États plus faibles du continent, aussi, y a une

marque. Le choix de l’absence de droit de veto s’inscrit dans la logique de ne laisser

aucun État puissant l’instrumentaliser à d’autres fins. Ils peuvent aussi être tentés de

l’utiliser contre des États voisins qui peuvent être en conflit avec eux.

Le CPS ne figurait pas dans les prévisions de création de l’Acte constitutif de l’UA

. En

fait, il est le résultat de l’incorporation du Mécanisme de gestion des conflits à

l’organisation (fait lors du Sommet de Lusaka). Il a pris corps réellement en 2002, lors

du lancement officiel de l’UA à Durban.

Dans un tel contexte, l’on est en droit de se demander, si elle est réellement en mesure

d’exercer le pouvoir d’harmoniser et de coordonner les efforts visant à combattre le

terrorisme international, et toutes les formes d’insécurité au niveau continental et

régional

B. Limites structurelles et efficacité relative : le fossé entre normes et

pratiques

L’écart entre les avancées normatives et les réalités opérationnelles se manifeste avec

acuité dans l’action de l’Union africaine (UA). Alors que son Conseil de paix et de sécurité

(CPS), son Groupe de Sages

et son Comité d’état-major

incarnent des innovations

majeures par rapport à l’OUA, offrant un cadre intégré d’alerte précoce, de médiation et

de commandement unifié

. Le cadre institutionnel est confronté à des limites

structurelles entamant son efficacité. La dépendance aux interventions externes révèle

une autonomie compromise. Deux cas peuvent illustrer ce fait. Lors de l’éclatement de

la crise malienne en 2012, la MISMA s’est d’abord alignée sur l’opération française au

Mali (Serval)

avant de se fondre complètement dans le dispositif onusien qu’est la

MINUSMA. Le même scenario s’est produit avec le cas centrafricain. Plus criant encore

responsabilités devrait être plus grande que celle des autres. Ceci est une réalité. Nous devons envisager cette

démarche dans une vision démocratique et non de gendarme, et la traduire en comportement pour avancer

vers la réalisation de nos objectifs majeurs…».

Les Chefs d’État se sont basés sur l’article 5 alinéa 2 de l’Acte, « (2) La Conférence peut décider de créer

d’autres organes » pour créer le CPS, « Il est créé, au sein de l'Union, conformément à l’Article 5(2) de l’Acte

constitutif, un Conseil de paix et de sécurité…», cf. article 2 du protocole sur la création du CPS.

Cf. article 7, point « i » du Protocole relatif à la création du conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’union africaine

(disponible sur https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-fr.pdf).

Le Groupe des sages est composé de cinq personnalités africaines, hautement respectées, venant des

diverses couches de la société et qui ont apporté une contribution exceptionnelle à la cause de la paix, de la

sécurité et du développement sur le continent. Elles sont sélectionnées par le Président de la Commission,

après consultation des États membres concernés, sur la base de la représentation régionale et nommées pour

une période de trois ans par la Conférence (article 11 du Protocole instituant le CPS).

Il est créé un Comité d’état-major chargé de conseiller et d’assister le Conseil de paix et de sécurité pour

tout ce qui concerne les questions d’ordre militaire et de sécurité en vue du maintien et de la promotion de la

paix et de la sécurité en Afrique… Le Comité d’état-major est composé d'officiers supérieurs des États membres

du Conseil de paix et de sécurité… (Article 13, points 8-9). Le Groupe des Sages et le Comité d’état-major ainsi

que d’autres institutions ou organes (tel que les Forces Africaines Pré-positionnées crées par l’article 13) de

l’UA ressemble sur les points à d’autres organes et institutions du mécanisme de paix de la CEDEAO. D’ailleurs

ils ont les mêmes appellations et les mêmes rôles à la différence que l’UA agit sur le plan continental et la

CEDEAO sur le plan régional

Voir KPODAR, op. cit. p. 37.

Voir KPODAR, op. cit. p. 39.

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est l’absence persistante des Forces africaines en attente (FAA), pourtant actées dès

2003 et réaffirmées après le sommet d’Addis-Abeba de 2013. Ce décalage persistant

entre les engagements solennels (comme la "Force de réaction rapide" promise en 2013

lors du Sommet d’Addis-Abeba, le 23 mai 2013, les Chefs d’État, disant vouloir tirer les

leçons de leur incapacité à réagir lors de la crise malienne, ont pris l’engagement de

réactiver la mise en place d’une force d’intervention rapide

) et leur faible matérialisation

inexistante encore en 2025 souligne l’incapacité à dépasser les logiques souverainistes

et les lacunes financières. Ces éléments transforment l’Architecture africaine de paix et

de sécurité (APSA) en édifice inopérant. Malgré quelques réussites

, les situations

sécuritaires dans les régions africaines pèsent sur l’opérationnalisation correcte de ces

forces.

Il est important aussi de noter que le CPS n’est pas un organe à part de l’Architecture de

Paix et de Sécurité en Afrique, en plus d’harmoniser et de coordonner les activités des

Mécanismes régionaux dans le domaine de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité, afin

que ces activités soient conformes aux objectifs et aux principes de l’UA

, il entretient

des relations étroites de travail avec le parlement panafricain

et établit une coopération

étroite avec la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples

pour toutes

questions touchant à son mandat.

Il est alors loisible de se demander si le manque de justiciabilité des États et des acteurs

membres des résolutions des conflits n’est pas une énième cause de l’inefficacité du

système ?

Pendant longtemps, du vivant de l’OUA, le règlement des conflits africains se préoccupait

plus d’aplanir les positions des parties, pour sauvegarder les intérêts du moment, que

d’y apporter une solution durable et définitive. En réalité, cet état fait, pousse certains

auteurs à ne voir dans le règlement des conflits aucune logique

, tous les cas sont traités

différemment, aussi bien que chaque conflit voit naître un type de règlement qui lui est

propre. L’on donne raison, alors, à celui qui a dit qu’en Afrique, on ne juge pas une

affaire, on l’arrange

. Aucune mention de règlement juridictionnel des conflits n’est faite,

ni par l’Acte constitutif

, ni par le Protocole créant le CPS.

La solution serait-elle de voir du côté de la juridiction obligatoire de la CIJ ? Ne faudrait-

il pas, peut-être, étendre ses compétences et exiger des États, où naissent des conflits

Cette mise en place fut renvoyée au sommet de janvier 2014 où elle a été encore renvoyée à celui de juin

2014.

Tel fut le cas lorsqu’en 2003 une force interafricaine de plus de 2000 hommes a été déployée au Burundi

pour s’interposer entre les belligérants et permettre au médiateur sud-africain de décrocher un accord de paix.

Voir KPODAR, op. cit. p. 37.

Cf. article 16, par. 1 point a du Protocole.

Cf. Article 18, par. 1 du Protocole.

Cf. Article 19 du Protocole.

Cf. M. BEDJAOUI, «Le règlement pacifique des différends africains», AFDI 1972, pp. 85-89, cité par KPODAR,

op. cit. p. 46.

Voir KPODAR, op. cit. p. 47. En effet, les traditions de médiation à l’ancienne pour décanter des situations

conflictuelles sont restées dans la pratique des États africains. Au sein de l’OUA, il a toujours été fait recours à

ce type de règlement, en utilisant un voisin, un notable, un sage à la forte personnalité… pour éteindre le feu

des conflits. L’histoire a montré que comme des phœnix, ces conflits renaissaient toujours, avec plus d’acuité.

Cf. article 4 de l’Acte constitutif, «L’Union africaine fonctionne conformément aux principes suivants: … (e)

Règlement pacifique des conflits entre les États membres de l’Union par les moyens appropriés qui peuvent

être décidés par la Conférence de l’Union...».

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susceptibles de dégénérer, de porter leur conflit à l’appréciation de la Cour ? La récente

posture de l’Israël et des Etats-Unis face à cette juridiction internationale face à la

situation en Palestine, fait planer le doute sur celle-ci

Cette solution serait souhaitable pour plus d’un, d’autant plus que, jusqu’à présent, peu

d’États africains ont ratifié

le Protocole créant la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme

et des Peuples (CADHP) et ses activités n’ont que récemment commencé. Lors du

sommet de la Conférence de 2004, il a été décidé de transformer cette cour en lui

fusionnant la Cour de Justice de l’Union. Cette nouvelle entité aurait pour nom la Cour

Africaine de Justice et des Droits de l’Homme. Certains universitaires et dirigeants d’ONG

luttant pour la promotion des droits de l’homme voyaient une opportunité d’impliquer

efficacement cette Cour dans la résolution des conflits africains par le biais du droit. En

conséquence, une modification des statuts de la Cour s’imposerait

. Mais contre toute

attente, les Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement, par un communiqué à l’issue de leur

Conférence en Guinée équatoriale, les 26 et 27 juin 2014, ont décidé d’insérer dans les

nouveaux statuts la possibilité d’accorder une immunité, contre les poursuites devant

cette juridiction, aux dirigeants et à d’autres hauts fonctionnaires durant leur mandat. Et

cela en violation du droit international, du fait que, eux-mêmes, dans la Charte africaine

des droits de l’Homme et des Peuples reconnaissent la nécessité de prendre des sanctions

judiciaires contre toute atteinte aux droits de l’homme

. Puis, la fusion décidée n’a

jamais eu lieu.

Pour prévenir du caractère violateur du droit international d’une telle mesure, Salil

SHETTY, Secrétaire général d’Amnesty International, avait adressé une lettre ouverte

aux chefs d’État et de gouvernement de l’Union en leur demandant de rejeter cette

proposition de modification

Lire utilement sur le doute au sujet de la justice internationale Alioune SALL, L’émotion et la raison, l’Afrique

face à la justice internationale, L’Harmattan Sénégal, 2020, p.277.

A ce jour, 34 sur 44 États signataires l’ont ratifié et il est entré en vigueur le 11 février 2009. Sur les 34

seuls 8 États (Burkina Faso, la Gambie, le Ghana, Guinée-Bissau, le Mali, le Malawi, le Niger et la Tunisie) ont

déposé la déclaration reconnaissant la compétence de la Cour pour recevoir des requêtes introduites

directement par des ONG et des individus. Voir https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/bienvenue-a-la-cour-

africaine/?lang=fr#

Lire utilement à ce sujet, S. H. Adjolohoun, Les grands silences jurisprudentiels de la Cour africaine des droits

de l’homme et des peuples, Annuaire africain des droits de l’homme, 2018, pp. 24-46,

http://doi.org/10.29053/2523-1367/2018/v2n1a2

La réaction de Netsanet BELAY, Directeur de la recherche et du plaidoyer pour l’Afrique au sein d’Amnesty

International, a été virulente : «Alors que le continent africain lutte pour faire en sorte que les auteurs de

violations graves des droits humains soient tenus de rendre des comptes, il est impossible de justifier cette

décision, qui sape l’intégrité de la Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme avant même qu’elle soit

opérationnelle». voir https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2014/07/au-summit-decision-backward-step-

international-justice/

Cf. Lettre d’AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SECRETARIAT INTERNATIONAL, du 19 juin 2014 à Londres, Réf. :

AFR 01/012/2014, «Je m'adresse à vous dans la perspective de la 23ème session de l'Assemblée des chefs

d'État et de gouvernement de l'Union africaine (…) pour vous demander de ne pas adopter la proposition

d'amender l'article 46A bis du Projet de protocole sur les amendements au Protocole portant statut de la Cour

africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme (Projet de protocole). La réunion ministérielle du Comité technique

spécialisé a décidé, à l'issue de ses délibérations des 15 et 16 mai, de modifier l'article 46A bis du Projet de

protocole, qui se lirait alors comme suit : « Aucune accusation ne sera déposée devant la Cour contre un chef

d'État ou de gouvernement de l'Union africaine en exercice, aucune personne exerçant ou autorisée à exercer

ces fonctions, ou tout autre haut représentant de l'État sur la base de leurs fonctions, pendant la durée de leur

mandat. » Amnesty International craint que cette proposition, de même que diverses démarches récentes de

l'Union africaine, n’assurent l'immunité aux chefs d'État et de gouvernement. Au nombre de ces démarches, il

y a la décision de l'Union africaine, a) en octobre 2013, d'exempter les hauts représentants de l'État de

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Enfin, le CPS pourrait être un excellent outil au service du lien indissociable paix et

développement s’il était judicieusement utilisé, il aurait agi en amont et en aval de tout

type de conflits éclatant dans toute partie du continent, et ce avec le concours des CER.

En effet, l’expérience accumulée par les CER, en matière de gestion de conflits, est

considérable.

II. Le Mécanisme de prévention, de gestion et de règlement des conflits,

un outil ouest-africain

La situation ouest-africaine avait commencé à se modéliser bien avant celle de l’OUA et

de sa continuatrice. Son analyse se fera à travers l’évolution normative des mécanismes

sous régionaux (A) et des expériences opérationnelles (B).

A. Évolution normative et institutionnelle du cadre sous régional de la

CEDEAO

La CEAO, en 1977 avait conclu entre ses États membres plus le Togo un Accord de non-

agression et de défense (ANAD)

. La CEDEAO avait depuis le 29 mai 1981 signé un

Protocole d’Assistance mutuelle en matière de défense, adopté au sommet de Freetown

et dont l’idée avait été lancée deux ans plus tôt au sommet de Dakar. Il englobait tous

les États membres à l’exception du Cap vert, de la Guinée-Bissau et du Mali. Ledit

Protocole prévoyait une assistance des autres parties en cas d’agression contre l’une

d’elles

et entre les parties signataires, une obligation de non-recours à la force. Il

prévoyait également la création d’une force d’interposition, mais seulement en cas de

conflit entre États membres, leur intervention étant exclue si le conflit était purement

interne

. Le conflit libérien a été la cause de la réactivation de la réflexion sur la

prévention de la paix et de la sécurité internationale dans la sous-région. Il a fait l’objet

de plus de 20 décisions prises par la CEDEAO dans la résolution de cette crise

, en plus

de la création d’un comité permanent de médiation.

poursuites devant la Cour pénale internationale ; b) en janvier 2014, d'appeler les membres de l'Union africaine

à se prononcer en faveur des amendements à l'article 27 du Statut de Rome, pour empêcher les poursuites

contre les chefs d'État et de gouvernement. Je vous prie de bien vouloir examiner la proposition prévoyant

l'amendement de l'article 46A bis pendant les délibérations à venir (…)L'article 46A bis du Projet de protocole

porte gravement atteinte à l'intégrité de la Cour africaine et au but déclaré de l'Union africaine de permettre

aux victimes de crimes graves de droit international d'obtenir justice (…)Si l'article 46A bis est adopté, les

déclarations sur le fait que l'élargissement de la compétence de la Cour africaine faciliterait la lutte contre les

fléaux que sont les génocides, les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l'humanité et qui minent le continent

africain seront vides de sens. (…) Amnesty International vous prie instamment d'examiner l'article 46A bis et

de le remplacer par une disposition reprenant le principe fondamental inscrit à l'article 27 du Statut de Rome

de la Cour pénale internationale...».

Cet Accord est issu du Sommet franco-africain de 1977. Voir SALL op. Cit., p. 134. Mais le Protocole

d’application de l’Accord en date du 14 décembre 1981 engage les parties à ne pas abriter d’opposant ou

d’activités de subversion contre un autre État partie. Il faut ajouter un autre Protocole additionnel relatif à

l’assistance en matière de défense militaire du 20 décembre 1982.

Voir Protocole d'assistance mutuelle en matière de défense des pays de la CEDEAO (Nations-Unies, recueil

des traités, 1992, Vol. 1690, 1-29137) disponible sur

https://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/HSGO/assets/cedeao-1981-asistencia_mutua.pdf

Cf. Article 16 du Protocole.

Cf. Article 17 du Protocole.

Voir J. O. CEDEAO, n° spécial sur la crise libérienne, novembre 1992, vol. 21.

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Mais à l’analyse, il ressort très vite que dans un premier temps, c'est-à-dire, avant

l’adoption du nouveau Mécanisme, la communauté envisageait la sécurité, seulement,

sous l’angle de la défense, ou dans le cas d’un conflit interétatique, comme l’avait fait

l’OUA. C’était manifestement faire fi des réalités du monde contemporain d’après-

guerres. L’émergence et la multiplication de conflits d’un type nouveau avec des acteurs

nationaux, transnationaux et internationaux appelaient forcément à une actualisation du

système de défense. L’approche des premiers instruments de défense était obsolète. Cet

état de fait pousse certains auteurs

à qualifier les premières interventions de la

communauté, sous l’emprise des anciens textes

, comme illégales, même au regard de

l’ingérence humanitaire. La CIJ avait donné son appréhension de cette situation dans les

affaires du Détroit de Corfou et les Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua

L’ECOMOG qui est intervenu au Libéria en 1990 créa une situation de doute quant à son

adéquation avec le traité de l’époque (l’on se souvient que le traité actuel de la CEDEAO

date seulement de 1993). L’article 2 de celui-ci, en évoquant les buts de la Communauté,

ne fait aucune référence aux questions de sécurité or il se trouve que la Communauté a

pris plus d’une dizaine de décisions en y apposant le visa de l’article 5 du de l’ancien

traité dont l’alinéa 2 se borne uniquement à évoquer les fonctions de la Conférence des

Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement ; fonctions ne faisant aucune mention pouvant lui

attribuer des prérogatives militaires.

En outre, le pacte de non-agression de 1978 qui a constitué la base juridique du comité

permanent de médiation est en réalité juste un pacte de non-agression ne pouvant

nullement justifier une opération de maintien de la paix. Cet état de fait est valable pour

le protocole d’assistance mutuelle qui agit seulement en cas d’agression ou menace

d’agression extérieure et exclut d’intervenir dans des conflits internes, cas du conflit

libérien. Même si ce Protocole autorise les Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement à réfléchir

sur les problèmes généraux de sécurité, cette argumentation tombe en désuétude du fait

que l’intervention fut décidée par le Comité permanent de médiation dont le rôle se

limitait à aider à la solution de litiges entre États membres

Le traité de 1993 de la CEDEAO lève ses péripéties juridiques et en fait quasiment un des

objectifs de la Communauté. En effet, il préconise le préalable de la sécurité à tout

développement économique ou intégration entre ses États membres. C’est là que peut

Voir SALL, « Les mutations… », Op. Cit. p 136 ; Abass BUNDU « Aucune Disposition n'avait été prise dans le

cadre du traité de la CEDEAO concernant la coopération régionale dans les domaines de la politique et de la

défense… » in LAVERGNE, op. Cit. p. 55 ; F. M. DJEDJERO « la guerre civile au Libéria et l’ingérence dans les

affaires intérieures des États » in Revue Belge de droit international, 1993, p. 9/44 : «La condamnation de la

subversion est très nette dans la doctrine et la jurisprudence. On constate en effet que si la doctrine est divisée

sur la question de la licéité de l’aide apportée au gouvernement en place, elle considère globalement que le

soutien aux insurgés est illégal…».

Disponible sur https://rbdi.bruylant.be/modele/rbdi/content/pdf/files/RBDI%201993/RBDI%201993-

2/Etudes/RBDI%201993.2%20-%20pp.%20393%20%C3%A0%20436%20-

%20F.%20Meledje%20Djedjro.pdf (consulté en septembre 2024).

Il s’agit du traité de Lagos, le traité de non-agression du 22 avril 1978 et du Protocole d’assistance mutuelle

du 28 mai 1981.

«… l’appui fourni par les États-Unis ... aux activités militaires et paramilitaires des contras au Nicaragua,

sous forme de soutien financier, d’entraînement, de fournitures d’armes, de renseignements et de soutien

logistique constitue une violation indubitable du principe de non-intervention…» In Activités militaires et

paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis d'Amérique), § 242, compétence et

recevabilité, arrêt, CIJ. Recueil 1984, p. 392.

J.O. CEDEAO, op. cit. pp. 6 et 7.

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se rapprocher l’article 15 du traité de l’UEMOA tout comme l’article 58 du traité de la

CEDEAO, traitant des questions relatives à la sécurité à l’échelle sous régionale. L’on peut

dire, sans doute, qu’elle s’aligne sur les tendances et pratiques de l’ONU et de son

organisation mère, l’UA en la matière. Aucune objection ne peut être faite, maintenant,

à une base légale des interventions de la communauté en cette matière conformément à

l’article 4 point « e » de son traité

. Mais ce type d’intervention, même au sein de l’ONU,

est régi par le principe de neutralité ce qui n’a pas toujours été le cas de la CEDEAO dans

ses expériences passées.

B. Expériences opérationnelles à l’épreuve des ressources limitées et de

la neutralité

Le bilan de la CEDEAO quant à son impartialité et le caractère dépourvu de sanctions de

son intervention reste mitigé. Elle s’est vue impliquée de trop, altérant ainsi l’orthodoxie

même du maintien de la paix

. Il est souvent arrivé que les forces de la communauté

soient prises pour cible. Elle a été amenée aussi à des situations extrêmes qui l’ont vu

menacer le président Charles Taylor d’un blocus économique. Ce n’est qu’avec l’Accord

de Cotonou de 1993

, a posteriori, que ce pouvoir de sanction fut autorisé conformément

à l’article 5 du traité de Cotonou. Il a donné à l’ECOMOG toute latitude pour sanctionner

les violations d’un cessez-le-feu imposé Et même là, l’ECOMOG a outre passé les

autorisations du Comité chargé des violations. Cet état de fait créa un risque

d’affrontement ouvert entre les forces de la communauté et les belligérants, toute chose

qui créa un climat propice au retrait des troupes de certains pays membres

. Les actions

ainsi entreprises par la Communauté furent appuyées par l’ONU, a posteriori, à travers

la résolution 1132 du 8 octobre 1997 imposant le cessez-le-feu, l’institution autorisa la

CEDEAO, en coopération avec le Gouvernement démocratiquement élu de la Sierra

Leone, à veiller strictement à l’application des dispositions de la résolution.

L’ampleur des opérations a conduit à l’envoi d’une force des Nations Unies (Mission des

Nations Unies à la Sierra Leone).

Heureusement, peut-on dire, le Protocole de Lomé mettant en place le Mécanisme de

prévention, de gestion et de règlement des conflits de la CEDEAO de 1999

, tente de

corriger les erreurs du passé en s’inscrivant dans le sillage des pratiques de la

Communauté internationale. Ce Protocole qui est désormais la base légale de

l’organisation en matière de sécurité abroge les deux autres qui le précédent (le Protocole

de 1978 et l’Accord de 1981) et elle intègre en son sein l’ANAD de l’ancienne CEAO. Nulle

part sur le continent, au moment de son adoption, on ne trouvait d’équivalent dans toutes

«LES HAUTES PARTIES CONTRACTANTES, dans la poursuite des objectifs énoncés à l'Article 3 du présent

Traité affirment et déclarent solennellement leur adhésion aux principes fondamentaux suivants : (…) e)

Maintien de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité régionales par la promotion et le renforcement des relations

de bon voisinage».

Cf. SALL, op. cit. p. 139.

L’Accord de Cotonou fait référence à l’Accord trouvé par les parties prenantes pour la résolution du conflit

libérien. Son article 5 énonce tous les cas de figure pouvant être considérés comme violation de l’Accord et

l’inobservation est sanctionné. Voir un exemplaire de l’Accord sur

https://www.ceja.ch/images/CEJA/DOCS/Bib/Pays/Liberia_S2/I8_FR.pdf

L’exemple du Sénégal est donné par le Professeur SALL, in Les mutation…, op.cit. p. 142.

Voir https://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/HSGO/assets/cedeao-1999-protocole.pdf

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les organisations sous-régionales. L’UEMOA, à travers son Mécanisme d’alerte et de suivi

des conflits, et tout récemment l’intervention de la CEDEAO en Côte d’Ivoire et au Mali,

a été minée par son retard et son manque de moyen cruel à un moment où la vie de ces

pays était tout simplement menacée.

À tous les égards, la plus grande innovation de la communauté en matière de sécurité,

à travers son nouveau traité et le Protocole, reste qu’elle conçoit, désormais, le maintien

de la paix sur une durée permanente. C’est en ce sens que l’UEMOA s’inscrit avec elle

dans le sillage des pratiques onusiennes. La CEDEAO a, pour cela, créé un système

d’observation de la paix et de la sécurité régionales, tout comme le Mécanisme interne

d’alerte et de suivi des conflits de l’UEMOA qui s’est traduit par l’adoption de l’Acte

additionnel N° 04/2013/CCEG/UEMOA instituant la politique commune de l'UEMOA dans

le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité.

Ce système de pré-alerte résulte de l’article 58 du traité de la CEDEAO et contient deux

composantes : (1) un centre d’observation et de suivi chargé de la collecte et de la

redistribution de l’information à l’attention du Secrétaire exécutif, et (2) des zones

d’observations et de suivi, ayant chacune une capitale

. Dans chaque capitale il existe

un Bureau placé sous l’autorité du Secrétaire exécutif. En outre la conception de la

communauté du maintien de la paix répond à celle de l’ONU, dont il était question dans

l’Agenda pour la paix

. En témoigne, d’ailleurs, la création d’une Cellule des armes

légères

, d’un Fonds de la paix, d’un mécanisme de gestion des catastrophes et d’un

Groupe inter gouvernemental d’Action contre le blanchissement d’Argent (GIABA

Malgré cette consécration, les différents rapports de la Commission de la CEDEAO sont

édifiants sur l’état de la sécurité dans les pays membres de la CEDEAO. Il y a toujours

un tableau noir peignant les difficultés sécuritaires de la région. Le rapport annuel de la

CEDEAO de décembre 2012, est le suivant : «le Burkina Faso, où des mutineries

Zone 1 : Cap vert, Gambie, Guinée-Bissau, Mauritanie, Sénégal avec pour capitale Banjul ; zone 2 : Burkina

Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger avec Ouagadougou comme capitale ; Zone 3 : Ghana, Guinée Conakry, Libéria,

sierra Léone ayant pour capitale Monrovia ; Zone 4 : Bénin, Nigéria, Togo dont la capitale est Cotonou.

«… La paix et la sécurité internationales ne découlent pas seulement de l’absence de guerre et de conflits

armés. D’autres menaces de nature non militaire trouvent leur source dans l’instabilité qui existe dans les

domaines économiques, sociaux, humanitaires et écologiques…». In Revue générale de droit international

public (RGDIP), 1992, p. 258

Rapport final de la 51ème session du Conseil des ministres, doc.ECW/CMLI/XXIV/Rev.1, Accra, décembre

2003, pp. 15 et 25. Voir aussi le Moratoire sur les armes légères entré en vigueur en novembre 998 dont la

gestion incombe au Programme de Coordination et d’Assistance pour la Sécurité et le Développement (PCASED)

financé par le PNUD. Ce programme finissant en 2004 au terme de son mandat fut remplacé par ECOSAP le 6

juin 2006 à Bamako, dont le mandat s’écoulait le 8 juin 2008. La CEDEAO a relancé le projet et lui a donné un

autre mandat qui doit finir en 2015 lors de la Conférence d’Abuja de 2010 (voir le règlement C/REG.17/06/10

portant prorogation du projet ECOSAP et adoption de son programme d'activités).

Voir Décision A/DEC.6/12/00 portant adoption des statuts du groupe inter-gouvernemental d’action contre

le blanchiment de l’argent (GIABA). En fait la création de ce groupement est consécutif à la Déclaration Politique

et le Plan d’Action contre le Blanchiment de l’Argent, adoptés lors de la vingtième session extraordinaire de

l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée à la lutte contre le problème mondial de la drogue, qui s’est

tenue à New York, le 10 juin 1998, et des quarante (40) recommandations adoptées par le Groupe d’Action

financière contre le Blanchiment des capitaux établi par les Chefs d’État des sept (7) pays les plus industrialisés,

et le Président de la Commission Européenne (GAFI) ; et surtout les Recommandations de la quarante-septième

session du Conseil des ministres tenue à Bamako, du 9 au 12 décembre 2000. Les évolutions du concept de

maintien de la paix sont spectaculairement visibles dans le Protocole de 1999 (voir article 45 relatif à la

restauration de l’État de droit, chapitre VIII relatif à l’assistance humanitaire, article 40 relatif à la sauvegarde

de l’environnement, article 46 relatif à la criminalité transfrontalière, article 48 relatif à la lutte contre la

corruption, article 49 relatif au blanchiment d’argent et l’article 51 relatif à la circulation illégale des armes

légères).

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militaires ont été notées en 2011 s’est traduit par des violences et des pillages. La Côte

d’Ivoire a connu une situation d’instabilité en 2002, qui s’est aggravée en 2011, à la suite

de la crise postélectorale née de la volonté de l’ancien Président de se maintenir au

pouvoir en dépit du verdict des urnes ; la Guinée-Bissau continue d’enregistrer une

situation d’instabilité, avec les coups d’État intervenus en 2009, et plus récemment en

avril 2012 ainsi que la tentative de coup d’État d’octobre 2012 et d’aout 2020. Le Mali,

après plusieurs décennies de stabilité politique, a enregistré trois coups d’État, dans un

contexte d’attaques armées au nord de son territoire. Le Niger a connu une période

d’instabilité en 2009 à la suite de la volonté du Président de prolonger son mandat arrivé

à échéance. Cette situation d’instabilité a abouti à un coup d’État intervenu en février

2010. Le Sénégal pour sa part a enregistré des troubles sociopolitiques en 2011 et au

début de l’année 2012, à la suite de la tentative de modification de la Constitution de

juin 2011

».

Le plus grand problème dont souffrent les outils de Maintien de la paix au sein de la

communauté reste le manque de moyens

. En effet, toutes les actions qu’elle a eu à

mener étaient tributaires de l’aide extérieure, soit des Nations unies, soit de partenaires

bilatéraux et multilatéraux et quelques rares fois les États membres eux-mêmes. Cet

état de fait réduit quelque peu la marge de manœuvre des États africains en général

quant à la prise en main de leur destinée sécuritaire. Une telle situation est à la base de

la proposition de créer la Capacité Africaine de Réponse Immédiate aux Crises Force en

Attente

, pour pallier le retard des Forces Africaines en Attente (FAA) dans les crises

maliennes et bissau-guinéenne.

Néanmoins, AMBROSETTI et ESMENJAUD, identifient certains des conflits dans lesquels

des États africains ont eux-mêmes assuré le maintien de la paix et tous les coûts y

relatifs. En intervenant au Libéria et en Sierra Leone, le Nigéria, avant la montée en

puissance de la MINUSIL, a assumé pendant huit ans la majeure partie des coûts

financiers. Il en a été ainsi, aussi lors de la récente crise malienne de 2012, où pour

pallier l’inertie de la CEDEAO, le Nigéria, le Sénégal et le Burkina ont envoyé des troupes

dont le financement restait autonome avant la reprise par la MINUSMA. Dans le cas

bissau-guinéen, ces pays, avec en tête, le Nigéria, remplacèrent des militaires angolais

qui assuraient le maintien de la paix pour le compte de la Communauté des pays de

langue portugaise. Toutefois, le soutien aérien d’États extérieurs à la CEDEAO était

Voir Rapport annuel de la Commission, Abuja décembre 2012, p. 99, disponible sur

https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/ANNUAL-REPORT-2012.pdf

Voir article Axel AUGE, « Le ‘’maillon faible’’ de l’architecture de paix et de sécurité africaine : la condition de

l’homme de troupe ». Contribution issue du colloque de Ouagadougou les 25 et 26 octobre 2013, in NAUGARET

et IBRIGA (dir.), L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique, op. Cit. pp. 155-164.

Sa création fut annoncée par Annoncée la présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine, Nkosazama

Dlamini-ZUMA, le 27 mai 2013 à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire de l'Union africaine (UA), la Capacité

africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC) tarde à voir le jour, les forces la constituant sont constituées

des pays volontaires. Lancée en réaction à la crise malienne, l'idée de la présidente de la Commission de l'UA

était de faire de la CARIC une mesure transitoire dans l'attente de la pleine opérationnalisation de la FAA, sans

doute pas avant 2015. Les pays volontaires à l’issue du Sommet de l’Union Africaine des 26 et 27 juin 2014

sont le Mali, le Burkina, l’Égypte, le Niger, le Sénégal, l'Ouganda, l’Algérie, la Guinée, la Mauritanie, le Tchad,

l’Éthiopie, le Soudan, la Tanzanie, l’Angola et l’Afrique du Sud. Ces États membres de la CARIC sont prêts à

mettre leurs troupes à disposition et financer eux-mêmes les coûts que cela créera sous l’autorité du Conseil

de paix et de sécurité de l’Union Africaine. Dès son lancement en Éthiopie, début 2014, le soutien ferme de la

plupart des partenaires multilatéraux de l'Afrique, dont l'ONU. Voir La CARIC, au cœur des préoccupations de

la PAX AFRICANA, disponible sur https://afriquinfos.com/caric-coeur-preoccupations-africana-258118/

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nécessaire

. L’UA, pour sa part, a fourni un gros effort lors de la crise malienne en

déboursant 50 millions de dollars sur le milliard que requérait la Mission internationale

de soutien au Mali. Dans d’autres parties du continent, la CEEAC a eu à financer 30%

de la mission de consolidation de la paix déployée en République Centre Africaine qui est

devenue par la suite la Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique en décembre

2013

L’article de AMBROSETTI et ESMENJAUD, va plus loin, et analyse les causes des faiblesses

des forces de l’UA. L’audit externe rendu par le panel de Haut niveau au Président de l’UA

le 27 décembre 2007 identifie la difficulté de ces opérations africaines à absorber l’aide

financière et à la transformer en efficacité opérationnelle. Au demeurant, l’appropriation

de ces opérations par l’ONU est un signe évident de la légitimation internationale des

actions de ces organisations africaines, tant sur le plan continental que régional. Toute

chose dont la mesure doit être prise, et dont le profit doit être tiré pour, pour qu’enfin,

se réalise le vieux rêve d’une défense africaine.

Conclusion

L’Architecture Africaine de Paix et de Sécurité (APSA) représente une avancée

significative par rapport au modèle de coopération de l’OUA, grâce à la mise en place de

mécanismes nouveaux tels que le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS), les systèmes

d’alerte précoce et les cadres de médiation comme le Groupe des Sages. La collaboration

de la CEDEAO, par le biais de l’ECOMOG et du Protocole de Lomé, a démontré la capacité

régionale à répondre aux enjeux sécuritaires et à favoriser plusieurs transitions politiques

pacifiques.

Cependant, l’APSA demeure vulnérable face à des faiblesses structurelles persistantes :

la non-opérationnalité pérenne des Forces africaines en attente, prévues depuis 2003, la

forte dépendance financière vis-à-vis des partenaires extérieurs, ainsi que les divisions

politiques illustrées par les tensions entre la CEDEAO et les pays de la confédération des

États du Sahel, ainsi que la nébuleuse terroriste. Ces limites ont entravé l’efficacité des

dispositifs de prévention lors de crises majeures sur le continent.

Cette aide de certains partenaires de l’Afrique a souvent fait l’objet de malversations financières au point

que, lors des crises récentes maliennes et centrafricaines, des cellules financières ad hoc furent créées en vue

de canaliser les aides extérieures et d’afficher une certaine transparence éliminant tout risque de mauvaise

gestion ou de corruption. Voir à ce titre le journal Libération du 16 juillet 2007, « Des euros évaporés par

millions au Darfour. Disponible sur https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2007/07/16/des-euros-evapores-par-

millions-au-darfour_98329/. Il est intéressant de savoir qu’en réalité, malgré les efforts particuliers et

autonomes de certains pays africains, l’OTAN et surtout l’UE restent les principaux bailleurs de fonds aux

opérations de maintien de la paix en Afrique. L’UE à travers son programme Facilité de Paix en Afrique (APF),

dont la première action fut utilisée au Burundi via la Mission africaine (MIAB) a pris, par exemple, la majeure

partie des opérations en Somalie et au Mali, et jusqu’à 70% de la MICOPAX. Voir, p. 142, David AMBROSETTI

et Romain ESMENJAUD, « Le financement des opérations de paix africaines: quatre types d’arrangements et

leurs enjeux politiques », contribution au colloque de Bordeaux, le 30 novembre 2012, in NAUGARET et IBRIGA

(dir.), L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique, op. Cit. pp. 135-153.

Ces données sont issues d’un entretien que les auteurs ont eu avec un officiel de l’UE à Paris en janvier 2013.

Cf. David AMBROSETTI et Romain ESMENJAUD, « Le financement des opérations de paix africaines …, op. Cit.

p. 140.

Évidemment, l’aide de la CEEAC fut stoppée par les États membres à partir du moment où la MISCA repris

le dossier à son compte.

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Dans un contexte de changements géopolitiques marqué par la ZLECAF, l’émergence de

l’AES et les réformes institutionnelles encouragées par la Commission Kagamé – des

mesures prioritaires s’imposent pour renforcer l’APSA:

Opérationnalisation des Forces africaines en attente, via une contribution obligatoire des

États membres, dont la taxe de 0,2 % sur les importations;

Harmonisation des initiatives sous-régionales (CEDEAO, AES, CEEAC), sous la

coordination effective de l’Union africaine;

Développement de brigades régionales d’intervention rapide, à l’image de la Force

conjointe du G5 Sahel;

Institutionnalisation de la justice transitionnelle afin de mettre fin durablement aux cycles

de violence, en mobilisant la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples.

Pour assurer la consolidation durable de la paix sur le continent, il est indispensable de

promouvoir l’appropriation souveraine des outils sécuritaires par les États africains. À

condition d’intégrer les enseignements des expériences passées, l’APSA est en mesure

de devenir le fondement d’une véritable paix en Afrique afin que le développement

économique soit une réalité dans une perspective pérenne.

Références

Ambrosetti, David et Esmenjaud, Romain (2014). Le financement des opérations de paix

africaines: quatre types d’arrangements et leurs enjeux politiques, in Naugaret, M. F. et

Ibriga, L. M. (dir.), L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique. Paris : L’Harmattan,

pp. 135-153.

Barry, M. A. (1997). La prévention des conflits en Afrique de l’Ouest : mythes ou réalités?.

Paris : Karthala, 284 p.

Bedjaoui, Mohammed (1972). Le règlement pacifique des différends africains, Annuaire

français de droit international, vol. 18. Paris : CNRS Éditions, pp. 85-89.

Boniface, Pascal (2006). L’environnement de sécurité et le processus de construction de

la paix en Afrique de l’Ouest, Étude réalisée en qualité de consultant indépendant,

Octobre – Décembre, 92 p.

Bundu, Abass (1997). Intégration et coopération régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest, in

Lavergne, Real (dir.). Paris : Karthala, 332 p.

CEDEAO (1999). Protocole relatif au mécanisme de prévention, de gestion, de règlement

des conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité. Abuja : CEDEAO.

Déclaration de Lomé (2000). Déclaration de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine sur les

principes constitutionnels communs aux États africains. OUA : Lomé.

Kant, Emmanuel (2006). Projet de paix perpétuelle, coll. « Les Intégrales de philo ».

Paris : Nathan 128 p.

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Kpodar, Kossi (2014). La politique de défense commune en Afrique, in Naugaret, M. F.

et Ibriga, L. M. (dir.), L’architecture de paix et de sécurité en Afrique. Paris : L’Harmattan,

pp. 33-51.

Lecoutre, Delphine (2004). Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine, clef

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La Documentation française, pp. 131-162.

Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de (1995). De l’esprit des lois, édition établie par Laurent

Versini, coll. Folio Essais, 2 vol. Paris : Gallimard (Vol. I : 604 p. ; Vol. II : 1024 p.).

Nations Unies (1992). Agenda pour la paix, Rapport du Secrétaire général Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, New York : ONU.

OCDE/CSAO (2020). Géographie des conflits en Afrique du Nord et de l’Ouest, Cahiers

de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, Paris, Éditions OCDE, 156 p.

ONU (1945). Charte de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. San Francisco : ONU.

OUA (1981). Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, Nairobi: OUA.

Sall, Alioune (2006). Les mutations de l’intégration en Afrique de l’Ouest : une approche

institutionnelle. Paris : L’Harmattan, 212 p.

Sall, Alioune (2020). L’émotion et la raison : l’Afrique face à la justice internationale.

Dakar : L’Harmattan Sénégal, 277 p.

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d’Ivoire. Lecture des guerres pour la reconnaissance, Thèse de doctorat en science

politique, Université Paris-Saclay, 487 p.

Schricke, Christian (1992). L’Agenda de la paix du Secrétaire général Boutros Boutros-

Ghali – Analyses et premières réactions, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. 38,

Paris, CNRS Éditions, pp. 11-31.

Sikondo, V. H. (1986). La sécurité des États africains dans le système international

contemporain : aspects politiques, diplomatiques et juridiques, Thèse de doctorat,

Université de Reims, 450 p.

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sécurité dans l’espace francophone ouest-africain (UEMOA), in Naugaret, M. F. et Ibriga,

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de droit internation

OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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AN AFRICAN GORDIAN KNOT? INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL

LIMITATIONS IN AU CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE

INTERVENTION INITIATIVES

BABATUNDE AFOLABI

babatundetafolabi@gmail.com

Regional Director of Anglophone & Lusophone Africa at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

(Nigeria). Previously worked at the Economic Community of West African States Commission and

the Centre for Democracy and Development in Nigeria. He holds a PhD in International Relations

from the University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK. In 2017, his book ‘Politics of Peacemaking in

Africa: Non-State Actors’ Role in the Liberian Civil War’ was published by James Currey Oxford.

PINAR KADIOGLU CHEN

pkadioglu@gmail.com

Expert in Peace and Conflict Studies (France). Previously taught in various universities in

Scotland, Cyprus, Turkey, Portugal and Guatemala. She holds a PhD in International Relations

from the University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK. Her work primarily focuses on Political Violence,

Human Rights, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding with a particular focus on socio-

psychological dimensions of conflict and post-conflict peace processes. She has previously

published on UN peace missions, war crimes, crime of genocide and conflict resolution in various

areas. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9704-3071

Abstract

This article provides an insight into the progress on the operationalization of African Peace

and Security Architecture (APSA) since its establishment over two decades ago with the

ambitious task of offering ‘African solutions to African problems’. It explores the extent to

which APSA’s critical components have been effective in promoting peace and security across

the continent with a specific focus on the African Union (AU) conflict prevention and conflict

response scheme. In doing so, followed by a historical survey highlighting the political

developments leading to the establishment of the APSA, it offers a critical interrogation on

the relevance and effectiveness of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the AU

Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AU-PAPS). These have been undertaken

within a broader context of substantive political, operational and contextual challenges extant

in the domain of conflict management. In conclusion, the article argues for the future

operational opportunities to arise from structural change that involves the adoption of AU

principles and instruments relevant to the current security challenges, the demonstration of

political will, the conferment of greater supra-nationality to the African Union by African

leaders, as well as the intensification of cooperation among the continental and international

APSA stakeholders.

Keywords

African Union, APSA, AU-PAPS, AU PSC, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Response, African

Politics.

Resumo

Este artigo fornece uma visão sobre o progresso na operacionalização da Arquitetura Africana

de Paz e Segurança (APSA) desde a sua criação há mais de duas décadas, com a ambiciosa

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An African Gordian Knot? Institutional and Operational Limitations in

au Conflict Prevention and Peace Intervention Initiatives

Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

tarefa de oferecer "soluções africanas para os problemas africanos". Explora em que medida

as componentes críticas da APSA têm sido eficazes na promoção da paz e da segurança em

todo o continente, com um foco específico no esquema de prevenção de conflitos e resposta

a conflitos da União Africana (UA). Ao fazê-lo, seguido de um levantamento histórico

destacando os desenvolvimentos políticos que levaram à criação da APSA, oferece uma

interrogação crítica sobre a relevância e eficácia do Conselho de Paz e Segurança (CPS) da

UA e do Departamento de Assuntos Políticos, Paz e Segurança da UA (AU-PAPS). Estes foram

realizados num contexto mais amplo de desafios políticos, operacionais e contextuais

substantivos existentes no domínio da gestão de conflitos. Em conclusão, o artigo defende as

futuras oportunidades operacionais decorrentes de mudanças estruturais que envolvam a

adoção de princípios e instrumentos da UA relevantes para os atuais desafios de segurança,

a demonstração de vontade política, a atribuição de uma maior supranacionalidade à União

Africana pelos líderes africanos, bem como a intensificação da cooperação entre os

intervenientes continentais e internacionais da APSA.

Palavras-chave

União Africana, APSA, AU-PAPS, AU PSC, Prevenção de Conflitos, Resposta a Conflitos, Política

Africana.

How to cite this article

Afolabi, Babatunde & Chen, Pinar Kadioglu (2025). An African Gordian Knot? Institutional and

Operational Limitations in au Conflict Prevention and Peace Intervention Initiatives. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. VOL. 16 Nº. 1, TD 2– Thematic Dossier – “Os Vinte Anos da União

Africana: Passado, Presente e Futuro”. October 2025, pp. 26-42. DOI

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425.2

Article submitted on 24th November 2024 and accepted for publication on 11th August

2025.

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An African Gordian Knot? Institutional and Operational Limitations in

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Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

AN AFRICAN GORDIAN KNOT? INSTITUTIONAL AND

OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS IN AU CONFLICT PREVENTION AND

PEACE INTERVENTION INITIATIVES

BABATUNDE AFOLABI

PINAR KADIOGLU CHEN

Introduction

The current sociopolitical and security landscape across the African continent is arguably

the gloomiest since post-independence. Despite the limitations of the OAU in addressing

emerging threats to peace and stability during its nascent years, it was at least able to

respond adequately to the mandate thrust into its laps as contained in its 1965 Treaty of

Addis Ababa. The tasks of the day back then- to work towards a coordinated continental

response to colonialism and apartheid were undertaken with much success. Today, with

a new mandate enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act and related normative frameworks,

one can safely conclude that the AU has for the past two decades of its renewed mandate

been unable to adequately address many of the challenges that informed its existence,

for various reasons, and some of which this article seeks to examine in detail.

This article examines the conceptualization and operationalization of the African Peace

and Security Architecture (APSA), which has been in place for a little over two decades

since the AU evolved from the OAU, following the signing of the African Union (AU)

Constitutive Act in Lomé in 2000. It undertakes an assessment of APSA’s key conflict

management and response mechanisms with a view to determining whether the

challenge of adequately responding to the threats to peace and stability lies in the quality

and content of the normative instruments themselves, or in the much-required political

will and action, which reinforces every good policy. Put in simple terms, has the problem

been with the inadequacy of the normative instruments and the structures developed to

operationalize key instruments? Alternatively, on the other hand, does the problem lie

with the much-required political will and action determined by political leaders? While the

initial decade after the AU adopted its Constitutive Act was characterized by action and

a concerted action to develop APSA, a gradual lull in the operationalization of the

framework was observed subsequently. The AU’s peace and security architecture and

intervention must also be assessed through the lens of its ability to facilitate the principles

of complementarity and subsidiarity. Given that the Regional Economic Communities

(RECs), as building blocks and partners of the AU in its peace and security mandate, have

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Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

a critical role to play in delivering on the overarching mandate of ensuring peace and

stability in Africa, an appraisal of their linkages and synergy with the AU must also be

examined. Going into the future and in view of emerging threats to peace and stability

on the continent, an assessment of this nature becomes important for contributing

towards a realignment of the AU for the future.

1. The African Peace and Security Landscape: Historically Entrenched

Patterns of Instability & The Genesis of Contemporary Continental

Cooperation

The contemporary African peace and security landscape is marked by a substantial

humanitarian crisis in effect with the rising armed conflicts in Northern, Eastern and

Central Africa, as well as intensified terrorist activities in Sahel region and

unconstitutional changes of government with conflict potential.

The locus of these

regional and continental elements of instability is rooted in the mutually reinforcing

structures of economic, social and political inequalities, most of which transcend

concurrent subjectivities. The pre-colonial, colonial and early post-colonial legacies in

extant political culture and inter-group animosities take a toll on the effective

operationalization of the extant African peace and security framework. Thence,

necessitates a nuanced and multifaceted understanding on historical patterns in African

peace and security landscape brimmed with great human suffering in effect with episodes

of collective violence ranging from inter-state and intra-state wars, inter-ethnic clashes,

violent extremism, terrorism to genocides.

Although it is not possible to argue for a priori state of absolute peace, the inordinate

scale and magnitude of collective violence and insecurity across the continent can be

traced back to the rise of transatlantic slave trade and the natural resource extraction

which was intensified in 17th century in effect with the high European demand for slave

labour, reaching its devastating peak in 19th century.

This interaction with the outsiders

gradually transmuted into forceful social, economic and political control over African

people, eventually leading to the colonization of the whole continent by European Powers

between 1833 and 1914.

Throughout the colonial era, along with the economic exploitation, Africa’s experience

was of racial humiliation and cultural dominance. African people were forced to live under

the colonial rule as subjects, and under such conditions, aside from being subjected to

arbitrary violence and political suppression, they were stripped from most basic cultural

rights such as right to speak their own languages and exercise traditional religions. Borne

out of the forced dispersal of millions through the transatlantic slave trade, the African

diaspora, on the other hand, was also exposed to the equally dreadful structures of socio-

economic and political inequality in elsewhere across the globe. All in all, this

United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Promotion of Durable Peace through Sustainable

Development in Africa, A/79/226-S/2024/550, 23 July 2024.

Frankema, E., De Haas, M. & Van Waijenburg, M. (2023) Inequality Regimes in Africa from Pre-Colonial Times

to the Present. African Affairs, 122(486), pp. 57-94; Lovejoy, Paul E. (2000). Transformations in Slavery: A

History of Slavery in Africa. Cambridge University Press

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troublesome existence led to the emergence of Pan-Africanism in mid-19th century as a

political and cultural movement calling for the liberation and unification of African people

and the celebration of African identity.

The early Pan-African ideas were articulated by the formerly enslaved Africans living in

Northern America and the Caribbeans on their quest against racial injustice, inequality

and colonialism both in continental Africa and all places where people of African descent

lived. At the turn of the century, the creation of a formal organization to institutionalize

Pan-African ideals became a matter of vigorous endeavour. Between 1900 and 1927, a

total of four conferences took place in United Kingdom (UK), Belgium, France, Portugal

and United States of America (US) within which the advocates of Pan-Africanism voiced

their demands for the abolishment of systemic and structural racial discrimination,

injustices and inequities faced by Africans and people of African descent across the world.

In 1944, several political organizations from the continental Africa and UK opened up

talks for the establishment of the Pan-African Federation, which was actualized a year

later during the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester with the calls for decolonisation

and elimination of all forms of racism in Africa. Standing at a critical juncture in the

history of the Pan-African movement, with this event the Pan-African leadership shifted

to the African leaders, and the Pan-Africanist political cause to the continent itself.

Throughout the 1950s, Pan-Africanism flourished as a driving force behind the

decolonization wave in Africa. At the time, the African leaders of independence sought

unity and solidarity among African peoples as a necessity "[...] for the rapid eradication

of colonialism and for the continent's economic and political development."

The first

remnant, in this regard, was the independence of Gold Coast (later Ghana) from the

British rule in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who was to state that “our

independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African

continent”

at the historic celebration of Ghana's independence.

Despite the consensus on the unity ideal, however, the questions of ‘what entails African

unity and how to achieve it?’ surfaced as a matter of contest between the ideological

camps to which the nascent immediate post-independence African leaders belonged. On

the one hand was the more conservative, gradualist Monrovia Group, which favoured an

inter-African economic, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation. The idea of political

integration was seen as a premature venture which could compromise the newly attainted

sovereign rights of the African states. For Monrovia, whatever the unity would entail, it

was crucial for it to be built on the principle of non-intervention. On the other hand, was

the federalist Casablanca group that ab initio, favoured a ‘United States of Africa’ model,

which would foster integration and de-emphasize national identities and other forms of

delineations. Extremely wary of the prospect of external political and economic

interventions, this group strongly advocated for the socio-political and economic

DuBois, W. E. B. (1921). To the World: Manifesto of the Second Pan-African Congress. The Crisis, 23 (1), pp.

5-11; Esedebe, P. O. (1994). Pan-Africanism: the Idea and Movement, 1776-1991. Howard University Press;

Sherwood, M. (2011). Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa and the African Diaspora.

Routledge.

Muyangwa, M., & Vogt, M. A. (2000). An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution, 1993-2000. International Peace Academy, p. 4.

Kwameh, N. (1957). Independence Speech, 5 March 1957.

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integration across the continent to prevent external intrusion in the future. At the onset

in 1963, due to the reluctance of the Monrovia group to aspire to supranational ideal

prescribed by the Casablanca group, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was birthed

as an offspring of compromise.

1.1. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The OAU, whose treaty was signed in Addis Ababa in 1963 by 32 African states, was

founded as an inter-governmental organization. The primary goal of the Organization

was prescribed as the promotion of unity and solidarity of the African States through

which member states would work together towards the eradication of all forms of

colonialism from Africa, and to provide better life for people of Africa via harmonisation

of economic, diplomatic, socio-cultural and security policies.

Through concerted

diplomatic and non-diplomatic means, the OAU achieved its key political goals, having

championed the independence of African states that were still under the clutches of

colonialism, and carrying out a successful fight against the apartheid rule in South Africa.

Yet, overtime, it became clear that the Organization lacked the required institutional

capacity to promote better living conditions for African people.

The peace and security issues in post-independence Africa were primarily by-products of

ill-governance. The Pan-African dreams of socio-political equality and economic

development were effectively crashed within a decade by the African leaders of

independence, who were captivated by the pre-colonial/patrimonial traditions of political

leadership and dictatorial aspirations. Consequently, millions were exposed to violent

campaigns of political oppression, acute poverty and underdevelopment under the

authoritarian kleptocratic systems of governance extant in various newly independent

African states. In 1970s and 1980s, African continent witnessed high-intensity conflicts

in the form of super power proxy wars and coup d'etats, along with the spark of

secessionist insurgency directed against the suppressive regimes. The colonial

inheritance of international borders in post-independence Africa, which separated the

closely related ethno-linguistic groups into different regions, also surfaced as a driver in

the regionalization of on-going conflicts in the form of border disputes.

In the absence of articulation on peace and security matters beyond elimination of foreign

invasion, the OAU’s approach to conflict was underpinned by the principles of non-

interference, territorial integrity and inviolability of the colonial boundaries. The OAU

Charter neither had a clause on exceptions to the sovereign equality of its member states,

nor had any significant elements on peace and security matters. All governments,

regardless of their method of acquiring political power, were recognized as legitimate

members to partake in decision-making processes, while the domain of peace and

security was exclusively left to domestic jurisdiction. The culture of impunity generated

under the prevailing structure, thus, provided convenient conditions for much of OAU

member states to perpetuate political tyranny. The OAU’s strong focus on inviolability of

Organization of African Unity, Charter of the Organization for African Unity, 479 UNTS 39, 13 September

1963.

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the colonial boundaries, which together with non-interference policy, also incapacitated

the Organization to address issues arising from the secessionist/border disputes.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, in effect with liberation movements and post-independence

conflicts, millions of Africans were forced to leave their homes to escape persecution,

armed conflict and human rights violations. The OAU, in effect with its 1969 regional

refugee convention which encompassed a capacious and inclusive interpretation with

respect to refugee protection arising out of armed aggression and other kinds of

violence,

and its member states’ generosity in accepting refugees served as a positive

example for the rest of the world.

The admirable success of the OAU in dealing with

Africa’s refugee problems, however, was not mirrored on its ability to address rest of the

peace and security matters of the era. Thus, it could not prevent the Organization from

attaining an unsavoury reputation for being notoriously ignorant towards the unfolding

human tragedies of the era as the guardian of autocratic regimes.

The OAU Charter had no provision on conflict management but a claim on the

commitment of its member states to peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation,

mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Consequently, the Organization’s scope for peace

interventions was limited. In comparison to the UN Secretary-General, for instance, the

Executive Secretary of the OAU had no mandate to initiate peace interventions while the

continental body was also limited in terms of its capacity to enforce its own resolutions.

Tasked with the coordination of peaceful settlement of the disputes between the member

states, the Commission on Mediation, Arbitration and Reconciliation was commanding

the OAU peace and security agenda. Although, the very existence of this organ signaled

commitment and value to institutional mediation, the operationalization of this

framework was jeopardized by the OAU’s strict non-interference policy, leaving the

Commission impotent to prevent and respond effectively to intra-state conflicts.

Furthermore, the Commission had no compulsory jurisdiction over the settlement of

disputes, which eventually led to the collapse of the framework as the member states

were wary of transferring their sovereign rights. The deadlock on the matter was

attempted to be resolved gradually through the establishment of ad hoc committees, and

later a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which lacked

enforcement authority in furtherance of the futility of the Organization’s peace and

security framework.

2. The African Union & The Quest for Continental Peace and Security

In the early half of the 1990s, the inability of the United Nations to prevent and stop the

Rwandan genocide, inter alia, state collapse in Somalia, the eruption of civil wars across

several parts of Africa, as well as human rights violations orchestrated by states, created

an impulse for the revival of Pan-African consciousness. Deriving from these ideals

Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001

UNTS 45, 10 September 1969.

Crisp, J. (2006). Forced Displacement in Africa: Dimensions, Difficulties and Policy Directions. New Issues in

Refugee Research, RP No 126, UNHCR.

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emerged the desire for the promotion of better living conditions for African people,

hitherto lost with the rise of dictatorial and corrupt regimes in the immediate aftermath

of the decolonization. The zeitgeist of the era was equally potent in shaping the African

leaders’ perceptions on the necessity for African governments to play a proactive role in

combatting emergent threats to peace and security across the continent. Kofi Annan,

Secretary-General of the United Nations had called for the adoption of relevant principles

to the UN Charter to enable humanitarian interventions for the protection of civilians in

armed conflicts

. Annan also made a call for the UN Security Council’s reinforcement for

involvement of the African regional and sub-regional agencies in conflict prevention and

management initiatives in cooperation with the UN.

Drawing on revived Pan-African ideals and the vivid pre-Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

debates in global level, the African Union (AU) assumed a pioneering role by embracing

human security understanding and affirming regional and international collaboration as

a requisite for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the continent. This epochal

moment was defined by the adoption of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol

in 2002

which established the first continent-wide peace and security system in Africa

with the objective of offering ‘African solutions to African problems’, the African Peace

and Security Architecture (APSA).

The transformation of the OAU into the AU portrayed the continental body’s readiness to

tackle some of the weaknesses inherent in the old order. The OAU’s scorecard was replete

with its inability to play a significant role in such major situations as the border dispute

between Algeria and Morocco in 1963, the Biafra war in Nigeria from 1967-1970, the

Chadian Civil War in the early 1980s, the collapse of Somalia in the early 1990s and

consequent state decay. Other occurrences that brought the OAU’s limitations into the

fore included the civil wars experienced in West Africa in countries such as Liberia, Sierra

Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire in the 1990s, as well as the devastating genocide

in Rwanda in 1994.

Departing from the old ways, the AU Constitutive Act, specifically Articles 2 and 3,

emphasizes the need to promote continental peace and stability, democratic principles

and institutions, popular participation and good governance, sovereign equality and

interdependence.

Quite importantly, to banish the ill-effects of the ‘non-interference’

principle, the Constitute Act was explicit in its principles which spell out important

elements such as the sovereign equality and interdependence of African states, the right

of the Union to intervene in a Member State under grave circumstances, namely war

crimes, genocide and war against humanity, and the right of a Member State to request

intervention from the union in order to restore peace and security. Of particular

significance was the creation of the organs and instruments of the Peace and Security

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/54/1, 1 October

1999.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1197 (1998) [Africa], S/RES/1197, 18 September 1998.

African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,

AU Doc. 9/7/2002.

African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.

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An African Gordian Knot? Institutional and Operational Limitations in

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Council, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise, as well as

the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOCC).

These systems and structures were mandated by the Constitutive Act to adequately

operationalize the new continental peace and security architecture which embraces a

comprehensive peace and security agenda that includes conflict prevention, early

warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace support operations,

peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian response and disaster

management, as well as the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for

human rights. The operationalization of this continental framework is supported by the

assignment of stakeholders such as United Nations (UN), the Regional Economic

Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and civil society

organizations.

The coordination of the APSA in collaboration with the stakeholders, on

the other hand, is centralized around the PSC, the apex body of decision-making

responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, supported by

four institutional instruments, namely, the Panel of the Wise, Conflict Early Warning

System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.

2.1. AU Conflict Prevention Scheme

Devoted to establishing the capabilities that would enable the AU’s ability to anticipate

and predict potential crises, ensure the timely intervention of conflict, as well as the

ability to resolve prevailing tensions or to avert conflict relapse, the AU conflict prevention

framework derives from its overarching APSA. It primarily functions through the

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the activities carried out by the Panel of

the Wise (PoW). This framework comprises five highly respected African personalities

from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause

of peace, security and development on the continent,

and it serves as an advisory body

to the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU Commission. The five Panel members, who

represent the East, Southern, West, North and Central parts of Africa, are appointed as

peace mediators even as the AU can also rely upon special envoys and committees for

the matter. The PoW, thus, carries out its primary function through the preparation of

special reports on issues such as election-related violence and vulnerabilities of women

and children in armed conflicts.

Prior to its recent internal reforms as part of the merging of the AU Political Affairs and

Peace & Security Departments into one, a critical component of the APSA framework was

the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). CEWS, a proactive component in APSA’s

African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.

African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the

African Union, The Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby

Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa, 26 September 2008, Article IV (iii).

African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,

AU Doc. 9/7/2002, Article 12.

African Union, Report of the AU Panel of the Wise: Election- Related Disputes and Political Violence, 2010;

African Union, AU PSC & Panel of the Wise Expert Report on Eliminating Vulnerabilities of Women and Children

in Armed Conflicts, 2014.

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conflict prevention scheme, had the mandate of data collection and analysis to detect

situations that are likely to escalate into armed conflicts at an early stage, with the

mandate to prepare reports to the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the PSC. Part

of CEWS’ functions was also to undertake its missions out in the observation and

monitoring centre in Addis Ababa, also known as the Situation Room, which directly

operates on the data collected from AU liaison offices, AU field missions, AU early-warning

officers and monitoring-observation units in RECs and RMs. The CEWS no longer exists

as we know it and it is the firm belief of the authors of this Paper that a critical element

of the AU’s peace and security architecture has been sacrificed to institutional reforms.

Yet, prior to this recent development on the CEWS, the entity had suffered from the

active coordination with RECs early warning structures, which limited its ability to obtain

information that would have reinforced the AU’s ability to carry out its early warning and

early response functions. The limited political will by AU member states and reluctance

to act on ‘internal matters’ form part of the problems in the effective functioning of the

APSA. This disconnect between early warning and early response comes alive with the

PSC’s decision on not taking preventive action in 2012 despite being informed about a

possible outbreak of conflict in Mali and Guinea- Bissau by the CEWS staff.

The AU Conflict Prevention Scheme also encompass two voluntary processes: the Country

Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) and the Country Structural

Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS) within the CEWs. Since its adoption in April

2013, the PSC has been repeatedly encouraging the utilization of these mechanisms by

AU member states for the structural prevention of conflict in Africa.

Yet, as important

as they are in helping member states to evaluate their structural vulnerabilities, identify

resilience factors and develop risk mitigation strategies, and doing so, strengthening the

AU capacity in addressing the challenges in early warning and early response nexus, the

continental uptake on CSVRA and CSVMS have been extremely slow, limited to the

participation of Ghana (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2019) and Zambia (2020) out of the extant

55 AU member states.

2.2. AU Conflict Response and Intervention Mechanism

AU Conflict Response and Intervention mechanism under APSA primarily functions

through the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), and the African

Standby Force (ASF) which is a peacekeeping force with international and continental

components inclusive of military, police and civilian contingents. Envisaged as a

multipurpose instrument, the PSC holds the mandate to authorize ASF observation and

monitoring missions, peace support missions and humanitarian interventions in AU

member states. Despite the ambitious scope of this framework, however, the ASF lacks

the rapid deployment capacity, which is central to its operational capability. Equally, if

Noyes, A. & Yarwood, J. (2013). The AU Continental Early Warning System: From Conceptual to Operational?

International Peacekeeping, 20(3), p. 256.

PSC/PR/COMM.2 (DII) ; Assembly/AU/ Decl.1-2(XXXV) ; Assembly/AU/4(XXXVII).

African Union Peace and Security Council, Press Release: National and Regional Consultations on Country

Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) of Ghana. 3 November 2017; African Union, Key

Decisions of the 32nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union (January 2019), 12 February 2019.

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not more critical, is the importance of Member States conferring more supra-nationality

to the AU, by providing the required political backing needed to put the ASF into readiness

and action.

The PSC’s role in operationalizing APSA requires an African Union Commission whose

mandate is to ensure that the structures and processes align. Prior to 2018, the AU

Commission had two separate departments with mandates on political affairs and peace

and security respectively. However, by November 2018, the 11th Extraordinary Session

of the AU Assembly, had ratified the merger of two separate departments, namely

Political Affairs and Peace & Security into the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and

Security (PAPS). PAPS’ mandate covers four AU Commission priorities- political affairs,

peace and security, economic integration, and Africa’s global representation and voice,

and in line with the AU Agenda 2063,

which aspires to a “An Africa of Good Governance,

Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law”

. Effectively, this

merger of the old departments into a single new department commenced in 2020 and

has remained work in progress since then. The core functions of the department include

the monitoring of peace and security trends, support to conflict prevention, capacity

building and training of Member States and RECs on relevant political, peace and security

issues, and the coordination of the development of Common African Positions on relevant

political, peace and security issues. Also included in the new Department’s mandate is

the responsibility to ensure complementarity and synergy in the implementation of

African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture

(APSA), as well as supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development policy and

strategy development.

Ideally, the merger of the two departments into one present numerous challenges which

will require time and resources to tackle. These will include a reorientation of relevant

personnel to ensure a shared sense of purpose and vision, a realignment of human

resource needs and the stock-taking of existing capacity, as well as the luxury of time to

allow the new department to evolve. Merging the two departments has, according to AU

sources, been chaotic and problematic because of the lack of clarity of mandates,

competition between the personnel of the old departments, some of whom keep their

loyalties to the old set up.

According to a senior AU staff who chose to remain

anonymous:

“The old set up of having separate departments for peace and security and

political affairs was better. The biggest mistake was merging peace and

security with political affairs as things are being done in a chaotic manner.

Peace and security were dedicated to peace interventions while political affairs

did political stuff such as elections, democratic governance issues and human

rights issues. The thinking behind the merger was that since most of the

African Union (n.d.). PAPS Mandate.

African Union Development Agency (n.d.), Aspiration 3: An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect

for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law.

African Union (n.d.). PAPS Mandate.

Personal interview with a senior staff of the AU PAPS Department.

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au Conflict Prevention and Peace Intervention Initiatives

Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

threats to peace and stability were political in nature, a unified set up would

boost the AU’s work”

3. Responding to the Most Pressing Threats to Peace and Stability across

Africa

The continental landscape is dotted with several conflict, humanitarian disasters and

political instability. Some of the threats to peace and stability include interstate conflicts,

ethnoreligious conflicts- identity based conflicts, climate change-derived conflicts, and

political contestations/coup d'états. Given its mandate to deal with peace and security

matters, the AU is expected to respond to the current threats and manifestation of

instability and conflict across the continent. Over the past two decades, the AU has played

an active role in dealing with such challenges as the political crisis in the Comoros, the

Darfur war, post-election crises and upheavals in places such as Cote d’Ivoire in 2010-

2011, and arguably more recently, the Tigray conflict through the signing of the Pretoria

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).

The limitations by multilateral organizations to successfully initiate dialogue processes

and arrive at a peace agreement has been severely limited in recent times for a number

of reasons. While the geopolitical battles between the US and China and the US and

Russia account for the stalemate at the Security Council, for the AU, it is a bit different.

The inability to galvanize ‘frontline states’ who are usually seized with peace and stability

concerns for the entire continent has created a leadership vacuum. The era of committed

regional hegemons- Algeria for North Africa, Ethiopia for East Africa and the Horn, Nigeria

for West Africa, South Africa for Southern Africa, who were at the forefront of initiating

peace interventions and developmental policies, is now in the past. The most protracted

conflicts no longer feature on the agenda of the bi-annual Summits of AU Heads of State.

Part of an era gone by was the ability to foster a consensual approach to the peace and

security challenges that beset the continent. This leads to an examination of the AU’s

response to the prevailing threats to peace and security, manifesting in the devastating

conflict in Sudan, the perennial conflicts in the Oromia and Amhara regions of Ethiopia,

the AU’s host state, the dangerous developments in the Horn between Ethiopia and

Somalia, leading to an alliance between Eritrea, Egypt (Ethiopia’s adversary over the

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)), violent clashes in the Sahel by extremists,

especially in Burkina Faso, as well the manifestation of the same in Nigeria and

Mozambique.

As mentioned briefly in the introductory section, the hallmark of effective collaboration

between the UN, AU and RECs was the respect for the two principles of subsidiarity and

complementarity. Adherence to these principles helped in the sharing of responsibilities

and in ensuring a collective approach to peace and security matters. On key issues

pertaining to West Africa for example, ECOWAS would normally act and obtain the

ratification of the AU and the UN, with the sub-regional entity acting in a timely manner

Personal interview with a senior staff of the AU PAPS Department.

The Tigray conflict ended with a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed in Pretoria in 2022.

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Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

and without waiting for interventions from Addis Ababa or New York. This did not mean

the non-involvement of the AU. Rather, the AU would be content with backstopping the

sub-regional effort and offer advanced legitimacy. In reality, this manifested in the AU

often co-chairing an International Contact Group (ICG) or ‘Friends’ arrangement, as was

done during the political dialogue and democratic transition process in Guinea from 2008-

2011. On rare occasions, when the impartiality or capability of a REC to respond to

threats and manifestations of conflict was in question, the AU would step in to coordinate

a joint AU-REC effort, as was done following the decision to constitute an AU High-level

Panel on the post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire between 2010-2011.

In terms of the capacity to respond to violent extremism, whether it be in Nigeria, the

Sahel, and in places such as Mozambique, the AU has been active through the application

of subsidiarity principles and, in the case of Somalia, the deployment of a peacekeeping

force with an expanded mandate to use force to repel non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

In response to the threat of violent extremism, the AU has worked with the Multinational

Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area of the

continent. In Somalia however, the AU’s deployment of a continental force, the AU

Mission in Somalia, initially to stabilize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),

implement a national security plan, and to train the TFG forces, and the subsequent

expansion of its mandate to support the Somali government efforts, has been the practice

since 2006. While the flexibility is commendable, it remains to be seen whether there is

any meaningful effort by the AU, RECs and the various ad-hoc arrangements such as the

MNJTF, to adopt an intervention that seeks to understand and tackle violent extremism

from its root cause. Gaps also exist in terms of the AU’s capacity to respond to conflicts

occurring or manifesting at the sub-state level but with repercussions for regional peace

and stability. Climate change-derived conflicts are often mixed with identity-based issues

and occurring through disputes over shared natural resources such as water sources,

land and farmer-herder disputes, and are limited to interventions by sub-state level

actors and NGOs. With the havoc that these conflicts may constitute for regional stability,

given the propensity for widespread violence across borders and various regions in Africa,

this constitutes another obvious gap that sub-regional and regional arrangements are

unable to deal with.

3.1. Progress & Setbacks in Peace Intervention Efforts

Beyond the aforementioned limitations of the AU to effectively prevent and respond to

conflict issues, additional obstacles to effective conflict management and resolution

efforts include the following:

3.1.1. Limited Supranationality of the AU

Expectations were that the principle of ‘non-indifference’, enshrined in the AU

Constitutive Act, would replace one of the cardinal principles of the defunct OAU’s

principle of non-interference. While ‘non-indifference exists in the normative instrument,

the reality is the frequent retention of the right to withdraw the AU’s right to intervene

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where necessary. An AU senior official

refers to this as ‘the constant invocation of

sovereignty by Member States in crisis’. The popular refrain is for member states to

reiterate their independence and sovereignty, and to label conflicts of concern in their

member states as internal matters. This act limits the capacity of the relevant

departments within the organization to make bold pronouncements on conflict issues in

member states. It also reveals the limitations of the Commission to identify and engage

in conflicts early before they escalate, especially in member states that wield power and

influence within the Commission. For example, a largely unspoken reality is the AU’s

reluctance to tackle conflict issues in Ethiopia, a powerful member state, and the host to

the AU, due to the host member state’s enormous influence within the organization and

beyond.

3.1.2. Inability to Tackle Conflict Root Causes

he AU’s limited staying power and ability to address the root causes of conflict and to

deploy long-term measures required in tackling them. There is the penchant for

facilitating inconclusive peace processes or peace agreement implementation, or peace

processes with limited participation of conflict actors. An example is the Pretoria

Agreement of 2022, which effectively ended the devastating Tigray conflict, but which

did not address the root causes of the conflict in itself, nor involve the participation of

Eritrea, an active conflict party, in the peace talks. The recent threats to peace and

stability in Ethiopia and the consequent concerns over the unravelling of the Pretoria

Agreement have come about because of the ad hoc nature of the Agreement.

3.1.3. Identifying and Pursuing Peace and Security Priorities

For various reasons, attaining a unity of purpose and a shared vision and direction for

the AU has been a struggle. This phenomenon is not exclusive to the AU, a fifty-five

member state organization with a broad mandate. Even the EU, with half the membership

of the AU, and with many years of advancement, has this challenge. However, the AU

has in recent years, struggled to attain harmonized position and a set of key priorities.

3.1.4. Short Intervention Lifespan and Placing Conflict Management

Over Transformation

Linked to the above, is a limited attention span on key conflict issues, and the frequent

‘flipping of channels’ from one conflict to another. Due to the myriad challenges that the

AU has to grapple with, there has been the tendency to move too quickly from one conflict

issue to another. The tendency to ‘fire-fight’ overwhelmingly supersedes the tendency to

prevent conflicts from occurring or escalating. There is a sense that some of the current

conflicts and political crises that have escalated in recent times- whether it be in the DRC,

the Sahel region, Mozambique, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan- could have been

Interview with a serving AU official who wishes to remain anonymous, 10th September 2025, Nairobi, Kenya.

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prevented from degenerating into full-scale conflict, or crisis. When the default approach

to conflict issues is a conflict management approach, rather than transformation, any

temporary reprieve or Band-Aid that stops the haemorrhaging will do.

3.1.5. Division of Labour with the Regional Economic Communities

We had earlier alluded to the blurring of lines in terms of the sharing of responsibilities

between the AU and the RECs. While there remain good working relations between the

multilateral organizations that are the building blocks of the AU (the RECs) and the AU,

there is perception in some quarters that with the AU’s backing, some of the conflicts

and crises could be better managed by the RECs where the countries in conflict are

domiciled

. On the other hand, some AU personnel believe that RECs already have too

much power and have arrogated some of the AU’s responsibilities to themselves. This

difficult topic is rarely discussed in the open but is a palpable reality that informs action

or inaction on the part of the AU

Conclusion & Recommendations

The adoption of the continental APSA, widely acknowledged as a comprehensive regional

plan, and which captures the realities and ambitions of attaining sustainable peace and

stability in Africa, represents a good starting point for attaining regional peace and

stability. However, what makes for a normative instrument, or a viable peace and

security architecture is the political will granted by decision makers to operationalize such

frameworks. Closely linked to this is the important role that RECs have to play in

furthering the peace and security agenda in their sub-regions and in collaboration with

the AU and other partners. This aspect of the collaboration between the AU and its

building blocks warrants a distinct study of its own. RECs not only have parts of their

mandates deriving from the AU, but they also seek an endorsement of their action from

the AU and from the UN. Over time, there has been a blurring of lines in and clarity on

what guides action, and who should lead dialogue processes across board. Going

forward, with the emergence of new actors, such as the Gulf countries and the likes of

Turkey, who have joined the established global powers in seeking to influence domestic

politics in parts of the continent such as the Horn and the Sahel among others.

In a recently-published report reviewing the progress made by the African Union on its

‘Silencing the Guns’ Initiative, Dersso & Hailu (2025) shared a gloomy if not damning

scorecard of the AU’s efforts at conflict management. They noted thus:

The AU is in crisis. Nothing more highlights this crisis than its increasing loss of leadership

in peace and security. There is nothing more central to the mandate of the Peace and

Security Council (PSC) and the AU than Silencing the Guns. It constitutes the raison

d’être for the very existence of this Council and indeed for the AU itself…from Sudan to

Interview with anonymous personnel of the ECOWAS Commission, 15th July 2025, Abuja, Nigeria.

One of the Authors has experienced these tensions while serving as a Political Affairs Officer with ECOWAS

and in the course of his frequent exchanges with AU personnel.

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DRC, from Mozambique to the Sahel, Ethiopia and South Sudan, the peace and security

situation of the continent has deteriorated exponentially.

a. The Conferment of Meaningful Supranationalism on the AU

Having described some of the challenges hindering the AU from fulfilling its mandate, it

is important to stress that the AU Commission can only be as effective as the Member

States want it to be. Indeed, the AU Chairperson and the AU Commissioner for Political

Affairs, Peace & Security both elected officials of the Commission, are mandated to lead

the AU’s peace efforts, but require the backing of the AU’s higher organs, the Assembly

and the Peace & Security Council. The conferment of supranational powers on the AU will

ensure its independence of action and reduce the political interference by Member States.

b. Revisiting Subsidiarity and Complementarity Principles between the AU, RECs

and the UN

Given that the attainment of continental peace and stability is a shared responsibility

between the UN, the AU and the RECs, a review of shared functions and the adherence

to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity will be a positive step forward. It

will help in attaining two main objectives- a clear division of roles and responsibilities,

and increased coordination between the AU, RECs, and Member States. Of particular

importance is the operational synergy between the AU and its building blocks- the RECs,

given the sheer impossibility of the AU to tackle every threat to peace and stability on

the continent.

c. Revisiting the AU Reforms with Particular Emphasis on Peace & Security

The AU’s internal reforms, especially the merging of the two Departments responsible for

Political Affairs, and Peace and Security, into one, which has effectively led to lesser

functions for such important organs as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS),

especially on its operationalization. While this piece does not afford the opportunity to

undertake an appraisal of its functions, future research on the ability of the AU Peace

Fund, mandated in the 1993 PSC Protocol to cater to operational peace interventions,

will be beneficial to scholars and practitioners alike.

d. Increased Capacity to Understand Evolving Geopolitics and New Threats to

Peace and Stability

Some of the most devastating threats to peace and stability on the continent today

include large-scale intercommunal conflicts, violence emanating from hate speech and

social media misuse, as well as the impact of geopolitical tussling between powerful

states and emergent powers. The ability to identify the root causes of the conflicts is

critical to devising solutions to them and this requires new engagements and analyses

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that are more sophisticated than what currently obtains. It may therefore require a

revisiting of existing early warning indicators and mechanisms for tackling conflict.

e. Towards a Longer-term Political Dialogue Processes, More Comprehensive

Peace Processes, and Gender Inclusion

The shift from a ‘fire-fighting’ and reactive approach to undertaking structural conflict

prevention initiatives can only be attained if the AU is provided with the required tools-

a supranational status with less interference in its operations by member states, as well

as the financing required to undertake longer-term political dialogue processes. Inclusion

of critical actors such as women, youth and marginalized groups are also critical for the

maximum delivery of its mandate to the people of Africa.

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Babatunde Afolabi, Pinar Kadioglu Chen

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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THE CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA (2020-2022) AND THE AFRICAN UNION'S ROLE

IN THE PEACE PROCESS

THAIS HORN

thaishonoriohorn@gmail.com

Scholar in African Studies and holds a Master’s degree from the European Interdisciplinary Master

in African Studies (EIMAS) at the University of Porto (Portugal), having defended her thesis

Ethiopia at War: Political causes of the civil war between the Ethiopian Federal Government and

the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF, 2020-2022) in September 2024. She holds a

background in International Relations and specializes in topics such as war, nationalism, and

post-colonial identity in the Horn of Africa. Thaís combines interdisciplinary approaches to

investigate how historical legacies, geopolitical shifts, and social identities shape contemporary

African political realities, especially in Ethiopia.

Abstract

The war that erupted between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2020 left the country embedded

in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, combining internal displacement, famine, and

widespread human rights violations by external forces still present in the region. This research

examines the conflict using the Contentious Politics Approach to Civil War (Florea, 2017) and

discusses the role of the African Union in the peace negotiations in Pretoria, South Africa.

After understanding the structural conditions that led to the authority and legitimacy crisis,

and consequently, civil conflict, we identified in the war cycle in Ethiopia several mechanisms

of radicalization and militarization. The interference of AU’s shuttle diplomacy resulted in the

beginning of the peace negotiations and represented a remarkable achievement in

independent African conflict resolution. Nonetheless, AU failed to oversee the full

implementation of the agreement. The disarmament and demobilization phases were never

completed, for instance, and Tigrayans currently find themselves on the edge of another

conflict.

Keywords

Civil War, Ethiopia, African Union, Peace Negotiations.

Resumo

A guerra que eclodiu entre o governo da República Federal Democrática da Etiópia e a Frente

de Libertação do Povo Tigré (FLPT) em novembro de 2020 deixou o país mergulhado em uma

crise humanitária sem precedentes, combinando deslocamento interno, fome e violações

generalizadas dos direitos humanos por forças externas ainda presentes na região. Esta

pesquisa examina o conflito usando a Abordagem Política Contenciosa da Guerra Civil (Florea,

2017) e discute o papel da União Africana nas negociações de paz em Pretória, África do Sul.

Após compreender as condições estruturais que levaram à crise de autoridade e legitimidade

e, consequentemente, ao conflito civil, identificamos no ciclo de guerra na Etiópia diversos

mecanismos de radicalização e militarização. A interferência da diplomacia de vaivém da UA

resultou no início das negociações de paz e representou uma conquista notável na resolução

independente de conflitos africanos. No entanto, a UA não conseguiu supervisionar a

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The Civil War in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and the African Union's Role in the Peace Process

Thais Horn

implementação integral do acordo. As fases de desarmamento e desmobilização nunca foram

concluídas, por exemplo, e os tigrés se encontram atualmente à beira de outro conflito.

Palavras-chave

Guerra Civil, Etiópia, União Africana, Negociações de Paz.

How to cite this article

Horn, Thais (2025). The Civil War in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and the African Union's Role in the Peace

Process. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL. 16 Nº. 1, TD 2– Thematic Dossier –

“Os Vinte Anos da União Africana: Passado, Presente e Futuro”. October 2025, pp. 43-60. DOI

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425.3

Article submitted on 7th November 2024 and accepted for publication on 20th July 2025.

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The Civil War in Ethiopia (2020-2022) and the African Union's Role in the Peace Process

Thais Horn

THE CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA (2020-2022) AND THE AFRICAN

UNION'S ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS

THAIS HORN

Introduction

On the 15th of February 2025, the African Union elected a new leader. Held in Addis

Ababa, home of the AU's headquarters, delegates from the member countries elected

Mahamoud Ali Youssouf for the new mandate. Not far from there, Tigrayans of Mekelle

were (and still are) facing the increasing fear of their region relapsing into another civil

war. The same AU that elected its new leader last weekend mediated the negotiations

and the signature of the peace agreement in November 2022. On the edge of a new

conflict, Ethiopia is back in the international eye. The criticism of the Cessation of

Hostilities Agreement reemerged, and the role of the AU in the negotiation process is

being discussed again. In this direction, the present article aims at understanding the

role of AU in the peace negotiations in 2020. In order to have this discussion, the conflict

itself and its causes must be put under investigation.

During the night of November 3rd, 2020, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF)

base in Mekelle, capital of the Tigray Regional State, known also as the Northern

Command, was attacked. The federal government, represented by Prime Minister Abiy

Ahmed, blamed the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) for the attack and

announced military activities against the group.

The Prime Minister's) announcement was followed by two years of intense military and

violent conflict between the federal government forces and the Tigray People's Liberation

Front. The federal government quickly gained control of Mekelle, forcing the TPLF fighters

to disperse and retreat. Nonetheless, regrouping and adopting guerrilla tactics, the TPLF

made advances, inflicting heavy losses on the government forces, including plundering

military equipment and kidnapping personnel. Amongst change of tactics, human rights

violations, and ceasefire announcements, the federal government and the TPLF fought

"the most preannounced war in recent African history" (Tronvoll, 2022, p. 163).

Being a multiethnic society, Ethiopia's cultural diversity is usually the primary aspect

considered to be the cause of the conflict. However, as advocated in this research,

ethnicity alone cannot be the sole explanation for Ethiopia's civil war between 2020 and

2022. To assume this argument is valid would represent enduring Westernised

interpretations of African politics, focused on the idea of "tribalism" as the primary driver

of conflicts on the continent. We advocate for a comprehensive and multifaceted

interpretation of the context in which the conflict occurred, taking into account the

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country's multiethnicity, and include topics such as ethnic fragmentation and polarization

in our research.

The research relies on the critical historical analysis method. Through the heuristic phase,

we collect data and information from primary and secondary sources. After critically

evaluating our sources, we commit to synthesizing information and constructing a

narrative that explains the political causes of the conflict between 2020 and 2022.

Regarding its structure, this article is divided into four sections, besides the introduction

and the conclusion. The theoretical framework will be introduced first; the conflict

between ENDF and TPLF is discussed and, after, analyzed using the Contentious Politics

Approach to Civil War onset (Florea, 2017). Finally, we discuss the role of the AU in the

peace negotiations.

The Contentious Politics Approach to Civil War Onset

Using the Contentious Politics Approach to analyze civil war onset implies considering the

flexible and uncertain nature of the cycles of contention as essential shapers of the

conflict dynamics, from the escalation to its resolution. The framework provides an

understanding that a combination of structural conditions and specific contextualized

factors generates conflict in a country. Firmly rooted in a mechanism-based approach,

the Contentious Politics Approach explains civil conflict as a result of a crisis of authority

and legitimacy and two distinct but interdependent mechanisms: radicalization and

militarization (Florea, 2017).

The combination of structural conditions and specific mechanisms is central to the

argument, considering that many contentious politics have happened across history, and

not all of them necessarily turned into civil war. A crisis of authority or legitimacy is

required but not sufficient. Radicalization and militarization must shape the conflict's

outburst (Florea, 2017). Nonetheless, it is essential to consider that this does not mean

other mechanisms have not influenced the contention cycle and its outcomes.

When a country faces a crisis of authority or legitimacy, several indicators emerge,

including multiple power contenders challenging the central government's sovereignty, a

fragmented political body with undermined functions, and declining capacities. These

types of crises are common in weak states, authoritarian regimes, and newly established

governments, especially in contexts after an imperial or federal collapse and in ethnically

and culturally diverse and fragmented societies (Florea, 2017).

Low-capacity, undemocratic countries are the most common hosts of civil wars

worldwide. In contrast, low-capacity democratic countries are known for experiencing

military coups and other contentious struggles (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Furthermore, in

undemocratic regimes, social movements often have to opt for more extreme and violent

performances and repertoires to have their claim heard, considering that peaceful and

institutional options have been removed from community reach. Contentious politics can

be even more hampered in high-capacity undemocratic regimes due to the most

considerable resource availability for repressive actions.

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Countries with successful democratic governments and transitions over the decades have

been the least common scenarios for civil conflict or other forms of violent contentious

politics (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Elections, term limits, and other forms of democracy

institutionalization are essential to build a political context that welcomes political

participation from ordinary citizens or opposition parties, deepening and entrenching

democracy. There is no such thing as a fully consolidated democracy. However, authors

have shown that extending the life expectancy of democracy beyond the short term is

necessary and assists in preventing authoritarian regression (Schedler, 1998). In other

words, long-lasting and stable democracies host political contexts where claim-making is

not only accepted but facilitated, and contentious and violent political claim-making

tactics are not chosen by civil society and opposition. Hence, where societies have seen

multiple and frequent democratic backslides, including regime collapses, democratic

values are improbable to take root in a society.

Contention and violence can be ethnically shaped, and hence, so can civil wars. In this

direction, some authors have argued that ethnic distribution (polarization and

fractionalization) is linked with the intensity of conflicts. Through empirical analysis,

studies have shown that polarization influences conflict over public goods, and

fractionalization increases conflict when private components are involved (Esteban et al.,

2012).

However, there is a distinction between ethnic fractionalization and polarization - the

latter having a more considerable influence on civil conflicts. Fractionalization is the

probability of two random individuals not belonging to the same group. At the same time,

polarization refers to the population distribution among groups, with high polarization

indicating a bipolar system. Ethnic conflicts are less likely in highly homogeneous or

heterogeneous societies but more likely in countries with a significant minority facing a

dominant majority (polarization) (Esteban et al., 2012).

Ethnic-shaped contention can generate structural conditions necessary for civil war to

emerge. Nonetheless, in the same direction as Florea (2017), Fearon and Laitin (2003)

argued that neither ethnic polarization nor ethnic fractionalization generated civil conflict.

Instead, internal wars were mainly the result of conflict accumulation across decades.

Also, civil war can be seen in terms of insurgency. Local grievances based on ethnicity

can be essential for the local population to support the insurgents (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Hence, ethnicity influences civil conflict, but there is no causal relationship between

ethnic diversity and the conflict.

The Ethiopian Civil War (2020 – 2022): the path from hope to war

On November 4th, 2020, Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, issued a statement

informing the Ethiopian population that the last red line had been crossed. The TPLF

attacked the Ethiopian National Defense Forces Base, also known as the Northern

Command, located in Mekele, the capital of the Tigray region, after "months of continued

provocation and incitement for violence." The ENDF was, hence, authorized to carry out

military activity to “save the country and the region from spiraling into instability” (Office

of the Prime Minister – Ethiopia, 2020a).

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Ethiopian Airlines planes, intended for civil use only, were reportedly arriving at Mekelle

with special forces troops and equipment. Shots were exchanged at the airport and

surrounding areas as Tigrayan political leaders received information about the federal

government's activities. The fighting moved to the Northern Command's main base, from

where the Tigrayans captured heavy weaponry (Plaut, 2021; Plaut & Vaughan, 2023;

Tronvoll, 2022). The Parliament unanimously approved a State of Emergency and, on

November 6th, the Prime Minister's Office report informed that the Federal Defense

Forces were determined to finish the "criminal enterprise with the least possible cost to

the civilian population" (Office of the Prime Minister - Ethiopia, 2020b).

Two weeks after the beginning of the attacks, Mekele was surrounded by federal troops,

and as the 72-hour deadline for Tigrayan surrender expired, the civilian population of

Tigray's capital was subjected to military attacks. With Mekele under federal control,

Tigrayan forces were forced to flee the capital and relocate to rural areas (Ethiopia, 2020;

Plaut & Vaughan, 2023).

The central government interpreted taking control over Mekele as a sign of the war's end

(Ethiopia, 2020). However, TPLF, momentarily defeated and separated, still had

resources and interpreted the takeover of their capital as only the beginning of the

conflict. From this moment onwards, Tigrayan troops reorganized, adopted guerrilla

strategies, and increased their military arsenal with every attack on federal troops. The

first phase of the conflict was marked by TPLF tactical successes (Ethiopia's Tigray

Conflict, 2021). Tigrayans recovered many territories previously taken by the federal

government, caused heavy losses on enemy troops. Unable to respond to the attacks,

the government and allied troops "took out their frustration on the civilian population"

(Plaut & Vaughan, 2023, p. 229). During the invasion of cities and houses, women and

girls were systematically raped and sexually assaulted. Expectedly, Tigray forces also

were accused of committing mass killings, sexual assaults, and systematic rapes after

taking over several cities in Afar and Amhara regions (The Acute Risk of Further Atrocity

Crimes in Ethiopia, 2023).

As June 2021 ended, Ethiopian forces were forced out of Mekelle after a significant battle

that allegedly captured over 9,000 ENDF men. TPLF was in control of Mekelle, and the

Central Government declared an instant and unilateral ceasefire (Ethiopia Peace

Observatory, 2021; Plaut & Vaughan, 2023; The Acute Risk of Further Atrocity Crimes in

Ethiopia, 2023). The announcement was received with hope. However, what happened

was "an extension of the genocidal war campaign on Tigray, perhaps the worst stage"

(The Acute Risk of Further Atrocity Crimes in Ethiopia, 2023). Using the ceasefire as an

instrument for violence, the central government cut the internet signals, discontinued

banking activities, and restricted electricity availability, severely constraining the

provision of aid (Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Update Situation Report, July 9th,

2021 - Ethiopia | ReliefWeb, 2021).

Federal government responses indicated that some damage was done: Abiy revoked the

unilateral ceasefire and, with the assistance of different media vehicles, convinced the

population that war was necessary, a patriotic endeavor, even asking citizens to march

against the ‘terrorist’ TPLF “with every weapon and power” (Plaut & Vaughan, 2023;

Standard4, 2021). Categorizing TPLF as a terrorist group was strategic, considering that

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it opened possibilities of counterterrorism attacks that would not be available otherwise,

restricted by international humanitarian law and human rights regulations.

TPLF forces attempted to capture the city of Mille but were targeted with intensive aerial

bombing. Drones sent by Turkey and China, for instance, led Ethiopia to a significant

victory in the Afar region and rapid advances toward the north (Plaut & Vaughan, 2023;

The Acute Risk of Further Atrocity Crimes in Ethiopia, 2023).

As a strategy to hold the enemy, Tigrayans started to call on the international community

to initiate peace talks and intervene. Christmas Eve saw, after more than one year, both

sides announcing ceasefires. Nonetheless, by January 2022, drone attacks resumed,

especially in civilian areas. Both sides of the conflict exchanged accusations of

perpetrating military attacks, while requesting the international community to act and

lead the peace negotiations (Plaut & Vaughan, 2023).

Ethnic Polarization and Fragmentation in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is both ethnically fragmented and polarized. The second largest population of

the African continent (more than 126 million) is composed of approximately 90 ethnic

groups, divided into nine regional states and two administrative councils. The most

significant part of the population belongs to four ethnic groups (Oromo, Amhara, Somali,

and Tigray), and more than half of the ethnic groups (at least 56 Indigenous groups) of

Ethiopia are concentrated in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region.

("Country Summary," n.d.).

Numerically, there is some level of polarization in the country, as the biggest ethnic group

comprises more than one-third of the population (Oromo, 35,8%). Nevertheless, when

considering the political aspect of the concept of "majority," other groups stand out as

the most prominent ethnicities: Amhara and Tigray have been representing political

majorities by controlling state resources alternatively since the establishment of modern

Ethiopia, without being the numerical majority (24,1% and 5,7%, respectively) ("Country

Summary," n.d.).

Party formation and proliferation in Ethiopia are processes intensely influenced by

ethnicity. As we consider the constant overlapping of ethnicity and aspects of public life

in Ethiopia (agriculture, land demarcation, economics, administrative routines,

education, etc.), the expected consequence is a high number of political parties to reflect

an ethnically diverse society with ethnic-based political agendas.

NEBE published a list of the accredited political parties in the country in 2022, which

contained 67 parties. Of the total, more than 40 have ethnic groups mentioned in their

names, being the Ethiopian party system a concrete example of the ethnically fragmented

society it represents (Political Parties | National Election Board of Ethiopia, n.d.).

Ethnicity plays a vital role in Ethiopian politics and the 2020 conflict. Ethnic divisions

shaped contention and contentious performances, as well as the mechanisms of

radicalization taken by both actors during the conflict. As discussed previously, the role

of ethnicity in the conflict is important. However, there is no direct causality relation

between ethnic diversity and conflict, neither in theory nor in the case of Ethiopia.

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Contentious Politics Approach to the Ethiopian Civil Wars Onset (2020 -

2022)

Exactly three weeks after the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak

a global pandemic, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced the

indefinite postponement of regional and national elections, to take place initially in May

and, later, at the end of August of 2020 ("Ethiopia Postpones June 5 Parliamentary

Elections," 2021).

In June 2020, the Tigray Regional State Council announced its decision to hold elections

despite the federal decision. The Council claimed that neither NEBE nor any other federal

government institution had the authority and legal grounds to announce the

postponement of the regional elections: the holding of polls was predicted in the regional

Constitution ("Ethiopia Postpones June 5 Parliamentary Elections," 2021).

The Ethiopian population had to choose members for the House of People's

Representatives (HPR) and the Regional Legislative Councils. The 2020 elections were

expected to be the freest, fairest, and most competitive since 2005. The timing was also

an issue: the mandate of the Parliament was supposed to end in September 2020. Hence,

elections needed to be held by August at the latest (Steering Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis Away

from Conflict | Crisis Group, 2020). NEBE and TPLF exchanged accusations for months,

with NEBE claiming that TPLF had no legal grounds to organize an election logistically

and deploy a workforce, for instance. NEBE was the only institute with the mandate to

execute an election impartially. However, the TPLF claimed that the institute was only a

tool to facilitate elections when they happen, not an organ that holds any decision-making

power (Tsehay & Chekol, 2021).

The Board was created in 1992, after the end of the Derg regime, as an independent

electoral institution under the 1995 constitution, with responsibilities to conduct

elections, announce results, register voters and political parties, for instance

(Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, n.d.). In this direction, NEBE

was the institution overseeing all Ethiopian elections, many of which were criticized for

impartiality and for favouring the leading party of the ruling coalition, the TPLF.

Reformed after Abiy's ascension to PM, Birtukan Mideksa, a former TPLF opposition

leader, was appointed as chairperson (Birtukan’s Appointment as NEBE’s Chief Crucial to

Realize Genuine Election System, n.d.). None of those reforms explicitly equipped NEBE

with the power to postpone elections. Articles of a proclamation from 2019 include

mentions to the responsibility of deciding on "matters necessary for the proper execution

of free, fair and peaceful elections” and taking measures “to resolve issues that may arise

in the electoral process" (Election Laws | National Election Board of Ethiopia, n.d.).

Further analysis of the issue of the postponement of the elections is made on Tronvoll

(2024) and Mengie (2022), for instance. The main goal here is to locate NEBE 's

announcement in a broader context of the authority and legitimacy crisis in Ethiopia: the

federal government instrumentalized NEBE's decision to extend its mandate and weaken

opposition, and the TPLF leadership criticized NEBE and defied its instructions,

questioning the legality and authority of the whole government.

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After a closed-door meeting, the House of Federation (HoF) decided that the elections in

Tigray were illegal. Hence, whatever the results were, they would be considered non-

applicable, non-effective, and non-binding. Abiy Ahmed, in the same direction,

mentioned taking "the necessary actions against those who are engaged in illegal political

acts that threaten the constitution and constitutional order." (Abbay Media apud Tsehay

& Chekol). Despite these two precise positions from the central government, TPLF opened

polls in September (Tsehay & Chekol, 2021).

The party violated the decision of the federal government, questioning not only its

authority but also its legitimacy. The 5-year term for federal political positions has ended,

and elections need to be held to fill public offices in Addis - the same elections that were

not conducted. Hence, TPLF argued that neither the HoF nor the HPR officeholders

represented Tigray and its people. The very existence of the federal government was

being denied by Tigrayan leaders (Tsehay & Chekol, 2021).

As discussed previously, there is a bigger probability of finding problems with authority

and/or legitimacy in four contexts: weak states, authoritarian regimes, newly established

governments, and ethnically plural societies. Despite the difficulty of inferring the level

of democracy of any country, it is essential to highlight here that Ethiopia, immediately

before the conflict onset, presented itself with three out of the four contexts mentioned.

Ethiopia can be labeled as an undemocratic and low-capacity regime, given its low level

of democracy institutionalization, the limited power transitions over decades, and the

persistent and numerous electoral issues, among other factors. In addition, considering

the cycle of the war, Abiy's government was extremely recent and was showing clear

signs of authoritarianism, as the PM was growing to be the next African Big Man.

Radicalization and Militarization: Actions taken by the Central

government

It is essential to understand that the federal government has invested in an anti-TPLF

campaign composed of several fronts since Abiy's ascension to power. In this piece, we

consider them as radicalizing actions, as the central government increased the resources

mobilized to achieve a specific goal: to undermine the TPLF influence in Ethiopian politics.

TPLF interpreted the creation of the Prosperity Party as an active movement to remove

power from the hands of TPLF. In a meeting with only three out of the four founder

parties of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, the

creation of a new unitary party system was voted on. Although almost anything was done

to institutionalize the new ruling system, the TPLF interpreted Abiy's action as

unconstitutional. In an attempt at a conciliatory movement, the PM tried to convince TPLF

to join the new party under particular and already defined circumstances. In its turn,

TPLF refused to integrate the Prosperity Party. In addition, a large number of Tigrayans

were removed from public office, especially from security and military institutions,

prosecuted, and imprisoned. Former members occupied high positions in the chain of

command (Colonels, Majors) and were responsible for defence logistics, intelligence, and

tactical operations coordination - having strategic access to information and resources

(“Ethiopia Parliament Dissolves Tigray Leadership”). The primary justification for the

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arrests was accusations of corruption and human rights violations. Most accusations were

made in sentences without proper evidence to back up the process (Tessemi, 2018).

Removed from the government, the new party, and even from public positions across

different government institutions, the Tigrayan leadership left (or was forced to leave) to

return to Mekelle. The pro-government media vehicles reported that returning was an

embittered announcement of defeat, while TPLF and its supporters were interpreting it

as a necessary homecoming embedded in a bigger narrative of a sacrifice done for the

greater good (Plaut & Vaughan, 2023).

In addition, following the general discourse of the public manifestations between 2015

and 2018, TPLF was the chosen culprit for all and every negative aspect of the country.

Abiy's various proposed reforms were presented to the population against the backdrop

of previous government errors. From the initial speech of "You are the motor that runs

Ethiopia" (PM Abiy to Tigray, 2018), the Prime Minister has come a long way to

characterize the TPLF-led government as "the dark years" and to describe the opponents

of his reforms as saboteurs and "daytime hyenas" (Gardner, 2024).

Leaders of opposition groups and political enemies of TPLF, previously exiled or in the

diaspora, returned to the country after Abiy issued their forgiveness or dropped any

charges. Many of them were even named to occupy public offices. After the 2005

elections, many people were prosecuted for crimes against the Constitution by the TPLF-

led government (Plaut & Vaughan, 2023).

Regarding militarization, the federal government invested heavily in reforming and

modernizing the military, especially training and reorienting the regional special forces

allied to the central authorities. Reports indicate an 88% increase in military spending

directed towards expanding surveillance and enhancing drone capabilities, among other

initiatives. Also, agreements with Western partners (United Kingdom) to train pilots, and

special forces were reached (Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022.”,

“Shifts in Ethiopia’s Military Strategy - World - Al-Ahram Weekly.”)

The federal government invested in a campaign of securitization and authoritarian

control, including mass arrests, human rights violations, and blockages, increasing

repression and violence towards ethnonationalist groups not only in Tigray but also in

the Oromia and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions (Kelecha, 2021; Plaut & Vaughan,

2023). Also, Tigray government insiders reported using Ethiopian Airlines to move

military personnel and equipment across the country. Forty heavily armed men were

detained at Mekele airport without any explanation or justification for their presence in

the region.

Radicalization and Militarization: Actions taken by the TPLF

Most TPLF acts of radicalization came as responses to federal government positions and

in the form of public speeches and answers in interviews. After the publication of a report

implying that TPLF was involved in the assassination of the Oromo singer Hachalu

Hundessa, Getachew Reda, the party spokesman at the time, said that scapegoating TPLF

was a trend and accused the Prime Minister and his government of being in chaos

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(AfricaNews, 2020). Accusations of lies, controlling the media, selective justice, and

attempts to corner the people of Tigray were common, amongst many others. After the

decision of the finance ministry to send resources directly to Tigray local administrations

as a sort of punishment for the holding of elections, the party leadership accused the

decision of being unconstitutional and ‘tantamount to a declaration of war' (Steering

Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis Away from Conflict | Crisis Group, 2020).

By holding regional elections, despite the federal decision to postpone and the numerous

threats and speeches made by the PM regarding the consequences of such an act of

defiance, the TPLF was responsible for a significant escalation in the already tense

relationship between the regional and federal governments. No federal government

would remain indifferent to an extensive and public demonstration of disrespect to its

authority and legitimacy. The TPLF leadership, as once the ruling party of Ethiopia, was

not naive to believe their acts would not have consequences.

Considering TPLF militarization actions, an investigation by the Attorney General's office

generated a report pointing to the crimes committed by TPLF against the ENDF. Besides

pointing to the fact that the TPLF as a whole was making sure that enough food and fuel

were available before initiating war, the report indicated that after Abiy's ascension to

power, Tigray Regional State started training an extra 5,000 special forces per year

(Abrehet, 2021).

It is relevant to highlight that acquiring military resources during the fighting was

extremely important for TPLF forces to defend, advance, and conquer many territories

across Tigray and Amhara, for instance. In fact, on the very first day of the conflict,

during the attack on the Northern Command base, TPLF fighters seized a large number

of weapons and killed and captured a high number of high-ranking officers and resistant

soldiers. TPLF guerrilla tactics were also crucial for several victories during the conflict

and, consequently, for taking hold of military equipment. These strategies were deployed

in the attack on the Northern Command buildings, initiating the conflict, and in the attack

on Kombolcha, a strategic location between Addis and the northern region. TPLF forces

were accused of killing 100 ethnic Amharics and looting military equipment (“Tigray

Rebels Accused of ‘Summarily Executing’ 100 in Kombolcha”). Also, after the beginning

of the conflict, TPLF implemented force enlistment strategies, augmenting their military

personnel (Paravicini & Houreld, 2022).

Strategies, expectations, and peace negotiations

The initial phases of the peace negotiation process, led by the African Union, was marked

by what the AU itself calls shuttle diplomacy between Addis Ababa and Mekele. The High

Representative for the Horn of Africa had begun discreet and direct engagements with

parties involved and key political actors in the country, where he advocated for

unconditional ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, unhindered humanitarian access and

political dialogue without any preconditions. When both parties showed disposition for

negotiating, the AU began the bureaucratic process to bring everyone to the table (Kodjo,

n.d.).

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According to Zekarias Abebe (2022), there were some sticking points about the AU

leadership of the peace negotiation process. The TPLF leadership expressed reservations

about the neutrality of the institution’s representatives, citing the proximity of former

Nigerian President Obasanjo to Abiy Ahmed. In addition, the TPLF also demanded the

lifting of the blockade and restoration of basic services in the region before the beginning

of the talks. The federal government wanted to see more indications of an agreement

before resuming basic services (Abebe, 2022). This proves that human rights were being

violated as electricity and banking services remained cut and aid was impeded in the

region in order to have negotiation leverage.

Despite apparent impediments, negotiations started in Pretoria, South Africa, on October

25th, 2022. The AU organized a High-Level Panel where representatives had direct and

confidential negotiation and plenary sessions were held to monitor progress and confirm

areas of agreement. Representing AU were the African Union High Representative for the

Horn of Africa and former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, by the former Kenyan

President, Uhuru Kenyatta, and by the former Deputy President of South Africa, Dr.

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngucka. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the

United Nations, and the Government of the United States also participated as observers.

The AU report on the negotiation process highlights the three mediation principles

followed by the organization during the talks: consent, relevance and ownership, with

the Panel adopting a mere facilitative approach. On November 2nd, the Cessation of

Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) was signed – also referred to as the Pretoria Agreement

(Opata, 2022).

The role of the African Union in the peace negotiations was unprecedented and became

a concrete representation of the motto “African Solution to African Problems”. The

document published by the AU about the process includes the lessons learned during the

process and mentions AU’s leadership and ownership promoting, as well as management

of the media vehicles and engagement with observers (Abraham, 2025). Considering the

high complexity of the conflict and topics discussed, mediating the signature of the CoHA

is an excellent achievement for the African Union.

Nonetheless, when discussing the implementation of the Agreement, the AU was not as

successful. A direct channel of communication was established between the senior

military commanders to implement the measures agreed in Pretoria and a Joint Planning

Committee was formed to develop a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

(DDR) strategy. However, there were few advances, especially when it came to dialogue,

accountability, reconstruction, the DDR process and the presence of non-ENDF forces in

Tigray (The Acute Risk of Further Atrocity Crimes in Ethiopia, 2023).

The power struggle is currently migrating inwards the TPLF, and the region is on the edge

of another conflict (Cascais, 2025). The head of the interim administration and the party

leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, were replaced by Getachew Reda. The TPLF is divided

regarding this replacement and its implications for the relationship with the central

government. Getachew was part of the peace negotiations in Pretoria and is criticized for

being more aligned with Abiy, as the PM nominated Getachew as his ministerial advisor

on East African Affairs.

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Eritrean interference in the region also exacerbates the tense relationship between the

central government and Tigray. While Getachew supporters seek alignment with the

central government, Debretsion supporters are aligning with Eritrea to explore the

current rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea over sea access. Abiy formally denied any

intention to military invade Eritrea to grant access to the Red Sea, but mentioned several

times its preparedness to military action, if that is needed. The conclusion of the

construction work on the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) also affects stability

in the region, considering Egypt and Sudan, for instance, are long opposing Ethiopia on

the topic - as the GERD will affect the water levels of the Nile, resources which Egyptian

and Sudanese government are highly dependant on.

Lasting peace is far from being a reality in Tigray - but it could have been closer if the

AU had maintained its efforts during the agreement implementation phase. It seemed

more concerned with receiving praise for an unprecedented win than with actually

working towards stability and peace in the region. It is clear that the complexity of the

issue and the involved parties' predisposition to peace are important factors to be

considered, and there is only so much AU can do if the parties involved are not willing to

compromise. In this direction, the same structural conditions that facilitated the onset of

the civil war may also be acting as impediments to the full implementation of the

agreement. Weak and undemocratic regimes, as well as ethnic fragmentation, are

possible factors, amongst many others, influencing the lack of sustainable peace - just

as they influenced the presence of violent contention. This is an open path for research.

Conclusion

When analyzing the period immediately before the conflict that erupted on November

3rd, 2020, we can conclude that the authority and legitimacy crisis occurred when some

mobilization performances related to the mechanisms of radicalization and militarization

were already underway. The government had already begun its media campaign against

Tigray. It intensified the ethnic discussion inside the political realm when TPLF refused to

comply with the decision to postpone regional elections. The crisis of legitimacy and

authority is a consequence of the central government's and TPLF’s increased use of

radicalization mechanisms.

Also, we argue that Abiy Ahmed, representing the central government, focused more on

radicalization mechanisms, considering that he, as the country leader, controlled an

already satisfactory array of material resources, such as military equipment and trained

personnel. These military resources were already deployed to control and suppress

opposition in other regions, such as Oromia. The balance of power, initially, was explicitly

pending towards the central government.

However, at the official beginning of the conflict, TPLF drastically intensified its

militarization mechanisms, acquiring considerable amounts of weapons and other

equipment and organizing and training units to use guerrilla tactics. This strategy brought

some military victories for TPLF forces and, even if momentarily, altered the balance of

power in their favor.

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As the humanitarian crisis worsened, international eyes focused more frequently on

Ethiopia. The beginning of peace negotiations between ENDF and TPLF resulted from

international pressure and intervention, as well as from resource draining and claims that

both parties were ready to negotiate. When conversations in Pretoria, South Africa,

resulted in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, the balance of power tilted back to the

central government.

As per the negotiation process, it is possible to conclude that the African Union leadership

was essential for the signature of the CoHA and without the shuttle diplomacy missions

and the High-Level Panel and talks facilitated by the AU representatives, the conflict

would not have ended within two years. What the international media and international

community saw happening in Pretoria in 2022 was an incredible demonstration of power,

diplomacy and African agency in regards to African conflicts. No external participant

played a pivotal role in the preparation, negotiation or implementation phases.

What remains to be seen is a more active role from the AU in guaranteeing the affected

region can see stable peace and human rights being restored unhindered, mitigating

further radicalization and militarization actions from the parties involved - TPLF, the

federal government and Eritrea, as well.

Press releases strongly encouraging the parties to uphold the obligations agreed during

the signature of the CoHA may not be enough. A closer look to the post-war context in

Tigray is needed, as the population is still suffering from the consequences of the conflict,

such as lack of infrastructure and job opportunities, for instance. The AUs' position of

promoting ownership and allowing the own parties to establish the agenda, as it assumed

a facilitator role, was appropriate for the peace negotiations only. At this moment, AU

needs to provide more assertive guidance and actions towards conflict prevention and

peacebuilding and investing resources into projects in key areas in the region:

governance, free and fair elections, human rights, justice and disarmament.

Activating networks with local NGOs and cooperatives can be the solution for increasing

formal employment and improving the post-war economy; reinstating the Joint

Monitoring Committee with the participation of local leaders and activists can provide

inside insights about what are the actual needs of the Tigrayans and provide more

accurate humanitarian assistance; implementing international elections observers and

providing technical assistance for an electoral reform can represent a significant step

towards fair elections, and officially discussing accountability and transparency in regards

to the issue of war crimes can be an important milestone for the victims and their families.

In addition, mediating the tense relationship between Ethiopia and its neighbours is

crucial to prevent further conflicts, as the relationship with Eritrea is a key point of

contention within the TPLF, and any Ethiopian military incursion into the neighboring

country may reignite the conflict in Tigray.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2

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October 2025

ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA

LAETITIA KOECHLIN

laetitiakoechlin@gmail.com

Master in Law by the Porto Faculty of Law (Portugal)

Abstract

This paper explores the issue of access to justice for indigenous peoples in Africa, a topic that

has received insufficient attention within the broader discourse on human rights and legal

inclusion. The concept of indigenous peoples in Africa is examined, with a focus on the unique

cultural, social and historical contexts that shape their relationship with the States and its

legal systems. The African legal framework is analyzed in relation to its provisions for

protecting indigenous rights, alongside an exploration of the mechanisms available for

accessing justice within the continent. Key challenges to accessing justice, such as

discrimination, the marginalization of indigenous knowledge, and the lack of recognition of

customary law, are discussed. Landmark cases highlighting both the successes and failures of

the legal system in addressing indigenous grievances are presented to underscore the gaps

in the protection of their rights. The paper also addresses the concept of restorative justice

as an alternative legal approach that aligns more closely with indigenous peoples’ traditions

of conflict resolution and healing. Finally, recommendations for improving access to justice for

indigenous communities are offered, including legal reforms, better integration of indigenous

legal systems, and the promotion of inclusive, culturally sensitive judicial processes. By

examining these themes, the paper advocates for a justice system that respects the rights,

cultures, and traditions of indigenous peoples, ensuring their full participation in the legal

processes that affect their lives.

Keywords

Indigenous peoples, Africa, Fundamental Rights, Humanitarian aid, Justice, CSOs, NGOs.

Resumo

Este artigo explora a questão do acesso à justiça para os povos indígenas na África, um tema

que tem recebido atenção insuficiente dentro do discurso mais amplo sobre direitos humanos

e inclusão legal. Examina-se o conceito de povos indígenas em África, com enfoque nos

contextos culturais, sociais e históricos únicos que moldam a sua relação com os Estados e os

seus sistemas jurídicos. O quadro jurídico africano é analisado em relação às suas disposições

de proteção dos direitos indígenas, juntamente com uma exploração dos mecanismos

disponíveis para o acesso à justiça no continente. São discutidos os principais desafios para o

acesso à justiça, como a discriminação, a marginalização do conhecimento indígena e a falta

de reconhecimento do direito consuetudinário. Casos marcantes que destacam os sucessos e

fracassos do sistema jurídico no tratamento das queixas indígenas são apresentados para

sublinhar as lacunas na proteção de seus direitos. O artigo também aborda o conceito de

justiça restaurativa como uma abordagem jurídica alternativa que se alinha mais

estreitamente com as tradições dos povos indígenas de resolução e cura de conflitos. Por

último, são apresentadas recomendações para melhorar o acesso das comunidades indígenas

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Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa

Laetitia Koechlin

à justiça, incluindo reformas jurídicas, uma melhor integração dos sistemas jurídicos indígenas

e a promoção de processos judiciais inclusivos e culturalmente sensíveis. Ao examinar esses

temas, o artigo defende um sistema de justiça que respeite os direitos, culturas e tradições

dos povos indígenas, garantindo sua plena participação nos processos legais que afetam suas

vidas.

Palavras-chave

Povos indígenas, África, Direitos Fundamentais, Ajuda humanitária, Justiça, OSC, ONGs.

How to cite this article

Koechlim, Laetitia (2025). Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa. Janus.net, e-journal

of international relations. VOL. 16 Nº. 1, TD 2 – Thematic Dossier – “Os Vinte Anos da União

Africana: Passado, Presente e Futuro”. October 2025, pp. 61-81. DOI

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425.4

Article submitted on 27th November 2024 and accepted for publication on 15th August

2025.

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Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa

Laetitia Koechlin

ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA

LAETITIA KOECHLIN

“For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that

respects and enhances the freedom of others.”

Nelson Mandela

Introduction

Access to justice is a fundamental human right that should be available to all individuals,

regardless of sex, religion, ethnicity, race, or language. It ensures that everyone has the

opportunity to seek and obtain a fair resolution to disputes, protect their rights, and

receive equal treatment under the law. However, for indigenous peoples in Africa, access

to justice remains a deeply challenging and often inaccessible reality. These communities,

with their distinct cultures, languages, and ways of life, face numerous barriers in

navigating mainstream legal systems, which are frequently ill-equipped to address their

unique needs and realities. The issues surrounding access to justice for indigenous

peoples in Africa are compounded by systemic marginalization, historical inequalities,

and the lack of recognition of indigenous customary law within national legal frameworks.

Traditional justice systems, which have served indigenous communities for centuries,

often come into conflict with modern state-run judicial systems that fail to acknowledge

or respect the legitimacy of Indigenous legal practices. These tensions raise important

questions about the role of traditional justice mechanisms and the need for legal reforms

that respect both the universality of human rights and the cultural autonomy of

Indigenous peoples. While some indigenous juridical systems continue to function

effectively within their communities, they are often excluded or undermined by state

laws, exacerbating the struggles for justice faced by these populations. Understanding

these dynamics is essential in advocating for a justice system that is truly inclusive and

reflective of Africa’s rich diversity.

The concept of indigenous peoples

Sometimes referred to as “autochthonous”, “aboriginal”, or “native” people, there is yet

no universally accepted definition of the concept of “indigenous people”.

However, the

United Nations, 2021. Guidelines in Indigenous Peoples Issues.

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Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa

Laetitia Koechlin

United Nations has described indigenous peoples as any group or community of people

who have retained social, cultural, economic and political characteristics that are distinct

from those of the dominant societies in which they live. It lists the factors that are

relevant to understand the concept to include any ethnic community having priority in

time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; “the voluntary

perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include language, social organization,

religion and spiritual values; self-identification as well as recognition by other groups or

by state authorities as a distinct collectivity; and experiences of subjugation,

marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination ». In the African context, the

Commission , the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in Africa lists similar

factors to include any people having a distinct culture from the dominant society, and

whose cultures are under threat, in some cases, of extinction ; whose survival of their

particular way of life depends on their access to their ancestral lands and the resources

thereon ; who suffer discrimination as they are regarded as less developed than other

parts of the society ; who suffer various forms of marginalization ; who are subjected to

“domination and exploitation through political and economic structures that reflect the

interest of the national majority; and who identify themselves as indigenous”.

Many

African countries do not formally recognize indigenous peoples in their constitutions or

legal frameworks. As a result, indigenous groups often do not have legal standing or the

right to claim specific protections under national laws. This lack of recognition can result

in the denial of their rights to land

, culture, and self-determination. While the African

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter) provides some protections, it does

not explicitly define or recognize “Indigenous peoples.” The United Nations Declaration

on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has been endorsed by many African

nations, but its implementation is inconsistent. In many parts of Africa, indigenous

communities are being driven off their ancestral lands to make way for wildlife reserves,

tourist resorts or the extraction of natural resources.

The Commission through its WGIP

set out four criteria defining indigenous peoples ; occupation and use of a specific

territory, the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification as a

distinct collectivity, as well as recognition by other groups and an experience of

subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination.

During the

colonial period, the word indigenous was used for the people inhabiting or existing in land

from the earliest times or from before the arrival of colonialists. The first organization to

expand this concept was the Pan-American Union in 1938, which declared that indigenous

people were descendants of the first inhabitants of the land. It was further examined by

the General Assembly in 1949 whom recommended a study of the ‘Social Problems of

the Aboriginal Populations and Other Under-Developed Social Groups of the American

Continent’. In 1960, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1514 which granted the

Odum and Hari (2022).

The International Labor Organisation in its Convention n°169 from 1957 underlines the importance of the

indigenous peoples’ land rights and highlights the free, prior and informed consent principle (known as the FPIC

principle), which the companies or any institution should respect before trying to do something on the land of

ethnic communities

Gilbert (2017). LITIGATING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN AFRICA: POTENTIALS, CHALLENGES AND

LIMITATIONS. See the 2003’s report by the WGIP/ Communities of the Commission on Human and Peoples’

Rights which provides a profound analysis of the situation of indigenous peoples in Africa

See Chapter 4 (Report of the African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations /

Communities , 2005)

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Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples in Africa

Laetitia Koechlin

independence to colonial countries and peoples and characterized the foreign rule as a

violation of the Human Rights, affirmed the right to self- determination and called for an

end of the colonial rule. Between the 1960s and 1970s, an international level indigenous

activism arose. In 1971, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities commissioned a study on the discrimination

against indigenous peoples. The report, written by Cobo, published in 1983, was

indicative of the difficulty in defining indigenous people. Despite the lack of an

authoritative definition, there are criteria that help to define indigenous peoples.

On an

individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous populations

through self-identification as indigenous and is recognized and accepted by these

populations as one of its members – acceptance by the group.

This preserves for these

communities the sovereign right and power to decide who belongs to them, without

external interference. Indigenous peoples are distinct social and cultural groups that

share collective ancestral ties to the lands and natural resources where they live, occupy

or from which they have been displaced.

In addition of the criteria stressed above, the

United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples defined some more criteria such

as a strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources ; distinct social, economic

and political systems ; and distinct language, culture and beliefs.

During the process of

the UNDRIP’s adoption, a formal definition of indigenous peoples needed to be set ; as

there was no such definition under international law. Over the course of international

discussion and debate, four themes emerged as being important criteria in

conceptualizing indigeneity : priority in time, perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness,

self-identification and recognition by other actors, experience of subjugation,

marginalization or discrimination.

Unfortunately, the predominant approach by African

governments is the suppression of diversity through assimilation, with a focus on

developing and integrating peoples who are seen as primitive. These pre-colonial

development strategies mimic those of imperial states as well as various postcolonial

development initiatives funded and led by the international organizations. The continent’s

complicated history makes identifying as indigenous in Africa a complex exercise. There

are tensions fueled by issues of power, representation, and difference. In addition, the

concept of indigeneity, originally championed by indigenous peoples from the Americas

and Australasia, had to be molded and reframed to fit the African context as indigenous

peoples (re)asserted their agency previously been erased by the State. It is therefore

not that surprising that its applicability is questioned, despite the increasingly vocal

engagement of the indigenous community. This molding of indigeneity to fit the African

environment has led to skepticism among scholars who have pointed out that self-

identification as indigenous can – and possibly has been – used by groups who might not

identify as indigenous as a way to access the benefits of collective rights as a way to

Cobo (1987, pp. §379-380)

Cher (2023, p. 4).

The land and natural resources on which they depend are linked to their identities, cultures, livelihoods, as

well as their physical and spiritual well-being. Indigenous peoples often lack formal recognition over their

lands, territories and natural resources, are often last to receive public investments in basic services and

infrastructure and face multiple barriers to participate fully in the economy, to have access to justice, and to

participate in political processes and decision making.

Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Human Rights System (2013, pp. 2,3).

See also Article 33(1) of the UNDRIP as it states the indigenous peoples’ right to determine their own identity.

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better access their natural resources and land rights. Important rights for indigenous

peoples have been guaranteed by international and regional legal instruments

nevertheless the question has remained regarding if these protections are enough to

protect indigenous peoples or whether a separately formulated response to their situation

is necessary and appropriate.

Scholars have a divergent opinion on this matter, some

would argue that indigenous voices will get lost under a generalist Human Rights system,

whereas others believe it is sufficient to meet the needs of indigenous peoples.

Collective rights versus individual rights is another contentious issue. Collective rights

have historically been incompatible with international law that is traditionally centered

on individuals and States, and so, indigenous rights – which include a set of collective

rights – have been an uneasy fit for international law. Nonetheless, with the emergence

of third generation rights

, the international legal forum has grown to accept indigenous

group claims.

Individual rights are those which belong to each person and which he or

she can assert vis-à-vis the State, the community or other human being. Each individual

can exercise these rights alone, according to his or her own will. But certain individual

rights can only be exercised collectively – freedom of assembly, association or trade

union freedom. Collective rights are those that belong to a group or collectivity and are

intended to protect the integrity of that group or collectivity (right to development and

right to self-determination)

, they can only be exercised if several people agree to use

collectively – together and for the same purpose – the right that belongs to each of them.

The African legal framework

The African [Banjul]

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted on June 27, 1981,

in Nairobi, Kenya at the Organization of the African Union’s eighteen summit, was the

first declaration to be adopted regarding the indigenous African peoples’ Human Rights.

Within the framework of the African regional system, the African Charter on the Rights

and Welfare of the Child was adopted on July 11, 1990 and is the first regional

instrument exclusively dedicated to the regulation of the rights of the minors ; and the

Protocol to the Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa [Maputo Protocol] adopted on

July 1, 2003.

The last treaty adopted within the Organization of the African Union is

the Protocol to the Charter on the Establishment of an Court ,

adopted on June 10,

1998.

Other treaties of the system can be mentioned, such as the Organization of the

African Union’s Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa

adopted on September 10, 1969 or the African Union Convention for the Protection and

See the legal framework chapter of this paper.

The question here is regarding the necessary separate set of rights specifically for indigenous peoples.

Cher (2023, p. 6).

Also known as solidarity Human Rights, they are rights that try to go beyond the framework of individual

rights to focus on collective concepts, such as community or people.

Cher (2023, pp. 11,12), in practice, collective rights have emerged and become increasingly acceptable under

IL (Mazel, 2009). See Conventions No. 107 and 169, and the UNDRIP (Articles 3, 6, 26) – all affirms the

collective indigenous rights to land, territories and resources.

The recognition of group rights for indigenous peoples is essential to establish an effective instrument for

the protection of indigenous ways of life and to secure their cultural survival.

Ngom (1984, p. 68)

Rodríguez (2021, pp. 236-239)

Mubiala (2005, pp. 95,96)

Droits de l'Homme en droit international - Recueil de textes (2007)

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Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa adopted on October 23, 2009. There

are significant signs of the emergence of new legal frameworks to recognize and protect

indigenous peoples’ rights across the continent. For instance, the new Constitution of

Kenya, from 2010, recognizes historically “marginalized group”,

including indigenous

communities. The Constitution of Cameroon also mentions in its Article 2 the protection

of the rights of indigenous peoples. In 2011, the Republic of Congo became to first

country to adopt a specific law on indigenous peoples : Law on the Promotion and

Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Populations in the Republic of Congo.

In 2022,

the Democratic Republic of Congo took a big leap forward in recognizing the customary

rights of its indigenous population by adopting a new law on the Promotion and

Protection of the Rights of the Indigenous Pygmy Peoples. This historic law is the

country’s first ever legislation to formally recognize and safeguard the rights of

indigenous peoples, in particular their land rights. The Constitution of the Republic of

Benin makes the provisions of the Charter an integral part of the national constitution ;

by clarifying how international should be treated in and by its domestic courts.

The

Constitution of the Central African Republic states in its Article 6 the equality before the

law of all human beings without distinction of race, ethnic origin, region, sex, religion,

political affiliation or social position and the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples

and the guarantee of equality for all rights in all the domains for men and women.

Lastly, the Malawi’s Constitution adopted in 1998, shows the protection granted to

everyone, none withstanding their origin, race, customs, ethnicity in its Chapter IV –

Section 26 of the Constitution

and Section 28.

It is up to Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGOs) and Human Rights activists to advocate the advancement and

implementation of these rights to the relevant state bodies, particularly the courts, who

must in turn ensure that these rights have meaning and are better recognized for the

population.

The mechanisms to access justice in Africa

Justice Charles Kajimanga

defines the access to justice as “The right of individuals and

groups to obtain a quick, effective and fair response to protect their rights, prevent or

solve disputes and control the abuse of power, through a transparent and efficient

process, in which mechanisms are available, affordable and accountable.” In the

absence of access to justice, people are unable to have their voice heard, exercise their

rights, challenge discrimination or hold decision-makers accountable. Access to justice

helps to preserve human dignity, it is helpful in efforts to grow civil society and to reduce

and end poverty. Delivery of justice should be impartial and non-discriminatory. To

strengthen access to justice, the United Nations system works with national partners to

develop national strategic plans and programs for justice reform and service delivery.

See Kenya’s Constitution’s Chapter seventeen – general provisions ; Article 260 – interpretation

N’ZOBO (2012)

It can be seen through the Preamble of Benin’s Constitution specifically references to the United Nations

Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UNDRIP ; and also in Benin’s Constitution’s Article

7, adopted on December 2, 1990.

See Malawi’s Constitution’s Section 26 – culture and language

See Malawi’s Constitution’s Section 28 – right to property

Kajimanga (2013)

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One of the major obstacles in accessing justice is the cost of legal advice and

representation. The United Nations system supports the provision of legal aid by building

the capacity of rights-holders, improving legal aid programs that empower rights-

holders, particularly the poor and marginalized groups, and supporting legal awareness,

legal aid clinics and public information campaigns. Access to justice is a requirement

that is increasingly at the heart of the major debates of our time, whether in the fields

of economic, political and social development, peace, Human Rights or culture. This

issue forms a bridge between the past, the present and the future, as it refers to the

marginalization and systemic discrimination suffered by members or groups of society.

The solid international Human Rights framework developed over the last 70 years, and

the way in which it is further developed through the interpretation of international

Human Rights bodies, gives access to justice the normative contours and specificity

necessary for its practical implementation. Major elements such as the rule of law, the

right to the truth and other fundamental normative frameworks have given new weight

to access to justice. Based on the legal framework defined in chapter 3, several cultural

biases and discrimination within legal systems issue have been identified. As a matter

of fact, indigenous women, children, youth, and persons with disabilities face

discrimination on multiple grounds, which often puts them in a particularly

disadvantaged situation. So, there is a huge need to pay attention to the situation of

these specific groups, who face cumulative discrimination. Winning a court case,

whether at the level of the Commission or nationally, has proven to be only one small

step in the struggle against marginalization, discrimination, and dispossession.

The

Commission’s report argues that indigeneity “is today a term and a global movement

fighting for rights and justice of those particular groups who have been left at the

margins of development paradigms, whose cultures and way of life are subject to

discrimination and contempt and whose very existence is under threat of extinction”.

Formal justice systems

The Commission

Since its inception in 1987, the Commission has sought to execute its mandate as

stipulated in Article 45 of the Charter, which includes promoting and protecting human

and peoples’ rights and interpreting the Charter.

The Commission meets twice a year

in ordinary sessions, where its members, states, organizations having observer status

and other stakeholders engage in dialogue on pertinent human rights issues on the

continent. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs has been at the forefront

and indeed elicited interest through raising awareness and supporting the participation

of indigenous peoples at the Commission’s sessions

and has also facilitated and funded

the Commission’s Working Group and its activities.

The Commission is officially charged

with three major functions : the protection and the promotion of human and peoples’

Werner (2023, p. 392), while technically the decisions of the Court are legally binding, there is no follow-up

instrument or mechanisms to make sure that the States comply.

See the Report of the Commission’s WGIP from 2005, page 87

Bojosi and Wachira (2006)

See IWGIA’s official website – https://iwgia.org/en/

Bojosi and Wachira (2006)

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rights ; and the interpretation of the Charter. The WGIP in Africa was established by the

Commission at the 28th Ordinary Session in Benin in 2000 and it consists of

commissioners as well as external expert members. The WGIP carries out promotional

activities for the rights of indigenous peoples, including country visits, research and

sensitization seminars. Since 2015 the WGIP has carried out 13 country visits and

research and information visits, as well as a number of seminars and research activities.

The WGIP is an active participant in international gatherings on indigenous peoples’

rights, and published in 2010 an Advisory Opinion on the UNDRIP. In 2003 the

Commission adopted a groundbreaking report on the rights of indigenous peoples in

Africa taking point of departure in the Charter.

The adoption of an Advisory Opinion by

the Commission to support the adoption of UNDRIP marked another step toward the

affirmation of indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa.

The Advisory Opinion not only

participated in unlocking the reluctance of the group of African States to adopt the

UNDRIP, but also reflected developments taking place at the international level on the

rights of indigenous peoples as well as their connection to the continent. Remarkably, in

recent years, the Commission has started to refer to indigenous peoples’ rights in its

examination of States’ periodic reports.

All these factors and the recent decision of the

Commission in the Endorois case indicate the emergence of a consistent jurisprudence

on indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa.

The Court

The Court was established by African countries to ensure the protection of human and

peoples’ rights in Africa. It complements and reinforces the functions of the Commission.

The Court was established under Article 1 of the Protocol to the Charter, which was

adopted by member states of the Organization of African Unity

in Burkina Faso, in June

1998. The Protocol entered into force on January 25, 2004. To date, thirty-four member

states have ratified the protocol establishing the Court. To date, only eight of the thirty-

four States parties to the Protocol have deposited the declaration recognizing the Court’s

jurisdiction to receive applications lodged directly by NGOs and individuals (Burkina Faso,

Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Tunisia).

The Court’s contentious

jurisdiction applies to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation

and application of the Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights

instrument ratified by the States concerned. As part of its advisory jurisdiction, the Court

may, at the request of a Member State of the African Union, one of its organs or any

African organization recognized by the African Union, give an opinion on any other legal

question relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instrument, provided

that the subject of the opinion is not related to a question being examined by the

Commission. The Court is made up of eleven judges who are nationals of African Union

See the Resolution on the Adoption of the Report of the African Commission’s WGIP, November 2003,

ACHPR/Res.51 (XXVII) 34th Ordinary Session

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (May 2007)

Bojosi and Wachira (2006)

Gilbert (2011). INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: THE PRAGMATIC REVOLUTION OF THE

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

Legally replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2001

Rwanda withdrew its declaration in 2017 ; Tanzania in 2019 ; Ivory Coast and Benin in 2020.

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member states. On the proposal of their respective States, the judges of the Court are

elected, in their individual capacity, from among African jurists of proven integrity and

recognized practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of

human rights. Judges are elected for a six-year term, renewable once. The judges of the

Court elect from among their number a President and a Vice-President of the Court for a

two-year term. They may be re-elected only once. The President of the Court resides and

works full-time at the seat of the Court, while the other ten judges work part-time. In

the performance of his duties, the President is assisted by a Registrar who performs the

clerical, management and administrative functions of the Court. The Court may receive

cases filed by the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, States Parties to the

Protocol or African intergovernmental organizations. NGOs with observer status with the

Commission and individuals may file cases directly with the Court, provided that the

State they are suing has filed the declaration under Article 34(6) recognizing the Court’s

competence to accept cases from individuals and NGOs.

Informal justice systems

African traditional justice systems can be referred as all the mechanisms African

communities have applied in managing conflicts and disputes since ages, and which have

been passed on from one generation to the other. These systems are often called

traditional, informal, customary or non-state justice systems.

These systems have

strengths, such as the high level of public participation, the fact that it helps discovering

the truth and as a consequence it helps the survivors and the relatives of the deceased

victims to handle their emotions of anger and loss and to understand what happened,

and in the end, it contributes to reconciliation. Also, indigenous justice systems may

benefit a higher degree of legitimacy as they reflect the norms, values and customs

recognized for aged by their communities ; and these systems are usually geographically

closer than the formal systems, there is usually no language issue as they speak all the

same dialect, and it is way more affordable. In addition, in case of serious crimes or

human rights violations, customary justice systems may contribute to reconciliation and

communal stability as the perpetrators may return to the community and their own

families. As a contrary, these traditional justice systems have weaknesses.

These

weaknesses could be the abuse of the informal system’s position, corporal punishment

or violence based on sexual orientation, or violations of human rights and individual rights

such as fair trail guarantees.

Other critics are regarding the violation of women’s rights

in particular and the non-protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of suspects in

criminal cases.

Although these informal justice systems have huge potential for

enhancing access to justice for indigenous communities in Africa – as they have been

sometimes excluded from the formal justice systems –, strengthen the rule of law and

bring development among communities ; various challenges arise in operationalizing

them. Indeed, some of these traditional practices have been declared illegal and in some

Kariuki (2018). African Traditional Justice Systems.

It should be noted that these cons are usually formulated from the Western point of view.

Szpak (2019)

Kariuki (2018). African Traditional Justice Systems.

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African countries such as Kenya or South Africa, there are laws proscribing the traditional

practices despite their complementary role in dispute resolution with the formal

systems.

Some other challenges are due to the fact that African justice systems are

regarded as inferior in comparison to formal justice systems, and these systems are

threatened by modernization and by the socio-economic, political and cultural changes.

The challenges to access justice

Material issues

Indigenous peoples, particularly in rural areas, face economic and social disadvantages

that limit their ability to access legal resources, including legal representation and to

engage in lengthy legal battles. Many are illiterate or lack knowledge about the legal

system, making it harder for them to assert their rights. Furthermore, widespread

discrimination and stereotypes about indigenous peoples in many African countries and

societies contribute to their marginalization in the legal system. This cultural bias can

hinder their access to fair trails, legal processes and remedies. Also, in some African

countries, corruption and a lack of effective governance system undermine the

functioning of the judiciary, making it difficult for indigenous peoples to secure justice

and especially when their cases involve powerful corporate or state interests.

Individual issues

Indigenous women

Numerous barriers exist for indigenous women in accessing justice on an equal basis to

others. Indigenous women are disproportionately at risk of experiencing all forms of

violence, compounded by multiple forms of discrimination based on race, gender and

other forms of identity, including disability and sexual orientation. Remote or rural is

another barrier for indigenous women to have access to justice. Indigenous women are

overrepresented in national criminal justice systems. Reporting of violence against

indigenous women is lacking, as sometimes they do not feel comfortable to fill

complaints or as they may be unaware of the protections available. Lastly, justice

systems are mostly male dominated and discriminating against women. International

Human Rights law requires that States take all measures to ensure equality before the

law.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has noted

with concern – in its study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

from April 29, 2013 – the lack of women, including indigenous women, appointed to the

judiciary and has called for gender-sensitization training of justice officers. The

Committee has noted further that laws or customs that limit a women’s access to legal

advice or ability to seek remedy before courts, or accord lesser value to a female

testimony, violate the right to equality before the law.

Kariuki (2015). Conflict Resolution by Elders in Africa: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities, p. 50)

See the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, Article 15

Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2013)

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Indigenous children and youth

The rights of indigenous children and young people are recognized, implicitly and

explicitly, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ; the ICESCR ; the Convention

on the Rights of the Child ; the World Declaration and Plan of Action on the Survival,

Protection and Development of Children ; the Declaration of the World Summit for

Children ; the UNDRIP and of course the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of

the Child.

There is some discrimination towards indigenous youth ; despite the fact

that the available data is limited, several studies show that indigenous children and

youth are disproportionately represented in criminal justice systems. The Committee on

the Rights of the Child pointed out that disproportionate high rates of incarceration of

indigenous children may be attributed to systematic discrimination within the justice

system and / or society. Other areas in which persistent barriers remain are access to

justice for indigenous children who have been victims of domestic violence or sexual

abuse ; and once in custody, indigenous youth may be less likely to benefit from non-

custodial sentencing options or restorative justice measures, more likely to receive the

most punitive measures and to be subjected to the harshest treatments, such as being

placed in secure confinement. The Committee has called upon the States to take

measures to address juvenile crimes without resorting to judicial proceedings wherever

possible and also to support traditional restorative justice systems to promote the best

interests of the child. The governments must make certain that their national

constitutions as well as their statutory and customary laws, reflect the provisions of

international Human Rights instruments. Nevertheless, it is argued that custom

tradition, culture, and religion are major constraints to the recognition and protection

of the rights of children in Africa. In several countries, traditional values are often

deployed as an excuse to undermine Human Rights, including those of children.

For

children’s rights to be recognized and protected in an African country, it must be the

case that the country has first internationalized its constitutional law ; then the country

must establish a governing process that adequately constrains the state and prevents

civil servants and political elites from acting with impunity and violating the rights of

children. The issue is regarding the fact that such a governing process must have the

judicial system that is independent enough to bring to justice those who violate

children’s rights. Unfortunately, in many African countries, even including those that

have domesticated the various international Human Rights instruments, there is still a

widespread abuse of the rights of the children.

Indigenous children and youth are

exposed to economic and social factors that impact their fundamental rights. They are

often forced to leave their traditional communities in search of work or education and

move to the city where they are frequently discriminated against and do not have the

same opportunities as others to find work and access education.

Their new condition

Also known as the African Children’s Rights Charter, adopted in 1990 and entered into force in 1999. The

African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child was formed in July 2001.

Reid (2013)

Mbaku (2022, p. 231), this is due to the fact that these countries do not yet have a governing process that

can adequately prevent those whose role it is to enforce the laws and protect children from prohibiting adoption

behaviors that contribute to non-enforcement of the law.

Fonds des Nations Unies pour l’enfance Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant Groupe de la jeunesse

(ONU, 2000), indigenous children and young people are one of the groups most at risk of fundamental rights

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can have devastating consequences on their self-esteem and cultural identity, and thus

be at the root of many serious medical and social disorders, such as depression and

drug addiction. Indigenous youth inherit the responsibility of protecting and preserving

the traditional lands, resources and sacred sites that represent their cultural heritage

and determine their identity. Various Human Rights bodies, including treaty and Charter

bodies, can address concerns about the rights of indigenous children, such as UNICEF,

the United Nations Youth Advisory Group.

Indigenous disabled persons

A key framework Convention is the one on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which

guide the interpretation of other relevant international Human Rights and the

development of instruments in this regard. Non-discrimination is a general principle of

this Convention – Article (3)b). Indigenous persons with disabilities face considerable

obstacles in terms of access to justice ; such as living in rural areas, limited access to

information provided in accessible formats and appropriate languages, inaccessibility of

legal counsel. There are also concerns regarding the treatment of indigenous persons

with disabilities in detention. Indeed, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes

has found that indigenous persons with disabilities face magnified difficulties in prisons

and that women prisoners with disabilities are at particularly high risk of manipulation,

violence, sexual abuse and rape.

Although legal protections and the social status of

indigenous persons with disabilities have both improved, there still are many areas

where services and accessibility fall short,

some areas need to be addressed : services,

legal capacity, imprisonment. Nevertheless, some factors could contribute to overcome

these issues. For instance, at the international level, the Committee on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities instituted by the United Nations has taken the opportunity to

comment on the situation of indigenous persons with disabilities’ access to justice. Its

observations have focused on the equality and non-discrimination issue, the liberty and

the security of the person, the importance of data and statistics and the situation of

indigenous children with disabilities.

Landmark cases

The Endorois case n°276/2003

The 2010 decision by the African Commission marked a significant milestone in the

recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa, especially concerning land and natural

resource claims. The case arose from the forced eviction of the Endorois community –

approximately 60,000 people – from their ancestral lands around Lake Bogoria, Kenya,

to make way for a game reserve. The Endorois alleged that the Kenyan government

violations, as their language, customs and values often set them apart from the society to which their

community belongs.

Pollack (2014, pp. 310, 311)

See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Justice’s Handbook on Prisoners with special needs,

2009, p. 45

Larson (2014, p. 225), the persons with disabilities still face wide gaps in achievement, access and services

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violated their rights to property, culture, religion, and development by evicting them

without adequate prior consultation or compensation for the loss of their land. In its

ruling, the Commission found several violations of the Charter, particularly concerning

the Endorois’ right to property, access to natural resources, and the freedom to practice

their religion and culture. The Commission recommended that the Kenyan government

formally recognize the Endorois’ ownership of their ancestral land, grant them

unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria for religious and cultural purposes, and provide

compensation for the community’s losses. This ruling was pivotal for several reasons. It

was the first time the Commission addressed the rights of Indigenous peoples in Africa

and the first international decision to acknowledge a violation of the right to development.

Furthermore, the Commission recognized the Endorois as an indigenous community,

completing an ongoing process of ethnic identification that had begun in the 1990s. The

decision also has far-reaching implications for the rights of Indigenous peoples across

Africa, especially given the increasing pressures on land from environmental conservation

and economic development projects. Although the Kenyan government has not fully

implemented the Commission’s recommendations, the case has significantly raised

awareness about the plight of Indigenous peoples in Kenya and across the continent. It

contributed to the creation of a new community-based land tenure system in Kenya’s

2010 Constitution, but further legal and policy reforms are necessary. Additionally, the

case has attracted attention from international human rights bodies and civil society

organizations, emphasizing the growing global recognition of indigenous rights in Africa.

The Ogiek Case n°006/2012

The Ogiek people, an Indigenous community of about 20,000 members, have historically

inhabited the Mau Forest in Kenya, relying on it for residence and sustenance as a hunter-

gatherer society. Despite their long-standing presence, in October 2009, the Kenya

Forestry Service ordered their eviction from the Mau Forest. The government refused to

recognize the Ogiek as an Indigenous group deserving of protection. In response, the

Centre for Minority Rights Developments and Minority Rights Group International

submitted a complaint to the African Commission, which was referred to the African Court

in 2012. The Court ruled in May 2017 that Kenya had violated the Ogiek’s rights by

forcibly evicting them from their ancestral land and denying them access to its resources,

which disrupted their traditional practices and religious ceremonies linked to the forest.

The Court ordered Kenya to reinstate restrictions on land transactions in the Mau Forest

and to respect the Ogiek’s right to land and natural resources. Additionally, Kenya was

instructed to pay compensation to the Ogiek and take steps to legally recognize and

protect their ancestral land, including granting them collective land title and ensuring

their consultation on any development or conservation projects. The Court's 2022 ruling

further mandated Kenya to engage in consultations regarding land concessions and to

fully recognize the Ogiek as an Indigenous people. This decision marked a historic step

in securing the rights of Indigenous communities in Kenya and has been seen as a hopeful

precedent for other marginalized groups. However, despite these rulings, the Kenyan

government continued to violate the Ogiek’s rights, including a 2020 eviction. As of now,

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the task force report on the matter has not been released, and the Ogiek's struggle for

justice remains ongoing.

The Ogoni and Shell case

The case of the Ogoni people in Nigeria against Shell is primarily associated with the

long-standing environmental and human rights issues resulting from Shell’s oil operations

in the Niger Delta, particularly in Ogoniland. The Ogoni people, who live in the Niger

Delta region, have long protested the environmental degradation caused by oil

exploration and extraction, as well as the human rights abuses they believe are

associated with Shell’s activities. The case highlights the complexities of multinational

corporate responsibility, the intersection of human rights and environmental justice, and

the challenges faced by communities in conflict zones in seeking accountability from

powerful corporations. The struggle of the Ogoni people has also inspired similar activism

and legal actions around the world, as communities fight for environmental justice and

the protection of their rights. The outcome of the Ogoni people’s case against Shell has

been mixed. While there have been financial settlements, particularly the 2008 U.S.

settlement, and legal victories concerning some of the environmental damage (e.g., in

the Netherlands), the widespread environmental devastation and human rights abuses in

the Niger Delta persist. The consequences include limited justice for the victims, with

many still waiting for compensation or accountability for the full scale of human rights

abuses, slow environmental restoration, with Ogoniland remaining one of the most

polluted regions on earth, global awareness of the need for greater corporate

responsibility, particularly for oil companies operating in fragile states and continued

activism from Nigerian communities, demanding reparations and systemic change in how

oil resources are managed and how companies like Shell operate in the Niger Delta.

Ultimately, the Ogoni case remains a symbol of the ongoing struggle for environmental

justice, human rights, and corporate accountability, and its consequences continue to

shape discourse around corporate responsibility and sustainable development globally.

Restorative justice

Restorative justice is an approach that emphasizes repairing the harm caused by criminal

behaviour through cooperative processes that involve victims, offenders, and the

community. In the context of Africa, indigenous peoples often face challenges in

accessing justice, as their customary practices and legal systems may not always align

with national legal frameworks. However, there are examples where restorative justice

mechanisms have been integrated into the legal systems, or where indigenous justice

practices have been recognized to ensure access to justice for indigenous communities.

For instance, South Africa has made significant strides in incorporating restorative justice

principles, particularly in the post-apartheid era. The country’s Truth and Reconciliation

Commission is an example where restorative justice was used to address the atrocities

of apartheid and give victims, including indigenous and marginalized groups, a platform

to tell their stories and seek reparations. South Africa recognizes the traditional justice

systems of indigenous communities, especially in rural areas. Traditional Courts were

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historically used by indigenous communities to address disputes. These systems prioritize

reconciliation, restitution, and community restoration, with a focus on repairing harm

rather than punishing offenders. Through the Traditional Courts Bill from 2017, the

country seeks to balance the legal rights of indigenous people with its national laws.

However, there has been significant criticism of the Bill’s approach to gender equality, as

traditional courts sometimes uphold patriarchal customs. In Kenya, the Maasai and Nandi

communities, among others, traditionally use restorative justice methods to address

grievances. They use elders as mediators in conflict resolution, with the aim of restoring

balance and ensuring that all parties are reintegrated into society. Kenya has

promoted Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms, which include restorative justice

practices, through the Judicial Service Commission and local community initiatives. The

government has worked to integrate these methods into formal justice systems to

provide indigenous peoples with a platform for accessing justice. The National Policy on

Peacebuilding and Conflict Management from 2011 encourages the use of indigenous

conflict resolution methods, especially among pastoralist communities like

the Maasai and Turkana, recognizing their role in peacebuilding and restorative justice.

Rwanda is known for its Gacaca Courts, which were used to address crimes committed

during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. These Courts were community-based and

utilized restorative justice principles to promote healing and reconciliation. The Gacaca

system, though not exclusively indigenous, shares key elements with traditional African

restorative justice practices. These Courts encouraged offenders to confess, ask for

forgiveness, and make restitution, while also allowing victims to participate in the process

of reconciliation. It provided marginalized communities, particularly those in rural areas,

with a means to access justice outside the formal court system, helping to bridge the gap

between traditional practices and national legal frameworks. The integration of

restorative justice principles into the legal systems, especially in relation to indigenous

peoples, varies widely across the African continent. Many countries, such as South Africa

and Rwanda, have made significant strides in recognizing the importance of indigenous

justice systems, blending them with formal judicial processes. However, challenges

remain, particularly in ensuring that indigenous justice practices respect human rights

and that indigenous peoples have equal access to both traditional and formal justice

systems. Another avenue to explore are the truth commissions

which have on many

occasions been established in nations where there are indigenous peoples in order to

redress Human Rights violations, in accordance to the right of victims to an effective

remedy and the right to know the truth to the fullest extent possible.

Truth commissions

investigate violent historical periods

and are going further than the traditional focus on

individual Human Rights violations to tackle collective Human Rights violations to

economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. The involvement of indigenous

peoples in these processes has varied, ranging from not being included at all, to more

recent instances of truth commissions established specifically to address rights violations

Lavin (2014), a key factor contributing to the development of the right to the truth is the establishment of

truth commissions.

The right to truth has been increasingly recognized by various United Nations Resolutions, expert reports,

and national courts, regional and international decisions. See United Nations Human Rights Council’s

Resolution A/HRC/EMRIP/2013/2 and Resolution A/HRC/27/65.

Librizzi (2014), The recommendations of truth commissions generally seek to identify the causes of the

violations, determining patterns of abuse and preventing recurrence.

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experienced by indigenous peoples, where indigenous peoples have led the processes

from their initiation. In many cases, however, truth commissions have failed to address

the needs of indigenous peoples in any significant ways. Challenges faced by truth

commissions include ensuring the independence and credibility of the commission ;

political interference ; inadequate funding; and ensuring continued participation of

marginalized groups, civil society and victims’ organizations. Truth commissions have

also been criticized for weak outcomes, lack of implementation of their recommendations

or adequate follow-up. Implementation of these recommendations has generally been

weak even where recommendations are strong. There are a number of advantages of

truth commissions, including that they might be more consistent with indigenous peoples’

conceptions of justice and cultures; they can inspire political commitment to the

resolution of grievances. A positive example of indigenous engagement comes from the

Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya.

Truth commissions have

varying purposes and modes of operation, yet many display features that align with or

support restorative justice principles. Truth commissions have significant potential to

help remedy abuses suffered by indigenous peoples and strengthen their rights.

Implemented properly, with strong guarantees of independence, integrity and adequate

leadership, as well as considering the rights, perspectives and needs of indigenous

peoples, truth commissions can help strengthen the identity of indigenous peoples, and

respect for their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as their rights

to ancestral lands and natural resources the rights of indigenous peoples and proposing

policies to prevent further violations. National NGOs have a key place in the work of truth

commissions.

Indeed, they usually monitor the commission’s activities, provide honest

feedback and push the commission to respond appropriately to the needs of victims and

communities. CSOs may offer support services that the commission may wish to refer

the victims and survivors to – such as individual or group counselling, community support

mechanisms, or basic medical services to those injured or still suffering from past

violence.

Improvements for accessing justice as indigenous peoples in Africa

Scholars generally agree that one of the most important goals of the international

indigenous movement is to advance indigenous rights under international law.

Several

key actors have played significant roles in this movement. Three United Nations bodies,

namely, the WGIP, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Rights, and the Special

Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, have been instrumental in setting

norms on indigenous rights. International and African NGOs played an important

advocacy role for setting up an African regional protection of Human Rights mechanism.

NGOs have played an advocacy role with the Commission, helping it to improve its

Although not specifically focused on indigenous peoples, the Commission provided an explicit forum for

the expression of indigenous issues regarding historical injustices, marginalization and ethnic tension. The

Commission hired indigenous people as part of its staff ; conducted public hearings allowing testimony in

different languages, including Maasai ; and conducted outreach to indigenous communities and organizations

that addressed their rights.

Rule-of-law tools for post-conflict states : truth commissions, 2006.

Morgan (2007)

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working methods. By May 30, 2003, the Commission had granted consultative status to

13 National Human Rights Institutions and by January 1, 2004, the Commission had

already granted consultative status to more than 300 NGOs.

The Commission has

gradually defined the framework for its relations with NGOs and national rights

institutions, to which it grants consultative and affiliate status respectively. Human

Rights NGOs with observer status are required to present their activity reports to the

Commission. National Human Rights Institutions granted affiliate status with the

Commission are obligated to submit reports on activities undertaken in promoting and

protecting Human Rights under the Charter and at the national level. As analyzed before

in the paper, the African Constitutions have a high level of Human Rights norm

recognition, but the enforcement through the Commission is relatively weak and

remains problematic. Nevertheless, this situation has improved since the development

of subregional institutions and an indigenous African fundamental rights jurisprudence.

Indeed, the domestic level is the most important in the protection of Human Rights –

followed by the regional and global systems – as the domestic level has the benefit of

direct enforcement, and the regional scale has the advantage of peer pressure that the

global level often lacks. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the mechanisms and their

capacity to facilitate the coordination of Human Rights norms recognition and

enforcement have yet to be proven. International indigenous rights coalitions involve

indigenous and non-indigenous CSOs. Similarly as self-identification points out on

different aspects of indigeneity across regions or continents, there is a variance between

indigenous and non-indigenous CSOs. This can be explained through the fact that they

might have different understandings of indigenous values, symbolism and customs. The

four main issues these CSOs are advocating are regarding the unequal treatment African

indigenous peoples can face, the self-determination concern, the violence and threats

to indigenous culture and the question of the environment. Even though indigenous and

non-indigenous CSOs may have not the same approach in their messaging and

interpretation of indigenous rights issues in the international scene, their voices are

heard – and even more since the adoption of the UNDRIP as the CSOs in indigenous

rights coalitions are more homogenized. The State has a responsibility to ensure the

promotion and protection of Human Rights principles, norms and instruments ; CSOs

and NGOs have a role to play through its struggles and participation in Human Rights

culture.

Conclusion

The struggle for access to justice among indigenous peoples in Africa is multifaceted,

involving both legal and cultural dimensions. While the African legal framework, including

institutions such as the African Court and the African Commission, offers avenues for

addressing grievances, the gap between legal recognition and practical implementation

remains a significant challenge. Indigenous peoples continue to face barriers in accessing

Mubiala (2005, pp. 92,93)

Zeleza (2007, p. 491), CSOs have expanded, and in the last two decades, Human Rights NGOs have

emerged as powerful instruments in Africa’s drive for the promotion of Human Rights and development.

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both formal and informal justice systems, often due to socio-political marginalization,

historical injustices, and limited awareness of their rights. Informal justice mechanisms,

such as community-based dispute resolution, provide a more culturally relevant avenue

for seeking justice, yet they are often under-recognized or inadequately supported by

the States. Restorative justice, with its emphasis on healing and community

reconciliation, presents an alternative approach that is more aligned with the values of

many Indigenous communities in Africa. However, its broader application faces

challenges in terms of state support and integration within formal legal frameworks. To

improve access to justice for indigenous peoples, both African and international legal

systems must work collaboratively to ensure that indigenous rights are not only

recognized in theory but also implemented in practice. This involves legal reforms,

strengthening indigenous representation within formal legal bodies, and fostering greater

awareness and respect for indigenous customary law and cultural practices. In doing so,

Africa can move closer to a more inclusive and just legal system that honors the rights

and dignity of its indigenous peoples.

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OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

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AS POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS PARA A EDUCAÇÃO NO DIREITO DA UNIÃO

AFRICANA

RUI GARRIDO

rgarrido@upt.pt

Professor auxiliar na Universidade Portucalense (Portugal). Doutor em Estudos Africanos pelo

Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, mestre em Direitos Humanos pela Universidade do Minho

e licenciado em Ciências de Comunicação pela Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro. Pós-

graduado em Direito Internacional Humanitário pela Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de

Lisboa e foi auditor da Defesa Nacional no Instituto da Defesa Nacional. https://orcid.org/0000-

0002-2585-2571

MOJANA VARGAS

mvargas@ccsa.ufpb.br

Professora associada da Universidade Federal da Paraíba – UFPB (Brasil) e coordenadora do

NEABI-UFPB (Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas Afro-Brasileiras e Indígenas) na mesma instituição,

além do projeto "Dimensões Étnico-Raciais nas Relações Internacionais". Doutora em Estudos

Africanos pelo Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, mestre em Relações Internacionais pelo

Programa San Tiago Dantas (Unesp-Unicamp-Puc/SP), Bacharel em História pela Universidade de

São Paulo (USP). https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5353-1938

Resumo

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o quadro legislativo que dá substrato ao

conjunto das políticas públicas para a educação da União Africana e que vertem sobre a

política para a educação em África. Adotando uma abordagem multinível, toma-se como ponto

de partida o arcabouço normativo instituído a partir da União Africana para seguir a

adaptação, a efetivação e a operacionalização de políticas públicas educacionais emanadas do

plano internacional para o plano sub-regional, em especial as Comunidades Económicas

Regionais das quais fazem parte os países em estudo. A análise documental versa, em

específico, sobre os documentos políticos adotados pela União Africana, sobretudo a partir de

2006 até 2025. Conclui-se que, apesar de uma codificação, em instrumentos jurídico-políticas,

relativamente ampla e abrangente para a promoção dos direitos humanos na área da

educação dos cidadãos africanos, a sua efetividade permanece reduzida atendendo à baixa

capacidade da União Africana atrair financiamento para sua implementação.

Palavras-chave

Políticas educativas, Agendas políticas, Direito da Educação, União Africana, efetivação e

financiamento.

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the legislative framework that underpins the set of public

policies for education developed by the African Union and which inform educational policy

across Africa. Adopting a multilevel approach, the study begins with the normative framework

established by the African Union and traces the adaptation, implementation, and

operationalisation of educational public policies as they move from the international level to

the sub-regional level—particularly within the Regional Economic Communities to which the

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As Políticas Públicas para a Educação no Direito da União Africana

Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas

selected countries belong. The documentary analysis concentrates specifically on the political

instruments adopted by the African Union, especially from 2006 to 2025. The study concludes

that, despite a relatively broad and comprehensive codification of legal-political instruments

aimed at promoting human rights in the field of education for African citizens, their

effectiveness remains limited due to the African Union’s low capacity to attract funding for

their implementation.

Keywords

Educational policies, Policy agendas, Right to Education, African Union, Effectivity and funding.

Como citar este artigo

Garrido, Rui & Vargas, Mojana (2025). As Políticas Públicas para a Educação no Direito da União

Africana. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL. 16 Nº. 1, DT 2 – Dossiê Temático –

“Os Vinte Anos da União Africana: Passado, Presente e Futuro”. Outubro 2025, pp. 82-102. DOI

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0425.5

Artigo submetido em 12 de dezembro de 2024 e aceite para publicação em 15 de

setembro de 2025.

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Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas

AS POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS PARA A EDUCAÇÃO NO DIREITO DA

UNIÃO AFRICANA

RUI GARRIDO

MOJANA VARGAS

1. Introdução

A educação é fundamental para o desenvolvimento de uma sociedade plural. A garantia

da educação está vertida em vários instrumentos de direitos humanos, quer também ao

nível do ordenamento jurídico de diversos Estados. Tendo como ponto de partida a noção

conceptual de “direito da educação”, entendida como um conceito dinâmico que

compreende a articulação entre o aparato jurídico e a sua implementação através de

políticas públicas (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, 2021), importa perceber em que medida esta

segunda dimensão – as políticas públicas – se torna efetiva e operacional. A definição

conceptual de política pública não é consensual, havendo distintas noções, mas todas

convergem na ideia de que se trata das políticas governamentais que versam sobre

problemas concretos da governação (Souza, 2006). Ainda que este artigo não verse

sobre o nível doméstico dos Estados, entendemos que podemos servir-nos desta noção

conceptual e definir que as organizações internacionais também podem produzir políticas

específicas que procurem dar resposta a problemas à escala continental. Neste sentido,

no panorama das políticas públicas para a educação, temos três níveis de relevância no

contexto regional africano, nacional, sub-regional e continental. No entanto, esta

investigação analisa as políticas públicas produzidas ao nível, sobretudo, da União

Africana, dada a crescente atenção e consistência destas políticas. Isto porque o direito

da União Africana – entendido como todos os tratados, resoluções e decisões adotados

pela União Africana e que têm aplicação direita ou indireta nos Estados membros da

União (AMAO, 2019) – tem-se consolidado no que tange à educação, como poderemos

verificar. No continente africano encontramos a particularidade de haver mais de uma

fonte de direito comunitário (a União Africana), uma vez que entre os Estados e a União

existe um nível intermédio sub-regional – as Comunidades Económicas Regionais –

também elas fontes de direito comunitário de âmbito regional mais restrito. Esta

particularidade traduz-se numa aplicação diferenciada do direito comunitário africano em

distintas regiões, o que evidencia uma receção distinta por cada uma das Comunidades

Económicas Regionais.

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Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas

Ao nível da União Africana, as políticas públicas em matéria educativa datam do final da

década de 1990, ainda sob os auspícios da Organização da Unidade Africana. Esta

experiência precursora foi fulcral para o desenvolvimento das políticas seguintes,

bastante alinhadas com as agendas internacionais para o desenvolvimento. Neste caso,

como sugere Leon Tikly (2019), as políticas regionais africanas tinham como finalidade

a interpretação, à luz das necessidades continentais, mas também de mediação daquelas

políticas de matriz universal – por exemplo, os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio

(ODM) ou os Objetivos para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS) –, que posteriormente

seriam reinterpretadas e implementadas a nível nacional (TIKLY, 2019).

A este respeito, a agenda da ONU para o desenvolvimento sustentável determina, no seu

objetivo 4 (ODS4), as metas a atingir para uma educação de qualidade. Estas metas

compreendem desde logo o acesso universal e equitativo a uma educação básica e

secundária de qualidade (UN, n/d). O acesso ao ensino superior é igualmente

contemplado, determinando o ODS4 que, até 2030, deve ser assegurado o acesso

equitativo a mulheres e homens a um ensino tecnológico, vocacional ou terciário, onde

também se inclui a universidade (UN, n/d). Na concepção de Tikly (2019), as várias

agendas regionais devem assim atender a este objetivo mais amplo – o acesso equitativo

ao ensino superior – tendo em consideração que, à medida que as políticas são

desenhadas em fóruns de âmbito regional mais próximos do local, tenham em

consideração as especificidades e necessidades desse mesmo contexto. Neste sentido,

tem contribuído significativamente a Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Educação

em África (ADEA), uma instituição Pan-Africana criada em 1988 por iniciativa do Banco

Mundial, que compõe uma rede de decisores políticos, investigadores e professores com

o objetivo de acelerar reformas no setor da educação no continente Africano (ADEA,

n/da). No caso do ensino superior, a ADEA dispõe de um grupo de trabalho específico,

em atividade desde 1989, com a finalidade de “reforçar a colaboração entre governos

africanos, parceiros de desenvolvimento e instituições de ensino superior para melhorar

a eficácia da assistência ao desenvolvimento” (ADEA, n/db). Este grupo de trabalho tem

encetado estudos sobre reformas estruturais no ensino superior e desenhado políticas

públicas que atendem a problemas específicos no acesso à universidade, nas

desigualdades de género e na harmonização dos currículos universitários.

Posto isto, este artigo tem como objetivo identificar e problematizar as políticas públicas

na área da educação adotadas no quadro do União Africana. Adota uma metodologia

qualitativa, analisando fontes primárias, desde logo a legislação, diretivas e outras fontes

oficias que emanam das organizações internacionais africanas. O presente artigo

encontra-se dividido em 2 partes, na qual a primeira identifica e analisa as políticas

públicas ao nível das organizações regionais africanas e a segunda, debruça-se sobre as

políticas públicas da União Africana, mapeado desde as primeiras iniciativas no final da

década de 90, até à estratégia atualmente em vigor. Uma terceira parte tece algumas

considerações sobre a implementação destas agendas, identificando alguns

constrangimentos e dificuldades.

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2. As políticas públicas da educação ao nível sub-regional: as

Comunidades Económicas Regionais Africanas

O Tratado de Abuja, de 3 de junho de 1991, estabelece as metas para a criação e

funcionamento de uma Comunidade Económica Africana. Este processo de integração

económica assenta, sobretudo, nas várias comunidades económicas regionais que

caracterizam o processo de integração regional africano. Neste sentido são reconhecidas

pelos Tratado de Abuja as seguintes comunidades:

− União do Magrebe Árabe (UMA);

− Mercado Comum para a África Oriental e Austral (COMESA);

− Comunidade dos Estados do Sahel e do Sahara (CEN-SAD);

− Comunidade dos Estados da África Oriental (ECA);

− Autoridade Intergovernamental para o Desenvolvimento (IGAD);

− Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central (CEEAC);

− Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental (CEDEAO);

− Comunidade para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC).

2.1 Comunidade dos Estados do Sahel e do Sahara

A CEN-SAD é uma comunidade económica regional relativamente recente, criada em

1998, no seguimento da estratégia de Abuja para a Comunidade Económica Africana. É

a maior comunidade regional e a sua operacionalização tem sido bastante difícil. Houve

um pequeno avanço no objetivo de harmonização dos sistemas educacionais e

pedagógicos, por meio da criação de uma divisão ligada ao secretariado executivo da

Comunidade (AU, 2014). A revisão de seu Tratado fundador

criou uma organização

interna, indicando a disposição de dar um tratamento mais adequado aos temas ligados

à educação, saúde e assuntos sociais no secretariado executivo da Comunidade. Nesse

mesmo ano, na Conferência regional para a educação em ambiente nómada da região

do Sahara e do Sahel, ocorrida em dezembro de 2013, a CEN-SAD requereu apoio à

Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Educação em África para desenvolver uma política

específica para os povos nómadas na região (ADEA, 2014). Não foi possível apurar se

houve algum desenvolvimento significativo nesta matéria específica, ou em outras

políticas públicas na área da educação na região.

2.2 Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental

No caso da CEDEAO, uma fonte importante de direito da educação é o seu tratado

fundador, em particular, a sua revisão de julho de 1993. O Tratado Revisto da CEDEAO

(doravante, Tratado Revisto) estipula os objetivos para o desenvolvimento da

comunidade baseados na promoção da cooperação e da integração com a finalidade de

Artigo 33 do Tratado Revisto da Comunidade dos Estados do Sahel e do Sahara (2013).

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melhorar o padrão de vida dos cidadãos comunitários. Para tal, os Estados-membros

devem harmonizar e coordenar políticas públicas nacionais que promovam, entre outros,

a educação, a ciência e a tecnologia (CEDEAO, 1993). O artigo 27.º (Ciência e Tecnologia)

do Tratado Revisto postula que os Estados devem cooperar na formação e na

transferência de conhecimento tecnológico e para tal devem “harmonizar os sistemas

educativos com a finalidade de adaptar uma melhor formação educativa, científica e

técnica às necessidades específicas de desenvolvimento do ambiente da África Ocidental

(CEDEAO, 1993b)”.

Atendendo ao que tinha sido estipulado pelo Tratado Revisto de 1993, os Chefes de

Estados e de Governo da CEDEAO adotaram, em 2006, o Protocolo A/P3/1/03 sobre

Educação e Formação (CEDEAO, 2006), que não sendo uma política pública em si, define

um conjunto de diretrizes que fortalecem a cooperação na área do ensino formal e da

formação tecnológica. É um tratado abrangente, englobando todas as áreas da educação,

incluindo o ensino superior. Neste grau de ensino, destaca-se a cooperação no ensino

superior como vetor estrutural para o desenvolvimento da África Ocidental. Assim, e

tendo por base outros desenvolvimentos legislativos e políticos no seio desta comunidade

– desde logo o estatuto de Cidadão Comunitário e a liberdade de circulação dentro do

espaço comunitário

– no que concerne ao acesso às universidades, este protocolo

estabelece que os Estados-membros devem consignar 5% das vagas para os cidadãos

de outros Estados da CEDEAO (CEDEAO, 2006). Define ainda que deve haver uma

harmonização dos critérios de admissão, do ano escolar, dos currículos como forma de

evitar duplicação e facilitar o sistema de transferência de créditos e conhecimento

(CEDEAO, 2006, ART. 1-4). Um exemplo da aplicação desta política para o ensino

superior é a proposta, de 2015, de harmonização do currículo para a formação de

farmacêuticos (WAHOOAS, 2015), oferecido em toda área da CEDEAO. Também é

importante referir que, em 2014, foi adotado o Supplementary Act A/SA.1/12/14, que

define metas para a melhora do Ensino superior no espaço da CEDEAO (2014), quer ao

nível do financiamento, da harmonização e do reconhecimento mútuo dos currículos.

Em matéria específica de políticas públicas, a CEDEAO tem tido um desenvolvimento

relevante na criação de políticas integradas de desenvolvimento, nas quais a educação

surge como fator potencializador. Em 2012, foi adotada a Diretiva A/DIR.1/1/06/12 sobre

Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, que determinou como objetivo o “melhorar o acesso à

educação e à aprendizagem de ciências básicas e matemática em todos os níveis do

sistema educativo” (CEDEAO, 2012, art. 3). Esta diretiva postula ainda a cooperação na

promoção da equidade de género e acesso universal à educação na área da ciência, da

tecnologia e da inovação (CEDEAO, 2012, art. 4).

Por fim, a agenda ECOWAS VISION 2020 (CEDEAO, 2010), destaca-se pela sua visão de

criar uma região integrada, na qual a população usufrui de liberdade de circulação e tem

acesso a uma educação e saúde eficientes. Esta eficiência, podemos pressupor, traduz

não apenas um acesso universal – tal como se afirma mais adiante quando se refere

como meta o acesso a uma educação acessível a todos –, como também uma educação

Desde logo o Protocolo A/P.3/5/52 relativo à definição do Cidadão Comunitário (1990). É importante notar,

neste campo, que a liberdade de circulação dentro da comunidade e o estatuto de cidadão comunitário,

equiparado em termos de direitos aos cidadãos nacionais, tem sido um fator importante de desenvolvimento e

transferência de conhecimento dentro da CEDEAO. Neste sentido, ver YUSUF, M. (2019).

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de qualidade capaz de estimular o desenvolvimento do potencial humano. Identifica como

desafios socioeconómicos a insegurança, as desigualdades de género, a fraca qualidade

dos serviços sociais e o fraco processo de integração. Por isto mesmo, uma das

prioridades da política da CEDEAO é o investimento nas áreas da educação, da formação

e da juventude (CEDEAO, 2010, p.7).

2.3 Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Central

A CEEAC é uma comunidade económica estabelecida em 1983, mas que sofreu um

período de inatividade prolongado até ao final do século XX, por dificuldades financeiras,

mas também pela conflitualidade armada que marcou a região dos Grandes Lagos. Em

1999, os líderes políticos procuraram dar nova força a esta comunidade – coincidindo

com a primeira etapa definida pelo Tratado de Abuja, no sentido do reforço das

comunidades económicas regionais e que derivaria, em 1998, na adoção do Protocolo

sobre as relações entre a Comunidade Económica Africana e das Comunidades

Económicas Regionais.

A educação surge como um pilar estrutural no Tratado que estabelece a Comunidade

Económica dos Estados da África Central (1983), no Capítulo XIII – Cooperação na

Educação, Formação e Cultura. Neste sentido, o artigo 61 do tratado (Educação e

Formação) determina que os Estados membros da comunidade devem encetar esforços

numa política educativa comum, que atenda às especificidades económicas e

socioculturais da região, para a promoção do desenvolvimento e do progresso sociais.

Neste sentido, determina a melhoria da eficiência dos sistemas educativos nacionais, a

criação e/ou o fortalecimento de instituições de formação, e a promoção do intercâmbio

de experiências e informação no domínio das políticas educativas (ECCAS, art. 61, nº2).

A comunidade tem produzido um importante acervo jurídico em várias matérias, tendo

adotado o Protocolo para a Cooperação no Desenvolvimento de Recursos Humanos,

Educação, Formação e Cultura entre os Estados membros da Comunidade Económica dos

Estados da África Central. Ao nível das políticas públicas para a educação – e sobretudo,

para o ensino superior – não tem havido nenhum desenvolvimento significativo nesta

matéria.

2.4 Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral

No caso da África Austral, a SADC tem tido um papel decisivo no incremento de um

processo de integração regional, que tem tido na educação uma das suas forças maiores.

A SADC reconhece o papel fundamental da educação no potenciamento do crescimento

económico e no desenvolvimento sustentável. Para a SADC, a educação é uma

ferramenta com o potencial de aliviar a pobreza e garantir uma maior qualidade de vida

dos cidadãos. A educação é fulcral na concretização da visão da SADC de um futuro

comum, na garantia de um bem-estar social e económico, melhoria dos padrões de vida,

de promoção dos valores da liberdade, da justiça, da paz e da segurança comuns.

Ao nível de políticas regionais, os Chefes de Estado e de Governo da SADC adotaram,

em 1997, o Protocol on Education and Training (SADC, 1997), um documento que

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estabelece a cooperação entre Estados em vários domínios, inclusive na coordenação e

implementação de políticas, estratégias e sistemas de ensino nos Estados-membros

(SADC, 1997, Artigo 3, alínea c). Prevê ainda a coordenação de políticas públicas noutros

setores, como a formação e a investigação. São também objetivos deste protocolo a

redução e eliminação das limitações no acesso a uma educação de qualidade e a

programas de formação (SADC, 1997, Artigo 3, alínea f). Destacamos ainda o estímulo

ao ensino e aprendizagem da língua inglesa e da língua portuguesa como línguas de

trabalho na África Austral (idem). As áreas de cooperação entre os Estados são: políticas

para a educação e formação, educação básica, ensino secundário, ensino superior,

investigação e desenvolvimento (I&D), educação ao longo da vida e publicação e recursos

bibliotecários (SADC, 1997, Artigos 4-10).

Ao nível do ensino superior (SADC, 1997, art. 7), o protocolo determina que, no que

tange ao acesso, os Estados membros devem reservar 5% das vagas de ingresso nas

universidades para estudantes de outros Estados da SADC, à semelhança do que já havia

sido previsto na CEDEAO. A mobilidade e a harmonização de currículos são dois aspetos

sublinhados como essenciais para permitir uma prossecução dos objetivos de uma

educação superior de qualidade e capaz de produzir e transferir conhecimento (HAHN &

TEFERRA; 2013, p.132). Os Estados devem assim cooperar no sentido de uma integração

do ensino superior como forma a suprir a procura por este grau de ensino, sobretudo em

sociedades muito jovens e com uma pressão muito grande para a especialização e a

formação avançada. A cooperação torna-se, desta forma, uma ferramenta para suprir as

carências de alguns Estados (HAHN, 2004. p.200). Ele tem ainda uma preocupação, no

que tange ao acesso ao ensino superior, na redução das barreiras à mobilidade, mas

também no incremento do acesso equitativo e respeitando a equidade entre géneros

(HAHN, 2005. p.14).

O Protocolo determina, nos pontos seguintes, aspetos específicos da cooperação

interuniversitária, programas de mobilidade e reconhecimento mútuo de currículos no

espaço da SADC para as licenciaturas e pós-graduações. É ainda estimulada a criação de

centros de especialização em áreas do conhecimento a determinar em concertação entre

as universidades e os governos dos Estados membros. O protocolo determina a

necessidade de criar fóruns ou associações entre as universidades, e tal viria a acontecer,

em 2007, ano em que foi criada a SARUA – Southern African Regional Universities

Association – associação que tem, entre outros, a missão de “construir e sustentar uma

comunidade de ensino superior vibrante que dá um contributo distintivo para o

desenvolvimento e integração socioeconómica regional através de redes e parcerias

colaborativas” (SARUA, 2007). Esta associação tem, portanto, desenvolvido iniciativas

em prol de um espaço comunitário de Ensino universitário que, como referiu o seu

presidente em 2017, ainda se encontra fragmentado em toda a região (DELL, 2017).

Neste sentido, a SARUA está “motivado para que um alinhamento estratégico,

organizacional e programa mais próximo entre a SARUA e a SADC comece a enfrentar

os desafios partilhados que as instituições de ensino superior enfrentam” (DELL, 2017).

O Protocolo em Educação e Formação foi posteriormente complementado com uma

política pública relativa ao ensino à distância, o Regional Open and Distance Learning

Policy Framework, que só viria a ser aprovado em 2012 (SADC, 2012). Esta política

resulta do projeto iniciado em 2008, que teve como principal objetivo contribuir para o

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desenvolvimento e mobilização de uma política de ensino à distância que fosse efetiva,

para potenciar uma educação e formação de qualidade na SADC.

Em 2020, a SADC adotou aquela que é a sua política de desenvolvimento para a região

para as próximas três décadas. A SADC Vision 2050 aspira “um futuro comum que

assegurará o bem-estar socioeconómico, a melhoria dos padrões e qualidade de vida, a

liberdade e a justiça social, e a paz e segurança para o povo da África Austral” (SADC,

2020, p.2). Esta visão comum de desenvolvimento assenta em três pilares que são:

Desenvolvimento Industrial e Integração de Mercado (Pilar 1), Desenvolvimento de

Infraestruturas em apoio à Integração Regional (Pilar 2), e Desenvolvimento de Capital

Humano e Social (Pilar 3). A educação tem lugar no terceiro pilar, que se debruça sobre

as pessoas e o seu desenvolvimento, o que determina que, até 2050, na região da SADC

deve ser alcançado um patamar elevado de qualidade de vida, o que se traduzirá em

cidadãos bem instruídos, com níveis de produtividade elevados e que atendam ao

desenvolvimento sustentável económico, mas também humano (SADC, 2020, p.7). Para

tal, prevê esta política que os Estados devem garantir “maior acesso à educação de

qualidade e relevância, bem como ao desenvolvimento de competências, incluindo na

ciência e tecnologia, para os cidadãos da SADC” (SADC, 2020, p.7).

É ainda de referir que outras políticas públicas da SADC, que têm outras áreas de foco,

têm abordado o ensino e a sua importância para alcançar os objetivos destas políticas

públicas. Exemplo disso é a Política de Género da SADC (2009) que tem na educação

uma ferramenta de eliminação de barreiras entre género e a violência baseada no género.

3. As Políticas Públicas da Educação ao Nível Continental: União Africana

A União Africana tem várias estratégias implementadas no que concerne à Educação.

Esta centralidade da educação já advém do tempo da Organização da Unidade Africana,

como iremos ver de seguida. Ao nível do enquadramento normativo há algumas

particularidades locais que se articulam ou colidem com as políticas que derivam da

União. Duas tendências sobressaem no continente: a governação e a diversificação.

Neste sentido, ao nível da governação, identificou um estudo do Banco Mundial, em 2009,

que os governos detinham um grande controlo sobre as instituições de ensino superior,

o que influenciava na experiência de autonomia destas instituições (SAINT, LAO &

MATERU; 2009, p.13), contudo, também se observou um nível elevado de diversificação

dos sistemas de ensino (ASSIÉ-LUMUMBA, 2006; p.18). Estas características locais têm

de estar articuladas com as políticas adotadas ao nível das Comunidades regionais, mas

sobretudo com as políticas da UA. E neste caso, para além dos programas implementados

sob iniciativa da União, também as parcerias a nível internacional têm sido fundamentais

na persecução de uma educação de qualidade em África. Neste campo, sobressai o

Programa de cooperação União Africana – União Europeia para o Ensino Superior, fruto

da cooperação estratégica União Africana – União Europeia, da cimeira do Cairo, em

2000. Esta cimeira foi fundamental para o reforço do quadro de cooperação entre os dois

continentes (CARAPETO, 2020). A estratégia conjunta foi apresentada e adotada em

2007, na 2.ª cimeira União Europeia – África, em Lisboa, na qual se reafirmou a

aceleração da implementação dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio, em

específico a educação básica universal (UA, 2007, p.12). Para além da educação básica,

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a parceria EU-África sublinhou a necessidade de reforço de todos os níveis de ensino,

implementando as agendas Education for All Fast Track Initiative

e o plano de ação da

Segunda Década da Educação para África (UA, 2007, p.13), a política da União Africana

em vigor à época. O desenvolvimento da cooperação no ensino superior Europa – África

tem sido possível através de vários programas, tais como o Erasmus+, o Intra-Africa

academic mobility scheme, o Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions/Horizon 2020, e ainda as

iniciativas conjuntas de harmonização do ensino superior – o programa Tuning Africa e

o Harmonisation of African higher education quality assurance and accreditation

(ZYGIEREWICZ, 2019). Estes mecanismos associam-se a outros no controlo de qualidade

do ensino superior – desde logo o African Quality Rating Mechanism e o African Quality

Assurance Network – os quais têm sido fundamentais para a estruturação de um ensino

superior de qualidade no continente africano, com real potencial de formação de quadros

locais altamente especializados produtores de conhecimento e de inovação (ADEA, n/sc).

Outras parcerias têm sido postas em prática com a ONU, em particular a Universidade

das Nações Unidas, que em 2009 elaborou um estudo sobre a necessidade de

revitalização do ensino superior na região da África subsaariana e das necessidades em

termos de políticas públicas a adotar para tal fim (UN, 2009).

No âmbito concreto das iniciativas africanas, importa referir que tanto ao nível da

Organização da Unidade Africana, como ao nível da União Africana, a educação tem sido

transversal como ferramenta de desenvolvimento social e económico. O vasto corpo

normativo produzido pela União Africana em matéria de educação, previsto em vários

tratados de direitos humanos de âmbito geral ou específico, têm-se traduzido numa

abordagem mais ampla em instrumentos de soft law – como protocolos, resoluções ou

diretivas – mas também em políticas públicas de âmbito continental. Num âmbito mais

geral, importa destacar o papel da Comissão Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos,

que tem tido um profícuo trabalho de interpretação e densificação dos direitos

económicos, sociais e culturais, onde se inclui o direito à educação, da Carta Africana dos

Direitos Humanos e dos Povos. Como apontado por Garrido e Baldé (2021), destacam-

se as Diretrizes relativas aos Direitos Económicos, Sociais e Culturais para a elaboração

dos Relatórios dos Estados Parte da Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos

(1989), a Declaração de Pretória sobre Direitos Económicos, Sociais e Culturais em África

(2004) e os Princípios e Diretrizes na Implementação dos Direitos Económicos, Sociais e

Culturais da Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos (2011).

Como pudemos verificar anteriormente, a harmonização de currículos tem sido uma

aposta forte na área do ensino superior no continente. Quer ao nível das comunidades

económicas regionais, mas também da União Africana e das parcerias estratégicas, esta

harmonização tem sido entendida como fator potenciador da mobilidade e da

transferência de conhecimento. Em 1981, ainda no tempo de atividade da Organização

da Unidade Africana, foi adotada a Convenção de Arusha para o reconhecimento de

estudos, certificados, diplomas, graus e outras qualificações académicas no ensino

superior nos Estados Africanos (UNESCO, 1981). A Convenção de Arusha propunha que

os Estados adotassem políticas no sentido de garantir a acessibilidade das universidades

a todos, de reconhecer os estudos e diplomas de outras universidades, assim como

Parceria global que procurou acelerar a implementação do ODM 2 – Educação Básica Universal – até 2015.

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potenciar a mobilidade de professores, estudantes e investigadores (UNESCO, 1981,

art.2). Estavam ainda previstos como objetivos a flexibilidade no retorno de estudantes,

professores e investigadores, critérios objetivos de avaliação de competências,

abordagem dinâmica na admissão à universidade, entre outros. Para além da Convenção

de Arusha, a Organização da Unidade Africana/União Africana adotou um conjunto

significativo de tratados internacionais de direitos humanos que, não sendo específicos

da questão da educação – menos ainda do ensino superior – reconhecem, contudo, a

importância do direito à educação e do seu potencial de desenvolvimento humanos. São

disso exemplo, como pudemos analisar na primeira parte, a carta Africana dos Direitos

Humanos e dos Povos (1981), a Carta Africana dos Direitos e Bem-Estar da criança

(1990), a Carta Africana para a Juventude (2006), o Protocolo à Carta Africana dos

Direitos Humanos e dos Povos relativo aos direitos das Mulheres em África (2003), o

Protocolo à Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos relativo aos direitos das

pessoas idosas em África (2016) e ainda o Protocolo à Carta Africana dos Direitos

Humanos e dos Povos relativo aos direitos das pessoas com deficiência em África (2018).

Este enquadramento normativo robusto permite que o direito à educação seja

amplamente reconhecido como um direito fundamental na realização pessoal e

profissional dos cidadãos.

Este complexo enquadramento normativo deriva num conjunto significativo de políticas

públicas, que se articulam entre si, fomentando a consolidação de um direito bastante

dinâmico da educação em África. Neste sentido, podemos identificar três políticas

públicas de âmbito específico da educação em África, que cobrem um espaço temporal

de cerca de 30 anos:

3.1 A Primeira Década da Educação para África (1997 – 2006)

A Primeira Década da Educação para África (Primeira Década) foi uma política pública

adotada pela Organização de Unidade Africana, tendo como referencial a agenda da ONU

para o Milénio, mas também os objetivos de integração propostos pelo Tratado de Abuja

(1991).

Foi adotada em 1997 e o seu plano de ação demorou dois anos a ser desenhado

e adotado. Este plano foi estruturado em torno dos seguintes eixos: 1) equidade e acesso

ao ensino básico; 2) a qualidade, relevância e eficácia da educação; 3) modalidades

complementares de aprendizagem; 4) capacitação (PITYANA, 2008, p.5). O ensino

superior não se destacou nestes eixos e a própria política teve uma fraquíssima

implementação (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, 2021).

O Tratado de Abuja estabeleceu as metas para a criação de uma comunidade económica africana, assente

em várias etapas. No que tange à educação, previu a criação de um Comité Técnico Especializado, o Comité

para a Educação, a Cultura e os Recursos Humanos (artigo 25.º, n.º 1, alínea g). Na área da tecnologia e da

inovação, determinou que os Estados membros deveriam assegurar o ensino e a harmonização de políticas

públicas nesta área do conhecimento e a adequação dos currículos escolares, na área da inovação tecnológica,

para atender às necessidades de desenvolvimento Africanas (artigo 51.º). Em seu capítulo XII – Educação,

Formação e Cultura – determina-se que os Estados devem cooperar na educação e na formação através de

políticas que permitam: o aproveitamento da capacidade instalada e a sua ampliação; a melhoria da qualidade

dos sistemas de ensino; a criação de programas conjuntos de formação; o incentivo e incremento da troca de

informação e partilha de conhecimentos; e, todos os esforços necessários que retenham os quadros altamente

especializados, procurando evitar a sua saída para fora do continente africano (artigo 68.º).

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A Primeira Década foi essencial para a área da educação, pois pela primeira vez uma

política pública de escala continental norteou os Estados Africanos para a cooperação a

nível sub-regional, regional e pan-Africano, para a integração, harmonização e melhoria

dos sistemas educativos em África (KANSAKAI, 2010, p.32). Apesar disto, esta política

teve vários problemas na sua implementação e ficou bastante aquém dos objetivos

delineados (TOURAY, 2016).

3.2 A Segunda Década da Educação para África (2006 – 2015)

Finalizado o tempo para a implementação da Primeira Década, mas também com

finalização do processo de transição da Organização de Unidade Africana para a União

Africana, tiveram lugar algumas alterações significativas no campo das políticas

africanas. Tendo em atenção o enquadramento normativo, mas também fazendo uma

reflexão sobre a implementação de políticas anteriores, em particular a Primeira Década,

foi desenhada uma nova política no campo da educação: a Segunda Década da Educação

para África, a implementar entre os anos de 2006 e 2015.

A decisão sobre a Segunda Década foi adotada na 6.ª sessão ordinária da Conferência

da União, que teve lugar em 23 e 24 de janeiro de 2006, em Cartum, Sudão (UA, 2006).

Nesta decisão, a Conferência da União saudou os Estados e das Comunidades Económicas

Regionais pelo esforço na implementação da Primeira Década, reconhecendo, contudo,

os obstáculos e as limitações que impediram a concretização dos objetivos desta política

(UA, 2006). Tendo em consideração a experiência já acumulada, a Segunda Década

difere bastante da sua antecessora, procurando evitar e corrigir as dificuldade e

ineficiências da sua aplicação. Por isto mesmo, foi desenhado um plano de ação prevendo

uma estratégia de gestão e comunicação assente numa multiplicidade atores envolvidos

nos vários níveis de organização política do continente (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, 2021). Em

concreto, do nível mais local para o continental, os atores envolvidos foram as

autoridades nacionais com responsabilidade na área da educação, as Comunidades

Económicas Regionais, e ao nível da União Africana, a Comissão da União (Idem). O

envolvimento da Comissão da União Africana é indicativo de que houve um esforço de

garantir a efetividade deste plano de ação da Segunda Década, uma vez que a Comissão

é um órgão com funções administrativas e que tem, na prática, a tarefa de gestão dos

assuntos da União (MAKINDA, OKUMU & MICKLER, 2016, p. 57). Na decisão que aprova

a Segunda Década, a Conferência reconhece ainda:

[A] existência de outras iniciativas envolvidas na educação em África, tais

como a Educação Para Todos, os Objetivos do Desenvolvimento para o

Milénio, a Nova Parceira para o Desenvolvimento de África (NEPAD) e lança

um apelo no sentido de haver uma melhor coordenação entre estas iniciativas

e o quadro de ação para a Segunda Década (UA, 2006).

Por isto mesmo, a Segunda Década surge como uma política integrada nas iniciativas no

campo da educação e do desenvolvimento em vigência à época. Também reflete uma

mudança de paradigma que foi operada com a transição OUA – UA e que foi a

centralidade dos direitos humanos para a nova organização. Como aponta Emenet

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Woldegiorgis (2017), a Segunda Década estava orientada para os direitos humanos como

matriz fundamental para o crescimento económico e o desenvolvimento de capital

humano em África (p.44). Esta abordagem nos direitos humanos traduziu-se em

objetivos que pretendiam, entre outros, a equidade de género. Na área de atuação

“Género e Cultura”, definiu o plano de ação como objetivo:

Eliminar as disparidades de género e garantir a igualdade de género, a

capacitação das raparigas e das mulheres em todo o sistema educativo,

enriquecendo ao mesmo tempo o sistema com os aspetos positivos dos

valores culturais africanos (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2006).

As meninas e mulheres são incluídas, no quadro da política, na categoria de grupos

vulneráveis ou marginalizados, entendidos, de forma não exaustiva, como “meninas,

pessoas portadoras de deficiência, e crianças infetadas com o vírus do VIH/SIDA” (UNIÃO

AFRICANA, 2006, p.5). Desta forma, a Segunda Década procurou eliminar as

desigualdades não apenas entre género no acesso à educação e a empregos qualificados,

como também de crianças em situação de particular vulnerabilidade económica e social

e em situação de exclusão (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, 2021). Para estes casos, o ensino técnico

e vocacional assumiu particular relevância. A Segunda Década definiu que estes grupos

devem ter acesso a este tipo de formação especializada, inclusive através de programas

de educação não-formal, mas também para reconstrução nacional em situações de pós-

conflito (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2006, p.11). Ainda no que concerne à questão da equidade

entre géneros, é necessário ter em consideração que a Segunda Década articulou-se com

outras políticas da União Africana, em particular a Política da União Africana para o

Género (2008), que tinha, entre outros, o objetivo de promover o acesso e controlo

igualitário entre homens e mulheres sobre recursos, conhecimento, informação,

propriedade de terras e empresas, e serviços como educação e formação, cuidados de

saúde, crédito e direitos” (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2008).

No campo do ensino superior, o plano de ação da Segunda Década delineou, como meta,

Revitalização completa do ensino superior em África, com o surgimento de

instituições fortes e vibrantes profundamente envolvidas em serviços de

investigação, ensino, divulgação comunitária e enriquecimento para os níveis

mais baixos de educação; e funcionamento num ambiente de liberdade

académica e autonomia institucional, num quadro global de responsabilidade

pública (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2006, p.8).

Norteada por esta meta, a política educativa propunha uma aposta no reforço do ensino

superior em África, em contraciclo com o que se tinha verificado na implementação da

Primeira Década, que tinha um foco orientado para atingir a meta da educação básica

universal. Esta reorientação para o ensino superior incorporou o espírito da agenda da

ONU para o Milénio, sobretudo pelo potencial do ensino superior no desenvolvimento

económico e do capital humano, da ciência e da tecnologia.

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3.3 A Estratégia Continental para a Educação em África (2016 – 2025)

A Estratégia Continental para a Educação em África (União Africana, 2016a) é a terceira

política no campo da educação da União Africana, que se encontra atualmente em vigor.

A designação da política reflete, desde logo, uma transformação institucional para a área

da educação, demonstrando uma maior ambição na implementação do que as suas

antecessoras. Esta estratégia é demonstrativa de uma maior ambição da União Africana,

para uma transformação da educação em África, em todos os domínios e que permitam

que esta seja uma ferramenta transformadora no continente (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, 2021).

A Estratégia Continental enquadra-se numa abordagem mais ampla, que é a agenda para

o desenvolvimento da União Africana (AWAAH, 2019). A Agenda 2063 – A África Que

Queremos determina as aspirações do continente em matéria de desenvolvimento para

um espaço temporal de 50 anos.

Ela é uma agenda transversal, na qual a educação é

central para as suas metas. Os direitos humanos norteiam a agenda de desenvolvimento

delineada pela Agenda 2063, que determina na sua Aspiração 1 - uma África próspera

baseada no desenvolvimento inclusivo e sustentável – a luta contra a pobreza, as

desigualdades e a falta de serviços básicos de saúde e sanitários como prioridades de

desenvolvimento, a par do desenvolvimento das competências e da transformação do

capital humano através da educação (GARRIDO & BALDÉ, op.cit). A Estratégia

Continental deriva das aspirações da Agenda 2063, facto que a torna tão distinta das

políticas anteriores adotadas no quadro a OUA e da UA. Ela estabelece as metas a

educação na transformação para o desenvolvimento sustentável, focando uma visão pan-

africana de unidade e prosperidade (TIKLY, 2019, p.223). Imbuída desta visão pan-

africana, a Estratégia Continental verte ainda em si a agenda de desenvolvimento

sustentável da ONU, sendo inclusive o guião para a implementação do ODS 4 para a

garantia de uma educação inclusiva e de qualidade para todos (EMMANUEL, 2019, p.33).

Resulta de um esforço de consulta de stakeholders, entre os quais o AUDA-NEPAD, as

Comunidades Económicas Regionais, outros atores regionais e os Estados (GARRIDO &

BALDÉ, 2021.).

No âmbito do ensino superior, a Estratégia Continental não prevê nenhuma medida

independente, sendo este grau de ensino articulado com outras políticas, em particular

a Estratégia para África na Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (2024) – uma política de

educação específica para o ensino técnico e vocacional. Neste sentido a Estratégia

Continental reconhece que:

O ensino superior proporciona um ambiente propício ao desenvolvimento e

exploração adequada de todo o potencial da ciência, tecnologia e inovação

para apoiar o crescimento sustentável e o desenvolvimento socioeconómico.

Melhora também a competitividade no que diz respeito ao processo global de

investigação, inovação e empreendedorismo que exige uma produção de

conhecimento de qualidade das universidades dos países africanos (UNIÃO

AFRICANA, 2016, p.18).

A Agenda 2063 foi adotada em 2013.

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Em junho de 2017, teve lugar a 14.ª Conferência da Associação de Universidades

Africanas, em Acra (Gana) que lançou oficialmente o CESA Higher Education Cluster

(União Africana, 2017). Esta iniciativa integra-se na lógica integrada de criação de vários

clusters nas várias áreas de foco da Estratégia Continental (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2017). No

caso do cluster para o ensino superior, este tem como propósito: a expansão de uma

sociedade Africana do conhecimento, através de um forte investimento nas

universidades, na ciência, na tecnologia, na investigação e na inovação; a harmonização

do ensino superior e o reconhecimento de competências; estabelecer uma Agência

Africana de Acreditação, para atestar níveis de qualidade do ensino, e; fortalecer a

Universidade Pan-Africana e estabelecer uma Universidade Virtual Pan-Africana com o

objetivo de aumentar o alcance do ensino no continente e fortalecer as áreas prioritárias

da ciência, da tecnologia e da inovação (UNIÃO AFRICANA, s/da).

O projeto de uma universidade virtual no continente africano foi incluído no plano de

ação para a primeira década de implementação da Agenda 2063 (UNIÃO AFRICANA,

s/db). Neste sentido, e já com a Estratégia Continental em vigor, o Comité Técnico

Especializado em Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia, em articulação com o cluster para o

ensino superior (2017) e dos objetivos a que se propunha alcançar, propôs a criação da

universidade virtual. Tal proposta seria acolhida pelo Conselho Executivo da União

Africana, em janeiro de 2018 e marcando o arranque oficial do projeto (UNIÃO

AFRICANA, 2018). A Pan African Virtual and E-University foi oficialmente inaugurada em

2019. Esta iniciativa tem como propósito acelerar o desenvolvimento do capital humano,

da ciência, tecnologia e da inovação através de um projeto de ensino superior de acesso

universal (UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2019). A Pan African Virtual E-University cimenta-se na

revolução tecnológica e digital do século XXI para permitir que os cidadãos africanos

tenham acesso a uma formação superior especializada em qualquer lugar em que

estejam. Desta forma, a Pan-African Virtual and E-University complementa e consolida

todas as iniciativas e estratégias africanas que visam o desenvolvimento e a inovação.

4. Impedimentos à implementação das Política Públicas Educativas da

União Africana

O mapeamento realizado neste artigo demonstra a construção de um amplo leque de

políticas públicas para o avanço da educação no continente. A criação de normativas nos

planos continental, regional e nacional reforça a formação de uma rede de diretrizes e

projetos abrangentes dados os enormes desafios para se oferecer educação de qualidade

para as populações africanas. A abordagem de construção de níveis de ação cria uma

estrutura que busca envolver todos os níveis que constituiriam o que se pode chamar de

um sistema educacional africano. Articuladas aos Objetivos do Desenvolvimento

Sustentável e à Agenda 2063, as diretrizes educacionais da Estratégia Continental

rompem com a falsa contradição que comumente é apontada nos projetos educacionais

para os países em desenvolvimento entre a educação básica e a educação superior

(CORBUCCI, 2004; SGUISSARDI, 2014), ao tratar o nível superior (incluindo-se o ensino

tecnológico) e o nível básico (inclusive o ensino técnico-profissional), como partes

integrantes de um mesmo complexo cuja estruturação é indispensável para a promoção

do desenvolvimento económico.

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Também é relevante o destaque atribuído à promoção da igualdade de género no sistema

educacional, uma vez que, como ficou demonstrado nos esforços da Primeira Década da

Educação para a África, o objetivo de ampliar o percentual de pessoas escolarizadas em

todo o continente por si só não bastava para garantir o acesso igualitário de mulheres e

meninas à escolarização em todos os níveis e a sua consequente inserção profissional.

Entretanto, se a construção das políticas públicas para a educação avançou no plano sub-

regional com a inclusão de diversas comunidades económicas regionais e no plano

continental com a ampliação das ações da União Africana no âmbito educacional, um

obstáculo dos mais importantes ainda permanece: o financiamento necessário para a

efetivação das diretrizes instituídas.

A falta de autonomia financeira da União Africana é um tópico presente nas discussões

do organismo desde a sua fundação (MOLLA & SHUNDE, 2023; MOYO, 2021). Tal

condição foi herdada de sua predecessora – a OUA – fundada em meio ao processo de

descolonização africana, e, desde a origem, a capacidade dos estados-membros para

sustentar economicamente a atuação da entidade foi restrita. A partir de 2016, a

entidade começou a discutir um conjunto de reformas com o objetivo de reduzir a

dependência de doações dos países desenvolvidos por meio da busca por novas fontes

de financiamento e da reforma de diversos mecanismos de gestão dos recursos

(KAGAME, 2017; UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2016c).

Em suas recomendações, Kagame aponta uma série de reformas que considera

essenciais para ampliar a eficiência na implementação das políticas definidas pela UA,

dentre as quais destacamos a indicação de que a entidade adote um número mais

reduzido de prioridades, privilegiando áreas em que possa atuar com alcance continental

(Kagame, 2017, p.27), em colaboração com as comunidades económicas regionais.

Mesmo após com a aprovação da Decisão de Kigali sobre o Financiamento da União

(UNIÃO AFRICANA, 2016c), Kagame constata que mais de 40% dos estados-membros

deixaram de pagar suas contribuições anuais para a organização.

Por sua vez, Moyo (2021), argumenta que a condição de dependência económico-

financeira da UA deita suas raízes na subalternidade dos próprios países africanos. O

autor aponta que 80% dos recursos da UA são originados de ex-colonizadores, dos EUA

e de atores que buscam aprofundar sua influência no continente, como China e Rússia.

Essa relação é utilizada, na visão do autor, para perpetuar a condição dependente dos

países africanos e impossibilita a efetiva implementação de qualquer política para

autonomizar o continente e, para superar esse quadro é preciso reforçar o

autofinanciamento da organização, algo problemático em meio aos orçamentos nacionais

bastante restritos dos estados-membros, sobretudo por conta do endividamento externo.

O quadro apresentado demonstra que há grandes desafios políticos e económicos para a

implementação efetiva das políticas educacionais definidas no âmbito da União Africana.

Em que pese a vontade política que mobilizou os estados-membros da UA para sua

criação, a baixa capacidade de investimento de muitos países ainda se coloca como o

principal obstáculo a ser superado para avançar como políticas que impulsionem o

desenvolvimento continental e construam sua efetiva autonomia.

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Rui Garrido, Mojana Vargas

Conclusão

A educação tem ocupado um lugar importante na agenda política da União Africana. A

consagração do direito à educação em vários instrumentos jurídicos adotados no quadro

da União Africana é demonstrativa da relevância deste direito na vida jurídica da União.

Por outro lado, a concepção e desenho de políticas públicas específicas nesta área vêm

reforçar a relevância desta agenda no quadro das prioridades políticas da União. A

Primeira Década da Educação foi importante para catapultar o tema na cena política

regional, posteriormente consolidada na década seguinte. É com a Estratégia Continental

que a União concretiza uma agência robusta em matéria de políticas na área da educação,

concretizando medidas a implementar nos diferentes níveis de educação. Esta Estratégia

articula-se com outras agendas adotadas no quadro da organização, concertando uma

resposta jurídica e política forte no quadro da educação em África. Contudo, foi possível

identificar algumas dificuldades nesta implementação, desde logo, a dificuldade da União

Africana em alocar um orçamento razoável para esta área, fruto de alguma debilidade

estrutural em matéria do financiamento da organização pelos estados-membros. A União

Africana tem assim uma crónica falta de autonomia financeira que compromete a

concretização das agendas e políticas por si definidas.

Referências

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