OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
VOL15 N2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324
Editorial. Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order – Francisco Jose
Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li – pp. 3-12
ARTICLES
Sino-Brazilian mutual interests: A comprehensive overview – Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri,
Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro, Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky,
Sheldon William Silva – pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian cooperation in Analysis: bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism –
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Medeiros – pp. 38-59
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations through BRICS: Development Prospects and
Strategic Partnerships – Mohamad Zreik – pp. 60-79
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension
of Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement - Pedro Steenhagen – pp. 80-100
Balancing continuity and adjustments in Brazil’s foreign policy towards China: A
comparative approach between Bolsonaro and Lula’s third term – Florencia Rubiolo,
Gonzalo Fiore – pp. 101-121
Understanding China’s stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode – Xuheng
Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
– pp. 122-144
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future
Research Directions - Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li – pp. 145-174
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between being a ‘do-good’ state and a
BRICS member – Luis Gouveia Junior – pp. 175-189
Brazil-China Bilateral Link During The 21st Century: Business as Usual – Natalia Ceppi,
Gisela Pereyra Doval – pp. 190-206
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
- Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga – pp. 207-221
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
A Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
- Baiba Biteniece, Dana Dūda – pp. 222-247
Brazilian foreign policy and the quest to promote Portuguese: Building bridges through
Macau – João Simões, Daniel Veras – pp. 248-273
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education: The Case of Brazil and China - Teli Chen,
Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro – pp. 274-289
Global Health Diplomacy as an Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations -
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha – pp. 290-308
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
2
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic: a contribution to maritime
security in the Gulf of Guinea - António Gonçalves Alexandre – pp. 309-328
Brazilian TiVA under US-China strategic competition and impact on export-related jobs
(2000-2015) - Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin – pp. 329-353
Brazil-China relations since 2003: Convergences and Divergences - André Luiz Reis da
Silva, Juli Arusiewicz Berta, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo Nunes – pp. 354-367
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024) - Henoch
Gabriel Mandelbaum – pp. 368-380
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
- Chen Jianfei – pp. 381-390
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
3
EDITORIAL
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828
PhD in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal in
2010, and habilitation from ISCTE–University Institute of Lisbon in 2022. From 2016 to 2017,
Prof. Leandro took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China —
One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded an Institute of European
Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-
Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was Programme
Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of
Saint Joseph in Macau. From 2018 to 2023 he was Associate Dean of the Institute for Research
on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau. He is currently Associate
Professor with Habilitation in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the
University of Macau (China). His most recent publications are: The Belt and Road Initiative: An
Old Archetype of a New Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran
(2021), Palgrave Macmillan; The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global;
Disentangled Vision on Higher Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023), Peter Lang
Publishers; The Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics (2023), Palgrave
Macmillan; Changing the Paradigm of Energy Geopolitics: Resources and Pathways in the Light of
Global Climate Challenges (2023), Peter Lang Publishers; Portuguese-speaking Small Island
Developing States: The development Journeys of Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and
Timor-Leste (2023), Palgrave Macmillan; The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa
Relations: Legacies and the New International Order (2024), Palgrave Macmillan.
KAIAN LAM
kaianlam@um.edu.mo
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9050-0804
Assistant Professor in international relations at the University of Macau (China). Prof. Lam’s
current research is aligned with International Political Sociology. She employs aesthetic strategies
to study storytelling and self-styled narration in world politics and is well versed in ethnographic
and arts-based methods. She received a PhD in African Studies from ISCTE – University Institute
of Lisbon in 2020 and holds degrees from the University of Lisbon, the Catholic University of
Portugal, and the University of Macau. She is currently undertaking a project on “Interpreting
Europe: Sonic politics and the affective foundation of multilingual negotiations” concerning the
mundane organizational life of the European Union. Her latest Africa-focused project is entitled
“Unnarratizing China-Angola relations: Visual memory, mediating bodies, and bilateral
infrastructures of feeling.” Her papers have been published in journals including Mediterranean
Politics, Island Studies Journal, Visual Ethnography, and she has published reviews in the Journal
of Peasant Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, and African Studies Review
(www.kaianlam.com).
YICHAO LI
liyichao@zjnu.edu.cn
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8588-1043
Ph.D. from the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University of
Macau, China. Dr. Lam also holds a master’s degree in comparative civil law (in Chinese) from
the University of Macau (China) in 2018. From 2021 to 2022, she was a postdoctoral researcher
at the Centre for International Studies (ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal). Since 2023, she has been
an assistant research fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University,
China. Her research interests are the Belt and Road Initiative, Portuguese-speaking countries,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
4
and Sino-African relations. Her most recent publications are: Leandro, F. J. & Li, Y. (2023).
Spatial Development Initiatives: The Case of African Portuguese Speaking Countries. In Duarte,
P. A. B., Albuquerque, R., Tavares, A. M. L. (eds.). Portugal and the Lusophone World: Law,
Geopolitics and Institutional Cooperation, Palgrave Macmillan. Costa, C. M. & Li, Y. (2023). China
and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results? Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol. 14, No. 1, TD1–Thematic dossier “European Union-China
relations”, September 2023.
How to cite this editorial
Leandro, Francisco José, Lam, Kaian & Li, Yachao (2024). Editorial, Brazil - China Relations: The
Rise Of Modern International Order. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2,
TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil-China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”.
December 2024, pp. 3-12. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.ED .
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
5
BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS: THE RISE OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
KAIAN LAM
YICHAO LI
Acknowledgement
The editors would like to convey our gratitude to the individual authors for their invaluable
contributions and to all the reviewers for their patience, insightful comments and
suggestions. As this publication is the first of a series of publications on China and the
Portuguese-speaking Countries edited by the Department of Governance and Public
Administration - Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Macau (China), we would
like to thank Professor Brigida Brito (Autonoma University of Lisbon, Portugal), for
extending this invitation to edit this especial issue and also the following project
facilitators: André Silva, (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil); Carlos
Schonerwald (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil); Carmen Amado Mendes
(Macau Scientific and Cultural Center, Lisbon, Portugal); Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba (Sun
Yat-sen University, Zhuhai, China); Fernanda Ilhéu (Lisbon School of Economics and
Management (ISEG), Portugal); João Simões (City University of Macau, China); Luís
Bernardino (Autonoma University of Lisbon, Portugal); Luis Pires (University of Macau,
China); Paulo Duarte (University of Minho, Portugal); Paulo Gonçalves (Independent
Researcher, Portugal); Pedro Steenhagen (Fudan University, China); Rodrigo Flanklin
(University Centre of the South of Minas (UNIS-MG), Brazil): and Vera Borges (City
University of Macau, China).
Why are Brazil-China Relations Important?
“The Brazil Federation is neither sufficiently small to be ignored, nor
sufficiently strong to leverage the global stage on its own. However, Brazil is
an important player in South-South relations, and China discerningly values
that role” (Leandro, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
6
Brazil-China relations are an unavoidable topic in the context of international relations.
They are both major developing countries and emerging markets in the Global South and
have broad common strategic interests (MFA-PRC, 2024). This bilateral relationship is
the result of a prolonged process, dating from the establishment of diplomatic relations
in 1974. The physical distance between Brazil and China is another factor that has tended
to bring them together, as the two countries do not bear the weight of historical disputes
or rivalries. They are both undeniably important in their respective regional
environments, and both play a relevant role in their neighbors’ development. The
relationship “(…) has been built around two main lines of action: (1) joint efforts to
promote economic development; (2) multilateral collaboration in search of a multipolar
world” (Santoro, 2022, p. xi).
The idea behind this special issue is also associated with the “International as an
Everyday Practice”. Within the field of international studies, the everyday can be read as
a text that illuminates central practices at the heart of the production of “international”
representations, the reproduction of relations of domination — gendered, economic,
social — at the international “level,” as well as the consumption of “international” goods,
ideas and norms” (Guillaume, 2011). In the light of this, what is current practice in the
context of Brazil-China relations?
Brazil and China are regional pivot states, are states displaying interregional interests –
namely in Africa - are among the largest developing economies, are both members of
large economic organizations such as BRICS+ and MERCOSUR, are perceived as key
states in the context of the Global South, and have been developing a strong bilateral
commercial relationship. In 2000, China became Brazil’s largest trading partner in Asia
and Brazil’s position in Mercosur has not been overlooked by China. Since 2009, China
has been its largest trading partner and in 2012, it became the main supplier of products
imported by Brazil (GOV.BR, 2024). In fact, the sector that best illustrates their
commercial complementarity is the agricultural sector as Brazil contributes decisively to
China's food security — an issue of strategic importance for the Chinese government and
people. In 1974, “China accounted for 0.24% of Brazilian exports but by 2023, China was
the major destination for Brazilian exports, accounting for 30.7% of foreign sales” (CEBC,
2024, p. 19). Indeed, in 2023, approximately a quarter of all imports of agricultural
products in China came from Brazil.
Brazil was the first country to establish a strategic partnership with China in 1993. As
Table 1 illustrates, this partnership has been one of the most dynamic and has been
deepened five times. Particularly important is the fact that the strategic partnership was
upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. This made Brazil the first
country in Latin America and the Caribbean to establish such a partnership with China
(Xinhua, 2023).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
7
Table 1- China-Brazil Partnerships and Economic Spaces
China and
Brazil
1993
Strategic Partnership
（战略伙伴关系）
In July 2024, Brazil
revealed a plan to
join the Belt and
Road initiative
(MoU) (SCMP,
2024).
2009
Further strengthened
2012
Comprehensive strategic
partnership
（全面战略伙伴关系）
2014
Further strengthened
2019
Strengthened and deepened
2023
Deepened
Source: Authors
The Brazil-China High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation (COSBAN)
was established in 2004. This has played a significant role in strengthening bilateral
relations and in promoting dialogue and cooperation in various fields. Furthermore, in
2014, the China-Brazil Foreign Ministerial-Level Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue was
created, and four of these have been held to date. Technology, the digital sector, aviation
(Embraer), infrastructure, agriculture, mining, energy and sustainability are the leading
sectors in Sino-Brazilian relations. Brazil has one of the world’s largest offshore oil and
gas reserves, and cooperation in the area of green energies, including hydrogen and
electric vehicles, is extremely promising.
Two projects are likely to have a significant impact on the global south. One is the Brazil-
Peru Transcontinental (Bi-Oceanic) Railway, in which China continues to be involved,
despite the challenges. “The Chinese side became the leading player in the development
of the basic feasibility study of the Brazil–Peru Transcontinental Railway project (…) the
Chinese state-owned company China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group (CREEC) was in
charge of preparing the study (…). Meanwhile, Brazil and Peru assigned governmental
institutions to perform supporting tasks and review the inception, interim and final
reports prepared by the Chinese company (MOU on the Joint Conduction of the Basic
Feasibility Studies for a Bioceanic Railway Connection 2015)” (Dourado, 2022). The
second project is the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program (CBERS), which is
emblematic as it is the first high technology project in the context of South-South
cooperation.
Brazil-China relations also have a multilateral dimension, particularly in the context of
the WTO, G20 and BRICS+. Both strongly oppose unilateralism, protectionism and the
decoupling and rupture of industrial chains. They defend inclusive economic globalization
and the promotion of an open world economy. The relations between the two countries
therefore also reflect China’s interest in Latin America: “China has always given priority
to its relations with Brazil in its overall diplomacy and its diplomacy with Latin America,
and supports Brazil in promoting state development and national rejuvenation (China
Daily, 2024).” China regards Brazil as an important member of BRICS+ and Brazil uses
this organization to leverage its international bargaining power and it hosted the G20 in
2024. Its agenda priorities were aligned with China’s global interests: (1) The fight
against hunger, poverty and inequality; (2) The three dimensions of sustainable
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
8
development (economic, social and environmental); (3) Reform of the global governance
institutions. Brazil has adopted a hedging position, seeking to maintain a position close
to China, but without producing adverse effects on the US - China Great Game. In fact,
although Brazil did condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Lula’s
government expressed its neutrality in the conflict, and denied direct material support to
Ukraine. In May 2024, China and Brazil released "Common Understandings Between
China and Brazil on Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis". Thus far, this has gained
widespread support (110 countries) (RUBRYKA, 2024). In addition, Brazil seeks China's
support for its candidacy to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and Brazil
shares most of China’s views on the reform of the United Nations.
Structure of this Special Issue
This special issue is divided into two sections. The first consists of 15 articles and the
second contains four short articles (these short articles included the participation of junior
researchers). The articles cover issues such as: economics, partnerships, multilateralism,
political relations, gender, health, technology, international security, foreign policy, the
Lusophone world, climate change and energy – which we believe is part of the
“International as an Everyday Practice”. The range of themes is designed to encourage
more research on this topic, as well as contribute to decoding the current scholarly
discourse on Sino-Brazilian relations, and also anticipate the future state of affairs
between Brazil and China.
The first paper by Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior,
Francisco José Leandro, Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, and Sheldon William Silva
presents an overview and a critical analysis of international relations between Brazil and
China in areas of mutual interest to the two countries. The authors suggest that it is
important for Brazil and China to develop initiatives reflecting mutual and sovereign
interests and that are aimed at establishing environmentally sustainable trade with
reduced asymmetry. The second article, by António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia
M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte, and Sabrina Evangelista
Medeiros, examines the role of bilateralism, multilateralism and mini-multilateralism in
Sino-Brazilian relations. The authors focus on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,
the New Development Bank, the BRICS, the Basic Four, and the G20 They conclude that
the interplay between bilateralism, multilateralism and mini-multilateralism will play an
increasing and complementary role in Sino-Brazilian relations.
The article by Mohamad Zreik focuses on how the BRICS, in particular, serve as a
platform for enhancing relations between China and Brazil and explores the future
development prospects within this framework. The author argues that the strengthened
partnership between China and Brazil not only promotes mutual development but also
facilitates broader South-South cooperation, positioning the BRICS as a crucial player in
shaping a multipolar world order.
In January 2023, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was re-elected President of Brazil and began
his third term. The article by Pedro Steenhagen focuses on why the reform of global
governance was (re)prioritized in Brazil’s foreign policy during the first year of “Lula 3”.
The author seeks to give readers a better understanding of the importance of this for an
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
9
examination of the interactions between domestic and international politics and the
demands of Brazilian foreign policy.
Maintaining the focus on Brazilian foreign policy, the article by Florencia Rubiolo and
Gonzalo Fiore Viani provides an in-depth analysis of Jair Bolsonaro’s foreign policy
towards China from 2018 to 2022 and the first year of Lula da Silva’s administration in
2023. The focus is on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of their respective
approaches towards China, highlighting both changes and continuities. The authors
believe that China retained a crucial role in Brazil’s economic agenda and that the bilateral
and multilateral relationship was restored when Lula returned to power in 2023.
The article by Xuheng Wang and Carmen Amado Mendes uses Guanxi theory as the
theoretical framework for an analysis of China's attitude and policies towards Brazil
during and after the Covid-19 pandemic. The authors point out that, because China
prefers to maintain the existing mutually beneficial model, the Lula government
smoothed over the legacy of tense Sino-Brazilian relations inherited from the Bolsonaro
government and has promoted the expansion of China-Brazil interaction to more and new
areas.
Over the past three decades, China and Brazil have developed a robust and multifaceted
relationship characterized by cooperation across various sectors. The article by Rodrigo
Franklin Frogeri and Yichao Li is based on an extensive Systematic Literature Review
that also applied bibliometric and lexical analyses to a total of 208 studies. The
bibliometric analyses revealed that the peak of publications covering Brazil and China
was in 2016. The authors further identify four central research lines that could be
developed in future studies.
The article by Luis Gouveia draws on social identity theory to analyze official discourse
and mass media posts relating to Brazil's position on the war in Ukraine. The author
concludes that Brazil attempted to gain status by utilizing a ‘creativity’ strategy.
Meanwhile, Brazil also faced a dilemma as to whether to capitalize on its image within
the BRICS or maintain a ‘do-good’ state image.
Natalia Ceppi and Gisela Pereyra Doval examine the rise of China in Brazil's
diplomatic agenda in the 21st century, with a focus on existing commercial interests.
Based on a qualitative methodological design, the authors state that identification of the
same objective, i.e. generating a business agenda with a medium- to long-term impact,
means that strategic cooperation between China and Brazil is sustained, at least in
economic terms and mainly in the energy sector.
Further exploring the evolving multifaceted engagement between China and Brazil,
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira and Kai Yin Allison Haga focus on the catalytic role of the
iron ore trade in shaping the strategic partnership. The authors argue that the
partnership, fueled by a mutual reliance on iron ore, exemplifies how resource-driven
partnerships can evolve into strategic alliances that have significant implications for
global politics and economics.
The article by Baiba Biteniece and Dana Dūda examines the strategic collaboration
between China and Brazil in the renewable wind energy sector. Drawing on the theoretical
framework of Liberal and Economic Interdependence, the authors consider that China's
strategic engagement drives collaboration and growth in the wind energy sector in Brazil,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
10
and that there are mutual interdependencies between the two countries. However, these
interdependencies are asymmetrical, resulting in greater dependencies for Brazil
compared to China.
João Simões and Daniel Veras draw on Cooper’s (1989) framework on the international
promotion of languages to explore Brazil’s role in promoting the Portuguese language
globally. The authors investigate the intertwined political, economic and cultural
motivations behind language promotion initiatives. They emphasis the need for Brazil to
effectively leverage Macau’s strategic position to capitalize on these opportunities.
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, and Francisco José Leandro investigate
the reversal of gender disparities in enrolment in higher education in Brazil and China.
The authors explore factors contributing to this transition, such as feminist movements,
the legal framework, economic development, the expansion of higher education, and
demographic factors.
In recent decades, health has become a top priority in global governance. Anabela
Rodrigues Santiago and Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha therefore
adopt a perspective based on bilateralism to outline both China’s and Brazil’s positioning
in relation to health diplomacy between 2013 and 2023 and to analyze their articulation
within the context of the BRICS. The authors believe that both Brazil and China have
leveraged health diplomacy to strengthen their global influence. Also, that they use
multilateral platforms like BRICS to strengthen collaboration in order to enhance their
soft power and contribute to global health governance.
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) established in 1986
aims to promote regional cooperation and maintain peace and security in the region.
António Gonçalves Alexandre explores how ZOPACAS can contribute to improving
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The author states that ZOPACAS appears to be
an opportunity for Brazil to expand its role in the Gulf of Guinea, especially as it is seeking
to increase its influence in the international arena and on countries in the Global South.
The second part of this special issue consists of four articles by junior scholars. The first,
by Alberto J. Lebron and Carlos M. Martin, presents their view that empirical evidence
is crucial to complement political considerations in their research. The authors measure
the overall effects of Trade-in-Value-Added (TiVA) exchanges with both China and US on
the Brazilian labor market, and determine which countries/industries might become the
most optimal choice for Brazil in terms of TiVA.
The article by André Luiz Reis da Silva, Juli Arusiewicz Berta, and Maiara de
Almeida Cardozo Nunes analyzes relations between Brazil and China since 2003 to
identify major lines of continuity and change. The authors argue that changes in Brazilian
Foreign Policy, especially in terms of how Brazil perceives its position in the world and its
relationship with the major powers, have conditioned relations with China since 2003,
causing fluctuations in the political relationship despite their growing economic
interaction.
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum dissects Macau's role in evolving China-Brazil relations
over twenty-five years. The author draws on soft power and paradiplomacy frameworks
to explore how China has utilized Macau as an instrument of attraction in its dealings
with Brazil. The author concludes that, while Macau has made significant strides in
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
11
enhancing China-Brazil relations, several challenges remain, and addressing these is
crucial in order to fully capitalize on Macau's strategic position.
The last article, by Chen Jianfei, explores opportunities, challenges, and prospects for
enhanced cooperation between China and Brazil on climate action and sustainable
development. The author states that, despite the challenges presented by domestic
politics and external pressures, Brazil and China have built common ground based on
their interest in protecting vital and important ecosystems and solving climate change
issues.
Why this Special Issue?
This special issue on Brazil-China relations marks a number of milestones: the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and China, the
31st anniversary of the establishment of their strategic partnership, the 20th anniversary
of the establishment of the COSBAN, the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the
China-Brazil Foreign Ministerial-Level Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue, and the 20th
anniversary of the creation of the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC). It is the result
of meaningful collaboration between scholars from the University of Macau (China), the
Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University (China), and the Autonoma
University of Lisbon (Portugal). As such, it contains contributions from renowned
international scholars as well as from junior researchers publishing for the first time.
We believe that it is important to support young and emerging scholars from China and
the Portuguese-speaking countries and regions and the special issue is intended to
provide a safe space for critical learning and discussion. Several of the research projects
have involved graduate students, providing exposure for young scholars and
incorporating them within the academic community.
Our initiative brings together experts, scholars and students interested in Brazil and its
international forays, and examines what the future may hold for emerging partners
hailing from as far away as China. The contributing scholars have adopted qualitative,
quantitative and mixed method approaches. The special issue attracted interest from
International Relations departments, and we are pleased to have received high-quality
proposals from scholars of cognate disciplines. All of the articles have been double peer
reviewed and all are focused on Brazil and/or China and their global connections.
This special issue proposes new epistemologies for the study of Brazil with a focus on its
world engagement preparedness. It also examines novel conceptualizations that advance
our knowledge of Brazil-China relations. The studies are generally up-to-date and
pertinent, and they consolidate Lusophone perspectives on “the rise of modern
international”. Overall, the studies agree on the need to adapt western epistemologies in
view of the multifaceted realities on the ground and to problematize universal
assumptions about international systems and operations. The authors highlight the
importance of knowledge production from within the Global South and its subsequent
international dissemination. They show that expertise on Brazil and the South Atlantic is
transferable and can benefit debates on China, Brazil-China Relations, and International
Relations, broadly defined. This collection of articles is important in promoting greater
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 3-12
Editorial - Francisco José Leandro, Kaian Lam, Yichao Li
12
awareness of world connectivity and interdependence, while also pointing the way
forward for area studies scholars.
References
China Daily. (2024). China, Brazil vow to expand cooperation in emerging fields.
https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/372556.
Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China (CEBC) (2024). Parcerias que Moldaram o Futuro – 50
anos de relações diplomáticas Brasil-China (Partnerships that Shaped the Future – 50
years of Brazil-China diplomatic relations). https://www.cebc.org.br/2024/08/15/edicao-
especial-50-anos-de-relacoes-brasil-china/.
Cooper, R. L. (1989). Language planning and social change. Cambridge University Press.
Dourado, L. (2022). China-backed infrastructure in the Global South: lessons from the
case of the Brazil–Peru Transcontinental Railway project. Third World Quarterly, 44(4),
pp. 814–832. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2154204.
GOV.BR (2024). People’s Republic of China.
https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/bilateral-relations/all-countries/people-s-republic-
of-china.
Guillaume, X. (2011). The international as an everyday practice. International Political
Sociology 5(4), pp.446–462. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00145_1.x.
Leandro, F. (2024). Brazil: A key state engaging two geopolitical games towards a single
objective. Conference - ALACIP, ISCTE, Portugal.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - China (MFA-PRC). (2024). 王毅外长和巴西外长就两国建交50周年
在对方主流媒体发表署名文章 (Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Brazilian Foreign Minister
published signed articles in each other's mainstream media on the 50th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries).
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202408/t20240818_11475261.shtml.
RUBRYKA (2024). Beijing assures "China-Brazil consensus" on Ukraine allegedly backed
by over 110 countries. https://rubryka.com/en/2024/08/02/kytaj-zayavyv-shho-jogo-
spilnyj-z-brazyliyeyu-konsensus-shhodo-ukrayiny-zdobuv-pidtrymku-bilsh-nizh-110-
krayin/.
Santoro, M. (2022). Brazil-China Relations in the 21st Century: The making of a strategic
partnership. Palgrave Macmillan.
SCMP (2024). After spurning China for years, Brazil reveals plan to join Belt and Road
Initiative. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3271218/after-
spurning-china-years-brazil-reveals-plan-join-belt-and-road-initiative.
Xinhua (2023). 中巴元首会晤的温度、高度与深度 (Meeting between the Chinese and
Brazilian heads of state). http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2023-
04/16/c_1129527113.htm.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
13
SINO-BRAZILIAN MUTUAL INTERESTS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
rodrigo.frogeri@professor.unis.edu.br
received a Ph.D in Information Systems and Knowledge Management from FUMEC University
(Brazil) in 2019. He holds a master’s degree in administration (2014) from Centro Universitário
Novos Horizontes (Brazil) and a bachelor’s degree in computer science (2001) from Universidade
José do Rosário Vellano (Brazil). He has specializations in Computer Networks (2003), Higher
Education Teaching (2005), and Information Technology Management (2012). He has been
teaching undergraduate and postgraduate courses in management and technology since 2005.
Currently, he is a permanent professor in the Graduate Program in Management and Regional
Development at Centro Universitário do Sul de Minas - UNIS-MG, Brazil. He is a guest professor
in the master’s program in Data Science at Universidad Científica del Sur (Peru) - 2024. He
serves as a technology mentor in the Innovation Ecosystem of Grupo Integrado (Brazil) and as a
guest researcher at Centro Universitário Integrado, Brazil. He leads the following research groups
accredited by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq): GPGDER
- Research Group in Management and Regional Economic Development and GEADO - Research
Group in Organizational Dynamic Ambidexterity. His most recent books/chapters include: "e-
Government and Green IT: The Intersection Point", published in Recent Advances in Data and
Algorithms for e-Government, Springer Nature (2023); "Restructuring of the Brazilian Private
Higher Education Sector through the Entry of Foreign Investment", published in Advances in
Tourism, Technology, and Systems. Smart Innovation, Systems, and Technologies, Springer
Nature (2022); "Mapping the Brazilian Reality in the Development of Special Economic Zones",
published in Special Economic Zones as Regional Development Enablers, IGI-Global (2022); and
"IT Governance in SMEs: the state-of-the-art", published in Research Anthology on Small
Business Strategies for Success and Survival, IGI-Global (2022). ORCID: 0000-0002-7545-7529.
PEDRO DOS SANTOS PORTUGAL JÚNIOR
pedro.junior@professor.unis.edu.br
received a Ph.D (2016) and Master's (2012) in Economic Development from the Institute of
Economics, Unicamp. Postdoctoral Fellow (2018) through the Postdoctoral Researcher Program
(PPPD) at the Institute of Economics, Unicamp. Bachelor’s degree in economics (2001) and
Specialization in Business Management from Faculdade Cenecista de Varginha (2005). Began his
teaching career at Faculdade Cenecista de Varginha (Department of Economics) and is currently
a professor at Centro Universitário do Sul de Minas (UNIS-MG). Coordinator of the Research
Department at UNIS-MG and a permanent professor in the academic master’s program of the
Graduate Program in Management and Regional Development (PPGDR - UNIS/MG). Guest
professor at Centro Universitário Integrado de Campo Mourão-Paraná (Brazil). Leader of the
Research Group on Management and Regional Economic Development (GPGDER). Member of the
Group of Advanced Studies in Organisational Ambidexterity (GEAMO). Member of the Group of
Studies on Regional Development and Industrial and Construction Waste (GEDRRIC) and also of
the Research Group on Distance and Hybrid Education (GPEDH). Member of the Group of
Economic Studies of Southern Minas Gerais (GEESUL) and of the Business Council of Southern
Minas (CESUL). ORCID: 0000-0003-2590-1959.
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
received a Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of
Portugal in 2010, and his habilitation from ISCTE–University Institute of Lisbon in 2022. From
2016 to 2017, he took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China
— One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of
European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
14
Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the Programme
Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of
Saint Joseph in Macau. From 2018 to 2023 he was the Associate-Dean of the Institute for
Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau. He is currently
Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences at
the University of Macau (China). His most recent books are: Steps of Greatness: The Geopolitics
of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges, Development and Promise of Timor-Leste
(2019), City University of Macau; The Belt and Road Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New
Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran (2021), Palgrave Macmillan;
The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global; Disentangled Visions on Higher
Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023), Peter Lang Publishers; The Palgrave Handbook
of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics (2023), Palgrave Macmillan; Changing the Paradigm
of Energy Geopolitics: Resources and Pathways in the Light of Global Climate Challenges (2023),
Peter Lang Publishers; and Portuguese-speaking Small Island Developing States: The
development Journeys of Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Timor-Leste (2023), Palgrave
Macmillan, ORCID: 0000-0002-1443-5828.
FABRÍCIO PELLOSO PIURCOSKY
fabricio.pelloso@grupointegrado.br
Post-Doctorate in Social Sciences, Politics and Territory from the University of Aveiro (Portugal),
PhD in Administration from the Federal University of Lavras and Specialist in Innovation and
Business Communication from the Polytechnic Institute of Porto (Portugal). I have a lot of
experience in higher education as a manager, teacher and researcher. I have led teams in
international research projects with India, Russia, Portugal, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina and
Mexico and as a visiting professor in Portugal, Russia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay and Bolivia.
Consultant and facilitator of innovation models and processes for AGROGALAXI, ALICORP, J.
MACEDO, GERDAU. I have won 9 awards for innovation in education. I've created 2 coworking
spaces, mentored 8 startups and 3 business councils. Professor on courses for the Brazilian Air
Force and the Brazilian Army. International assessor of higher education courses for the Higher
Education Assessment and Accreditation Agency (Portugal). Coordinator of the Industry,
Technology and Innovation Chamber of the Campo Mourão Development Council and Director of
the Regional Innovation System. ORCID: 0000-0001-5458-5129.
SHELDON WILLIAM SILVA
sheldon.silva@ifmg.edu.br
received a PhD in Administration in the area of concentration in Global Business Strategy and
Corporate Finance from the Federal University of Lavras in 2022. Master’s in administration from
Fundação Pedro Leopoldo in 2012 and Specialist in Teaching in Professional and Technological
Education; Active Methodologies and Business Management. Bachelor’s in administration with
Qualification in Foreign Trade from the State University of Minas Gerais in 2006. Associate
Professor since 2007 in undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Management, with
experience in coordinating technology, bachelor's and postgraduate courses (Brazil). He is
currently a Professor of Basic, Technical and Technological Education in the Administration area
at the Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology of Minas Gerais. Topics of interest:
efficiency of public and private organizations, entrepreneurship, foreign trade, international
relations, organizational learning and methodologies innovative teaching styles. ORCID: 0000-
0002-2473-5728.
Abstract
Brazil-China relationship is two-fold, influencing both economic development and geopolitical
strategy in Latin America. On one hand, China views Brazil as an emerging market with
abundant natural resources, making sectors such as agriculture, energy, and infrastructure
attractive for Chinese investment. On the other hand, Chinese investments often come with
infrastructure development projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which can
help Brazil improve its transportation and energy sectors, as seen in the Transoceanic Railway
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
15
project. Furthermore, the countries have mutually cooperated in other areas, such as in the
integration of the BRICS group, the launch of satellites through the China-Brazil Earth
Resources Satellite (CBERS) program telecommunications (e.g., 5G technology), the wind
energy sector, and green technologies, as well as the integration of Brazil into global value
chains. Thus, this study aims to discuss the Sino-Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to
the understanding of this broad subject. Our discussions and analyses suggest that it is
important for Brazil and China to develop initiatives with mutual and sovereign interests aimed
at establishing environmentally sustainable trade with reduced asymmetry. Areas such as the
bioeconomy and global governance are of great interest to Brazil and China. The collaborative
efforts of these nations can enable new initiatives with prospects to balance forces with the
USA. From a macro perspective, the economic and commercial strengthening of BRICS and
its relationship with the Global South could serve as a counterpoint to American influence.
While BRICS may redefine global power relations, member countries of the group may face
influences in managing their regional relations.
Keywords
Brazil, Bioeconomic, BRICS, China, Trade, Innovation, South-South cooperation.
Resumo
A relação Brasil-China é dupla e influencia tanto o desenvolvimento econômico quanto a
estratégia geopolítica na América Latina. Por um lado, a China vê o Brasil como um mercado
emergente com recursos naturais abundantes, o que torna setores como agricultura, energia
e infraestrutura atraentes para o investimento chinês. Por outro lado, os investimentos
chineses geralmente vêm acompanhados de projetos de desenvolvimento de infraestrutura,
como a Iniciativa Cinturão e Rota (BRI), que pode ajudar o Brasil a melhorar seus setores de
transporte e energia, como visto no projeto da Ferrovia Transoceânica. Além disso, os países
têm cooperado mutuamente em outras áreas, como na integração do grupo BRICS, no
lançamento de satélites por meio do programa China-Brasil Earth Resources Satellite
(CBERS), em telecomunicações (por exemplo, tecnologia 5G), no setor de energia eólica e em
tecnologias verdes, bem como na integração do Brasil em cadeias globais de valor. Assim,
este estudo tem como objetivo discutir os interesses mútuos sino-brasileiros e contribuir para
a compreensão desse amplo assunto. Nossas discussões e análises sugerem que é importante
que o Brasil e a China desenvolvam iniciativas com interesses mútuos e soberanos, visando
estabelecer um comércio ambientalmente sustentável com assimetria reduzida. Áreas como
a bioeconomia e a governança global são de grande interesse para o Brasil e a China. Os
esforços de colaboração dessas nações podem viabilizar novas iniciativas com perspectivas
de equilibrar forças com os EUA. De uma perspectiva macro, o fortalecimento econômico e
comercial do BRICS e seu relacionamento com o Sul Global podem servir como um
contraponto à influência americana. Embora o BRICS possa redefinir as relações de poder
globais, os países membros do grupo podem enfrentar influências no gerenciamento de suas
relações regionais.
Palavras-chave
Brasil, Bioeconomia, BRICS, China, Comércio, Inovação, Cooperação Sul-Sul.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
16
How to cite this article
Frogeri, Rodrigo Franklin, Júnior, Pedro dos Santos Portugal, Leandro, Francisco José, Piurcosky,
Fabrício Pelloso & Silva, Sheldon William (2024). Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a comprehensive
Overview. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier –
“Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 13-37.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.1.
Article received on 2 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 20 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
17
SINO-BRAZILIAN MUTUAL INTERESTS: A COMPREHENSIVE
OVERVIEW
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
PEDRO DOS SANTOS PORTUGAL JÚNIOR
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
FABRÍCIO PELLOSO PIURCOSKY
SHELDON WILLIAM SILVA
Introduction
The establishment of official relations between Brazil and China occurred through their
first treaty, the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation, signed in 1881. Following
this, Brazil opened a consulate in Shanghai in 1883. At the end of the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century, Brazil's interactions with Asia were limited to Japanese
workers and unofficial Chinese migration (Oliveira, 2004). During the Cold War period,
Brazil initially recognized Taiwan but later established diplomatic ties with mainland
China. Throughout this era, Brazil engaged in commercial missions (both official and
unofficial) to China and signed the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS)
agreement. The country developed economic interactions with China while focusing more
on political ties with the Asian nation and maintaining economic relations with Japan
(Oliveira, 2010). In the 1990s, Brazil began to deepen its economic engagement with
China, accompanied by significant political elements. During this period, Brazil and China
signed the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership, which was the first such partnership
promoted by China globally (Oliveira, 2010). This shift was driven by China's rapid
economic growth and the challenges posed by the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) (Oliveira, 2004). The deepening economic ties between Brazil and China
included Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Trade relations, and loans to Brazil.
These factors pressured Brazil to adopt a more favorable stance towards China
(Blanchard, 2019).
The commercial rapprochement between Brazil and China developed considerably during
the administrations of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) and his successor,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
18
Dilma Rousseff (2011-2015) (Haibin, 2010). In subsequent years, there were some
fluctuations in imports and exports between the two countries. However, Brazil's exports
to China consistently grew, reaching a peak in 2023 (US$ 49.93 billion) under the new
administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2023-2026) (MDIC, 2024). Despite the
commercial ties between Brazil and China being maintained during the administration of
former Brazilian President Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019-2022), Brazilian foreign policy
during this period was based on the pillars of anti-globalism, anti-communism, and
religious nationalism (Casarões & Farias, 2022; Jesus, 2022). During Bolsonaro's
government, diplomatic relations between Brazil and China experienced the greatest
distancing seen in the last three decades (Jesus, 2022).
Under the current administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2023-2026), China remains
Brazil's largest trading partner, with exports to China twice the value of imports. This
trend has been consistent since 2009, including during the Bolsonaro administration
(MDIC, 2024). At the International Conference “50 Years of Brazil-China Relations:
Cooperation for a Sustainable World,” held on April 17, 2024, Brazilian Vice President
Geraldo Alckmin stated: “It is difficult to find an area where there is no partnership
between Brazil and China, a friendship that only consolidates and advances" (Alckmin,
2024).
In the economic field, international relations between Brazil and China are based on the
sale of commodities to China, while Brazil imports manufactured goods. Otherwise, the
countries have mutually cooperated in other areas, such as in the integration of the
BRICS group, the launch of satellites through the CBERS program (Lulla, Duane Nellis, &
Rundquist, 2013), telecommunications (e.g., 5G technology) (Li, 2023), the wind energy
sector (Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018), and green technologies (Miranda, Moletta,
Pedroso, Pilatti, & Picinin, 2021), as well as the integration of Brazil into global value
chains.
Brazil-China relationship is two-fold, influencing both economic development and
geopolitical strategy in Latin America. On one hand, China views Brazil as an emerging
market with abundant natural resources, making sectors such as agriculture, energy, and
infrastructure attractive for Chinese investment (Gallagher, 2010). Furthermore, China's
interest in enhancing its geopolitical standing in Latin America positions Brazil as a
strategic partner (Becard & Lessa, 2021). On the other hand, Chinese investments often
come with infrastructure development projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
(Almeida Ferreira Abrão & Amineh, 2024), which can help Brazil improve its
transportation and energy sectors, as seen in the Transoceanic Railway project that can
connect Brazil, Peru, and Chile (Almeida, Seleme, & Neto, 2013; Marques, Borges, De
Souza Pires, & Bezerra de Souza, 2023). Thus, this study aims to discuss the Sino-
Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to the understanding of this broad subject.
To address this objective, we conducted searches on the central theme of this research
using generative Artificial Intelligences (generative AI) due to their ability to index and
analyze large volumes of data (Morgan, 2023; The Lancet, 2024). Subsequently, we
analyzed the mutual areas of interest identified in the GAIs consulted and supplemented
these analyses with a Systematic Literature Review considering these areas of interest.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
19
This approach allowed the study to be divided into four areas: (i) Sino-Brazilian mutual
trade interests; (ii) Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests (e.g.,
Environmental Sustainability - Green Technology, Climate Change, Renewable Energy);
(iii) Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development, and
innovation; (iv) South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance.
Methodology
Our study is characterized by a qualitative approach and follows an inductive logic. Due
to the broad scope of the theme 'Brazil-China bilateral relationship,' we chose to use
generative AI (Fonseca, Chimenti, & Suarez, 2023) to identify areas of mutual interest
between the two countries. Generative AI are based on large language models (LLM) that
have the ability to analyze and summarize large amounts of information, though still
without the critical evaluation and original thinking of a human being (The Lancet, 2024).
To identify which LLM would be most suitable for the objectives of this study, we applied
the following criteria: (i) the model must be a popular tool with a recognized capability
to index both historical and current data available on the internet; and (ii) the model
must be capable of searching through large volumes of scientific data. These criteria
ensure that both publications by governments, official agencies, and the general media,
as well as scientific publications, are considered in the searches. No temporal restrictions
were applied to the results presented.
Thus, we identified the following LLM as meeting the first criterion: OpenAI's ChatGPT,
Alphabet/Google's Gemini, and Microsoft's CoPilot (Masinde, 2024; Syriani, David, &
Kumar, 2024). The LLM selected for this study for its ability to conduct specific searches
across large volumes of academic data (e.g., Semantic Scholar) was Perplexity
(https://www.perplexity.ai/). Although there are other tools similar to Perplexity (e.g.,
Scispace, Scite, Elicit, Consensus, etc.), we chose this one for its simplicity and for
presenting results in a manner similar to the aforementioned LLM (Bolanos, Salatino,
Osborne, & Motta, 2024), thereby facilitating the creation of Table 1.
Table 1. Searches in generative AI and its respective results
Generative AI
Prompt
Results
Perplexity (Pro search -
academic)
https://www.perplexity.ai/
What are the mutual
interests in Brazil-China
bilateral relations?
Economic Cooperation (Trade Relations,
Investment)
Technological Cooperation (Science and
Technology, Space Cooperation)
Environmental Sustainability (Green
Technology, Climate Change Initiatives)
Strategic Partnerships (Defense
Cooperation, South-South Cooperation)
ChatGPT 4o (free version)
https://chat.openai.com/
Trade and Investment (Commodities
Trade, Chinese Investment in Brazil,
Brazilian Exports to China)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
20
Infrastructure Development (Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), Energy
Cooperation)
Technology and Innovation (5G and
Telecommunications, Research and
Development)
Environmental Cooperation (Sustainable
Agriculture, Climate Change)
Multilateral Cooperation (BRICS Alliance,
Global Governance)
Cultural Exchange (Educational and
Cultural Programs)
Gemini 1.5 (free version)
https://gemini.google.com/
Trade
Investment
Economic cooperation
Climate change
South-South cooperation
Copilot
https://copilot.microsoft.com/
Trade and Investment
Infrastructure and Industry Development
Technological Cooperation
Renewable Energy
Strategic Alignment
Source: Developed by the authors.
Note. We chose to use the term 'Brazil-China' instead of 'Sino-Brazilian' to allow for broader
search results when using AI tools.
After identifying the areas of mutual interest between Brazil and China (Table 1), the
authors of this study grouped the results into four central topics: (i) Sino-Brazilian mutual
trade interests; (ii) Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests (e.g.,
Environmental Sustainability - Green Technology, Climate Change, Renewable Energy);
(iii) Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development, and
innovation; (iv) South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance.
Next, after identifying and grouping the areas of mutual interest between Brazil and
China, we conducted a Systematic Literature Review on each of the topics to support the
subsequent discussions. We adopt the standard PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) methodology for conducting and reporting the
systematic review (Page, McKenzie, Bossuyt, Boutron, Hoffmann, Mulrow, Shamseer,
Tetzlaff, & Moher, 2021; Page, McKenzie, Bossuyt, Boutron, Hoffmann, Mulrow,
Shamseer, Tetzlaff, Akl, et al., 2021). According to Webster and Watson (2002), the
most influential articles in the literature are typically found in leading academic journals.
Consequently, the authors conducted searches on the topics identified in the previous
step using SCOPUS, one of the foremost indexing databases for academic journals in
social sciences.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
21
Table 2. Systematic Literature Review framing
Database
Search string
Results
Included
SCOPUS
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (trade))
16
15
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (economic) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY
(bioeconomic))
11
10
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (Sino-brazilian) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (technology) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY
(research) OR TITLE-ABS-KEY (development)
OR TITLE-ABS-KEY (innovation))
16
15
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (south-
south AND cooperation) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY
(BRICS))
72
59
Total:
115
99
Source: Developed by the authors.
We adopted the following exclusion criteria for the results of the Systematic Literature
Review (SLR): duplicate records found in multiple searches and lack of relevance to the
theme of "Sino-Brazilian mutual interests." Our SLR identified a total of 115 studies, of
which 16 were excluded based on the aforementioned criteria. The remaining 99 studies
were used to support the discussions in the following sections. However, due to the large
number of documents to be considered and the limited number of pages to write this
paper, the authors chose to cite more recent publications or those that provide adequate
support for the discussions. The snowball technique (searching for studies cited in the
SLR results but not initially identified) was used to further expand and substantiate the
discussions.
Sino-Brazilian mutual trade interests
The crisis of the agro-export model in the 1930s, leads Brazil to import substitution
industrialization and the shift in the 1990s from a "protected industry" model to
competitive global integration (Legler, 2013). The agro-export model crisis, adopting an
import substitution industrialization strategy. This led to rapid industrial growth in the
latter half of the 20th century, with Brazil incorporating exports into its industrial policy
by the 1960s and 1970s. Brazil’s foreign policy played a crucial role, advocating for
preferential treatment for developing nations in global trade, opening new markets, and
fostering cooperation with other Southern hemisphere countries (Rodrigues, Urdinez, &
De Oliveira, 2019).
Brazil's transition to democracy was driven by economic challenges and a severe fiscal
crisis. This period saw the liberalization of Brazil's industrial sector to global competition,
coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the shift from military to democratic rule
(Santarcángelo, Schteingart, & Porta, 2017). The new foreign policy paradigm of
"autonomy through participation" (Amorim Neto & Malamud, 2015; Fonseca Jr, 1998)
marked a departure from the defensive postures of the military regime, advocating for
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
22
active engagement in international regimes. Following this new approach, Brazil
experienced its first significant commercial alignment with China, marked by the signing
of the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership in the 1990s (Oliveira, 2010). This was the
first of several important engagements that followed (Arbache & Condi, 2022; Cardoso,
2013; Whalley & Medianu, 2013).
Currently (2024), the trade balance between Brazil and China shows that exports (2023
– US$ 49.93 billion) are double the value of imports (2023 – US$ 25.52 billion). These
data suggest an economic interdependence, particularly in sectors such as soybean
production (2023 – 37% of Brazilian exports to China), crude petroleum oils (19%), and
iron ore and its concentrates (19%) (MDIC, 2024).
According to Figure 1, Brazil's imports from and exports to China began increasing
throughout the 1990s. In 2009, the value of exports to China surpassed the value of
imports for the first time in history.
Figure 1. Graph of Imports and Exports from Brazil to China
*Values are showed in billions of US dollars per year.
**Data updated in June 6, 2024.
Source: https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/geral
Brazil's export portfolio to China is characterized by a diverse range of products,
predominantly raw materials and agricultural goods (Jenkins, 2012). This composition
underscores the bilateral trade dynamics between the two countries, with Brazil serving
as a fundamental supplier of essential commodities to China's burgeoning economy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
23
Soybeans are the most significant export from Brazil to China, accounting for 37% of
the total exports (MDIC, 2024). This high percentage reflects China's demand for
soybeans, driven by its extensive use in animal feed and as a raw material for various
food products. Brazil's vast arable land and favorable climate conditions position it as a
leading global producer and exporter of soybeans (Rocha, Majo, & Silva, 2022).
Crude petroleum oils and bituminous minerals constitute 23% of Brazil's exports to China
(MDIC, 2024). On one hand this category underscores the strategic importance of
energy resources in the trade relationship (Cáceres, 2011; Castro, Peiter, & Góes, 2020).
On the other hand, Brazil seeks technology transfer from China for energy resources in
Brazil (Castro et al., 2020). Iron ore and its concentrates represent 19% of the export
share, highlighting Brazil's role as a key supplier of raw materials for China's steel
industry (Castro et al., 2020). The extensive iron ore reserves in Brazil provide a steady
supply to meet China's infrastructure and construction needs (Cáceres, 2011). The
export of fresh, chilled, or frozen beef accounts for 5% of the total exports and Cellulose
exports make up 3.8% of the trade. Pulp trade between Brazil and China intensified after
the BRICs were formed (Soares, Viana, & Rego, 2020). Finally, raw cotton constitutes
2.5% of exports between Brazil and China, underscoring the agricultural sector's
contribution to the trade mix.
After analyzing Brazil's exports to China, we will now examine the Chinese products
imported by Brazil.
Products imported by Brazil from China highlight a diverse array of goods with varying
degrees of technological complexity and industrial application. Leading the imports are
thermionic valves and tubes, cold cathode or photo-cathode, diodes, and transistors,
which collectively constitute 8.9% of the total (MDIC, 2024), reflecting Brazil's
substantial demand for advanced electronic components vital for both consumer
electronics and industrial applications (Hauser, Zen, Selao, & Garcia, 2007). Following
closely are telecommunications equipment, including parts and accessories, which
account for 5.5% (MDIC, 2024), underscoring the significance of the
telecommunications sector in Brazil's economy and its reliance on Chinese technology.
Other categories include various products from the manufacturing industry (4.9%)
(MDIC, 2024), passenger motor vehicles (4.9%), and a range of organo-inorganic
compounds, heterocyclic compounds, nucleic acids, and their salts, as well as
sulfonamides (3.6%)(MDIC, 2024), which are essential for both pharmaceutical and
chemical industries.
In general, soybeans, crude oil, and iron ore are the main products exported by Brazil to
China, while China exports to Brazil products with varying degrees of technological
complexity (Giraudo, 2020; MDIC, 2024). This difference in the level of complexity (Gala,
2017) of imported and exported products between the two countries is a source of
criticism (China exports manufactured goods to Brazil, while Brazil exports commodities
to China) (Giraudo, 2020; Rodriguez & Hounie, 2016) and raises questions about the
symmetry of Brazil-China cooperation, which resembles a center-periphery dynamic
(Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022). The two conceptual paradigms of center-periphery
thinking significantly influence the policy formulations and strategic perspectives of the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
24
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Bonzanini, Menuzzi
Diverio, Zuliani da Silva, & Olesiak, 2018).
ECLAC's efforts primarily focus on shaping the region's development through initiatives
aimed at economic diversification, with the goal of reducing vulnerabilities in the face of
global dynamics (Gala, Camargo, & Freitas, 2018). This focus has been a constant feature
of ECLAC's framework since its 1968 founding document, where Prebisch critiqued David
Ricardo's theory of static comparative advantage (Marca, Bertol, Fernando, & Filho,
2021). Prebisch highlighted the deterioration in terms of trade, which favored
manufactured goods over primary goods (Souza, 1999)
1
.
ECLAC’s structuralist perspective advocated for transforming Latin American economies
through an import substitution program. This approach involved establishing domestic
industries to produce goods that were previously imported (Marca et al., 2021). Countries
such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina implemented this policy most directly between the
1950s and 1970s (Souza, 1999).
Sino-Brazilian mutual economic and bioeconomic interests
As noted in the previous section, the Sino-Brazilian commercial dynamic is characterized
by Brazil's export of commodities (e.g., soybeans) and its import of manufactured goods
from China. In this context, Brazilian commodities, particularly grains and meat,
contribute to China's food security policies, as well as its social stability and development
(Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022). While China pursues a broader development
strategy, Brazil relies on its commodities (e.g., soybeans and iron ore) as its primary
export products (Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022).
The process of Brazil's productive reprimarization began in the late 1990s and early
2000s, driven by the robust economic growth of developing countries such as China,
which led to a surge in international demand for agricultural and mineral commodities,
both metallic and non-metallic (Portugal Júnior, Reydon, & Portugal, 2012). During this
period, Brazil-China trade grew at an average rate of 29% per year, making China
Brazil's largest trading partner and primary destination for agricultural exports by 2009
(Lima, 2016). This closer relationship was facilitated by the geopolitical alignment
between the two countries, further reinforced during the Lula and Dilma administrations
(Lima, 2016).
China itself has assisted in the expansion of soybean production in South America,
particularly in Brazil (Giraudo, 2020). Despite Chinese companies investing in soybean
production in Brazil, Chinese investors are not the dominant players in Brazilian
agricultural land acquisitions (Oliveira, 2018). Investors from the Global North (e.g., the
USA and EU countries) surpass China in land acquisitions in Brazil (Oliveira, 2018).
Brazil's trade dependence on China, particularly in exporting resources like soybeans,
oil, and iron ore, imposes structural constraints on Brazil's ability to transition to a low-
1
Prebisch demonstrated that the terms of trade between primary goods and manufactured goods, which
stood at 1:1 at the end of the 19th century, shifted to 0.687:1 by the mid-20th century (Prebisch, 1949).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
25
carbon bioeconomy (Rodríguez, 2021). On one hand, China aims to peak carbon
emissions before 2030 (Liu, Jiang, Tang, & Han, 2022) and achieve carbon neutrality by
2060 (Jia & Lin, 2021). On the other hand, Brazil's heavy reliance on exporting its high-
environmental-impact agricultural commodities faces social, environmental, and
corporate governance challenges to meet Chinese demands (Bulla, Denny, Burnquist, &
Peneluppi Junior, 2022). From a Brazilian internal perspective, large conglomerates in
soy, sugarcane, and meatpacking dominate the bioeconomy agenda (Lima, 2021). The
significant dominance of agribusiness in Brazil negatively influences natural ecosystems
(Rodríguez-Morales, 2018), as the main drivers of deforestation and land-use change
(e.g., soybean plantations, cattle ranching) may gain economic and political incentives,
as well as greater social legitimacy under the bioeconomy framework (Lima, 2021).
Finally, in the quest to replace fossil fuels, Brazil has recently facilitated the construction
of a factory by the Chinese electric vehicle company BYD. This initiative aims to reduce
the costs of such vehicles for the Brazilian market and to begin replacing the national
fleet with electric vehicles. Brazil has a particular interest in transitioning its fleet to
electric vehicles because, despite its significant potential for domestic fossil fuel
production (e.g., pre-salt oil and ethanol), the country's electricity is generated from
renewable sources (Baran & Legey, 2013). The production of the Chinese factory in
Brazil, combined with the country's self-sufficiency in electricity production, could make
electric vehicles an attractive alternative for a low-carbon economy (e.g., Al-Wreikat and
Sodré, 2023; Liu, 2022).
Sino-Brazilian mutual interests in technology, research, development,
and innovation
For decades, China has consistently financed science and technology development,
focusing particularly on so-called cross-cutting technologies with the potential to
permeate and transform various productive sectors (IPEA, 2024). Technological
relations between China and Brazil have evolved over the years, emphasizing
collaboration and mutual benefits. Both countries have strengthened their ties through
various initiatives (Haibin, 2010).
The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program, operational since 1999,
exemplifies technological cooperation between the two countries and has contributed to
the use of remote sensing technologies and geoinformation (Lulla et al., 2013). In the
2010s, Chinese technology firms such as Huawei and ZTE began playing a significant
role in Latin America's telecommunications sector (Ellis, 2013). Huawei established a
strong presence in Brazil, becoming a key player in developing the country's
telecommunications infrastructure, including the deployment of 4G networks and
preparations for 5G networks (D. S. R. Becard & Macedo, 2014). In the subsequent
decade (2020), despite geopolitical pressures favoring American 5G technology adoption
(Li, 2023), Brazil opted for Huawei in developing its 5G telecommunications network
(Zeng, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
26
In the field of green technologies, China has initiated more programs compared to Brazil,
including sustainable agriculture, water treatment, waste management, green energy,
and carbon reduction (Bulla et al., 2022). While Brazil has potential in these areas, it
has not matched China and India, its BRICS partners, in implementing such practices to
the same extent (Miranda et al., 2021).
In the wind energy sector, Brazil and China have developed significant initiatives.
Despite both countries being latecomers in this sector, their approaches to balancing
national and foreign technology differ (Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018). In China's case,
the balance has gradually shifted from foreign to domestic technology. Brazil has
successfully attracted foreign direct investment and built a domestic supply chain
(Gandenberger & Strauch, 2018). However, Brazil remains highly dependent on foreign
technologies and has a negative trade balance in high-tech goods, indicating reliance on
imported technologically advanced products while specializing in low to medium-low
technology goods (Chiarini & da Silva, 2019).
We observe that Brazil's integration into global value chains (GVC) has been focused on
technological groups where the country holds static comparative advantages. However,
China has moved towards more dynamic technological groups, indicating a more
advanced position in GVC (Araújo & Diegues, 2022). The Chinese economy maintains an
advantage in participating in more dynamic sectors with higher levels of technological
intensity, whereas Brazil concentrates its participation in less technologically intensive
sectors (Araújo & Diegues, 2022).
Nevertheless, due to political and diplomatic alignment between Brazil and China in the
early years of the Lula government, their participation in the BRICS group, bilateral
agreements (e.g., Sixth Meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for
Consultation and Cooperation - COSBAN) (Brasil, 2024c) and the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) may offer opportunities for scientific (Leta, Machado, & Canchumani, 2019) and
technological cooperation between the two countries, despite existing asymmetries
(Oliveira & Myers, 2021).
Even during the period of Brazil's economic re-primarization, policies and efforts were
made to promote local industry (Portugal Jr; Reydon & Portugal, 2012). Examples
include initiatives such as the Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy (ITFTP)
from 2004 to 2007, the Growth Acceleration Program (GAP) in 2007, the Productive
Development Policy (PDP) from 2008 to 2010, and the Greater Brazil Plan in 2011
(Portugal Júnior et al., 2012). In more recent years, particularly from 2016 to 2022,
Brazil did not effectively implement an industrial policy. However, with the new
government under Lula, the New Brazil Industry (NBI) was established, focusing on neo-
industrialization and grounded in strategic investment areas with potential impacts on
social and economic development for the period 2023-2033 (Brasil, 2024a). The NIB is
organized into six missions, aiming to integrate economic, social, and environmental
objectives while complementing other public policies (Mazzucato, 2024).
The NBI's Action Plan encompasses the following missions: i) sustainable and digital
agro-industrial chains; ii) the health economic-industrial complex; iii) sustainable
infrastructure, sanitation, housing, and mobility; iv) digital transformation of industry;
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
27
v) bioeconomy, decarbonization, energy transition, and security; and vi) technologies of
interest for national sovereignty and defense (Brasil, 2024b). To achieve these missions,
key instruments include local content requirements, government procurement,
technology transfer, public investment, and preferential margins (Brasil, 2024b), which
may influence Brazil's external relations and contribute to the enhancement of Brazilian
products in global value chains.
South-South Cooperation and the BRICS Alliance
Brazil has emerged as a regional power in Latin America, particularly in the southern
region, due to its economic and territorial advantages (Bernal-Meza, 2022). Its
geographic stability allowed Brazil to resolve territorial and border issues earlier than its
neighbors, facilitating regional consolidation post-mid-20th century (Kozlova, 2023). This
aligns with Brazil's ambitions to play a significant role in global affairs, aspiring for parity
with northern hemisphere powers (Berringer & Ferreira, 2022).
Brazil's participation as a belligerent in World War I ensured its representation at the
1919 Paris Peace Conference, where it advocated for minor states' rights and sought to
reform the League of Nations' collective security framework (United Nations, n.d.).
Brazil's founding membership in the United Nations (UN) and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exemplifies its active involvement in international affairs. The
presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2015)
(Silva & Pérez, 2019), emphasized engagement within the South-South axis amid rising
protectionism and challenges in Northern markets (Rizzi & Antunes, 2017). Furthermore,
Brazil has been pivotal in regional blocs like MERCOSUR (Almeida, 2018) and UNASUR
(Vaz, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2018), promoting regional integration through "autonomy
through participation" (Amorim Neto & Malamud, 2015; Giacalone, 2012; Lima & Hirst,
2006).
Brazil aspires to be recognized as a global player, aiming for a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council (UNSC) (Valença & Carvalho, 2014). However, this ambition faces
resistance from regional players like Argentina and Mexico, which prefer increasing non-
permanent UNSC members (Valença & Carvalho, 2014). Lacking regional support, Brazil
sought backing from sympathetic nations, forming the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa)
initiative (Visentini, 2019). This coalition underscores a regionalist argument for
representation from Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America in global decision-making
bodies (Leisering, 2021). Brazil's foreign policy has evolved significantly, marked by
strategic shifts in response to economic challenges and global dynamics. While
maintaining a focus on economic development and regional stability, Brazil has
increasingly sought active participation in international affairs, aspiring to assert itself as
a global player on par with industrialized powers (e.g., China) (Oliveira, 2010).
However, over the decades, Brazil and China have developed an asymmetrical strategic
partnership (Romano Schutte & Campos, 2022), but at the same time one of
dependence, especially on the Chinese side with regard to Brazilian commodities. Both
countries exhibit markedly distinct economic, military, and political characteristics. China
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
28
holds a seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is a nuclear power, and
boasts the world's second-largest economy (Cardoso, 2017). Chinese international
engagement strategies focus on infrastructure investments, direct aid programs to
countries, debt forgiveness for poorer nations, and a policy of non-interference to secure
privileged access to markets and resources (Pecequilo, 2014). While China is Brazil's
largest trading partner, the reverse is not true.
Despite significant power asymmetries between the two countries, Brazil has proven to
be a key partner in establishing and expanding BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) and its extension to BRICS+ (including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates) (Coquidé, Lages, & Shepelyansky, 2023). In 2023, during
a visit to China, Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva proposed to President Xi
Jinping the creation of a BRICS-backed commercial currency. BRICS has emerged as a
group capable of influencing global governance (Duggan, Hooijmaaijers, Rewizorski, &
Arapova, 2022), internet governance (Hurel & Rocha, 2018) and international relations
(Sergunin, Konyshev, & Fei, 2020).
However, the unity of BRICS countries may have regional implications for Brazil, given
its historical leadership in similar initiatives in South America such as UNASUR and
MERCOSUR. Brazil's involvement with BRICS countries could weaken relations with other
South American nations and potentially diminish regional defensive regionalism (Vadell
& Giaccaglia, 2020, 2021) characteristic of Latin America (Quiliconi & Espinoza, 2017;
Vivares, 2021).
From the Chinese perspective and its participation in BRICS, Beeson and Zeng (2018)
argue that China's dominance within BRICS could lead to conflicts, as it may seek to
consolidate regional hegemony over other member nations (e.g., Russia and India). An
example of such tensions is India's boycott of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) due
to sovereignty and security concerns, particularly regarding projects like the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Beeson & Zeng, 2018). Moreover, Chinese
environmental policies driven by domestic political pressures may not align with
expectations of global leadership within BRICS (Beeson & Zeng, 2018). Asymmetries are
already apparent among BRICS countries in sustainable development initiatives,
particularly in Green Technologies, where China and India lead compared to Brazil,
Russia, and South Africa (Miranda et al., 2021).
Despite the potential impacts of BRICS on member countries and their regions, there is
a clear motivation among BRICS nations to seek alternatives to the dominance of the
US dollar, which has strengthened their relationships (Kondratov, 2021). In this context,
Coquidé et al. (2023) suggest that if a BRICS currency becomes a reality, there are
favorable prospects for its dominance in international trade.
Final considerations
At this juncture, it is opportune to revisit the objective that guided this study - to discuss
the Sino-Brazilian mutual interests and contribute to the understanding of this broad
subject. Our discussions and analyses suggest that it is important for Brazil and China
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
29
to develop initiatives with mutual and sovereign interests aimed at establishing
environmentally sustainable trade (e.g., Bulla et al., 2022) with reduced asymmetry.
Areas such as the bioeconomy and global governance are of great interest to Brazil and
China. The collaborative efforts of these nations can enable new initiatives with prospects
to balance forces with the USA.
Brazil and China are nations that exhibit considerable asymmetry in their economic and
hard power characteristics. While Brazil seeks growth opportunities from China, China
views Brazil as a resource base to meet its internal demands, especially regarding
Chinese food security. However, we emphasize that the challenges are not solely on the
Brazilian side. Despite China's increased global influence, its economy still faces
instabilities. Currently (2024), China is confronting new challenges in seeking internal
balance and revising its growth model (World Bank Group, 2024).
From a macro perspective, the economic and commercial strengthening of BRICS and its
relationship with the Global South could serve as a counterpoint to American influence,
reducing the role of the US dollar in the global economy and Federal Reserve System
(FED) monetary policy. However, while BRICS may redefine global power relations,
member countries of the group may face influences in managing their regional relations,
particularly Brazil, which has traditionally based its international relations on defensive
regionalism.
Finally, we consider that the Brazil-China relationship has potential for bidirectional
expansion. Brazil can continue its approach with China in developing Brazilian
infrastructure (e.g., electrical, telecommunications, and railways) and industry.
Technological cooperation between Brazil and China can assist in expanding and
modernizing Brazilian 5G telecommunication networks and facilitating innovations in the
country. In this sense, BRICS can serve as a platform to accelerate this technological
cooperation. In the strategic field, the two countries can strengthen South-South
cooperation and increase the voice and representation of developing countries in
international affairs.
On the Chinese side, besides securing commodity-based resources that fuel the Chinese
economy and enable its growth, the multifaceted relationship with Brazil is characterized
by cooperation in key sectors such as agriculture, energy, and industry. China's
investments in Brazil's renewable energy sector expand its global energy footprint.
Furthermore, strategic coordination in international structures and agreements on the
digital economy, logistics, and environmental cooperation supports China's global
influence and sustainable development goals.
Even though strict methodological criteria were followed in this study, certain limitations
must be considered. The systematic literature review conducted yielded a considerable
number of results, and the selection and interpretation of these results were performed
inductively by the authors. This approach is subject to the authors' own limitations and/or
analytical biases. Furthermore, it was not possible to address all the phenomena
discussed in the studies identified in the systematic review that involve Sino-Brazilian
mutual interests. Therefore, we believe there is room for further studies that aim to
explore in depth one of the themes presented in this study or all of them collectively.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
30
References
Al-Wreikat, Y., & Sodré, J. R. (2023). Impact of electric vehicles on carbon emissions in
Great Britain. In 3rd International Conference on Electrical, Computer, Communications
and Mechatronics Engineering (ICECCME) (pp. 1–6).
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICECCME57830.2023.10253067
Alckmin, G. (2024). Alckmin: “Difícil pensar uma área em que não haja parceria entre
Brasil e China”. https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/vice-presidencia/central-de-
conteudo/noticias/alckmin-201cdificil-pensar-uma-area-em-que-nao-haja-parceria-
entre-brasil-e-china201d
Almeida Ferreira Abrão, R., & Amineh, M. P. (2024). Brazilian Perception of the China-
Led Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Contemporary China.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2023.2299792
Amorim Neto, O., & Malamud, A. (2015). What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin
America? Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946-2008.
Latin American Politics and Society, 57(4), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-
2456.2015.00286.x
Araújo, C. G. de, & Diegues, A. C. (2022). Patterns of external insertion in global value
chains: a comparative analysis between Brazil and China. Brazilian Journal of Political
Economy, 42(1), 172–191. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572022-3161
Arbache, J., & Condi, G. (2022). Sino-Brazilian Relations. In China, Latin America, and
the Global Economy: Economic, Historical, and National Issues (pp. 245–273). University
of Brasília, Brasília, Brazil: Springer International Publishing.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18026-2_11
Baran, R., & Legey, L. F. L. (2013). The introduction of electric vehicles in Brazil: Impacts
on oil and electricity consumption. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 80(5),
907–917. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2012.10.024
Becard, D. R., & Lessa, A. C. (2021). Brazilian foreign policy to china in the 21st century
(2003-2019): Trends, transitions and implications. In China-Latin America and the
Caribbean: Assessment and Outlook (pp. 99–111). Institute of International Relations
(IREL), University of Brasilia (UnB), Brazil: Taylor and Francis.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003037934-9
Becard, D. S. R., & Macedo, B. V. de. (2014). Chinese multinational corporations in Brazil:
strategies and implications in energy and telecom sectors. Revista Brasileira de Política
Internacional, 57(1), 143–161. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400107
Beeson, M., & Zeng, J. (2018). The BRICS and global governance: China’s contradictory
role. Third World Quarterly, 39(10), 1962–1978.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1438186
Bernal-Meza, R. (2022). The Rise and Decline of Brazil as a Regional Power (2003–2016).
Latin American Perspectives, 49(5), 51–67.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221113248
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
31
Berringer, T., & Ferreira, M. D. (2022). Power Blocs and Regional Organizations in Latin
America: A Poulantzian Perspective. Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, 65(1),
1–16. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202200110
Blanchard, J. M. F. (2019). Brazil’s Samba with China: Economics Brought Them Closer,
but Failed to Ensure their Tango. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24(4), 583–603.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09586-8
Bolanos, F., Salatino, A., Osborne, F., & Motta, E. (2024). Artificial Intelligence for
Literature Reviews: Opportunities and Challenges. http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08565
Bonzanini, O. A., Menuzzi Diverio, T. S., Zuliani da Silva, L., & Olesiak, E. M. (2018).
Economic Development and Dependence Theory: The Approach of the Un Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Economic and Regional
Studies / Studia Ekonomiczne i Regionalne, 11(1), 20–33. https://doi.org/10.29316/ers-
seir.2018.02
Brasil. (2024a). Brasil ganha nova política industrial com metas e ações para o
desenvolvimento até 2033. Retrieved January 31, 2024, from Brasil ganha nova política
industrial com metas e ações para o desenvolvimento até 2033
Brasil. (2024b). Plano de Ação para a Neoindustrialização 2024-2026. Brasília.
Brasil. (2024c). Sixth Meeting of the Sino-Brazilian High Level Commission for
Consultation and Cooperation (COSBAN). https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-
area/press-releases/sixth-meeting-of-the-sino-brazilian-high-level-commission-for-
consultation-and-cooperation-cosban-may-23-2022
Bulla, O., Denny, D. M. T., Burnquist, H. L., & Peneluppi Junior, J. R. (2022).
Sustainability as added value in the Brazil-China relationship. Sustentabilidade: Diálogos
Interdisciplinares, 3, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.24220/2675-7885v3e2022a5568
Cáceres, S. B. (2011). China’s Natural Resource Appetite in Brazil. Asian Journal of Latin
American Studies, 24(2), 69–89.
Cardoso, D. (2013). China-Brazil: A strategic partnership in an evolving world order. East
Asia, 30(1), 35–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-012-9186-z
Cardoso, Daniel. (2017). Between Dependence and Autonomy: Understanding the Power
Dynamics in Brazil–China Relations. Global Dialogue, (March), 11–14.
https://research.unl.pt/ws/portalfiles/portal/6536118/DC_Special_Edition_BRICS_Glob
al_Dialogue_final_copy_11_14.pdf
Casarões, G. S. P. e, & Farias, D. B. L. (2022). Brazilian foreign policy under Jair
Bolsonaro: far-right populism and the rejection of the liberal international order.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 35(5), 741–761.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.1981248
Castro, F. F. de, Peiter, C. C., & Góes, G. S. (2020). Strategic Minerals and Brazil-China
Relations: Opportunities for Cooperation for The Development of the Brazilian Mineral
Industry. Revista Tempo Do Mundo, (24), 349–378.
https://doi.org/10.38116/rtm24art12
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
32
Chiarini, T., & da Silva, A. L. G. (2019). International Trade in Goods by Technological
Intensity: The Brazilian Case, 1996–2010. In E. C. Grivoyannis (Ed.), International
Integration of the Brazilian Economy (pp. 143–185). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-46260-2_6
Coquidé, C., Lages, J., & Shepelyansky, D. L. (2023). Prospects of BRICS currency
dominance in international trade. Applied Network Science, 8(1).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-023-00590-3
de Almeida, C. A., Seleme, R., & Neto, J. C. (2013). Rodovia transoceânica: Uma
alternativa logística para o escoamento das exportações da soja brasileira com destino à
China. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 51(2), 351–368.
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20032013000200008
De Almeida, P. R. (2018). Regional integration in Latin America: historical developments,
current challenges, especially in Mercosur. Meridiano 47 - Journal of Global Studies, 19.
https://doi.org/10.20889/M47e19015
Duggan, N., Hooijmaaijers, B., Rewizorski, M., & Arapova, E. (2022). Introduction: ‘The
BRICS, Global Governance, and Challenges for South–South Cooperation in a Post-
Western World.’ International Political Science Review, 43(4), 469–480.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121211052211
Ellis, R. E. (2013). The strategic dimension of Chinese engagement with Latin America.
Revista Científica “General José María Córdova,” 11(11), 121–140.
http://chds.dodlive.mil/files/2013/12/pub-PP-ellis.pdf
Fonseca, A. L. A. da, Chimenti, P. C. P. de S., & Suarez, M. C. (2023). Using Deep
Learning Language Models as Scaffolding Tools in Interpretive Research. Revista de
Administracao Contemporanea, 27(3), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1590/1982-
7849rac2023230021.en
Fonseca Jr, G. (1998). Alguns aspectos da política externa brasileira contemporânea: A
Legitimidade e outras questões internacionais. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
Gala, P. (2017). Complexidade econômica: uma nova perspectiva para entender a antiga
questão da riqueza das nações. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto: Centro Internacional Celso
Furtado de Políticas para o Desenvolvimento.
Gala, Paulo, Camargo, J., & Freitas, E. (2018). The Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was right: scale-free complex networks and core-
periphery patterns in world trade. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 42(3), 633–651.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bex057
Gallagher, K. P. (2010). What’s Left for Latin America to Do With China? NACLA Report
on the Americas, 43(3), 50–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2010.11725501
Gandenberger, C., & Strauch, M. (2018). Wind energy technology as opportunity for
catching-up? A comparison of the tis in Brazil and China. Innovation and Development,
8(2), 287–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/2157930X.2018.1428050
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
33
Giacalone, R. (2012). Latin American Foreign Policy Analysis: External Influences and
Internal Circumstances. Foreign Policy Analysis, 8(4), 335–354.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00176.x
Giraudo, M. E. (2020). Dependent development in South America: China and the soybean
nexus. Journal of Agrarian Change, 20(1), 60–78. http://10.0.4.87/joac.12333
Haibin, N. (2010). Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China. Revista Brasileira de
Politica Internacional, 53(SPEC ISSUE), 183–192. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-
73292010000300011
Hauser, G., Zen, A. C., Selao, D. C., & Garcia, P. L. (2007). The Electronic Industry in
Brazil And China: A Comparative Study And the Analysis of the Public Policies of
Stimulation the Technological Capacity of the Sector. Journal of Technology Management
{&} Innovation, 2(3), 85–96.
Hurel, L. M., & Rocha, M. S. (2018). Brazil , China and Internet Governance: Mapping
Divergence and Convergence. In JCIR Special Issue (pp. 98–115).
https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.jcir.v0i0.2267
IPEA. (2024). China planeja ampliar investimento em C&T em 2024.
https://www.ipea.gov.br/cts/pt/central-de-conteudo/noticias/noticias/420-china-
planeja-ampliar-investimento-em-c-t-em-2024#:~:text=Centro de Pesquisa em
Ciência%2C Tecnologia e Sociedade,-A%2B&text=Ao todo%2C o governo do,Ministério
das Finanças da China
Jenkins, R. (2012). China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship.
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41(1), 21–47.
https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100102
Jesus, D. S. V. de. (2022). The Strategy of Chaos: Brazilian Foreign Policy under Jair
Bolsonaro (2019-2022). International Journal of Social Science Studies, 10(6), 1.
https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v10i6.5686
Jia, Z., & Lin, B. (2021). How to achieve the first step of the carbon-neutrality 2060
target in China: The coal substitution perspective. Energy, 233, 121179.
https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.121179
Kondratov, D. I. (2021). Internationalization of the Currencies of BRICS Countries. Herald
of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 91(1), 37–50.
https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331621010044
Kozlova, A. (2023). Brazil. Regional political evolution in the beginning of the XXI century.
Latin America, 5, 20–34. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0044748X0025403-2
Legler, T. (2013). Post-hegemonic regionalism and sovereignty in Latin America:
optimists, skeptics, and an emerging research agenda. Contexto Internacional, 35(2),
325–352. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-85292013000200001
Leisering, L. (2021). One Hundred Years of Social Protection The Changing Social
Question in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. Bielefeld, German: Palgrave Macmillan.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
34
Leta, J., Machado, R. das N., & Canchumani, R. M. L. (2019). Scientific Collaboration
Among BRICS: Trends and Priority Areas. In W. Glänzel, H. F. Moed, U. Schmoch, & M.
Thelwall (Eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Indicators (pp. 485–504). Cham:
Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02511-3_19
Li, Y. (2023). How Are Government’s Decisions Affected By An External Power? The Case
Of Huawei 5g In Brazil. Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV).
https://repositorio.fgv.br/server/api/core/bitstreams/9826041d-6772-48fe-945f-
a7d380335cfa/content
Lima, M. R. S. de, & Hirst, M. (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power:
action, choice and responsibilities. International Affairs, 82(1), 21–40.
Lima, M. G. B. (2021). Corporate power in the bioeconomy transition: The policies and
politics of conservative ecological modernization in Brazil. Sustainability (Switzerland),
13(12), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13126952
Lima, S. E. M. (2016). Brasil e China: 40 anos de relações diplomáticas. Brasília.
Liu, S. (2022). The Predicted Relationship Between Relating Factors on Electric Vehicles
and Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the United States. In 7th International Conference on
Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2022) (Vol. 648, pp. 1969–
1978). https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220307.324
Liu, W., Jiang, W., Tang, Z., & Han, M. (2022). Pathways to peak carbon emissions in
China by 2030: An analysis in relation to the economic growth rate. Science China Earth
Sciences, 65(6), 1057–1072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11430-021-9901-y
Lulla, K., Duane Nellis, M., & Rundquist, B. (2013). China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
Collaboration is a success. Geocarto International, 28(5), 381.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10106049.2013.836786
Marca, L., Bertol, M. E., Fernando, L., & Filho, F. (2021). Estruturalismo latino-americano
e complexidade econômica: uma análise comparativa da estrutura produtiva do Japão,
Coreia do Sul, Cingapura e Brasil. Teoria e Evidência Econômica, a.27(56), 7–32.
Marques, H. R., Borges, P. P., De Souza Pires, T., & Bezerra de Souza, D. (2023). O Brasil
e as relações geopolíticas no contexto do Corredor Bioceânico Brasil-Chile. Interações
(Campo Grande), e2444165. https://doi.org/10.20435/inter.v24i4.4165
Masinde, M. (2024). Enhancing Systematic Literature Reviews using LDA and ChatGPT:
Case of Framework for Smart City Planning. 2024 IST-Africa Conference, IST-Africa 2024,
1–13. https://doi.org/10.23919/IST-Africa63983.2024.10569979
Mazzucato, M. (2024). A nova estratégia industrial brasileira.
https://valor.globo.com/opiniao/coluna/a-nova-estrategia-industrial-brasileira.ghtml
MDIC. (2024). Exports, Imports and Trade Balance - Partner: China.
https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/comex-vis
Miranda, I. T. P., Moletta, J., Pedroso, B., Pilatti, L. A., & Picinin, C. T. (2021). A Review
on Green Technology Practices at BRICS Countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa. SAGE Open, 11(2). https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211013780
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
35
Morgan, D. L. (2023). Exploring the Use of Artificial Intelligence for Qualitative Data
Analysis: The Case of ChatGPT. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 22, 1–10.
https://doi.org/10.1177/16094069231211248
Oliveira, H. A. de. (2004). Brasil-China: trinta anos de uma parceria estratégica. Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional, 47(1), 7–30. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-
73292004000100002
Oliveira, H. A. de. (2010). Brasil e China: Uma nova aliança não escrita? Revista Brasileira
de Politica Internacional, 53(2), 88–106. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-
73292010000200005
Oliveira, G. de L. T. (2018). Chinese land grabs in Brazil? Sinophobia and foreign
investments in Brazilian soybean agribusiness. Globalizations, 15(1), 114–133.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1377374
Oliveira, G. de L. T., & Myers, M. (2021). The Tenuous Co-Production of China’s Belt and
Road Initiative in Brazil and Latin America. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(129),
481–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1827358
Page, M. J., McKenzie, J. E., Bossuyt, P. M., Boutron, I., Hoffmann, T. C., Mulrow, C. D.,
… Moher, D. (2021). The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting
systematic reviews. The BMJ, 372. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n71
Page, M. J., McKenzie, J. E., Bossuyt, P. M., Boutron, I., Hoffmann, T. C., Mulrow, C. D.,
… Moher, D. (2021). Updating guidance for reporting systematic reviews: development
of the PRISMA 2020 statement. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 134, 103–112.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2021.02.003
Pecequilo, C. S. (2014). A União Europeia: os desafios, a crise e o futuro da integração.
Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.
Portugal Júnior, P. dos S., Reydon, B. P., & Portugal, N. dos S. (2012). A sustentabilidade
ambiental como direcionador estratégico ao processo de reindustrialização no Brasil.
Economia e Sociedade, 21(spe), 889–907. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0104-
06182012000400008
Prebisch, R. (1949). O desenvolvimento econômico da América Latina e seus principais
problemas. Revista Brasileira De Economia, 3(3), 47–111.
Quiliconi, C., & Espinoza, R. S. (2017). Latin American integration: Regionalism à la Carte
in a Multipolar World? Colombia Internacional, 92, 15–41.
https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint92.2017.01
Rizzi, K. R., & Antunes, D. F. B. (2017). Development and security in Brazilian foreign
policy: Theoretical and empirical considerations of Lula’s and Dilma’s Governments
(2003-2016). Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations, 6(12),
209–239. https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.75389
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
36
Rocha, C. D. B., Majo, C. De, & Silva, S. D. e. (2022). A Geo-historical Analysis of
Expanding Soybean Frontiers in the Brazilian Cerrado. Historia Ambiental
Latinoamericana y Caribena, 12(2), 217–252. https://doi.org/10.32991/2237-
2717.2022v12i2.p217-252
Rodrigues, P., Urdinez, F., & De Oliveira, A. (2019). Measuring International
Engagement: Systemic and Domestic Factors in Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1998 to
2014. Foreign Policy Analysis, 15(3), 370–391. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz010
Rodríguez-Morales, J. E. (2018). Convergence, conflict and the historical transition of
bioenergy for transport in Brazil: The political economy of governance and institutional
change. Energy Research and Social Science, 44(June), 324–335.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.05.031
Rodríguez, F. (2021). Contested Resources and South-South Inequalities: What Sino-
Brazilian Trade Means for the “Low-Carbon” Bioeconomy. In M. Backhouse, R. Lehmann,
K. L. M. Lühmann, J. Puder, F. Rodrígue, & A. Tittor (Eds.), Bioeconomy and Global
Inequalities Perspectives on Biomass Sourcing and Production (pp. 265–285). Palgrave
Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68944-5_13
Rodriguez, O., & Hounie, A. (2016). CEPAL: velhas e novas idéias. Economia e Sociedade,
4(2), 79–109.
Romano Schutte, G., & Campos, R. (2022). Soy, China’s Food Security, and the Brazilian
Supply. Latin American Perspectives, 49(5), 68–85.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221115675
Santarcángelo, J. E., Schteingart, D., & Porta, F. (2017). Industrial Policy in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico: a Comparative Approach. Interventions Économiques, (59).
https://doi.org/10.4000/interventionseconomiques.3852
Sergunin, A., Konyshev, V., & Fei, G. (2020). International Relations Theory and the
BRICS Phenomenon. Journal of China and International Relations (JCIR), Special Ed, 11–
26. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844564
Silva, A. L. R. da, & Pérez, J. O. (2019). Lula, Dilma, and Temer: The Rise and Fall of
Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Perspectives, 46(4), 169–185.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19846521
Soares, N. S., Viana, L. S., & Rego, L. J. S. (2020). Brazilian pulp trade performance for
China, 1990 to 2016. Conjuntura Internacional, 17(2), 11–19.
https://doi.org/10.5752/p.1809-6182.2020v17n2p11-19
Souza, N. J. (1999). Desenvolvimento Econômico (4th ed.). São Paulo: Atlas.
Syriani, E., David, I., & Kumar, G. (2024). Screening articles for systematic reviews with
ChatGPT. Journal of Computer Languages, 80(July), 101287.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cola.2024.101287
The Lancet. (2024). Rethinking research and generative artificial intelligence. The Lancet,
404(10447), 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)01394-1
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 13-37
Sino-Brazilian Mutual Interests: a Comprehensive Overview
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Pedro dos Santos Portugal Júnior, Francisco José Leandro,
Fabrício Pelloso Piurcosky, Sheldon William Silva
37
United Nations. (n.d.). The League of Nations.
https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/league-of-nations/overview
Vadell, J. A., & Giaccaglia, C. (2020). El rol de Brasil en el regionalismo latinoamericano:
la apuesta por una inserción internacional solitaria y unilateral. Foro Internacional, 1041–
1080. https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v60i3.2770
Vadell, J. A., & Giaccaglia, C. (2021). Brazil’s Role in Latin America’s Regionalism:
Unilateral and Lonely International Engagement. Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations, 27(1), 25–48.
https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701007
Valença, M. M., & Carvalho, G. (2014). Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: the Shifting Role
of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy. Brazilian Political Science Review, 8(3), 66–94.
https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212014000100021
Vaz, A. C., Fuccille, A., & Rezende, L. P. (2018). UNASUR, Brazil, and the South American
defence cooperation: A decade later. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 60(2).
https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700212
Visentini, P. F. (2019). The Multilateral and Regional Dimensions of Current Brazil–Africa
Relations. In G. Seibert & P. F. Visentini (Eds.), Brazil-Africa Relations: Historical
Dimensions and Contemporary Engagements, From the 1960s to the Present (pp. 79–
98). Boydell & Brewer. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/9781787445123.005
Vivares, E. (2021). Latin America A challenging prospect for regionalism. Regions and
Cohesion, 11(1), 126–139. https://doi.org/10.3167/reco.2021.110107
Webster, J., & Watson, R. T. (2002). Analyzing the Past To Prepare for the Future :
Writing a Review. MIS Quarterly, 26(2), xiii–xxiii. https://doi.org/10.2307/4132319
Whalley, J., & Medianu, D. (2013). The deepening China-Brazil economic relationship.
CESifo Economic Studies, 59(4), 707–730. https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifs031
World Bank Group. (2024). The World Bank In China.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#1
Zeng, J. J. (2024). Threatening National Security or Bridging the Digital Divide? A Case
Study of Huawei’s Expansion in Brazil.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=jgi_research
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
38
SINO-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN ANALYSIS: BILATERALISM,
MULTILATERALISM AND MINILATERALISM
ANTÓNIO TAVARES
antonio.tavares@ulusofona.pt
Integrated member of CEAD. Assistant Professor at Lusófona University, Oporto (Portugal).
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3536-7035.
ASYA GASPARYAN
gasparyanasya9@gmail.com
Research Fellow at the Regional Studies Center, Yerevan (Armenia).
https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7430-6382.
CÁTIA M. COSTA
Catia.Miriam.Costa@iscte-iul.pt
Researcher at CEI-IUL and an invited Assistant Professor at ISCTE-IUL (Portugal).
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7666-5661.
JOSÉ PALMEIRA
palmeira@eeg.uminho.pt
Integrated member of CICP, and Assistant Professor at University of Minho (Portugal), Portugal.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3256-2062.
PAULO AFONSO B. DUARTE
duartebrardo@gmail.com
Integrated member of CEAD. Furthermore, he is an Assistant Professor at Lusófona University,
Oporto (Portugal) and invited Assistant Professor at University of Minho.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1675-2840.
SABRINA E. MEDEIROS
sabrina.medeiros@ulusofona.pt
Assistant Professor at Lusófona University , Oporto (Portugal).
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4954-3623.
Abstract
The current international system is undergoing several structural changes boosted by the so-
called Global South, in an attempt to change the norms and structuring organisations built up
after World War II under US hegemony. Emerging states, who have a great deal of influence
in the international system, often question the westernised nature of global governance and
its main institutions, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. In this context it seems pertinent to study the cases of Brazil and China, who
look for changes in the traditional North-South relations that have long failed to reflect the
power dynamics resulting from their emergence. To this end, we will pay special attention not
only to their bilateral and multilateral initiatives, but also to the potential of minilateralism as
a complementary approach in the process, despite often neglected by the literature. Based
on this gap, we argue that the interplay between bilateralism, multilateralism and
minilateralism is crucial in Sino-Brazilian endeavours to reform obsolete structures for the
sake of their own interests and those of the Global South. This being said, the research
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
39
question that will guide our study is the following: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism
and minilateralism within Sino-Brazilian relations? Focusing on the specific bilateral and mini
cooperation dynamics together with the multilateral forums in which China and Brazil are
integrated - namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank,
the BRICS, BASIC, the G20, among others - one can expect the interplay between
bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism to assume an increasing and complementary
role in Sino-Brazilian relations.
Keywords
Bilateralism, Brazil, China, Global South, Minilateralism, Multilateralism.
Resumo
O atual sistema internacional passa por diversas mudanças estruturais impulsionadas pelo
chamado Sul Global, na tentativa de alterar as normas e as organizações estruturantes
construídas após a Segunda Guerra Mundial sob a hegemonia dos EUA. Os Estados
emergentes, que têm uma grande influência no sistema internacional, questionam
frequentemente a natureza ocidentalizada da governação global e das suas principais
instituições, como as Nações Unidas, o Fundo Monetário Internacional e o Banco Mundial.
Neste contexto, parece pertinente estudar os casos do Brasil e da China, que procuram
mudanças nas relações tradicionais Norte-Sul que há muito não conseguem reflectir a
dinâmica de poder resultante da sua emergência. Para tal, prestaremos especial atenção não
só às suas iniciativas bilaterais e multilaterais, mas também ao potencial do minilateralismo
como abordagem complementar no processo, apesar de muitas vezes negligenciado pela
literatura. Com base nesta lacuna, argumentamos que a interação entre bilateralismo,
multilateralismo e minilateralismo é crucial nos esforços sino-brasileiros para reformar
estruturas obsoletas em prol dos seus próprios interesses e dos do Sul Global. Dito isto, a
pergunta de pesquisa que norteará nosso estudo é a seguinte: Qual o papel do bilateralismo,
do multilateralismo e do minilateralismo nas relações sino-brasileiras? Centrando-nos nas
dinâmicas específicas de cooperação bilateral e de minicooperação, juntamente com os fóruns
multilaterais em que a China e o Brasil estão integrados - nomeadamente o Banco Asiático de
Investimento em Infraestruturas, o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento, os BRICS, o BASIC, o
G20, entre outros - pode-se esperar a interação entre bilateralismo, multilateralismo e
minilateralismo para assumir um papel crescente e complementar nas relações sino-
brasileiras.
Palavras-chave
Bilateralismo, Brasil, China, Sul Global, Minilateralismo, Multilateralismo.
How to cite this article
Tavares, António, Gasparyan, Asya, Costa, Cátia M., Palmeira, José, Duarte, Paulo Afonso B. &
Medeiros, Sabrina E. (2024). Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism
and Minilateralism. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic
Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp.
37-59. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.2.
Article received on 2 February 2024 and accepted for publication on 29 August 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
40
SINO-BRAZILIAN COOPERATION IN ANALYSIS: BILATERALISM,
MULTILATERALISM AND MINILATERALISM
ANTÓNIO TAVARES
ASYA GASPARYAN
CÁTIA M. COSTA
JOSÉ PALMEIRA
PAULO AFONSO B. DUARTE
SABRINA E. MEDEIROS
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, Brazil and China have built and consolidated a comprehensive
cooperation on a broad range of fields, including social development, environmental
protection, low-carbon economy, digital economy, scientific and technological innovation,
and poverty reduction, as stressed by Zhang and Chen (2021) as well as by de Castro
Neves and Cariello (2022). Besides, the literature offers insightful analyses concerning
the bilateral nature of Sino-Brazilian cooperation (Hase Ueta, Alencastro & Pinheiro-
Machado, 2023; van Tongerlo 2023). At the same time, Sino-Brazil cooperation was
referred to by Maurício Santoro (2022, p.28) as a strategic partnership based on the
“political perspective” of the Global South to push the world order towards multilateralism
(Lessa, 2010). Academic literature further suggests that Sino-Brazilian cooperation is
highly conditioned by multilateralism and a stronger sense of Global South identity
(Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007; Oliveira, 2010; Guilhon-Albuquerque, 2014). In this regard,
China and Brazil were among the pioneers who founded G20 which affirms their
commitment to South-South cooperation (Alles, 2012). Not only economics are key in
their relation (Lins, 2024; Zumah, 2024) but also a shared sense that world institutions
have become obsolete, thus needing to be reshaped in order to better accommodate the
interests of the developing countries (Bezerra & Lin, 2023; Dams, 2024)
Yet, literature dedicated to the contribution of minilateralism as a complementary
approach vis-à-vis the traditional multilateral and bilateral dimensions of Sino-Brazilian
relations, as well the interplay between the three, remains a gap which the present study
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
41
will help to narrow down. Along these lines, we have adopted the following research
question: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism within Sino-
Brazilian relations? The analysis spans from 1993, when the Sino-Brazilian Strategic
Partnership was established - a significant milestone in both actors’ bilateral and even
multilateral cooperation - until the most recent developm1ents under current President
Lula da Silva at the time of writing. This time frame enables us to better grasp the
geostrategic and geopolitical dynamics associated with the ongoing war between Russia
and Ukraine, whose impacts reinforce the debate on the effectiveness of the existing
western-led world structures. In fact, the Lula da Silva administration represents one of
the most significant contributions to this debate, unlike other administrations such as
Fernando Henrique Cardoso's or even Jair Bolsonaro. The recent appointment of former
President Dilma Roussef as head of the new Development Bank is one of the signs of
Brazil coming back again to its place in multilateralism with converging interests with
China’s own agenda for the Global South.
All this means that the United States' area of influence is gradually being replaced by
China’s own initiatives in multilateralism, which under Lula’s administration have been
largely supported. On August 15, 2024, Brazil and China marked the 50th anniversary of
their diplomatic relations, a milestone that highlights the evolving nature of their strategic
partnership. The creation of mechanisms like the High-Level Sino-Brazilian Commission
on Consultation and Cooperation (COSBAN) in 2004 underscores efforts to institutionalize
bilateral cooperation, yet the outcomes of such initiatives warrant further examination.
In 2023, bilateral trade reached a record $157 billion, with Brazil achieving a $51 billion
trade surplus, reflecting China's role as a critical market for Brazilian exports.
Additionally, Brazil has become a notable destination for Chinese investments,
particularly in infrastructure, which aligns with domestic initiatives like the Growth
Acceleration Program (China Daily, 2024).
The present study will start by outlining the most relevant milestones in Brazil-China
bilateral relations. It then attempts to understand how multilateralism complements both
actors’ agendas when addressing Global South issues and international policy
perspectives, mainly regarding global governance. The final section aims to investigate
the role and manifestations of minilateralism as an in-between and complementary
approach to both bilateralism and multilateralism. The conclusion summarises the main
findings whilst pointing to future avenues of research.
2. Bilateralism in Sino-Brazilian Relations
This section aims to evaluate the evolution of Sino-Brazilian relations in order to
understand the degree of relationship between the two States and whether this is
determined by cyclical or structural factors.
Brazil and China have never been as close in terms of bilateral relations as they are
today. The dynamic between China and Brazil stands out among Beijing's relations with
other Latin American countries primarily because Brazil is the sole Latin American
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
42
member of BRICS
1
(Santoro, 2022). Since Lula da Silva's return to the Planalto Palace in
2022, Brasília and Beijing have shown signs of geopolitical alignment regarding major
international issues, which represents a departure from the traditional equidistance of
Brazilian foreign policy in the dispute between the great powers. This approach will not
be strange to Brazil's commitment to cooperation within the BRICS, seen as an attempt
at a greater role in the so-called Global South, resulting in a distance from the United
States of America (US) and the European Union (EU).
The turning point dates back to 2009, the year in which China overtook the US as Brazil's
largest trading partner, a situation that continues to this day. The global strategic
partnership established between the two countries in 2012, reinforcing the strategic
partnership celebrated in 1993 (Serra, 2016), is the corollary of a rapprochement
initiated since they established diplomatic relations in 1974. Therefrom Brasília would
recognise mainland China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese State to the
detriment of the nationalist regime taking refuge in Taipei, on the island of Formosa.
According to Brazilian scholar Adriana Abdenur (2022), Brazil's prominent role in South-
South cooperation and global environmental agenda had been undermined under
Bolsonaro presidency, which significantly weakened the country's multilateral practice
and ties with the Global South. Yet, the Guardian’s reference to the victory of Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva in presidential elections as “Brazil is Back” is more than relevant (The
Guardian, 2023; da Silva, 2023). Lula’s new revisionist agenda is set to grant the Global
South a larger voice in world decision-making, reduce hunger and poverty as well as curb
climate change as priorities under Brazil's G20 presidency. In doing so, Lula’s Brazil is
resolute to revitalise close cooperation with China to cope with pressure coming from the
Global North (Berg & Baena, 2023; Vieira, 2023). In this context, Brazil endorsed
Beijing’s efforts to end the dollar dominance of global commerce by calling on developing
nations to replace the US dollar with their own currencies in international trade (Financial
Times, 2023).
The most decisive step taken by Brazil took place during the visit that Lula da Silva made
to Beijing, in 2023, when he signed an agreement with Xi Jinping aiming to replace the
US dollar in international trade. Brasília meets the Chinese aim of weakening the North
American role in the international system, thereby distancing itself from Washington, but
also from its Western partners, especially the Europeans. Although it has not formally
joined the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Brazil has welcomed significant Chinese
investment in infrastructure and increased its cooperation in strategic areas such as
aerospace, involving the respective national agencies.
Traditionally very jealous of its sovereignty over the Amazon rainforest, Brasília did not
shy away from establishing the China-Brazil Earth Resources program with Beijing, which
includes, among other capabilities, the launch of Earth observation satellites, including
the Amazon rainforest. Lula and Xi “signed 15 agreements that foster cooperation
between the two countries in various areas, such as trade and industry, communication,
innovation, research and technology” (Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, 2023),
deepening the Sino-Brazilian strategic partnership that dates back to the 90s. Brazil
1
BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
43
supplies China with raw materials that it lacks and, in return, receives investment in
infrastructure where Beijing has potential.
A study by the BRICS Policy Centre (2019), which analyses the number of Sino-Brazilian
agreements signed over twenty years (1999-2019), reveals that it was during Dilma
Russef's mandate (2011-2016) that the largest number of agreements were signed
(109), more than the double of those signed during Lula's governments (2002-2010),
which were 53. The two presidents assigned by the Workers' Party were much more
proactive in relation to China than their predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who
between 1999 and 2002 made six agreements, or his successor, Michel Temer,
responsible for 15 agreements in 2017 and 2018, while Jair Bolsonaro concluded two in
2019.
At the international level, the so-called enlarged West, with the US and the EU at its
head, has expressed caution in its opening to the Chinese market, for reasons of alleged
national security. At stake are mainly strategic sectors, such as communications and
semiconductors, where there is fear that the Chinese authorities, who control investment,
may access information considered strategic for Western countries. To this fear, which
follows years of relocation of Western companies to Asian countries, more favourable to
production, with a cheaper, although qualified, workforce, is added the global geopolitical
context marked by the conflict in Ukraine, in relation to which Beijing has maintained
public neutrality, although it promotes an “unlimited strategic partnership” with Moscow
(Reuters 2022). At the same time, tension in the Taiwan Strait is intensifying, with Beijing
reaffirming its intention to absorb the territory of Taipei, despite the 2024 presidential
elections reaffirming the power of defenders of autonomy for the island of Formosa vis-
à-vis Mainland China. In this geopolitical context, the rapprochement between Brasília
and Beijing continues to be seen in Western chancelleries as a distancing of Brazil from
liberal democracies, which could affect the approval of agreements such as the EU-
Mercosur or mortgage Brazil's ambition for a greater role in the United Nations system,
including accession to a permanent member position on the Security Council.
This feeling is shared by Thiago de Aragão (2023, p.8), who professionally deals with
foreign investment funds, who expresses a fear: “Without choosing sides, Brazil would
continue to enjoy everything that the two superpowers and their allies could offer. By
choosing a side, Brazil must hope that tensions do not worsen, as then the price of
alliances can be placed on the table”.
If there is a hallmark that Itamaraty (reference for the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Relations) has cultivated since the democratisation of the regime, it is Brazil's strategic
autonomy in navigating relations with the great powers. It began with non-alignment,
during the Cold War period, which had as a corollary the creation of the Zone of Peace
and Cooperation in South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)
2
, under the sponsorship of the United
Nations, and continued with the deepening of South-Atlantic relations, especially during
2
Established in 1986 by resolution 41/11 of the United Nations General Assembly, the ZOPACAS includes
24 members states: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uruguay.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
44
the mandates of Lula da Silva (Fonseca, 2011), the embryo of what is today called the
Global South.
President Lula sought to place Brazil in the leadership of the countries of the South,
bringing his country closer to the most influential African countries and then extending
this cooperation to great powers considered allies in this purpose, such as India, China
and the Russian Federation, within the scope of the BRICS. Former President Dilma
Rousseff was elected, in 2023, president of the New BRICS Development Bank, based in
Shanghai, which is intended to finance infrastructure projects in the five countries, but
also in Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, admitted as members
of the bank in 2021. The South African summit also approved the expansion of the BRICS
to new countries - Argentina
3
, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates – a fact that, on the one hand, could expand China's influence in other markets
and, on the other hand, could reduce Brazil's influence (Bingyun, 2024).
Although the relationship between China and Brazil has intensified in the last two decades
due to the BRICS, the participation in their bilateral relations is intense. In 2022, Chinese
companies invested in thirty-two new investment projects across strategic sectors such
as energy, information technology, and agriculture, the highest number annually
recorded in history, distributed among all regions of the country. Chinese investments in
Brazil are not limited only to large projects, but also include bilateral agreements and
joint initiatives that strengthen cooperation from bilateral relations, especially so that in
2021 Brazil reached the mark of the largest recipient of Chinese investments (CEBC,
2023).
In addition to direct investments, bilateral cooperation between Brazil and China is
facilitated by a series of agreements and protocols established between the two
countries. On January 19, 2024, an agreement was signed between the Brazilian and
Chinese governments on long-stay and multiple-entry visas, further facilitating trade and
business relations between the two countries. Other agreements cover areas such as
defence cooperation, outer space science and technology, and strengthening ministerial
relations, as table 1 shows.
3
The new president of Argentina, Javier Milei, announced on December 10, 2023 that Argentina was
renouncing membership of the BRICS.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
45
Table 1. Brazil-China Cooperation Agreements
Source: The authors
Although the relations between the ministries of foreign affairs are primarily those that
demarcate bilateral cooperation, initiatives associated with investments in states of the
federation, municipalities or linked to the various ministries take place systematically and
in parallel with macro-agreements also take place in the form of paradiplomacy (Setzer
& Anderton, 2019), an essential component of minilateralism (see section 4) in our
perspective.
In this sense, the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Commission for Consultation and Cooperation
– COSBAN, created in 2004 to promote biannual regions between China and Brazil to
deepen bilateral relations, is one of the drivers of the outstanding numbers of this
bilaterality. Although delayed, the VI COSBAN Meeting states a Strategic Planning
between 2022 and 2031 and an Executive Planning until 2026, so that the first document
registers the World Trade Organization
4
as the primary forum for multilateralism of trade
relations between the parties, in the promotion of cooperation, including bilateral
regulatory cooperation. The forum includes scientific exchange and renewable energies
as an essential agenda, dividing the commitment between axes of economic, scientific,
energy and mineral cooperation, and digitalisation, with the formulation of specific
working groups. In addition, the Executive Plan reinforces the commitment to institutions
within the framework of the UN and the 2030 Agenda, but also to the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the G20, in addition to the BRICS, which reveals the
non-opposition to the Western international financial system.
Also, within this agenda, a group of agreements touches on the defence system, including
space cooperation, technologies, and communications. In this framework, the
cooperation system highlights the peaceful application of space technology, through the
Complementary Protocol on the Joint Development of CBERS-6 between the Government
of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of China as part of the
Framework on Cooperation in Peaceful Applications of Science and Technology from Outer
Space between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government
4
It had a Brazilian director general, Roberto Azevêdo (2013-2020).
Agreement Title Area of Cooperation
Date Signed
Status
Earth-Resources Satellite (CBERS) Project - CBERS-6 Space and Technology 14/04/2023 In Progress
Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Investment Economic and Trade 12/11/2004 Superseded
Cultural and Educational Cooperation Agreement Cultural and Educational 01/11/1985 In Force
Defense Cooperation Agreement Defense and Military 12/04/2011 Special Status
Infrastructure Construction Cooperation Agreement Infrastructure and Energy 05/06/2006 In Force
Energy and Mining Cooperation Protocol Energy and Mining 19/02/2009 In Force
Judicial Assistance Treaty Judicial and Administrative 19/05/2009 In Force
Multiple Entry Visa Agreement Visas and Immigration 19/01/2024 In Promulgation
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
46
of China. Also, within the bilateral cooperation framework, the 2010 Defence Cooperation
Agreement includes joint military exchanges and exercises, disseminated for peaceful
purposes.
This diverse group of initiatives and agreements, whether sheltered by large umbrellas
of technical cooperation and long-term investments, moves forward with fewer barriers
and with a repercussion that may not be observed in proportion (Oliveira, 2010). In
addition, the stakeholders representing Chinese interests are also of different natures.
Institutions such as the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC) have played a crucial role
in promoting dialogue and facilitating investment and business between the two nations,
whose annual conference highlighted the importance of a new bilateral agenda focused
on sustainability and neo-industrialization, as appointed.
3. Multilateralism as a way to deepen the Global South’s agenda
After analysing Sino-Brazilian relations from a bilateral perspective, we will now try to
understand how multilateralism complements both actors’ agendas when addressing
Global South issues and international policy perspectives, mainly regarding global
governance.
In the last decades, China became a global actor, while Brazil maintained its journey as
a regional power. Both countries have turned to a vibrant diplomacy to increase their
international role and notoriety based on dynamic bilateral relations and the building of
innovative multilateral ties. Inclusively, China created several international forums based
on a new multilateral perspective that gathered China with different regions of the world
(e.g. FOCAC, Forum China Middle East, China-CELAC, Macao Forum), or that inaugurated
a new way to deal with issues like defence and security (The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation). Through these diplomatic forms, China could develop a global discourse
for foreign policy and ensure the recognition of new ways of dealing with multilateralism
(Costa, 2023). Besides engaging in global discourse, China used bilateral and multilateral
relations to export some elements that successfully developed the economy and society
(e.g., the special economic zones) (Costa & Li, 2022).
Brazil also explored multilateralism through diverse regional and global organisations,
participating actively in creating Mercosur. Brazil’s direct contribution to building new
international organisations or multilateral forums is also relevant, mainly through its
association with regional blocks or other emergent economies, like in the case of the
BRICS or the G20. Some authors refer to 2003-2014 as a shifting moment for Brazilian
foreign policy when the country engaged with an unprecedented international agenda
(Chin & Diaz, 2016). Besides evolving in international politics, Brazil also diversified
bilateral and multilateral relations by introducing new countries and geographies as their
primary partners. During this period, Brazilian authorities tried to balance the principles
of the Washington Consensus and a public policy to foster industrialization and
innovation. Brazil also became more ambitious regarding security policies, trying to
implement a strategy for regional security and a permanent presence in the global south.
Somehow, the Brazilian new approach to foreign policy resulted in a commitment to
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
47
innovative international governance, paying more attention to the needs and claims of
peripheral countries, namely the ones in the Global South.
China and Brazil experimented with the momentum to increase and deepen their
relationship but also to engage mutually in a broader process of building alternatives to
an international order that did not allow newcomers to lead or deeply participate in the
decision processes. The non-conformist way of looking at international order and foreign
policy overlaps with the growth of both economies and a common interest in matching
each country’s development processes in a way they could be complimentary. The next
step was to reinforce multilateralism through new patterns and to engage in the creation
of new multilateral organisations (Stephen & Parízek, 2019).
Authors such as Petrone (2021) agree that multilateralism has become convenient for
emerging powers to propose new perspectives on global issues and their governance.
BRICS is one of the most successful international organisations, reflecting a Global South
approach and the demand for a different global order, better reflecting the needs for the
International Order identified by these countries. The role of countries such as Brazil and
China in the shift of the international balance is evident. However, this new context
resulted in the establishment of new organisations, some of them reflecting
multilateralism with a tendency to address solutions through multilateralism and
bilateralism, paying more attention to their national interests. This situation results in a
convergence when these international organisations have to address global issues and
propose a nationalist approach regarding specific development questions (Stephen &
Parízek, 2019).
The lack of success of global organisations such as the World Trade Organisation also
contributed to the peripheral states regarding the decision to experiment with specific
alignments through minilateralism diplomacy. In the particular case of Brazil and China,
the flexible way they use multilateral approaches, in complementarity with other
diplomatic methods such as bilateral relations to minilateral relations BRICS is a relevant
example of a new way to deal with multilateralism, allowing the use of diverse formats
inside the organisation in a multilateralism a “la carte”, encompassing bilteralization and
multilateralization within the member states, but fostering an alignment when
participating in other multilateral organisations such as WTO (Vazquez, 2021). This open
way of engaging member states is very attractive for dynamic regional powers that can
claim deeper participation in global governance and the international order. One of the
main issues at BRICS is the accommodation of diversity, following a coexistence strategy
while contributing to a non-west perspective of global governance (van Noort, 2018).
As for the G20, it was unclear how the pandemic and the Ukrainian war would impact the
organisation in which Brazil and China are also active members. However, the
commitment to some drivers of global governance such as climate change, taxation or
cooperation for development allowed the organisation to maintain its role, not without a
perception of a precedent of western-driven nature that these events contributed to
eroding (Larionova, 2023).
Combining the cases of BRICS and G20, it is noticeable that both countries used
multilateralism to address global issues and to establish a leading position with the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
48
countries of the Global South. Some authors even refer to the combination of strategic
policies in the BRICS and the G20, promoting reform in economic governance (Larionova
& Shelepov, 2022). Other authors also argue that the BRICS region was criticised several
times due to its lack of institutionalisation. Nevertheless, the BRICS maintained the
needed institutional coherence to survive the challenges of proposing an alternative to
the dominant multilateralism (Abdenur, 2014).
Brazil and China share other geopolitical spaces, with variable geometry, such as the
case of the G77. The origin of the Group of 77 (number of founding States) dates back
to 1964 and has its origins in a joint position of those States, taken during a United
Nations conference on trade and development. Another multilateral platform in which
Brazil and China are included is BASIC. The latter is the acronym for Brazil, South Africa,
India and China, industrialised countries that in 2009 defined a joint strategy within the
scope of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, cooperation that they have
maintained in this area, with the most recent taking place in 2023, at the New York
climate summit (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023).
4. Minilateralism as a complementary approach in Sino-Brazilian
cooperation
This section aims to investigate the role and manifestations of minilateralism as an in-
between and complementary approach to both bilateralism and multilateralism. More
specifically, it claims that a multistakeholder arena has been evolving from various forms
of diplomatic engagement, from bottom-up to top-down institutions.
Sino-Brazilian cooperation extends beyond multilateral platforms like BRICS or G20
5
to
encompass minilateralism. This is evident in the establishment of the High-Level Sino-
Brazilian Commission and the creation of the "private arm" of the Sino-Brazilian
relationship, the Brazil-China Business Council in 2004 (Lessa, 2010).
Minilateralism as a diplomatic tool has coexisted with other forms of global governance
since the end of World War II, for example, when considering initiatives such as the
European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the precursor of the European Community.
Minilateralism represents an alternative approach to international cooperation,
characterised by the formation of narrower and more targeted partnerships between a
limited number of countries that share common interests and concerns on specific
agendas. Unlike multilateralism, which involves a greater number of states in
comprehensive agreements and institutions, minilateral agreements seek to bring
together varied stakeholders in discussing limited issues, and on some occasions, in
defined periods. These initiatives often arise in response to the perception that existing
multilateral structures are ineffective or incapable of adequately dealing with urgent
global challenges, a relevant characteristic presented about three decades ago in the
literature (Braga, 1989; Naim, 2009; Becard, 2011).
5
The G20 brings together the most developed economies that have met since 1999, with the aim of
regulating the financial system and the global economy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
49
Minilateralism offers advantages in terms of agility, flexibility, and focus, allowing
participants to act more quickly and decisively on specific issues, often bypassing the
complexity and time-consuming associated with multilateral processes (Wuthnow, 2019).
The complementarity between multilateral agreements qualified by traditional diplomacy
and minilateral agreements qualified by alternative multi stakeholder diplomatic axes
characterises and encompasses a large part of the systems and subsystems in use. This
phenomenon incorporates actions marked, for example, by paradiplomacy, whether
interministerial, inter-municipal or multisectoral (Ribeiro, 2009), once treated as
convergent paradiplomacy (Zeraoui, 2016).
Some axes of cooperation have emerged from systems guided by themes and qualified
as minilateral, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT),
which began as expanded bilateral negotiations between the major trading powers
(Tirkey, 2021). To some extent, the criticism of minilateral agreements involves the
question of the efficiency and legitimacy of these agreements for the macro-processes in
which they are involved, but also the presence of minilateralism to soften the circuit of
influences carried by the instruments. In addition, some risk seems to be associated with
what have been called "power imbalances" derived from the accentuation of minilateral
relationships (Mladenov, 2023).
There is also a growth proportional to the complexity between the minilateral agreements
and the expansion of the system of international interdependencies. The difficulties
associated with the governance of multilateral organisations have reduced the belief in
global cooperation on crucial issues. Part of the scepticism in the classical multilateral
environment points out that minilateralism may be the new type of efficient
multilateralism (Duygun, 2022). Although it is relevant to note that there has been
progress in multilateral structures in recent decades, the progressive fragmentation of
these structures, the reorientation of agendas, the more specific thematic attribution and
the strengthening of civil society are components that reveal this incidence (Anuar &
Hussain, 2021; McGee, 2011; Tirkey, 2021).
Through trilateral/bilateral agreements and/or minilateral partnerships, challenges such
as climate change, technology, energy, or food security are addressed, highlighting the
greatest possible effectiveness of minilateralism in bringing together relevant
stakeholders, unlocking original barriers between diplomacies, and achieving shared
goals in a more targeted and pragmatic manner (Eckersley, 2012; Falkner, 2015). In this
context, minilateralism is associated with the concept of club governance, since the
conduct of an important part of global governance is translated by third parties into
forums of possible low visibility (Duygun, 2022).
Exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the environment in which minilateralism and
all associated decentralisation movements thrived highlighted the weaknesses of the
main multilateral forums, so that relationships and partnerships of a different nature
were created following the paralysis of many of these forums (Tirkey, 2021). In this
context, minilateral agreements and subsystems swiftly emerge, benefiting not only
China but also facilitating its planned expansion across various sectors. Minilateralism
encompasses diplomatic initiatives involving multiple layers and stakeholders,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
50
underpinned by a robust commitment to investment. In this dynamic context, minilateral
agreements and subsystems rapidly come to the forefront, not only advancing China's
interests but also facilitating its strategic expansion across diverse sectors. Minilateralism
epitomises diplomatic endeavours that engage multiple layers of governance and
stakeholders, bolstered by a steadfast commitment to investment. Notably, this approach
has been emblematic of China's strategy in the Global South, where it positions itself as
a partner adept at navigating the demands and intricacies unique to these regions
(Kobayashi & Sanchez, 2017).
Conversely, microlateralism pertains to smaller-scale partnerships, as implied by its
nomenclature, and is not within the scope of this study. A clear distinction arises: bilateral
or trilateral actions qualify as minilateralism when they (1) diverge from conventional
diplomatic approaches, (2) engage multiple stakeholders in their implementation, (3)
operate outside the framework of complex multilateral environments, and (4) span
various layers of representation within national or international spheres (such as local,
federative, or other).
Whether concerning international agreements related to technological development or
climate change, Chinese participation in most economies, especially in developing
economies, has been significantly higher in recent years (Duygun, 2022). In the global
diplomatic landscape, China finds an advantage both in the elaboration of traditional
diplomatic, and thematic agreements or in the expansion of its commercial and cultural
stakeholders.
The emergence of middle and emerging powers and rapid technological advances make
it clear that minilateralism is a viable path for many countries (Anuar & Hussain 2021).
China's presence and influence in Brazil have intensified over the years, reflected through
a variety of investments and cooperation agreements in various sectors. In agribusiness,
for example, China's share as an importer went from less than 3 percent to more than
35 percent between 2000 and 2020. The ties between the two countries extend beyond
the economic realm, also encompassing areas such as technology, diplomacy, and
defence (Medeiros, Feodrippe & Benvenuto, 2018; Medeiros & Benvenuto, 2020).
Following the shift in Brazil's foreign policy focus towards South-South cooperation in the
early 2000s, the expansion of Brazil-China collaboration consistently incorporated a
broad strategic element. This revitalization of the strategic partnership with China
ushered in a new era of relations (Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018). During Lula's initial term,
two significant institutional developments underscored this renewed defence
cooperation: the establishment of the Joint Commission for Exchange and Cooperation
(referred to as JCEC) and the ratification of the Framework Agreement on Defence
Cooperation. Sino-Brazilian strategic cooperation also extends to the satellite sector,
notably through the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) project. As a space-
related scientific and technological initiative that began under a cooperation agreement
established in 1988, it currently involves a group of different service providers from Brazil
(China Daily, 2024) and whose cooperation was reaffirmed in June 2024 under a Joint
Declaration for the CBERS 5. In this regard, China's participation in the "Amazon
Protection system" monitoring initiative is nothworty as the latter enables the sharing of
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
51
Chinese satellite imagery of the Amazon forest to safeguard Brazil’s maritime exclusive
economic zone (Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018; de Stange, 2023). One should note that
while Brazilian satellite institutions involved in cooperation are civilian, Chinese ones are
directly linked to the People’s Liberation Army.
To ensure that minilateral instruments effectively complement the work of multilateral
instruments, for example on climate issues, minilateral agreements play a crucial role in
facilitating cooperation in the research and implementation of renewable energy
technologies. Working to uphold the interests of developing nations in the international
climate change agenda, China and Brazil have pursued climate diplomacy, advocating for
equitable compensation for the past emissions generated by developed countries during
their developmental phases (Hallding et al., 2011; Qi, 2011; Conrad, 2012; Groen,
2020).
These partnerships are structured by subnational and non-governmental actors,
expanding the capacity to generate innovative solutions to contemporary challenges,
whilst China has a programme on its energy security (Foguel, Paiva & Medeiros, 2014).
Ultimately, the operation of minilateral agreements is guided by a perspective that
includes a variety of actors, from developing countries to vulnerable economies,
broadening political dialogue in confidence-building and for international cooperation and
global governance.
In the context of the High-Level Sino-Brazilian Commission (COSBAN), significant
achievements include the successful facilitation of bilateral trade growth. For instance, in
June 2024, Brazil exported $9.74 billion to China and imported $5.84 billion, resulting in
a positive trade balance of $3.9 billion. Over the past year, Brazilian exports to China
increased by $435 million (4.67%), driven primarily by higher exports of Crude
Petroleum, which rose by $623 million (64.1%), and Corn, which saw a substantial
increase of $275 million. Concurrently, imports from China grew by $1.29 billion
(28.3%), largely due to increased imports of Refined Petroleum and Video and Card
Games (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2024). As of 2024, the COSBAN has
been representing the China-Brazilian bilateral relations, whilst paving the road for
deepening South-South Relations (Maia, 2024).
The Brazil-China Business Council has played a pivotal role in this expansion by
facilitating over $15 billion in bilateral investments. For instance, the Council's initiatives
have significantly enhanced Brazil's trade dynamics, evidenced by a substantial year-
over-year growth in key export sectors. The increase in exports of products such as Crude
Petroleum and Corn highlights the effectiveness of the Council in boosting Brazil's trade
performance and economic engagement with China. Regarding its participation, although
it is focused on Brazil's bilateral relations with China, the Council reports the important
participation of bilateralism both regarding the states of the federation and sectors of
interest, as well as in the strengthening of other relations such as in Latin America, which
can be evidenced through events and news from the Council's own system (CEBC, 2024).
The relationship between Brazil and China continues to expand, driven by cooperation in
several areas, although the participants of the Brazil-China Meeting still consider the
investments to be lower than expected. The establishment of strategic partnerships and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
52
the deepening of economic development and trade ties are key elements of this bilateral
relationship and this invisible minilateralism. As a consumer of Brazilian agribusiness,
China has also concentrated its investments in the sector given the significant increase
in demand for food. In 2022, Chinese investments in Brazilian agribusiness reached
almost US$99 million, benefiting agricultural exploration projects in the Midwest of Brazil.
In addition, the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation of Portuguese-speaking
Countries (Macao) has promoted multilateral cooperation between China and
Portuguese-speaking countries, strengthening economic and trade ties, where a relevant
part is the cooperation with Brazil. It is notable that Brazil's participation in the Global
South and Portuguese-Language international systems is both boosted and a driver of
minilateral relationships that are dissipated by cooperative sublayers and offer space for
multi-stakeholder relationships with greater flexibility, increasing bilateral synergies.
While triangulation is a key aspect of Brazil's foreign policy strategy in promoting South-
South Cooperation and development, within the context of bilateral agreements, the
formation of minilateral arrangements often arises from shared commitments to broad
regimes, such as climate change, technological development, and energy security. On
the other side, while minilateralism offers notable benefits in terms of agility and focus,
it also poses several challenges. The efficiency of minilateral agreements can sometimes
lead to questions about their legitimacy and broader acceptance, as they often exclude
less influential actors or are part of semi-formal agreements. Additionally, the
proliferation of minilateral agreements contribute to the fragmentation of global
governance structures, potentially undermining the effectiveness of multilateral
institutions designed to address global challenges comprehensively, posing a demand for
bridging the different cooperative layers.
6. Conclusion
Drawing on an existing gap in the literature that has failed to consider other alternative
approaches to the traditional bilateral and multilateral elements in Sino-Brazilian
cooperation, this article has attempted to answer the previously stated research
question: Which role play bilateralism, multilateralism and minilateralism within Sino-
Brazilian relations? In doing so, we have arrived at some important conclusions.
As a first major finding, we conclude that the Sino-Brazilian bilateral relationship is
marked by interests that can be considered cyclical, in the case of economic cooperation,
but also structural, in the case of opposition to the Western model led by the US.
Furthermore, bilateralism has been the privileged approach to advance the Sino-Brazilian
Strategic Partnership. The latter is often recognised as a model of South-South
cooperation and reflects a shared sense that world institutions have become obsolete,
thus needing to be reshaped in order to better accommodate the interests of the
developing countries. The ‘strategic’ essence of Sino-Brazilian ties has been connected
with a broad range of fields encompassing trade, political dialogue, technological
cooperation (such as building satellites), science and climate change (the case of the
Amazon), but also more macro goals such as reforming the international system. This
links to our second finding, which is precisely the complementary boost that Sino-
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
53
Brazilian endeavours in multilateralism provide to their parallel bilateral approach.
Multilateralism seems to be both actors’ preferred foreign policy tool for mutual support
in the BRICS, G20, BASIC, New Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank, based on non-intervention, solidarity, and mutual respect. Moreover,
multilateralism is the instrument that both favour to build alternatives both for the
obsolete Bretton Woods’ institutions and US-Eurocentric world order. In this regard,
President Lula’s view that countries have the right to go into debt in order to develop,
without the pressure from the International Monetary Fund, together with his questioning
of the dominance of the dollar as the world’s dominant currency, and his attempt to
encourage Chinese strategic projects in Brazil (including 5G), clearly contrast with
Bolsonaro’s Washington first policies. With Lula’s return to Brazilian presidency, the
country is therefore back to the multilateral agenda that it has shared with China in the
defence of the Global South.
As a third last finding, we conclude that minilateralism provides an alternative approach
in the longstanding Sino-Brazilian foreign policy that has been simultaneously driven by
the traditional bilateral and multilateral elements. Nonetheless, minilateralism has
proved advantageous in terms of agility, flexibility, and focus, enabling Brazil and China
to reach faster decisions, often bypassing the complexity and time-consuming associated
with multilateral processes. Besides, Sino-Brazilian engagement in minilateralism arises
in response to the perception that Western-led multilateral structures are too broad,
ineffective or incapable of adequately dealing with urgent global challenges. The session's
scope was chosen to focus on the detection of minilateral efforts as specifically bridging
evidence, without deepening into specific case studies or empirical measurements of
impact. Given the relatively recent and evolving nature of Sino-Brazilian minilateralism
due to the multiplying efforts from different stakeholders, this approach allows for a more
flexible and comprehensive discussion of its potential, which can be tested in future
studies.
Considering the new stage inaugurated by President Lula in the Sino-Brazilian Strategic
Partnership and its impacts for the Global South, future avenues of research would
certainly benefit from paying closer attention to the South Atlantic as a case of bilateral,
multilateral and minilateral governance. In fact, the rekindling of the conflict in the Middle
East and its extension to other actors, namely the Houthi of Yemen, affecting navigation
in the Red Sea between the ocean Indian and Mediterranean Sea, via the Suez Canal,
led to alternative maritime routes, through the South Atlantic, via the Cape (South
Africa), in the transport of goods between Asia-Pacific countries and Europe or the east
coast of the US. Hence future studies should complement the works of Palmeira (2023)
and Ferreira-Pereira & Duarte (2023) on the importance of Brazil’s role in strengthening
ZOPACAS and other bilateral and multilateral agreements, particularly with Portuguese-
speaking African countries, such as Angola, which has intervened in the Gulf of Guinea
Commission, a region in whose security the EU has also been involved, given its strategic
interest for international maritime security. As a global actor, China also seeks to exert
its influence in the South Atlantic, with Brazil emerging as a potential ally in this purpose.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
54
References
Abdenur, Adriana (2022). New Directions for South-South Cooperation on Climate and
Environment. CartaCapital. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.cartacapital.com.br/opiniao/como-o-brasil-pode-retomar-a-cooperacao-
internacional-em-clima-e-meio-ambiente/.
Abdenur, Adriana (2014). China and the BRICS Development Bank: Legitimacy and
Multilateralism in South-South Cooperation. IDS Bulletin 45 (4): pp. 85–101.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-5436.12095.
Alles, Leonardo (2012). Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: From Non-Intervention to
Non-Indifference. Www.academia.edu 6 (2). Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.academia.edu/2352621/Brazilian_Foreign_Policy_Under_Lula_from_non_i
ntervention_to_non_indifference.
Anuar, Amalina; Nazia, Hussain (2021). Minilateralism for Multilateralism in the Post-
COVID Age. Ponder the Improbable. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/PR210119_Minilateralism-For-
Multilateralism-in-the-Post-COVID-Age.pdf.
Aragão, Thiago (2023). Por Que Proximidade Com a China é Uma Aventura Complexa
Para O Brasil. Estadão E-Investidor - As Principais Notícias Do Mercado Financeiro.
Retrieved in September 2024, from: https://einvestidor.estadao.com.br/colunas/thiago-
de-aragao/brasil-se-aproxima-china-russia/.
Becard, Danielly S. (2011). O que esperar das relações Brasil-China? Revista de
Sociologia e Política, 19, pp. 31-44.
Berg, Ryan; Carlos Baena (2023). The Great Balancing Act: Lula in China and the Future
of U.S.-Brazil Relations. Www.csis.org, April. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/great-balancing-act-lula-china-and-future-us-brazil-
relations.
Bezerra, Valdir; Zaiguan, Lin (2023). The Welcomed Rise of China: An Overview of
Beijing’s Relations with Brazil and Other BRICS Countries. BRICS Journal of Economics 4
(3): pp. 335–46. https://doi.org/10.3897/brics-econ.4.e110895.
Braga, Carlos Alberto Primo (1989). Comércio Internacional: Uma Agenda De Pesquisas
Para Os Anos 90. Análise Econômica 7 (12). https://doi.org/10.22456/2176-
5456.10324.
Bingyun, Guo (2024). Why has Argentina declined to join BRICS?. January 16, Retrieved
in September 2024, from: https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/why-has-argentina-
declined-join-brics
Castro Neves, Luiz Augusto de, and Tulio Cariello (2022). China’s Growing Presence in
Brazil and Latin America. China and Globalization, pp. 73–87.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-8603-0_8.
CEBC (2023, 2024). CEBC – Conselho Empresarial Brasil China. 2023 & 2024. Retrieved
in September 2024, from: https://www.cebc.org.br/.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
55
Chin, Gregory. Diaz, Ismael. (2016). Brazil In Regional And Global Governance: Foreign
Policy, Leadership And Unasur, International Organisations Research Journal. 11(2).
China Daily (2024). Lula da Silva. 50 years of the Brazil-China diplomatic relations:
Celebrating the past and launching the foundations of the future. August 15, Retrieved
in September 2024, from:
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202408/15/WS66bd306aa3104e74fddba011.html
Clotilde, Maria, Meirelles Ribeiro (2009). A ação internacional das entidades
subnacionais: teorias e visões sobre a paradiplomacia. Globalização e novos atores: a
paradiplomacia das cidades brasileiras [online]. Salvador: EDUFBA, pp. 33-68.
Conrad, Björn (2012). China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the ‘Beijing Climate Revolution’
and the ‘Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy.’ The China Quarterly 210 (June): pp. 435–55.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0305741012000458.
Costa, Cátia M. (2023). The Globalizing Discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative. The
Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics, January, pp. 55–66.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6700-9_4.
Costa, Cátia M.; Li, Yichao (2021). International and Domestic Discourses of Chins’a
Special Economic Zones: An Instrument for New Projects. In Handbook of Research on
Special Economic Zones as Regional Development Enablers, edited by Francisco José
Leandro and Yichao Li, pp. 39–57. https://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7619-9.
Dams, Ties (2024). How China Is Pursuing a New World Order among the Geopolitical
Ruins. Clingendael. (2024). Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/how-china-pursuing-new-world-order-among-
geopolitical-ruins.
Eckersley, Robyn (2012). Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or
Minilateralism? Global Environmental Politics 12 (2): pp. 24–42.
https://doi.org/10.1162/glep_a_00107.
Evangelista Medeiros, Sabrina, Laura Martucci Benvenuto (2020). BRICS and Brazil
Facing Complexity under Uncertainty. Journal of China and International Relations , 1–
22. https://doi.org/10.5278/jcir.v8iSE.4235.
Falkner, Robert (2015). “Towards Minilateralism.” Nature Climate Change 5 (9).
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292382384_Towards_minilateralism.
Ferreira-Pereira, Laura; Duarte, Paulo Afonso (2023). The South Atlantic in China’s Global
Policy: Why It Matters? In The Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese
Characteristics, edited by Francisco José B. S. Leandro and Enrique Martínez Galán, pp.
705–22.
Foguel, Juliana; Ana, Luiza Paiva; Sabrina, Medeiros (2014). Por Uma Análise Das
Relações Entre a Segurança Energética E a Defesa. Revista Da EGN 20 (2): pp. 401–34.
https://portaldeperiodicos.marinha.mil.br/index.php/revistadaegn/article/view/4559/44
09.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
56
Fonseca, Carmen (2011). “Brasil”. In Freire, M. R. (coord.), Política Externa: As Relações
Internacionais em Mudança. Coimbra University Press, pp. 97-124.
Groen, Lisanne (2020). Group Interaction in the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change.” Brill, pp. 267–84. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004384446_015.
Guilhon-Albuquerque, José-Augusto (2014). Brazil, China, US: A Triangular Relation?
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 57 (spe): pp. 108–20.
https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201400207.
Hallding, Karl, Marie Olsson, Aaron Atteridge, Marcus Carson, Antto Vihma, and Mikael
Roman (2011). Together Alone: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) and the
Climate Change Conundrum. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/Climate/sei-basic-preview-
jun2011.pdf.
Kobayashi, Yuka (2017). “Minilateralism à La Chine Strategic Responsibility in Climate
Change and Global Finance. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24924/1/Kobayashi-Sanchez-Final-policy-brief-17-August-
2017.pdf.
Larionova, Marina (2023). “G20 at the Critical Juncture. Indonesia’s 2022 Presidency:
Internal and External Shocks, Risks of Power Rebalancing and Eventual Demise, Causes
of Resilience and Re-Equilibrium. International Organisations Research Journal 18 (1):
33–74. https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2023-01-02.
Larionova, Marina, Andrey Shelepov (2021). BRICS, G20 and Global Economic
Governance Reform. International Political Science Review 43 (4): 019251212110351.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121211035122.
Lessa, Antônio Carlos (2010). Brazil’s Strategic Partnerships: An Assessment of the Lula
Era (2003-2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (spe): 115–31.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-73292010000300007.
Lins, Ronnie (2024). China, Brazil Representing Growing Diplomatic Role Played by Global
South - Global Times. Www.globaltimes.cn. 2024. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315997.shtml.
Maia, J. N. Bessa (2024). A reunião da Cosban e o adensamento da relação China-Brasil.
5 June, Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://portuguese.cri.cn/2024/06/05/ARTIMKNQeUU3TRVww0DrHf8R240605.shtml
Marcondes, Danilo; Pedro Henrique, Batista Barbosa (2018). Brazil-China Defense
Cooperation: A Strategic Partnership in the Making? Journal of Latin American Geography
17 (2): pp. 140–66. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44861540.
Mariana, Hase Ueta; Mathias, Alencastro; Rosana, Pinheiro-Machado (2023). How China
Is Transforming Brazil. Palgrave Macmillan.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
57
McGee, Jeffrey Scott (2011). Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within
International Climate Change Governance? PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary
International Studies 8 (3). https://doi.org/10.5130/portal.v8i3.1873.
Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2023). Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign
Affairs/International Relations – Joint Statement – New York, September 20, Retrieved
in September 2024, from: https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-
releases/meeting-of-brics-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-international-relations-2013-
joint-statement-2013-new-york-september-20-2023
Mladenov, Nickolay (2023). Minilateralism: A Concept That Is Changing the World Order.
The Washington Institute. April 14, 2023. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/minilateralism-concept-changing-
world-order.
Naim, Moises (2009). “Minilateralism.” Foreign Policy. 2009. Retrieved in September
2024, from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/.
Oliveira, Henrique de Altemani (2010). Brasil E China: Uma Nova Aliança Não Escrita?
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (2): pp. 88–105.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-73292010000200005.
Palmeira, José (2023). The Soft Power of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking
Countries. Portugal and the Lusophone World, pp. 473–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-
981-99-0455-6_23.
Petrone, Francesco (2021). BRICS and Civil Society: Challenges and Future Perspectives
in a Multipolar World. International Organisations Research Journal 16 (4): pp. 171–90.
https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2021-04-08.
Pooler, Michael, Bryan Harris (2024). Lula’s Playbook: Brazil Bets on a Return to State
Capitalism. Www.ft.com. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.ft.com/content/5c9d5735-639e-47c0-9eb6-a1fae26096e8.
Presidency of the Republic of Brazil (2023). Brasil E China Fecham 15 Acordos E Reforçam
Parceria. Secretaria de Comunicação Social. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.gov.br/secom/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2023/04/brasil-e-china-fecham-15-
acordos-e-reforcam-parceria.
Qi, Xinran. (2011). The Rise of BASIC in UN Climate Change Negotiations. South African
Journal of International Affairs 18 (3): pp. 295–318.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2011.622945.
Reuters (2022). China, Russia partner up against West at Olympics summit. February
14, Retrieved in September 2024, from: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-
china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/, February
4).
Rodrigues, Vieira; Vinícius, Guilherme (2023). Embedded Nationalism in a Fragmented
World: Lula’s Brazil. The Washington Quarterly 46 (1): pp. 45–60. Retrieved in
September 2024, from: https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2023.2192136.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
58
Santoro, Maurício (2022). Brazil–China Relations in the 21st Century.
Springerprofessional.de. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/brazil-china-relations-in-the-21st-
century/20240816.
Serra, José (2016). Política Externa Brasileira Brasil E China: 40 ANOS de Relações
Diplomáticas. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://funag.gov.br/loja/download/1174-brasil-e-china-40-anos.pdf.
Setzer, Joana; Karen, Anderton (2019). “Subnational Leaders and Diplomacy. Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, May.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.504.
Silva, Daniel da Afonso (2023). ‘Brazil Is Back’: The Return of the South on Lula’s Agenda.
Latinoamérica 21. 2023. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://latinoamerica21.com/en/brazil-is-back-the-return-of-the-south-on-lulas-
agenda/.
Soliz, Ana, De Stange (2023). China and Brazil’s Cooperation in the Satellite Sector
Implications for the United States? Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jun/14/2003241445/-1/-
1/1/08%20DE%20STANGE_VIEW.PDF.
Stephen, Matthew; Michal Parízek (2018). New Powers and the Distribution of
Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation. New
Political Economy 24 (6): pp. 735–58.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065.
Su Duygun, Elif (2022). “Minilateralism Is the New Multilateralism? .” Ghent University.
https://libstore.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/003/119/225/RUG01-
003119225_2023_0001_AC.pdf.
The Guardian (2023). ‘Brazil is back’: Lula to visit Xi as he resets diplomatic relations
with China. March 24, Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/24/lula-xi-jinping-visit-china-brazil-
diplomatic-relations-reset
The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2024). Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/bra/partner/chn
Tongerlo, Arjan van. (2023). Analysis | the Implications of China’s Clearing Arrangement
with Brazil. Medium. The Diplomatic Pouch. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://medium.com/the-diplomatic-pouch/analysis-the-implications-of-chinas-
clearing-arrangement-with-brazil-dcda25eba641.
van Noort, Carolijn (2018). Brics Issue-Narrative on Culture: Strategic or
Trivial?”International Journal of Cultural Policy 24 (6): pp. 786–97.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2018.1459589.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 38-59
Sino-Brazilian Cooperation in Analysis: Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Minilateralism
António Tavares, Asya Gasparyan, Cátia M. Costa, José Palmeira, Paulo Afonso B. Duarte,
Sabrina E. Mendes
59
Vazquez, Karin Costa (2021). Brazil and BRICS Multilateralism à La Carte: From
Bilateralism to Community Interest. Global Policy, August.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12969.
Vigevani, Tullo; Cepaluni, Gabriel (2007). A Política Externa de Lula Da Silva: A Estratégia
Da Autonomia Pela Diversificação. Contexto Internacional 29 (2): pp. 273–335.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-85292007000200002.
Wuthnow, Joel (2018). U.S. ‘Minilateralism’ in Asia and China’s Responses: A New
Security Dilemma? Journal of Contemporary China 28 (115): pp. 133–50.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1497916.
Zeraoui, Zidane (2016). “Para Entender La Paradiplomacia.” Desafíos 28 (1): pp. 15–34.
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=359643444001.
Zhang, Shu G.; Ni, Chen (2021). Beijing’s Institutionalised Economic Statecraft towards
Brazil: A Case Study. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 50 (3): pp. 339–65.
https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026211041630.
Zumah, Samuel (2024). The Rationale behind China’s Alignment with the Global South.
Modern Diplomacy. March 19, 2024. Retrieved in September 2024, from:
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/03/19/the-rationale-behind-chinas-alignment-with-
the-global-south/.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
60
STRENGTHENING SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS THROUGH BRICS:
DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
MOHAMAD ZREIK
zreik@mail.sysu.edu.cn
Postdoctoral Fellow at Sun Yat-sen University (China). His published works has focused on
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Arab-region impact. Presently, he furthers his research on
China’s soft power diplomacy tactics at Sun Yat-sen University.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6812-6529.
Abstract
This paper examines the role of the BRICS alliance, particularly focusing on how it serves as
a platform for enhancing relations between China and Brazil, and explores the future
development prospects within this framework. By analyzing bilateral trade agreements,
cultural exchanges, and political collaborations initiated under the BRICS umbrella, the study
identifies key areas where both nations have significantly benefited. It highlights the strategic
importance of these relations in the context of global geopolitics and economic shifts.
Furthermore, the paper discusses the impact of these enhanced ties on regional development,
technology transfer, and sustainable growth initiatives. It argues that the strengthened
partnership not only promotes mutual development but also facilitates a broader South-South
cooperation, positioning BRICS as a crucial player in shaping a multipolar world order. The
findings suggest that sustained focus on cooperation in areas like renewable energy,
agricultural technology, and digital innovation can lead to substantial progress and stability in
the region.
Keywords
BRICS, Sino-Brazilian Relations, Global Geopolitics, Sustainable Development, South-South
Cooperation.
Resumo
Este artigo examina o papel da aliança BRICS, concentrando-se particularmente na forma
como ela serve como plataforma para melhorar as relações entre a China e o Brasil, e explora
as perspectivas futuras de desenvolvimento dentro deste quadro. Ao analisar acordos
comerciais bilaterais, intercâmbios culturais e colaborações políticas iniciadas sob a égide dos
BRICS, o estudo identifica áreas-chave onde ambas as nações beneficiaram
significativamente. Destaca a importância estratégica destas relações no contexto da
geopolítica global e das mudanças económicas. Além disso, o documento discute o impacto
destes laços reforçados no desenvolvimento regional, na transferência de tecnologia e nas
iniciativas de crescimento sustentável. Argumenta que a parceria reforçada não só promove
o desenvolvimento mútuo, mas também facilita uma cooperação Sul-Sul mais ampla,
posicionando os BRICS, como um interveniente crucial na formação de uma ordem mundial
multipolar. As conclusões sugerem que o foco sustentado na cooperação em áreas como as
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
61
energias renováveis, a tecnologia agrícola e a inovação digital pode levar a um progresso
substancial e à estabilidade na região.
Palavras-chave
BRICS, Relações Sino-Brasileiras, Geopolítica Global, Desenvolvimento Sustentável,
Cooperação Sul-Sul.
How to cite this article
Zreik, Mohamad (2024). Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics: Development
Prospects and Strategic Partnerships. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2,
TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”.
December 2024, pp. 60-79. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.3.
Article received on 21 August 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
62
STRENGTHENING SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS THROUGH BRICS:
DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS
MOHAMAD ZREIK
1. Introduction
Sino-Brazilian relations have gained increasing prominence in recent years as both
nations have solidified their partnership through economic, cultural, and strategic
collaboration (Hooijmaaijers, 2021). As China emerges as the world's second-largest
economy and Brazil stands as the largest economy in Latin America, the cooperative
relationship between these two giants is vital for their respective growth and influence.
Their cooperation extends beyond traditional trade relations to areas like technology
transfer, cultural exchanges, and joint strategies on global issues. The BRICS alliance,
which includes Russia, India, and South Africa alongside China and Brazil, has been
instrumental in strengthening these ties (Lagutina, 2019; Stuenkel, 2020). Initially
formed as an informal grouping of emerging economies, BRICS has developed into a
strategic platform that allows member nations to coordinate efforts and address global
challenges (Arapova, 2019). Within this framework, China and Brazil have found a space
to align their interests and emphasize sustainable development, enhancing their bilateral
ties while leveraging their influence on regional and global matters.
The objectives of this study are to analyze how the BRICS framework strengthens Sino-
Brazilian relations and supports broader development goals for both nations. It seeks to
examine how China and Brazil use BRICS to deepen economic, political, and cultural ties,
investigate the effects of this partnership on global geopolitics and sustainable growth
initiatives, and identify key areas for further cooperation, particularly in renewable
energy, agricultural technology, and digital innovation. Furthermore, the study aims to
underscore BRICS's role in fostering a more balanced and inclusive world order.
Policymakers, scholars, and business leaders can gain valuable insights into the evolving
dynamics of international politics and economics through this analysis.
This paper will begin by exploring the historical background of the BRICS alliance and its
role in shaping Sino-Brazilian relations. It will then review the existing literature to
establish a theoretical foundation for the analysis. The study will delve into key areas
where BRICS has facilitated significant collaboration between China and Brazil, focusing
on bilateral trade agreements, cultural exchanges, and political partnerships. It will then
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
63
examine the impact of these strengthened ties on regional development, technology
transfer, and sustainable growth initiatives, emphasizing their significance for Latin
America, Asia, and beyond. The paper will also explore the strategic importance of this
partnership in the context of global geopolitics and South-South cooperation, illustrating
how BRICS provides emerging economies with a voice in global governance.
Finally, the paper will explore future development prospects, identifying potential areas
for further cooperation and offering recommendations for deepening partnerships while
addressing future challenges. The conclusion will summarize key findings and reaffirm
the strategic importance of BRICS for Sino-Brazilian relations and global cooperation.
2. Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative research methodology, combining both a literature review
and case study analysis to explore the strengthening of Sino-Brazilian relations through
the BRICS framework. The literature review includes scholarly articles, policy papers, and
reports from international organizations, focusing on the economic, cultural, and political
dimensions of Sino-Brazilian cooperation. Additionally, case studies on bilateral trade
agreements, cultural exchanges, and strategic partnerships in areas like renewable
energy and technology transfer are examined to provide an in-depth understanding of
how these initiatives are facilitated within the BRICS framework. This approach allows
for a comprehensive analysis of the impacts and future prospects of Sino-Brazilian
cooperation, while also identifying potential challenges and opportunities for further
collaboration.
3. Background of BRICS and Sino-Brazilian Relations
The concept of BRICS emerged in the early 2000s when economist Jim O’Neill coined the
term to represent Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the world’s rapidly growing
economies (Kiely, 2015). South Africa was later included in the grouping in 2010,
transforming BRIC into BRICS (Asuelime & Jethro, 2013). The alliance started as an
informal grouping focused on economic collaboration but quickly gained importance as a
platform for emerging economies to coordinate policies on global economic and political
issues. BRICS has since evolved into an influential entity with annual summits and
multilateral initiatives, such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve
Arrangement (Qobo & Soko, 2015; Batista Jr, 2021). The aim was to create an alternative
to Western-dominated institutions, providing a forum for these nations to advocate for a
more inclusive and multipolar global order (Chakraborty, 2018).
China and Brazil are pivotal members of the BRICS group. China is the world's most
populous nation and the second-largest economy, characterized by rapid economic
growth and industrialization over the past four decades. It has a significant influence on
global trade and investment, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Koveos &
Zhang, 2023). Politically, China's global influence is expanding through initiatives like the
Belt and Road Initiative (Lewin & Witt, 2022). Culturally, it seeks to promote its language
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
64
and values abroad through Confucius Institutes and other soft power initiatives (Zreik,
2024).
Brazil, on the other hand, is Latin America’s largest economy and plays a leading role in
regional political and economic affairs. Its diverse economy is driven by agriculture,
mining, energy, and manufacturing (Bernal-Meza, 2022). As a major exporter of
agricultural products, Brazil has an extensive trade network that complements China's
needs for raw materials and food (Oliveira & Schneider, 2016). Politically, Brazil seeks to
expand its global presence and foster regional integration. Culturally, Brazil promotes its
vibrant and diverse heritage to the world, aligning with China's soft power interests in
promoting mutual understanding (Samson & Sandroni, 2013).
The formation of BRICS has been instrumental in strengthening Sino-Brazilian ties
(Batista Barbosa, 2021). Through this alliance, both nations have found common ground
to promote their economic interests and engage in strategic dialogues. China and Brazil
share complementary economic structures, which has facilitated their growing trade
partnership. China became Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009, driven by Brazilian
exports of agricultural products and minerals, and imports of Chinese machinery,
electronics, and consumer goods (Jenkins, 2012).
Politically, the BRICS framework allows China and Brazil to align their diplomatic efforts
on key global issues, such as reforming international financial institutions, advocating for
climate change mitigation, and promoting sustainable development (Sampene et al.,
2021). Their cooperation through BRICS has also facilitated partnerships in areas like
technology transfer, infrastructure investment, and educational exchanges. For instance,
the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai, has funded infrastructure
projects that benefit both nations and other developing countries (Wang, 2019).
Culturally, BRICS has promoted mutual understanding between China and Brazil through
various cultural exchanges and educational programs (Chang, Chen & Xiong, 2018). Both
nations have shown a willingness to celebrate their diversity while fostering people-to-
people connections through initiatives like student exchanges, joint research, and arts
collaborations.
4. Literature Review
The literature on BRICS's impact in international politics and economics is rich with
analyses that explore its potential to redefine global governance. Scholars like Cooper
and Öniş & Kutlay (2020) have extensively discussed the strategic significance of BRICS
in challenging the dominance of Western powers within global institutions. They highlight
the alliance's advocacy for reforms in the United Nations Security Council and its push
for greater representation in international financial institutions, arguing that BRICS is
transforming into a pivotal political force for a more balanced world order.
Economically, Hooijmaaijers (2021) provide insights into how economic synergies among
BRICS countries are reshaping global trade and investment flows. His research points to
a substantial increase in intra-BRICS trade, which has diversified economic dependencies
away from traditional Western markets. Furthermore, the establishment of the New
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
65
Development Bank in 2015, as he notes, marks a significant move towards financial
independence, offering alternative funding sources for infrastructure projects in
developing countries.
In terms of South-South cooperation, Cooper (2017) analyzes how BRICS leverages its
collective capacity to support sustainable development initiatives across the Global
South. He emphasizes the role of the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in providing
financial stability to BRICS nations, alongside promoting technological and cultural
exchanges that enhance mutual development.
Kim & Tromp (2021) examine the increasing trade volume between the two countries,
emphasizing how China’s rise to Brazil’s largest trading partner has transformed their
economic relationship. They argue that China's high demand for Brazilian raw materials,
particularly soybeans, iron ore, and oil, has significantly benefited Brazil’s export-oriented
economy. However, the authors also caution that this dependence on commodities makes
Brazil vulnerable to fluctuations in Chinese demand.
Da Silva Medina & Pokorny (2022) delve into the diversification of bilateral trade, noting
the gradual shift from primarily commodities to value-added products. They assert that
while China's growing middle class provides new opportunities for Brazilian exporters in
sectors like agribusiness and food processing, Brazil still faces the challenge of increasing
its competitiveness in higher-value manufacturing sectors to fully benefit from this
relationship.
Zhang & Chen (2021) explore the political aspects of Sino-Brazilian trade relations,
particularly how both nations leverage the BRICS platform to advocate for fairer global
trade rules. Their research indicates that BRICS collaboration has facilitated dialogue and
understanding between the two nations, leading to smoother negotiations on bilateral
agreements and reducing trade barriers. However, they also highlight that China's pursuit
of strategic investments in Brazilian infrastructure and energy sectors can create tensions
due to concerns about sovereignty and competition.
In addition, Jenne (2021) analyze the broader implications of Sino-Brazilian trade for
regional integration and South-South cooperation. She emphasizes that China's
investments in Brazilian infrastructure and manufacturing have helped stimulate
economic growth and regional development in Latin America, promoting greater
integration through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative.
Scholars like Lugo-Ocando (2020) discuss South-South cooperation as a counter-
narrative to the historical dominance of North-South aid structures. He argues that the
principles of mutual respect, solidarity, and shared development underpin these
partnerships, differentiating them from traditional aid frameworks. South-South
cooperation is seen as a way for developing countries to collectively negotiate for fairer
terms in global trade, finance, and governance.
In the context of strategic partnerships, Keukeleire & Hooijmaaijers (2014) explore the
role of regional organizations and alliances like BRICS in promoting development
objectives. They argue that these partnerships enable emerging economies to combine
their strengths and promote common agendas, such as climate change adaptation,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
66
poverty reduction, and technological transfer. BRICS, in particular, serves as an
influential platform where members align their diplomatic strategies to shape global
policy reforms.
Wolfe (2010) offers an analysis of how strategic partnerships foster resilience among
emerging economies. He examines the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the New
Development Bank, noting that these financial tools provide crucial support during
economic downturns. Such mechanisms have become pillars of economic cooperation
within BRICS, enabling member countries to pursue long-term infrastructural and
technological projects that underpin growth.
Furthermore, De Moortel & Crispeels (2018) explores how strategic partnerships facilitate
technology transfer and innovation. He emphasizes that knowledge-sharing in renewable
energy, agriculture, and digital innovation accelerates development while reducing
dependence on Western technologies.
5. Key Areas of Sino-Brazilian Cooperation within BRICS
5.1. Bilateral Trade Agreements
China and Brazil have developed an increasingly robust trade relationship, particularly
since the early 21st century (Siddiqui, 2016). Their partnership is cemented through
several bilateral trade agreements that focus on reducing trade barriers and promoting
economic cooperation. The two countries are members of the BRICS alliance, which has
become a significant platform for advancing their trade interests. In addition to their
cooperation within BRICS, they have signed agreements that span various sectors. A
notable example is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Investment and Trade
Promotion signed in 2004, which paved the way for greater investment and economic
collaboration (Eberling, 2017). The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, formalized in
2012, strengthened economic ties and established frameworks for dialogue on energy,
agriculture, infrastructure, and financial services. As a result of these agreements, China
has emerged as Brazil's largest trading partner, surpassing the United States in 2009
(Cardoso, 2013).
The BRICS framework has played a pivotal role in accelerating Sino-Brazilian trade
growth and diversification. China imports a substantial volume of commodities from
Brazil, primarily soybeans, iron ore, and crude oil (Casanova, Xia & Ferreira, 2016). These
imports fulfill China's domestic demand for food security and raw materials to sustain its
industrial growth. Brazil, in turn, imports a significant amount of Chinese machinery,
electronics, and manufactured goods, which bolster its manufacturing capabilities
(Eichengreen & Tong, 2006).
Beyond the traditional commodity sectors, both countries have made strides in
diversifying their trade portfolios. China has shown growing interest in Brazilian
agricultural products, such as beef and poultry, while Brazilian companies have tapped
into China's consumer electronics and automotive markets (Blanchard, 2019).
Additionally, their partnership within BRICS has enabled the New Development Bank to
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
67
fund infrastructure projects in Brazil, promoting broader economic growth and attracting
Chinese investments in energy, mining, and logistics (Yarygina & Krylova, 2023).
Despite the remarkable growth in bilateral trade, several challenges and opportunities
persist in further strengthening Sino-Brazilian economic relations. One significant
challenge is Brazil's heavy dependence on commodity exports to China, which makes the
country vulnerable to fluctuations in global demand and prices. Such reliance can
adversely affect Brazil’s economy during downturns or shifts in Chinese consumption
patterns. Moreover, concerns exist about Brazil’s trade deficit in manufactured goods
with China, given that many Brazilian industries struggle to compete with lower-priced
Chinese products (Wise, 2016).
Another challenge lies in regulatory barriers and differing standards between the two
nations. Brazilian exporters often face hurdles complying with Chinese import
regulations, while Chinese investors encounter bureaucratic delays in securing approvals
for their projects in Brazil (Méndez & Turzi, 2020). Furthermore, geopolitical tensions and
the diversification of supply chains could lead to protectionist policies that hinder free
trade.
Despite these challenges, significant opportunities for expanding and diversifying
bilateral trade relations exist. Both nations have the potential to collaborate further in
areas like renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and technological innovation. Brazil’s
vast renewable energy resources and China's expertise in solar and wind technology
provide a perfect foundation for strategic partnerships in clean energy. Likewise,
opportunities in agribusiness can be further explored as China seeks sustainable sources
of food and Brazil seeks to add value to its agricultural products (Oliveira & Schneider,
2016).
Moreover, joint initiatives to improve transport and logistics infrastructure can enhance
trade efficiency between the two economies, and cooperation within BRICS can help
address the financing gaps for such projects. Through consistent dialogue and mutual
trust, China and Brazil can continue to unlock the untapped potential of their strategic
economic partnership while ensuring sustainable growth for both economies (Scoones et.
al., 2016).
5.2. Cultural Exchanges
China and Brazil have recognized the value of cultural exchanges in deepening their
diplomatic relationship, and various initiatives have been implemented to foster mutual
understanding. These efforts aim to promote a rich exchange of values, traditions, and
artistic expression that goes beyond the economic sphere. One prominent initiative is the
establishment of Confucius Institutes across Brazil, which provide a platform for Brazilian
students to learn the Chinese language and gain insight into Chinese culture and history
(Li & Xiaohong, 2016). This has helped raise awareness and appreciation of Chinese
customs and philosophies, and the programs also encourage academic exchanges,
enabling Brazilian students and researchers to study in China.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
68
Brazil, in turn, has promoted its vibrant cultural heritage through events like the Brazilian
Carnival and film festivals hosted in Beijing and Shanghai. Brazilian embassies and
consulates often organize art exhibitions, music performances, and food festivals to
showcase the country’s multicultural identity. Additionally, tourism and travel exchanges
have grown significantly, facilitated by visa waivers and streamlined travel policies
between the two nations. Cultural understanding has also been enhanced through
collaboration in sports, as seen in the popularity of Brazilian football in China and the
exchange programs set up during events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics
(Júnior & Rodrigues, 2023).
Furthermore, academic institutions and think tanks from both countries have been
actively fostering collaboration through joint research projects, seminars, and
conferences focused on topics ranging from history and anthropology to technology and
economics (Lugo-Ocando, 2020). Such partnerships build an intellectual bridge that
deepens mutual understanding.
These cultural exchanges have profoundly influenced diplomatic relations between China
and Brazil by creating a foundation of mutual respect and trust. Through the Confucius
Institutes and language exchange programs, Brazilians have gained a better
understanding of China's social norms and historical context, dispelling myths and
misconceptions that often arise due to geographic and linguistic barriers. This has
contributed to a more positive perception of China in Brazil, easing diplomatic dialogues
and enhancing cooperation across various sectors (Li & Xiaohong, 2016).
Similarly, China's growing appreciation for Brazilian culture has strengthened the
countries' diplomatic ties. Events like Brazilian Carnival in China and Brazilian-themed
festivals have sparked interest among Chinese citizens in Brazilian arts, music, and sports
(Spooner, 2016). This cultural admiration has translated into improved people-to-people
connections and a welcoming environment for Brazilian businesses seeking to expand
into the Chinese market.
These exchanges have also helped both nations identify common values and goals. For
instance, their shared passion for sports, particularly football, has paved the way for
cooperation in youth development programs, while their academic collaborations have
fostered policy dialogues on sustainable development and poverty reduction. Joint
research initiatives have also led to innovative solutions that align with each country's
aspirations (Jenne, 2021).
Moreover, cultural understanding has proven instrumental in reducing diplomatic
tensions and preventing miscommunications, especially during negotiations on sensitive
issues like trade barriers and foreign investment policies. By highlighting shared values
and fostering goodwill, these exchanges have helped both nations focus on collaborative
opportunities rather than areas of disagreement (Méndez & Turzi, 2020).
5.3. Political Collaboration
Within the BRICS framework, China and Brazil have found considerable alignment in their
political agendas and policies, advocating for a multipolar world order that emphasizes
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
69
fairness and inclusivity. Both nations share a common understanding of the importance
of reforming international institutions to better reflect the interests and aspirations of
developing countries. They argue that the existing frameworks, largely dominated by
Western powers, no longer represent the current geopolitical landscape (Flint & Xiaotong,
2019).
China and Brazil have consistently advocated for reforms in international financial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, calling for a
more equitable distribution of voting rights. They emphasize the need to increase the
representation of emerging economies to ensure that global economic governance aligns
with contemporary realities. In this regard, they actively collaborate on economic
strategies that counterbalance Western dominance, such as developing the New
Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide alternative
sources of financing for developing nations (Biziwick, Cattaneo & Fryer, 2015).
On the political front, both countries call for greater inclusivity in the United Nations
Security Council, where Brazil aspires to obtain permanent membership. China, with its
significant diplomatic influence, supports Brazil’s candidacy as part of its vision for a more
representative and balanced Security Council (Garcia & Coelho, 2018). Furthermore, the
BRICS nations collectively advocate for climate change mitigation, peace, and sustainable
development, emphasizing the need for greater cooperation among emerging economies
(Kıprızlı & Köstem, 2022).
Beyond their collaboration within BRICS, China and Brazil have pursued joint diplomatic
efforts on various regional and global platforms. In Latin America, China has steadily
expanded its diplomatic footprint, with Brazil serving as a gateway for these efforts. Both
nations work together to advance South-South cooperation by fostering economic
partnerships with other Latin American countries. This includes investments in
infrastructure projects, renewable energy, and technology transfer that contribute to
regional integration and sustainable development (Wang et al., 2020).
China has deepened its relationship with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC) through regular ministerial meetings and policy dialogues, a move that
aligns with Brazil's broader foreign policy interests in the region (De Souza & Cavalcante,
2017). As a result, Brazil and China have been instrumental in shaping regional economic
policies that promote infrastructure connectivity and sustainable growth.
On global platforms like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the two
nations present a united front in advocating for developing economies. They are vocal
proponents of trade liberalization that addresses imbalances, particularly those impacting
agricultural exports. China has often supported Brazil in its efforts to challenge unfair
trade practices, while Brazil aligns with China's pursuit of economic openness and
technological innovation (Casanova, Xia & Ferreira, 2016).
In Africa, both nations share a common interest in sustainable development. Their joint
diplomatic engagements aim to address critical challenges such as food security, poverty
alleviation, and health. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes Brazil as a
cooperative partner, offering opportunities for collaboration in energy, transportation,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
70
and manufacturing that benefit multiple regions (Montoya, Delgado & Kaltenecker,
2019).
6. Impact on Regional Development and Strategic Partnerships
6.1. Technology Transfer
The collaborative efforts between China and Brazil in technology transfer and research
and development (R&D) are crucial elements of their strategic partnership. Both nations
recognize that technological innovation is a driving force behind economic growth and
sustainable development. They have actively pursued joint projects that leverage their
respective strengths to foster innovation in various sectors (Casanova, Xia & Ferreira,
2016).
A significant manifestation of this collaboration is the China-Brazil Earth Resources
Satellite (CBERS) program, a landmark initiative that began in 1988 and has launched
multiple remote sensing satellites to monitor Earth's resources (Furtado & Filho, 2003).
By sharing satellite imagery, the program provides both nations with valuable data on
agriculture, forestry, water resources, and disaster management. This data-sharing
initiative enhances their technological capacities and enables them to better manage
environmental and developmental challenges.
Furthermore, both nations have established research partnerships between universities,
research institutes, and private enterprises. The Sino-Brazilian Joint Laboratory for High-
Speed Rail Technology is one such partnership that seeks to exchange expertise in high-
speed rail development (Ueta, Alencastro & Pinheiro-Machado, 2023). This project aims
to modernize Brazil’s rail network, reduce logistics costs, and promote sustainable
transportation solutions. In the energy sector, Chinese companies have been actively
involved in helping Brazil harness its immense renewable energy potential, particularly
in hydropower, wind, and solar energy (Hochstetler & Kostka, 2015). Collaborative
research in biotechnology and digital technology has also been pursued to bolster
agricultural productivity and industrial automation (Au & Da Silva, 2021).
These technology transfer initiatives present immense potential for improving the
technological competitiveness of both China and Brazil. For Brazil, the transfer of Chinese
expertise in infrastructure development, high-speed rail, and renewable energy can
significantly enhance its technological capabilities (Au & Da Silva, 2021). This would
modernize Brazil's transportation and energy infrastructure and improve logistics,
productivity, and access to international markets.
In return, China benefits from Brazil's expertise in agricultural technology, which plays a
critical role in ensuring food security. Brazil's advancements in developing genetically
modified crops and improving agricultural practices provide valuable knowledge that can
enhance China's food production (Casanova, Xia & Ferreira, 2016). By incorporating
Brazilian agricultural technologies, China can ensure a stable and sustainable food supply
to meet its growing domestic demands.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
71
Moreover, joint research initiatives lay the foundation for technological breakthroughs
that can improve global competitiveness. The synergy between China's advanced
manufacturing and digital infrastructure and Brazil's innovative agricultural and energy
solutions can create new growth opportunities in various high-tech sectors. As both
countries continue to prioritize digital transformation, the collaboration between their
tech industries can open new markets for high-value products and services, from AI and
data analytics to smart agriculture and green energy (Chang, Chen & Xiong, 2018).
6.2. Sustainable Growth Initiatives
China and Brazil have recognized renewable energy as a cornerstone of sustainable
growth, and their collaboration in this sector has yielded significant progress and future
potential. Brazil's extensive natural resources offer abundant opportunities for renewable
energy production, especially in hydropower, wind, and solar energy. China, a global
leader in renewable energy technology, has provided technical expertise, investment,
and equipment to help Brazil unlock its renewable energy potential (Rizzi, van Eck & Frey,
2014).
In hydropower, China has made notable investments in Brazilian projects, sharing its
expertise in constructing and managing dams. State-owned companies like China Three
Gorges Corporation have acquired stakes in Brazilian hydropower plants, enhancing
Brazil's energy grid stability and efficiency. Wind energy is another area where their
collaboration is evident. Chinese firms like Goldwind have partnered with Brazilian
counterparts to establish wind farms in resource-rich regions, supplying advanced
turbines and technology to increase Brazil's clean energy capacity (Rubio & Jáuregui,
2022).
Solar energy also holds promising prospects due to Brazil's favorable climate and
expansive land area. The two countries have worked on knowledge transfer and capacity
building in photovoltaic (PV) technology (De Souza & Cavalcante, 2017). China's
expertise in mass-producing solar panels and Brazil's commitment to expanding its solar
infrastructure could accelerate renewable energy adoption.
Agricultural technology forms another critical aspect of the sustainable growth initiatives
between China and Brazil. Brazil is a global agricultural powerhouse, providing substantial
volumes of soybeans, beef, poultry, and other products to China, which has rapidly
expanded its imports to meet growing domestic demand (Xu et. al., 2016).
China has sought to learn from Brazil's advancements in agricultural technology,
particularly in sustainable farming practices and biotechnology. This collaboration has led
to projects focused on improving crop yields and disease resistance through genetic
modification. Brazilian research institutions have shared techniques for reducing
deforestation and soil degradation while maximizing productivity, vital in ensuring
sustainable agricultural growth (Scoones et. al., 2016).
In return, Chinese companies have shared expertise in mechanization and irrigation
technologies, helping Brazilian farmers increase their efficiency and reduce water
consumption (Xu et al., 2016). By jointly investing in research and development, both
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
72
countries are working to diversify crop production, improve food security, and establish
resilient supply chains less affected by climate variability and market disruptions.
Moreover, initiatives such as the China-Brazil Agricultural Technology Demonstration
Park aim to provide practical, field-based solutions to farmers by demonstrating best
practices and innovative technologies (Scoones et al., 2016). This cooperation not only
improves agricultural sustainability but also contributes to rural development by
providing technical training and creating employment opportunities.
6.3. Regional Development
The strengthening of Sino-Brazilian relations through BRICS has significant socio-
economic implications for both Latin America and Asia. Brazil and China serve as
gateways for regional development, using their extensive networks to promote growth,
investment, and cooperation across continents (Wise, 2016).
In Latin America, Brazil is a dominant economic force, and its partnership with China
opens new avenues for growth across the region. China's increasing investment in
infrastructure, manufacturing, and resource extraction not only enhances Brazil's
economic standing but also generates spillover benefits for neighboring countries.
Investments in road, rail, and port infrastructure make Latin American markets more
accessible to Asia, boosting trade and connectivity. Additionally, Chinese companies’
involvement in developing industrial and logistical hubs in Brazil provides employment
opportunities and knowledge transfer, stimulating local economies (Casanova, Xia &
Ferreira, 2016).
Meanwhile, China's collaboration with Brazil in the energy sector provides more stable
and diversified energy supplies, benefiting Brazil and surrounding nations. Access to
renewable energy technologies, like solar and wind, allows Latin American countries to
meet their rising energy demands while reducing carbon emissions (Méndez & Turzi,
2020).
In Asia, China's close ties with Brazil create an opportunity to strengthen relationships
with Latin America's broader economic community. Asian companies benefit from Brazil’s
large consumer base and resource-rich markets through favorable trade deals negotiated
under the BRICS umbrella (Christensen, 2015). Furthermore, the diplomatic alignment
between China and Brazil establishes a foundation for cross-continental cooperation,
providing Asian nations with a framework for securing raw materials and energy supplies.
The BRICS alliance plays a pivotal role in addressing regional inequalities by fostering
inclusive development through its shared initiatives. The New Development Bank (NDB),
established by BRICS nations, has provided financing for infrastructure and sustainable
development projects in all member states, including Brazil (Suchodolski &
Demeulemeester, 2018). In Latin America, NDB-funded projects prioritize access to clean
water, sanitation, transportation, and energy infrastructure, reducing disparities between
rural and urban regions.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
73
Moreover, BRICS nations emphasize South-South cooperation, particularly in capacity
building, technology transfer, and education. Their joint efforts support rural
development programs that empower marginalized communities through technical
training and microfinance opportunities. For instance, partnerships between Chinese and
Brazilian universities facilitate academic exchanges that produce innovative solutions for
poverty alleviation and agricultural productivity (Montoya, Delgado & Kaltenecker, 2019).
In Asia, China's participation in BRICS has strengthened regional initiatives by enhancing
infrastructure development across the continent. The BRICS-led Contingent Reserve
Arrangement provides financial safety nets to member countries facing liquidity crises,
ensuring stability in volatile economic times (Katada, Roberts & Armijo, 2017). Such
mechanisms empower developing nations to maintain social programs that uplift
impoverished regions, ultimately narrowing regional disparities.
7. Global Geopolitics and South-South Cooperation
The world is shifting from a unipolar system dominated by the United States to a
multipolar order characterized by multiple centers of power. This transformation is largely
driven by the economic rise of emerging markets, particularly China and India. Latin
America, with its rich resources and growing economies, has also become a key player
in global geopolitics. Alliances like BRICS have underscored this shift by providing a
platform for emerging economies to assert their influence. BRICS, which includes Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa, collectively represents a substantial portion of the
world’s population and economic output (Öniş & Kutlay, 2020).
China, a leading advocate for this multipolar order, has expanded its global influence
through infrastructure investments, trade agreements, and diplomatic engagements. Its
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) extends into Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and
Europe, reflecting China's strategic ambitions to reshape global commerce (Zreik, 2021).
Simultaneously, Brazil seeks to solidify its leadership in South America, leveraging its
economic strength, resource wealth, and strategic location.
Together, China and Brazil advocate for reforming international institutions to better
represent the current balance of global power. They emphasize inclusivity and the
equitable representation of developing economies, challenging the dominance of
Western-led structures like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Batista
Jr, 2021). BRICS, in this context, serves as a key platform for these efforts, with both
nations pushing for reforms that give emerging economies a stronger voice in global
governance.
BRICS has made significant strides in fostering South-South cooperation, offering an
alternative to traditional Western-led models of development. This includes the New
Development Bank (NDB), which funds sustainable development projects that bypass
traditional lenders, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which provides financial
safety nets for member states (Qobo & Soko, 2015). These mechanisms are instrumental
in promoting inclusive growth and supporting long-term development strategies.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
74
In addition to economic goals, BRICS has played a critical role in diplomatic affairs. The
bloc regularly consults on foreign policy issues, presenting a unified stance on climate
change, cybersecurity, and trade liberalization. Joint military exercises, though limited in
scope, signal the willingness of BRICS nations to protect their shared interests (Bernal-
Meza, 2022). Sino-Brazilian cooperation, particularly, has become a driving force for
South-South alliances, serving as a model for how emerging economies can collaborate
on shared development goals (Blanchard, 2019).
China’s investments in Brazil have extended beyond bilateral relations into Latin America,
where infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and ports enhance regional
connectivity. This infrastructure is vital for efficiently transporting commodities, thus
facilitating trade between Brazil and China and other Latin American countries. As Brazil
evolves into a logistical hub, neighboring nations gain better access to Asian markets
(Casanova, Xia & Ferreira, 2016).
Moreover, the Sino-Brazilian partnership emphasizes technology transfer initiatives that
strengthen the agricultural, energy, and manufacturing sectors. Brazil’s expertise in
agriculture, coupled with China's capabilities in manufacturing and digital infrastructure,
creates a powerful synergy that fosters productivity across regions (Xu et al., 2016).
Renewable energy collaboration is also a cornerstone of sustainable growth initiatives
between the two nations, with China investing in Brazil’s hydropower, wind, and solar
projects, while Brazil shares its agricultural technologies to ensure food security and
environmental sustainability (Rizzi, van Eck & Frey, 2014).
Beyond bilateral engagements, China and Brazil champion South-South cooperation
within multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade
Organization. Their joint efforts focus on addressing poverty alleviation, fair trade, and
environmental sustainability. For instance, both nations have advocated for agricultural
subsidies that protect the livelihoods of small-scale farmers in developing regions
(Scoones et al., 2016).
8. Conclusion
This paper has explored the evolving relationship between China and Brazil within the
BRICS framework and how it serves as a strategic platform for strengthening their
bilateral relations. Through an examination of bilateral trade agreements, cultural
exchanges, and political collaborations, it is evident that both nations have significantly
benefited from their partnership. This collaboration has not only advanced mutual
development but has also bolstered broader South-South cooperation, providing a
template for emerging economies to align their interests.
Their shared investments in renewable energy, agricultural technology, and digital
innovation underscore the potential for improving technological competitiveness and
achieving sustainable growth. By leveraging each other's strengths, China and Brazil can
address key challenges, such as diversifying energy sources and enhancing food security,
while contributing to global initiatives on climate change and digital transformation.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
75
Furthermore, this partnership highlights the strategic importance of BRICS in shaping
the emerging multipolar world order. BRICS provides an alternative model of inclusive
global governance, ensuring that the voices of developing nations are heard in
international institutions. Sino-Brazilian cooperation exemplifies how emerging
economies can challenge traditional power structures and foster equitable growth.
Looking ahead, it is essential for China and Brazil to continue deepening their partnership
by promoting technology transfer, aligning policy priorities, and increasing collaboration
in key sectors. Addressing challenges such as trade imbalances and environmental
impacts, while fostering public-private partnerships, will be crucial to ensuring the long-
term success of this relationship. By committing to these principles, Sino-Brazilian
relations can serve as a global example of cooperative progress and set the stage for
continued leadership within the BRICS alliance in promoting sustainable development
and a multipolar world order.
References
Arapova, E. Y. (2019). The “BRICS Plus” as the first international platform connecting
regional trade agreements. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 19(2), 30-46.
Asuelime, L., & Jethro, A. (2013). Building with BRICS: A burgeoning dynamic for South
Africa. Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development, 3(3), 29-37.
Au, L., & Da Silva, R. G. L. (2021). Globalizing the scientific bandwagon: trajectories of
precision medicine in China and Brazil. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 46(1),
192-225.
Batista Barbosa, P. H. (2021). Chinese Economic Statecraft and China's Oil Development
Finance in Brazil. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 50(3), 366-390.
Batista Jr, P. N. (2021). The BRICS and the Financing Mechanisms They Created. Anthem
Press.
Bernal-Meza, R. (2022). The Rise and Decline of Brazil as a Regional Power (2003–
2016). Latin American Perspectives, 49(5), 51-67.
Biziwick, M., Cattaneo, N., & Fryer, D. (2015). The rationale for and potential role of the
BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement. South African Journal of International
Affairs, 22(3), 307-324.
Blanchard, J. M. F. (2019). Brazil’s Samba with China: Economics brought them closer,
but failed to ensure their tango. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24(4), 583-603.
Cardoso, D. (2013). China-Brazil: a strategic partnership in an evolving world order. East
Asia, 30(1), 35-51.
Casanova, C., Xia, L., & Ferreira, R. (2016). Measuring Latin America’s export
dependency on China. Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies, 9(3),
213-233.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
76
Chakraborty, S. (2018). Significance of BRICS: Regional powers, global governance, and
the roadmap for multipolar world. Emerging Economy Studies, 4(2), 182-191.
Chang, V., Chen, Y., & Xiong, C. (2018). Dynamic interaction between higher education
and economic progress: a comparative analysis of BRICS countries. Information
Discovery and Delivery, 46(4), 225-238.
Christensen, T. J. (2015). The China challenge: Shaping the choices of a rising power.
WW Norton & Company.
Cooper, A. F. (2017). The BRICS’New Development Bank: Shifting from material leverage
to innovative capacity. Global Policy, 8(3), 275-284.
Da Silva Medina, G., & Pokorny, B. (2022). Agro-industrial development: Lessons from
Brazil. Land use policy, 120, 106266.
De Moortel, K., & Crispeels, T. (2018). International university-university technology
transfer: Strategic management framework. Technological Forecasting and Social
Change, 135, 145-155.
De Souza, L. E. V., & Cavalcante, A. M. G. (2017). Concentrated Solar Power deployment
in emerging economies: The cases of China and Brazil. Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews, 72, 1094-1103.
Eberling, G. G. (2017). China's bilateral relations with its principal oil suppliers. Lexington
Books.
Eichengreen, B., & Tong, H. (2006). How China is reorganizing the world economy. Asian
Economic Policy Review, 1(1), 73-97.
Flint, C., & Xiaotong, Z. (2019). Historical–geopolitical contexts and the transformation
of Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12(3), 295-331.
Furtado, A. T., & Filho, E. J. C. (2003). Assessing the economic impacts of the China-
Brazil resources satellite program. Science and Public Policy, 30(1), 25-39.
Garcia, E. V., & Coelho, N. B. (2018). A seat at the top? A historical appraisal of Brazil’s
case for the UN Security Council. SAGE Open, 8(3), 2158244018801098.
Hochstetler, K., & Kostka, G. (2015). Wind and solar power in Brazil and China: interests,
state–business relations, and policy outcomes. Global Environmental Politics, 15(3), 74-
94.
Hooijmaaijers, B. (2021). The brics countries’ bilateral economic relations, 2009 to 2019:
Between rhetoric and reality. Sage Open, 11(4), 21582440211054128.
Jenkins, R. (2012). China and Brazil: economic impacts of a growing relationship. Journal
of Current Chinese Affairs, 41(1), 21-47.
Jenne, N. (2021). The value of security cooperation in Sino–South American
relations. Asian Education and Development Studies, 10(3), 433-444.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
77
Júnior, E. L., & Rodrigues, C. (2023). Desafios ao plano do futebol Chinês: uma análise
sobre as naturalizações de futebolistas. Rotas a Oriente. Revista de estudos sino-
portugueses, 3, 85-104.
Katada, S. N., Roberts, C., & Armijo, L. E. (2017). The varieties of collective financial
statecraft: the BRICS and China. Political Science Quarterly, 132(3), 403-433.
Keukeleire, S., & Hooijmaaijers, B. (2014). The BRICS and Other Emerging Power
Alliances and Multilateral Organizations in the Asia‐Pacific and the Global South:
Challenges for the European Union and Its View on Multilateralism. JCMS: Journal of
Common Market Studies, 52(3), 582-599.
Kiely, R. (2015). The BRICs, US ‘decline’and global transformations. Palgrave Macmillan.
Kim, T. J., & Tromp, N. (2021). Carbon emissions embodied in China-Brazil trade: Trends
and driving factors. Journal of Cleaner Production, 293, 126206.
Kıprızlı, G., & Köstem, S. (2022). Understanding the BRICS framing of climate change:
The role of collective identity formation. International Journal, 77(2), 270-291.
Koveos, P., & Zhang, Y. (2023). China's Economic Reforms: Successes and Challenges.
World Scientific.
Lagutina, M. L. (2019). BRICS in a world of regions. Third World Thematics: A TWQ
Journal, 4(6), 442-458.
Lewin, A. Y., & Witt, M. A. (2022). China’s Belt and Road Initiative and international
business: The overlooked centrality of politics. Journal of International Business
Policy, 5(2), 266-275.
Li, J., & Xiaohong, T. (2016). A global experiment in the internationalization of Chinese
universities: Models, experiences, policies, and prospects of the Confucius Institutes’ first
decade. Chinese Education & Society, 49(6), 411-424.
Li, L. (2019). BRICS: a limited role in transforming the world. Strategic Analysis, 43(6),
499-508.
Lugo-Ocando, J. (2020). Foreign aid and journalism in the Global South: A mouthpiece
for truth. Lexington Books.
Méndez, Á., & Turzi, M. (2020). The political economy of China–Latin America relations:
the AIIB membership. Springer Nature.
Montoya, M. A., Delgado, D. L., & Kaltenecker, E. (2019). The Geopolitical Factor of Belt
and Road Initiative in Latin America. Latin American Journal of Trade Policy, 2(5), 6-21.
Oliveira, G. D. L., & Schneider, M. (2016). The politics of flexing soybeans: China, Brazil
and global agroindustrial restructuring. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 43(1), 167-194.
Öniş, Z., & Kutlay, M. (2020). The new age of hybridity and clash of norms: China, BRICS,
and challenges of global governance in a postliberal international
order. Alternatives, 45(3), 123-142.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
78
Qobo, M., & Soko, M. (2015). The rise of emerging powers in the global development
finance architecture: The case of the BRICS and the New Development Bank. South
African Journal of International Affairs, 22(3), 277-288.
Rizzi, F., van Eck, N. J., & Frey, M. (2014). The production of scientific knowledge on
renewable energies: Worldwide trends, dynamics and challenges and implications for
management. Renewable Energy, 62, 657-671.
Rubio, T. G., & Jáuregui, J. G. (2022). Chinese overseas finance in renewable energy in
Argentina and Brazil: implications for the energy transition. Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs, 51(1), 137-164.
Sampene, A., Li, C., Agyeman, F., & Brenya, R. (2021). Analysis of the BRICS countries’
pathways towards a low-carbon environment. BRICS Journal of Economics, 2(4), 77-102.
Samson, G., & Sandroni, C. (2013). The recognition of Brazilian samba de roda and
reunion maloya as intangible cultural heritage of humanity. Vibrant: Virtual Brazilian
Anthropology, 10, 530-551.
Scoones, I., Amanor, K., Favareto, A., & Qi, G. (2016). A new politics of development
cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian engagements in African agriculture. World
development, 81, 1-12.
Siddiqui, K. (2016). Will the growth of the BRICs cause a shift in the global balance of
economic power in the 21st century? International Journal of Political Economy, 45(4),
315-338.
Spooner, P. B. (2016). Macau and Brazil: from the World Trade Organization to a major
gaming city. Asian Education and Development Studies, 5(3), 327-341.
Stuenkel, O. (2020). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lexington books.
Suchodolski, S. G., & Demeulemeester, J. M. (2018). The BRICS coming of age and the
new development bank. Global Policy, 9(4), 578-585.
Ueta, M. H., Alencastro, M., & Pinheiro-Machado, R. (Eds.). (2023). How China is
Transforming Brazil. Springer Nature.
Wang, H. (2019). The new development Bank and the Asian infrastructure investment
Bank: China's ambiguous approach to global financial governance. Development and
Change, 50(1), 221-244.
Wang, Y., Zhang, D., Ji, Q., & Shi, X. (2020). Regional renewable energy development
in China: A multidimensional assessment. Renewable and Sustainable Energy
Reviews, 124, 109797.
Wise, C. (2016). China and Latin America's emerging economies: New realities amid old
challenges. Latin American Policy, 7(1), 26-51.
Wolfe, D. A. (2010). The strategic management of core cities: Path dependence and
economic adjustment in resilient regions. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and
Society, 3(1), 139-152.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 60-79
Strengthening Sino-Brazilian Relations Through Brics:
Development Prospects and Strategic Partnerships
Mohamad Zreik
79
Xu, X., Li, X., Qi, G., Tang, L., & Mukwereza, L. (2016). Science, technology, and the
politics of knowledge: The case of China’s agricultural technology demonstration centers
in Africa. World Development, 81, 82-91.
Yarygina, I., & Krylova, L. (2023). BRICS investment policy in contemporary
environment. BRICS Journal of Economics, 4(2), 193-208.
Zhang, S. G., & Chen, N. (2021). Beijing’s Institutionalised Economic Statecraft Towards
Brazil: A Case Study. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 50(3), 339-365.
Zreik, M. (2021). The potential of a sino-Lebanese partnership through the belt and road
initiative (BRI). Contemporary Arab Affairs, 14(3), 125-145.
Zreik, M. (Ed.). (2024). Soft Power and Diplomatic Strategies in Asia and the Middle East.
IGI Global.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
80
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER “LULA 3”: THE REFORM OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE AS AN EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL (RE)ENGAGEMENT
PEDRO STEENHAGEN
ph.steenhagen@gmail.com
Ph.D. Candidate in International Politics and Teaching Assistant at the School of International
Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA) of Fudan University 复旦大学. Director of Development and
Head of the Workgroup for China-Brazil and Lusophony Relations at Observa China 观中国
(China). Political Commentator at the Observatory of Geopolitics of Jornal GGN.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7195-2469.
Abstract
After two consecutive and mostly successful administrations in the 2000s, Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva made a comeback and became Brazil’s President in 2023. Both the domestic and the
international landscapes have considerably changed since he left power back then, and new
challenges have arisen for his third term. However, one historical, long-term goal has been
reframed again by the country as one of its most pressing matters: the reform of global
governance. Hence, this paper seeks to understand the reasons behind the (re)prioritisation
of the reform of global governance in Brazil’s foreign policy during the first year of “Lula 3”.
Based on qualitative research, it deals with the foundations and recent developments of
Brazilian foreign policy, particularly when it comes to Brazil’s relations with China and its
considerations on the Global South, as well as the dynamics between Lula’s presidential
diplomacy and the institutional role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as Itamaraty.
Furthermore, it addresses debates involving Foreign Policy Analysis, Global Governance, and
the interactions between domestic and international politics. This article concludes by
identifying that Brazil has prioritised the reform of global governance as a way to align its
international aspirations with its domestic needs.
Keywords
Brazilian Foreign Policy; Brazil’s Domestic Politics; Foreign Policy Analysis; Reform of Global
Governance; China and the Global South.
Resumo
Após dois governos consecutivos e bem-sucedidos na década de 2000, Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva retornou ao cargo de Presidente do Brasil em 2023. Os cenários tanto interno quanto
externo mudaram consideravelmente desde que Lula deixou o poder da última vez, e novos
desafios mostram-se prementes para o seu terceiro mandato. Contudo, um objetivo histórico
e de longo prazo foi reenquadrado novamente pelo país como uma questão de alta relevância:
a reforma da governança global. Dessa forma, este artigo visa a compreender as razões por
trás da (re)priorização da reforma da governança global na política externa do Brasil durante
o primeiro ano do “Lula 3”. Baseado numa investigação qualitativa, ele lida com as bases e
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
81
os recentes desenvolvimentos da política externa brasileira, particularmente no que concerne
às relações do Brasil com a China e suas considerações acerca do Sul Global, bem como com
as dinâmicas entre a diplomacia presidencial do Lula e o papel institucional do Ministério das
Relações Exteriores, também conhecido como Itamaraty. Ademais, ele trata dos debates que
envolvem Análise de Política Externa, Governança Global e as intersecções entre política
interna e externa. Este artigo chega a sua conclusão ao identificar que o Brasil priorizou a
reforma da governança global como uma maneira de alinhar suas aspirações internacionais
com suas necessidades domésticas.
Palavras-chave
Política Externa Brasileira; Política Interna do Brasil; Análise de Política Externa; Reforma da
Governança Global; China e Sul Global.
How to cite your article
Steenhagen, Pedro (2024). Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global
Governance as an Extension of Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations:
The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 80-100.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.4.
Article received on 15 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
82
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER “LULA 3”: THE REFORM OF
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS AN EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC
POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL (RE)ENGAGEMENT
PEDRO STEENHAGEN
Introduction
In January 2023, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva started his third term as President of Brazil.
Having captained the country from 2003 to 2010, he left an important legacy in foreign
affairs, not only due to his policies to expand the number of Brazilian diplomats and
embassies around the world, but also because of the active and leading role the nation
aimed to adopt in the international stage on a wide range of matters, from
socioenvironmental to security. Indeed, his personal interest in the area and the resulting
presidential diplomacy he conducted, alongside the existence of a favourable political
environment and the availability of a capable body of foreign policymakers and decision-
takers alongside him, in particular, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also known as
Itamaraty, turned Brazil into a significant player on the global stage.
In March 2009, during Lula’s visit to the United States, Barack Obama (2009) stated that
he had been “a great admirer of Brazil and a great admirer of the progressive, forward-
looking leadership that President Lula has shown throughout Latin America and
throughout the world. We have a very strong friendship between the two countries”. The
subprime mortgage crisis was being widely felt, especially by developed nations, and
Global South countries were on a rise in the international scene. A month later, at the
G20 Summit in London, Obama greeted Lula, saying “that’s my man right there […] The
most popular politician on Earth” (Newsweek, 2009). Meanwhile, in that same year, China
became Brazil’s main trade partner for the first time in history, and both countries sought
to further boost their strategic partnership, established in 1993 — the very first promoted
by the Asian nation in the globe. Notably, in a joint communique issued during Lula’s visit
in Beijing, the two sides agreed to “enhance coordination with other developing countries,
to increase the participation and voices of developing countries in international affairs”
(Global Times, 2009).
Fast forward 15 years, and relations between Brazil and the United States — and, to a
certain extent, European nations — though stable, have more frictions, as domestic
politics in a number of these countries has become more challenging, and the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
83
international society faces relevant adversities. Additionally, the Brazilian position on
certain matters is seen as less aligned with traditional partners from the West, and more
with other Global South nations, in particular, China. Stuenkel (2023) even affirmed that
“Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s honeymoon with the West ended
remarkably quickly”, after his win over Jair Bolsonaro had been met with relief.
Notwithstanding, with the exception of the years under Bolsonaro, Brazilian foreign policy
has actually remained rather solid in recent decades, based on a pragmatic set of
principles and goals. Possibly, surprises coming from American and European parties
involving Lula’s current and complex take on foreign policy may derive much more from
a lack of attention or thorough understanding about Brazil’s goals and vision for
international relations than from an effective course correction or drastic change in
policymaking.
This is very much clear when looking at the country’s historical objective of reforming
global governance. In multiple ways, from seeking a permanent seat in the United
Nations (UN) Security Council to rebalancing the power structures in multilateral
institutions and defending the building of a multipolar world, Brazil has been
implementing efforts in this regard since the previous century, though with varying levels
of attention and effort (Steenhagen, 2023). The latest example is that the country has
stipulated the reform of global governance as one of the three priority axes — figuring
alongside the formation of a global alliance against hunger and poverty, and the combat
against climate change — of its first G20 presidency under its new format, bringing the
topic as a central one in the recent meetings of the grouping to project the nation as one
of the leaders of the Global South (Soares, 2024).
In this context, the paper will focus on the following research question: Why has the
reform of global governance been (re)prioritised in Brazil’s foreign policy during the first
year of “Lula 3”? The main hypothesis is that this new wave of strong support to advance
on this broad goal is likely the result of two main factors: At the international level, the
rise of China and the strengthening of the Sino-Brazilian partnership can favour Brazil’s
historical foreign policy interests, reinforcing the country’s image as one of the go-to
references for the Global South; and, at the State level, foreign policy is now considered
to have the unusual capacity to influence sociopolitical outcomes and impact domestic
politics, contributing to further enhance or undermine the image of Lula before the
population and part of the electorate.
In order to deal with the topic at hand, it is pondered that a qualitative approach best
fits the research pursued here. Therefore, it will be primarily based on published
materials, such as academic articles and books, official government documents, and
available interviews and speeches from public authorities. Moreover, although the
research will be qualitative-based, some quantitative sources will also be used, such as
public opinion surveys. The study carried out is relevant for multiple reasons, and it is
worth highlighting two of them: The importance to better examine interactions between
domestic and international politics, and the need to better understand Brazilian foreign
policy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
84
First, as domestic politics has become more gruelling in politically divided societies such
as Brazil, the realm of international relations gained a prominent place in the first year
of Lula’s third run as President, with foreign affairs serving as a potential tool to increase
or at least maintain his popularity and win over a slice of centrist citizens. In this sense,
the G20 and the themes prioritised in it could play a crucial role under the Brazilian
presidency, as it is arguably one of the most important international forums nowadays,
a place where countries with largely different world views can still have productive
exchanges and reach agreements without all the weight of having to carry out more rigid
positions in organs like the UN Security Council. Moreover, the G20 includes a wide
number of countries, from the BRICS to the United States, the United Kingdom, the
European Union (EU), Japan, and Mexico. All of the nations involved represent
approximately 85% of the global economy and two thirds of the world population, as well
as more than 75% of international trade.
Second, Brazil is an indispensable member of the international society and the Global
South, which has increasingly demanded more participation and decision-making power
in global affairs. The South American nation is also one of the 10 main economies of the
world, with a population of over 200 million people. Despite its importance and the need
to further comprehend its foreign policy, misunderstandings and gaps of knowledge about
it remain, given the prevalence of debates coming from Western great powers.
With that said, this paper will be divided into four main sections, in addition to this
introduction. First, it will provide a theoretical discussion on foreign policy analysis and
global governance, highlighting the relevance of utilising a two-level analysis to deal with
increasingly complex scenarios and advancing the framework of Role Theory. Second, it
will investigate the impacts of domestic politics on Brazil’s foreign policymaking and
identify the resulting dynamics between Itamaraty and Lula during the first year of his
current presidential term. Third, it will examine the renewed push for the reform of global
governance in light of the “Brazil is back” slogan and the influential synergies between
Brazil and China in the international stage. Fourth, it will provide concluding remarks.
Intersections between Foreign Policy and Global Governance: The Two-
Level Analysis and Role Theory
Foreign Policy Analysis has been gaining an increasing attention as a sub-field of
International Relations, as the number of high-quality publications on the discipline
throughout the last few years has maintained a steady growth (Alden & Aran, 2017;
Ostermann & Mello, 2022; Thies, 2018). It has its origins linked to the 1950s, when
foreign policy began to be conceptualised as a “complex, multilayered process, consisting
of the objectives that governments pursue in their relations with other governments and
their choice of means to attain these objectives” (Kubálková, 2001, p. 17).
Traditionally, the concept of foreign policy has also been approached either as an abstract
expression of relations between political entities, seeking to understand how organised
groups interrelate, or as a way to differentiate the political self from the other, identifying
two distinct realms, the “inside” and the “outside”, the State and the interstate system
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
85
(Leira, 2019). However, more recently, new trends have appeared, historicising it as a
practice concept and associating it with institutions, ideas, politics, and policies,
especially due to the pluralisation of actors in the foreign policymaking process and the
existing interconnections between domestic and foreign affairs (Leira, 2019).
Just like diplomacy, or maybe even more, foreign policymaking is often entangled with
domestic politics, with groups pursuing their interests by pressuring the government to
adopt favourable policies, and the national government seeking to maximise their ability
to satisfy domestic pressures while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign
developments (Putnam, 1988). In this two-level game, the national political leader, the
main actors or interest groups, and the key decision-makers, who strive to reconcile
domestic and international imperatives simultaneously, are essential to the
understanding of the dynamics at play (Putnam, 1988). Since decision-making factors
and conceptions of agency continue to be underdeveloped in contemporary theories of
international relations (Kaarbo, 2015), under which global governance studies tend to
situate themselves, this paper fills a gap between Foreign Policy Analysis and
International Relations investigations, discussing how both domestic and systemic factors
can shape foreign policies (Putnam, 1988; Milner, 1997).
Indeed, “foreign policy analysts, in a conscious departure from systemic theories of world
politics, have always highlighted the considerable variation in national foreign policies
and pointed at the relevance of domestic-level variables for explaining this behaviour”,
and current challenges in a wide number of areas, from security to climate change, and
at all levels, have brought an unprecedented contestation of foreign policymaking
(Ostermann & Mello, 2022, p. 3). In this sense, several dimensions of foreign policy
analysis have been expanded and further explored, such as the role of leaders, their
reputations and personal characteristics, the rise of populist parties and their impact on
foreign policy, the influence of civil society, social media, and technological innovation,
and the role of emotions for foreign policymaking (Ostermann & Mello, 2022).
While the international component is, naturally, omnipresent in foreign policy studies,
domestic politics are considered simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in academic
investigations (Kaarbo, 2015). Meanwhile, foreign policy analyses associated with global
governance issues, underdeveloped as they are, have been appearing as a clear
emerging trend (Mendez, 2017). In this regard, according to Mendez (2017), Foreign
Policy Analysis is the best situated discipline and social scientific practice to research
global governance to the requisite depth, including when it comes to issues involving the
(re)shaping of the international architecture and the risks posed by elitism, especially
from Western elites.
Keohane (2009, p. 363) has already recognised that the field of International Politics “is
heavily American and to some extent European […] As the economic and political centres
of gravity shift away from Europe and the United States […] this is bound to change.
Political science will become a global discipline”. Truly, “Western ideologies still dominate
intellectual and academic frameworks. All of the modern ideologies are products of the
West” (Zhang, Gu & Chen, 2015, p. 7). Furthermore, Acharya & Buzan (2007, p. 288)
affirm that almost all IR theory “is produced by and for the West, and rests on an
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
86
assumption that Western history is world history […] the almost exclusively Western
sources of international relations theory conspicuously fail to correspond to the now
global distribution of its subjects”.
Similarly, despite becoming more pluralist in recent years, Foreign Policy Analysis still
has its strongest institutional footing in the United States, and most empirical research
usually focuses on this country (Ostermann & Mello, 2022). There is an urgent need to
diversify such studies, and this is an effort promoted by this paper, which brings Brazilian
foreign policy to the forefront. After all, Global South countries have, since the 2000s,
questioned the absolute dominance of Western powers on international law and foreign
affairs as a whole, highlighting the need to further democratise the international system
and to consider more complex scenarios of global governance than before. Again, as
Mendez (2017) indicated, combining Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Governance
approaches can give good results to understand the transformations occurring in national
and international scenarios.
Meanwhile, the concept of global governance only gained prominence after the Cold War,
when a new wave of globalisation took place, economic interdependence was clearly
increasing, the international agenda was considerably expanded beyond security affairs,
and a plurality of non-State actors began having a stronger voice around the globe.
Global governance encompasses the handling of transnational or international
challenges, such as development, security, climate change, and poverty, by a plurality
of actors through collaborative ways. In addition, it can be defined as a cooperative
problem-solving arrangement that includes – but not necessarily limits itself to – the
United Nations system, serving to manage global problems and help actors, both State
and non-State, to pursue global objectives through concerted efforts (Thakur & Weiss,
2004; Ortega, 2007). Therefore, it is closely connected to foreign policy goals and
debates, and a major concern arising from these studies has been the push for the reform
of global governance, promoted by developing nations.
Under this scene, one of the risks at the system level, as Stuenkel (2016) elucidates,
involves the rise of parallel or complementary structures of global governance by the
Global South, particularly China, and the consequent reduction of the universal claim of
Western-led institutions. In this sense, while “policymakers in Beijing (and Delhi &
Brasília) can be expected to continue to invest in Western-dominated structures and push
for their reform […] they quietly expand networks in many different areas, ready to
engage those who feel today’s institutions fail to satisfy their needs” (Stuenkel, 2016, p.
120).
In the case of Brazil under “Lula 3”, a relevant factor to be taken into consideration is
the role of the leader (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Peveri, 2022) in the shaping of the
country’s foreign policy and global governance mechanisms or institutions, particularly
in light of the presidential diplomacy conducted by him and his perception that “Brazil is
back” to its prestigious place in the international stage after the Bolsonaro administration
(Hirst, 2023; Fonseca, 2017; Santos, 2021). Another factor is the dynamics between
foreign policy and domestic politics, as the latter has had an increasing relevance in the
former, and vice-versa.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
87
Indeed, although international debates might appear too far from people’s realities,
individuals can and should be considered as actors in the international society, and
national citizens, either individually or collectively, have played substantial roles in the
global stage in a wide number of areas. In truth, people end up getting involved with
global issues, in particular, when they care about the subject at home too. Since,
domestically, Lula and Bolsonaro are the main representatives of the electoral panorama
in Brazil, and they profoundly diverge in terms of foreign policy and international
engagement, foreign policy and global governance matters have entered the realm of
domestic politics and elections in a clearer way than before.
To guide such examination, this paper utilises Role Theory, which, as the name suggests,
is a theoretical framework devoted to the study of behaviour using the notion of role.
According to it, States can be presented as playing a variety of roles, and diverse factors,
such as domestic needs and demands, critical events or trends in the external
environment, and the projections of other governments, shape foreign policy
orientations, create role perceptions, and develop expectations for States to carry out
certain role performances (Sekhri, 2009).
This framework is especially appealing to the study of Global South nations’ foreign
policies, because they attempt to play different roles both regionally and globally, often
experiencing role conflict as a consequence of their multi-dimensional forms of
dependency on Western great powers and of bilateral or multilateral relations between
themselves (Sekhri, 2009). In the case of Brazil, Sekhri (2009, p. 8) argues that the
country has emerged as a significant political and economic power in Latin America and
a key player in global affairs, playing prominent roles in them, “including the role of
‘Leader’ in Latin America and rest of the Third World, and the role of ‘Mediator’ in the
North-South and South-South frameworks”.
Impacts of Domestic Politics on Brazilian Foreign Policymaking under
“Lula 3”
Bringing Role Theory to the national level, Wehner & Thies (2021, p. 1425) argue that
“leaders are the backbone of foreign policy decision-making who make choices about
continuing existing roles, modifying such roles, or choosing new roles to play with
significant others in the international system”. Moreover, they note that “roles are the
representations of state identity, interests, and behaviour in foreign policy, while leaders
are the key agents to enact the roles that they have inherited, or to adjust and reinterpret
them, and even to change them altogether”, highlighting that the theoretical framework
boasts as one of its key promises the potential to bridge multiple levels of analysis
(Wehner & Thies, 2021, p. 1426).
Although it is a misconception to consider that Brazilian foreign policy has gone through
drastic changes throughout the 21st century, there is no doubt leaders have played a
significant role in influencing its direction and, especially, the intensity to pursue certain
goals, and not others. Even if both of them were from the Worker’s Party (PT), there is
a clear difference in the relevance Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2011-
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
88
2016) gave to foreign policy and international politics, with the former having a personal
interest in the area, and the latter being widely known for her somewhat lukewarm
approach to it. An even bigger contrast was seen under the Bolsonaro administration,
with Brazil abandoning its traditionally strong international presence, in favour of
isolationism, a situation which led the country to be seen as a global pariah (Brum, 2021).
As previously showed, domestic politics and, in particular, the national leader are
important factors to be taken into consideration when it comes to foreign policy. As Milani
(2017) explains, its formulation and implementation are deeply connected with
governmental choices, and, consequently, with interest groups, bargaining, disputes, and
negotiations with coalitions. Traditionally in the case of Brazil, two actors are seen as key
in foreign policymaking: the President, due to the fact that Brazilian presidentialism
system concentrates a considerable portion of agency in this position; and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, given its long-standing professionalism, stability, and prestige (Milani,
2017).
Throughout most of the 20th century, Itamaraty saw itself, and was seen by the other
actors, as the sole agent responsible to formulate and to implement the country’s foreign
policy, a situation which was frequently supported by the Presidency of the Republic
(Lima, 1994). In Brazil, Foreign Policy Analysis studies on bureaucratic behaviour have
shown, indeed, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been one of the earliest
governmental bodies to operate in bureaucratic insulation since its establishment, in
order to reduce interferences from external actors (Ives, 2024).
Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, debates about the need to remove foreign policy’s
exceptionalism and conceive it as a public policy like any other began to surface (Lima,
2000), resulting in Itamaraty’s increasing openness and dialogue with other
bureaucracies and with society as a whole in more recent decades (Ives, 2024). As a
public policy, it is also more prone to changes depending on the political front, both by
state and non-state actors. Additionally, this gradual process of “opening-up”, which
gives more transparency to its policymaking and decision-taking, still has further room
to develop, but it has arguably already transformed foreign policy from a distant and less
palpable matter to something that is more concrete and relatable to the overall
population, especially with the strengthening of the media and communication sector and
the democratisation of the access to information.
The assumption that the public knows relatively little about foreign affairs and, as a
consequence, structures its beliefs only by taking cues from partisan elites has been
increasingly challenged by recent developments, which show patterns where political
elites are united, but the public is divided (Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Indeed, as Kertzer
& Zeitzoff (2017, p. 544) show, “members of the public may often lack information, but
they do not lack principles, and information need not cascade from the top down […]
individuals have general predispositions toward foreign policy they can rely on when
forming attitudes toward specific policy issues”.
In Brazil, Diniz & Ribeiro (2008) have pointed out that, as international matters have
gained a growing importance domestically and, in some cases, impacted public opinion
polls, members of the Congress have also tended to get involved in such debates. This
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
89
also helps to reject the commonly advanced idea that foreign affairs are too distant from
the ordinary lives of citizens, resulting in their lack of interest in it, a low level of
accountability by leaders, and irrelevant electoral impacts. In fact, according to Lopes &
Faria (2014), foreign policy has become an electoral topic in Brazil since the country’s
transition to democracy in the 1980s, but it was under the second term of President Lula
that it had unprecedented visibility in the public electoral propaganda on TV and radio.
For the authors, recent trends seem to suggest that there is, at least, an expectation that
foreign policy, if it does not have the capacity to directly provide votes, can undermine
the image and the prestige of political parties, candidates, and leaders (Lopes & Faria,
2014).
When it comes to the previous two Lula administrations, undoubtedly, one of his main
legacies lie, justifiably, in the fields of foreign policy and diplomacy, bringing Brazil to the
spotlight in the global stage. Certainly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by seasoned
Ambassador Celso Amorim — now Chief Advisor to the Presidency in “Lula 3” — had a
decisive role, but one cannot understate the positive impact of Lula’s presidential
diplomacy in both the country’s prestige abroad and his own electoral gains internally. It
is worth remembering that Lula left the Brazilian presidency after two terms as a global
phenomenon, as shown in the introduction of this paper, and, domestically, according to
surveys from the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope), with a
personal approval rate of 87%, while his government had 80% — numbers never before
seen in the country’s history (Bonin, 2010).
Notwithstanding, the panorama has changed. In a recent survey conducted by Ipec,
former Ibope, in early March 2024, the trust in Lula sits at 45%, and only 33% evaluated
the government on a positive note, with another 33% evaluating it as average (Nicoceli
& Croquer, 2024). Among other reasons, this can be explained by the stringent
sociopolitical polarisation which has been a constant in Brazilian society since the
Worker’s Party (PT) fell from grace for part of the society in the mid-2010s and
bolsonarism gained track in the latter half of the decade. With the country marked by
clear political and electoral divisions, without a lot of margins for manoeuvre, the foreign
policy terrain has surprisingly appeared as one which can bring political rewards
domestically. Due to his international prestige, there is potential for Lula to capitalise on
his global presence with the more centrist or even traditionally conservative electorate,
which is more inclined to approve of Brazil being praised and fulfilling its “predisposition”
to be a regional and global leader.
Amid such division between supporters of Lula and Bolsonaro, it is possible to identify
the existence of a form of adversarial politics, characterised by a distinctive manner of
representing, battling, and mobilising against political opponents in a populist
environment.
1
In this regard, it is worth noting that the scholarship related to Foreign
1
Although populism remains an essentially contested concept, as Cadier (2024) indicates, it can amount
to an “othering” discourse, particularly through a discursive construction of an enemy or opposition, which
can include not only elites, supranational institutions or the establishment, but also previous governments
and political opponents. Under these lenses, foreign policy provides an appropriate terrain for populist
articulatory practices, be it through the amalgamation of domestic actors and opponents with foreign
“others” and interests, be it with the projection of the populist logic onto the international stage, using
foreign policy as a battleground to combat domestic political adversaries.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
90
Policy Analysis has already documented that “the type of strategy chosen by
governments in dealing with political opposition is in turn a key mediating factor in how
and to what extent domestic politics affects foreign policy” (Cadier, 2024, p. 2).
Indeed, populist leaders, or leaders dealing with a populist environment, tend to politicise
foreign policy once in office, and confronting political opponents is precisely at the core
of their legitimation, mobilisation, and popularity-maximising strategies, something
which consequently produces effects on foreign policy (Cadier, 2024). In the end, as
Cadier (2024) argues, it seems that these actors are inclined to use foreign policy as the
continuation of domestic politics by other means, defining their foreign policy preferences
and choices in opposition to those of their political predecessors or adversaries and
investing in foreign policy as an instrument and a ground to battle political opponents.
This, in turn, ends up contaminating the political game and the strategies associated with
the successors of such populist actors.
Bringing back Role Theory to the table, it is possible to see that, during his presidency,
Bolsonaro reinterpreted, adjusted, and modified Brazil’s roles in the international stage,
overhauling the country’s behaviour in terms of foreign policy and defining them as the
opposite of what came before. When Lula won the last presidential elections, he sought
to recover Brazil’s previously existing roles and the historical traditions of its foreign
policy, something which is clear with the slogan “Brazil is back”, widely used during his
first year back in power both for domestic and international purposes. Lula has always
been a powerful political force in the national landscape, and now the context favours a
more personalistic, alongside an institutional (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or party-based
(PT), approach to politics and foreign policy.
Therefore, the presidential diplomacy renews its relevance under “Lula 3”, clearly
differentiating itself from the administration of Bolsonaro, who did not travel abroad as
much and distanced himself from the international community. A presidential diplomacy
takes place when the President has a personal, active, and effective participation in the
conception and execution of foreign policy based on three foundations: the conduction of
the decision-making process of foreign policy; the diplomacy of initiatives, in which the
leader proposes and reap the rewards of foreign policy initiatives; and the diplomacy of
visits and travels (Pasquarelli, 2010). At the same time, such an ambitious foreign policy,
with leadership goals in the region and the world, should encompass not only Brazilian
national interests, but also common, wider aspirations from the Global South and other
big players in the international scenario, and the reform of global governance is a key
aim in this regard.
“Brazil Is Back”: A New Era for the Sino-Brazilian Partnership, A New
Era for the Reform of Global Governance and the Global SoutH
Brazil has historically seen itself as a global player and tried to occupy a relevant place
in international politics, with this being a dominant trace in its foreign policy and a
constant during Lula’s first two terms as President (Fonseca, 2017). During this period,
the BRICs came into existence, China became Brazil’s main trade partner, the 2008 crisis
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
91
profoundly affected Western great powers, and developing nations implemented their
strategies to benefit from the appropriate conditions to better influence global
governance and increase their voices and participation in the international system
(Fonseca, 2017). Not coincidentally, Brazil has revisited historical goals associated with
the reform of international institutions, such as the pursuit of a permanent seat in the
UN Security Council (Steenhagen, 2023).
As Almeida (2004, p. 162-163) notes, “it is in its external relations and international
politics that the government of President Lula resembles the most the discourse of PT.
[…] certainly the party discourse in international politics themes […] commands the
governmental action, more than in any other institutional area”.
2
In this sense, Brazil’s
role as a leader has not been constrained only to its region, and Lula has believed that
such a role could be achieved through diplomatic activism, including his presidential
diplomacy, and the formation of strategic alliances (Almeida, 2004). Perceiving the
changes in the international landscape, with an unprecedented strategic partnership
already signed in 1993 — updated to the level of global strategic partnership in 2012 —
and a mutual interest in strengthening ties based on common interests and goals, Brazil
and China started a trajectory of reinforcing their bilateral and multilateral relations in a
way that has established Lula as “China’s old friend”.
This marks a stark contrast to the previous and atypical government. Under Bolsonaro,
Brazil broke up with previous foreign policy traditions and promoted antiglobalism,
conservatism, anticommunism, and religious nationalism (Casarões & Saraiva, 2021).
Simultaneously, the role of Itamaraty was decreased, based on an active pursuit to
reduce its importance, dismantle its bureaucracy, and weaken its diplomatic capacity,
under the perception that the institution was one of the bodies responsible for the
country’s globalist insertion (Pinheiro & Santos, 2022). Despite a strong alignment with
the United States under the Trump administration, after Biden’s election, Brazil distanced
itself from the nation, all while its relations with both Europe and China also deteriorated
in the sociopolitical field (Saraiva & Reis, 2023).
With the advent of “Lula 3”, there is a strong restructuring of Brazilian foreign policy, and
the country seeks to be involved again in the great themes of international politics,
whether they are directly connected with its direct goals or not (Saraiva & Reis, 2023).
According to Saraiva & Reis (2023), this quick foreign policy restructuring and Brazil’s
reinsertion in the international stage, putting an end to Bolsonaro’s approach to the area,
was made possible due to the role of the leader, as Lula still has a considerable political
weight internally and internationally, as well as to the expertise from his policymakers
and other actors who influence foreign policy. Some positions on international conflicts
were modified, progressive, instead of conservative, orientations were promoted in topics
such as human rights, global governance, elimination of poverty and hunger, and
sustainability, Latin American integration and international engagement made a
2
Translation made by the author. In Portuguese: “é nas relações exteriores e na sua política internacional
que o governo do Presidente Lula mais se parece com o discurso do PT. [...] certamente que o discurso
partidário em temas de política internacional [...] comanda a ação governamental, mais do que em
qualquer outra área institucional.”
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
92
comeback, interactions with the United States and Europe were stabilised and cherished,
and relations with China were normalised and further strengthened.
On the Asian country’s side, as Pu (2019, p. 3) explains, the 2000s and the 2010s saw
its rise in the international stage, and “the nature and content of the international order
in coming decades will partially depend on what roles the emerging powers, especially
China, decide to play”. Certainly, policymakers’ ideas about China’s role in the
international system have a considerable influence on its foreign policy and on its
decision-making process, as China engages in a search for a new identity as a global
player, one that encompasses both continuity and adaptation (Noesselt, 2014). However,
as Pu (2019) notes, China’s grand strategy ends up including contradictory elements and
competing visions for its emerging roles in the world, and this can be identified both in
the domestic and international stages.
Inside China, perceptions on the existing international order have been molded by
historical and uneasy experiences, resulting in three basic positions (Tang, 2018). The
first, which is linked to Mao Zedong’s ideas of a revolutionary State and figures as a
marginalised one in China today, considers the existing order is mostly unjust and needs
fundamental restructuring, and the country should therefore lead the way in shaping
global governance (Tang, 2018). The second and the third, which are the core of the
debate under the present leadership, are interconnected by the premise that the current
order is mostly acceptable, only needing to be fine-tuned; however, while the former
considers China should take the lead to press for reforms, the latter believes the Asian
nation should not even seek leadership in this sense and should work with other
countries, both Western and non-Western, to achieve that goal (Tang, 2018). To some
extent, this last position is somewhat similar to the one permeating Brazilian foreign
policy, in particular, under Lula.
Associated with the two abovementioned main positions is the idea of a “governance with
Chinese characteristics”, which can be divided into responsible State governance, and
governance through global partnership (Chen, 2016). The first is intrinsically attached to
an effective management of domestic affairs — which directly and indirectly impacts
global governance — and to the avoidance of exporting negative externalities through
domestic and foreign policies (Chen, 2016). Meanwhile, the second presupposes that
China, in opposition to hierarchical schemes of hegemonic governance and order and
their inherent injustices, should serve as a partner in four aspects of non-aligned global
partnership governance: joint global governance, incremental global governance, joint
regional governance, and global governance reform (Chen, 2016). This second aspect is
particularly important to understand the alignment of vision and behaviour between
Brazil and China in global affairs, as the former, under Lula and PT, largely agrees with
it and would like to see more inclusiveness, representation, and legitimacy in
international institutions historically dominated by Western powers.
As a result, it is not uncommon for analysts in the United States and Europe to be puzzled
about the foreign policy of “Lula 3”. During his first year back in the presidency for a third
term, Lula strongly promoted the slogan that “Brazil is back”, which had both domestic
and international purposes and targets and sought to clearly show a fresh start for the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
93
country, after what is considered to be a disastrous Bolsonaro administration, and to
instigate hope for a better future (Maschietto, 2024). In terms of foreign policy, the
slogan indicated that the South American nation would go back to its traditions, end the
ideological alignment with the global far-right, and redirect its attention to an active
positioning in the international stage based, amongst other things, on the pursuit for
leadership as a representative of the Global South (Maschietto, 2024).
In late 2022, during his first speech to the population as president-elect, among other
matters, Lula stated that “we will fight again for a new global governance, with the
inclusion of more countries in the UN Security Council and the end of the veto right,
which undermines the balance between nations” (G1, 2022). Subsequently, in 2023,
Amorim affirmed that “Brazil wants to reform global governance […] We would like to
have a world governance which does not look like the present Security Council” (Balingit
& Tobin, 2023), meaning a renewed global governance, one which does not resemble
the political panorama of the post-Second World War period.
In this context, Brazil’s presidency of the G20 has appeared as a great opportunity for
the country to test its strategy of “active nonalignment”, balancing engagement between
powers without picking a side and focusing on an agenda that is firmly grounded in the
priorities of the Global South (Timerman, 2024). It may seem like a longshot in a more
divided world, but, as Timerman (2024) states, “if anybody can leverage the importance
of the global south on the international stage, it’s the one-name international superstar
Lula” — something which also confirms the maintenance of his personal status as a
recognised leader, especially for the Global South, and how useful this can be in the
domestic landscape.
Therefore, Brazil under “Lula 3” might have disappointed expectations from the United
States and Europe in terms of close alignment in face of certain current global challenges,
such as the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, its current foreign policy is not a major
departure from its previous positionings; for instance, when Russia invaded Crimea,
Brazil also did not promote strong pushbacks against the country, and Putin even visited
the South American nation for the BRICS Summit later in the year, regardless of protests
from Western powers. In spite of its efforts to balance relations with American and
European partners, on the one hand, and developing nations, on the other, it is clear that
the country’s broad interests and goals have inevitably lied more aligned with the latter.
And, although American and European disappointment towards certain aspects of
Brazilian foreign policy exists, it can be said that this is partly due to their own omissions
and neglections, both old and new.
Overall, as Stuenkel (2023) notes, the Global South has shown a certain level of
reluctance to align with the West on specific topics, such as the support to Ukraine in
light of the war with Russia. In the case of Brazil, four key factors explain such reluctance
(Stuenkel, 2023). First, Brazil, whether led by leftist, centrist, or rightist governments,
has maintained positive relations with China and Russia, both in the BRICS and outside
of it, and this connects with its efforts to preserve a nonaligned position internationally.
Second, Brazil perceives Western rhetoric in a number of subjects as grating and
hypocritical, especially in light of numerous violations of international law coming from
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
94
great powers when it suits them. Furthermore, it believes that the supposedly rules-
based liberal order has often shown to be neither liberal nor rules-based, with Western
great powers failing to take the Global South and its demands seriously. This is one of
the reasons the country has attempted to reform global governance for many decades,
including through the establishment of parallel institutional structures.
Third, Brazil has strongly believed that the best way to preserve its strategy of autonomy
and nonalignment is through the active promotion of a multipolar global order. This, in
turn, just like the second factor, closely aligns with the foundations of China’s foreign
policy. Fourth, Brazil has been traditionally convinced that it has a role to play in the
international stage, and Lula, in particular, has shown an eagerness to provide
meaningful contributions under the vision that the country is a diplomatic powerhouse.
The “Brazil is back” slogan clearly seeks to revive what is seen as the glorious days of
the 2000s and the early 2010s. With Brazil at the helm of the G20 now, it brings a huge
opportunity for Lula and the PT to show their capabilities when it comes to foreign affairs,
both to the domestic and to the global public.
Notwithstanding, it is possible to argue that Brazil feels even more comfortable to nourish
the thrust towards global governance reforms, especially in a rhetorical way, due to the
strengthening of the Sino-Brazilian partnership throughout the last decade and China’s
own initiatives that already impact global governance. In this regard, Lula has a central
role in the efforts to advance Brazil’s push for the reform of global governance. As Hirst
(2023) points out, the presidential diplomacy in Lula’s third term has become as or more
central than during the 2000s, and there has been considerable connections between his
national leadership and his international and regional projection, with the project of
international insertion pertaining to the President, but its execution depending on the
operational capacity of the Itamaraty.
At the same time, Lula’s margin for political manoeuvrers is now reduced if compared to
his previous administrations, given that the reality, both domestically and internationally,
has changed. Consequently, while Brazil’s current foreign policy might resemble, in many
ways, that of the 2000s, it has gone through adaptations and renovations, and one should
not expect from it the same intense and proactive behaviour as before due to existing
constraints in the micro and macro levels (Carvalho, 2023). After all, Lula faces not only
a more challenging domestic landscape, struggling to win certain political and legislative
battles, but also a more demanding international scenario, all while lacking sufficient
resources to promote an expanded agenda of global governance reform and South-South
cooperation, and, as a result, having to be more strategic in the implementation of his
foreign policy (Carvalho, 2023).
Specifically, regarding China, the Asian nation has increasingly shown an interest to
expand policy coordination in global governance issues, especially when it comes to the
UN, the G20, and the BRICS, and the interest deriving from the Brazilian government to
give high priority to the dialogue with China was immediate (Hirst, 2023). The case of
the Brazilian presidency in the G20 is emblematic: All three priorities launched in the first
year of “Lula 3” — combat against hunger and poverty, sustainable development, and
reform of global governance — are, of course, closely connected with domestic needs
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
95
and international aspirations or opportunities, but they are also intrinsically associated
with common interests involving China and, more broadly, the Global South. Indeed,
relations with China seem to be increasingly strategic for Brazil on these two fronts.
Domestically, Brazil has been trying to seek opportunities and investments from the
Chinese side that are closely aligned with its development goals, especially those related
to (re)industrialisation, sustainability, and technological innovation (Sousa, Abrão &
Porto, 2023). Internationally, the South American nation sees its Asian counterpart as a
fundamental partner to help advance its regional and global interests, as well as
contribute to the strengthening of individual or collective positionings and agendas
(Sousa, Abrão & Porto, 2023). The effort to take the bilateral relationship to the next
level and the vision that China can bolster Brazil’s diplomatic image abroad can be
inferred, for instance, from Lula’s statement that “we want to have with China a
relationship which goes beyond economy and trade”
3
(República Federativa do Brasil,
2023a), as well as from the list and content of the agreements signed during Lula’s official
visit to China a few months after he took office (República Federativa do Brasil, 2023b).
In sum, Brazil under “Lula 3” sees in China an instrumental partner for it to achieve both
its domestic and its international objectives, which are directly and indirectly associated
with global governance reform.
Conclusion
This paper has sought out to check the reasons behind the (re)prioritisation of the reform
of global governance in Brazil’s foreign policy during the first year of “Lula 3”. After the
analysis, it is possible to confirm the main hypothesis put forward. Indeed, the new wave
of support coming from President Lula and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to advance this
broad goal is most likely linked to two main factors: at the State level, foreign policy has
improved its capacity to influence sociopolitical outcomes and impact domestic politics,
contributing to alter, either positively or negatively, the image of Lula before the
population and part of the electorate; and, at the international level, the rise of China
and the strengthening of the Sino-Brazilian partnership have favoured Brazil’s foreign
policy historical interests, giving the opportunity for the country to reinforce its image
and positioning as one of the go-to references for the Global South.
In the end, it is possible to identify that Brazil has prioritised the reform of global
governance in the G20 and beyond as a form of alignment between its international
aspirations and domestic needs. Domestically, this is a topic that facilitates the
strengthening of Lula as a competent leader who favours the country’s development and
national interests. Internationally, it pushes forward the projection of a Brazil that
pursues its key historical objectives, that leads the way toward the democratisation of
the international system, and that serves as a reference for the Global South and as a
bridge-builder between developing nations and great powers, in particular, between
China and the BRICS, on one side, and the United States and Europe, on the other.
3
Translation made by the author. In Portuguese: “Queremos ter com a China uma relação que vá além da
economia e do comércio.”
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
96
Overall, though, with the exception of the Bolsonaro administration, Brazilian foreign
policy, in terms of principles and goals, has remained pragmatic and stable, and potential
changes seem to be more connected with mechanisms — from a purely institutional to a
combination of presidential and institutional diplomacy — and the level of emphasis on
certain subjects and audience — as is the case of the reform of global governance, now
targeted for domestic and global purposes — than with an effective and thorough change
of course in its substance.
Brazil occupies the presidency of the G20 from December 1st, 2023, to November 30th,
2024, and it is expected that over 130 meetings will be held in 15 Brazilian cities
throughout this period, with the most important one, the G20 Heads of State and
Government Summit, taking place between November 18th and 19th in Rio de Janeiro
(Cardoso, 2024). During this time, China’s President Xi Jinping plans to make an official
State visit in a year that celebrates the 50th anniversary of the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two nations, and the expectation is that this visit will
bring significant results for the bilateral relationship, including a potential agreement for
Brazil to join the New Silk Road, officially called Belt and Road Initiative (Moreira, 2024).
Indeed, in August 2024, Lula made a positive signalling about this subject. During a
speech at the National Industry Confederation (CNI), he stated that “the Chinese want
to discuss with us the Silk Road. We will discuss the Silk Road. We will not close our eyes,
no. We will say ‘What do you have for us? What do I get?’ Because this is the debate.”
4
(Estadão, 2024). If Brazil finally gets on board, it would be a considerable boost to the
Chinese-led project, and it could be interpreted as a firm recognition that China is
effectively capable to influence global governance and to offer concrete benefits for
Brazil’s development — and, consequently, to help Brazilian goals in the domestic and
international stage to be achieved.
References
Acharya, Amitav; Buzan, Barry (2007). Why is there no non-Western international
relations theory? An introduction. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, v. 7, n. 3,
pp. 287-312.
Alden, Chris; Aran, Amnon (2017). Foreign policy analysis: New approaches. Oxon:
Routledge.
Almeida, Paulo Roberto de (2004). Uma política externa engajada: A diplomacia do
governo Lula. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, v. 47, n. 1, pp. 162-184.
Axelrod, Robert; Keohane, Robert O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy:
Strategies and institutions. World Politics, v. 38, n. 1, pp. 226-254.
4
Translation made by the author. In Portuguese: “Os chineses querem discutir conosco a Rota da Seda.
Nós vamos discutir a Rota da Seda. Nós não vamos fechar os olhos, não. Nós vamos dizer: ‘O que é que
tem para nós? O que eu ganho? Porque essa é a discussão.”
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
97
Balingit, Moriah; Tobin, Meaghan (2023). The West Hoped Lula Would Be A Partner. He’s
Got His Own Plans. The Washington Post.
Https://Www.Washingtonpost.Com/World/2023/04/13/Lula-Foreign-Policy/.
Bonin, Robson (2010). Popularidade de Lula bate recorde e chega a 87%, diz Ibope. G1
Política. https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2010/12/popularidade-de-lula-bate-
recorde-e-chega-87-diz-ibope.html.
Brum, Eliane (2021). Bolsonaro has turned Brazil into a global pariah. El País.
https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-03-09/bolsonaro-has-turned-brazil-into-a-global-
pariah.html.
Byman, Daniel L.; Pollack, Kenneth M. (2001). Let us now praise great men: Bringing
the Statesman back in. International Security, v. 25, n. 4, pp. 107-146.
Cadier, David (2024). Foreign policy as the continuation of domestic politics by other
means: Pathways and patterns of populist politicization. Foreign Policy Analysis, v. 20,
n. 1, pp. 1-21.
Cardoso, Rafael (2024). Reforma da ONU é uma das prioridades do Brasil em reunião do
G20. Agência Brasil, 2024. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/internacional/noticia/2024-
02/reforma-da-onu-e-uma-das-prioridades-do-brasil-em-reuniao-do-g20.
Carvalho, Thales (2023). Uma política mais estratégica? Perspectivas para a política
externa de Lula III. Revista Conjuntura Austral, v. 14, n. 68, pp. 135-142.
Casarões, Guilherme; Saraiva, Miriam Gomes (2021). El populismo y la política exterior
de Jair Bolsonaro. In: Gratius, Susanne (Ed.); Rodríguez, Ángel R. (Ed.). Populismo y
política exterior en Europa y América. Madrid: Tecnos.
Chen, Zhimin (2016). State governance, global governance and the construction of world
order. Social Sciences in China, v. 37, n. 4, pp. 152-163.
Diniz, Simone; Ribeiro, Cláudio Oliveira (2008). The role of the Brazilian Congress in
foreign policy. Brazilian Political Science Review, v. 2, n. 2, pp. 10-38.
Estadão (2024). Lula sinaliza que pode aderir à Rota da Seda. UOL Economia.
https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/estadao-conteudo/2024/08/15/lula-sinaliza-que-
pode-aderir-a-rota-da-seda.htm.
Fonseca, Carmen (2017). O Brasil de Lula: A permanente procura de um lugar no sistema
internacional. Relações Internacionais, v. 55, pp. 51-70.
Global Times (2009). China, Brazil to boost strategic partnership. Global Times.
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/431452.shtml.
Hirst, Monica (2023). A política externa de Lula 3.0 além do horizonte. Cadernos
Adenauer, v. 24, n. 1, pp. 89-109.
Ives, Diogo (2024). Do insulamento burocrático à interação com a sociedade: O
Itamaraty na Conferência Nacional sobre Migrações e Refúgio (2014). Revista do Serviço
Público, v. 75 (Especial A), pp. 108-127.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
98
Kaarbo, Juliet (2015). A foreign policy analysis perspective on the domestic politics turn
in IR theory. International Studies Review, pp. 1-28.
Keohane, Robert O. (2009). Political Science as a vocation. Political Science and Politics,
pp. 359-363, April.
Kertzer, Joshua D.; Zeitzoff, Thomas (2017). A bottom-up theory of public opinion about
foreign policy. American Journal of Political Science, v. 61, n. 3, pp. 543-558.
Kubálková, Vendulka (2001). Introduction. In: Kubálková, Vendulka (Ed.). Foreign policy
in a constructed world. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Leira, Halvard (2019). The emergence of foreign policy. International Studies Quarterly,
v. 63, n. 1, pp. 187-198.
Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (1994). Ejes analíticos y conflicto de paradigmas en la
política exterior brasileña. FLACSO América Latina/Internacional, v. 1, n. 2, pp. 27-46.
Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (2000). Instituições democráticas e política exterior.
Contexto Internacional, v. 22, n. 2, pp. 265-303.
Lopes, Dawisson Belém; Faria, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de (2014). Eleições presidenciais
e política externa brasileira. Estudos Internacionais, v. 2, n. 2, pp. 139.148.
Maschietto, Roberta Holanda (2024). “O Brasil está de volta”, mas o mundo é outro.
Revista CEBRI, v. 3, n. 9, January-March. https://cebri.org/revista/br/artigo/149/o-
brasil-esta-de-volta-mas-o-mundo-e-outro.
Mendez, Álvaro (2017). Global governance in foreign policy. In: Thies, Cameron G. (Ed.).
The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milani, Carlos R. S. (2017). The politics of Brazilian foreign policy and its analytical
challenges. Foreign Policy Analysis, v. 13, pp. 278-296.
Milner, Helen (1997). Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and
international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moreira, Assis (2024). Xi Jinping to promote Belt and Road during visit to Brazil. Valor
International. https://valorinternational.globo.com/foreign-affairs/news/2024/05/07/xi-
jinping-to-promote-belt-and-road-during-visit-to-brazil.ghtml.
Newsweek (2009). Brazil’s Lula: The most popular politician on Earth. Newsweek.
https://www.newsweek.com/brazils-lula-most-popular-politician-earth-79355.
Nicoceli, Artur; Croquer, Gabriel (2024). Avaliação positiva do governo Lula cai para
33%, aponta Ipec. G1 Política. https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2024/03/08/ipec-
avaliacao-lula.ghtml.
Noesselt, Nele (2014). China’s contradictory role(s) in world politics: Decrypting China’s
North Korea strategy. Third World Quarterly, v. 35, n. 7, pp. 1307-1325.
Obama, Barack (2009). Remarks by President Obama and President Lula da Silva of
Brazil. The White House. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lula-da-silva-brazil.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
99
Ortega, Martin (2007). Building the future: The EU’s contribution to global governance.
Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
Ostermann, Falk; Mello, Patrick A. (2022). Methods of foreign policy analysis: Charting
ground, engaging traditions, and opening up boundaries. In OSTERMANN, Falk (Ed.);
Mello, Patrick A. (Ed.). Routledge Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis Methods. London:
Routledge.
Pasquarelli, Bruno Vicente Lippe (2010). Política externa como política pública: Uma
Análise da atuação diplomática brasileira durante o governo Lula. Revista Política Hoje,
v. 19, n. 1, pp. 187-221.
Peveri, Julieta (2022). The wise, the politician, and the strongman: Types of national
leaders and quality of governance. Journal of Comparative Economics, v. 50, n. 4, pp.
849-895.
Pinheiro, Leticia; Santos, Leandro W. dos (2022). Diplomatic capacity and foreign policy
changes under Bolsonaro: Elements of a paradox. Latin American Policy, v. 13, n. 2, pp.
447-463.
Pu, Xiaoyu (2019). Rebranding China: Contested status signalling in the changing global
order. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level
games. International Organisation, v. 42, n. 3, pp. 427-460.
República Federativa do Brasil (2023a). Brasil e China fecham 15 acordos e reforçam
parceria. Presidência da República. https://www.gov.br/secom/pt-
br/assuntos/noticias/2023/04/brasil-e-china-fecham-15-acordos-e-reforcam-parceria.
República Federativa do Brasil (2023b). Com primeiro-ministro chinês, Lula reforça
intenção de diversificação de investimentos. Presidência da República.
https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/04/com-
primeiro-ministro-chines-lula-reforca-intencao-de-diversificacao-de-investimentos.
Santos, Roberty Douglas Marinho dos (2021). Política externa e diplomacia presidencial:
Uma análise comparada dos governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva e Dilma
Rousseff (1995-2016). Fronteira, v. 20, n. 39, pp. 67-95.
Saraiva, Miriam Gomes; Reis, Ana Paula Marino de Sant’Anna (2023). O Brasil “voltou”:
As mudanças na política externa nos primeiros 100 dias do governo de Lula. Revista
Conjuntura Austral, v. 14, n. 68, pp. 61-72.
Sekhri, Sofiane (2009). The role approach as a theoretical framework for the analysis of
foreign policy in third world countries. African Journal of Political Science, v. 3, n. 12, pp.
1-10.
Soares, João Pedro (2024). Reforma da governança global domina encontro do G20 no
Rio. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/pt-br/reforma-da-governança-global-
domina-encontro-do-g20-no-rio/a-68302453.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 80-100
Brazilian Foreign Policy under “Lula 3”: The Reform of Global Governance as an Extension of
Domestic Politics and International (Re)Engagement
Pedro Steenhagen
100
Sousa, Ana Tereza Lopes Marra de; Abrão, Rafael Almeida Ferreira; Porto, Luis Filipe de
Souza (2023). A China na política externa do terceiro governo Lula: Cem dias de
reconstrução. Revista Conjuntura Austral, v. 14, n. 68, pp. 150-162.
Steenhagen, Pedro (2023). Brazil’s aspiration in the UN Security Council: The pursuit of
a permanent seat and the launch of the RwP agenda. Revista Hoplos, v. 7, n. 12, pp. 29-
49.
Stuenkel, Oliver (2023). How to understand Brazil’s Ukraine policy? Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/18/russia-ukraine-war-brazil-lula-nonalignment-
global-south/.
Stuenkel, Oliver. Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order.
Malden: Polity Press, 2016.
Tang, Shiping (2018). China and the future international order(s). Ethics & International
Affairs, v. 32, n. 1, pp. 31-43.
Thakur, Ramesh; Weiss, Thomas G. (2004). The UN and global governance: An idea and
its prospects. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Thies, Cameron G. (2018). Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Timerman, Jordana (2024). Lula is styling himself as the new leader of the global south
— and shifting attention away from the west. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/09/brazil-g20-lula-west-global-
south.
Wehner, Leslie E.; Thies, Cameron G. (2021). Leader influence in role selection choices:
Fulfilling role theory’s potential for foreign policy analysis. International Studies Review,
v. 23, pp. 1424-1441.
Zhang, Yanbing; Gu, Jing; Chen, Yunnan (2015). China’s engagement in international
development cooperation: The state of the debate. Evidence Report n. 116. Beijing:
Institute of Development Studies (Tsinghua University), February.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
101
BALANCING CONTINUITY AND ADJUSTMENTS IN BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS CHINA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH BETWEEN BOLSONARO
AND LULA’S THIRD TERM
FLORENCIA RUBIOLO
frubiolo@gmail.com
Ph.D. in International Relations, from the National University of Rosario. Currently, she is an
Independent Researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET),
CIECS (Argentina) and a Director of Insight 21 at Universidad Siglo 21, Córdoba. She is also a
Professor in the International Relations Doctoral Program at Córdoba Catholic University
(Argentina). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5669-7332.
GONZALO FIORE
gonzalofioreviani@gmail.com
Ph.D. in International Relations from Catholic University of Córdoba and a postdoctoral fellow at
the National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET). He currently is a professor
at Blas Pascal University in Córdoba (Argentina), and Anahuac University in Querétaro (Mexico).
He has published two books and numerous articles for both popular and academic audiences.
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0017-0435.
Abstract
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy, characterized by a staunchly conservative identity aligned with far-
right populist ideologies, emphasized anti-globalism, nationalism, and adversarial narratives.
His administration fostered close ties with the Trump Administration, influencing Brazil’s shift
away from emerging countries and international blocs. This pivot tested Brazil's previously
strong relationship with China, leading to stagnation in diplomatic and political relations,
contrasting sharply with the proactive approaches of Bolsonaro's predecessors. With Lula da
Silva's return to the presidency in 2023, Brazilian foreign policy underwent significant revision
during his first hundred days. Lula aimed to restore key elements of his earlier foreign policy,
emphasizing South-South cooperation, revitalizing the BRICS, and redefining Brazil’s
international agenda amid the ongoing Ukraine conflict. This reorientation notably impacted
Brazil-China relations. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of Jair Bolsonaro’s foreign
policy towards China from 2018 to 2022 and examines the first year of Lula da Silva’s
administration in 2023. It explores the diplomatic and economic dimensions of their respective
approaches towards China, highlighting both changes and continuities. The main argument
posits that during Bolsonaro’s tenure, Brazil’s relations with China underwent political and
diplomatic adjustments in line with the administration’s conservative foreign policy narrative.
Despite this, China retained a crucial role in Brazil’s economic agenda. Following Lula’s return
to power in 2023, diplomatic initiatives towards China were rejuvenated, reflecting a political
rapprochement with Beijing. This shift materialized through high-level official engagements
and continued robust economic ties, illustrating a restored bilateral and multilateral
relationship.
Keywords
Brazil foreign policy, autonomy, China, middle power, economic relations.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
102
Resumo
A política externa de Bolsonaro, caracterizada por uma identidade firmemente conservadora
alinhada com ideologias populistas de extrema direita, enfatizou o antiglobalismo, o
nacionalismo e narrativas adversas. A sua administração promoveu laços estreitos com a
administração Trump, influenciando o afastamento do Brasil dos países emergentes e dos
blocos internacionais. Este pivô testou o relacionamento anteriormente forte do Brasil com a
China, levando à estagnação nas relações diplomáticas e políticas, contrastando fortemente
com as abordagens proativas dos antecessores de Bolsonaro. Com o retorno de Lula da Silva
à presidência em 2023, a política externa brasileira passou por uma revisão significativa
durante seus primeiros cem dias. Lula pretendia restaurar elementos-chave da sua política
externa anterior, enfatizando a cooperação Sul-Sul, revitalizando os BRICS e redefinindo a
agenda internacional do Brasil no meio do conflito em curso na Ucrânia. Esta reorientação
impactou notavelmente as relações Brasil-China. Este artigo fornece uma análise aprofundada
da política externa de Jair Bolsonaro em relação à China de 2018 a 2022 e examina o primeiro
ano da administração de Lula da Silva em 2023. Explora as dimensões diplomáticas e
económicas das suas respectivas abordagens em relação à China, destacando tanto as
mudanças como as continuidades. O principal argumento postula que durante o mandato de
Bolsonaro, as relações do Brasil com a China passaram por ajustes políticos e diplomáticos
em linha com a narrativa conservadora da política externa do governo. Apesar disso, a China
manteve um papel crucial na agenda económica do Brasil. Após o regresso de Lula ao poder
em 2023, as iniciativas diplomáticas em relação à China foram rejuvenescidas, reflectindo
uma aproximação política com Pequim. Esta mudança materializou-se através de
compromissos oficiais de alto nível e da continuação de laços económicos robustos, ilustrando
uma relação bilateral e multilateral restaurada.
Palavras-chave
Política externa brasileira, autonomia, China, potência média, relações econômicas.
How to cite this article
Rubiolo, Florencia & Fiore, Gonzalo (2024). Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s
Foreign Policy Towards China: A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term.
Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil -
China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 101-121.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.5.
Article received on 1 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 20 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
103
BALANCING CONTINUITY AND ADJUSTMENTS IN BRAZIL’S
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
BETWEEN BOLSONARO AND LULA’S THIRD TERM
FLORENCIA RUBIOLO
GONZALO FIORE
1. Introduction
Brazilian foreign policy has historically been characterized by an active and pragmatic
diplomacy, based on principles such as non-intervention, self-determination and the
search for international cooperation. Several works have identified Brazil as a country
with a universal vocation, and with the ambition to become a key actor in international
politics. (Caballero & Crescentino, 2020). Building on a highly qualified and
professionalized diplomatic tradition, Itamaraty became an example of professional and
institutional foreign policy for other Latin American countries and beyond.
Regarding the geographical scope, Brazilian relations with the so-called Global South
countries have been a priority. South-South relations and regional alliances became
fundamental means to diversify partnerships and reduce asymmetries with developed
countries, adopting a reformist and more assertive diplomatic stance (Neto & Malamud,
2015). Diversification became an essential pillar in Brazil’s foreign policy, and China, with
special emphasis on South-South relations. In this context, China has emerged as a
crucial player in Brazil's economic diversification strategy.
During the first decade of the 21st century, China and Brazil witnessed a significant
strengthening of their economic and political ties. This period marked the establishment
of a robust trade partnership, with bilateral trade soaring from just over 3 billion USD in
2001 to surpass 44 billion USD in 2010 and then reaching 100 billion USD by 2019 (Myers
& Gallagher, 2024).
Concurrently, the two nations deepened their political collaboration, notably through
initiatives like the BRICS grouping - comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa - and the establishment of corresponding multilateral financial institutions like the
New Development Bank. For an extended period, Brazil has consistently ranked as the
primary destination for Chinese direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC), even in the face of initial challenges related to investing in sectors such as green
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
104
energy, transportation infrastructure, and agriculture within the country (Studart and
Myers, 2019).
Bolsonaro's foreign policy, characterized by a strong conservative identity, aligned with
far-right populist ideologies, focusing on anti-globalism, nationalism, and anti-foe
narratives (De Sá Guimarães & De Oliveira e Silva, 2021), maintained closed links with
the Trump Administration and its political objectives in South America, driven Brazil’s
focus away from emerging countries and blocs. Brazil’s close relations with China were,
then, tested. Diplomatic and political relations stagnated, with few gestures from the
Brazilian government towards Beijing, in sharp contrast with Bolsonaro’s antecessors (De
Sousa, Abrão & de Souza Porto, 2023; De Sá Guimarães & De Oliveira e Silva, 2021;
Gomes Saraiva and Costa Silva, 2019).
With the return of Lula da Silva to the Planato in 2023, during his first hundred days
there was a review of Brazilian foreign policy (de Oliveira, 2023) that had to do with
returning to some milestones of Lula's first foreign policy and restoring the agenda.
South-South cooperation, rebuild and rethink the role of the BRICS and remake an
international agenda within the framework of the war in Ukraine (Gallego, 2023). This
reorientation had an impact on Brazil-China relations, which will be analyzed in the
following sections.
In this paper, we aim to provide an insightful analysis of Jair Bolsonaro's foreign policy
towards China during his term from 2018 to 2022, as well as examining the initial year
of Lula da Silva's administration in 2023. We will analyze the diplomatic and economic
dimensions, highlighting changes and continuity in their approaches towards China. As a
main argument we suggest that Brazilian relations with China underwent political and
diplomatic adjustments during Bolsonaro’s administration, in line with the government’s
narrative and conservative foreign policy identity. But, in the economic realm, China
maintained a core place in Brazilian global agenda. After Lula’s return to power in 2023,
diplomatic initiatives towards China were restored, - both at the bilateral and multilateral
arena - reflecting the political rapprochement to Beijing, which materialized in high level
official actions, paralleling the ongoing density of economic ties.
The theoretical approach centers on the concept of autonomy, and its interpretations
through different Brazilian administrations, particularly on the political and economic
dimensions. We also focus on the notions of the continuity, changes and adjustments in
foreign policy, to understand the dynamics during both presidential periods under study
in the bilateral relation with China. In doing so, we will examine bilateral investment and
commercial figures for the economic dimension, and systematize foreign policy actions
such as official visits, statements and bilateral documents during the period under study.
This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, in section two we present the
theoretical debates to frame Brazil’s foreign policy during Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s
governments, with a focus on the concept of autonomy. In section three and four we
discuss the specific features of Brazil's relations with China during each Administration,
delving into the economic and political dimensions, to identify traces of continuity,
adjustment or change between the two periods. Overall, the study aims to offer insights
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
105
into the complexities of Brazil-China relations and their significance within the broader
context of international diplomacy.
2. Theoretical perspectives on Brazilian foreign policy and autonomy
In recent decades, Brazil's foreign policy has attracted significant attention from
academics, especially since the country solidified its position as a middle power on the
global stage. Soares de Lima & Hirst (2006, p. 21) underline this trend by suggesting
that “since the early years of the twentieth century, Brazil's major foreign policy
aspiration has been to achieve international recognition”, based on its self-definition of a
big country which should assume a global role. In this same vein, Sotero (2010)
highlights Lula’s role in shifting towards a more assertive and innovative approach in
global affairs, driven by the country's increased international activism and self-
confidence. This aspiration for international recognition, adds Malamud (2011), has
driven Brazil to engage actively in multilateral forums and regional initiatives to enhance
its global standing, aligning with the country's self-perception as a significant player.
A cornerstone of Brazilian foreign policy since, at least, the second half of the twentieth
century has been the pursuit and consolidation of autonomy (Rodriguez, 2012). This
concept played a central role for several South American governments and has been a
guiding concept for analysts from the region as both a goal and an instrument for
explanatory purposes. In the Brazilian case, autonomy, according to Caballero &
Crescentino (2020, p. 2) can be considered as a “compass of Brazil’s foreign policy”.
Autonomy has several interpretations as a foreign policy concept, particularly developed
in Argentina and Brazil’s academic circles. As Briceño Ruiz & Simonoff (2017) underline,
the autonomy approach is an outstanding contribution to Foreign Policy theoretical
debates from a South American perspective, although its impact for IR theory has been
mostly regional. Notwithstanding the diverse definitions the concept adopted throughout
the decades, autonomy is intimately related to the broader objective of foreign policy
which is the promotion of national development. (Caballero & Crescentino, 2020) Under
the light of becoming a vehicle to overcome dependency and to avoid becoming an
“obedient” country (Malamud, 2011), autonomy also had a performative narrative role
in academic circles, with an impact on governmental discourse.
Regarding Brazil’s foreign policy, autonomy can be classified by different periods
reflecting both the country's self-perception and the surrounding international and
regional environments. From the end of the Cold War, and along with a resurgence of
the autonomic debate (Briceño Ruiz & Simonoff, 2017), Brazil’s search for autonomy was
built on participation in international institutions and regimes “in order to leverage the
country’s foreign policy leeway” (Neto & Malamud, 2015: 14), reflecting principles such
as pacifism, multilateralism, and non-intervention. This new orientation became known
as “autonomy through participation” and meant that “foreign policy retained its ‘desire
for autonomy’ but, at the same time, sought to remove the legacy of authoritarianism
and to respond to the international power of global liberalism” (Soares de Lima & Hirst,
2006, p. 24).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
106
In 2003, Lula came to power and a new impetus was given to Brazil’s foreign policy,
particularly in the regional scenario but also in the desire to build the nation as an
unequivocal middle power with a dynamic participation in multilateral institutions and
emerging blocs. In contrast to previous administrations, Lula’s foreign policy centered on
Latin America as a privileged scenario for integration. Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007)
highlight that autonomy remained a central goal for this government’s foreign policy,
with a renewed emphasis on diversification. the authors define this concept as the
“adherence to international norms and principles by means of South - South alliances,
including regional alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners
(China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, etc), trying to reduce
asymmetries in external relations with powerful countries.” (Vigevani & Cepaluni, 2007,
p. 1313) The idea underlying this new orientation is that Brazil’s power asymmetry vis-
a-vis developed countries could only be balanced and, eventually, reduced by
strengthening the political and economic relations with non-traditional partners from the
Global South and adopting a more assertive diplomatic stance towards international
institutions in order to introduce reforms that could also favored the developing world.
Although autonomy through diversification has been widely adopted among academics
to analyze Lula’s period (Neto & Malamud, 2015; Crescentino & Caballero, 2021), Pereyra
Doval (2013) distances herself from this definition and introduces the concept of
“autonomy by coalition”. This notion refers to “the constant search for partners to form
coalitions and thus coordinate policies in common forums” (Pereyra Doval, 2013, p. 120).
Although the concept reflects Brazil’s projection in the period, in this work we use the
previous definition as it better portrays the evolving dynamics of Brazil's relationship with
China, particularly in the economic domain.
China became a central partner within the diversification strategy, with a particular focus
on the economic dimension. But the economic prosperity that resulted from the
commodity prices boom between 2003-2013, which largely benefited Brazil exports, nor
autonomy neither trade diversification was improved, given the absence of a trade and
investment policy. “Far from granting greater autonomy at the international level or a
desirable diversification of the export matrix, this repressing of exports generated a
pendulum, causing China to replace the U.S.A. as Brazil’s preferred trading partner”
(Caballero & Crescentino, 2020, p. 10). Somehow, the result was a diversification of
dependency, since relations with China continued to reproduce a model dependent on
the demand of the third country instead of being the outcome of national long-term policy
or strategy.
In the aftermath of Rousseff’s interrupted second term, China had become a major
economic partner, but political relations were dependent on Beijing’s political interests
and the relevance Brazil could represent in a wider international strategy aimed at
positioning China in a global stage through multilateral fora, such as BRICS. In other
words, diversification as a means to achieve greater autonomy was only partly successful,
mostly in trade terms.
Temer's short period was marked by a strengthening of an economistic and reductionist
foreign policy approach, focused on using diplomacy as a commercial lever, giving priority
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
107
to the nexus with the United States. The strategy of its foreign ministers (José Serra and
Aloysio Nunes) consisted of defending internationally the legitimacy of the
administration, while dismantling the foreign policy design woven throughout the PT
government, claiming a supposed de-ideologization of foreign relations. (Crescentino &
Caballero, 2021; Gomes Saraiva, 2020).
According to Gomes Saraiva (2022) Bolsonaro's foreign policy represented a
reorientation in the country's external relations path, breaking with diplomatic traditions.
Unlike institutionalists who supported normative frameworks and autonomists who aimed
to amend them, Bolsonaro's approach was aggressive and reactive, challenging
multilateralism and existing international standards, and viewing the international order
as a threat to Brazilian autonomy. This period’s foreign policy, with a strong emphasis
on economic-commercial interests, escalated a process that began during Dilma's second
term and was consolidated during Temer's interim period. The construction of a critical
narrative about the ideological footprint of Lula's foreign policy is not new in the
Bolsonaro period, although there has been a radicalization of that discourse. As a
consequence, during Bolsonaro’s term, autonomy became a secondary goal,
subordinated to the ideological agenda that granted the US and the West a privileged
status in Brazil’s foreign policy. (Caballero and Crescentino, 2020)
As we will analyze in the following section, relations with China showed increasing
tensions, stemming from the executive's anti-communist rhetoric and alignment with
Trump's foreign policy that deepened rivalry with China since 2017, mainly through the
trade war. But, as months passed by, economic pragmatism reemerged and relations
with Beijing improved, given the relevance the country had for Brazil’s foreign trade and
economic stability. Notwithstanding this, the rapprochement to Beijing did not follow the
autonomous goal it had during previous presidencies. Instead, there was a material-
mercantilist imprint, which resulted in an improvement of economic indicators of the
bilateral relations, coexisting with constant political and diplomatic tensions.
Lula’s return to power in 2023 implied a new turn to foreign policy orientation. Autonomy
regained centrality, as a guiding principle, tool and goal, but with a different
interpretation. As Soares de Lima (2023) underlines, Lula’s foreign policy 3.0, faces
several changes both at the domestic and the international levels. In the external front,
the war in Ukraine; China’s economic slowdown and its consequent global impact; and
the escalating US-China rivalry, are the main features in a rapidly evolving systemic
context. According to Rodrigues (2023), under this new administration, autonomy can
be characterized as pragmatic. This notion, ‘pragmatic autonomy’, combines the
country's leadership aspirations on issues such as climate change and combating hunger
with the desire to maintain a balance between opposing powers in the international
system, mainly China and the United States (Rodrigues, 2023).
As Caballero and Crescentino (2020) suggest, autonomy as a concept, given the multiple
interpretations it had through the decades, has become an indicator of breaks rather
than a measure for continuity. We will utilize this concept as a theoretical framework to
examine Brazil's interactions with China during the two administrations under evaluation.
Additionally, we will uncover discrepancies between the economic and diplomatic aspects,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
108
as they have followed diverging trajectories in each presidency. It is useful to understand
that autonomy has a political pillar, based on a self-identification as a developing country,
seeking to amplify the margin of maneuver in international affairs and to lessen
dependence on external powers; and an economic one, which has been central to seek
developing goals in South American country, and to maintain domestic economic
stability, even through different political ideologies.
Finally, given the notable contrasts in foreign policy between Bolsonaro and Lula's third
term, we resort to the notions of change, adjustment and continuity to grasp the
complexities of Brazil's interactions with China in both political and economic spheres. In
this line, Busso (2019) approaches foreign policy as a dynamic and complex phenomenon
in constant evolution. Change in foreign policy implies a deliberate break with established
practices, whether due to changes in political direction, ideological considerations or new
geopolitical realities (Busso and Barreto, 2020). In their approach, adjustment is
presented as a more nuanced and adaptive process, reflecting responses to external
changes without a complete reconfiguration of foreign policy frameworks. Busso
highlights the importance of identifying elements of continuity, which indicate the
persistence of certain principles, alliances or strategic priorities over time, even in
contexts of political transition. In this line, Hermann (1990, p. 5) suggests that
adjustments refer to “occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope
of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done,
and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.” This adjustment can manifest
itself in the review of alliances, the adoption of new diplomatic strategies or the
recalibration of priorities based on emerging circumstances (Rusell and Tokatlian, 2009).
Regarding continuity, it stands out that, despite changes in government, foreign policy
should maintain certain guiding principles and fundamental strategic lines over time. This
continuity is essential to preserve coherence and predictability in the country's
international relations.
As we discuss in the following sections, Bolsonaro’s foreign policy represented a shift
from previous administrations. The alignment to Trump’s policies; a retreat from Latin
American multilateral initiatives; and constant diplomatic tensions with Beijing, driven by
the anti-communist rhetoric; were some of the main features of the new government.
However, based on the data analysis, it is evident that adjustments were made to
bilateral relations with China instead of significant changes, as previously defined.
3. Brazil-China relations under Bolsonaro (2018-2022)
Since the late 1990s, Brazil had pursued an international strategy focused on diversifying
relationships (hedging) and investing in multilateral institutions to navigate the
challenges posed by superpowers and collective action issues. In recent years, the
relationship between Brazil and China “has become increasingly relevant in the context
of Brazilian foreign policy” (Feitosa et al, 2022, p. 2). The growing economic importance
of China worldwide has led to an intensification of commercial ties and cooperation
between both countries. Pragmatic institutionalists, by advocating close cooperation,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
109
seek to capitalize on the economic opportunities offered by the relationship with China
(Shqueitzer, 2021).
In that sense, Jair Bolsonaro's government was an adjustment in Brazil's foreign policy,
giving rise to a decision-making structure divided into two large sectors: one of an
ideological nature, with an inclination towards Washington, and another pragmatic, which
prioritized the defense of national interests and did not frown upon deepening the
relationship with Beijing. In this sense, Bolsonaro’s government introduced “new ideas,
a new road map of the world, and new partnerships, putting at stake the standards that
have guided Brazil’s international presence for an extended period” (Gomes Saraiva,
2022, p. 1).
This dichotomy can be associated, in turn, with the geopolitical competition between the
United States and China. An illustrative example is the case of the Chinese-based
multinational company Huawei and 5G technology services in the Latin American country,
generating indecision in the Brazilian government due to the position (Shqueitzer, 2022).
The Bolsonaro administration seemed to opt for an automatic alignment strategy with
the United States. Such alignment strategies are commonplace, especially among
medium-sized countries like Brazil, aiming to minimize costs or gain incentives by
aligning with superpowers. However, the issue in the Brazilian context lies in the lack of
concrete evidence supporting national gains resulting from this alignment (Hirst & Valls
Pereira, 2020).
In relation to the anti-China rhetoric, it is observed that Jair Bolsonaro has expressed
critical comments toward the Asian nation, especially during the electoral campaign
period (Burton, 2018). However, once in office, a modulation in his tone has been noted,
acknowledging the significance of the relationship with China for the Brazilian economy.
This change in perspective could suggest a pragmatic adaptation by the Bolsonaro
government based on the country's economic interests despite what his main vocal
supporters may have said on social media (Lopez Conte, 2021). The complexity of the
relationship between both countries is thus manifested in the intersection of political,
economic, and environmental factors.
Trade and technological tensions between Brazil and China have arisen in the context of
the development of the 5G network in the South American country. The participation of
the Chinese company Huawei led to conflicts, prompting the Bolsonaro administration to
consider restrictions. However, a complete ban on Huawei's participation was not
implemented. This episode highlights the delicate balance that the Brazilian government
seeks to maintain between its trade and technological relationships with China and its
political alignments (Esteves, 2020). At the beginning of 2019, according to Stuenkel
(2022, p. 5) “relations faced its most difficult moment in history”. Despite these strains,
in January 2019 Chinese authorities invited members of then-presidential party PSL for
a visit to China and between may 23rd and 26th in 2019, Bolsonaro’s Vice-President,
Hamilton Mourāu had an encounter with Xi which served to rebuild the bilateral
relationship after Bolsonaro's campaign statements. His main task was to improve the
tarnished image of Brazil by convincing the Chinese government that pragmatic forces
within the Brazilian administration were in control of the situation, able to restrain
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
110
attitudes which could damage bilateral relations. His visit also led to a reactivation of
COSBAN (Sawicka, 2020).
Bolsonaro engaged in two bilateral encounters with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2019.
The first took place from October 24th to 26th in Beijing, followed by another meeting
from November 14th to 16th in Brasilia during the BRICS Summit (Paulino, 2020). During
that Summit, Economy Minister Paulo Guedes also travelled to Brasilia to meet his
Chinese counterpart (Dryomova & Stolyarova, 2019). Bolsonaro's stance towards China
has been marked by a volatile evolution, oscillating between seeing China as an arch-
enemy, a strategic partner, and an ideological rival within a short span of time. Initially,
he portrayed China as a significant ideological adversary, emphasizing his visits to Taiwan
and positioning Brazil alongside the United States and Israel (Guimarães & De Oliveira E
Silva, 2021). This approach, however, incurred swift responses from Beijing, highlighting
the importance of careful diplomacy in choosing allies. Bolsonaro depicted China as a
predatory force aiming to dominate key sectors of Brazil's economy, fueling tensions
further. Despite China's status as Brazil's top trading partner, Bolsonaro's administration
explored ways to diminish dependence on China, raising concerns among crucial
constituencies, notably farmers.
The dynamics shifted during the Amazon fires crisis in 2019 when, amid mounting
international criticism, particularly from figures like French President Macron, who
questioned Brazil's sovereignty over the region, Bolsonaro found an unexpected ally in
China. Beijing supported Brazil, aligning momentarily on issues of sovereignty and
rebuffing international criticism (Marra et al, 2021). The three-day visit of Brazilian
President Jair Bolsonaro to Beijing marked a significant shift in his approach towards
China. In a complete turnaround from his previous criticisms, Bolsonaro adopted a tone
of cooperation and openness, acknowledging the mutual dependency between Brazil and
China. His words emphasized the importance of this bilateral relationship, describing
Brazil as a vast ocean of opportunities willing to share with China. 25 agreements in the
areas of politics, science, technology, education, economy, trade, energy, and agriculture
were signed. The agreements include sanitary protocols for the export of processed meat
and cottonseed flour from Brazil to China, as well as cooperation for the development of
new and renewable energy (Vidal Liy & Gallaraga Gortázar, 2019).
This newfound alignment, though pragmatic, didn't substantially alter Bolsonaro's
underlying views on China. His subsequent apology to Xi Jinping was overshadowed by
domestic accusations of Chinese involvement in the COVID-19 pandemic, perpetuating a
narrative of Chinese threat. Bolsonaro's diplomatic tightrope walk underscores the
complexities of balancing economic interests with ideological differences, epitomizing
Schmitt's notion of the "political enemy" as existentially different, yet necessary for
engagement. During the 2019 BRICS summit, which was chaired by Brazil, Minister of
Economy Paulo Guedes announced that the government of Bolsonaro was in talks with
China to establish a free trade area between the two nations. This move aimed to
strengthen the bilateral economic relationship and diversify Brazil's trade partnerships.
Guedes emphasized the importance of greater integration with China, even if it entailed
a shift in the trade balance, stating that the country could balance itself in the future
through increased exports (Hooijmaaijers, 2021). During the covid-19 pandemic, the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
111
bilateral relation went through hard times again. The initially harmonious stance towards
Chinese provider Huawei in Brazil's 5G network auction, announced by the government
in April 2020, underwent a stark transformation amid the Coronavirus pandemic. The rift
began with President Bolsonaro's son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, attributing global blame for
the crisis to China, followed by the resignation of the recent Minister of Education, who
insulted the country in a racially charged and childish speech. This deterioration in
relations was further evidenced during a late April cabinet meeting, where Foreign
Minister Ernesto Araújo criticized China as undemocratic and dismissive of human rights,
advocating for Brazil to spearhead a new global order alongside like-minded nation.
However, disrespectful comments towards China were reportedly struck from the record,
with Economy Minister Paulo Guedes highlighting the economic necessity of maintaining
ties despite ideological differences (Ibañez, 2020).
China issued a warning to Brazil, stating that there could be "negative consequences"
following the characterization by Brazilian lawmaker Eduardo Bolsonaro of Chinese
activities regarding 5G technology as "infamous espionage." This stark message,
conveyed through the Chinese embassy in Brasilia, represents a notable shift in tone
toward the South American nation, a declared ally of outgoing U.S. President Donald
Trump and his anti-Beijing rhetoric. Eduardo Bolsonaro, who was also serving as chair of
the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Chamber of Deputies during his father’s presidency,
subsequently deleted the contentious tweet following discussions with the Minister of
Communications and advisors from the National Telecommunications Agency (Meier,
2023). The central focus of these talks was the 5G auction in 2021. The embassy's
statement, urging Brazilian figures to refrain from aligning with U.S. rhetoric and
disinformation against China, underscores the potential repercussions of straying from
the path of Sino-Brazilian friendship, highlighting the historical responsibility to maintain
the stability of the China-Brazil alliance. After this, in May 24th of 2022, there was a
meeting during the COSBAN Summit, where Mourão met with Chinese Vice President
Wang Quishan (Roberto, 2022).
Bolsonaro's administration, marked by a dichotomy between ideological alignment with
the United States and pragmatic engagement with China, underscores the geopolitical
competition between superpowers, reminiscent of the arguments presented by pragmatic
institutionalists like Shqueitzer (2021). The volatility in Bolsonaro's stance towards China,
oscillating between adversarial rhetoric and moments of cooperation, reflects the delicate
balance between economic interests and political alignments, as highlighted by Hirst &
Valls Pereira (2020). Despite initial tensions and criticisms, Bolsonaro's government
ultimately pursued a pragmatic approach, acknowledging the significance of the Brazil-
China relationship for economic stability and technological advancement. However,
challenges persisted, particularly regarding the integration of Huawei into Brazil's 5G
network, revealing the complex interplay between trade, technology, and political
considerations (Esteves, 2020). Amidst challenges and disagreements, efforts to deepen
economic cooperation, such as discussions on establishing a free trade area and
navigating the COVID-19 pandemic, underscored the importance of maintaining stability
and continuity in the China-Brazil alliance, as emphasized by the warnings issued by the
Chinese embassy in Brasilia (Meier, 2023).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
112
3.1 Strengthening economic ties with China: Growth in trade and
investments despite political tensions
The economic dimension, particularly in trade terms, showed not only continuity, but
also a growing dynamism, in contrast with the prevailing tensions in the diplomatic
front. Trade has been a core pillar in Brazil’s relations with China since the beginning of
the 2000s. In 2009, China became the main destination for Brazil's exports, surpassing
the United States for the first time, and becoming the country's largest global trading
partner.
Figure 1: Total Trade Brazil - China, 2016-2023, in thousands of US dollars.
Source: Authors, based on data retrieved from the International Trade Center (2024).
As a result of this unprecedented trend, China’s growing role as core trade partner for
Brazil had impacts on the overall participation of other partners and on the country's
global commercial basket composition. In both dimensions, partners and compositions,
there was a gradual decline in diversification. As shown in figure 2, Brazil’s total trade
with China in 2023, more than doubled that with the United States, and was 5.4 times
larger than total trade with Argentina. Furthermore, total trade with China grew faster
than with the other two partners, particularly between 2018-2023. As figures show,
Brazilian trade with China concentrated 20.3% of the country’s global trade in 2017 and
27.1% in 2023. (ITC, 2024) So, in contrast to Bolsonaro's rhetoric, especially during his
campaign and first months as president, China not only sustained a privileged position
as Brazil's primary trading partner but also significantly increased its participation
throughout the period.
0
40 000 000
80 000 000
120 000 000
160 000 000
200 000 000
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Impo desde China Expo a China
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
113
Figure 2: Brazil’s Main trade partners. 2016-2023, in thousands of US dollars.
Source: Authors, based on data retrieved from the International Trade Center (2024).
Brazilian exports represented the main bulk of Brazil-China total trade, and their increase
surpassed that of the country’s imports from this partner. In fact, in the period under
study, Brazil’s exports to China were almost three times greater than those to the United
States and eight times greater than exports to Argentina, the second and third largest
destinations respectively. In terms of participation, Brazil’s exports to China, reached
30.7% of total exports in 2023, with the highest share in 2020 -during Bolsonaro’s
period-, accounting for 32.4%. (ITC, 2024). Analyzing these numbers, there is no doubt
Brazil’s trade relations with China reflected continuity during the whole period under
study. This continuity is further demonstrated by the ongoing asymmetry in trade
composition, which has only strengthened in recent years, emphasizing an interindustrial
trade pattern. Since 2017, the majority of Brazil's main export products to China have
consistently comprised an average of 86% of total items, indicating a highly concentrated
portfolio. (International Trade Center, 2024) Until 2019, the four main products in Brazil’s
export basket were soya beans (42%), petroleum oil (22%), iron ores (18%), and
chemical wood pulp (5%). In 2020, after Beijing granted permission in September 2019
to 25 additional Brazilian beef, pork and poultry plants to ship to the country (Bloomberg,
2019), meat became the fourth exported item, a position that was reinforced in the
following years, accounting for 9% of total exports in average between 2020 and 2023.
Chinese investments have also become increasingly relevant for Brazil since 2009. As
Sawicka (2020) recalls, that year the China Development Bank provided Petrobras with
a loan of 10 billion USD, and in 2010, the State Grid Corporation of China, the largest
power company in the world, acquired seven Brazilian companies in the electric energy
sector. Moreover, in 2016, State Grid purchased a controlling stake in Brazil's largest
power distributor, CPFL. Between 2005 and 2022, this South American country was the
world’s fourth largest recipient of Chinese investment in the world. However, in recent
0
40 000 000
80 000 000
120 000 000
160 000 000
200 000 000
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Total China Total USA Total Argentina
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
114
years, China has taken a more cautious and selective approach towards outbound
investment for several reasons. The focus on domestic priorities and a more uncertain
global geopolitical landscape have prompted Beijing to adapt its strategies and
concentrate on key partners, such as Brazil. (Cariello, 2023)
During the Bolsonaro administration, the number of investment projects announced and
confirmed showed a fluctuating trend. In 2019, projects announced were 31 and
confirmed 24. But in 2020, as a clear result of the Covid-19 outbreak, confirmed
investment projects plummeted to a total of 8. The years 2021 and 2022 portrayed a
significant recovery, with 28 and 32 confirmed projects respectively. (Cariello, 2023)
Then, despite Bolsonaro’s hostile initial rhetoric towards China, “several cooperation
agreements and sectorial MoUs were signed, resulting in the expansion of Chinese
business operations in Brazil” (García et al, 2023, p. 8). In terms of flows, figures show
that after a peak in 2017 (17.4 billion USD) -that was mainly due to State Grid’s
acquisition of a majority stake in CPFL for a total of 12.5 billion USD (García et al, 2023)-
investments dropped to an average of 3.5 billion USD between 2018 and 2022. The main
sectors receiving Chinese investments include energy, mining, automotive and finance.
Between 2007-2022, measured by value, the electricity sector absorbed 45.5% of total
investments by Chinese companies in Brazil, followed by oil extraction (30.4%),
extraction of metallic minerals (6.2%), manufacturing industry (6.2%), infrastructure
projects (4.4%) and agriculture (3.4%) (Cariello, 2023).
Overall, economic relations between Brazil and China remained stable during the
Bolsonaro period in comparison with previous administrations, and although total figures
are not still available, it is supposed to continue during Lula’s current term. Both trade
and investment flows reacted more to external conditions -such as the pandemic
outbreak, China’s domestic conditions, and international conflicts- than to Brazil’s
political changing orientation. In the aftermath, continuity rather than change or
adjustment, was the result of a pragmatic lecture during Bolsonaro’s years, that
privileged material needs over ideology and political values in its relations with Beijing.
4. Brazil-China relations under Lula’s third term
In the first hundred days of the new foreign policy under Lula's presidency, an attempt
was made to reverse the negative impact of Bolsonaro's previous management on
Brazil's foreign relations. Lula and his team diagnosed a deterioration in the country's
image due to the dismantling of internal policies and an isolationist vision in the
international arena. The objective of Brazilian Foreign Policy under the new government
was to bring Brazil back to the world stage (de Sousa et al, 2023). The first hundred
days of Lula's new foreign policy emphasized the reconstruction of Brazil's international
image, the reorientation of bilateral relations with China and the search for
opportunities for internal development, global projection and cooperation on crucial
issues at the national level. worldwide (De Sousa et al, 2023).
During his first presidency from 2003 to 2010, Lula sought to strengthen ties with China,
recognizing the country's growing economic power. He visited China four times during
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
115
his tenure, and in 2009, China surpassed the US to become Brazil's largest trading
partner, a position it has held since then. This event can be seen in the context of the
commodities boom of the early 2000s, which created a favorable environment not only
for Brazil but also for other Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia,
and Venezuela, to deepen economic ties with China, then seen as a key market for their
exports and a potential source of investment and technology transfer (Almeida, 2010).
Since President Lula took office again in early 2023, bilateral relations have significantly
improved, with Lula seeking to rekindle the relationship with China and showing
eagerness to develop bilateral trade and investment ties. In late March 2023, China and
Brazil signed an agreement to settle all trade exchanges in their respective currencies
rather than in US dollars. In April 2023, Lula continued the bilateral dialogue by meeting
Xi in Beijing (Giaccaglia, 2024). This agreement, along with President Lula's comments
during his visit to China, shows Brazil's willingness to disrupt the dominance of the US
dollar as the primary trading currency, aligning with Beijing's aspirations to
internationalize the renminbi (Da Rosa, 2024).
During President Lula's trip to China in 2023, over 20 agreements were signed, and high-
level meetings took place, underscoring Brazil's renewed commitment to a robust and
multifaceted relationship with the Asian powerhouse. During these meetings included the
appointment of former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff as the new head of the BRICS
Bank, underscores Brazil's renewed commitment to a robust and multifaceted
relationship with the Asian powerhouse given that “Lula's decision seeks to give
geopolitical relevance to this scheme” (Giaccaglia & Dussort, 2023, p. 9). Set against the
backdrop of escalating tensions between China and the United States, Lula's visit reflects
Brazil's pursuit of a pragmatic, mutually beneficial approach, consistent with its tradition
of neutrality and negotiation in international affairs. Accompanied by a diverse delegation
including ministers and governors, Lula's journey represents a significant step towards
diversifying Brazil's foreign relations and exploring new avenues of cooperation in
strategic sectors.
According to the Joint Declaration between the People's Republic of China and the
Federative Republic of Brazil on the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership, released during the visit, the two countries intend to deepen cooperation in
various fields and jointly address a wide range of issues, such as poverty reduction, social
development, technological innovation, environmental protection, climate change, low-
carbon economy, and digital economy (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023). The
bilateral agreements cover many of these fields and more, aiming to boost bilateral trade
and investment across a wide range of industries, including trade facilitation, research
and innovation cooperation, information and communication technology cooperation,
industrial investment promotion, strengthening cooperation in the digital economy,
cooperation between finance ministries, and social and rural development cooperation
aimed at eradicating hunger and poverty. Moreover, the renewal of cooperation in the
aerospace industry was highlighted, with the signing of documents to renew cooperation
in the aerospace sector and restart the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program
(Huld, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
116
“Under the new agreements, both sides agree to accelerate the development of CBERS-
6, the sixth satellite built through their partnership, and to implement related projects
within the China-Brazil Space Cooperation Program” (Huld, 2024), reflecting a joint effort
to promote research and development of new technologies and undertake projects
including technology transfer elements (Alcalá et al, 2023). Furthermore, agreements
were made to facilitate trade in agricultural products, with efforts to digitalize customs
procedures and promote cooperation in disease management that could affect bilateral
trade and supply chain stability. Additionally, agreements were reached to resume
Brazilian beef exports to China, although no timeline was provided for lifting the
suspension (Da Rosa Muñoz, 2024). In June 2024, during another COSBAN Summit,
Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckim met with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng in
Beijing (Secretaria de Comunicação Social, 2024).
The dynamic evolution of Brazil-China relations under Lula’s third term epitomizes the
interplay of theoretical concepts elucidated within the framework of Brazilian foreign
policy. Lula’s pragmatic approach, characterized by a pursuit of autonomy and strategic
partnerships, resonates with the notion of "pragmatic autonomy" as articulated by
Rodrigues (2023). The reinvigoration of bilateral ties, spanning economic, technological,
and environmental cooperation, underscores Brazil’s pursuit of comprehensive strategic
partnership, echoing Tokatlian’s (1996) emphasis on foreign policy as an expression of
national identity and strategic interests.
Final Remarks
In a developing country like Brazil, despite its GDP level and status as a global middle
power, the material conditions linked to development needs set the pace for foreign policy
decisions. During his campaign, Bolsonaro built an anti-communist, anti-Chinese rhetoric
aligned with the Trump administration, which initially led to a cooling of relations with
Beijing. Since the moment the new government comprehended that the economic ties
with China were truly irreplaceable and that Brazil’s well-being and economic stability
depended on them, the President toned down his criticism and showed gestures of
diplomatic rapprochement, particularly through official visits and the signing of economic
agreements.
Unlike previous governments, the quest for autonomy was not in Bolsonaro’s agenda
towards China, but pragmatism, which is also a traditional feature of Brazilian foreign
policy, gradually became a compass for managing the relationship. In the aftermath,
economic pragmatism prevailed over ideological differences, and relations with China
remained stable through most of Bolsonaro´s administration and strengthened economic
ties. Economic interests, and the unavoidable evidence that the relation with Beijing is a
cornerstone of Brazil’s economic progress, were the essence of continuity besides the
outstanding political differences with previous governments.
Lula’s return to power in 2023 signaled a shift back towards a more autonomous foreign
policy orientation, also characterized by pragmatism. Under Lula's leadership, autonomy
regained centrality as a guiding principle, aiming to balance Brazil's relationships with
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
117
central powers, namely China and the United States, while pursuing leadership
aspirations in global issues like climate change and hunger eradication. This pragmatic
autonomy acknowledges the complexities of the international system and seeks to
maintain a balance between national interests and global realities.
Lula’s government has clearly emphasized the central role China plays for Brazil, both
bilaterally and multilaterally. However, times have changed. Geopolitical rivalry has
intensified, the Global South has lost leverage, and multilateralism is under threat in a
less flexible international environment. Lula now faces the dual challenge of restoring
Brazil’s international standing while addressing increasing domestic social and economic
demands. Global conditions are not as favorable as they were during his previous
administrations. Although the relationship with China remains pivotal, it must be
leveraged in response to the shifting international dynamics and conditions.
References
Alcalá, J. D.; Claver, R. F. & Velázquez, J. A. A. (2023). La integración de Brasil en
mercados internacionales. Boletín Económico de ICE, (3164).
https://doi.org/10.32796/bice.2023.3164.7670
Almeida, P. R. D. (2010). Never before seen in Brazil: Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's grand
diplomacy. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53: pp. 160-177.
Barbosa, P. H. (2021). Two Decades of Brazil-China Oil Cooperation: Investments and
Infrastructure Projects. Cuadernos de Trabajo del Cechimex 3, pp. 1-24.
https://dusselpeters.com/CECHIMEX/20210506_3_CECHIMEX_Two_decades_of_Brazil_
China_Oil_Cooperation_Pedro_Henrique_Batista_Barbosa.pdf
Bloomberg (2019, October 24). Bolsonaro to Meet China’s Xi in Bid to Balance Ties With
U.S. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/bolsonaro-to-meet-china-s-xi-in-bid-to-balance-
ties-with-u-s-1.1337261
Briceño Ruiz, J. & Simonoff, A. (2017). La escuela de la autonomía, América Latina y la
teoría de las relaciones internacionales. Estudios Internacionales 49 (186), pp. 39-89.
https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-3769.2017.45218
Burton, G. (November 9, 2018). What President Bolsonaro Means for China-Brazil
Relations. The diplomat, 11. https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/what-president-
bolsonaro-means-for-china-brazil-relations/
Busso, A. E. (2019). Política exterior y cambio cultural en el gobierno de Mauricio Macri.
La Argentina que cambiemos. Editorial: Universidad Nacional de Rosario. ISBN: 978-987-
702-344-2
Busso, A. E., & Barreto, L. M. (2020). Política exterior y de defensa en Argentina. De los
gobiernos kirchneristas a Mauricio Macri (2003-2019). URVIO Revista Latinoamericana
de Estudios de Seguridad, (27), pp. 74-93.
Caballero, S. & Crescentino, D. (2020). From the quest for autonomy to the dual break:
structural and agential changes in Brazil’s foreign policy during the 21st century. Revista
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
118
Brasileira de Política Internacional 63 (1), pp. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-
7329202000111
Cariello, T. (2023). Chinese investment in Brazil 2022. Technology and energy transition.
Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China (CEBC).
Crescentino, D. & Caballero, S. (2021). Arquitectura de la política exterior brasileña:
autonomistas, institucionalistas pragmáticos y americanistas en Itamaraty. Araucaria.
Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales
23 (48), pp. 211-234. https://dx.doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2021.i48.10
Da Rosa Muñoz, L. (2024). O Brasil está de volta: credibilidade e protagonismo na política
externa de Lula da Silva. Conjuntura Austral, 15(69), pp. 95-106.
https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.133296
De Sá Guimarães, F. & De Oliveira E Silva, I. D. (2021). Far-right populism and foreign
policy identity: Jair Bolsonaro’s ultra-conservatism and the new politics of alignment.
International Affairs, 97(2), pp. 345–363. doi:10.1093/ia/iiaa220
De Sousa, A. T. L. M., Abrão, R. A. F. & de Souza Porto, L. F. (2023). A China na política
externa do terceiro governo Lula: cem dias de reconstrução. Conjuntura Austral, 14(68),
pp. 150-162. https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.133618
Dryomova, O. V.; Stolyarova, L. G. (2019). BRICS in the contemporary world arena.
Financial Unniversity Bulletin Tula Branch, (1-2), pp. 101-
102https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=39560700
Esteves, P. (2020). Bolsonaro Adminstration and Brazil–China Relations. BPC Policy Brief,
9(3), pp. 1-6. https://bricspolicycenter.org/en/publications/o-governo-bolsonaro-e-as-
relacoes-brasil-chinabolsonaro-adminstration-and-brazil-china-relations/
Feitosa, L.; Silva Freire, M. & Paiva Silva. H. (2022). Energy Cooperation Through an
Environmental Perspective: Analysis of The International Agreements Signed Between
Brazil and China | Cooperaco Energtica Atravs de Uma Perspectiva Ambiental: Anlise
dos Atos Internacionais Assinados por Brasil e China, Mural Internacional
https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2022.68285
Gallego, E. S. (2023). «Lula 3» o cómo dejar atrás el legado de Jair Bolsonaro. Nueva
Sociedad, (303), pp. 4-12. https://nuso.org/articulo/303-lula-legado-bolsonaro/
Garcia, A.; Rodriguez, M.E.; Brito, C. M.; Grinsztejn, C. (2023). Chinese investments in
Brazil: investment data, public policies for investment facilitation and the case of the
Manaus industrial pole. BPC Policy Brief 13 (6). https://bricspolicycenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/07/BRICS_ChinaBrasil-7.pdf
Gomes Saraiva, M. (2020). The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign
policy towards South America. Brazilian Political Science Review 14 (3), pp. 1-39.
https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-3821202000030001
Gomes Saraiva, M. (2022). South America at the core of Brazilian foreign policy during
Bolsonaro’s administration (2019-2022). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 65
(2). https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202200224
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
119
Gomes Saraiva, M. & Costa Silva, Á. V. (2019). Ideologia e pragmatismo na política
externa de Jair Bolsonaro. Relações Internacionais, (64).
https://ipri.unl.pt/images/publicacoes/revista_ri/pdf/ri64/RI_64_art08_MGSAVCS.pdf
Giaccaglia, C. (2024). La ampliación de BRICS en el marco de un orden internacional de
alineamientos complejos: un análisis de las motivaciones de sus miembros plenos y de
los estados aspirantes al ingreso. Conjuntura Austral, 15(70), pp. 51-68.
Giaccaglia, C., & Dussort, M. N. (2023). Los BRICS y sus vínculos con América Latina y
el Caribe en el marco de un orden permeado por la guerra ruso-ucraniana¿ Qué rol
juega el nuevo gobierno de Lula da Silva? Análisis Carolina, (4), 1.
https://doi.org/10.33960/AC_04.2023
Hermann, C. F. (1990). Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign
Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 34(1), pp. 1-20. doi:10.2307/2600403
Hirst, M., & Valls Pereira, L. B. (2022). Making sense of United States–Brazil relations
under Bolsonaro. Latin American Policy, 13(2), pp. 432-446.
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12273
Hooijmaaijers, B. (2021). The BRICS countries’ bilateral economic relations, 2009 to
2019: Between rhetoric and reality. Sage Open, 11(4).
https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440211054128
Huld, A. (2024). China y Brasil profundizan relaciones bilaterales con firma de 15
acuerdos durante visita de Lula. China Briefing. https://www.china-
briefing.com/news/china-y-brasil-profundizan-relaciones-bilaterales-con-firma-de-15-
acuerdos-durante-visita-de-lula/
Ibañez, P. (2020). Geopolítica e diplomacia em tempos de Covid-19: Brasil e China no
limiar de um contencioso. Espaço e Economia. Revista brasileira de geografia econômica,
(18). https://doi.org/10.4000/espacoeconomia.13257
International Trade Center (2024). Official Website.
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx
López Conte, M. B. (2021). La influencia de los grupos de apoyo de Bolsonaro en la
política exterior brasileña: un análisis a través de Twitter. Universidad de San Andrés.
https://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/jspui/bitstream/10908/18135/1/%5bP%5d%5bW%5d
%20T.L.%20Rel.%20López%20Conte,%20Mar%C3%ADa%20Belén.pdf
Malamud, A. (2011). La política externa de Dilma Rousseff: ¿menos de lo mismo?
Iberoamericana 11 (41), pp. 174-79. https://doi.org/10.18441/ibam.11.2011.41.174-
179
Marra, A. T. L.; Schutte, G. R.; Teixeira, A. P.; Belasques, B. & Castro, B. (2021). 14.
Relaçöes Brasil-China no governo Bolsonaro: Da ideologia ao pragmatismo. As bases da
política externa bolsonarista, 229. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gilberto-M-A-
Rodrigues/publication/352136014_Desconstrucao_dos_Direitos_Humanos_na_Politica_
Externa_Brasileira/links/60baaf27a6fdcc22ead944bc/Desconstrucao-dos-Direitos-
Humanos-na-Politica-Externa-Brasileira.pdf#page=230
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
120
Meier, C. (2023). Posicionamiento de Brasil durante el gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro en el
marco de la competencia tecnológica por el 5G entre EEUU y China. Universidad Nacional
de Rosario. https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/items/065e26db-7f19-4bae-8a7b-3ccf3576f425
Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2023). Declaração Conjunta entre a República
Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China sobre o Aprofundamento da Parceria
Estratégica Global - Pequim. April 14. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-
br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-conjunta-entre-a-
republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-a-republica-popular-da-china-sobre-o-
aprofundamento-da-parceria-estrategica-global-pequim-14-de-abril-de-2023
Neto, O. A. & Malamud, A. (2015). What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America?
Systemic versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008. Latin
American Politics and Society, 57(04), pp. 1–27. doi:10.1111/j.1548-
2456.2015.00286.x
Paulino, L. A. (2020). Las relaciones Brasil-China en el siglo XXI”. Relaciones
internacionales, 29(59), pp. 155-175.
Pereyra Doval, G. (2013). La autonomía como eje rector de la política exterior. El caso
brasileño. Revista Temas y Debates 17 (25), pp. 109-125.
http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1853-
984X2013000100005
Roberto, L. C. C. (2022). O papel desempenhado pela Comissão Sino-Brasileira de Alto
Nível de Concertação e Cooperação (COSBAN) na relação bilateral Brasil-China.
Universidade Federal Da Paraíba.
https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/25785
Rodrigues, G.M.A. (2023): ¿Autonomía pragmática? La nueva política exterior de Lula.
Análisis Carolina, nº 7, Madrid, Fundación Carolina, pp. 1-15.
https://www.fundacioncarolina.es/catalogo/autonomia-pragmatica-la-nueva-politica-
exterior-de-lula/
Rodríguez, J. C. (2012). Chacal ou cordeiro? O Brasil frente aos desafios e oportunidades
do sistema internacional. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55 (2), pp. 70–89.
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292012000200005
Russell, R., & Tokatlian, J. G. (2009). Modelos de política exterior y opciones estratégicas:
El caso de América Latina frente a Estados Unidos. Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals,
pp. 211-249. https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=695776903010
Sawicka, M. (2020). Burning Bridges and Defending the Faith. The Troubled Brazil-China
Partnership in the Bolsonaro Era. Anuario Latinoamericano Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones
Internacionales, 10, pp. 121-146. DOI:10.17951/al.2020.10.121-146
Secretaria de Comunicação Social. (2024). Alckmin se reúne con Xi Jinping y concluye
una misión a China que resultó en más de BRL 24 mil millones en créditos para Brasil.
https://www.gov.br/secom/es/ultimas-noticias/2024/06/alckmin-se-reune-con-xi-
jinping-y-concluye-una-mision-a-china-que-resulto-en-mas-de-brl-24-mil-millones-en-
creditos-para-brasil
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 101-121
Balancing Continuity and Adjustments in Brazil’s Foreign Policy Towards China:
A Comparative Approach Between Bolsonaro and Lula’s Third Term
Florencia Rubiolo, Gonzalo Fiore
121
Shqueitzer, M. F. (2021). Brasil frente a una difícil disyuntiva: Estados Unidos o China.
Boletín del Departamento de América Latina y El Caribe. Boletín del Departamento de
América Latina y El Caribe, no. 76. ISSN: 2250-6683
Soares de Lima, M. R. & Hirst, M. (2006). Brazil as an intermediate state and regional
power: action, choice and responsibilities”. International Affairs, 82(1), pp. 21–40.
Retrieved in September 2024, from: doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00513.x
Soares de Lima, M. R. (2023). A dialética da política externa de Lula 3.0. Revista CEBRI
2 (5): 79-95. https://cebri-revista.emnuvens.com.br/revista/article/view/ 104/127
Sotero, P. (2010). Brazil’s Rising Ambition in a Shifting Global Balance of Power. Politics
30 (1), pp. 71–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01394.x
Stuenkel, O. (2022). Brazil’s foreign policy strategy after the 2022 elecfions. Elcano Royal
Institute 39/2022. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/06/ari39-2022-stuenkel-brazil-foreign-policy-strategy-after-the-
2022-elections.pdf
Stuenkel, O. (2021). The Rise China and the Post-Western World in Latin America: What
Is in Store? Latin America in Global International Relations (pp. 109-125). London:
Routledge.
Studart, R. & Myers, M. (2021). Reimagining China-Brazil Relations Under the BRI: The
Climate Imperative. Council on Foreign Relations and Brazilian Center for International
Relations (CEBRI). https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/studart-myers-cfr-cebri-
paper_0.pdf
Tokatlian, J. G. (1996). Pos-guerra fría y política exterior: De la autonomía relativa a la
autonomía ambigua. Análisis Político, (28), pp. 22-41. from:
https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/74837
Vidal Liy. M. & Gallaraga Gortázar N. (October 25, 2019). Bolsonaro sella su reconciliación
con China con propuestas de inversión. El Pais.
https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/10/25/actualidad/1571966736_154441.html
Vigevani, T. & Cepaluni, G. (2007). Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy
Through Diversification. Third World Quarterly 28 (7), pp. 1309–1326.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20455000
Vigevani, T. & Cepaluni, G. (2018). A política externa brasileira: a busca da autonomia,
de Sarney a Lula. SciELO-Editora UNESP. https://doi.org/10.7476/9788595460621
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
122
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STANCE IN SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS: THE
CHINA MODE
XUHENG WANG
carol_wxh@foxmail.com
Ph.D. Candidate in International Politics and Conflict Resolution in the School of Economics
(FEUC) at the University of Coimbra and the Centre for Social Studies (Portugal). She holds a
Master’s degree from the School of Economics (FEUC), University of Coimbra, Portugal and a
Bachelor’s degree from the School of Business, Macao Polytechnic Institute, China. Currently, she
is working on the research on the role of Macao in Sino-Portuguese-speaking countries relations,
based on paradiplomacy in China. Since November 2023, she has also worked in the project
AspirE, "Decision making of aspiring (re)migrants to/within the EU: The case of labour market-
leading migrations from Asia", on the scope of HORIZON-CL2-2022-TRANSFORMATIONS-01 in
the local team of the University Institute of Lisbon. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0186-7445.
CARMEN AMADO MENDES
carmen.mendes@cccm.gov.pt
President of the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre in Lisbon (Portugal). She is an Associate
Professor with tenure in International Relations, accredited at the School of Economics of the
University of Coimbra, where she established the course “China and the Portuguese-speaking
Countries in World Trade.” She is the former head of the International Relations department and
coordinator of the School of Economics International Office at the same university. She holds a
Ph.D. degree from the School of Oriental and African Studies - University of London, a Master’s
degree from the Institute of Higher European Studies - University of Strasbourg, and a Bachelor’s
degree from the Institute of Social and Political Sciences - University of Lisbon. She was a Post-
doctorate scholar at the Institute of Political Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University of
Lisbon, and visiting professor at the University of Macau, the University of Salamanca, and the
University of Lyon. She was a board member of the European Association for Chinese Studies,
and the organizer of the 2014 EACS conference in Coimbra, and president of the International
Relations Section and member of the board of the Portuguese Political Science Association.
Principal Investigator at the University of Coimbra on a research project on the role of Macau in
Chinas relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries, funded by the Portuguese national
funding agency for Science, Research and Technology; and on the project on South– South
Cooperation for the Europe China Research and Advice Network, supported by the European
External Action Service. Auditor of the Portuguese National Defense Institute. Co-founder of the
consulting company ChinaLink, and of the Observatory for China in Portugal. Author of China and
the Macau Negotiations, 1986–1999 (HKUP) and China’s New Silk Road: An Emerging World
Order (Routledge), as well as other publications available for consultation at:
www.uc.pt/feuc/carmen. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1376-5048.
Abstract
During the Covid-19 pandemic, Sino-Brazilian relations were affected by the election in
January 2019 of Jair Bolsonaro as President of Brazil. Various voices were raised on the topic
of Sino-Brazilian relations, with some people believing that the attitude towards China that
Bolsonaro held damaged Sino-Brazilian relations to a noticeable degree. However, several
studies also suggested that the election of Jair Bolsonaro did not have any negative impact
on Sino-Brazilian relations, in the form of actual results. In the post-epidemic era, with the
new Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva taking office, Brazil and China’s strategic
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
123
partnership seems to have been strengthened. Lula not only expressed his friendly attitude
towards China after taking office, but also paid a state visit to China from April 12 to 15, 2023.
China and Brazil subsequently signed the Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of
China and the Federative Republic of Brazil on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership. China and Brazil not only continue to cooperate in trade, but have also expanded
cooperation in aerospace, electronic technology and other fields. Using Guanxi theory as its
theoretical framework, this paper studies China's attitude and policies towards Brazil during
Covid-19 and after the epidemic, from a Chinese perspective. It analyses the different
attitudes and policy orientations of Brazilian leaders towards China, as well as China's
responses to ensure the maintenance of Sino-Brazilian relations, discussing the various
actions taken.
Keywords
Sino-Brazilian relation, Guanxi Theory, Bolsonaro, Lula.
Resumo
Durante a pandemia de Covid-19, as relações sino-brasileiras foram afetadas pela eleição, em
janeiro de 2019, de Jair Bolsonaro como Presidente do Brasil. Várias vozes se levantaram
sobre o tema das relações sino-brasileiras, com algumas pessoas acreditando que a atitude
de Bolsonaro em relação à China prejudicou as relações sino-brasileiras em um grau notável.
No entanto, vários estudos também sugeriram que a eleição de Jair Bolsonaro não teve
qualquer impacto negativo nas relações sino-brasileiras, na forma de resultados reais. Na era
pós-epidemia, com a posse do novo presidente brasileiro, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a parceria
estratégica do Brasil e da China parece ter sido fortalecida. Lula não apenas expressou sua
atitude amigável para com a China após assumir o cargo, mas também fez uma visita de
Estado à China de 12 a 15 de abril de 2023. A China e o Brasil assinaram posteriormente a
Declaração Conjunta entre a República Popular da China e a República Federativa do Brasil
em Aprofundamento da Parceria Estratégica Abrangente. A China e o Brasil não só continuam
a cooperar no comércio, mas também expandiram a cooperação nos setores aeroespacial,
tecnologia eletrónica e outros campos. Utilizando a teoria de Guanxi como referencial teórico,
este artigo estuda a atitude e as políticas da China em relação ao Brasil durante a Covid-19 e
após a epidemia, a partir de uma perspectiva chinesa. Analisa também as diferentes atitudes
e orientações políticas dos líderes brasileiros em relação à China, bem como as respostas da
China para garantir a manutenção das relações sino-brasileiras, discutindo as diversas ações
tomadas.
Palavras-chave
Relações sino-brasileiras, Teoria de Guanxi, Bolsonaro, Lula.
How to cite this article
Wang, Xuheng & Mendes, Carmen Amado (2024). Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian
Relations: The China Mode. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 –
Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December
2024, pp. 122-144. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.6.
Article received on 3 January 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 August 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
124
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STANCE IN SINO-BRAZILIAN
RELATIONS: THE CHINA MODE
XUHENG WANG
CARMEN AMADO MENDES
Introduction
The year 2024 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and Brazil, and after half a century of exchanges, the Sino-Brazilian
relationship continues to develop. But this relationship has not always been problem-
free, and this is related to the different governing strategies and attitudes of Brazilian
leaders towards China. Looking back at former Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s electoral
campaign and the Covid-19 epidemic period, we can find that Sino-Brazilian relations
fluctuated then. Particularly when national leaders make negative remarks, tensions will
arise in official discourse between two countries. Under the dual influence of the epidemic
and official discourse, cooperation between China and Brazil in various fields at the official
level was hindered to a noticeable extent.
After being re-elected as President of Brazil in 2023, Lula continued his former friendly
attitude towards China. He visited China in 2023 and signed a series of agreements in
various fields with China. He emphasized China and strategic partnership (China, 2023b).
China has been Brazil's largest trading partner and export destination for fourteen
consecutive years. Brazil is China’s largest trading partner and largest direct investment
destination in Latin America (Bian, Zhuodan; Chen, Weihua; Xie, Zhao & Zhou, Yongshui,
2023). In 2023, the bilateral trade volume between China and Brazil was US$181.53
billion, a year-on-year increase of 6.1%, of which China's import volume will be
US$122.42 billion, a year-on-year increase of 11.9%. It mainly consists of iron ore and
its concentrate, soybeans, crude oil, paper pulp, and soybean oil, etc. (China, 2024c). It
can be seen that China is the largest buyer of Brazilian products, especially agricultural
products (Brasil, 2024). Based on the trade situation between China and Brazil, Lula has
a positive attitude towards future cooperation and the development of bilateral relations
between Brazil and China. Relations between China and Brazil appear to be getting closer.
Bolsonaro and Lula have exhibited different attitudes towards China. The Chinese
government also responded accordingly to the different attitudes of the Brazilian
government. Considering the results, the relationship between China and Brazil has not
fundamentally changed. There is no doubt that the changing attitude of the Bolsonaro
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
125
government imposed certain obstacles on cooperation between the two countries in
important areas (such as technology), and further made the Sino-Brazilian relation tense
for a time. However, after the Lula government took office, faced with this more positive
and friendlier attitude, the Chinese government quickly restored its friendly attitude
towards Brazil.
This paper explores the impact of the changes in the attitudes of the two Brazilian leaders
since Bolsonaro came to power in 2018 and the actual relations between China and Brazil,
and how China responds to the behavioural patterns of the leaders of other countries,
and their different attitudes and strategies towards China. This manuscript uses Guanxi
Theory for this analysis. This research paper suggests that the interaction between the
governments of China and Brazil reflects China’s specific behaviour model—relationship
model in international relations. This relationship model is a dynamic communication
process and changes as the process changes. However, the relationship established
through this model is long-term oriented, i.e. the two parties establish a trusting
relationship and even a cooperative relationship with each other during their long-term
interaction. In the case of China and Brazil, the two countries have a strong basis for
trade relations. Although some tensions may arise due to the government's attitude, the
foundation of the relationship previously established between the two countries has not
been fundamentally shaken.
This paper uses commercial trade data, official visit data, and public speeches to illustrate
Bolsonaro’s propositions for diplomacy, investment and cooperation with regard to China
during his administration (2019-2022), and since Lula took office in 2023. Firstly, this
paper analyses official texts made by each government, in the form of speeches and
interviews, to determine their different attitudes towards developing diplomatic relations
with China. This manuscript also analyses the Chinese government’s responses, and its
attitude towards the Brazilian government. Secondly, this paper analyses the
destinations for, and timing of, diplomatic visits under each administration and their
intended goals, and then examines trends in international trade numbers and
partnerships under each president. It is worth noting that China and Brazil’s trade was
undoubtedly affected by Covid-19 during Bolsonaro’s administration. This manuscript will
also take this into consideration. In addition to the above sources, I also use newspaper
sources, other government publications, and academic research as auxiliary data to
support the views presented in this paper.
Guanxi Theory: Understand Chinese mode
In order to understand China’s attitude and foreign affairs, it is necessary to discuss the
Chinese international relations theories which have been developed in modern China.
Chinese scholars have developed international theories based on the Chinese cultural
background, which inspired various thoughts and debates. For example, Yan Xuetong
who was inspired by ancient Chinese political philosophy, developed the discussion of
modern Chinese international relations (Yan, 2013). Even there was no specific concept
of an “international society” or “international politics” in ancient China, it does not mean
there was no international political thought. Ancient Chinese thoughts based on the idea
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
126
of “Tianxia (天下)”, which means the largest world in people's recognition, at that time
was China in pre-Qin dynasty. This “Tianxia” concept is still used in modern world, to
represent the whole earth. Thus, ancient Chinese thoughts could be treated as Chinese
international political thought (Yan, 2013). Because of this, Yan compared the concept
of “hegemony” in ancient Chinese thoughts with Western international theories, which
share the similarity of “the great power” (Mearsheimer, 2001; Keohane & Nye, 1973;
Yan, 2013). He also pointed out that the political power in ancient Chinese thoughts
involves two aspects, namely the ability to govern and the “virtue and self-cultivation”
of important officials (Yan, 2013). Then he developed the concept of Moral Realism (Yan,
2014; Yan, 2023) and the idea of the leadership of the great power (Yan, 2019). Yan’s
thought thus incorporated of human authority into international relations (Paltiels, 2011).
Paltiels claims that Yan’s discussion can be regarded as the contribution of Chinese
scholars to international relations study (Paltiels, 2011). Yan’s ideas concentrate on the
discussion of the connections between power, leadership and norms, and debates on
conflicts. However, there is a lack of discussion on finding a solution to the problem of
cooperation (Paltiels, 2011).
Another Chinese scholar, Ye Zicheng, has introduced the geopolitical discussion of China’s
relations with various countries (Ye, 2010). He claims that “different countries have
different requirements for comprehensive national power” (Ye, 2010, p33). He explains
national strength as a combination of ability to survive, capacity for development and
international influence (Ye, 2010). Thus, a national state may have different
requirements for its national strength in different periods. From a geopolitical view, China
has different strategic choices to its neighbouring countries, both large countries (i.e.
Russia, Japan, India) and small countries (i.e. Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam). Ye
emphasizes the importance of developing the economy, together with the anxiety and
suspicion brought by China’s fast development (Ye, 2010). In general, Ye has provided
a diversity to discussions on Chinese international relations rather than developing any
specific theory.
When it comes to Sino-Brazilian relations, I chose Guanxi theory, which is suitable
because of its relational perspective. The Guanxi theory proposed by Qin Yaqing is now
considered as being able to explain China's contemporary international relations (Nordin,
Smith, Bunskoek, Huang, Hwang, Jackson & Nakamura, 2019; Kavalski, 2022;
Eisenman, 2023). Guanxi Theory is based on the Chinese social and cultural background,
and exhibits Chinese characteristics. Unlike Western society, which takes the
independent individual as the basic unit, the thinking mode of Chinese society is "family,
country and the world." (Qin, 2018) Whether it is family, country or the world, they are
all collections of individuals. In other words, the identity of an individual is closely related
to groups. The identity of an individual changes according to the different groups to which
she or he belongs. Due to this Chinese cultural value, one critique of Guanxi theory is
whether it could be sufficiently universal in the field of international relations. In fact,
Guanxi theory provides a relational aspect, which is also reflected in the “relational turn”
in Western international relations studies (Kavalski, 2017). Guanxi theory explains that
the establishment of a network of relationships is dynamic, and that actors influence each
other in the process of establishing relationships. Individuals also form new groups and
establish new relationships because of interactions between the different groups to which
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
127
they belong. Qin describes international relations as a set of intertwined binary
relationships, each of which represents a unique connection in the unique social
connection group of both parties (Eisenman, 2023). Guanxi theory is claimed to provide
a better explanation of the “complex, eclectic, and non-objective blend” in interactions
between cultural universals and culturally specific patterns (Chen, 2011).
Qin argues that from the perspective of relational logic, the influence and power of actors
come from their larger circle of relationships, and other closer and more important actors.
These circles have higher social prestige, and manipulation of circles is an important
source of their influence (Qin, 2016). This means that in Guanxi Theory, actors become
more powerful by sharing resources with other actors through established relationships
rather than by simply using their own resources. Relational logic is not altruism (Xue,
2023), but a strategic move. It is carried out with the expectation of receiving more
loyalty and reciprocity from the recipient. This practice is not just to achieve the short-
term interests of others, but to regard others as part of their long-term self-interest
(Kavalski, 2017; Xue, 2023). States gain power and resources by establishing
relationships. Although there is a lack of discussion of hierarchy in Guanxi Theory,
especially the forced obedience of weak countries to strong countries, for the sake of
maintaining relationships and long-term interests, great powers should obey stricter
international norms while giving marginalized weaker countries room to manoeuvre
(Shih, & Huwang, 2014). In other words, only when weak countries can truly obtain
resources from big countries and transform them into their own interests can they
establish a long-term reciprocal mechanism. The acquisition generated through
relationships is two-way, and both the strong and weak parties in the relationship can
interact and exchange through the establishment of a relationship network. Therefore,
the focus is not on any specific individual, but on the specific nature of the interactive
relationship between individuals.
Guanxi Theory emphasizes social norms and trust building in relationships (Qin, 2018).
Mutual respect and mutual respect are necessary conditions for China to achieve its
relationship management goals and are also the focus of China's normative power. (Qin,
2018; Kavalski, 2017; Xue, 2023; Kavalski, 2013). Xue (2023) points out the difference
between the concept of “respect” under Chinese norms and Western ideas in modern
international politics. He believes that the Treaty of Westphalia emphasizes the principle
of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United Nations
Charter explicitly advocates and encourages respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, regardless of race, gender, language or religion. This respect is based
on the premise of "respect for what I say, not what I do." The logic of relations
emphasizes that Beijing's normative power makes other countries participate in the
practice of mutual respect - that is, "they do as China does" (Xue, 2023). Following this
understanding, China emphasizes the practicality of respect rather than following certain
clearly defined values and rules. For long-term considerations, China often adopts a
continuous attitude in establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations. Even if conflicts
arise in the short term, China will tend to take actions to safeguard its long-term
interests. Such actions may manifest themselves in different ways depending on
diplomatic style, but the common point is the emphasis on the long-term development
of relations and interests. However, most of the debate regarding Guanxi theory still
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
128
concentrates on the relations that have been built already. There’s a lack of discussion
on the interactions to develop new relations. From this aspect, the development of new
relations relies on a “middleman”, that is a third party that has already built relations
and trust with those two sides.
In recent years, China's foreign policy discourse has always tried to emphasize harmony,
reciprocity and respect for differences. In Guanxi Theory, the interaction process of actors
is also a process of mutual tolerance (Qin, 2018). Individuals with different natures can
coexist in the process of interaction, rather than by one party eliminating the other.
Similarly, competition, conflict or struggle may also exist. But actors can achieve the so-
called state of coexistence through bargaining or mutual transformation in the process
of interaction. This enables actors to better practice mutual respect and reciprocity
(Berenskoetter, 2007), that is, the "seeking common ground while reserving differences"
emphasized by Chinese society. Under the constraints of this norm, actors try to
transform the resources of others into part of their own interests by coexisting with other
actors with different characteristics, and at the same time, their own resources will also
be transformed into part of the interests of others. Based on this logic, when
understanding China's diplomatic model, it is inseparable from the discussion of actual
resources and interests. In the Sino-Brazilian relation, this especially refers to trade
exchanges. The following section explores the characteristics of China's behaviour model
in the face of the different attitudes exhibited by the two Brazilian leaders towards China.
The Bolsonaro government and Covid-19: Changing bilateral relations
Former Brazilian President Jair Messias Bolsonaro had some very distinct political
characteristics. During his administration, the diplomatic discourse between China and
Brazil fluctuated between positive and tense. As a right-wing politician, Bolsonaro, as
could be expected, aligned himself with the right-wing US President Donald Trump, who
was in power from 2017 to 2021, interrupting good relations with China (Damacena,
2021). In 2018, during Bolsonaro’s campaign, he was nicknamed Tropical Trump, and as
a presidential candidate he made clear his desire to realign foreign policy, forge closer
ties with the United States, and distance Brazil from its growing ties with China and other
emerging powers (Lapper, 2019). In February 2018, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan. He
became the first Brazilian presidential candidate to visit Taiwan since Brazil recognized
Beijing as the sole Chinese government in 1979 (Agência Lusa, 2018). The visit to the
island was part of a tour of East Asia that includes Japan and South Korea but did not
include China (Santoro, 2018), Brazil's largest trading partner. In Taipei, Bolsonaro
called Taiwan "one country" and said it was the best of the United States and Japan
combined (Santoro, 2022). The move prompted condemnation from China. The Chinese
Embassy in Brazil issued a letter condemning Bolsonaro’s trip to Taiwan as “an insult to
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Andreoni, 2018). This raised concerns about
whether the presidential candidate would affect Sino-Brazilian relations (Spring, 2018).
Among other comments, Bolsonaro portrayed China as a predatory economic power
during his campaign (Lapper 2019; China Daily, 2018). On the China issue, the Brazilian
leader has often expressed concerns about Chinese purchasing land in Brazil, citing
national security concerns to avoid Chinese state-owned enterprises participating in the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
129
privatization process of government energy companies (Gabriel, Mandelbaum, Campos
& Carvalho, 2019). He claimed during his campaign that Beijing is not only “buying things
from Brazil, but also buying Brazil (Andreoni, 2018).” China's official English-language
newspaper "China Daily" admitted in an editorial that Beijing authorities and Chinese
companies operating in Brazil were questioning the extent to which Brazil's new leader
would affect relations between the two countries (China Daily, 2018). In 2018, Chinese
investment in Brazil fell by more than 60% (Cariello, 2018). This may have been due to
Chinese investors' concerns that Bolsonaro could make changes in Brazil's existing China
policy after taking office (Zheng, 2020). In response to Bolsonaro’s attitude, the China
daily newspaper wrote that “Dumping China […] may serve some specific political
purpose”, but “the economic cost can be backbreaking for the Brazilian economy” (China
Daily, 2018). This view was similar to that of some academics and analysts. Maurício
Santoro, professor of International Relations at the State University of Rio de Janeiro,
said that from a pragmatic perspective, Bolsonaro would continue to maintain friendly
relations with China once he entered the government (Andreoni, 2018), and that Brazil’s
agricultural sector had benefited from China’s feud with Trump, especially in the wake of
the U.S.-China trade war. China sharply reduced its purchases of U.S. soybeans, making
up the difference with Brazilian grain. Brazil’s soybean exports to China increased by
22% in 2018 and currently accounts for approximately 80% of Brazil’s total soybean
exports (Voice of America, 2018). From China's perspective, maintaining trade relations
with Brazil is important. The economies of China and Brazil are considered “truly
complementary” and have “few competitors” (China Daily, 2018). At this stage, though
it was difficult to say that Bolsonaro's political ideology had changed Sino-Brazilian
relations, all sectors of society were generally concerned about the friendly relations
between China and Brazil. Obviously, part of the exchange of interests in the Sino-
Brazilian relation came from trade. From the perspective of maintaining long-term trade
relations with Brazil, China tried to express its hope that friendly relations could continue
by emphasizing the close economic and trade cooperation between the two countries.
Bolsonaro has always regarded China as one of Brazil's most important ideological rivals,
yet portraying China as an enemy has political and economic consequences (Guimarães
& Silva, 2021). China is Brazil's largest trading partner and consumes most of Brazil's
agricultural and mining exports. These goods account for 80% of Brazil’s total exports to
China (Zhang & Jin, 2020). To many Bolsonaro supporters, China is far more important
than the United States. Brazilian farmers' decisive support for Bolsonaro's electoral
victory could be undermined by a tougher stance on China. As Bolsonaro continued to
view China as an adversary, even discussing with U.S. authorities during a visit to
Washington how to reduce Brazil's dependence on China, important supporters began to
complain about the government's anti-China bias (Folha de So Paulo, 2019).
Bolsonaro's criticism of Chinese investment did not last long. After Bolsonaro was elected,
his government made friendly gestures towards Chinese investment. On March 8, 2019,
Bolsonaro announced that he would visit China later that year (Verdélio, 2019). On May
24, 2019, the Brazilian Vice President Mourao paid an official visit to China. Mourao
emphasized that the new Brazilian government led by President Bolsonaro continued to
attach great importance to relations with China (China, 2019b). The leaders of the two
countries expressed their willingness to further expand trade cooperation while opposing
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
130
unilateralism and trade protectionism. Mourao's visit was seen as an attempt to create a
friendlier atmosphere between the two countries, following Bolsonaro's visit to Taiwan.
However, at Bolsonaro's personal request, Mourao eventually had to give up his
favourable position towards Beijing (Junqueira, 2019; Guimarães & Silva, 2021). This is
obviously inconsistent with the attitude expressed by Bolsonaro in his official statement.
As mentioned earlier, considering the real situation, Bolsonaro chose to send a friendly
signal to China, but it does not mean that he had really changed his attitude towards
China.
China did not adopt the same view towards Brazil as Bolsonaro did to China. This is
specifically reflected in China’s support for Brazil on the issue of Amazon fires (Guimarães
& Silva, 2021). As fires in the Amazon begin to spiral out of control, Bolsonaro's
government had to contend with growing international criticism from many quarters. The
French President Emmanuel Macron said: "We cannot allow you (Bolsonaro) to destroy
everything." This was considered an indirect challenge to Brazil's sovereignty in the
region (Associated Press, 2019). Asked about the Amazon fires, Minister-Counsellor Qu
Yuhui of the Chinese Embassy in Brasilia said Brazil has one of the most effective
environmental laws in the world (Oliveira, 2019). Although the diplomat stressed that his
views were personal and did not represent Beijing's official position, Brazil sees China’s
stance on the Amazon as a bridge to rebuild relations (Guimarães & Silva, 2021). As a
result, Bolsonaro publicly announced approval of China's support for Brazil's sovereignty
over the Amazon for the first time (Landim, 2019). Bolsonaro's attitude towards China
has also begun to change. Since then, Bolsonaro has publicly expressed interest in
visiting China to improve tense bilateral relations. On July 25, Bolsonaro met with Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi to discuss relations between the two countries and his visit to
China in October (China, 2019a). Bolsonaro said Brazil is very interested in deepening
trade negotiations with China (Estadão Conteúdo, 2019). On October 25, during his visit
to China, Bolsonaro stated that although he was dissatisfied with the unbalanced trade
relationship between Sino-Brazilian during the election, he recognized the importance of
Sino-Brazilian relations to Brazilian society (Zheng, 2020).
Interestingly, judging from the speeches made by the leaders of the two countries during
this meeting, the two sides exhibited completely different attitudes. Bolsonaro's
comments on China seemed to be more focused on economic and trade opportunities
(Fernandes, 2019). He claimed that the only purpose of visiting China was to do business
(Guimarães & Silva, 2021). He also commented that coming to China was "coming to a
capitalist country (Senra, 2019)." In contrast, Chinese leader Xi Jinping's official speech
emphasized the friendly development of bilateral relations since the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two countries, citing the principles of mutual respect,
equal treatment, mutual benefit and win-win results and the outlook for future bilateral
relations (China, 2019c). Chinese leaders often adopt the same pattern in such speeches,
expressing a friendly attitude towards bilateral or multilateral relations by elaborating on
the historical origins of establishing relations with other countries and looking forward to
long-term cooperation in the future. A new term that began to appear in Brazilian-
Chinese dialogue was "strategic partner". Despite the ideological differences between the
two countries, Brazil was recommended to adopt a pragmatic approach toward China
(Guimarães & Silva, 2021). As far as Bolsonaro's first year in power (2019) was
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
131
concerned, regardless of his attitude towards China, Bolsonaro generally conducted
pragmatic diplomacy with China along the lines of strategic partnership (Santoro, 2022).
The participation of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the November 2019 oil auction
was politically significant—without Brazilian government approval, only Petrobras would
have participated in the operation due to operating rules (Rosa, 2019). But at the same
time, although Bolsonaro signed multiple infrastructure development and agricultural
trade agreements with Chinese companies, he did not reach any major agreements with
China in economic and technological cooperation as some optimistic observers had
predicted (Zheng, 2020).
Up to the end of 2019, Sino-Brazilian relations seemed to be improving, but after the
Covid-19 epidemic broke out, the Bolsonaro government's attitude towards China
changed again. 2020 is considered the tensest year for the political relationship between
China and Brazil, and even triggered a diplomatic crisis (Sawicka, 2020). Members of
Bolsonaro's government began openly attacking China on social media. Eduardo
Bolsonaro, a federal police officer who is the son of President Bolsonaro, likened the
Covid-19 outbreak to the Chernobyl disaster, and accused the communist regime of
hiding the truth in the wake of the pandemic and claimed that "freedom is the solution"
(Bolsonaro, 2020). Chinese Ambassador Yang Wanming and the Chinese Embassy in
Brazil responded quickly on social media, accusing Eduardo Bolsonaro’s remarks of being
an “evil insult against China and the Chinese people” (Yang, 2020). Subsequently, the
Chinese Embassy in Brazil issued a severely worded statement expressing strong
condemnation of Eduardo Bolsonaro (Laio, 2020). The statement emphasized that
Eduardo's remarks are likely to have a negative impact on bilateral relations. These
official statements from China attracted the attention of the Brazilian Congress. Rodrigo
Maia, President of the Brazilian House of Commons, apologized to the Chinese
Ambassador for Eduardo Bolsonaro’s remarks on behalf of the House of Commons on
social media (Maia, 2020). Hamilton Mourão and Ernesto Araújo also emphasized in
interviews that the deputy’s personal opinion does not represent the government’s
position (Sawicka, 2020). A similar situation occurred again shortly after the US national
security adviser visited Brazil in November. Eduardo Bolsonaro accused Huawei's 5G
technology on Twitter of bringing espionage and cybersecurity problems to Brazil.
Although the post was deleted, the Chinese Embassy responded in harsher terms, stating
that Eduardo's stance could lead to "negative consequences and bear historical
responsibility for disrupting the normality of the partnership between China and Brazil"
(Embaixada da China, 2020). Instead of taking action to calm the situation, the Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to criticize China for its offensive and disrespectful
behaviour when it publicized its outrage on social media (de Sousa, Souza, da Fonseca,
Carneiro, Abrão & dos Santos, 2020). Similarly, on the issue of the COVID-19 virus,
President Bolsonaro himself has made no secret of his suspicion and made accusations
against China. He has repeatedly stated that the coronavirus was deliberately created in
a Chinese laboratory (Murakawa, 2021). He even explicitly hinted that the epidemic was
a Chinese conspiracy in a public speech: "The military knows what chemical warfare,
bacterial warfare and radioactive warfare are. Aren't we facing a new war? Which country
has the highest GDP? I won't tell You. (Bolsonaro, 2021)"
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
132
It can be seen that Chinese diplomats in Brazil reacted to this situation with more
confidence than in the past (Santoro, 2022). They chose to respond to critical remarks
and demonstrate China's attitudes and views directly through the news or social media.
This approach is considered the new “Wolf Warrior” Chinese diplomacy of the Xi Jinping
years (Martin, 2021). It should be pointed out that this approach is not aimed at the
bilateral relations between China and Brazil, but is a change in the overall style of China's
diplomacy. Compared with the low-key diplomatic orientation adopted by China in the
1990s and early 2000s, China's diplomacy during the epidemic period was more robust
(Martin, 2021). This exchange between Chinese diplomats and Brazilian politicians is also
considered as being unprecedented. While China's assertive style of diplomacy spreads
around the world, it also appears to be intensifying in Brazil (Santoro, 2022). This may
be due to the fact that this is possible in the case of Brazil. Brazil's dependence on the
Chinese market gives China more room to manoeuvre. For example, there is no fear that
a national government will declare its diplomatic personnel persona non grata and deport
them (Santoro, 2022). However, some scholars believe that in the face of deliberately
biased remarks, the Chinese authorities are limited to issuing notes denying conspiracy
theories and repudiating Sinophobia in Brazil. The lack of a tougher stance could be a
signal to members of Bolsonaro’s government that demonstrating Sinophobia has no real
consequences (Quinan, Araujo & De Albuquerque, 2021). On the one hand, China does
not want to break off friendly relations with Brazil, as that would have a huge negative
impact on the mutual interests of the two countries. On the other hand, due to the change
in the attitude of Brazilian leaders, which showed a trend of breaking away from the
previous norms of interaction between China and Brazil, the Sino-Brazilian relation has
also fluctuated. China has chosen to adopt a relatively tough attitude to try to maintain
the relationship between the two countries under the original norms.
Bolsonaro's negative comments about China have not stopped. The narrative surrounding
the COVID-19 viral disease has gradually shifted from the concept of “Chinese virus” to
“Chinese vaccine.” (Ramos, Leite & Mendonça, 2024). Health Minister Eduardo Pazuello
announced his intention to purchase 46 million doses of Coronavac, a vaccine against
COVID-19 from the Chinese laboratory Sinovac Biotech, tested in Brazil by the Butantan
Institute. Less than 24 hours after the news, Bolsonaro fired his health minister and said
the Brazilian government "will not buy" Coronavac (Farias & Gullino 2020). Bolsonaro’s
rationale is that “any vaccine must be scientifically proven by the Ministry of Health and
certified by Anvisa before being made available to the public” (UOL, 2020). At the same
time, another COVID vaccine was also in Phase 3 testing, but it not yet proved its efficacy,
and not been authorized for use by Anvisa. That vaccine received a special approval of
1.9 billion reais from the Brazilian government for the purchase, production, and
distribution of 100 million units of the vaccine (de Sousa et al., 2020). The president
made no secret of his fear of China when considering vaccine: "We're not buying from
China. I don't think it gives people a sense of security because of its origins. That's what
we think" (Bolsonaro & Paraguassu, 2020). Bolsonaro’s behaviour during the epidemic is
considered to be a continuous use of social fears to transform false narratives into official
national discourse and public policies. (Kalil I., Silveira, Pinheiro, Kalil A., Pereira, Azarias
& Amparo, 2021)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
133
Bolsonaro's comments led some key players to begin linking delays in deliveries of active
pharmaceutical ingredients from China to the disastrous conduct of Brazilian diplomacy
under Bolsonaro (Ramos, Leite & Mendonça, 2024). The president of the Butantan
Institute, Dimas Covas said that the Bolsonaro government's attacks on China led to
delays and reductions in the delivery of raw materials needed for vaccine manufacturing,
and that multiple delays in sending immunizers could be understood as diplomatic
retaliation (Oliveira, 2021). Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Yang Wanming denied such
diplomatic retaliation and delayed delivery of the CoronaVac vaccine, saying that the
delay was due to high demand for the vaccine (UOL, 2021). However, after Trump
stepped down, Bolsonaro immediately changed his tone and showed favour to China.
Bolsonaro said during the vaccine negotiations between China and Brazil that Brazil
needed China and China needed Brazil, “I hope China can help Brazil regardless of past
doubts” (Marques & Lázaro, 2021). He reiterated the trade relationship between China
and Brazil and emphasized China's need to purchase agricultural products from Brazil.
Domestically, political groups in Brazil have put pressure on the government to adjust
bilateral relations. For example, telecom companies that do business with Huawei have
pressured the Bolsonaro government not to implement major changes (de Sousa, Gajus,
Porto, Freitas, Abrão, Rodrigues, Silva & Santos, 2022). The defeat of Donald Trump and
the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States prevented Bolsonaro from
establishing a good relationship with Biden, making alliance plans with Washington
unfeasible (Berringer, Soprijo, Almeida, Mitake & Antoniazzo, 2021). Factors at home
and abroad in Brazil caused the Bolsonaro government's change of attitude.
In general, during Bolsonaro's administration, he always regarded China as Brazil's
political and ideological opponent. But when confronted by a real situation, especially
trade and COVID-19, Bolsonaro has shown that his attitude towards China is not always
consistent with his diplomacy. China's diplomatic stance has also become tougher. The
Sino-Brazilian relationship was tense during Bolsonaro's administration and has
continued to fluctuate. The Sino-Brazilian relation went through a period where it was
not considered a priority (Lopes, Carvalho, Thales & Santos, 2022). The bilateral
relationship was ultimately dominated by pragmatism and still maintained a certain
degree of cooperation that was not completely destroyed. From China's perspective, the
persistence of the Sino-Brazilian relation has been emphasized several times in
diplomatic speeches, which shows that China attaches great importance to the long-term
goal of establishing and maintaining a network of relations. In Sino-Brazilian relations,
China and Brazil each obtained what they needed. It is true that the Bolsonaro
government may have had different views on the benefits and power that Brazil could
obtain in this relationship. But the Bolsonaro government does not seem to have been
able to gain greater benefits from the changing relationship. China's attempt to maintain
the original relationship status and resource exchange has also prevented the bilateral
relationship from undergoing major changes due to the Bolsonaro government's
governing philosophy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
134
The Lula government: friendly and close cooperation in the new era
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva maintained good cooperative relations with China during his first
two terms in power (2003-2010). This previously established good relationship laid a
secure foundation for Sino-Brazilian relations after he took office again. For the Lula
government, China is strategic for Brazil from both a political and economic perspective
(Berringer & Belasques, 2020). For China, this means that Brazil and China have
established and followed a set of behavioural norms in their interactions, and both sides
are willing to continue to be bound by such norms and conduct a new round of continuous
exchanges of interests. After the start of the new term, the Lula government believed
that Brazil's foreign relations were negatively affected by the Bolsonaro government
(Brasil, 2022). One of the important foreign policies of the Lula government has been to
try to rebuild the tense relations with China (de Sousa, Abro, & de Souza Porto, 2023).
Lula said in a speech that Brazil hopes to establish a relationship with China that goes
beyond economics and trade (Brasil, 2023b). This means that Brazil and China have
again become strategically related in Brazil's global diplomacy. In 2022, Lula announced
that China would be one of his first visit destinations after taking office (Chade, 2022),
and China sent Vice President Wang Qishan to attend the inauguration ceremony of
President Lula (China, 2022). This shows that China attaches great importance to
bilateral relations and has not changed due to the ups and downs during the term of
former President Bolsonaro. This was also considered to be a symbol of renewed political
reconciliation between Brazil and China (de Sousa et al., 2023). After taking office, Lula
quickly moved to repair relations with China. In March 2023, Brazil and China reached
an agreement that they will no longer use the U.S. dollar as the intermediate currency
in the future but will instead use their own currencies for trade settlements (Martello,
2023). Since China is Brazil's largest trading partner, this has a great impact on reducing
trade costs between the two sides. In September, the first fully closed-loop transaction
using the currencies of the two countries for trade settlement was realized (Sá, 2023).
That is to say that, compared with their previous trade relationship, China and Brazil
have expanded their cooperation to the financial field and bypassed the US dollar for
transactions. In their interactions, the two sides have begun to expand the areas of norm-
building and the influence of their relationship.
Although Lula's visit to China was postponed due to illness, it did not affect an eventual
meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Lula visited China from April 12 to 15,
2023. The leaders of the two countries signed a series of cooperation agreements and
issued a joint statement on deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership (China,
2023). Compared with the joint statement issued during Bolsonaro's visit to China,
bilateral relations now showed a clear relaxation. The statement expressed the view that
both parties believe that President Lula’s visit was a complete success and is of great
significance in the history of bilateral relations (China, 2023). Considering the specific
content of the talks, Lula's visit involved more cooperation areas and more detailed plans.
Whether in terms of discourse or specific measures, the relationship between China and
Brazil became more positive during Lula's visit. At the same time, compared with former
President Bolsonaro’s visit to China, the agreement signed by Lula with China emphasized
the field of industrial science and technology, especially communications, satellites and
aerospace cooperation plans (China, 2024c). This is consistent with the Lula
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
135
government’s mission to “reindustrialize Brazil and promote more competitive
international integration” (Brasil, 2022).
This also triggered Brazil's consideration of improving the quality of bilateral relations
when re-establishing close relations with China. As mentioned earlier, Brazil’s exports to
China mainly focus on bulk commodities, and it is necessary to seek diversification in
commodities (Brasil, 2023a). However, considering the low competitiveness and
complexity of the Brazilian economy, the main difficulty in increasing the export of high
value-added products is structural (Rocha, de Oliveira, Porto, Neiva & Pina, 2022). Lula
also attempted to improve the situation during his visit to China. The two sides signed
an agreement on health requirements for animal protein trade, which is beneficial to
Brazil's agricultural exports (Brasil, 2023a). However, it must be admitted that under the
current sales situation of Brazil's national industry, it is difficult to realize the interests
and diversification of Brazil's agricultural export base (de Sousa et al., 2023). In addition
to the commercial aspect, the Lula government focuses on cooperation between China
and Brazil for finding Chinese investment to achieve the country's goals of
reindustrialization, job creation and technological advancement (Brasil, 2023b). In other
words, Brazil hopes to seek more resources owned by China in the interaction and to be
able to transform them into its own interests. This kind of interest acquisition is long-
term oriented. In this model, the Sino-Brazilian relation becomes closer through
continuous reciprocity.
Compared with the Bolsonaro government, the Lula government is more pragmatic and
has a friendlier attitude towards China. In 2023, Brazil's exports to China will increase by
16.6%, reaching US$104.31 billion. This increase significantly exceeded the 1.7%
increase in Brazil's total exports (Exame, 2024). This reflects the strong and diverse
business partnership between Brazil and China that continues to strengthen. In addition
to this, although Brazil has chosen not to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has
expressed interest in studying the synergies between Brazil’s development policies,
investment plans and South American regional integration initiatives and the BRI. (23-
6). For China, this does not affect the progress of Brazil-China relations. When meeting
with Lula, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the two sides should strengthen the
strategic alignment between the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" and Brazil's
"re-industrialization" and "accelerated growth plan" (China, 2024a). 2024 marks the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil. Wang
Yi said in his speech that China and Brazil would work together to create the next "golden
50 years" of bilateral relations (China, 2024d). In addition, Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim,
Chief Special Advisor to the President of Brazil, visited China at the end of May (China,
2024b). This shows that the Sino-Brazilian relation have become closer. Both China and
Brazil have shown a positive attitude towards cooperation and the intention to maintain
the long-term development of relations.
In general, the Lula government has repositioned the Sino-Brazilian relation after taking
office. Brazil's attitude towards China has undergone significant changes. Faced with the
friendly attitude shown by the Brazilian government, the Chinese government has
responded equally positively. Changes in Brazil's foreign policy have also expanded
cooperation between China and Brazil from agriculture to technology. It can be said that
the Lula government's re-establishment of bilateral relations has achieved results. From
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
136
China's perspective, the bilateral relations between China and Brazil have a long-term
foundation and will not be easily shaken. And out of long-term considerations for future
development, even under the influence of the previous Brazilian president, China tends
to maintain the previously established interaction model and maintain its interests. Lula's
friendly attitude has repaired the previous tension in the Sino-Brazilian relation, making
bilateral relations closer and allowing more exchanges and cooperation in various fields.
Sino-Brazilian relations have entered a period of close cooperation.
Discussion and Conclusion
Since the beginning of 2019, Sino-Brazilian relations have experienced tensions, and
fluctuations, but now they have rebuilt a close and friendly relationship. It’s clear that
the changing attitudes of Brazilian leaders affect the Sino-Brazilian relation. Based on the
Guanxi perspective, the previously built relations and trust between China and Brazil
helped to reanimate current relations. The Bolsonaro government’s view of China as an
ideological rival has affected Brazil’s attitude towards China. Therefore, the Bolsonaro
government tried to reduce its interactions with China, and China was no longer Brazil's
leading priority. This was so much so that during Bolsonaro's term, although China and
Brazil had a number of agreements and cooperation exchanges, they were not as
numerous or important as those of the later Lula government. As long as China's national
sovereignty is not compromised, China's attitude towards Brazil remains friendly and
cooperative, and this is also based on the previous bilateral relations between China and
Brazil. When the Bolsonaro government repeatedly made negative remarks against China
due to COVID-19, China showed a tougher attitude than in the past. Even so, when China
responded to the Bolsonaro government, it emphasized the healthy and friendly
development of Sino-Brazilian relations in the past, and at the same time tried to warn
the Brazilian government to consider the overall situation and maintain a good
environment for the development of bilateral relations.
The historical origins of bilateral relations are a recurring expression in China’s official
narrative. For China, bilateral relations and even multilateral relations are based on long-
term orientation. As the explanation of Guanxi theory, this long-term oriented
relationship builds trust through the interaction between the two parties, and even a
specific model or norm, which provides a certain foundation and guarantee for future
relationships. Under this model, even if bilateral relations fluctuate due to different
diplomatic strategies of leaders, there is still some room for relaxation. When both parties
change due to diplomatic strategies and political goals, the trust and models established
through previous long-term relationships will also have an impact on new cooperation
and negotiations. In the Sino-Brazilian relationship, Lula has reached cooperation and
consensus with China during his previous two terms, establishing a foundation of trust,
so much so that after Lula started his new term, he aimed to repair the Sino-Brazilian
relations. On this basis, China quickly responded with positive feedback and expressed
its willingness to deepen Sino-Brazilian relations.
Apart from official statements, neither China nor Brazil has taken direct actions to
damage relations between the two countries. Whether it was the Bolsonaro government’s
criticism of China or China’s counterattack against similar criticism, most of the steps
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
137
stop at the diplomatic discourse-level on official websites. Perhaps out of pragmatism,
despite various criticisms of China by the Bolsonaro government, China has not taken
any action to sever relations between the two countries. China and Brazil have close
economic and trade ties. Obviously, the political strategies of the Bolsonaro government
and the Lula government towards China were different. The Bolsonaro government
tended to distance itself from China and approach closer to the United States. But such
a strategy meant destroying the interaction model and interest exchange that China and
Brazil had established over a long period. The Lula government chooses to continue to
maintain the reciprocal model with China and tries to seek further development on this
basis to establish a closer bilateral relationship. Whether it is the Bolsonaro government
or the Lula government, when dealing with the Sino-Brazilian relations, they need to
consider the actual impact of weakening or strengthening this relationship. Out of long-
term considerations for bilateral relations, China is relatively cautious about diplomatic
discourse or political measures that may affect bilateral relations. Regardless of whether
China's diplomatic style is tough or not, at this stage, China does not want to damage
Sino-Brazilian relations. Therefore, although the Sino-Brazilian relations were once
strained due to the attitude of the Bolsonaro government, under the friendly attitude of
the Lula government, China can restore its close ties with Brazil based on the trust and
interaction model that has been established.
In general, China pays more attention to long-term interests and maintaining long-term
relationships when establishing and developing diplomatic relations. A mutually beneficial
situation can only be achieved when both sides can achieve resource sharing through
interaction and transform it into their own interests. Only when both sides recognize that
relationships and interactions can bring benefits to themselves and actively abide by the
behavioural norms and profit models established through interaction can this relationship
be sustained and deepened. When one side questions the relationship, as in the actions
taken by the Bolsonaro government, it often causes fluctuations or even stagnation in
the relationship. In the face of the other side's doubts, China may adopt different ways
of diplomatic discourse, either tough or gentle. But no matter what diplomatic style,
China prefers to maintain the existing mutually beneficial model. This also enabled the
Lula government to smoothly ease the legacy of tense Sino-Brazilian relations from the
Bolsonaro government and promote the expansion of China-Brazil interaction to more
and new areas.
References
Agência Lusa. (2018). Jornal oficial chinês adverte Bolsonaro com peso da China para a
economia brasileira. https://observador.pt/20-18/11/01/jornal-oficial-chines-adverte-
bolsonaro-com-peso-da-china-para-a-economia-brasileira/
Andreoni, Manuela (2018). Bolsonaro se elege no Brasil com retórica hostil à China.
Dialogue Earth. https://dialogue.earth/pt-br/neg-ocios/12181-bolsonaro-se-elege-no-
brasil-com-retorica-hostil-a-china/
Associated Press. (2019). Macron calls Amazon an issue for the whole planet.
https://www.courthousenews.com/macron-calls-for-a-new-global-economic-order/.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
138
Berenskoetter, F. (2007). Friends, there are no friends? An intimate reframing of the
international. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (3), pp. 647–676. doi:10.
1177/03058298070350031501
Berringer, T.; Belasques, B. (2020). As relações Brasil-China nos governos Lula e Dilma:
burguesia interna e subordinação conflitiva. Carta Internacional, 15(3).
Berringer, Tatiana; Soprijo, Gabriel; Almeida, Gabrielly; Mitake, Flavia & Antoniazzo,
Fernanda (2021). 100 dias de governo Biden, as relaces Brasil-EUA e a vacinaco contra
Covid. Observatrio de Poltica Externa e da Inserco Internacional do Brasil.
https://opeb.org/2021/05/07/100-dias-de-governo-biden-as-relacoes-brasil-eua-e-a-
vacinacao-contra-covid/.
Bian, Zhuodan; Chen, Weihua; Xie, Zhao; Zhou, Yongshui. (2023). On the right path of
the world, China and Brazil are on the same journey - Exclusive interview with Zhu
Qingqiao, Chinese Ambassador to Brazil. [人间正道上，中国和巴西是同路人——专访中国驻巴
西大使祝青桥。]” Outlook瞭望, 51 (December 16).
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1785679121797892542&wfr=spider&for=pc.
Bolsonaro, Eduardo (2020). Quem assistiu Chernobyl [Tweet/X], March 18, 2020.
https://twitter.com/bolsonarosp/status/1240286560953815040?lang=en.
Bolsonaro, Jair & Paraguassu, Lisandra (2020). Bolsonaro questiona credibilidade da
China para vacina e diz que Pazuello fica. Reuters, Octorber 22, 2020.
https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/reuters/2020/10/22/bolsonaro-
questiona-credito-da-china-para-vacina-e-diz-que-pazuello-fica.htm?-
cmpid=copiaecola.
Bolsonaro, Jaire (2021). ‘No citei a China’, diz Bolsonaro depois de falar em ‘vrus de
laboratrio.’ Poder 360, May 5, 2021. https://www.poder360.com.b-r/governo/nao-citei-
a-china-diz-bolsonaro-depois-de-falar-em-virus-de-laboratorio/.
Brasil, Gabinete de Transico Governamental (2022). Relatrio Final. December 22.
Brasil, Ministrio das Relaces Exteriores (2023a). Nota Imprensa no 131. Lista e
ntegra dos atos assinados no Grande Palcio do Povo, por ocasio da visita do Presidente
Luiz Incio Lula da Silva Repblica Popular da China. April 14,
2023https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-
imprensa/lista-e-integra-dos-atos-assinados-no-grande-pa-lacio-do-povo-por-ocasiao-
da-visita-do-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-a-republica-popular-da-china.
Cariello, Tulio (2018). Investimentos Chineses no Brasil 2018. O quadro brasileiro em
perspectiva global. CEBC-Conselho Empresarial Brasil China.
Chade, Jamil (2022). China envia delegaco de mais alto nvel que EUA para posse de
Lula. December 29, 2022. https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/j-amil-
chade/2022/12/29/china-envia-delegacao-de-mais-alto-nivel-que-eua-para-posse-de-
lula.htm.
Chen, C. C. (2011). The absence of non-western IR theory. International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific 11 (1): pp. 1–23.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
139
China Daily (2018). No reason for 'Tropical Trump' to disrupt relations with China: China
Daily editorial. October 29, 2018. https://www.chinadaily.com.c-
n/a/201810/29/WS5bd702e9a310eff303285424.html.
Damacena, A. B. (2021). As relações entre Brasil e China: do pragmatismo à
ideologia. Conexões Internacionais, 2(1).
de Sá, Nelson. (2023). China e Brasil fazem primeira operação completa em moedas
locais.” UOL, October 3, 2023. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/merc-ado/2023/10/china-
e-brasil-fecham-primeira-operacao-completa-em-moedas-locais.shtml.
de Sousa, A. T. L. M., Abro, R. A. F. & de Souza Porto, L. F. (2023). A China na poltica
externa do terceiro governo Lula cem dias de reconstruco. Conjuntura Austral, 14(68),
pp. 150-162.
de Sousa, A. T. L. M.; Souza, B. B., da Fonseca, B. C. D.; Carneiro, G. S.; Abrão, R. A.
F. & dos Santos, V. H. (2020). Relações Brasil-China durante a pandemia: balos no
pragmatismo. A Política Externa de Bolsonaro [Bolsonaro Foreign Affairs], 31.
de Sousa, Ana T. L. M; Gajus, Brenda N.; Porto, Filipe; Freitas, José L.; Abrão, Rafael A.
F.; Rodrigues, Vanessa C. P.; Silva, Vitor G. & Santos, Vitor H. (2022). Distensão,
Assimetrias e Oportunidades Perdidas: Relações Brasil-China no Governo Bolsonaro. In:
Sousa, Ana T. L. M; Azzi, Diego A. & Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A. (Eds.) Política externa
brasileira em tempos de isolamento diplomático. Rio de Janeiro: Telha.
Eisenman, J. (2023). China’s relational power in Africa: Beijing’s ‘new type of party-to-
party relations. Third World Quarterly, 44 (12), pp. 2441-2461.
Embaixada da China. (2020). Declaraco do porta-voz da Embaixada da China no Brasil
sobre co- mentrios difamatrios de um deputado federal brasileiro. Nov 25 2020.
http://br.china-embassy.gov.cn/por/sghds/202011/t20201125_446-6596.htm.
Estadão Conteúdo. (2019). Bolsonaro: Nos interessa aprofundar relações comerciais com
a China.” July 25, 2019. https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/inte-
rnacional/2019/07/25/interna_internacional,1072479/bolsonaro-nos-interessa-
aprofundar-relacoes-comerciais-com-a-china.shtml.
Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços do Brsil (2024). Brasil
discute oportunidades de expansão dos negócios com a China. March 21, 2024.
https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2024/marco/brasil-dis-cute-
oportunidades-de-expansao-dos-negocios-com-a-china.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2019a). Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro met with
Wang Yi. [巴西总统博索纳罗会见王毅。]. July 26, 2019.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_68097-
4/xgxw_680980/201907/t20190726_9367873.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2019b). Xi Jinping meets with Brazilian Vice President
Morão. [习近平会见巴西副总统莫朗。]. May 24, 2019.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/x
gxw_680980/201905/t20190524_9367869.shtml.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
140
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2019c). Xi Jinping held talks with Brazilian President
Jair Bolsonaro. [习近平同巴西总统博索纳罗会谈。]. October 25, 2019.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_6-
80924/1206_680974/xgxw_680980/201910/t20191025_9367880.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2022). President Xi Jinping’s Special Representative
and Vice President Wang Qishan will attend the inauguration ceremony of the Brazilian
President. [习近平主席特别代表、国家副主席王岐山将出席巴西总统就职仪式。]. December 29,
2022. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhd-
q_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/xgxw_680980/202212/t20221229_1
0997946.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2023a). Joint Statement Between the People's Republic
of China and the Federative Republic of Brazil on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership. [中华人民共和国和巴西联邦共和国关于深化全面战略伙伴关系的联合声明（全文）].
April 14, 2023.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/x
gxw_680980/202304/t20230414_11059627.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2023b). Xi Jinping held talks with Brazilian President
Lula. [习近平同巴西总统卢拉举行会谈。] April 14, 2023.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_68092-
4/1206_680974/xgxw_680980/202304/t20230414_11059493.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2024a). Brazilian President Lula meets with Wang Yi.
[巴西总统卢拉会见王毅。] January 20, 2024.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/x
gxw_680980/202401/t20240120_11229828.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2024b). Chief Special Advisor to the President of Brazil
Amorim will visit China. [巴西总统首席特别顾问阿莫林将访华。] May 6, 2024.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nm-
z_680924/1206_680974/xgxw_680980/202405/t20240521_11308789.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2024c). Relations between China and Brazil. [中国同巴
西的关系。] Last updated: January 2024,: https://ww-
w.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/sbgx_6809
78/.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2024d). Wang Yi: China and Brazil will join hands to
create the next ‘Golden 50 years’ of bilateral relations. [王毅：中巴将携手打造双边关系下一
个 ‘黄金50年’。] January 20, 2024. https://ww-
w.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/xgxw_68098
0/202401/t20240120_11229830.shtml.
Palácio do Planalto – Brasil (2023b). Com primeiro-ministro Chins, Lula refora inteno
de diversificao de investimentos. April 14, 2023. https://ww-w.gov.br/planalto/pt-
br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/04/com-primeiro-ministr-o-chines-lula-reforca-
intencao-de-diversificacao-de-investimentos.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
141
Exame. (2024). Em meio século de parceria, Brasil e China aproximam ainda mais
relação bilateral e comercial. March 20, 2024. https://exame.com/mund-o/em-meio-
seculo-de-parceria-brasil-e-china-aproximam-ainda-mais-relacao-bilateral-e-
comercial/.
Farias, Victor & Gullino, Daniel. (2020). ‘No será comprada’, diz Bolsonaro sobre vacina
Coronavac. O Globo, October 21. https://oglobo.globo.com/sau-de/coronavirus/nao-
sera-comprada-diz-bolsonaro-sobre-vacina-coronavac-24703879.
Fernandes, Maria Cristina. (2019). Xi buscou recolocar Bolsonaro na rota das relaces
bilaterais. Valor Econmico, October 25, 2019. https://valor.globo.c-
om/brasil/noticia/2019/10/25/xi-buscou-recolocar-bolsonaro-na-rota-das-relaes-
bilaterais.ghtml.
Folha de So Paulo (2019). Ruralistas reclamam de vis anti-China no governo Bolsonaro.
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/20-19/03/ruralistas-reclamam-de-vies-anti-
china-no-governo-bolsonaro.shtml.
Gabriel, J. P. N.; Mandelbaum, H. G.; Campos, A. S. S. & Carvalho, C. E. (2019).
Bolsonaro, China and the Indo-Pacific: Challenges in Sight| Bolsonaro, China e o Indo-
Pacífico: desafios à vista. Mural Internacional, 10, e40103-e40103.
Guimarães, F. D. S., & Silva, I. D. D. O. E. (2021). Far-right populism and foreign policy
identity: Jair Bolsonaro's ultra-conservatism and the new politics of
alignment. International Affairs, 97(2).
Junqueira, Caio (2019). Bolsonaro x militares—cada um no seu quadrado. Revista
Cruso, 5 July 2019. https://www.defesanet.com.br/pensamento/bolso-naro-x-
militares-cada-um-no-seu-quadrado/.
Kalil, Isabela; Silveira, Sofia Cherto; Pinheiro, Weslei; Kalil, Alex; Pereira, João Vicente;
Azarias, Wiverson & Amparo, Ana Beatriz (2021). Politics of fear in Brazil: Far-right
conspiracy theories on COVID-19. Global Discourse, 11(3), pp. 409-425.
Kavalski, E. (2013). The struggle for recognition of normative powers: Normative power
Europe and normative power China in context. Cooperation and Conflict, 48(2), pp. 247–
267.
Kavalski, E. (2017). The Guanxi of relational international theory. London: Routledge.
Kavalski, E. (2022). What Can Guanxi International Relations Be About? In China’s Rise
and Rethinking International Relations Theory, pp. 62–82. Bristol University Press.
Keohane, R. O., & Nye Jr, J. S. (1973). Power and interdependence. Survival, 15(4), 158-
165.
Landim, Raquel. (2019). Bolsonaro agradece isenco da China sobre polmica ambiental
na Amaznia. Folha de So, October 25, 2019.
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2019/10/bolsonaro-agradece-isencao-da-
china-sobre-polemica-ambiental-na-amazonia.shtml.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
142
Lapper, Richard. (2019). Bolsonaro took aim at China. Then reality struck. Americas
Quarterly, 13(2), 2019. https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/bolson-aro-took-
aim-at-china-then-reality-struck/.
Liao, Junhua. (2020). The Chinese Embassy in Brazil issued a statement on the Brazilian
congressman’s insulting remarks against China: Opposing any slanderous attacks. [中国
驻巴使馆就巴西众议员辱华言论发表声明：反对任何污蔑攻击。] Huanqiu环球网, March 20,
2020. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=16-61648122692098559&wfr=spider&for=pc.
Lopes, Dawisson B; Carvalho, Thales; Santos, Vinicius (2022). Did the Far Right Breed a
New Variety of Foreign Policy? The Case of Bolsonaro's “More-Bark-Than-Bite” Brazil.
Global Studies Quarterly, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.109-3/isa-gsq/ksac078.
Maia, Rodrigo (2020). Em nome da Câmara dos [Tweet/X], March 19, 2020.
https://x.com/RodrigoMaia/status/1240474698326163456?ref_src=twsrc%5Etf-
w%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1240474698326163456%7Ctwgr%5E99
86a0c62af370dbbb830283ab1e51d18bb43133%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%
2F%2Fnoticias.uol.com.br%2Fpolitica%2Fultimas-noticias%2F2020%2F0-
3%2F19%2Fsenado-pede-desculpas-a-china-por-declaracao-de-eduardo-bolsonaro.ht-
m.
Martello, Alexandro (2023). Bancos centrais de Brasil e China firmam acordo para
conversão direta das moedas dos dois países em operações comerciais. G1, March 29,
2023. https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2023/03/29/bancos-centrais-de-brasil-e-
china-firmam-acordo-para-conversao-direta-das-moedas-dos-dois-paises-em-
operacao-comerciais.ghtml.
Martin, P. (2021). China's civilian army: The making of wolf warrior diplomacy. Oxford
University Press.
Marques, Gilvan; Lázaro, Letcia. (2021). ‘A China precisa da gente’, diz Bolsonaro sobre
negociaço por vacinas.” UOL, January 21, 2021. https://noticias.u-
ol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2021/01/21/bolsonaro-elogia-relacao-com-china-e-
india-e-cita-problemas-burocraticos.htm?cmpid=copiaecola.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.
Murakawa Fabio (2021). Bolsonaro ataca China e mente sobre pandemia e vacinas em
culto em Goiás. Valor Econômico, June 9. https://valor.globo.com/politic-
a/noticia/2021/06/09/bolsonaro-ataca-china-e-mente-sobre-pandemia-e-vacinas-em-
culto-em-gois.ghtml.
Nordin, A. H. M., Smith, G. M., Bunskoek, R., Huang, C. Chiu, Hwang, Yih-jye (Jay),
Jackson, P. T., in Zalewski, M. (2019). Towards global relational theorizing: a dialogue
between Sinophone and Anglophone scholarship on rationalism. Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 32(5), pp. 570–581.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1643978
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
143
Oliveira, Eliane. (2019). ‘Brasil um dos pases mais rigorosos nessas questes
ambientais’, afirma diplomata chins. O Globo, August 23, 2019.
https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/brasil-um-dos-paises-mais-rigorosos-nessas-
questoes-ambientais-afirma-diplomata-chines-23899850.
Oliveira, Joana. (2021). Butantan afirma que ataques de Governo Bolsonaro à China já
atrapalham vacinaço.” El País, May 6, 2021. https://brasil.elpais.com/br-asil/2021-05-
06/butantan-afirma-que-ataques-de-governo-bolsonaro-a-china-ja-atrapalham-
vacinacao.html.
Paltiel, J. T. (2011). Constructing Global Order with Chinese Characteristics: Yan Xuetong
and the Pre-Qin Response to International Anarchy Looking for a Chinese School of
International Relations. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4(4), pp. 375–403.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/por017
Qin, Y. (2016). A relational theory of world politics. International Studies Review, 18(1),
pp. 33–47.
Qin, Y. (2018). A relational theory of world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Quinan, R., Araujo, M.; De Albuquerque, A. (2021). A Culpa é da China! O discurso sino-
conspiratório no governo Bolsonaro em tempos de COVID-19. Revista Eco-Pós, 24(2),
pp. 151-174.
Ramos, L., Leite, A.; Mendonça, F. (2024). Brazil and the China–US rivalry: There and
back again. In China-US Rivalry and Regional Reordering in Latin America and the
Caribbean, pp. 172-190. Routledge.
Rocha, Daniel; de Oliveira, Fabíola Lara; Porto, Filipe; Neiva, Flávia Mitake & Pina, Lais.
(2022). Após incertezas, Brasil e China reafirmam compromissos de parceria.
Observatório de Política Externa e Inserção Internacional do Brasil, June 28, 2022.
https://opeb.org/2022/06/28/apos-incertezas-brasil-e-china-reafirmam-compromissos-
de-parceria/.
Rosa, Bruno. (2019). As estatais chinesas que chamaram a atenco no leilo do pr -
sal. poca, November 6, 2019. https://oglobo.globo.com/epoca/econ-omia/as-estatais-
chinesas-que-chamaram-atencao-no-leilao-do-pre-sal-24066343.
Santoro, Maurıcio (2018). A Gafe de Bolsonaro. O Globo, March 14, 2018.
https://oglobo.globo.com/opiniao/a-gafe-de-bolsonaro-22485852.
Santoro, M. (2022). Brazil-China relations in the 21st century: The making of a strategic
partnership. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Senra, Ricardo. (2019). Estou num pas capitalista, diz Bolsonaro ao chegar China. BBC
News Brazil, October 24, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/b-rasil-50165787.
Sawicka, M. (2020). Burning bridges and defending the faith: the troubled Brazil-China
partnership in the Bolsonaro era. Anuario Latinoamericano, 10.
Shih, C., & Huwang, C. (2014). Harmonious Intervention: China’s quest for relational
security. London: Routledge.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 122-144
Understanding China’s Stance in Sino-Brazilian Relations: The China Mode
Xuheng Wang, Carmen Amado Mendes
144
Spring, J. (2018). Discurso anti-China de Bolsonaro causa apreenso sobre negcios com
o pas. UOL, October 25, 2018. https://noticias.uol.com.br/polit-
ica/eleicoes/2018/noticias/reuters/2018/10/25/discurso-anti-china-de-bolsonaro-causa-
apreensao-sobre-negocios-com-o-pais.htm.
UOL. (2020). Governo vai comprar qualquer vacina que for aprovada por Sade e Anvisa,
diz Bolsonaro. https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-
noticias/reuters/2020/11/09/governo-vai-comprar-qualquer-vacina-que-for-aprovada-
por-saude-e-anvisa-diz-bolsonaro.htm.
UOL. (2021). Embaixador chinês nega retaliação e atribui atraso a demanda, diz Aécio.
May 14, 2021. https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redaca-
o/2021/05/14/atraso-vacina-china-aecio.htm.
Verdélio, Andreia (2019). Bolsonaro confirma viagem à China neste ano. Agência Brasil,
March 8, 2019. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/notici-a/2019-03/bolsonaro-
confirma-viagem-para-china.
Voice of America (2018). Bolsonaro's China-critical remarks make Beijing nervous about
Brazil. October 26, 2018. https://www.voachinese.com/a/BOLSON-ARO-BRAZIL-CHINA-
20101025/4629540.html.
Xue, Y. (2023). China’s rise, Guanxi, and primary institutions. The Pacific Review, 36(1),
pp. 1-31.
Yang, Wanming (2020). As suas palavras são [Tweet/X], March 19, 2020.
https://x.com/WanmingYang/status/1240440011536896010.
Yan, Xuetong (2013). Ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power. In Ancient
Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton University Press.
Yan, Xuetong (2014). 道义现实主义的国际关系理论[Moral realism theory of international
relations]. 国际问题研究 [International Studies], (5), pp. 102-128.
Yan, Xuetong (2019). Leadership and the rise of great powers (Vol. 1). Princeton
University Press.
Yan, Xuetong (2023). Moral Realism on Interstate Leadership in Response to Critics.
In the Essence of Interstate Leadership, pp. 179-203. Bristol University Press.
Ye, Zicheng (2010). Inside China's grand strategy: the perspective from the People's
Republic. University Press of Kentucky.
Zhang, J.; Jin, S. (2020). Analysis on Sino-Brazilian Trade Structure and the Impact of
Trade Growth. ICIC express letters. Part B, Applications: an international journal of
research and surveys, 11(9), pp. 889-896.
Zheng, A. (2020). Utilizing economic ties with China: Brazilian economic development
policy in the age of Bolsonaro. Pepperdine Policy Review, 12(1), p. 6.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
145
THREE DECADES OF BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS: MAPPING SCHOLARLY
DISCOURSE AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
rodrigo.frogeri@professor.unis.edu.br
Ph.D in Information Systems and Knowledge Management from FUMEC University (Brazil) in
2019. He holds a Master's degree in Administration (2014) from Centro Universitário Novos
Horizontes (Brazil) and a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science (2001) from Universidade José
do Rosário Vellano (Brazil). He has specializations in Computer Networks (2003), Higher
Education Teaching (2005), and Information Technology Management (2012). He has been
teaching undergraduate and postgraduate courses in management and technology since 2005.
Currently, he is a permanent professor in the Graduate Program in Management and Regional
Development at Centro Universitário do Sul de Minas - UNIS-MG, Brazil. He is a guest professor
in the Master's program in Data Science at Universidad Científica del Sur (Peru) - 2024. He
serves as a technology mentor in the Innovation Ecosystem of Grupo Integrado (Brazil) and as a
guest researcher at Centro Universitário Integrado, Brazil. He leads the following research groups
accredited by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq): GPGDER
- Research Group in Management and Regional Economic Development and GEADO - Research
Group in Organizational Dynamic Ambidexterity. His most recent books/chapters include: "e-
Government and Green IT: The Intersection Point", published in Recent Advances in Data and
Algorithms for e-Government, Springer Nature (2023); "Restructuring of the Brazilian Private
Higher Education Sector through the Entry of Foreign Investment", published in Advances in
Tourism, Technology, and Systems. Smart Innovation, Systems, and Technologies, Springer
Nature (2022); "Mapping the Brazilian Reality in the Development of Special Economic Zones",
published in Special Economic Zones as Regional Development Enablers, IGI-Global (2022); and
"IT Governance in SMEs: the state-of-the-art", published in Research Anthology on Small
Business Strategies for Success and Survival, IGI-Global (2022).
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7545-7529.
YICHAO LI
liyichao@zjnu.edu.cn
Ph.D. degree from the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University
of Macau, China. She also received a Master’s degree in comparative civil law (in Chinese) from
the University of Macau (China) in 2018. From 2021 to 2022, she has been a postdoctoral
researcher at the Centre for International Studies (ISCTE-IUL). Since 2023, she is currently an
assistant research fellow at Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China. Her
research interests are the Belt and Road Initiative, Portuguese-speaking countries, and Sino-
African relations. Her latest publication stands as: Leandro, F. J. & Li, Y. (2023). Spatial
Development Initiatives: The Case of African Portuguese Speaking Countries. In Duarte, P. A. B.,
Albuquerque, R., Tavares, A. M. L. (eds.). Portugal and the Lusophone World: Law, Geopolitics
and Insititutional Cooperation. Palgrave Macmillan. Costa, C. M. & Li, Y. (2023). China and
European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. Vol. 14, No. 1, TD1–Thematic dossier “European Union-China
relations”, September 2023. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8588-1043.
Abstract
Over the past three decades, China and Brazil have developed a robust and multifaceted
relationship characterized by cooperation across various sectors. This relationship extends
into numerous areas, including poverty reduction, social development, scientific and
technological innovation, environmental protection, climate change mitigation, the low-carbon
economy, and the digital economy. Despite the substantial bilateral relations between Brazil
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
146
and China, we are particularly interested in understanding the discussions within the scientific
literature over the past 30 years and identifying new avenues for future research. To achieve
this objective, we conducted an extensive Systematic Literature Review and applied
bibliometric laws and lexical analyses to a total of 208 studies. The bibliometric analyses
revealed that the peak of publications involving Brazil and China occurred in 2016. The
scientific journal that published the greatest number of articles was the International
Organisations Research Journal of the Russian Federation, and the most prolific author was
Professor Mihaela Papa from Tufts University in the U.S. We identified four central research
lines that could be developed in future studies: (i) Emerging Geopolitical Dynamics and the
Role of BRICS; (ii) Economic and Trade Relationships within BRICS; (iii) South-South
Cooperation and Alternative Development Models; (iv) Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
BRICS.
Keywords
Bibliometric laws, Bilateral cooperation, BRICS, Lexical Analysis, South-South cooperation,
Trade Relationship.
Resumo
Ao longo dos últimos 30 anos, a China e o Brasil desenvolveram uma relação sólida e
multifacetada, caracterizada pela cooperação em vários setores. Essa relação se estende a
diversas áreas, incluindo redução da pobreza, desenvolvimento social, inovação científica e
tecnológica, proteção ambiental, mitigação das mudanças climáticas, economia de baixo
carbono e economia digital. Apesar das consideráveis relações recíprocas entre o Brasil e a
China, estamos particularmente interessados em entender as discussões na literatura
científica dos últimos 30 anos e identificar novas oportunidades para pesquisas futuras. Para
atingir esse objetivo, realizamos uma extensa Revisão Sistemática da Literatura (RSL) e
aplicamos leis bibliométricas e análises lexicais a um total de 208 estudos. As análises
bibliométricas revelaram que o pico de publicações envolvendo o Brasil e a China ocorreu em
2016. A revista científica com a maior quantidade de publicações foi a International
Organisations Research Journal da Federação Russa, e o autor mais prolífico foi a professora
Mihaela Papa, da Universidade Tufts, nos EUA. Identificamos quatro linhas de pesquisa
centrais que podem ser desenvolvidas em estudos futuros: (i) Dinâmica Geopolítica
Emergente e o Papel do BRICS; (ii) Relações Econômicas e Comerciais dentro do BRICS; (iii)
Cooperação Sul-Sul e Modelos Alternativos de Desenvolvimento; (iv) Perspectivas
Interdisciplinares sobre o BRICS.
Palavras-chave
Leis bibliométricas, Cooperação bilateral, BRICS, Análise lexical, Cooperação Sul-Sul, Relação
comercial.
How to cite this artical
Frogeri, Rorigo Franklin & Li, Yichao (2024). Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping
Scholarly Discourse and Future Research Directions. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International
Order”. December 2024, pp. 145-174. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.7.
Article received on 1 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 24 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
147
THREE DECADES OF BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS: MAPPING
SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
RODRIGO FRANKLIN FROGERI
YICHAO LI
Introduction
China and Brazil established diplomatic relations on September 8, 1974 (MFA-Brazil,
2024). However, it was not until 1993 that the two countries began to significantly
strengthen their ties, marked by the visit of Chinese Vice-premier Zhou Rongji to Brazil
in May 1993 and the establishment of strategic partnership (MFA-Brazil, 2024). This visit
initiated a series of high-level engagements that underscored the growing importance of
their bilateral relationship (Cardoso, 2013; Oliveira, 2004). President Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva's initial visit to China in 2004, aimed at strengthening trade and economic
cooperation (MFA-Brazil, 2024). The momentum was sustained with Chinese President
Hu Jintao's visit to Brazil in 2012, which underscored the necessity for enhanced
cooperation in sectors such as energy and infrastructure (Barker, 2013). In 2014,
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff visited China, with a particular focus on trade and
investment (Busilli & Jaime, 2021).
During his initial presidency from 2003 to 2010, President Lula da Silva aimed to
strengthen relations with China, acknowledging the nation's burgeoning economic
influence (De Melo & Do Amaral Filho, 2015). President Lula da Silva visited China four
times during his tenure, and in 2009, China overtook the U.S. to become Brazil’s largest
trading partner (Rhys, 2012). This shift underscored the increasing economic
interdependence between the two countries. In 2012, the signing of the China-Brazil Free
Trade Agreement aimed to reduce tariffs and increase trade between the two nations.
The agreement went into effect in 2013, further solidifying their economic partnership
(Whalley & Medianu, 2013). Consequently, China has emerged as Brazil's largest trading
partner, with bilateral trade volumes expanding from $1.3 billion in 1993 to over $130
billion in 2023 (MDIC, 2024). Brazil has also become one of China's largest trading
partners in Latin America (Cunha, da Silva Bichara & Lélis, 2013; Hsiang, 2008).
Educational and technological cooperation between China and Brazil has also seen
substantial growth (Andrade & García, 2021). The establishment of bilateral cooperation
China-Brazil in areas as climate change (CGTN, 2018), energy (CNPEM, 2023), and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
148
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) (Sousa & Sousa, 2023) exemplifies
this collaboration. Research and development in areas such as renewable energy and
biotechnology, fostering innovation and technological advancement (Gandenberger &
Strauch, 2018). Additionally, China's investment in Brazil's infrastructure development
has been significant, particularly in the areas of transportation (Oliveira & Myers, 2021)
and energy (Busilli & Jaime, 2021). Agricultural cooperation has also been a cornerstone
of their relationship (Rhys, 2012). China has become one of Brazil's largest agricultural
export markets, and the two countries have collaborated on agricultural research and
development, strengthening their agricultural ties (Cunha, da Silva Bichara & Lélis, 2013;
Hsiang, 2008).
Cultural exchanges have been instrumental in fostering mutual understanding and
cooperation between China and Brazil (Leandro, 2023; Vérasi & Véras, 2013). The
Brazilian Cultural Program aims to enhance cultural ties and foster a deeper appreciation
of each nation’s heritage and traditions (CTG, 2021).
Both nations are members of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa), which convenes annual summits to enhance cooperation in trade, investment,
and social development (Kirton & Larionova, 2022; Porto de Oliveira & Romano, 2022).
This multilateral cooperation has provided a platform for China and Brazil to collaborate
on global issues and enhance their bilateral relations (Leta, Machado & Canchumani,
2019).
However, the period from 2019 to 2023 saw a cooling of relations under the presidency
of Jair Bolsonaro (Jesus, 2022). During this period, China-Brazil relations experienced a
cooling as Bolsonaro and his international governance advisors aligned more closely with
the U.S. (Hirst & Valls Pereira, 2022). This shift highlighted the complexities and
challenges inherent in maintaining a stable and mutually beneficial relationship (Jesus,
2022).
In summary, the thirty years of China-Brazil relations have been marked by significant
diplomatic events, trade agreements, cultural exchanges, and bilateral cooperation. The
two countries have made substantial progress in strengthening their ties, particularly in
areas like trade, infrastructure development, and agricultural cooperation.
Despite the substantial bilateral relations between Brazil and China, we are particularly
interested in understanding the discussions within the scientific literature over the past
30 years and identifying new avenues for future research. To achieve this objective, we
conducted an extensive Systematic Literature Review and applied bibliometric laws and
lexical analyses to a total of 208 studies.
Methodology
Methodologically, the study is characterized by a qualitative approach and follows an
inductive logic. We used the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses
1
(PRISMA, 2020) as a method to guide the research (Page et. al., 2021). The
1
Retrieved in June 2024, from https://www.prisma-statement.org/.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
149
PRISMA 2020 statement is an updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews (Page
et al., 2021). Transparent systematic reviews are an essential component of "good
research", as they provide reliability and enable the replicability of a study (Sarkis-
Onofre, Catalá-López, Aromataris & Lockwood, 2021).
The principal contributions to a field of knowledge or a specific topic are likely to be found
in the leading scientific journals (Webster & Watson, 2002). Therefore, we searched the
two main scientific journal indexing databases (SCOPUS and Web of Science) for terms
suggesting a relationship or cooperation between Brazil and China. In addition to applying
search strings, we read the abstracts of the studies to verify if there was any kind of
relation between the topics discussed in the publication and the Brazil-China relationship
or cooperation. Table 1 below shows the search string used in the databases and the
respective results.
Table 1. Review of academic databases
Platform
String
Results
Excluded*
Total
SCOPUS
(TITLE-ABS-KEY (China) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY
(Brazil) AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (cooperation)
AND TITLE-ABS-KEY (relation))
161
34
127
Web of
Science
Brazil (Topic) and China (Topic) and
relation (Topic) and cooperation (All Fields)
73
8
65
Overall
234
42
192
*The excluded data refers to duplicate records and marginal subjects found on both search
platforms.
Source: Authors, adapted from SCOPUS and Web of Science.
We identified a total of 234 studies in the two databases. Of these, 39 were excluded due
to duplicate records, and 3 were excluded because their subjects were marginal and not
aligned with the Brazil-China relationship or cooperation. No temporal cutoff or filters by
document type and field of knowledge were applied. Thus, we obtained a total of 192
studies considered for analysis.
In addition to the previous searches, we applied the study “China and Brazil: Economic
Impacts of a Growing Relationship” (Jenkins, 2012) on the ConnectedPapers platform
2
(Frogeri, Diniz, Portugal Júnior & Piurcosky, 2023). ConnectedPapers allows only one
study to serve as the basis for the platform's analyses. The criteria adopted for selecting
Jenkins' (2012) article were as follows: (i) the study has been published for over ten
years, increasing the likelihood of it being cited more frequently than more recent
studies; (ii) the author, Rhys Jenkins, has a considerable number of publications involving
Brazil and China; (iii) the study was published in a journal with international visibility and
relevance (Journal of Current Chinese Affairs); and (iv) the central theme of the study
(the China and Brazil relationship) closely aligns with the search criteria adopted in
academic databases (Table 1).
2
Retrieved in June 2024, from https://www.connectedpapers.com/.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
150
The ConnectedPapers platform enables users to visually explore relevant studies
associated with a base document (Eitan, Smolyansky & Harpaz, 2021). The platform
generates a graph of connections between the base study and other publications in the
literature, with Semantic Scholar as the source. These connections are based on the
similarity of references cited in the studies—a concept known as Co-citation and
Bibliographic Coupling (Eitan et al., 2021; Strutynska, 2019). Figure 1 shows the
Connectedpapers graph based on Jenkins' study (2012).
In addition to generating the graph of connections, ConnectedPapers lists the studies
considered seminal and derivative according to the base study (e.g., Jenkins, 2012)
(Table 2 and Table 3).
Source: Generated by the authors via the ConnectedPapers platform. Available at:
https://www.connectedpapers.com/main/f75f0fa46fccb678e130c9d2cfb3291da8a3be4a/Chin
a-and-Brazil%3A-Economic-Impacts-of-a-Growing-Relationship/graph.
Figure 1. Connected papers graph based on Jenkins' study (2012)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
151
Table 2. Prior works by ConnectedPapers based on Jenkins (2012)
Title
First
author
Year
Citations
Graph
citations
(Moreira, 2004)
M. Moreira
2004
208
17
(Lall et al., 2004)
S. Lall
2004
181
16
(Jenkins & Edwards, 2006)
R. Jenkins
2006
131
12
(Lall & Albaladejo, 2004)
S. Lall
2004
372
11
(Rodríguez et al., 2006)
J. Rodríguez
2006
128
10
(Rodrıguez-Clare et al., 2006)
A. Rodrıguez-
Clare
2006
152
9
(Lederman et al., 2008)
D. Lederman
2008
72
9
(Eichengreen et al., 2007)
Barry
Eichengreen
2007
172
8
(Greenaway et al., 2006)
D. Greenaway
2006
171
8
(Athukorala, 2009)
P. Athukorala
2009
200
8
Source: Generated by the authors via the ConnectedPapers platform.
Available at:
https://www.connectedpapers.com/main/f75f0fa46fccb678e130c9d2cfb3291da8a3be4a/China-
and-Brazil%3A-Economic-Impacts-of-a-Growing-Relationship/derivative.
Table 2 shows the studies considered seminal by the ConnectedPapers platform. The
number of citations of the study and the citations associated with the work in the
connection graph classifies the study as seminal. Subsequently, Table 3 presents the
articles considered derivatives—these are articles that cite many of the articles in the
graph. The derivative articles are studies on the field or recent relevant works inspired
by many articles (Eitan et al., 2021).
Table 3. Derivative works by ConnectedPapers based on Jenkins (2012)
Title
First
author
Year
Citations
Graph
references
(Jenkins, 2022)
R. Jenkins
2022
30
10
(Jenkins & Edwards, 2015)
R. Jenkins
2015
0
8
(Stanojevic et al., 2020)
S. Stanojevic
2020
8
7
(Xu, 2016)
Yan-Qing Xu
2016
4
7
(Barker, 2013)
C. Barker
2013
0
6
(Urdínez, 2017)
Francisco Urdínez
2017
0
6
(Cunha, Lélis, Haines, &
Franke, 2022)
André Moreira
Cunha
2022
1
5
(Sekakela, 2016)
Kedibonye Sekakela
2016
7
5
(Cunha et. al., 2013)
André Moreira
Cunha
2013
4
5
Source: Generated by the authors via the ConnectedPapers platform.
Available at:
https://www.connectedpapers.com/main/f75f0fa46fccb678e130c9d2cfb3291da8a3be4a/China-
and-Brazil%3A-Economic-Impacts-of-a-Growing-Relationship/derivative.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
152
We used a total of 208 documents in our analyses, combining 192 studies identified in
the SLR and references suggested by the ConnectedPapers platform. Figure 2 detailed
graphically the Systematic literature review procedure.
Figure 2. Systematic literature review procedure
Source: Developed by the authors based on PRISMA 2020 flow diagram.
For the lexical analyses, we employed Iramuteq software, version 0.7 alpha 2
3
. Iramuteq
allows various lexical analysis techniques on a textual corpus (Ramos, Lima & Amaral-
Rosa, 2019). Among these techniques is Descending Hierarchical Classification (DHC),
which categorizes text segments according to their vocabularies. DHC seeks to identify
classes of Elementary Context Units (ECUs) or Text Segments (TSs). An ECU exhibits
similar vocabularies within a class and distinct vocabularies between classes (Marchand
& Ratinaud, 2012).
Iramuteq also supports Correspondence Factorial Analysis (CFA), which utilizes a
Cartesian plane to represent the different words and variables associated with each DHC
3
Retrieved in June 2024, from https://iramuteq.org.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
153
class. Simpler analyses, such as word clouds and Similarity Analysis, are also possible.
Similarity Analysis, while less complex, utilizes graph theory to depict the relationships
among words (Marchand & Ratinaud, 2012).
The textual corpus used in Iramuteq was extracted from the abstracts of 208 studies
selected through the Systematic Literature Review (SLR) and ConnectedPapers platform.
First, we used Mendeley software to register the metadata of the documents and extract
the study abstracts. Next, we exported the data from Mendeley in .RIS format and
imported it into the Rayyan platform
4
(Johnson & Phillips, 2018).
On the Rayyan platform, we analyzed the data and then exported it in .csv (Comma-
Separated Values) format for import into Microsoft Excel©. This process resulted in a
spreadsheet of the 208 documents with their metadata (Dataset available at Frogeri &
Li, 2024). To conduct lexical analyses using the Iramuteq software, we copied the
abstracts of 208 documents and pasted them into a new Microsoft Word© document.
This procedure produced an 89-page .DOCX file. Finally, the abstracts in Microsoft Word©
were standardized (Chaves, Santos, Santosa & Larocca, 2017).
The first step in standardising the textual corpus was to remove the copyright data that
is exported along with the abstracts (e.g. ©All authors or ©Elsevier Ltd.). Extracting
these data resulted in a total of 87 pages in the Microsoft Word© document. Next, we
searched for compound terms (e.g. International Relations, Foreign Policy, etc.) to adjust
them to the format that the Iramuteq software recognises. Words separated by spaces
are treated individually by the software; therefore, compound words need to be organised
with an underscore between the terms (e.g. International_Relations).
The term “international relations” was replaced with “international_relations”, “foreign
policy” with “foreign_policy”, “Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)” with
“BRICS”, “Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)” with
“OECD”, “European Union (EU)” with “European_Union”, “Latin America” with
“Latin_America”, “U.S.” with “United_States”, “bilateral trade” with “bilateral_trade”,
“Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” with “Belt_Road_Initiative”, and “South-South” with
“South_South”. The character “&” was also replaced with an underscore to prevent its
influence on the analyses (Camargo & Justo, 2013). The Find and Replace feature in
Microsoft Word was used to standardise the terms. After the standardisation procedure,
the textual corpus consisted of 87 pages and 49,374 words.
Finally, the data from the .DOCX document were exported to a .TXT file and encoded in
UTF-8 format. This configuration is required for the data to be imported into the Iramuteq
software (Salviati, 2014).
Analysis and discussions
To organize the study's content, we have divided the analyses into two sections. The first
section presents bibliometric analyses based on the Bibliometric Laws of Zipf and
4
Retrieved in June 2024, from https://www.rayyan.ai/.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
154
Bradford (Araújo, 2006; Frogeri et. al., 2023; Pritchard & Wittig, 1981). The second
section presents lexical analyses (Chaves et al., 2017; Marchand & Ratinaud, 2012).
Bibliometric Analysis
Our initial analysis focuses on the frequency of scientific publications over the past three
decades that discuss the relationship between Brazil and China. Graph 1 highlights that
the first publication occurred in 1999 (1) and reached its peak in 2016 (24). There is a
noticeable increase in scientific publications involving the two countries (Brazil and China)
starting from 2004.
The data on publications involving Brazil and China coincide with periods of political
transitions in Brazil and in the international relations between the two countries. The year
2002 saw the beginning of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first term and the
subsequent strengthening of relations between the two countries (Lessa, 2010). The peak
in the number of publications occurred in 2016, following the impeachment of former
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and the ascension to power of her Vice-president,
Michel Temer (Silva & Pérez, 2019).
In 2016, scientific publications began to discuss the BRICS (e.g., Armesilla Conde, 2016;
De Andrade, 2016; Joshi & Ganeshan, 2016; Larionova, 2016; Muhr, 2016; Singh, 2016;
Tian, 2016), Mercosur and Chinese influence in Latin America (e.g., Bizzozero & Raggio,
2016; Selden, 2016; Urdinez, Burian, & De Oliveira, 2016; Xu, 2016), and South-South
cooperation (e.g., Amanor & Chichava, 2016; Zeng, Deng, Dong, & Hu, 2016).
The data in Graph 1 suggest that the number of scientific publications involving China
and Brazil increased during periods of political change in Brazil (e.g., 2016, during the
term of former President Michel Temer, and 2021-2023, during the term of former
President Jair Messias Bolsonaro). This increase in publications was particularly
noticeable when the change in Brazil's political leadership was not associated with
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva or his successor, Dilma Rousseff. While we do not have
scientific evidence to explain this trend, it can be speculated that the profile of the newly
inaugurated president or their diplomatic stance in Brazil-China relations (e.g., Hirst &
Valls Pereira, 2022; Vazquez, 2022) may prompt investigations by the scientific
community.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
155
Next, we analyzed the main funding agencies for research. The analyses highlighted the
National Natural Science Foundation of China (5 - China), Economic Social Research
Council - ESRC (3 – European Union), European Research Council – ERC (3 - European
Union), and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development – CNPq (2
- Brazil). The data indicate a predominance of incentives from research funding agencies
in China and the European Union – these analyses suggest that there is room for Brazil
to advance in funding research that involves the country’s international interests,
particularly in Brazil-China relations.
Regarding the scientific journals with the most publications, the following stood out
(Table 4):
Table 4. Journals with the highest number of publications addressing China and Brazil
relations
Title
Country
Count
International Organisations Research Journal – ISSN: 1996-7845
Russia
10
Third world quarterly – 0143-6597
UK
7
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – 0034-7329
Brazil
4
World development - 0305-750X
UK
4
IDS bulletin – 0265-5012
UK
4
Journal Of Contemporary China – 1067-0564
UK
3
Global Policy – 1758-5880
UK
3
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft – 0945-2419
Germany
3
India quarterly – 0974-9284
India
2
Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe – 0041-4751
South Africa
2
Economy of Regions – 2072-6414
Russia
2
Graph 1. Number of publications per year
111
344
24
7 7
46
12
1111
24
13
8
12
10
18
18
19
8
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
Source: Developed by the authors.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
156
East Asia – 1096-6838
Netherlands
2
Politische Vierteljahresschrift - 00323470
Germany
2
Economic Annals-XXI – 1728-6220
Ukraine
2
Space and Culture, India – 2052-8396
UK
2
Journal of environmental management – 0301-4797
U.S.
2
Tropical geography/Redai Dili – 1001-5221
China
2
Oxford Development Studies – 1360-0818
UK
2
Foresight – 1463-6689
UK
2
POLITIKON – 0258-9346
UK
2
World Economy and International Relations – 0131-2227
Russia
2
Note. The table only shows journals with a total of two or more publications.
Source: Developed by the authors.
The journal with the highest number of publications was the International Organisations
Research Journal of the Russian Federation. Its mission is to disseminate Russian and
international research on global governance, international cooperation, and international
multilateral institutions (e.g., G20, BRICS, OECD, World Bank, IMF, WTO, UN, among
others). The journal with the second highest number of publications was the Third World
Quarterly from the United Kingdom (UK), which aims to disseminate studies on the Global
South. The third journal is from Brazil and is titled "Revista Brasileira de Política
Internacional - RBPI" (Brazilian Journal of International Politics). The RBPI journal
publishes studies on topics related to International Relations in general (Politics,
Economy, Sociology, Security, History, Foreign Policy, Environment, and other relevant
issues on the contemporary international agenda).
Our analyses suggest that despite the journal with the highest number of publications
being from the Russian Federation, there is a predominance of UK journals discussing
topics related to the relationship and cooperation between Brazil and China.
Continuing with our bibliometric analyses, we observed which authors were the most
prolific (Table 5).
Table 5. Most prolific authors
Author
Country
Affiliation
Count
Papa, Mihaela
U.S.
Tufts University
4
Lessa, Antônio Carlos
Brazil
University of Brasilia
3
Cezne, Eric
Netherlands
Utrecht University
3
Note. Only authors with a number of publications equal to or greater than three are listed due to
the large number of authors with two or just one publication.
Source: Developed by the authors.
The author with the highest number of publications among the 208 studies analyzed was
Professor Mihaela Papa from Tufts University in the U.S. Professor Mihaela Papa published
studies on the BRICS (Han & Papa, 2022; Papa, Han & O’Donnell, 2023), India’s multi-
alignment with the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle (O’Donnell & Papa, 2021) and the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
157
major emerging powers in sustainable development diplomacy (e.g., BRICS - Brazil,
Russia, India, China, South Africa | and BASIC - Brazil, South Africa, India, China) (Papa
& Gleason, 2012).
Following her, with three publications each, are Professor Antônio Carlos Lessa from the
University of Brasília – UNB (Brazil) and Eric Cezne from Utrecht University
(Netherlands). Professor Antônio Carlos Lessa presented studies on Brazil's foreign policy
with China in the 21st century (Becard & Lessa, 2021), the evolution of international
politics and the challenges this scenario presents for the field of International Relations
(Ramanzini Junior et al., 2023) and Brazil’s strategic partnerships with China during
Lula's administrations (Lessa, 2010). Professor Eric Cezne published studies on the
relations between Brazil and China with Africa (Hönke, Cezne & Yang, 2023), the
meanings and uses of South-South relations in mineral extraction in Mozambique (Cezne
& Hönke, 2022) and South-South investment in Guinea (Alencastro & Cezne, 2023).
Lexical Analysis
Figure 2. Word cloud of the abstracts
Note. The word cloud was generated for words
with a frequency greater than 50.
Source: Developed by the authors via Iramuteq.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
158
We began the lexical analyses with the simplest analysis, the word cloud.
Figure 3 graphically presents the words with the highest frequency among the 208
abstracts analyzed. The word "country" had the highest frequency (454), followed by
"china" (400), "BRICS" (308), "cooperation" (293), "economic" (290), "brazil" (289),
"development" (244), "global" (241), and "relation" (210). Other words appear less
frequently, with fewer than 200 occurrences.
The word cloud data suggest that the analyzed studies involve economic and
development aspects between Brazil and China, in addition to global discussions with a
focus on the BRICS group. However, the word cloud is limited in determining the context
of one or more studies by observing only the frequency of words. Therefore, we
proceeded with more robust analyses.
The next analysis performed was the Similarity Analysis (Figure 4), which allows for
identifying and visualizing the relationships between words or terms in a textual corpus
(Camargo & Justo, 2013).
Figure 4 shows how the words presented in the word cloud are interconnected within the
analyzed texts. The clusters presented with their respective keywords such as “country,”
Figure 3. Similarity analysis of the text corpus
Note. The similarity analysis was generated for words with a
frequency greater than 50.
Source: Developed by the authors via Iramuteq.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
159
“economic,” “BRICS,” “cooperation,” “Brazil,” and “China” suggest the topics or sub-
themes within the textual corpus.
The red cluster, at the top of the figure, highlights the words “China,” “Brazil,” “Russia,”
and “India” with thick branches leading to terms like “international,” “Africa,” “south,”
“trade,” and “relation,” suggesting that this cluster involves studies associated with
BRICS countries and the African continent (e.g., Barbosa et al., 2009; Deych, 2015;
Jenkins, 2022; Kamwengo, 2017).
The second cluster, in blue, has “country” as its keyword, serving more as a linking
cluster among the others. This cluster contains words with low frequency and less thick
connections between them. Moving on to the next cluster in Figure 3, the green cluster.
Nesse cluster, as palavras “economic” e “global” apresentam a maior frequêcnia. In this
cluster, the words “economic” and “global” have the highest frequency. The word
“economic” is associated with “investment,” “financial,” “growth,” “partnership,” and
indirectly linked to “strategic” through “partnership.” The strongest (thickest) link is
between “economic” and “global,” which in turn derives terms such as “governance” and
“power.” The green cluster suggests studies discussing economic aspects (e.g., Rana,
2019) and global governance (e.g., Cruz, 2015; Fues, 2007; Larionova, 2016; Pere,
2005; Shaw, Cooper & Chin, 2009).
Finally, the yellow cluster presents the words with the highest frequency “BRICS,”
“cooperation,” and “development.” The term “BRICS” has a strong association with the
word “cooperation,” suggesting discussions related to mutual cooperation among the
group’s countries in the pursuit of development (e.g., Iqbal, Yadav & Rahman, 2023;
Kubayi, 2022; Muhr, 2016; Trivedy & Khatun, 2023; Vazquez, 2021; Yarygina,
Lukashenko, Lee, Washington & Tsarev, 2021). The term “south-south” also appears in
this cluster, suggesting studies focused on Global South countries (e.g., Alencastro &
Cezne, 2023; Amanor, 2013; Amanor & Chichava, 2016; Cezne & Hönke, 2022; Gardini,
2021; Harrison, 2015; Kragelund, 2019; Malacalza, 2019; Vieira & Alden, 2011).
Although the similarity analysis allows for the grouping of the most frequent terms into
clusters, it is still not possible to understand in detail the context discussed in the studies
associated with each cluster. Therefore, we applied the Reinert Method or Descending
Hierarchical Classification (DHC), generating the following dendrogram (Figure 5).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
160
Figure 5. Dendogram of Reinert’s Method (Hierarquical Descendent Classification)
Source: Developed by the authors via Iramuteq.
Figure 5 details the four classes generated by the Hierarchical Descendant Classification
technique. Each class shares a similar vocabulary, and thus a common theme or topic. It
is important to note that the colours or words presented in the Hierarchical Descendant
Classification are not the same as those in the Similarity Analysis (Figure 3). his new
analysis uses a different algorithm from the Similarity Analysis.
The red and green classes contain the highest percentages of Elementary Context Units
(ECUs), with 37.7% and 33%, respectively. These classes are close together because
they are subdivisions of broader classes (classes 3 and 4). The analysis using the most
frequent words in each class is similar to the one conducted previously through the
Similarity Analysis. To deepen our analysis, we generated the "Corpus coleur" for the
HDC. The "Corpus coleur" file presents complete excerpts of the classes' keywords in an
.HTML format (Salviati, 2014), enabling contextual analysis of the classes.
Our first analysis concerns the Red Class (1) [words in red color] and the discussions
are presented in the following paragraphs.
The Red class (1) examines diverse facets of international politics and the dynamic
evolution of global relations. Red class objective is to provide a framework for
understanding recent transformations in international politics, focusing on the
ascendance of China and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, it
underscores the importance of interdisciplinary approaches and highlights the
contributions of Latin American scholars, especially from Brazil, to global academic
debates.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
161
The Class discusses the strengthening of state roles in local, national, and global
economies and advocates for a robust system of South-South relations based on
revitalized third-world institutions and a framework that transcends Eurocentric views. It
examines the foundations of Brazilian diplomacy over the past half-century, focusing on
changes in the 1980s and 1990s up to the foreign policies of Lula's government (2003-
2009). The analysis recognizes advancements in Lula's foreign policy, especially towards
Africa, but questions whether Brazil's economy can sustain such policies.
Further, the Class explores the political and economic cooperation between Brazil and
African countries, providing an overview of trade and investment relations within the
region and with key partners. It examines the BRICS group's evolution from a financial
category to a political entity, focusing on their coordinated efforts on global economic
and political issues.
The class also addresses China's ideological engagement in Latin America since the
1950s, transitioning from cultural diplomacy and revolutionary rhetoric to pragmatic
economic initiatives. It evaluates the impacts of China's economic boom on Latin
American and Caribbean countries, analyzing post-global financial crisis trends in Sino-
Latin American economic relationships, with an emphasis on Brazil's experience. In
addition, the class assesses China's significant economic growth and its implications for
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. It documents China's varied economic
involvement and its social, political, and environmental impacts on these regions.
The Class further examines China's and India's roles as major global economic players,
their impact on Sub-Saharan African countries, and the broader implications for
manufacturing and development in Latin America. It discusses the competitive challenges
posed by China and the policy options available for Latin American countries to address
these challenges.
Finally, the Red class addresses the BRICS' role in global governance, particularly after
the 2008 financial crisis, and the challenges faced by southern powers in reshaping the
existing power configurations. It evaluates the strategic implications of China's economic
performance for Latin American growth and development and examines the diplomatic
and economic relationships between Brazil and China in recent years.
Overall, the Red class provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics in
international relations and the intricate economic and political interactions between major
global players and Latin American countries.
Next, we analysed the data from the Green class (2) [words in green color] discussing
the shifting dynamics of global economic and political influence, focusing on the BRICS
countries. It covers their emergence as significant players in the international system
and the implications for global governance. The 2008-2010 economic crisis is highlighted
as a pivotal moment prompting changes in the international order, necessitating broader
geopolitical cooperation and the inclusion of regional powers. The BRICS countries'
coordinated efforts within the G20 to push for global governance reforms are
emphasized. Additionally, the Class also explores diplomatic, political, and economic
interactions among BRICS nations, examining whether they operate independently or
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
162
cohesively. It analyzes China's strategic partnerships with Latin American countries, the
asymmetry in these relationships, and the benefits to China.
Regional economic cooperation organizations' roles in reshaping trade groups and the
significance of trade among major global economies, including the U.S., China, and
European countries, are addressed. The class examines the motivations behind foreign
aid and the duality in managing development cooperation agendas within the BRICS and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia's strategic partnerships and
economic relationships with Latin American countries, driven by domestic political
motivations and economic interests, are analyzed. India's engagement with Russia and
China through multilateral alignments like BRICS and the SCO, despite geopolitical
tensions, is also considered.
The Green class (2) concludes by discussing the broader implications of the BRICS
countries' rise for global power dynamics and potential systemic changes. While the
BRICS have achieved some success in establishing an alternative global order based on
cooperation, mutual respect, and a balance of interests, it is premature to assert the
creation of a fundamentally new type of international institution within the BRICS
structure at this stage.
The Lilac class (3) [words in Lilac color] covers a range of topics, including the
dynamics, agreements and educational systems between the BRICS countries and US
hegemony in Latin America from 2001 to 2015. The Class also examines economic and
social inequalities in BRICS, relations between the US and Brazil, and the impact of major
international institutions on higher education. Future scenarios of global governance are
explored. Legal frameworks for outer space and BRICS participation in international
treaties are discussed, especially cooperation between Brazil and China. Finally, the
potential of South-South cooperation for alternative development is analyzed, including
the role of GMOs and the OECD in risk assessment.
Overall, the Class offers a comprehensive analysis of BRICS interactions, legal structures
and educational systems, with an emphasis on cooperation, market dynamics and
political implications.
Finally, the Purple Class (4) [words in purple color] initially discuss the dynamics of
economic relationships and trade patterns between various countries, particularly
focusing on the influence of China’s economic ascent on Latin American countries. It
outlines how China's rise has created asymmetrical trade relationships, often positioning
Latin American countries as exporters of raw materials while importing manufactured
goods from China. The analysis highlights the increasingly regressive production and
trade specialization in Brazil due to its trade relations with China.
The Class also discusses the mutual trade structures between Botswana and China,
highlighting Botswana's export of primary products and its import of intermediate and
capital goods from China. Similarly, in Brazil, the relationship between its regressive
specialization and China’s international competitiveness is analyzed. The growth of
China’s market share often coincides with a decrease in Brazil’s share, impacting Brazil's
competitiveness in global markets, particularly in manufactured goods. The class
suggests that Latin American countries should diversify their export agendas towards
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
163
China, develop new productive partnerships, and increase the competitiveness of their
firms.
Additionally, the Class examines the global trade network of oil crops, revealing Brazil’s
increasing market share and its impact on the U.S. It discusses the structure of the oil
crop trade network, noting China’s significant role despite risks from concentrated import
sources. The discussions into the Class recommends China to diversify its import sources,
deepen trade cooperation, and ensure the security of oil crop imports. Moreover, the
analysis of the global woody forest products trading network shows increased complexity
and changing trade positions, with China playing a crucial role.
In summary, the Purple class (4) provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted
trade and economic relationships influenced by China’s rise, emphasizing the need for
strategic diversification and competitiveness enhancements in Latin American
economies.
To compile the discussions of our analyses, we created Table 6, in which the central
themes of each class are presented.
Table 6. Summarization of the Red, Green, Lilac, and Purple class
Class
Summary
Red
Class
The Red class examines international politics, focusing on the rise of China and the
strengthening of state roles in economies. It explores South-South relations, Brazilian
diplomacy, BRICS evolution, and China's impact on Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa. The class highlights local conditions' role in shaping China's economic effects
and compares geopolitical significance between Brazil and China.
Green
Class
The Green class discusses the BRICS countries' emergence as global players and their
role in global governance post the 2008-2010 economic crisis. It covers diplomatic
and economic interactions within BRICS, regional economic cooperation, motivations
behind foreign aid, and strategic partnerships, particularly focusing on China, Russia,
and India's relations with Latin America and each other.
Lilac
Class
The Lilac class explores interactions within BRICS, analyzing China's market influence
on Brazil and U.S. hegemony in Latin America. It discusses indirect expropriation in
investment agreements, and BRICS summits' achievements. The class addresses
economic and social inequalities, U.S.-Brazil relations, higher education's influence
by international institutions, and future global governance scenarios, including legal
frameworks for outer space and South-South cooperation.
Purple
Class
The Purple class focuses on economic relationships and trade patterns, especially
China's impact on Latin America. It highlights asymmetrical trade relationships,
regressive production in Brazil, and Botswana's import dynamics. The class discusses
Brazil's competitiveness, diversification of export agendas, global trade networks of
oil crops and woody forest products, and the relation between innovation efforts and
export performance. It also examines the significance of OECD and UN model
conventions in Canadian tax treaties.
Source: Developed by the authors.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
164
Now, considering our analyses and discussions, we suggest new avenues to be explored
in future research.
Emerging Geopolitical Dynamics and the Role of BRICS
− The inclusion of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates in the BRICS
membership and the resulting implications for global geopolitics.
− The strategic partnerships and diplomatic interactions between BRICS countries, and
how these are shaping regional and global power dynamics.
− The role of BRICS in overhauling global governance institutions like the UN Security
Council, and the challenges encountered in achieving these changes.
− Comparative analysis of the BRICS model of cooperation versus traditional Western-
led institutions like the G7.
Economic and Trade Relationships within BRICS
− The evolving trade and investment patterns between BRICS countries, and the impact
on economic development in these regions.
− Strategies adopted by BRICS countries to enhance their competitiveness and diversify
their export baskets, especially in the context of China's growing economic influence.
− The role of regional economic cooperation organizations within the BRICS framework,
and their impact on intra-BRICS trade and investment.
− Implications of BRICS initiatives like the New Development Bank and the BRICS
Contingent Reserve Arrangement for the global financial architecture.
South-South Cooperation and Alternative Development Models
− The potential of South-South cooperation, as exemplified by BRICS, to foster
alternative development pathways that challenge traditional North-South dynamics.
− The role of BRICS in promoting a multipolar world order and challenging Western-
centric models of development and global governance.
− A comparative analysis of the BRICS approach to development cooperation versus
traditional aid models advocated by the OECD and other Western-led institutions.
− Exploration of the BRICS countries' engagement with the Global South, including Africa
and Latin America, and the implications for regional integration and development.
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on BRICS
− An examination of the legal frameworks and international treaties that govern the
participation of BRICS countries in global governance, particularly in domains such as
outer space.
− Analysis of the social, political, and environmental impacts of BRICS countries'
economic rise, and the potential for sustainable development models.
− Exploring the role of education systems and workforce development within BRICS
countries, and their implications for global competitiveness.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
165
Conclusion
Despite the substantial bilateral relations between Brazil and China, we were particularly
interested in understanding the discussions within the scientific literature over the past
30 years and identifying new avenues for future research. Our results revealed that the
peak of publications involving Brazil and China occurred in 2016. The scientific journals
with the highest number of publications were the International Organisations Research
Journal (ISSN: 1996-7845) of the Russian Federation, followed by Third World Quarterly
(ISSN: 0143-6597) from the UK, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (ISSN: 0034-
7329) from Brazil, World Development (ISSN: 0305-750X), and IDS Bulletin (ISSN:
0265-5012), both from the UK. The most prolific authors were Professor Mihaela Papa
from Tufts University (U.S.), Professor Antônio Carlos Lessa from the University of
Brasília (UNB, Brazil), and Eric Cezne from Utrecht University (Netherlands).
After reviewing the bibliometric data, we focused on identifying new avenues for research
based on our SLR. Several key topics are frequently discussed in the context of China-
Brazil relations. Central themes include the rise of China as a global power and the
increasing role of states in economic affairs, with particular attention to how these
dynamics influence international politics. The strengthening of South-South relations,
particularly through diplomatic engagements facilitated by Brazil, is also a significant
area of interest. Additionally, the evolution of the BRICS grouping and China's economic
and political influence on Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa are important themes.
Our findings also highlight the importance of local conditions in shaping China's economic
effect and the geopolitical significance of Brazil and China.
Furthermore, we consider that expanding BRICS membership to include Iran, Egypt,
Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates could have significant implications for global
geopolitics, potentially altering the balance of power. Strategic partnerships and
diplomatic interactions among BRICS countries may increasingly shape regional and
global dynamics, influencing economic and political landscapes. Furthermore, BRICS
might play an essential role in advocating for reforms in global governance institutions,
despite facing substantial challenges, and could offer a distinct model of cooperation
compared to traditional Western-led institutions like the G7.
The evolving trade and investment patterns between BRICS countries could significantly
impact economic development within these regions. Strategies adopted by BRICS nations
to enhance competitiveness and diversify their export baskets, especially in light of
China's growing economic influence, may prove pivotal. Additionally, regional economic
cooperation organizations within the BRICS framework and initiatives like the New
Development Bank and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement might reshape the
global financial architecture and boost intra-BRICS trade and investment.
South-South cooperation has the potential to foster alternative development pathways
that challenge traditional North-South dynamics. BRICS may play a pivotal role in
promoting a multipolar world order and challenging Western-centric models of
development and global governance. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the BRICS
approach to development cooperation versus traditional aid models promoted by the
OECD and other Western-led institutions, along with the engagement of BRICS countries
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
166
with the Global South, including Africa and Latin America, could have significant
implications for regional integration and development.
Finally, interdisciplinary perspectives on BRICS include examinations of the legal
frameworks and international treaties that govern BRICS countries' participation in global
governance. Furthermore, analyses of the social, political, and environmental impacts of
BRICS countries' economic rise, along with explorations of their education systems and
workforce development, could shed light on potential sustainable development models
and implications for global competitiveness.
Despite the rigorous methodological procedures followed in this study, certain limitations
must be considered. Our Systematic Literature Review was limited to the SCOPUS and
Web of Science databases, which do not cover all scientific journals. Furthermore, our
search was restricted to descriptors in English, excluding studies published in Portuguese,
Spanish, or Chinese. We also consider the absence of discussions on the literature
involving BRICS and the G20 to be a limitation of this study.
Therefore, in addition to the themes we identified as research opportunities, we suggest
that future studies conduct a Systematic Literature Review using descriptors in various
languages and incorporating other databases (e.g., SciELO.org, EBSCOhost, JSTOR).
Finally, we suggest that the literature on the G20 and BRICS groups be considered in
future studies.
Data available
Frogeri, R. F., & Li, Y. (2024). Dataset - Systematic Literature Review of China-Brazil
Relations (1993-2023): Exploring New Research Directions [Data set].
Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12665713
References
Alencastro, M., & Cezne, E. (2023). The South-South investment that never happened:
Vale in Guinea. Extractive Industries and Society, 13.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2022.101147
Amanor, K. S. (2013). South-South cooperation in africa: Historical, geopolitical and
political economy dimensions of international development. IDS Bulletin, 44(4), 20–30.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-5436.12039
Amanor, K. S., & Chichava, S. (2016). South-South Cooperation, Agribusiness, and
African Agricultural Development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique. World
Development, 81, 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.021
Andrade, A. F. . de, & García, C. A. C. (2021). How Brazilian Governments (2003-2019)
view China: A Role Theory Analysis. DESAFIOS, 33(1).
https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/desafios/a.9031
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
167
Araújo, C. A. (2006). Bibliometria: evolução histórica e questões atuais. Em Questão,
12(1), 11–32. https://seer.ufrgs.br/EmQuestao/article/view/16
Armesilla Conde, S. (2016). TTIP vs. BRICS: Consequences on geopolitics and
internacional relations of the XXIst. Century. Politica y Sociedad, 53(2), 621–637.
https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_POSO.2016.v53.n2.46758
Athukorala, P. (2009). The Rise of China and East Asian Export Performance: Is the
Crowding-Out Fear Warranted? World Economy, 32, 234–266.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2008.01151.x
Barbosa, A. D., Narciso, T., Biancalana, M., de Freitas Barbosa, A., Narciso, T., &
Biancalana, M. (2009). Brazil in Africa: Another emerging power in the continent?
POLITIKON, 36(1), 59–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155401
Barker, C. (2013). What Implications Does Rising Chinese Influence Have for Latin
America? E-International Relations, 1–8. https://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/13/what-
implications-does-the-rising-chinese-influence-have-for-latin-america/
Becard, D. R., & Lessa, A. C. (2021). Brazilian foreign policy to china in the 21st century
(2003-2019): Trends, transitions and implications. In China-Latin America and the
Caribbean: Assessment and Outlook (pp. 99–111). Taylor and Francis.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003037934-9
Bizzozero, L., & Raggio, A. (2016). The impact of the people’s republic of China in the
axis Argentina-Brazil between 2004 and 2014. Systemic - Structural evolution or
definitions politician strategic? Araucaria, 18(35), 341–364.
https://doi.org/10.12795/araucaria.2016.i35.17
Busilli, V. S., & Jaime, M. B. (2021). Chinese Investments in Brazil: Economic Diplomacy
in Bilateral Relations. Contexto Internacional, 43(3), 541–564.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0102-8529.2019430300005
Camargo, B. V., & Justo, A. M. (2013). IRAMUTEQ: Um software gratuito para análise de
dados textuais. Temas Em Psicologia, 21(2), 513–518.
https://doi.org/10.9788/tp2013.2-16
Cardoso, D. (2013). China-Brazil: A strategic partnership in an evolving world order. East
Asia, 30(1), 35–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-012-9186-z
Cezne, E., & Hönke, J. (2022). The multiple meanings and uses of South-South relations
in extraction: The Brazilian mining company Vale in Mozambique. WORLD
DEVELOPMENT, 151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105756
CGTN. (2018). China-Brazil Center responds to climate change.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/35676a4d316b7a6333566d54/share_p.html
Chaves, M. M. N., Santos, A. P. R. dos, Santosa, N. P. dos, & Larocca, L. M. (2017). Use
of the software IRAMUTEQ in qualitative research: An experience report. Studies in
Systems, Decision and Control, 71, 39–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43271-
7_4
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
168
CNPEM. (2023). Bilateral partnership between Brazil and China: CNPEM and IHEP sign
cooperation agreement. Centro Nacional de Pesquisa Em Energia e Materiais - CNPEM.
https://cnpem.br/en/bilateral-partnership-between-brazil-and-china-cnpem-and-ihep-
sign-cooperation-agreement/
Cruz, S. O. (2015). Alternative futures of global governance: scenarios and perspectives
from the global south. Foresight, 17(2), 125–142. https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-05-2014-
0030
CTG. (2021). CTG Brasil sponsored Brazilian Cultural Program in China. China Three
Gorges Corporation.
https://www.ctg.com.cn/ctgenglish/news_media/news37/1470151/index.html
Cunha, A., da Silva Bichara, J., & Lélis, M. T. C. (2013). Latin America and the rise of
China: a Brazilian perspective. América Latina Hoy, 65, 185–207.
https://doi.org/10.14201/alh201365185207
Cunha, A. M., Lélis, M., Haines, A. E. F., & Franke, L. (2022). Exports of Manufactured
Goods and Structural Change: Brazil in the Face of Chinese Competition. SSRN Electronic
Journal, null, null. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4117189
De Andrade, J. P. (2016). Cooperation among BRICS in space matter: A review of
brazilian agreements. Proceedings of the International Astronautical Congress, IAC, 0.
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-
85016520110&partnerID=40&md5=57b360a5dc31358f58ee0b5c59472b08
De Melo, M. C. P., & Do Amaral Filho, J. (2015). The Political Economy of Brazil-China
Trade Relations, 2000-2010. Latin American Perspectives, 42(6), 64–87.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X15593935
Deych, T. (2015). BRICS regional policy in Africa. International Organisations Research
Journal, 10(2), 206–228. https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2015-02-206
Eichengreen, B., Rhee, Y., & Tong, H. (2007). China and the Exports of Other Asian
Countries. Review of World Economics, 143, 201–226. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-
007-0105-0
Eitan, A. T., Smolyansky, E., & Harpaz, I. K. (2021). Connected Papers.
https://www.connectedpapers.com/about
Frogeri, R. F., Diniz, W. F. da S., Portugal Júnior, P. dos S., & Piurcosky, F. P. (2023). e-
Government and Green IT: The Intersection Point. In C. Gaie & M. Mehta (Eds.), Recent
Advances in Data and Algorithms for e-Government (pp. 103–126). Springer
International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22408-9_5
Fues, T. (2007). Global governance beyond the G8: Reform Prospects for the summit
architecture. Internationale Politik Und Gesellschaft, 2, 11-24+186+187.
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-
34248677138&partnerID=40&md5=7ab51158b88d9a2ded72b196cc3d3e20
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
169
Gandenberger, C., & Strauch, M. (2018). Wind energy technology as opportunity for
catching-up? A comparison of the tis in Brazil and China. Innovation and Development,
8(2), 287–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/2157930X.2018.1428050
Gardini, G. L. (2021). Geopolitics between neo-extractivism and South-South
cooperation. In External Powers in Latin America: Geopolitics between Neo-extractivism
and South-South Cooperation (pp. 263–276). Taylor and Francis.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429351808-102
Greenaway, D., Mahabir, A., & Milner, C. (2006). China and the World Economy Research
Paper 2006 / 21 Has China Displaced Other Asian Countries’ Exports ?
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b41f7b311b3f4d6087667e6a9fa13144838ad8c
9
Han, Z., & Papa, M. (2022). Brazilian alliance perspectives: towards a BRICS
development–security alliance? Third World Quarterly, 43(5), 1115–1136.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2055539
Harrison, P. (2015). South-south relationships and the transfer of “best practice”: The
case of Johannesburg, South Africa. International Development Planning Review, 37(2),
205–223. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2015.16
Hirst, M., & Valls Pereira, L. B. (2022). Making sense of United States–Brazil relations
under Bolsonaro. Latin American Policy, 13(2), 432–446.
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12273
Hönke, J., Cezne, E., & Yang, Y. (2023). Liminally Positioned in the South: Reinterpreting
Brazilian and Chinese Relations with Africa. Global Society, 37(2), 197–224.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2022.2094222
Hsiang, A. C. (2008). China challenges US in Latin America. Tamkang Journal of
International Affairs, 11(4), 121–152.
Iqbal, B. A., Yadav, A., & Rahman, M. N. (2023). Trade Relations among the BRICS
Countries: An Indian Perspective. China and WTO Review, 9(2), 355–366.
https://doi.org/10.14330/cwr.2023.9.2.07
Jenkins, R. (2012). China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship.
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41(1), 21–47.
https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100102
Jenkins, R. (2022). How China is Reshaping the Global Economy: Development Impacts
in Africa and Latin America. Oxford Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198738510.001.0001
Jenkins, R., & Edwards, C. (2006). The economic impacts of China and India on sub-
Saharan Africa: Trends and prospects. Journal of Asian Economics, 17(2), 207–225.
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ASIECO.2006.02.002
Jenkins, R., & Edwards, L. (2015). Is China ‘Crowding Out’ South African Exports of
Manufactures? The European Journal of Development Research, 27, 903–920.
https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2014.72
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
170
Jesus, D. S. V. de. (2022). The Strategy of Chaos: Brazilian Foreign Policy under Jair
Bolsonaro (2019-2022). International Journal of Social Science Studies, 10(6), 1.
https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v10i6.5686
Johnson, N., & Phillips, M. (2018). Rayyan for systematic reviews. Journal of Electronic
Resources Librarianship, 30(1), 46–48.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1941126X.2018.1444339
Joshi, M., & Ganeshan, S. (2016). India-EU energy relations: Towards closer
cooperation? In Challenges of European External Energy Governance with Emerging
Powers (pp. 149–171). Taylor and Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315571164-12
Kamwengo, C. M. (2017). China and Brazil as Southern Africa’s non-interfering
development partners: Rhetoric or reality? Journal of Southern African Studies, 43(5),
1087–1101. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2017.1343014
Kirton, J., & Larionova, M. (2022). The First Fifteen Years of the BRICS. International
Organisations Research Journal, 17(2). https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-02-
01
Kragelund, P. (2019). South-south development. In South-South Development.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315164731
Kubayi, J. M. N. (2022). BRICS, Structural Power and the BRICS Bank as a Potentially
Progressive Instrument for a Passive Revolution. In International Political Economy Series
(pp. 39–59). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1_3
Lall, S., & Albaladejo, M. (2004). China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat To East
Asian Manufactured Exports? World Development, 32(9), 1441–1466.
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2004.03.006
Lall, S., Weiss, J., & Oikawa, H. (2004). China’s Competitive Threat to Latin America: An
Analysis for 1990–2002. Oxford Development Studies, 33, 163–194.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600810500137764
Larionova, M. (2016). Evaluating global institutions’ effectiveness; Assessing summit
institutions engagement with other international organizations in the process of global
governance. International Organisations Research Journal, 11(1), 69–85.
Leandro, J. F. (2023). The Last Five Decades of Sino-Portuguese Relations: The Quest
for the Belt and Road Initiative. Daxiyangguo - Revista Portuguesa De Estudos Asiáticos
/ Portuguese Journal of Asian Studies, 30, 13–79. https://doi.org/10.33167/1645-
4677.daxiyangguo2023.30/pp.13-79
Lederman, D., Olarreaga, M., & Perry, G. E. (2008). China’s and India’s Challenge to
Latin America: Opportunity or Threat? https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-7308-8
Lessa, A. C. (2010). Brazil’s strategic partnerships: An assessment of the Lula era (2003-
2010). Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, 53(SPEC ISSUE), 115–131.
https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-73292010000300007
Leta, J., Machado, R. das N., & Canchumani, R. M. L. (2019). Scientific Collaboration
Among BRICS: Trends and Priority Areas. In W. Glänzel, H. F. Moed, U. Schmoch, & M.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
171
Thelwall (Eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Indicators (pp. 485–504). Springer
International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02511-3_19
Malacalza, B. (2019). The politics of south-south collaboration: China, India and Brazil in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia Internacional, 98, 67–103.
https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint98.2019.03
Marchand, P., & Ratinaud, P. (2012). L’analyse de similitude appliquée aux corpus
textuels : les primaires socialistes pour l’élection présidentielle française. Actes Des
11èmes Journées Internationales d’Analyse Des Données Textuelles (JADT), 687–699.
http://lexicometrica.univ-paris3.fr/jadt/jadt2012/Communications/Marchand, Pascal et
al. - L’analyse de similitude appliquee aux corpus textuels.pdf
MDIC. (2024). Exports, Imports and Trade Balance - Partner: China. Ministry of
Development, Industry, Trade and Services. https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/en/comex-
vis
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Brazil (MFA-Brazil). (2024). People’s Republic of China.
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores. https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/bilateral-
relations/all-countries/people-s-republic-of-china
Moreira, M. (2004). Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in Latin America?
Latin American Economics, null, null. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.597141
Muhr, T. (2016). Beyond ‘BRICS’: Ten theses on South–South cooperation in the twenty-
first century. Third World Quarterly, 37(4), 630–648.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1108161
O’Donnell, F., & Papa, M. (2021). India’s multi-alignment management and the Russia-
India-China (RIC) triangle. International Affairs, 97(3), 801-+.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab036
Oliveira, H. A. de. (2004). Brasil-China: trinta anos de uma parceria estratégica. Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional, 47(1), 7–30. https://doi.org/10.1590/s0034-
73292004000100002
Oliveira, G. D. L. T., & Myers, M. (2021). The Tenuous Co-Production of China’s Belt and
Road Initiative in Brazil and Latin America. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(129),
481–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1827358
Page, M. J., McKenzie, J. E., Bossuyt, P. M., Boutron, I., Hoffmann, T. C., Mulrow, C. D.,
Shamseer, L., Tetzlaff, J. M., Akl, E. A., Brennan, S. E., Chou, R., Glanville, J., Grimshaw,
J. M., Hróbjartsson, A., Lalu, M. M., Li, T., Loder, E. W., Mayo-Wilson, E., McDonald, S.,
… Moher, D. (2021). The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting
systematic reviews. The BMJ, 372. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n71
Papa, M., & Gleason, N. W. (2012). Major emerging powers in sustainable development
diplomacy: Assessing their leadership potential. Global Environmental Change, 22(4),
915–924. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.06.003
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
172
Papa, M., Han, Z., & O’Donnell, F. (2023). The dynamics of informal institutions and
counter-hegemony: introducing a BRICS Convergence Index. European Journal of
International Relations, 29(4), 960–989. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231183352
Pere, G. L. E. (2005). Emerging markets - Emerging powers: Changing parameters for
global economic governance. Internationale Politik Und Gesellschaft, 2, 36-51+185.
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-
18144382649&partnerID=40&md5=9d2ba55f43169307ac5fa877bf87223c
Porto de Oliveira, O., & Romano, G. C. (2022). Brazil and China in Knowledge and Policy
Transfer: Agents, Objects, Time, Structures and Power. In Brazil and China in Knowledge
and Policy Transfer: Agents, Objects, Time, Structures and Power. Springer International
Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09116-2
Pritchard, A., & Wittig, G. R. (1981). Bibliometrics. ALLM Books.
Ramanzini Junior, H., Lessa, A. C., Dias, W., Ramanzini, H. J., Lessa, A. C., & Dias, W.
(2023). RBPI and the Study of IR: Fostering a Multifaceted Platform for Global Dialogue,
Debate and Academic Cooperation. Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, 66(2).
https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202300225
Ramos, M. G., Lima, V. M. do R., & Amaral-Rosa, M. P. (2019). IRAMUTEQ Software and
Discursive Textual Analysis: Interpretive Possibilities. Advances in Intelligent Systems
and Computing, 861, 58–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01406-3_6
Rana, R. (2019). Asian infrastructure investment bank, new development bank and the
reshaping of global economic order: Unfolding trends and perceptions in Sino-Indian
economic relations. International Journal of China Studies, 10(2), 273–290.
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-
85084072381&partnerID=40&md5=0365fe539206da4096b1e0aff07f3abf
Rodríguez, J., Blazquez, J., & Santiso, J. (2006). Angel or Devil: China’s Trade Impact on
Latin American Emerging Markets. CEPAL Review, 15–41.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1298968
Rodrıguez-Clare, A., Devlin, R., & Estevadeordal, A. (2006). The Emergence of China:
Opportunities And Challenges for Latin America And the Caribbean.
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/173c0df9b9d3b9bef29606c96ca8c8b63fc1b85d
Salviati, M. E. (2014). Manual do aplicativo IRaMuTeQ.
http://www.iramuteq.org/documentation/html
Sarkis-Onofre, R., Catalá-López, F., Aromataris, E., & Lockwood, C. (2021). How to
properly use the PRISMA Statement. Systematic Reviews, 10(1), 13–15.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13643-021-01671-z
Sekakela, K. (2016). The Impact of Trading With China on Botswana’s Economy. Journal
of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies, 9, 2–23.
https://doi.org/10.1108/JCEFTS-09-2014-0022
Selden, Z. (2016). Alignment, Alliance, and American Grand Strategy. In Alignment,
Alliance, and American Grand Strategy. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.8772580
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
173
Shaw, T. M., Cooper, A. F., & Chin, G. T. (2009). Emerging powers and africa:
Implications for/from global governance? Politikon, 36(1), 27–44.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155385
Silva, A. L. R. da, & Pérez, J. O. (2019). Lula, Dilma, and Temer: The Rise and Fall of
Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Perspectives, 46(4), 169–185.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19846521
Singh, K. (2016). A comparative analysis of foreign trade of BRICS countries.
Prabandhan: Indian Journal of Management, 9(2), 29–40.
https://doi.org/10.17010/pijom/2016/v9i2/87235
Sousa, C., & Sousa, I. (2023). Brazil-China Cooperation: A New Page for the
Telecommunications Industry? Observa China.
https://www.observachina.org/en/articles/cooperacao-brasil-china
Stanojevic, S., Bin, Q., & Jian, C. (2020). Sino-EU15 Export Competition in Central and
Eastern Europe: Is China Crowding Out Exports from the EU15? Eastern European
Economics, 58, 264–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2020.1712554
Strutynska, I. (2019). Digital Platform for Determination And Monitoring of The Digital
Transformation Bussiness Business Structure.
https://www.connectedpapers.com/main/11ecc2430a211c430d55f350283ebc95f65753
e8/DIGITAL-PLATFORM-FOR-DETERMINATION-AND-MONITORING-OF-THE-DIGITAL-
TRANSFORMATION-BUSSINESS-BUSINESS-STRUCTURE/graph
Tian, H. F. (2016). The BRICS and the G20. China and World Economy, 24(4), 111–126.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12170 WE - Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)
Trivedy, A., & Khatun, M. (2023). Importance of BRICS as a regional politics and policies.
GeoJournal, 88(5), 5205–5220. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-023-10883-w
Urdínez, F. (2017). China in the backyard: Chinese assertiveness and United States
hegemony in Latin America between 2001 and 2015.
https://doi.org/10.11606/T.101.2017.tde-20062017-140250
Urdinez, F., Burian, C. L., & De Oliveira, A. J. (2016). MERCOSUR and the Brazilian
Leadership Challenge in the Era of Chinese Growth: A Uruguayan Foreign Policy
Perspective. New Global Studies, 10(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2015-0015
Vazquez, K. C. (2021). Brazil and BRICS Multilateralism à la Carte: From Bilateralism to
Community Interest. Global Policy, 12(4), 534–538. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-
5899.12969
Vazquez, K. C. (2022). Brazil–China Relations: Contestation, Adaptation, or
Transformation? In D. Pavlićević & N. Talmacs (Eds.), The China Question (pp. 201–222).
Springer Nature Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9105-8_10
Vérasi, E. Z., & Véras, D. B. (2013). Sino-Brazilian Relations and the Soft Power Cultural
Exchange. In A. de Hoyos, K. Kaminishi, & G. Duysters (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Innovation and Management (Issue 10th International
Conference on Innovation and Management, pp. 1116-+).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 145-174
Three Decades of Brazil-China Relations: Mapping Scholarly Discourse and Future Research
Directions
Rodrigo Franklin Frogeri, Yichao Li
174
Vieira, M. A., & Alden, C. (2011). India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA): South-South
cooperation and the paradox of regional leadership. Global Governance, 17(4), 507–528.
https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01704007
Webster, J., & Watson, R. T. (2002). Analyzing the Past To Prepare for the Future :
Writing a Review. MIS Quarterly, 26(2), xiii–xxiii. https://doi.org/10.2307/4132319
Whalley, J., & Medianu, D. (2013). The deepening China-Brazil economic relationship.
CESifo Economic Studies, 59(4), 707–730. https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifs031
Xu, Y. (2016). China’s Strategic Partnerships in Latin America: Case Studies of China’s
Oil Diplomacy in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, 1991 to 2015 [University of
Miami].
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/30d41c3748f0913fa1d0ed2c806990e8340a3a3
9
Yarygina, I., Lukashenko, I., Lee, E., Washington, P., & Tsarev, R. (2021). BRICS-
Eurasian Credit Markets: Problems and Prospects. In S. R., S. P., & P. Z. (Eds.), Lecture
Notes in Networks and Systems: Vol. 231 LNNS (pp. 296–318). Springer Science and
Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90321-3_24
Zeng, C., Deng, X., Dong, J., & Hu, P. (2016). Urbanization and sustainability:
Comparison of the processes in “BIC” countries. Sustainability (Switzerland), 8(4).
https://doi.org/10.3390/su8040400
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
175
A BRAZILIAN STATUS DILEMMA IN THE UKRAINE WAR?
BETWEEN BEING A ‘DO-GOOD’ STATE AND A BRICS MEMBER
LUIS GOUVEIA JUNIOR
luisgouveia@ces.uc.pt
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Coimbra - Centre for Social Studies (Portugal). He holds a
Master's in Latin American Studies from the University of Oxford. His research focuses mainly on
Peace and Security Studies and the Global South, especially Latin America and BRICS.
Abstract
Brazil’s position concerning the war in Ukraine has been the target of harsh criticism. Once it
did not impose sanctions, due to its close its political ties with Russia, some perceive that
Brazil has prioritized its alliances to the detriment of establishing peace conditions in the
region. However, the Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, has recurrently affirmed that he strives
to promote peace in Ukraine. His discourses exemplify Brazil’s strategy of being a ‘do-good’
state, to gain international status. Applying the ‘social identity theory’ and analyzing official
discourses and mass media posts, this study concluded that Brazil attempted to gain status
by utilizing a ‘creativity’ strategy. This strategy vowed to portray Brazil as a peace promoter.
However, this strategy failed because of Brazil’s proximity to Russia. Paradoxically, this
proximity to Russia also happens due to status-seeking. As a forum where Brazil has close
contacts with China and other powers, the BRICS works as a fundamental space for Brazil to
acquire international recognition. Therefore, I propose that Brazil has faced a status dilemma:
capitalize its image within the BRICS or maintain a ‘do-good’ state image.
Keywords
Brazil, international status, Ukraine War, BRICS, Social Identity Theory.
Resumo
A posição do Brasil em relação à guerra na Ucrânia tem sido alvo de duras críticas. Na verdade,
pelo facto de não ter imposto sanções e devido aos seus estreitos laços políticos com a Rússia,
alguns percebem que o Brasil priorizou suas alianças em detrimento de estabelecer condições
de paz na região. No entanto, o presidente brasileiro, Lula da Silva, tem afirmado
repetidamente que se esforça para promover a paz na Ucrânia. Os seus discursos
exemplificam a estratégia do Brasil de ser um Estado que faz o bem, para capitalizar o seu
estatuto internacional. Aplicando a “teoria da identidade social” e analisando os discursos
oficiais e as publicações nos meios de comunicação de massa, este estudo concluiu que o
Brasil tentou capitalizar o seu estatuto internacional utilizando uma estratégia de
“criatividade”. Essa estratégia prometia retratar o Brasil como um promotor da paz. Contudo,
esta estratégia falhou devido à proximidade do Brasil com a Rússia. Paradoxalmente, esta
proximidade com a Rússia também acontece devido à necessidade de capitalizar o seu
estatuto internacional. Sendo um fórum onde o Brasil mantém contatos estreitos com a China
e outras potências, o BRICS funciona como um espaço fundamental para o Brasil adquirir
reconhecimento internacional. Assim, este texto sugere que o Brasil esteja a enfrentar um
dilema de estatuto: capitalizar sua imagem dentro dos BRICS ou manter uma imagem de
Estado “que faz o bem”.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
176
Palavras-chave
Brasil, Estatuto Internacional, Guerra Ucrânia, BRICS, Teoria da Identidade Social.
How to cite this article
Junior, Luis Gouveia (2024). A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-
Good’ State and a Brics Member. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1
– Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December
2024, pp. 175-189. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.8.
Article received on 1 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 26 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
177
A BRAZILIAN STATUS DILEMMA IN THE UKRAINE WAR?
BETWEEN BEING A ‘DO-GOOD’ STATE AND A BRICS MEMBER
1
LUIS GOUVEIA JUNIOR
1 - Introduction
Since the election of Lula da Silva, the Brazilian president has attempted to lead a
potential mediation for an agreement to end the War in Ukraine. His positions were,
however, considerably criticized by some political forces, especially in Western media.
For some, his positions, sometimes criticizing Russia and other times criticizing the West,
demonstrated a lack of proper position in favor of peace. Applying the “Social Identity
Theory” (SIT), this piece argues that Lula da Silva’s position was an attempt to gain
international status for Brazil. More specifically, Lula da Silva endeavored to apply
strategies that some authors call “creativity” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Ward, 2017)
to gain status.
Although status has gained rampant attention in IR, most studies still focus on the Great
Powers (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014a). A recent trend in the literature has
consolidated new efforts to widen the analysis to emerging, middle, or small powers
(Wohlforth et al., 2018; Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019; Bilgic & Pilcher, 2023). This
literature has demonstrated how examining emerging and minor powers can shed light
on dynamics usually unnoticed in studies on the Great Powers’ status. One example of it
concerns incentives for conflicts. Studies on major powers usually refer to how status-
seeking fosters conflicts (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010; Forsberg, 2014; Tsygankov,
2014). However, when authors look at middle or emerging powers, non-conflictual
dynamics emerge (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015;
Wohlforth et al., 2018). These states usually utilize creativity to gain status, trying to
find a ‘niche,’ something distinctive about themselves (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). One
possibility is to become a ‘good state’ (Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015) or a ‘do-good
state’ (Wohlforth et al., 2018). For instance, states such as Norway managed to construct
an image of a humanitarian, peace settler state to gain status.
Brazil historically utilizes this image of a ‘good’ state to gain status (Neumann & De
Carvalho, 2015; De Carvalho et al., 2020). Nevertheless, his approach faced a
1
Acknowledgment: This research has received financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia
(Portugal).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
178
fundamental problem in the Ukraine case, because Brazil’s participation in BRICS is also
a fundamental step of the country’s foreign policy. More so, it offers a space for direct
contact with China, Brazil’s most important commercial partner. Consequently, the South
American country cannot neglect such a forum. With closer connections with Russia
because of this organization, the ties with the aggressor in Ukraine hindered the Brazilian
strategy to act as a “do-good” state. This became evident, for instance, when the
Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, affirmed that Brazil and China prefer to
maintain their alliances with Russia rather than establish peace in Ukraine (Poder360,
2024). Additionally, Lula da Silva’s declarations even provided more argument to this
position as some perceived his views as reproducing Wladimir Putin’s discourses (Wright,
2023). Hence, I argue that Brazil has achieved a status dilemma. While ties with Russia
within BRICS represent a crucial factor for Brazilian status, it also hampers the success
of the Brazilian status strategy concerning the Ukraine War.
Such debate contributes to the existing literature, focusing on the under-studied role of
peaceful behaviors in shaping status (Wohlforth et al., 2018; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Moreover, it offers promising conclusions for the literature on emerging powers. Hence,
the following three sections will discuss status. First, I will provide a more exhaustive
overview of my theoretical approach. Second, I will discuss the literature on Brazilian
status-seeking. Then, I will analyze the Brazilian strategies in Ukraine and evaluate their
results.
2 - Status-seeking
According to Renshon (2017: 5), the importance of status in international politics is so
evident that it is consensual among different epistemologies and theories in international
relations. Status might arguably contribute to a state’s security, influence on others, and
economic prosperity (Renshon, 2017: 3). For Duque (2018: 2), the absence of an
international authority increases the importance of status since it influences “who gets
what, when, and how.” Surprisingly, despite some definitional nuances, status tends to
be defined in similar terms by different authors. It is usually connected with “filling a
place in a social hierarchy.” (Wohlforth et al., 2018: 528). Moreover, to achieve a
particular status, other states must recognize a state’s status (Dafoe et al., 2014).
A common approach to status in International Relations usually arises from Social
Identity Theory (SIT), which asserts that “social groups strive to achieve a positively
distinctive identity” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010: 66). SIT proposes three approaches
usually used by states to gain status: 1- mobility, 2- competition, and 3- creativity. I
must mention that there are some divergences concerning this division. While Larson
and Shevchenko (2010) consider the three strategies simultaneously, Ward says this
perspective is inaccurate. For him, SIT makes a clear distinction between individual
strategy (mobility) and group strategy (competition and creativity) (Ward, 2017). Thus,
Ward affirms that the approach proposed by Larson and Shevchenko is problematic
because it confuses different levels of analysis and blurs the distinction between mobility
and competitiveness. Nonetheless, this debate is irrelevant to this piece, because my
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
179
further analysis will focus on creativity, which both agree can be applied to the group
level.
Presenting an overview of these three strategies, “mobility” arguably refers to conforming
to existing norms, aspiring to obtain a higher place in a hierarchy (Larson & Shevchenko,
2010)
2
. It presupposes a space and acceptance of newcomers in such hierarchies (Larson
& Shevchenko, 2010).
Meanwhile, “competition” refers to a strategy followed by a state where it competes with
others, in specific domains, aiming to gain status (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). This can
occur, for instance, through technological competition. In this case, obtaining new
technologies can represent a positive characterization of a country, achieving a higher
ranking in the social hierarchy.
The other strategy is “creativity”, which does not aim “to achieve a higher rank for the
in-group along a consensually valued dimension of comparison, but to reinterpret the
comparative situation in a way that mitigates the in-group’s experience of low status”
(Ward, 2017: 823). According to Larson & Shevchenko (2010), creativity can occur by:
1- changing a negative meaning of status to become a positive one; and, 2- creating a
new dimension in which the state can emerge as superior. Different creative strategies
contribute to improve a state’s status, such as participating in elite clubs (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010). When mobility is not desirable, due to an avoidance of reproducing
existing rules, and competition is not an option, due to power discrepancies, creativity is
the most promising strategy, especially for emerging states (Larson & Shevchenko,
2014b).
Considering these three potential strategies, most literature strives to comprehend how
status-seeking fuels conflict among states (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014a; Dafoe
et al., 2014; Forsberg, 2014). Many turn to Russia and its conflictual relationship with
the West (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014a; Tsygankov, 2014; Forsberg, 2014). Others
affirm that accommodating China and Russia's status concerns could be fundamental to
guarantee their peaceful participation in the international order (Larson & Shevchenko,
2010). Status, or social recognition, allegedly causes conflicts because it is an
uncontrollable human desire (Dafoe et al., 2014).
However, these studies focus mainly on major powers (Neumann & De Carvalho, 2015).
When opening the investigation boundaries to smaller states, other relevant dimensions
emerge. For instance, Latin American scholars identified the necessity of formulating new
concepts connected to status, such as international insertion (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni,
2019). According to this perspective, being accepted, or inserted, by those at the higher
hierarchical stances preludes acquiring status (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019). Looking
at middle powers also overcomes the recurrent connection between status and conflict.
Wohlforth et al. (2018) argue that small and middle powers can have other strategic
choices to gain status, including being a peace defender or avoiding conflict. As
mentioned above, Norway utilizes the image of a “do-good” state to gain status
2
As mentioned above, Ward (2017) affirms that Larson & Shevchenko misinterpreted SIT and mobility
should not be included in IR analyses.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
180
(Wohlforth et al., 2018). The same arguably happens with Brazil, whose participation in
peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian actions, attempted to gain the status of
‘doing good’ (De Carvalho et al., 2020). Such attempts, however, have been barely
effective (Beaumont & Roren, 2020: 45).
3 - The Global South; Brazil; and Status
A rising interest in identity formation in the Global South has emerged. Nevertheless, as
Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni (2019) allure, the literature on status still misses explanatory
capacity regarding how states from the Global South act to gain status. Some talk about
how the colonial past creates an identity of post-colonial anxiety in those countries (Bilgic
& Pilcher, 2022). The shared history of being explored also fosters cooperation in some
areas, including the non-aligned movement (Vieira, 2016). The colonized past also
severely influences how these states seek to gain status (Bilgic & Pilcher, 2022). As some
have identified, in recent decades, Global South emerging Powers have increased their
actions to gain status (Dal & Dipama, 2019). Brazil, the object of this analysis, is far from
being an exception.
De Carvalho et al. (2020) affirms that in the Brazilian case, there is an attempt to gain
status by emulating the Great Powers' actions (e.g., participating in peacekeeping) and
challenging existing governance channels. However, there are some disagreements
about the country’s status objectives. Some argue that Brazil strives to be between a
Great Power and a Global South state (De Carvalho, 2020). Meanwhile, others perceive
Brazil as aspiring to become a Great Power (Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Stolte, 2015).
Independently of its final aim, Brazil has utilized a few strategies to gain recognition for
its emergence. Its participation in regional and international blocs, such as Mercosur,
BRICS, and IBSA, is one meaningful example of the Brazilian strategy to get space in
multilateral forums (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019; Stuenkel, 2019). Furthermore, its
presence in Africa during Lula da Silva's first two mandates was arguably an attempt to
get a major power status (Stolte, 2015).
BRICS is significant since it is a group with annual meetings in which Brazil has direct
access to other major powers like China, Russia, and India. The recent BRICS expansion
to BRICS+, with the entrance of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, propelled this group’s geopolitical and economic importance even more. The
emergence of BRICS has direct linkages with creating the IBSA Dialogue Forum formed
by India, Brazil, and South Africa (Stuenkel, 2015, 2019; Brosig, 2019). One illustrative
anecdote of IBSA creation is that the three Global South leaders joined cooperative
efforts after participating in a G7 meeting, in which the three only observed without
participating in the crucial discussions (Stuenkel, 2015, 2019). The Brazilian president at
that time, Lula da Silva, queried about the sense of the three being there only ‘to eat the
dessert’, once they wanted the ‘main course, the dessert and then coffee’ (Lula da Silva
in Stuenkel, 2019:16). Thus, creating IBSA arose for a concise discontentment of the
status given to Brazil, India, and South Africa by the G7 members. These countries could
not join an elite club, so they created their own club.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
181
While IBSA has a diminutive global impact, BRICS is paramount for these countries to
gain status (Stuenkel, 2019: 43). To Brazil, constant and direct contact with China
represented an opportunity to advance its economic and political interests. Notably,
China is Brazil's most significant commercial partner, and Brazil is one of the few states
with a positive trade balance with China (Bermúdez, 2024). BRICS is usually described
as crucial to such commercial development (Stuenkel, 2019). Not surprisingly, some
authors have argued that BRICS members have refused to take measurements against
Russia (Junior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023). Brazil avoids breaking up with a partner in
BRICS, since the forum represents an opportunity to advance its own interests.
Nevertheless, in a quantitative comparison of BRICS member's status recognition, Brazil
appears to underperform the most, considering its potential (Beaumont & Roren, 2020).
Beaumont and Roren (2020) also identify this lack of status as a recurrent characteristic
of Latin American countries. Regardless of not fulfilling its potentiality, in his first two
terms as Brazilian president (2003-2010), Lula da Silva was responsible for an expressive
effort to improve the Brazilian international position (Chagas-Bastos & Franzoni, 2019).
Beyond joining new international forums, Brazil bolstered its participation in
peacekeeping operations, evidenced by its leading role in MINUSTAH, hosted the 2016
Olympics and the 2014 FIFA men’s World Cup, and ignited its claims for a permanent
seat in the Security Council (De Carvalho, 2020; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Notwithstanding, some have argued that since the 2010s, Brazil has stopped pursuing
actions to reinforce its status as a regional power (Nolte & Schenoni, 2024).
In the literature about Brazilian status-seeking, a recurrent tendency is the perspective
of Brazil attempting to gain status through an image of a ‘good state’, respectful of
international law and a contributor to peacekeeping (Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019;
De Carvalho et al., 2020). The idea of “good power” proposed by Neumann and De
Carvalho (2015) highlights those states that utilize their “moral authority” to gain status.
Larson and Shevchenko (2014b) consider the Brazilian strategies as examples of
creativity. The ‘good state’ strategy might represent another creative pathway to gain
status. In the next section, we will apply this perspective to analyze Brazilian behaviors
concerning the Ukraine War.
4 - Lula da Silva and the War in Ukraine
In this section, I will analyze speeches and statements issued by the Brazilian
government since January 2023, when Lula da Silva reassumed the presidency. As
mentioned in the introduction, the Brazilian president's position concerning the Ukraine
War was considerably questioned, especially by Western media. Indeed, as studies
identified, Brazil has not opposed Russia since the (February 2022) invasion of Ukraine,
following a BRICS pattern of criticizing while maintaining political and economic relations
with Putin’s regime (Júnior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023).
The Brazilian position, however, can be better explained as a creative attempt to gain
status. After becoming president, Lula da Silva claimed to cease the hostilities in Ukraine
(gov.br, 2023a, 2023b). Such claims arose with a discourse of “Brazil is back” (gov.br,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
182
2023a, 2023b). The Brazilian president recurrently referred to the years of Bolsonaro’s
presidency as lost years in Brazilian international participation (gov.br, 2023a). The
Worker’s Party leader perceived that his country had lost status, which he vowed to
regain.
As mentioned above, one aspect usually associated with status is the participation in
‘elite groups’ (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010). In the case of Ukraine, Lula da Silva
proposed a few times the creation of a new elite club. In his words: “When there was the
2008 economic crisis, quickly, we created the G20 attempting to save the economy. Now,
it is important to create another G20 to end the war and to establish peace” (gov.br,
2023c, author’s translation
3
).
In May 2023, after a meeting in London with the British Prime Minister, Lula da Silva
said: “I believe in constructing a mechanism that can establish the possibility of making
that the world returns to having peace” (gov.br, 2023b, author’s translation
4
). He then
added that he has talked about the War in Ukraine at the G20 and at the G7 and in
bilateral meetings with the Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese leaders (gov.br, 2023b). His
main proposal was the creation of a ‘Peace Group’ to deal with the war (gov.br, 2023c).
This demonstrates a robust attempt to reinforce the Brazilian position as a peace
defender. Historically, Brazil has tried to gain status through a peaceful image (De
Carvalho, 2020; De Carvalho et al., 2020).
Still, in 2023, Lula da Silva also defended the creation of a G20 of peace when meeting
the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez. This declaration is meaningful because he
connects this new ‘elite club’ with the failure of the existing Security Council (gov.br,
2023a). The Brazilian claims for a permanent seat in the Security Council also emerges
as an attempt to gain status (De Carvalho et al., 2020). The declarations by the Brazilian
president also indicate that the country’s behavior concerning Ukraine sought to solidify
the country’s position to achieve this objective. Lula da Silva’s speech at the 2023 G7
meeting in Hiroshima also includes a sharp criticism of the Security Council (Da Silva,
2023). Furthermore, this speech attests to how he proposes Brazilian peaceful behavior
as a matter of national identity. He said:
Brazil has lived in peace with its neighbors for over 150 years. We made
Latin America a region without nuclear weapons. We are also proud to have
built, together with our African neighbors, a zone of peace and nuclear
non-proliferation in the South Atlantic (Da Silva, 2023:1, author’s
translation)
5
.
3
Original Text: “Quando houve a crise econômica de 2008, rapidamente, nós criamos o G20 para tentar
salvar a economia. Agora é importante criar um outro G20 para acabar com a guerra e estabelecer a
paz.”
4
Original Text: acredito na construção de um mecanismo que possa estabelecer a possibilidade da gente
fazer com que o mundo volte a ter paz.
5
Original Text: “O Brasil vive em paz com seus vizinhos há mais de 150 anos. Fizemos da América Latina
uma região sem armas nucleares. Também nos orgulhamos de ter construído, junto com vizinhos
africanos, uma zona de paz e não proliferação nuclear no Atlântico Sul.”
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
183
Such statement is an attempt to gain international status. SIT proposes that states seek
status because human beings want to feel proud of participating in a group (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010). According to the Brazilian president, peace with its neighbors for
over 150 years is a reason for national pride. However, as the literature indicates, status
also requires recognition. Speaking in these terms in a G7 meeting indicates an attempt
to obtain recognition of Brazilian peaceful conduct.
Comparison is another essential feature of status-seeking (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010).
In Lula da Silva’s 2023 G7 speech, he compares the peaceful Brazil abovementioned with
the bellicose attitude of some Security Council permanent members, who “continue the
long-term tradition of waging wars non-authorized by the council.” (Da Silva, 2023,
author’s translation)
6
Such narrative indicates an approach similar to some
characteristics of a creativity strategy to gain status in some authors’ perspectives
(Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 2014b; Ward, 2017). Lula da Silva tries to create new
status measurements, such as a non-nuclear state as a positive feature and a new ‘elite
club,’ the ‘Peace Club,’ to gain recognition. This strategy encapsulates what some authors
call a ‘good state’ or a ‘do-good state’ strategy (Neumann & de Carvalho, 2015; Wohlforth
et al., 2018).
5 - The Brazilian dilemma: when status-seeking strategies overlap
The Brazilian strategy concerning the Ukraine War failed in its central claims. After less
than one year of making the War in Ukraine a pivotal matter in its foreign policy strategy,
Lula da Silva lost much of his appeal to this matter. The eruption of the Israeli invasion
of Gaza and the turbulence in its neighborhood with Venezuela and Guiana forced Brazil
to minimize its rhetoric about Ukraine. Domestic dynamics also forced Lula da Silva to
decrease his official international visits to other states (Moreno, 2023). Furthermore,
Western media mainly perceived the Brazilian posture negatively, creating some
diplomatic embarrassment to Lula da Silva. In this section, we will discuss why this
strategy fails.
As mentioned, Brazil’s participation in the BRICS is vital for the country to gain status
(Larson & Shevchenko, 2014b; Chagas-Bastos & Franzone, 2019; De Carvalho et al.,
2020; Stuenkel, 2019). Russia is one of the leading states in BRICS, and some argue
that Wladimir Putin used this group to overcome isolationism since the 2014 Crimea
invasion (Stuenkel, 2019). Some studies identify that Brazil did not effectively act in
dissonance with Russia’s interests (Júnior & Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023). As expected,
Brazil maintains its agenda closer to BRICS, including Russia, in Lula da Silva’s third
mandate.
A meaningful event in this regard was Sergey Lavrov's trip to Brazil in April 2023. The
official page of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations refers to the visit: “Beyond the
historical ties of friendship and cooperation between Brazil and Russia, the countries
maintain expressive commercial relations. Russia is the main supplier of fertilizers to
6
Original Text: “continuam a longa tradição de fazerem guerras não autorizadas pelo Conselho”.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
184
Brazil.”
7
(Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2023: 1, author’s translation). Lavrov even
affirmed in Brasília that Russia was “grateful to our Brazilian friends for their clear
understanding of the genesis of the situation.” (Paraguassu & Boadle, 2023:1). Western
platforms recurrently mentioned this visit to suggest that Brazil was getting farther away
from its traditional non-alignment and closer to Russia (Harris & Pooler, 2023).
After the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a prison mandate to Putin, some
questioned whether he could participate in the G20 meeting in Brazil in 2024. Lula da
Silva affirmed that, as long as he was the Brazilian president, Putin would not be arrested
in Brazil, despite the country being an ICC signatory (Reuters, 2023). This kind of
statement becomes even more meaningful, considering that Putin did not participate in
the BRICS 2023 summit in South Africa (Aljazeera, 2023a). Although the official reason
was a ‘mutual agreement,’ some affirm that he did not participate in the summit because
of the ICC mandate (Aljazeera, 2023a). Thus, the Brazilian president’s statement
becomes even more problematic.
Beyond Lavrov’s visit and Putin’s discourse, Lula da Silva’s assertions that the US and
the EU were fueling the war in Ukraine created significant criticism by Western powers.
The US spokesperson, John Kirby, even said that “Brazil is parroting Russian and Chinese
propaganda without at all looking at the facts,” affirming that Lula’s comments were
“simply misguided” (Wright, 2023: 1). According to an anonymous ambassador’s
interview to Reuters, this criticism also resonated within the European Union (Paraguassu
& Boadle, 2023). The EU spokesman, Peter Stano, rejected the Brazilian affirmations
(Paraguassu & Boadle, 2023). In a direct answer to Lula’s declarations, Stano enforced
that Russia was the only aggressor responsible for the conflict (Poder360, 2023).
The criticisms also surged when Lula da Silva visited Portugal for the commemorations
of the Portuguese Revolution. Ukrainian refugees protested against the Brazilian
president and his proximity to Russia (Aljazeera, 2023b). Referring to Lula da Silva, the
leader of the Portuguese Liberal Party said that having a friend of Putin in the Parliament
was outrageous (Lusa, 2023). The major oppositional party, PSD (currently in power),
also asked the government to issue a statement demarcating Portugal´s policy from Lula
da Silva’s affirmations (Lusa, 2023). Moreover, Chega, the Portuguese far-right party
currently the third major force in the Portuguese Parliament, called for protests against
Lula's presence in Portugal (Amato, 2023).
The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, fueled the critics, affirming that Brazil was
misinterpreting the war and who was the real aggressor (Gazeta do Povo, 2023). For
Zelensky, Lula da Silva reproduced Putin’s ideas about the war, which does not contribute
to peace (Duarte, 2023). The Ukrainian president even sarcastically affirmed that he was
happy that Lula da Silva criticized him (CNN Brasil, 2023). As mentioned, the Ukrainian
president has recently argued that Brazil and China prioritize their alliance with Russia;
rather than establishing peace in Ukraine (Poder360, 2024). Considering that the
7
Original Text: Além dos laços históricos de amizade e cooperação entre Brasil e Rússia, os países mantêm
expressivo relacionamento comercial. A Rússia é o principal fornecedor de fertilizantes para o Brasil.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
185
Europeans, and the North Americans, share a considerably positive perspective on
Zelensky, such statements negatively impact Lula da Silva’s image in the West.
The analysis of news reports and feature articles from Western media suggests that the
‘good guy’ image can hardly stand if you ‘walk with’ a ‘bad guy.’ Lavrov’s visit to Brazil
hardened Europeans' acceptance of Brazil's position. As demonstrated in the previous
section, Brazil attempted to gain status with the war in Ukraine. This strategy, however,
failed. The peace group never materialized, and Lula da Silva was never invited to
mediate peace talks. This does not mean that Brazil has not gotten the world’s attention
because it substantiated Lula da Silva’s discourse of “Brazil is back”, hence achieving
greater success. However, considering precisely the ‘creative’ strategy concerning the
Ukraine War, the polemic positions of Brazil hardly improved the country’s status.
6 – Conclusion
This paper proposes that the Brazilian posture regarding the War in Ukraine can be
qualified as a (failed) attempt to gain status. Although the literature on status focuses
mainly on how it fosters conflicts, this analysis demonstrates that seizing conflicts can
also be utilized when a state seeks status. As the Brazilian president’s declarations attest,
it attempted a few creative strategies, including creating a new elite club (G20 for peace)
and claiming the necessity of bringing non-nuclear states to the Security Council. This
conclusion contributes to the literature proposing that Brazil attempted to be a ‘do-good’
state (De Carvalho et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the failure of Lula da Silva’s strategy of
using creativity in the Ukrainian case demonstrates that there are other dynamics that
have still not been identified by these authors.
Lula da Silva failed for different reasons. The perspective among the status gatekeepers
was so polarized that the Brazilian ‘pro-peace perspective’ appeared as an acceptance of
Russia’s behavior. Thus, Western states barely acknowledged Brazil’s status in resolving
the Ukraine War. Moreover, Lavrov's presence in Brasília increased Western suspicion of
Brazil’s position regarding Ukraine. It indicated a vital conclusion for the literature on
‘good states’ or ‘do-good states’: it is difficult to maintain the image of a ‘good state’
while, simultaneously, being a friend of a state perceived by status gatekeepers as a ‘bad
state.’
In the Brazilian case, it faced a status dilemma. On the one hand, its participation in
BRICS with Russia constitutes a fundamental part of its status-seeking. One must always
bear in mind that China's presence in BRICS represents a unique opportunity for Brazil
to advance its economic and political interests with that rising Asian superpower.
However, it also strengthens Brazil’s proximity to Russia, which hinders the country’s
approach to gaining status as a ‘do-good’ state with its position in the Ukraine War. As
Zelensky criticizes, it seems to other states that Brazil prioritizes its alliance with ‘the
aggressor.’
More importantly, this conclusion demonstrates the necessity of a deeper analysis of
emerging powers' status-seeking. It is necessary to go beyond focusing on how status
creates conflicts and try to comprehend how peaceful behaviors can be a tool to gain or
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
186
lose status. The dynamics identified in this study contribute to this comprehension,
proposing that a ‘do-good’ strategy requires a few steps to be successful, including the
political assessment of that state’s partnerships. The Brazilian status dilemma is a case
study that might be reproduced by other Global South states. Further study is needed to
comprehend how Global South states utilize peace to improve their international status.
References
Aljazeera (2023a). Putin to miss BRICS summit by mutual agreement, South Africa says.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/19/south-africa-putin-to-miss-brics-summit-
by-mutual-agreement
Aljazeera (2023b). Brazil’s Lula met with protests in Portugal over Ukraine comments.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/21/brazils-lula-met-with-protests-in-
portugal-over-ukraine-comments
Amato, G. (2023). Ucranianos e ultradireita em protesto contra Lula em Portugal. O Globo
https://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/portugal-giro/post/2023/04/ucranianos-e-ultradireita-
em-protesto-contra-lula-em-portugal.ghtm l
Beaumont, P.; Røren, P. (2020). Brazil’s status struggles: why nice guys finish last.
Status and the Rise of Brazil: Global Ambitions, Humanitarian Engagement and
International Challenges, pp. 31-48.
Bermúdez, A. (2024). Como Brasil foi chave para América Latina bater recorde de
exportação para China em 2023.
https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/c72pdx8yrrpo
Bilgic, A.; Pilcher, J. (2023). Desires, Fantasies and Hierarchies: Postcolonial Status
Anxiety through Ontological Security. Alternatives, 48(1), pp. 3–19.
https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221086170
Brosig, M. (2019). The Role of BRICS in Large-Scale Armed Conflict (1st ed.). Palgrave
Macmillian.
Chagas-Bastos, F. H.; Franzoni, M. (2019). Frustrated emergence? Brazil and Mexico’s
coming of Age. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(4), pp. 33-59.
CNN Brasil (2023). Zelensky posta no Instagram críticas a Lula após pergunta da CNN.
CNN https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/em-perfil-oficial-no-instagram-
zelensky-fala-a-cnn-e-rebate-criticas-de-lula/
da Silva, L. (2023) Discurso do presidente Lula por ocasião da Sessão 8 do G7 e países
convidados: "Rumo a um mundo pacífico, estável e próspero". 21 May 2023.
https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/05/discurso-
presidente-lula-em-sessao-8-do-g7
Dafoe, A.; Renshon, J.; Huth, P. (2014). Reputation and status as motives for war.
Annual Review of Political Science, 17, pp. 371-393.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
187
Dal, E. P., & Dipama, S. (2019). G20 rising powers’ status seeking through social
creativity: The case of South-South development cooperation. South African Journal of
International Affairs, 26(4), pp. 663-684.
de Carvalho, B. (2020). Brazil’s (frustrated) quest for higher status. Status and the rise
of Brazil: global ambitions, humanitarian engagement and international challenges, pp.
19-30.
de Carvalho, B.; Gabrielsen Jumbert, M.; Esteves, P. (2020). Introduction: Brazil’s
humanitarian engagement and international status. Status and the rise of Brazil: global
ambitions, humanitarian engagement and international challenges, pp. 1-15.
Duarte, J. C. (2023). Zelensky critica Lula da Silva: "Os seus pensamentos coincidem
com os do Presidente Putin". Observador. Retrieved in May 2024, from:
https://observador.pt/2023/08/06/zelensky-critica-lula-da-silva-os-seus-pensamentos-
coincidem-com-os-do-presidente-putin/
Duque, M. G. (2018). Recognizing international status: a relational approach.
International Studies Quarterly, 62(3), pp. 577–592.
Forsberg, T. (2014). Status conflicts between Russia and the West: Perceptions and
emotional biases. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3-4), pp. 323–331.
Gazeta do Povo (2023). Zelensky critica posição de Lula sobre a guerra e descarta
soluções com cessão de território à Rússia. Agência EFE e Gazeta do Povo.
https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/republica/zelensky-critica-posicao-lula-guerra-
descarta-solucoes-cessao-territorio-russia/
Gov.br (2023a). Na Espanha, Lula defende união internacional para buscar solução para
o conflito na Ucrânia. https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-
planalto/noticias/2023/04/na-espanha-lula-defende-uniao-internacional-para-buscar-
solucao-para-o-conflito-na-ucrania
Gov.br (2023b). Pronunciamentos do presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
e do primeiro-ministro da Holanda, Mark Rutte, após encontro no Palácio do Planalto.
https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/discursos-e-
pronunciamentos/2023/pronunciamentos-do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-
da-silva-e-do-primeiro-ministro-da-holanda-mark-rutte-apos-encontro-no-palacio-do-
planalto
Gov.br (2023c). Entrevista coletiva do presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
em Abu Dhabi (Emirados Árabes Unidos). https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/centrais-de-
conteudo/publicacoes/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas/presidente-da-
republica/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-entrevistas/entrevista-coletiva-
do-presidente-da-republica-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-em-abu-dhabi-emirados-arabes-
unidos
Harris, B. & Pooler, M. (2023). Brazil criticised by West over stance on Ukraine. Financial
Times. https://www.ft.com/content/a07d2c48-83a2-4655-ae0f-f455c97e5343
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
188
Júnior, L., & Branco, G. (2022). The BRICS countries and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Carta Internacional, 17(3), e1286. https://doi.org/10.21530/ci.v17n3.2022.1286
Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses
to US primacy. International security, 34(4), pp. 63–95.
Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2014a). Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions
in foreign policy. Communist and post-communist studies, 47(3-4), pp. 269–279.
Larson, D. W., & Shevchenko, A. (2014b). Managing rising powers: The role of status
concerns. Status in world politics, pp. 33–57.
Lusa (2023). Lula no 25 de abril: IL diz que Parlamento não pode receber "um aliado de
Putin" nesse dia. Expresso. https://expresso.pt/politica/partidos/2023-04-16-Lula-no-
25-de-abril-IL-diz-que-Parlamento-nao-pode-receber-um-aliado-de-Putin-nesse-dia-
6bb8b53b
Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2023). Visita ao Brasil do Ministro dos Negócios
Estrangeiros da Rússia, Sergey Lavrov. Nota à Imprensa nº 136.
https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/visita-
ao-brasil-do-ministro-dos-negocios-estrangeiros-da-russia-sergey-lavrov
Moreno, S. (2023). Foco de 2024 é rodar o Brasil, diz Lula após viagem internacional.
Agência Brasil. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/radioagencia-
nacional/politica/audio/2023-12/foco-de-2024-e-rodar-o-brasil-diz-lula-apos-viagem-
internacional
Neumann, I. & de Carvalho, B. (2015). Introduction: Small states and status. In: Small
States and Status Seeking. De Carvalho & Neumann I. (org.). New York: Routledge.
Nolte, D., & Schenoni, L. L. (2024). To lead or not to lead: regional powers and regional
leadership. International Politics, 61(1), pp. 40-59.
Paraguassu, L. & Boadle, A. (2023). Brazil's Lula draws Russian praise, U.S. scorn for
Ukraine views. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-lavrov-thanks-
brazil-efforts-resolve-ukraine-war-2023-04-17/
Poder360 (2023). União Europeia rebate fala de Lula sobre guerra da Ucrânia.
https://www.poder360.com.br/internacional/uniao-europeia-rebate-fala-de-lula-sobre-
guerra-da-ucrania/
Poder360 (2024). Não entendo por que o Brasil está do lado do agressor, diz Zelensky.
https://www.poder360.com.br/europa-em-guerra/nao-entendo-por-que-brasil-esta-do-
lado-do-agressor-diz-zelensky/
Renshon, J. (2017). Fighting for status: Hierarchy and conflict in world politics. Princeton
University Press.
Reuters (2023). Putin would not be arrested in 2024 Brazil G20 meeting, Lula says.
https://www.reuters.com/world/lula-says-putin-would-not-be-arrested-2024-brazil-
g20-meeting-2023-09-10/
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 175-189
A Brazilian Status Dilemma in the Ukraine War? Between Being a ‘Do-Good’ State and a
Brics Member
Luís Gouveia Junior
189
Sjoli, J. N. (2023). The BRICS: An alliance for peace? A study of discourses in Brazil,
India, China and South Africa around the Russian War in Ukraine (2014-2023) [Master’s
Thesis]. University of Agder.
Stolte, C. (2015). Brazil’s Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international
status. Springer.
Stuenkel, O. (2015). India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) The Rise of the
Global South? (1st ed.). Routledge.
Stuenkel, O. (2020). The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2nd ed.). Lexington
Books.
Tsygankov, A. P. (2014). The frustrating partnership: Honor, status, and emotions in
Russia’s discourses of the West. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(3-4), pp.
345-354.
Vieira, M. A. (2016). Understanding resilience in international relations: The non-aligned
movement and ontological security. International Studies Review, 18(2), pp. 290-311.
Ward, S. M. (2017). Lost in translation: Social identity theory and the study of status in
world politics. International Studies Quarterly, 61(4), pp. 821-834.
Wohlforth, W. C., De Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Neumann, I. B. (2018). Moral authority
and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status
seeking. Review of International Studies, 44(3), pp. 526-546.
Wright, G. (2023). Ukraine war: US accuses Lula of parroting propaganda. BBC.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-65307553
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
190
BRAZIL-CHINA BILATERAL LINK DURING THE 21ST CENTURY:
BUSINESS AS USUAL
NATALIA CEPPI
nataliaceppi@gmail.com
Ph.D in International Relations, from the Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina (UNR).
Currenlty, she is a Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research,
COCINET (Argentina), and a lecturer of the Consular and Diplomatic Law at the Faculty of
Political Science and International Relations (UNR).
GISELA PEREYRA DOVAL
gpdoval@gmail.com
Ph.D in International Relations, from the Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina (UNR).
Currenlty, she is a Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research;
COCINET (Argentina) and lecturer of International Relations Problematic at the Faculty of Political
Science and International Relations (UNR).
Abstract
Throughout 50 years of bilateral relations, the link between Brazil and China was built slowly
but steadily, reaching an unusual dynamism in the 21st century. This was the result of State
policies, which found in their counterpart fertile ground for their own foreign policy to flourish,
as well as an important economic and commercial complementarity. For this reason, the aim
of this article is to examine China's rise on Brazil's foreign agenda over the course of this
century, paying special attention to existing commercial interests, particularly in the energy
sector. Chinese penetration since 2000 has maintained continuity and dynamism, regardless
the ideological turnovers, since trade and energy business have become its backbone. While
the PT governments took the political and economic dimensions of diplomacy towards China
along the same track, Bolsonaro's administration decoupled these dimensions, although he
had to relegate his 'anti-communist cultural battle' in the face of China's status as the main
economic partner and the exuberant portfolio of investments in renewable and non-renewable
energies. With a qualitative methodological design, this paper presents two sections: the first
begins with the declaration of the bilateral link as a strategic partnership and goes through
the Petistas governments; the second focuses on the post-impeachment period and sustains
the alliance despite Jair Bolsonaro's speeches against Chinese 'communism'. The results are
clear: the relationship between Brazil and China over the course of this century is
unprecedented in the regional scenario and is highly unique. Each country sees in the other a
first-rate partner to satisfy a set of interests that, at times, run parallel to political and
commercial dimensions and, at others, are decoupled, with one of them prevailing above all:
the economic one. For this reason, the short circuits that existed during Bolsonaro's term did
not divert the relationship from its usual path.
Keywords
China, Brazil, Energy Sector, Foreign Agenda, Ideological Turnovers.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
191
Resumo
Ao longo de 50 anos de relações bilaterais, o vínculo entre o Brasil e a China foi-se construindo
de forma lenta, mas constante, atingindo um dinamismo invulgar no século XXI. Este foi o
resultado de políticas de Estado, que encontraram no seu homólogo terreno fértil para o
florescimento da sua própria política externa, bem como uma importante complementaridade
económica e comercial. Por esta razão, o objectivo deste artigo é examinar a ascensão da
China na agenda externa do Brasil ao longo deste século, prestando especial atenção aos
interesses comerciais existentes, particularmente no sector energético. A penetração chinesa
desde 2000 manteve a continuidade e o dinamismo, independentemente das reviravoltas
ideológicas, uma vez que o comércio e os negócios energéticos se tornaram a sua espinha
dorsal. Enquanto os governos do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), levaram as dimensões
política e económica da diplomacia em relação à China no mesmo caminho, a administração
de Bolsonaro dissociou essas dimensões, embora tenha tido de relegar a sua “batalha cultural
anticomunista” face ao estatuto da China como principal parceiro económico e o exuberante
portefólio de investimentos em energias renováveis e não renováveis. Com um desenho
metodológico qualitativo, este artigo apresenta duas secções: a primeira inicia-se com a
declaração do vínculo bilateral como parceria estratégica e passa pelos governos do Partido
dos Trabalhadores (PT); a segunda centra-se no período pós-impeachment e sustenta a
aliança apesar dos discursos de Jair Bolsonaro contra o ‘comunismo’ chinês. Os resultados são
claros: a relação entre o Brasil e a China ao longo deste século é inédita no panorama regional
e altamente singular. Cada país vê no outro um parceiro de primeira ordem para satisfazer
um conjunto de interesses que, por vezes, correm paralelamente às dimensões política e
comercial e, outras vezes, são dissociados, prevalecendo sobretudo um deles: o económico.
Por isso, os curtos-circuitos que existiram durante o mandato de Bolsonaro não desviaram a
relação do seu rumo habitual.
Palavras-chave
China, Brasil, Setor Energético, Agenda Externa, Mudanças Ideológicas.
How to cite this article
Ceppi, Natalia & Doval, Gisela Pereyra (2024). Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century:
Business as Usual. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic
Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp.
190-206. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.9.
Article received on 30 June 2024 and accepted for publication on 27 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
192
BRAZIL-CHINA BILATERAL LINK DURING THE 21ST CENTURY:
BUSINESS AS USUAL
NATALIA CEPPI
GISELA PEREYRA DOVAL
Introduction
2024 is not just another year in the relationship between Brazil and China. The two
countries, whose contacts date back to colonial times, are celebrating 50 years of
uninterrupted diplomatic relations since their re-establishment in 1974 under the Geisel
administration. They are also commemorating 20 years of the creation of the Sino-
Brazilian High-Level Commission for Coordination and Cooperation (COSBAN), a decisive
section in bilateral political dialogue and in positioning themselves in relation to some
impact issues impact on the global agenda.
Throughout this time, the link was built step by step, acquiring an unusual dynamism
after the arrival of Lula da Silva in 2003 when the respective national interests converged.
On the one hand, during the first decade of the current century, the Brazilian government
focused, among other things, on South-South relations and the diversification of
international partnerships as part of its global player aspirations. On the other hand, the
Chinese government found in Brazil, as in the rest of Latin America, the opportunity to
import large volumes of raw materials that would feed the accelerated growth of its
economy and boost its strategy of global projection through investments and loans
(Paulino, 2020).
At the end of Lula's second government, China displaced the United States as the main
destination for Brazilian exports, narrowed the gap with imports from that country and
its direct investments made a notable leap in the areas of energy, metals and transport,
among others. As the Chinese proverb says, “the one who has displaced the mountain is
the one who started by removing the small stones” and, in this sense, the Asian giant
was able to take advantage of its positive assessment of time, understood as a continuity
of long-term actions, and its economic and commercial power.
In this paper, we aim to examine China's rise on Brazil's foreign agenda during the 21st
century, paying special attention to existing commercial interests, particularly in the
energy sector. The decision to analyze the bilateral relationship through the energy
business was not a random one. First, we must bear in mind that China plays a strong
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
193
role in the chess game of global energy geopolitics thanks to its exponential growth. It
leads the world in primary energy consumption and, with Japan, in international trade in
liquefied natural gas (LNG); it is the largest importer of crude oil; it sets the pace —along
with India— in global coal production; and it exhibits very attractive growth in renewable
energy generation (it ranked first in 2022), as well as in the production of technologies
for its development (Energy Institute, 2023). In short, it aims to dominate the energy
business fronts, i.e. as a consumer, buyer and supplier in the clean energy industry.
Second, the place of Chinese energy investments in Brazil. In fact, energy is the sector
that has received the most investment since Lula's first government, and Brazil is the
main recipient in the South American scenario, regardless of the political turnovers
experienced in the region in general and in the country in particular in recent years. An
eloquent fact is that, in 2021 during Jair Bolsonaro's administration (2019-2022), Brazil
was the largest recipient of Chinese investment in the world (Cariello, 2022).
Bearing in mind that, since the mid-2000s, Chinese penetration in Brazil has been
vertiginous and voracious, we argue that it has maintained continuity and dynamism,
without being overshadowed by Brazilian political turnovers. Despite fluctuating on the
left-right spectrum, the pragmatic and strategic sense of the bilateral link has prevailed,
where trade and energy business have become its backbone. While the PT governments
took the political and economic dimensions of diplomacy towards China along the same
track, Bolsonaro's administration decoupled these dimensions, although he had to
relegate his “anti-communist cultural battle” in the face of China's status as the main
economic partner and the exuberant portfolio of investments in renewable and non-
renewable energies.
The paper is structured based on a qualitative methodological design that includes the
analysis of bibliographical documentation, statistics and declarations by high-level
officials. It is organized in two sections. The first is framed temporally at the beginning
of the launch of the strategic partnership and goes through the Petistas governments. In
the second section, which begins post-impeachment, we focus on showing that the
strategic association with the communist country is sustained, at least in economic terms
and mainly in the energy sector, despite the discourses against Chinese “Marxist
globalism”.
From strategic partnership to global strategic partnership
The end of the Cold War and, consequently, the process of international restructuring in
political and economic terms, not only reaffirmed the path taken by China and Brazil in
previous years, but also catapulted bilateral ties to a new level. In November 1993, after
the visit of the then Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, to Brazil, the relationship was
defined as a strategic partnership, and since then it has been the expression used to
refer to contacts between the two countries.
However, as Gonçalves & Bauab Brito (2010) express, there is no univocal definition of
what a strategic partnership is, although there is a shared understanding regarding its
essence. A strategic partnership refers to a partnership between three core elements:
fruitful dialogue, commitment in the medium and long term and close links in different
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
194
areas. In this sense, it represents “(...) relations between nations that have common
interests and are committed to cooperate and coordinate their actions in the international
environment” (Gonçalves & Bauab Brito, 2010, p. 12). Brun (2016, p. 195) summarizes
the issue by indicating that a strategic partnership refers to “(...) a priority relationship
over time and with multiple facets with benefits for both partners”. In this sense, for
Brazil, the recognition of strategic partnership was the first attempt to establish a priority
relationship with an important actor in the international arena, outside the Latin America-
United States-Europe axis. For China, it was an opportunity to continue deepening its
process of international opening through rapprochement with a major player on the Latin
American stage that stands out geographically, economically and in terms of population,
and which also has the necessary conditions to exercise leadership among other
developing countries (Biato Junior, 2010).
The strategic partnership declaration placed the bilateral relationship between China and
Brazil in a central position, which explains the proliferation of agreements throughout the
1990s for the joint treatment of economic-commercial, educational, scientific-
technological, agricultural, industrial and technical issues, among others (República
Federativa do Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, n.d.). Simulating a game of
cards, the definition of strategic partnership represented shuffling and re-shuffling. In
practice, this commitment, which does not imply the non-existence of differences
between the partners, must be read with certain caveats. First, it should be understood
as a kind of foundation on which the bilateral relationship rests in all its dimensions. It is
a mechanism for regulating and coordinating actions at the State-State level and in the
international arena. Considering this, it will not necessarily generate automatic results,
nor will they have the same intensity in all the areas involved. Secondly, and in
connection with the above, in the Sino-Brazilian case the understanding of strategic
partnership favored the recovery of trade exchange but was not decisive. Biato Junior
(2010) explains that the increase in trade values responded mainly to the process of
economic recovery and growth experienced by both countries and the increase in the
purchasing power of the population. The 1997-1998 Asian crisis generated a phase of
deceleration in trade that was quickly reversed towards the end of the 20th century and
the beginning of the current one. As can be seen in Table I, in 1990-2000 period, the
United States led the market for Brazilian products, followed at a marked distance by
Argentina, the Netherlands and Japan.
China's share began to grow from 1993 onwards, although in 1995, with the highest
export peak of the decade, it only represented 2.5% of Brazil's total sales. Imports
replicated the same behavior as exports, i.e. in the years 1995-1997, and reached 2%
of total purchases at that time. Prima facie, these numbers seem insignificant. However,
if we consider the size of the partners and the fact that in previous years trade oscillated
between 0.6% and 0.7%, the result is more than eloquent.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
195
Table I: Brazil's exports by main destinations (in millions of dollars)
Year
United States
Argentina
The Netherlands
Japan
China
1990
7594
645
2494
2348
381
1991
6264
1476
2147
2556
226
1992
6932
3039
2338
2305
460
1993
7843
3658
2488
2313
779
1994
8816
4135
3077
2574
822
1995
8682
4041
2917
3101
1203
1996
9182
5170
3548
3047
1113
1997
9368
6765
3997
3065
1087
1998
9741
6743
2741
2204
904
1999
10662
5359
2589
2190
674
2000
13160
6229
2794
2471
1084
2001
14148
4993
2861
1984
1901
2002
15325
2337
3124
2096
2516
Source: Authors elaboration with data from Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria,
Comércio e Serviços (COMEX STAT) (https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/)
With the arrival of Lula to the presidency, the Sino-Brazilian relation took on a priority
character thanks to the convergence of concrete interests between the two countries and
the possibilities for growth derived from the international context. Brazil had much to
offer China and China to Brazil, especially after its admission to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001.
The PT leader's decision to amplify and consolidate Brazil's international presence; to
build, in Celso Amorim’s words, an ativa e altiva foreign policy, permeated by a
universalist vision, advocating multilateralism, with a view to strengthening South-South
relations (Gomes Saraiva, 2010; Lessa, 2010, among others) found in China the ideal
candidate: a market with an immense consumption capacity and a powerful political
partner for addressing the central issues of the global agenda. For China, Brazil was a
window of opportunity both bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilaterally through the provision
of raw materials and basic inputs, as a space for the internationalization of its companies
and as a partner in the construction of an international architecture in line with the 21st
century. During his visit in November 2004, the then President Hu Jintao summed up this
issue in his speech to the Brazilian Congress: “(...) at the political level, we support each
other to be trustworthy and time-tested friends (...) at the economic level, we promote
mutual complementation with our respective advantages to be mutually beneficial
cooperation partners on the basis of a new starting point” (Hu Jintao, 2010). At
multilateral level, the convergence on strengthening multipolarity and the need to
democratize international relations stood out. Lula delivered his first speech as president-
elect to parliament in 2003 underlining the word mudança. These were times of change
at home and abroad.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
196
We aim not only to increase Brazil's presence on the international market,
but also to stimulate the incipient elements of multipolarity in
contemporary international life. The democratisation of international
relations without hegemonies of any kind is as important for the future of
humanity as the consolidation and development of democracy within each
state (da Silva, 2003).
During the PT's tenure in office, ties with China grew by leaps and bounds. In 2012,
Dilma Rousseff and Hu Jintao agreed to recategorize it as a global strategic partnership,
raising the scale of convergence and commitment, guided by the following guiding
principles: strengthening political trust and dialogue between equals, intensifying trade
exchange with reciprocal benefits, deepening international cooperation on bilateral and
global agenda items, and promoting knowledge between the societies of both countries
(República Federativa do Brasil, 2004). This resulted, among other things, in the creation
of COSBAN in 2004, the Brazil-China Cooperation Fund in 2015 and the signing of Joint
Action Plans (2010-2014, 2015-2021) and a Cooperation Plan (2012-2021), which “(...)
in a spirit of equality and pragmatism and aiming at obtaining positive results for both
parties' set the objectives and guidelines for joint work in all areas of the relationship”
(República Federativa do Brasil, 2015). As Brun (2016, p. 198) puts it, such an alliance
“(…) does not resemble classic alliances for at least three reasons: it does not include a
military component, it involves collective initiatives, and it does not suggest a systematic
commitment”.
COSBAN deserves a brief mention. This mechanism is made up of 11 thematic sub-
commissions
1
and plays a key role in the dynamics of the relationship, as it not only
establishes dialogue between the States at the executive level —vice prime minister of
the State Council for China and vice president for Brazil—, but is also in charge of
promoting and sustaining bilateral contact and establishing the steps to be taken.
Of all the dimensions involved in the relationship, two undoubtedly stand out: trade and
investment, particularly in the energy sector. In 2003, Brazilian exports to China
represented 6.2 per cent of the total, compared to 22.8 per cent of sales to the United
States as the main trading partner. This situation was reversed during Lula's second term
(see Table II), when North America was displaced by the emergence of China in 2009 as
the number one destination for Brazilian exports (13.8 per cent of the total), made up
mainly of soybeans, iron ore, oil and sugar, among others. This behavior has continued
to the present day, in addition to the widening of the gap in terms of trade with the
United States. In terms of volume, Dilma's administration surpassed Lula's, with a peak
of USD 46,023 million, reaching 19.8% of total exports in 2013
2
.
1
.Politics, Economic-Commercial and Cooperation, Economic-Financial, Industry, Information and
Communication Technologies, Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Issues, Energy and Mining,
Science, Technology and Innovation, Space Cooperation, Culture and Tourism, and Environment and
Climate Change.
2
It should be clarified for organizational purposes that the data expressed in the Rousseff administration,
as well as those contemplated in Temer's mandate, were considered by virtue of the calendar year,
despite the impeachment that led to her removal from office in mid-2016.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
197
In terms of imports, the increase in Chinese presence was remarkable. In 2003, Brazil
bought USD 2143 million, or 4.3% of its total imports, while in 2010 they reached USD
25,591 million. During the period 2003-2010, the average import value was USD 11.66
billion, while during 2011-2016, this value was USD 32.62 billion (República Federativa
do Brazil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços, n.d.).
Table II: Brazil's exports by destinations (in millions of dollars)
Year
United States
China
Argentina
2003
16659
4531
4559
2004
20002
5438
7371
2005
22643
6826
9967
2006
24507
8398
11733
2007
25051
10776
14409
2008
26547
16519
17598
2009
15598
20994
12781
2010
19300
30747
18507
2011
25776
44304
22701
2012
26646
41225
17986
2013
24643
46023
19612
2014
27016
40611
14277
2015
24037
35155
12793
2016
23155
35133
13417
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria,
Comércio e Serviços (COMEX STAT) (https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/)
The other side of the economic dynamism between the two States is around investment,
which we consider to be the spearhead of China's strategy to reach, and thus expand,
both in Brazil and in the rest of Latin America through loans, financing, the sale of
technological equipment, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in the strict sense of the
word. As mentioned above, the energy sector, without being the only one, has been the
main beneficiary of the large amounts of money that the Chinese government has
invested in the South American country over the course of this century. This can be
explained by the insertion of the two countries in the bilateral energy scheme. On the
one hand, China has directed its international strategy towards energy security in the
short, medium and long term through the diversification of sources and countries in a
context of global projection and gigantic energy consumption, which it satisfies mainly
through imports. On the other hand, Brazil possesses enormous potential in renewable
and non-renewable resources. The seriousness of the Venezuelan crisis and the
discoveries of pre-salt oilfields make it a leading actor in the production of crude oil; a
key resource in the export basket to China, and a regional leader in the production of
electricity through clean sources, especially from hydroelectric sources (Energy Institute,
2023). In other words, the same sector in which the Chinese government has bet heavily
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
198
on electricity generation. After coal, Chinese electricity is produced through the
implementation of hydroelectric power plants that feed consumption throughout the
country.
According to data from the China Global Investment Tracker (American Enterprise
Institute, 2024) and the Brazil-China Business Council (CEBC), during Lula's first
presidency, Chinese investment
3
was almost nil. Except for a few specific projects in
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, China's sights were focused on other geographical
areas, such as Australia, the United States, Russia and part of Africa. As stated by da
Silva & Soares (2011), the qualitative leap took place after 2010, coinciding not only with
China's expansion as a global investor, but also with the dynamism acquired in trade,
particularly after the displacement of the United States as the main destination for
Brazilian exports. In the authors' words, “(…) the Chinese investments in Brazil
announced in 2010 followed two patterns. The first was the inclusion of Brazil in the
international base of suppliers of raw materials for China. The second was the entry of
the Chinese into the consumer market and the Brazilian industrial arena” (da Silva &
Soares, 2011, p. 7).
According to information provided by the American Enterprise Institute (2024), in Lula's
second term (2007-2010), Chinese investments, in their three basic modalities (total or
partial mergers and acquisitions, formation of joint ventures or greenfield projects),
reached a value of USD 14.99 billion, with USD 12 billion identified in the energy sector.
Here we find the participation of players such as China Investment Corporation (CIC),
China Petroleum and Chemical (SINOPEC), State Grid and SINOCHEM (American
Enterprise Institute, 2024).
The case of State Grid is noteworthy. This company is the world leader in the electricity
transmission and distribution business. Its figures are superlative. In China, it supplies
more than 1.1 billion customers, covers around 88% of the national territory and has
deployed operations in different countries in the five continents. In 2010, Brazil was the
first destination outside Asia where State Grid made its first major investment. Its growth
has led it to control transmission lines that cross 13 States, equivalent to 10% of the
total national high-voltage grid (State Grid Brazil Holding, n.d.).
In comparative terms, during the Rousseff administration, Chinese investment policy
showed similarities, but also some nuances. According to the American Enterprise
Institute (2024), investments totaled USD 35.62 billion, with energy accounting for
around 73.9 per cent, or USD 26.34 billion (Graph I). This was possible thanks to the
commitment of three large companies: Three Gorges, China National Petroleum Corp
(CNPC) and China National Off-shore Oil (CNOOC), which, together with those mentioned
above, eclipsed the Brazilian energy industry in renewable and non-renewable matters,
as well as in its distant phases. It is not a minor fact that three of the four companies
3
We agree with Paulino (2020) on the difficulties in addressing the issue of Chinese investments in Latin
America and the world due to the existence of different methodologies to quantify them. For
methodological and operational purposes, we opted for the information from China Global Investment
Tracker (American Enterprise Institute, 2024) to homogenize the data for the different periods and
because its interactive online access allows for permanent contact and comparisons with other countries.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
199
(State Grid, Three Gorges and SINOPEC) have Brazil as the main destination for activities
outside China.
In contrast to the period 2007-2010, the remaining percentage of investments was
diversified in terms of portfolio. Sectors such as agriculture, logistics, technology and
chemicals, among others, were added. A colorful fact is presented in the behavior of
investments during Dilma's administrations. In her first term investments of USD 16.09
billion were recorded, while in the following two years, coinciding with the greatest period
of national political instability because of Lava Jato Operation and the impeachment, this
amount rose to USD 19.53 billion. This shows that the ups and downs of investments are
subject to a myriad of factors and sometimes there is no unidirectional relationship in
terms of variables. Paulino (2020) notes that in 2012-2014 there was a slowdown in
Chinese investments in Brazil because in that period the effects of the 2008 international
financial crisis were felt most strongly in Europe and developing countries. Commodity
prices fell and both the global economy and growth in Brazil and China slowed down,
respectively, which led to a decline in investment volumes.
Graph I: Chinese investments in Brazil by periods
Source: Our elaboration with data from China Global Investment Tracker
(https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618)
From Temer to Bolsonaro: business is business
When Michel Temer assumed the presidency in 2016, after Dilma Rousseff's
impeachment, foreign policy was not one of his priorities, which to some extent was
expected given the complexity of the domestic context (Pereyra Doval, 2019). It did
undergo budgetary adjustments and adjustments in terms of perspectives since it was
led by a political leader who, unlike his predecessor, belonged to the center-right
spectrum. Gone were the intentions of understanding the region as a platform for the
country's international projection, of consolidating itself as a global player, or of
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Energy Metals Real
Estate
Finance Transport
2007-2010
Total Chinese investments in Brazil:
14990 (in millions of dollars)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
2011-2016
Total Chinese investments in Brazil: 35620
(in millions of dollars)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
200
appealing to South-South dialogue and cooperation. These were times of revitalizing
State-State relations fundamentally in economy.
And as business is business, Temer's first international mission was to China in
September 2016. At the Brazil-China High-Level Business Seminar, the former president
expressed his admiration for Chinese culture and people and described the bilateral
relationship with words such as trust, genuine friendship and allies, among others
(Temer, 2016). At the same time, he stated that the trade relationship with China not
only remained the same, but that he had clear intentions to deepen it. Given the
economic recession and the socio-political turmoil resulting from the impeachment, it
was imperative for Temer to sustain the flow of Chinese investment, at least in the short
and medium term, and to recover export volumes, which had fallen in 2014-2015.
In terms of trade, the 2017-2018 period was positive for the sale of Brazilian products.
While in those two years the average amount of exports to China was approximately USD
55.708 million, during the Rousseff administration this amount was USD 40.408 million.
In 2018, China accounted for 27.5% of total Brazilian exports, made up of crude oil, iron
ore, soybeans and sugar, among others.
What happened to investments? The information provided by China Global Investment
Tracker (American Enterprise Institute, 2024) shows that there was no halt in terms of
amounts, although they did have a stealthier behavior. This process was influenced by a
set of variables such as the temporary nature of Temer's term, the uncertainty of the
upcoming electoral process and the reduction of Chinese investments in the world.
Between 2017 and 2018, China invested USD 11.48 billion, with the energy sector
absorbing USD 6.84 billion. The power generation, transmission and distribution sector
led the way in receiving funds, especially through State Grid and Three Gorges (Cariello,
2019).
Jair Bolsonaro's triumph in the 2018 presidential elections generated astonishment in
some quarters, although it was a foreseeable fact. From a global perspective, it reflected
what was happening in the region and in other parts of the world, to wit the advance of
right-wing governments (Pereyra Doval & Souroujon, 2021). From a domestic
perspective, without being the sole cause, as Nunes (2024) argues, the Lava Jato
institutional corruption scandal provided a unique opportunity for ultra-liberals and anti-
communists to push a new narrative of polarization that Brazilian right-wing forces were
able to capitalize on.
Supported by sectors of the armed forces, the agribusiness lobby and evangelical groups,
Bolsonaro arrived at the Planalto Palace with the mission to “(…) restore and rewrite [the]
country, definitively freeing it from corruption, criminality, economic irresponsibility and
ideological submissiveness” (Bolsonaro, 2019). In short, his mission as a “good citizen”
was to combat everything that progressivism, identified with the PT, had built at the
domestic and international levels and, in this sense, Bolsonaro has given us something
to talk about (Pereyra Doval, 2019).
Regarding foreign policy, during his presidential campaign, where there was no lack of a
violent and reactionary narrative, Bolsonaro pointed out certain elements that would act
as a compass for his vision of the world. Thus, the idea of rebuilding Brazil's greatness
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
201
and promoting its development was anchored in the pursuit of a privileged relationship
with the United States, a move away from regional schemes, and a critical stance towards
China and governments associated with communism (Frenkel, 2018; Brun, 2019;
Pereyra Doval, 2019).
Of the three points, the link with China was undoubtedly the one that set alarm bells
ringing in academic, government and business circles. In February 2018, amid the
election campaign, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan. Since the recognition of China as a Republic
in the 1970s, he was the first presidential candidate to embark on such an adventure.
And as if that were not enough, there was no shortage of hostile appraisals of China,
described, among other things, as a “predatory economic power” that was not investing
in Brazil, but rather buying it.
When he took over the executive, the battle between his verbose anti-China rhetoric and
pragmatism was defined in favor of the latter by the existence of institutional
counterweights. This included the balancing of vice-president Hamilton Mourão through
official visits, Brazilian support for the Chinese candidate in the elections to the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the intervention of the
agribusiness, a sector that did not hesitate to pressure Bolsonaro for fear of the
consequences for exports (Brun, 2019; Pereyra Doval, 2019). In this sense, in addition
to the political counterweight, Mourão took advantage of the meeting with his Chinese
counterpart, Wang Qishan, at the fifth COSBAN meeting, held in May 2019, to propose
turning over a new leaf and putting the relationship back on track. However, the calm
was short-lived. There is no doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating impact
on the world in human, health, economic and commercial terms. Likewise, in politics it
was used not only by the United States and China to settle yet another front in their
dispute for global hegemony, but also by other actors to justify their vision of politics and
international reality anchored in a dichotomous right-left reductionism. Bolsonaro's
government was one of them. In addition to the exchanges between Eduardo Bolsonaro,
deputy and son of the former president, and the Chinese ambassador to Brazil, Yang
Wanming, the former blaming the Chinese government for the virus and the latter
blaming him for a 'mental virus', there were insinuations of the then president about
COVID-19 as a possible laboratory virus created by China to launch an international
bacteriological or chemical war: “Are we not facing a new war? Which country recorded
the highest GDP growth? I'm not going to tell you”, Bolsonaro asked in a public statement
(France 24, 05/05/21). However, in practice, the political distance between Bolsonaro
and Xi Jinping was overshadowed by the good performance of the economic-trade plane
in terms of trade and investment. As shown in Table III, Brazilian exports performed
positively during the Temer and Bolsonaro governments, with a brief decline between
2018 and 2019, despite being part of a political spectrum more inclined towards
understanding with the United States than with China. A curious fact is that during 2020
and 2021, complex years for trade flows due to the pandemic, Brazilian exports, precisely
because of their composition and destination, experienced a significant rise compared to
previous years. Bolsonaro ended his mandate in 2022 with 26.7% of total exports to
China, a value very similar to that of Temer. Meanwhile, the recovery of imports was a
little slower due to the weakening of Brazilian economy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
202
Table III: Brazil-China trade (2017-2022) (in millions of dollars)
Year
Exports
Imports
2017
47488
27553
2018
63928
35157
2019
63357
36028
2020
67788
34778
2021
87907
47650
2022
89427
60743
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria,
Comércio e Serviços (COMEX STAT) (https://comexstat.mdic.gov.br/)
In terms of investments, volumes were not exuberant compared to previous stages, but
they were on the order of the day, with no interruptions
4
or diversions. The pandemic
effect, the consolidation of ongoing projects and the challenges of the economies involved
help to understand these dynamics. Having overcome the obstacles posed by the COVID-
19 expansion, the CEBC defined 2021 as “a year of rebound” in terms of the flow of
Chinese investment in Brazil, with the number of projects having grown by 250%
compared to 2020. For China Global Investment Tracker (American Enterprise Institute,
2024), 2021 was a paradigmatic year for the Brazil-China link, as the South American
country was the one that received the most investments from the Asian giant in the
world; it is also the actor that concentrates around 48% of the flows invested by China
in South America (Cariello, 2022). Continuing the trend, the energy sector accounted for
USD 9.87 billion, 78.2% of the total invested in the period 2019-2022 (Graph II), with
the entry of PowerChina, the developer of clean energy infrastructure, such as solar and
hydroelectric, and China General Nuclear, dedicated to the implementation of renewable
energy plants, standing out (Cariello, 2022).
The facts show that, vis-à-vis China, Bolsonaro spent his mandate in a constant tension
between his ideology and the need to take certain actions to address the needs of the
country's domestic and foreign agenda. This situation led him, with his lack of foreign
policy knowledge, to many discursive missteps, many of which have escaped the basic
forms of diplomacy. Trade dynamism and investment policy reflect the fact that
Bolsonaro's slips have not overshadowed the pattern that has characterized the Sino-
Brazilian relationship for decades.
4
The case of the current Argentine executive can be taken as a reference to demonstrate the validity of
our hypothesis. In this sense, in the Argentina-China bilateral relationship, ideological divisions are
currently taking precedence over pragmatic considerations, which has had repercussions for Chinese
investment in Buenos Aires. The clearest example of this was the stoppage of the construction of two
dams in Santa Cruz and the consequent dismissal of workers, as well as a possible lawsuit for breach of
contract. All of this was a consequence of President Milei's reservations about the bilateral link and the
executive's delay in signing contracts (Pereyra Doval, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
203
Graph II: Chinese investments during the Temer and Bolsonaro governments
Source: Our elaboration with data from China Global Investment Tracker
(https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618)
Lula's return to the national executive has generated new expectations for the
relationship between Brasilia and Beijing. The current president made his third State visit
to China in April 2023 with the aim of writing a new chapter in the bilateral relationship,
probably with the 'illusion' that it would be like the one written during his first term in
office. The little time that has elapsed shows promising traits both economically - exports
and investments - and politically. However, one can only hope, as history is still being
written.
Conclusion
The process of building and strengthening ties between Brazil and China over this century
is unprecedented in the South American scenario. Undoubtedly, the weight of the actors
involved, the trajectory of the bilateral relationship and how it is inscribed in global
geopolitics are factors that differentiate it from other countries in the region.
The evolution from strategic partnership to global strategic partnership has been the
result of the continuous presence of both States in their respective foreign policy
guidelines, thanks to the identification of the same objective: the generation of a business
agenda with a medium- and long-term impact. The data are more than eloquent. For
more than a decade, China has displaced the United States as Brazil’s main trading
partner and has a compulsive investment policy. China’s interest in a key portfolio such
as energy provides it with a solid base for political and economic expansion towards the
rest of Latin America. For its part, Brazil has found in the Asian giant a first-rate source
of foreign currency due to the magnitude of the market and a major partner that
contributes to redefining its position on the international stage.
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2017-2018
Total Chinese investments in
Brazil: 11480
(in millons of dollars)
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
Energy Metals Transport
2019-2022
Total Chinese investments in
Brazil: 12620
(in millons of dollars)
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
204
Brazilian executive’s ideological turns in the left-right spectrum did not overshadow the
continuity of business or generate changes in the bilateral trade dynamic. In this sense,
both the PT governments and the administrations of Temer and Bolsonaro shared a
pragmatic and strategic vision of the bilateral relationship, anchored in the economic-
commercial sphere because, ultimately, business is business.
In the case of the PT, the objectives complementarity in foreign policy between Brasilia
and Beijing made it possible to strike a balance between the political and economic
dimensions of the shared agenda. The systemic changes at the beginning of the century
allowed Brazil and China to forge closer ties through convergence in common spaces and
the creation of multilateral forums such as BRICS. Brazil's active role in successive and
simultaneous global negotiations brought it closer to the Asian country, which was also
expanded economically at the international level. The shifts that emerged from the 2008
financial crisis continued to generate spaces for China's expansion, which became the
main competitor of the United States. Latin America thus became a scenario in dispute
for hegemony.
At this juncture of intra-hegemonic struggle, Bolsonaro’s government positioned itself on
the side of the “West”. To this end, the design of his foreign policy moved away from
Itamaraty’s traditional guidelines. In this way, the political-diplomatic and economic-
commercial dimensions were decoupled. However, perhaps due to pressure from
agribusiness —one of Bolsonaro's electoral backers— or the actions of Hamilton Mourão
—who in his role as vice-president carried out a kind of counter-balance - the ideological
struggle against China of the ex-president was mitigated. The short-circuits that existed
during Bolsonaro’s term in office did not divert the relationship from its usual path.
Bilateral relations between Brazil and China, even in years of diplomatic tensions, were
sustained and expanded in their economic aspect. Business as usual.
References
Altemani de Oliveira, H. (2006). China-Brasil: perspectivas de cooperación Sur-Sur.
Nueva Sociedad, (203), pp. 138-147.
American Enterprise Institute (2024). China Global Investment Tracker.
https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/
Biato Junior, Oswaldo (2010). A parceria estratégica sino-brasileira: origens, evolução e
perspectivas (1993-2006). Brasília: FUNAG-Ministério das Relações Exteriores.
Bolsonaro, Jair (2019). Discurso do Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, durante
Cerimônia de Posse no Congresso Nacional, 1º jan.
http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-
presidentes/bolsonaro/discursos/discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-jair-bolsonaro-
durante-cerimonia-de-posse-no-congresso-nacional
Brun, Élodie (2016). Brasil-China: varios torrentes, un río. Gladys Lechini & Clarisa
Giaccaglia (eds.). Poderes emergentes y cooperación Sur-Sur. Perspectivas desde el Sur
Global. UNR Editora: Rosario, pp. 193-210.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
205
Brun, Élodie (2019). El Brasil de Jair Bolsonaro y China: un matrimonio de conveniencia.
Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica. https://revistafal.com/el-brasil-de-jair-bolsonaro-y-china-
un-matrimonio-de-conveniencia/
Cariello, Tulio (2019). Investimentos chineses no Brasil 2018. O quadro brasileiro em
perspectiva global. Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China. Retrieved in June 2024, from:
https://ecoa.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Investimentos-chineses-no-Brasil-
2018.pdf
Cariello, Tulio (2022). Investimentos chineses no Brasil 2021. Um ano de retomada.
Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China. https://www.cebc.org.br/2022/08/31/estudo-
inedito-investimentos-chineses-no-brasil-2021/
Cervo, Amado L. (2010). Brazil’ s rise on the international Scene: Brazil and the World.
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53, pp. 7-32.
da Silva, Édison & Soares, André (2011). Chinese Investments in Brazil A new phase in
the China-Brazil relationship. Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China.
https://www.cebc.org.br/2011/05/01/investimento-chineses-no-brasil-2011/
da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2003). Discurso do presidente Lula no Congresso Nacional, 1 de
jan. https://www.camara.leg.br/tv/146709-discurso-dopresidente-lula-no-congresso-
nacional/
Energy Institute (2023). Statistical Review of World Energy, 72nd Edition.
https://www.energyinst.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1055542/EI_Stat_Review_PD
F_single_3.pdf
France 24 (2021). Bolsonaro insinúa que China creó la pandemia para lanzar una “guerra
química”. https://www.france24.com/es/minuto-a-minuto/20210505-bolsonaro-
insin%C3%BAa-que-china-cre%C3%B3-la-pandemia-para-lanzar-una-guerra-
qu%C3%ADmica
Frenkel, Alejandro (2018). El mundo según Bolsonaro. La nueva política exterior de
Brasil. Nueva Sociedad. Opinión. https://nuso.org/articulo/el-mundo-segun-bolsonaro/
Giaccaglia, Clarisa (2010). La influencia de los actores domésticos en la política exterior
brasileña durante el gobierno de Lula da Silva. Revista CONfines, 6(12), pp. 95-121.
Gomes Saraiva, M.; Costa Silva, Álvaro (2019). Ideologia e pragmatismo na política
externa de Jair Bolsonaro. Relações Internacionais, (64), pp. 117-137.
Gomes Saraiva, Miriam (2010). Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during
the Lula administration: caught between South America and MERCOSUR. Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53, pp. 151-168.
Gonçalves, Williams & Bauab Brito, Lana (2010). Relações Brasil-China: uma parceria
estratégica? Século XXI, 1(1), pp. 11-28.
Jintao, Hu (2004). Texto Íntegro del Discurso Pronunciado por Hu Jintao ante el Congreso
de Brasil, 12 de nov. http://ve.china-
embassy.gov.cn/esp/xwdt/200411/t20041113_4543276.htm
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 190-206
Brazil-China Bilateral link during the 21st Century: Business as Usual
Natalia Ceppi, Gisela Preyra Doval
206
Lechini, Gladys; Giaccaglia, Clarisa (2010). El ascenso de Brasil en tiempos de Lula ¿líder
regional o jugador global? Revista Problemas del Desarrollo, 163(41), pp. 53-73.
Lessa, Antônio Carlos (2010). Brazil's strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula
era (2003-2010). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53, pp. 115-131.
Nunes, Rodrigo (2024). Bolsonarismo y extrema derecha global. Una gramática de la
desintegración. Tinta Limón: Buenos Aires.
Paulino, Luís Antonio (2020). Las relaciones Brasil-China en el siglo XXI. Relaciones
Internacionales, 29(59), pp. 155-175.
Pereyra Doval, Gisela & Souroujon, Gastón (2021). Global resurgence of the right.
Routledge: London.
Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2013). La Autonomía como eje rector de la política exterior. El
caso brasileño. Revista Temas & Debates, (25), pp. 109-125.
Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2019). Giro a la derecha y política exterior brasileña en tiempos
de Bolsonaro. María Elena Lorenzini & Natalia Ceppi (eds.). Zooms sudamericanos:
agendas, vínculos externos y desafíos en el siglo XXI. UNR Editora: Rosario, pp. 47-65.
Pereyra Doval, Gisela (2024). Occidentalismo y Diplomacia Virtual: la Política Exterior de
Javier Milei. Le Monde Diplomatique, 298, pp. 8-9.
Reis da Silva, André & Pérez, José (2019). Lula, Dilma, and Temer: The Rise and Fall of
Brazilian Foreign Policy. Latin American Perspectives, 46(4), pp. 169-185.
República Federativa do Brasil (2004). Memorando de Entendimento entre a República
Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China sobre o estabelecimento da Comissão
sino-brasileira de alto nível de concertação e cooperação.
https://aplicacao.itamaraty.gov.br/ApiConcordia/Documento/download/3807
República Federativa do Brasil (2015). Plano de ação conjunta entre o governo da
República Federativa do Brasil e o governo da República Popular da China.
https://aplicacao.itamaraty.gov.br/ApiConcordia/Documento/download/130
República Federativa do Brasil, Ministério das Relações Exteriores (n.d.). International
Acts. https://concordia.itamaraty.gov.br/
República Federativa do Brazil, Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e
Serviços (n.d.) https://www.gov.br/mdic/pt-br
State Grid Brazil Holding (n.d.). https://stategrid.com.br/pt_br
Temer, Michel (2016). Discurso do senhor Presidente da República, Michel Temer,
durante cerimônia de encerramento do Seminário Empresarial de Alto Nível Brasil-China-
Xangai/China. http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-
presidentes/michel-temer/discursos-do-presidente-da-republica/discurso-do-
presidente-da-republica-michel-temer-durante-cerimonia-de-encerramento-do-
seminario-empresarial-de-alto-nivel-brasil-china
Vigevani, Tullo; Cepaluni, Gabriel (2007). Lula's foreign policy and the quest for
autonomy through diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28, pp. 1309-1326.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
207
BEYOND IRON ORE: REFRAMING THE BRAZIL-CHINA PARTNERSHIP AS A
MULTIFACETED ENGAGEMENT
LORHAN DE OLIVEIRA PEREIRA
lohan.diplomacy@gmail.com
Masters’ degree candidate in International Master Program in Asia-Pacific Affairs (IMAPA),
National Sun-Yat Sen University, Taipei (China)..
KAI YIN ALLISON HAGA
allisonh@cse.nsysu.edu.tw
Assistant Professor, International Master Program in Asia-Pacific Affairs (IMAPA), National Sun-
Yat Sen University, Taipei (China) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5721-3846.
Abstract
This paper examines the evolving multifaceted engagement between China and Brazil,
focusing on the catalytic role of the iron ore trade in shaping their strategic partnership.
Driven by China's growing demand for iron ore and its strategic need to diversify supply
chains, the relationship has evolved beyond economic interests into a broader strategic
alliance. This alliance encompasses increased economic integration, characterized by trade,
infrastructure projects, and technology transfer, as well as shared ideological alignment within
multilateral institutions like BRICS and the G20. This paper argues that the China-Brazil
partnership, fueled by their mutual reliance on iron ore, exemplifies how resource-driven
partnerships can evolve into strategic alliances with significant implications for global politics
and economics. The alliance signifies a shift in global power dynamics, with emerging powers
like Brazil playing an increasingly important role in shaping the future of international
relations.
Keywords
Iron ore, China-Brazil relations, resource-driven, multilateral institutions, global power
dynamics.
Resumo
Este artigo examina a evolução do envolvimento multifacetado entre a China e o Brasil,
concentrando-se no papel catalisador do comércio de minério de ferro na definição da sua
parceria estratégica. Impulsionada pela crescente procura de minério de ferro por parte da
China e pela sua necessidade estratégica de diversificar as cadeias de abastecimento, a
relação evoluiu para além dos interesses económicos, para uma aliança estratégica mais
ampla. Esta aliança abrange uma maior integração económica, caracterizada pelo comércio,
projectos de infra-estruturas e transferência de tecnologia, bem como um alinhamento
ideológico partilhado dentro de instituições multilaterais como os BRICS e o G20. Este artigo
argumenta que a parceria China-Brasil, alimentada pela sua dependência mútua do minério
de ferro, exemplifica como as parcerias orientadas para os recursos podem evoluir para
alianças estratégicas com implicações significativas para a política e a economia globais. A
aliança significa uma mudança na dinâmica do poder global, com potências emergentes como
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
208
o Brasil desempenhando um papel cada vez mais importante na definição do futuro das
relações internacionais.
Palavras-chave
Minério de ferro, relações China-Brasil, instituições multilaterais orientadas por recursos,
dinâmica de poder global.
How to cite this article
Pereira, Lorhan de Oliveira & Haga, Kai Yin Allison (2024). Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-
China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International
Order”. December 2024, pp. 207-221. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.10.
Article received on 6 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 21 August 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
209
BEYOND IRON ORE: REFRAMING THE BRAZIL-CHINA
PARTNERSHIP AS A MULTIFACETED ENGAGEMENT
LORHAN DE OLIVEIRA PEREIRA
KAI YIN ALLISON HAGA
Introduction
The Brazil-China relationship, once hailed as a "perfect match" due to their
complementary economic strengths, has faced significant challenges in recent years
(Freitas, 2014). This "perfect match" envisioned a mutually beneficial partnership, with
China's burgeoning demand for raw materials aligning with Brazil's abundant resources.
This initial optimism was tempered by a downturn in 2014, however, that was
characterized by economic contractions and declining levels of engagement. Beyond a
few large corporations, most Brazilian companies struggled to penetrate the Chinese
market, leaving Brazil with a trade deficit. Despite these challenges, a new window of
opportunity emerged in the 2020s. China's shift away from Australia, driven by
geopolitical tensions and economic statecraft, created a demand for alternative sources
of raw materials, particularly iron ore. Brazil, with its vast reserves, emerged as a key
alternative, offering China a chance to diversify its supply chain and reduce its
dependence on Australia. This shift has the potential to reshape the Brazil-China
partnership, opening avenues for deeper economic integration and strategic cooperation.
While iron ore remains a crucial commodity in this evolving relationship, it is only one
aspect of a multifaceted engagement. This paper explores recent shifts in Brazil-China
relations and proposes a new framework for analyzing their complex relationship, looking
at geopolitical, technological, strategic, multilateral, economic, and political dimensions.
This framework will be illustrated through the lens of the rising importance of Brazil's
iron ore supply to China, demonstrating how this single commodity can serve as a case
study for understanding the potential for a deeper and more strategic partnership
between the two nations. Realizing the full potential of this partnership, however, would
require addressing the economic disparities, geopolitical tensions, and technological
collaboration needs. This paper will explore how both countries can navigate these
challenges and build a more resilient and mutually beneficial relationship in the face of a
changing global landscape.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
210
Literature Review
The turn of the century saw China and Brazil, both aspiring regional powers, seeking
closer collaboration. Niu (2010), a Chinese research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for
International Studies, examined the impact of the Lula era on the evolving bilateral
strategic partnership. He recognized that the conversations and exchanges between the
two countries were becoming more substantive, covering a broader spectrum of topics,
and wielding a greater impact on the global stage. Niu advised both countries to layer
more regional and global components into their bilateral agenda, to enhance ties in terms
of economic cooperation and social interaction.
Cardoso (2012) echoed Niu's observation, highlighting the rise of trading volume and the
establishment of high-level bilateral institutions, particularly in their collaboration within
various multilateral institutions and mechanisms. Cardoso focused his research on
relevant domestic actors and the strategic meanings behind this partnership. He found
that both countries were eager to cooperate and seize this window of opportunity. The
establishment of the BRICS marked the starting point of this collaboration, aiming to
influence the world order and global governance. However, ten years later, the question
remains: what has this partnership achieved?
Armony & Velasquez (2016) recognized that a complex matrix of interactions,
encompassing developmental, political, cultural, and "soft power" dimensions, was
behind the rapid growth of China-Brazil economic relations. While acknowledging a clear
"honeymoon" sentiment among Brazilians towards China, they cautioned that the
benefits Brazil received might not be long term, due to unpredictable circumstances. This
warning proved prescient as bitterness began to rise as Brazilian companies faced
difficulties penetrating the Chinese market and the potential threat of China's aggressive
strategy in potentially taking over physical control of Brazil's (and other Latin American
countries') natural resources (Rocha and Bielschowsky, 2018).
Despite these difficulties and hazards, Brazilians remain eager to seek closer
collaboration with China, particularly in terms of investments to diversify its
manufacturing economy (Hiratuka, 2020). As China has established itself as Brazil's main
supplier of manufactured products, Brazilian elites have raised concerns about the
concentration of Brazilian exports in a few products, the potential hidden environmental
costs, and the impact of the influx of Chinese products on the domestic market. Brazil
urgently needs to upgrade its manufacturing capacity and diversify its economic growth.
Chinese companies, like BYD, may be able to provide the technological guidance and
assistance that Brazil seeks. Hiratuka emphasizes that the presence of these Chinese
companies requires appropriate coordination from Brazilian policymakers.
Iron Ore's Role
Scholars have observed that despite shifts in Brazilian political leadership, the
relationship between Brazil and China grew stronger and more multifaceted from 1995
to 2020, regardless of whether the Brazilian government was left-leaning or right-
leaning. Vazquez (2022) observed that Brazil's trade with China and its trade with the
United States moved in tandem, demonstrating a shared pattern of growth and evolution
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
211
over the course of the study. The transformation of Brazil-China relations over a quarter
of a century, according to Vazquez, is evident in three key areas: the strengthening of
diplomatic ties through an expanded network, the significant growth of trade and
investment, and the convergence of their positions on global governance issues. He
argued that Brazil's relationship with China should not be viewed solely through the lens
of political ideology. Under President Jair Bolsonaro, Vazquez points out, the relationship
has become more pragmatic, adapting to shared interests rather than ideological clashes,
without necessarily being dependent on or excluding Brazil's ties with the US.
The growing importance of iron ore is a crucial aspect of the Brazil-China partnership that
requires further analysis. Iron ore is a vital ingredient for making steel, a massive
industry that builds everything from bridges to buildings. The demand for steel has
grown quickly, so iron ore production has been booming since the year 2000. Australia
and Brazil are the biggest suppliers of iron ore, and China is the biggest buyer. The iron
ore industry is working to improve its technology to make it more efficient,
environmentally friendly, and cost-effective. These advancements include the adoption
of automated mining systems, advanced processing techniques, and sustainable mining
practices. This research aims to bridge the gap in existing scholarship by examining the
increasing importance of iron ore trade in the context of the broader Brazil-China
relationship, analyzing its implications for both countries, and exploring the potential for
a more multifaceted and strategic engagement.
Research Methodology
This research aims to answer the question: How has the increasing importance of iron
ore trade shaped the evolving relationship between Brazil and China? Contextual analysis
is particularly relevant to this research because it allows for a comprehensive
understanding of the complex interplay of historical, political, economic, and social
factors shaping the Brazil-China relationship, especially in the context of iron ore trade.
The research draws on a variety of data sources, including: 1) academic journal articles,
which provide in-depth analysis of Brazil-China relations, including the role of iron ore
trade; 2) news reports, which offer insights into current events and the evolving
dynamics of the Brazil-China relationship; and 3) think-tank reports, which provide
expert analysis and policy recommendations on various aspects of Brazil-China relations,
including trade and investment.
The data collected from these sources is analyzed through a process of thematic analysis,
identifying key themes and patterns in the literature related to the Brazil-China
relationship and iron ore trade. Thematic analysis will focus on identifying key themes
such as the evolution of trade patterns, the impact of geopolitical shifts on iron ore trade,
the role of technological advancements in the iron ore industry, and the broader
implications of the Brazil-China partnership for regional and global stability. This analysis
will involve coding the data, identifying patterns and relationships between themes, and
drawing conclusions based on the emerging insights.
While this research draws on a diverse range of sources, it is important to acknowledge
that the study is limited by the availability of publicly accessible data, particularly
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
212
regarding government documents and internal company reports. Future research could
benefit from conducting interviews with key stakeholders in the Brazilian and Chinese
iron ore industries to gain deeper insights into the dynamics of their relationship.
Geopolitical Analysis of China-Brazil Relations: Economic Ties, Political
Ideology, and Commodities
Bilateral relations between Brazil and the People's Republic of China are relatively recent.
In 1974, Brazil formally recognized the People's Republic of China. The Deng Xiaoping
era was crucial for Brazil as Deng Xiaoping's government incorporated Brazil into Chinese
plans. This culminated in 1984 with the first visit of a Brazilian president to China. In
the last three decades, the relationship between China and Brazil has evolved
significantly, spanning economic, political, and strategic dimensions. This analysis delves
into the multifaceted nature of their ties, exploring the dynamics of economic integration,
ideological alignment, and the significance of commodities in shaping their relationship.
What drew the attention of President João Figueiredo to China was the economic
situation. The 1980s is known as the lost decade for Brazil, where the Brazilian economy
was in decline. By contrast, China had already experienced significant economic growth,
with a 15.2% increase in 1984 (World Bank, n.d.). João Figueiredo's visit to China was
more symbolic, as he presented only a speech emphasizing a "convergence band"
between China and Brazil. President Figueiredo's speech highlighted that while China and
Brazil were extremely different countries in several factors, both sought international
clout in a similar manner. Neither Brazil nor China wanted to be aligned with superpowers
like the United States or the Soviet Union. Both countries prioritized development and
believed that internal stability was crucial for achieving it. This meant refraining from
interfering in the affairs of other countries (Horta, 2016). Although President Figueiredo
returned to Brazil without reaching any formal agreement with China, he managed to
demonstrate to China the mutual necessity for the two countries to draw closer together
to achieve joint international integration as sovereign nations. This shared focus on
economic development would eventually lead to a significant increase in trade between
the two countries, particularly in commodities like iron ore, which would become a key
driver of their relationship in the years to come. This early focus on economic cooperation
and non-alignment would lay the groundwork for a more multifaceted relationship in the
decades to come, with iron ore trade emerging as a crucial factor shaping the dynamics
of their engagement.
China-Brazil Technological and Strategic Partnership
In 1988, another Brazilian president traveled to China. President Sarney visited the
People's Republic of China, and during this visit, Brazil and China signed an agreement
called the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). This marked a significant
moment as both countries ventured into space satellite technology. The project is a
collaborative effort utilizing technology from both nations. The primary goal of CBERS is
to track the Earth's crust, mapping natural resources, monitoring deforestation, and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
213
tracking sea currents. This early technological collaboration would later pave the way for
joint ventures in the mining sector, including the development of more efficient and
sustainable iron ore extraction technologies.
In 1992, Brazil received two Chinese statesmen. The first was Jiang Zemin, who
succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the leader of China, marking the first visit of a Chinese head
of state to Brazil. Later that year, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji also visited Brazil.
During Zhu Rongji's visit, Brazil and China established a strategic partnership, meaning
a bilateral agreement signifying mutual importance in each other's foreign policy
objectives. This partnership would lay the foundation for a more integrated economic
relationship, with the iron ore trade being pivotal in strengthening their economic and
strategic ties. Over time, this relationship evolved from a strategic partnership to a global
strategic partnership, denoting even greater significance between the two nations
(Jenkins, 2012, p.21).
Brazil-China Trade Partnership
In the 1990s, Brazil witnessed a large trade surplus with China. Brazil imported
inexpensive manufactured products, known as low-value-added manufactured products,
from China during this period. Meanwhile, Brazil exported raw materials and commodities
such as iron ore and soybeans to China (Bull, 2011, p.231). From 1998 to 2004, Brazil
experienced a significant surge in commodity trade due to China's increasing demand,
solidifying its position as a global player in the exports of soybeans, oil, and iron ore
(Barbosa & Mendes, 2006, p.2).
In 2004, President Lula made his first visit to China. During the same year, Embraer, the
Brazilian multinational aerospace corporation (Aulakh, 2006, p.93) established a
presence in China. Additionally, the Brazil-China Business Forum was inaugurated. This
business forum, along with the earlier technological collaborations, facilitated the
development of joint ventures in the mining sector, contributing to the growth of iron ore
exports. The purpose of this business forum was to facilitate business and contracts
between Brazilian and Chinese companies, reducing the necessity for government
intermediation. While the government continued to participate in negotiations,
companies gained greater autonomy in forming agreements and conducting business.
Since then, Brazil has made larger investments in China, and China has become one of
the largest investors in Brazil, within various sectors. Brazil has primarily sold raw
materials to China, while China has sold manufactured products to Brazil; this
relationship is similar to the interactions between an underdeveloped and a developed
country (Powell, 2017, p.416). While Brazil benefits from increased demand for its raw
materials, China gains access to essential resources for its industrial development,
creating a mutually beneficial relationship. Nevertheless, Brazil began encouraging China
to produce goods in Brazil, so as to train Brazilian labor and help foster Brazil's
development.
In 2013, trade with China was worth $83 billion, covering a wide range of products. Brazil
continued to export iron ore, soybeans, and now oil to China (Government of Brazil,
2022). Between 2006 and 2016, total trade with China increased from $20 billion to $68
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
214
billion (Wei, et al., 2019, p.1). From 2020 to 2021, Brazil's iron ore exports reached a
total of 357.7 million tons (OEC, 2024). In 2024, Brazil's iron ore exports alone reached
$2.41B, representing a growth of China ($669M) in total exports representing ($9.77B)
on Brazil’s export to China, its biggest trade partner, according with trade data from The
Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2024). The continued growth of iron ore
exports suggests a strong foundation for further economic integration, but addressing
the trade imbalance and fostering technological collaboration will be crucial for
maximizing the potential of this partnership.
Multilateralism
China places significant emphasis on multilateralism over bilateral agreements, a stance
that extends to various international negotiations. This approach is particularly
highlighted in the perspectives of both China and Brazil, as they argue that multilateral
frameworks carry greater significance compared to exclusive agreements such as those
within the G7, where they are not present. Consequently, both China and Brazil prioritize
engagements within the G20, recognizing it as a more inclusive and impactful platform
for global discussions and agreements. This shared commitment to multilateralism has
also influenced their approach to iron ore trade, as they seek to create a more equitable
and sustainable global framework for resource management.
Moreover, Brazil's relationship with China extends beyond general diplomatic ties to
encompass collaboration on specific issues. This collaboration is evident in Brazil's
participation within groups such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), where they work closely with China on shared
objectives and policies. While they share a commitment to multilateralism, navigating
the complexities of these groups and balancing their national interests can pose
challenges to their collaboration. These partnerships within larger multilateral
frameworks underscore the strategic importance that China and Brazil attribute to
fostering broader international cooperation and consensus-building (Sauvant, 2006
p.373).
Robust Economic Ties
China and Brazil have forged a robust economic partnership over the past 30 years,
marked by increasing trade volumes, investment flows, and collaborative ventures. At
the heart of this relationship lies the exchange of commodities, with Brazil emerging as
a key supplier of raw materials to fuel China's rapid industrialization and economic
growth. Iron ore, in particular, has been a cornerstone of Sino-Brazilian trade. China's
insatiable demand for iron ore, driven by its booming steel industry, has thrust Brazil
into the spotlight as one of its main suppliers.
Historically, Australia dominated 60% of the iron ore market (Rodrigues & Lengyel, 2023,
p.44), but Brazil's rise as a major exporter of iron ore and other commodities has
significantly altered China's supply chain dynamics. Commodities beyond iron ore span a
diverse range of products, including soybeans, oil, and agricultural products. This broad
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
215
commercial relationship has fostered mutual interdependence with China, which is
unlikely to diminish in the future. Brazil is poised to remain a major international player
due to its abundant natural resources and robust agricultural production, which enable it
to offer bulk volumes at competitive prices that are difficult for other countries to match.
However, this reliance on commodity trade also presents certain vulnerabilities, such as
price fluctuations and the potential for market disruptions. Technological collaboration in
areas like mining and resource management can help to mitigate these risks and foster
a more sustainable and balanced economic partnership.
In recent years, bilateral trade between China and Brazil has soared to unprecedented
levels, reflecting the deepening integration of their economies. Strategic initiatives such
as the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism have facilitated
dialogue and cooperation across various sectors, laying the groundwork for sustained
economic collaboration (Chinese Embassy, 2024). The importance of raw materials in
shaping China-Brazil relations cannot be overstated, especially in the context of the iron
ore trade. Brazil's emergence as a major supplier of iron ore to China has not only
transformed the global commodities market but also catalyzed closer economic
integration between the two countries.
Diplomatic Engagement, Ideological Alignment and Commodities Trade
The political dimension of China-Brazil relations was initially characterized by a mutual
technological and economic partnership within the context of developing countries, which
later evolved towards elite interests and ideological alignment. This alignment is
supported by shared principles of multilateralism, global cooperation, and the distancing
from old alliances and partnerships from the Cold War period. Historically, both China
and Brazil have advocated for principles of non-interference and respect for national
sovereignty in international affairs. This shared commitment to sovereignty and non-
alignment has served as a cornerstone of their diplomatic relations, fostering trust and
cooperation on global issues ranging from climate change to international peacekeeping.
Furthermore, China and Brazil have actively sought to strengthen ties within the
framework of multilateral institutions such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) and the G20. As founding members of the BRICS bloc, China and Brazil
have collaborated closely on initiatives aimed at promoting economic development,
improving global governance, and reforming international financial institutions.
China's diplomatic overtures toward Brazil also reflect its broader strategy of cultivating
strategic partnerships with emerging powers in the Global South. By engaging with Brazil
on issues of mutual interest, such as infrastructure development, energy cooperation,
and technology transfer, China seeks to consolidate its influence and leverage in Latin
America and beyond. From a Brazilian perspective, engagement with China offers
significant economic benefits and opportunities for technological exchange and training.
Brazil's alignment with the BRICS framework exemplifies its commitment to deepening
cooperation and connectivity with Asia, Africa, and Europe, thereby enhancing its global
competitiveness and strategic relevance.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
216
Around 30 years ago, when Brazil began to take its first steps towards China, the country
saw a gradual shift in its policies, moving away from a strategic alignment that had fought
alongside the Allied powers in the Second World War and continued throughout the Cold
War, following the lead of the United States of America and its anti-communist stance.
Throughout the military administration in Brazil, the government adopted a stringent and
openly anti-socialist and anti-communist position.
At the end of the military period and with the beginning of democratization in Brazil in
1988, the country gradually began to implement social policies and change its outlook
towards communist and socialist regimes. This shift is evident in the eight-year
presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was identified as a social democrat,
followed by the extensive rule of the Workers' Party (PT), with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
and Dilma Rousseff being elected and re-elected over three consecutive terms.
Subsequently, Brazil experienced a period of conservatism under Jair Bolsonaro for four
years (Piza, 2023, p.41) followed by a return to left-wing governance with the re-election
of Lula and the Workers' Party.
The partnership between the Workers Party (Piza, 2023, p. 45), led by the iconic figure
Lula, and China has evolved into a strategic alliance characterized by deepening trade
relations, robust diplomatic engagements, and shared socialist ideologies. One of the
pillars of the Workers' Party and China alliance was the significant expansion of bilateral
trade during Lula's presidency (2003-2010). This trade expansion, fueled by the growing
demand for iron ore from China, solidified Brazil's position as a key supplier of raw
materials and strengthened the economic foundations of their partnership. Brazil, under
the PT's leadership, leveraged its abundant natural resources to become a key supplier
of commodities such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil to China. In return, Brazil imported
manufactured goods and technology from China, fostering a mutually beneficial economic
relationship. This trade expansion not only boosted economic growth but also enhanced
Brazil's strategic position in the global market (Green & Leuhrmann, 2018, p.345).
To achieve this trade expansion, PT-led administrations actively pursued diplomatic
initiatives to strengthen ties with China. High-level visits, diplomatic dialogues, and
cooperation agreements were hallmarks of this engagement, signaling a commitment to
deepening political and strategic understanding. Brazil, under PT's influence, aligned itself
with China on various international issues, supporting China's initiatives in forums like
the United Nations. This diplomatic synergy reinforced mutual trust and laid the
foundation for broader collaboration.
The alliance between PT, Lula, and China is not merely transactional but also ideological.
While they share a commitment to multilateralism, navigating these differences and
finding common ground on complex issues will be crucial for sustaining their ideological
convergence. Both parties share socialist ideologies, albeit with contextual differences,
leading to a convergence of interests on social welfare, poverty alleviation, and
sustainable development. This shared vision extends to global governance, where PT and
China advocate for a multipolar world order that accommodates diverse voices and
promotes equitable development. Their cooperation transcends traditional power
dynamics, challenging hegemonic structures and fostering a more inclusive international
system. The strategic alliance between PT, Lula, and China carries significant implications
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
217
for global politics and cooperation. It represents a model of South-South cooperation
based on mutual respect, shared values, and strategic alignment. This alliance not only
strengthens Brazil-China relations but also contributes to shaping a more balanced and
multipolar global order. The return of the PT to power in Brazil suggests a continuation
of this strategic alliance, but navigating global challenges and balancing their national
interests will be crucial for maintaining the momentum of their partnership. As PT and
China continue to collaborate on economic, diplomatic, and ideological fronts, their
partnership serves as a testament to the potential of cooperation among emerging
powers to drive positive change on the world stage.
The China-Australia Relations and the Rise of Brazil on Iron Ore Supply
Over the past four years, China has purchased billions of tons of iron ore. With Australia
being its largest supplier of iron ore, it was presumed that relations between the two
countries remained in an almost permanent state of goodwill. However, trade relations
between China and Australia began to experience strong turbulence in the last decade
due to China's significant interference in international politics in Southeast Asia, directly
impacting Australia's internal policies. Recognizing China as a growing international and
regional threat in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, Australia has visibly and gradually
shifted away from China while aligning itself with security partnerships to counter China's
long-standing maritime expansion in the region. These security partnerships are reflected
in initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Australia-United
Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) coalition.
China saw Australia as no longer a reliable partner for its strategic raw material needs,
especially as Australia entered into security alliances with China's geopolitical rivals. For
its part, the Chinese Communist Party has redirected its efforts to other sources of ore
and raw materials to mitigate the impact of Australia's strategic pivot. Brazil's proactive
engagement with China, coupled with its abundant iron ore reserves and competitive
pricing, has positioned it as a key alternative to Australia. This Chinese maneuver
demonstrates a concerted effort towards a common goal, not only between China and
Brazil countries operating under the logic of South-South cooperation but also between
two parties with similar political ideologies, once again reinforcing their global strategic
partnership. Brazil, a steadfast economic partner and reliable diplomatic friend of China
for decades, has steadily deepened its diplomatic engagement with China, resulting in
increased trade. China has become Brazil’s largest export partner over the years.
When it comes to iron ore, Brazil ranks only behind Australia as a supplier to China for
its steel production. Therefore, as China considers diversifying its sources of raw material
extraction, it primarily looks at smaller countries in Africa. However, in terms of iron ore,
Brazil is likely to remain China's top priority as the main supplier for the foreseeable
future. However, maintaining this position will require addressing environmental
concerns related to mining and navigating potential competition from other emerging
iron ore producers. The growing interdependence between Brazil and China in the iron
ore sector suggests a promising future for their partnership, with potential for further
collaboration in areas like resource management and technological development.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
218
Conclusion
The multifaceted relationship between China and Brazil, spanning economic, political, and
strategic domains, has undergone significant transformations in recent decades,
culminating in a mutual global strategic partnership. Rooted in the quest for natural
resources and driven by geopolitical imperatives, this partnership has evolved into a
strategic alliance with far-reaching implications for global geopolitics. At the core of
China-Brazil relations is the trade in raw materials, especially iron ore, which serves as
the backbone of China's industrial complex, infrastructure development, and military
efforts. China's strategic imperative to secure diversified sources of raw materials has
led to an increasing dependence on Brazil, positioning it as a key partner in China's quest
for resource security and strategic dominance.
Brazil's abundance of natural resources, coupled with its strategic diplomatic position,
makes it an attractive proposition for resource negotiations with China. As China seeks
to mitigate its dependence on traditional suppliers such as Australia and explore
alternative sources, Brazil is emerging as a key player in shaping the global raw materials
market and facilitating China's economic expansion. Economic ties between China and
Brazil have flourished in recent years, with bilateral trade volumes reaching
unprecedented levels. Brazil's emergence as a strategic trading partner for China
underscores the deepening economic integration between the two nations, driven by
mutual interests in raw materials, technology transfer, and infrastructure development.
BRICS, alongside other summit forums involving key states, serves as a convergence
point to enhance economic cooperation and connectivity between China and Brazil,
opening up new avenues for trade and investment. Leveraging Brazil's strategic position
in South America, its diplomatic prowess, and vast resource base, China aims to
consolidate its economic influence and expand global reach through infrastructure
projects and trade routes. The political alignment between China and Brazil is
characterized by shared interests and principles of multilateralism, sovereignty, and non-
interference. Both nations actively collaborate within multilateral institutions such as
BRICS, G20, and other international summits to advocate for a more equitable global
order and reform international financial systems. China's diplomatic overtures towards
Brazil reflect its broader strategy of cultivating strategic partnerships with emerging
powers in the Global South. By engaging with Brazil on mutual interests such as
infrastructure development and technology transfer, China seeks to enhance its
geopolitical influence and shape the future trajectory of international relations.
As both countries continue to navigate the complexities of global politics and economics,
their partnership is poised to shape the future of international relations, particularly in
the context of resource security and global governance. The China-Brazil relationship,
fueled by their mutual reliance on iron ore, serves as a compelling exam`ple of how
resource-driven partnerships can evolve into strategic alliances with far-reaching
implications for global politics and economics.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
219
References
Armony, A. C.; Velasquez, N. G. (2016). A Honeymoon with China? Public Perceptions in
Latin America and Brazil. Revista tempo do mundo 2(2), pp. 17-34.
Aulakh, P. S. (2006). Global strategies of Brazilian firms in an era of economic
liberalizations. In S. C. Jain (Ed.) Emerging Economies and the Transformation of
International Business Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs), pp. 91-110. Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited.
Barbosa, A. F.; Mendes, R. C. (2006). Economic Relations between Brazil and China: A
Difficult Partnership. Dialogue on globalization: Briefing papers - FES Brazil, pp. 2-10.
Bell, C. L.; Collinson, E. (2022, December 22). Australia-China Relations: The Outlook
for 2023. The Diplomat. Retrieved on February 26, 2024 from:
https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/australia-china-relations-the-outlook-for-2023/
Bull, B. and Kasahara, Y. (2011). Brazil and China: Partners or competitors?
Internasjonal Politikk. 69(2), pp. 231-241.
Business Standard. (2021, July 9). China hits Australian industries with economic
sanctions amid souring ties. Retrieved on March 20, 2024 from: https://www.business-
standard.com/article/international/china-hits-australian-industries-with-economic-
sanctions-amid-souring-ties-121070900082_1.html
Cardoso, D. (2012). China-Brazil: A Strategic Partnership in an Evolving World Order.
East Asia: An International Quarterly. DOI 10.1007/s12140-012-9186-z.
Chinese Embassy. (2024, January 20). China and Brazil Hold the Fourth Foreign
Ministerial-Level Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue. Retrieved on May 29, 2024 from:
http://gr.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202402/t20240204_11239801.htm
Freitas, A. (2014, June 2). China and Brazil: growing together or apart? CKGSB
Knowledge. Retrieved on August 15, 2024 from:
https://english.ckgsb.edu.cn/knowledge/article/china-and-brazil-growing-together-or-
apart/
Government of Brazil. (2022). Brazil stands out in the export of iron. Retrieved on March
30, 2024 from: https://www.gov.br/en/government-of-brazil/latest-news/2022/brazil-
stands-out-in-the-export-of-iron-
ore#:~:text=Brazil%20is%20the%20second%20largest%20exporter%20of%20iron,to
%20341.6%20million%20tons%20in%20the%20previous%20year
Global times. (2022, April 3). China Iron and Steel Association vows to increase domestic
mineral production by 100 million tons within five years. Retrieved on March 5, 2024
from: https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/china-iron-and-steel-association-vows-to-
increase-domestic-mineral-production-by-100-million-tons-within-five-years/
Green, D. & Leuhrmann, L. (2018). Leadership from Brasilia and Beijing. In F. Kelli, & C.
Catherine (Eds.) Contentious Politics in Brazil and China: Beyond Regime, pp. 345–408.
Routledge.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
220
Hiratuka, C. (2020). Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its
Manufacturing Economy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Horta, L. (2015). Brazil-China Relations. RSIS Working Paper. No. 287: 35
Jenkins, R. (2012). China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship.
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41(1), pp. 21-47.
https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100102
Niu, H. (2010). Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China. Revista Brasileira de
Política Internacional 53(SPE), pp. 183-192.
OEC Iron Ore in Brazil (2023). The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Retrieved on
March 10, 2024 from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/bra/
Powell, D. (2017). China–Brazil Economic Relations: Too Big to Fail? In M. Myers, & C.
Wise (Eds.), The Political Economy of China-Latin America Relations in the New
Millennium, pp. 243-265. Routledge.
Rocha, F. F.; Bielschowsky, R. (2018). China’s quest for natural resources in Latin
America. CEPAL Review, 126 (December), pp. 9-28.
Rodrigues, D.; Lengyel, P. (2023). Exploring the Correlation between Brazilian Iron Ore
Exports and the Chinese Construction Sector. Journal of Agricultural Informatics, 14, pp.
44-55. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17700/jai.2023.14.1.689
Santoro, M. (2022). Brazil–China Relations in the 21st Century: The Making of a Strategic
Partnership. University of Chicago Press.
Sauvant, K. P. (2006). Inward and outward FDI and the BRICs. In S. C. Jain. (Ed),
Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International Business Brazil, Russia,
India and China (BRICs), pp. 413 – 409. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Tang, F. (2021, December 31). China vows greater iron ore self-sufficiency as
‘deglobalisation tide’ and coronavirus expose mineral supply risks. South China Morning
Post. Retrieved on January 29, 2024 from:
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3147894/china-vows-greater-
iron-ore-self-sufficiency-deglobalisation
Toledo Piza, D. (2023). Chinese Migration and Changes in Brazilian Society. In M. H.
Ueta, M. Alencastro & R. Pinheiro-Machado (Ed.), How China is Transforming Brazil, pp.
41-55. Palgrave Macmillan.
Vazquez, K. C. (2022). Brazil–China Relations: Contestation, Adaptation, or
Transformation? In: Pavlićević, D., Talmacs, N. (eds) The China Question. Palgrave
Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9105-8_10
Wei, D.; Rafael, Â. P.; Machava, A. Z.; Muniz Cipriano, A. C.; & Freire e Almeida, D.
(2019). Overview on Trade Between Brazil and China. In Food Exports from Brazil to
China: A Legal and Economic Analysis, pp. 1-8. SpringerBriefs in Law.
World Bank. (1984). GDP growth (annual %) – China. Retrieved on March 1, 2024 from:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN&most_recent
_value_desc=false
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 207-221
Beyond Iron Ore: Reframing the Brazil-China Partnership as a Multifaceted Engagement
Lorhan de Oliveira Pereira, Kai Yin Allison Haga
221
Xu, Y. (2017) China’s Strategic Partnership and Oil Diplomacy with Brazil, China’s
Strategic Partnerships in Latin America Case Studies of China’s Oil Diplomacy in
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, pp. 1991–2015. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Yu, S.; Hume, N. (2022, June 15). China to set up centralised iron ore buyer to counter
Australia’s dominance. Financial Times. Retrieved on March 19, 2024 from:
https://www.ft.com/content/3ee7a726-889c-4e2b-bdf3-d073f06f4e72
Zhai, K. (2022, July 15). China Moves to Control Iron-Ore Imports with New State
Company. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on March 15, 2024 from:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-moves-to-control-iron-ore-imports-with-new-state-
company-11663695865
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
222
PRC-BRAZIL COLLABORATION IN RENEWABLE WIND ENERGY:
A CASE STUDY OF INTERDEPENDENCIES THROUGH THE LENS OF LIBERAL
INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY
BAIBA BITENIECE
biteniecebaiba@gmail.com
Master’s degree in Social Sciences in International Relations from Rīga Stradiņš University,
(Latvia). She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Humanities from the Latvian Academy of Culture,
Latvia (2019) and studied Humanities as part of the Erasmus+ program at Universidad de Alcalá,
Spain, in the same year. Baiba is fluent in Latvian (native), English (C2), Spanish (C2), and
Italian (C1). She studies Organizational Psychology, coaching principles, and Human Resources.
Her research interests are focused on Human Resources, particularly on enhancing employee
well-being. She continuously expands her expertise in the HR field and researches people
management to improve employees' daily work experiences. Her most recent training was in
“Psychological First Aid” for employees. ORCID: 0009-0007-6725-4194).
DANA DŪDA
dana.yizhe@gmail.com
Doctoral student in political science at Rīga Stradiņš University in Riga (Latvia). She earned a
Master of International Affairs (MIA) from Ming Chuan University, Taiwan (2024). She holds a
Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA) from Chinese Culture University, Taiwan (2022), and a
Bachelor of Arts in Business Chinese (BA) from Shanghai Normal University, China (2018). She
also completed Advanced Chinese Studies at Central China Normal University in 2015. Since
2024, Dūda has been an Affiliate Researcher at the China Studies Centre at Rīga Stradiņš
University and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. She has previously served as a
communications assistant, liaison officer, administrative assistant, speechwriter, fundraiser,
international business consultant, and Mandarin interpreter. Dana speaks Latvian (native),
English (C2), and Mandarin (Simplified and Traditional, C2). Dūda's research interests focus on
Chinese political discourse analysis and China-Taiwan relations. ORCID: 0009-0001-2561-6114).
Abstract
This paper examines the strategic collaboration between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and Brazil in the renewable wind energy sector. PRC’s strategic engagement with Brazil in
renewable wind energy has significantly impacted global energy markets, enabling the PRC to
expand its investment, technological exports, and geopolitical influence in wider Latin America
(LA). This study addresses the concerns surrounding the PRC’s growing role in Brazil’s wind
energy sector- including investments and control over renewable energy production. Guided
by the theoretical framework of Liberal and Economic Interdependence, this paper aims to
answer the research question of how the PRC’s renewable wind energy strategy in Brazil
contributes to creating strategic dependencies and potential vulnerabilities associated with
reliance on Chinese capital. Employing a qualitative methodology combining official document
analysis, political discourse analysis, and expert interviews, this paper examines PRC’s official
strategies, energy diplomacy, and security implications, as well as the political and economic
motivations driving its investments, technological exchanges, and joint ventures. The study
evaluates the prospects of mutual interdependence between PRC and Brazil and offers insights
from international renewable wind energy experts on the geopolitical implications of PRC’s
involvement in the global wind energy sector. Concluding that PRC’s strategic engagement
drives collaboration and growth in Brazil’s wind energy sector, creating mutual
interdependencies. However, these interdependencies are asymmetrical, resulting in greater
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
223
dependencies for Brazil compared to the PRC. Despite this imbalance, the cooperation also
fosters some dependencies for the PRC, albeit to a lesser extent. The study contributes to the
understanding of Sino-Brazilian energy relations and offers insights into the geopolitical
implications of PRC’s involvement in emerging renewable energy markets.
Keywords
Brazil, Economic Interdependence, PRC, PRC-Brazil Collaboration, Renewable Wind Energy.
Resumo
Este artigo examina a colaboração estratégica entre a República Popular da China (RPC) e o
Brasil no setor das energias eólicas renováveis. O envolvimento estratégico da RPC com o
Brasil na energia eólica renovável teve um impacto significativo nos mercados globais de
energia, permitindo à RPC expandir o seu investimento, as exportações tecnológicas e a
influência geopolítica na América Latina (AL) mais ampla. Este estudo aborda as preocupações
em torno do papel crescente da RPC no setor da energia eólica do Brasil - incluindo
investimentos e controlo sobre a produção de energia renovável. Guiado pelo quadro teórico
da Interdependência Liberal e Económica, este artigo pretende responder à questão de
investigação de como a estratégia de energia eólica renovável da RPC no Brasil contribui para
a criação de dependências estratégicas e potenciais vulnerabilidades associadas à
dependência do capital chinês. Empregando uma metodologia qualitativa que combina a
análise de documentos oficiais, a análise do discurso político e as entrevistas com
especialistas, este artigo examina as estratégias oficiais, a diplomacia energética e as
implicações de segurança da RPC, bem como as motivações políticas e económicas que
impulsionam os seus investimentos, intercâmbios tecnológicos e joint ventures. O estudo
avalia as perspetivas de interdependência mútua entre a RPC e o Brasil e oferece insights de
especialistas internacionais em energia eólica renovável sobre as implicações geopolíticas do
envolvimento da RPC no setor global da energia eólica. Concluindo que o envolvimento
estratégico da RPC impulsiona a colaboração e o crescimento no setor da energia eólica do
Brasil, criando interdependências mútuas. No entanto, estas interdependências são
assimétricas, resultando em maiores dependências para o Brasil em comparação com a RPC.
Apesar deste desequilíbrio, a cooperação também promove algumas dependências para a
RPC, embora em menor grau. O estudo contribui para a compreensão das relações energéticas
sino-brasileiras e oferece insights sobre as implicações geopolíticas do envolvimento da RPC
nos mercados emergentes de energias renováveis.
Palavras-chave
Brasil, Interdependência Económica, RPC, Colaboração RPC-Brasil, Energia Eólica Renovável.
How to cite this article
Biteniece, Baiba & Dūda, Dana (2024). PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy: a Case
Study of Interdependencies Through The Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations:
The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 222-247.
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.11.
Article received on 3 June 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
224
BEYOND IRON ORE: REFRAMING THE BRAZIL-CHINA
PARTNERSHIP AS A MULTIFACETED ENGAGEMENT
LORHAN DE OLIVEIRA PEREIRA
KAI YIN ALLISON HAGA
1. Introduction
The 21st century has seen profound changes in the global energy sector due to the
impacts of climate change caused by extensive fossil fuel use. Transitioning to green
energy is essential for sustainable socioeconomic development, and mitigating climate
change effects. In recent years, PRC and Brazil have increased their bilateral cooperation
in renewable energy production, which has come with an increase in Chinese investments
and technological exchange. PRC companies produce around 90% of solar and wind
technologies in LA. PRC’s increased control over Brazil’s renewable energy production
and distribution has raised international concerns (Myslikova & Dolton-Thornton, 2023).
While the PRC’s growing presence in Brazil strengthens its economy, it also affects Brazil’s
politics and security. Although this partnership offers sustainable alternatives to fossil
fuels, concerns persist over the PRC’s geopolitical strategy, which may lead to
dependence on PRC capital and control over Brazil’s critical infrastructure. Therefore,
analyzing the PRC-Brazil collaboration in wind energy provides a valuable case study on
the opportunities and risks involved. This paper analyzes the PRC’s strategy and
investments in renewable wind energy in Brazil, examining the implications for
interdependence between the PRC and Brazil through the lens of Liberal and Economic
Interdependence Theories.
The central argument is that while cooperation in renewable wind energy can provide
benefits like technology transfer and increased investments, the PRC’s strategy in Brazil
can create asymmetric dependencies on Chinese capital, potentially limiting Brazil’s
autonomy.
To address the research question, of how the PRC’s renewable wind energy strategy in
Brazil contributes to creating strategic dependencies and potential vulnerabilities
associated with reliance on Chinese capital- this study employs a qualitative methodology
encompassing several key components. Firstly, an extensive document analysis was
conducted, scrutinizing official publications and strategic documents from both the PRC
and Brazil. This analysis utilized sources in multiple languages, including Chinese,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
225
English, Latvian, Portuguese, and Spanish, to ensure a comprehensive and nuanced
understanding of the subject matter. Secondly, a political discourse analysis was
implemented to elucidate the political and economic motivations underlying the PRC’s
renewable energy investments and strategies. This involved a meticulous examination of
speeches, policy documents, and official statements, providing insight into the strategic
rationale behind the collaboration. Furthermore, the study incorporated expert interviews
with international renewable wind energy specialists, garnering diverse perspectives on
the geopolitical implications of the PRC’s involvement in Brazil’s wind energy sector. This
multifaceted approach was chosen to facilitate a comprehensive evaluation of the
strategic dependencies and potential vulnerabilities associated with the PRC-Brazil
collaboration in the renewable wind energy sector.
The research presented in this article encompasses a time frame, spanning from the early
2000s to 2023, to analyze the collaborative efforts between the PRC and Brazil in the
renewable wind energy sector. This timeframe is strategically chosen to capture the full
arc of this partnership, beginning with PRC’s initial forays into global economic expansion
and culminating in the most recent developments as of early 2023. By examining over
two decades of engagement, the study provides a longitudinal perspective that allows
the identification of significant trends, policy impacts, and investment patterns. This
period of analysis enables a nuanced understanding of how geopolitical initiatives, such
as the PRC’s “Going Out” Policy (走出去战略),
1
and the Belt and Road Initiative (一带一路)
(BRI), have shaped the trajectory of Sino-Brazilian cooperation in wind energy, by
offering insights into both historical and contemporary contexts.
To answer the research question, this article will systematically analyze several key topics
and follow a structured approach. The Introduction sets the contextual background,
introduces the PRC-Brazil collaboration in the energy sector, and presents the central
research question and objectives. The Literature Review introduces the theoretical
frameworks of Liberal Interdependence Theory and Economic Interdependence and
examines the historical and geopolitical context of PRC-Brazil relations, alongside existing
literature on their renewable energy collaboration and perspectives from both PRC and
Brazilian scholars. The section on Official PRC Strategies offers a detailed analysis of
PRC’s strategies in the renewable wind energy sector, including historical policies and
initiatives like the “Going Out” Policy and BRI. The PRC’s Energy Diplomacy and Security
Implications section explores PRC’s energy security concerns and the role of its energy
diplomacy and resource security. PRC Investments section analyzes the investments
made by PRC in Brazil’s renewable wind energy sector and the impact of Chinese
companies and financial flows. The Prospects for Mutual Interdependence section
examines the mutual dependencies created by PRC-Brazil cooperation, discussing
potential risks and benefits for both countries. Insights from International Renewable
Wind Energy Experts provide a summary of expert interviews on PRC’s involvement in
global wind energy and diverse perspectives on the topic of mutual interdependence.
Finally, the Conclusions answer the research question, summarize the findings, assess
1
Also known as the “Going Global Strategy”.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
226
the asymmetric interdependencies between PRC and Brazil, and offer policy
recommendations for Brazil.
2. Literature Review
The liberal interdependence theory in IR suggests that actions by one entity significantly
impact the outcomes and values of others (Coate, Griffin, & Elliott-Gower, 2017). There
are two key dimensions of interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity
measures the response to external influences before policy changes, while vulnerability
reflects the costs imposed even after policy adjustments (Keohane & Nye, 2001).
Whereas economic interdependence refers to a state where parties- individuals, groups,
companies, or nations- engage in transactions to satisfy their mutual needs through
trade. This implies that all parties are interwoven in a network of economic dependencies,
which drives international trade and cooperation. While mutual dependency may foster
trade and profit opportunities it also poses potential risks like inequality and exploitation
by dominant parties. Excessive reliance on a few external suppliers can lead to
vulnerabilities in supply chains, which, in the event of disasters like economic downturns
or natural calamities, could halt business operations and lead to economic downturns.
Thus, evaluating supply chain stability and considering risk factors is crucial for
minimizing negative business impacts and establishing fair, transparent, and sustainable
economic relations (Tomasetti, 2024). Risks associated with economic interdependence
include supply chain disruptions and increased costs. Excessive interdependence can be
seen as a matter of national vulnerability- where participants may face significant costs
if their relationship deteriorates (Baldwin, 1980).
While liberal scholars believe economic interdependence reduces political conflicts by
incentivizing trade over aggression- the First and Second World Wars have demonstrated
that high interdependence does not prevent war (Copeland, 1996).
The political and economic relations between the PRC and Brazil began centuries ago,
but the end of the Cold War and the bipolar international order facilitated the
development of broader relationships. Until the 1990s, Brazil’s development was
primarily financed by the US. Yet PRC has capitalized on diminishing US influence to
expand its economic presence through economic instruments like trade, loans, and
investments- facilitating Brazil’s distancing from US, and creating favorable conditions
for PRC’s expansion.
Yet, there is limited literature on the PRC-Brazil collaboration in the renewable wind
sector, thus it is helpful to examine the official perspectives from both sides by
scrutinizing the official strategic initiatives and bilateral agreements between the two to
assess the extent of the potential interdependencies derived from this cooperation.
To better understand Chinese perspectives, previous research has outlined the necessity
of analyzing specifically the Chinese-language material through political discourse
analysis examining official PRC’s policies and strategies (Berzina-Cerenkova, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
227
Economic cooperation directs PRC’s foreign policy and prioritizes relations with other
countries. Chinese and Brazilian scholars alike emphasize that this partnership is driven
by the global shift transitioning toward renewable energy sources, exacerbated by
escalating petroleum costs and environmental concerns associated with nonrenewable
resources (Peng et al., 2019; Junior et al., 2019). Both states position the collaboration
in renewable energy as an opportunity to enhance their efforts in sustainable energy
production (Xie et al., 2021; Vardiero et al., 2020). As one of the world’s largest carbon
emitters, PRC’s move towards clean energy is significant on a global scale. The latest
PRC’s 14th Five-Year Plan (十四五规划)(2021-2025) underscores its commitment to
innovation-driven, sustainable, and low-carbon renewable energy production from 2021
to 2025- aiming to cap PRC’s CO2 emissions by 2030 (Global Wind Energy Council, 2023).
Yet, the rapid expansion of renewable energy projects in LA has raised concerns
regarding the PRC’s growing geopolitical and economic influence. Approximately 90% of
renewable technologies in LA are produced with PRC support. PRC’s dominance in
renewable energy supply chains has raised international alarm, prompting LA countries
to seek ways to secure sustainable energy resources independently (Myslikova & Dolton-
Thornton, 2023).
Increased Chinese influence has sparked discussions on the security of global renewable
energy supply chains and the associated risks of energy dependence. Since 2021, PRC
has been the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable wind energy producer. As of
January 2023, the PRC’s total operational wind park capacity was 278,353 megawatts
(MW), affirming its position as the global leader in the renewable energy sector (Maguire,
2023).
Moreover, PRC has made substantial investments in wind energy projects in Brazil,
reflecting its long-term commitment to sustainable energy production in Brazil (Geng et
al., 2021). The largest PRC investors in Brazil are the PRC state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) such as China Three Gorges Corporation as well as private firms [albeit with
significant government support and involvement] such as Goldwind and Envision. These
enterprises are the key drivers of PRC-Brazil’s collaboration in the renewable wind energy
sector providing investments and technical expertise (Dudgeon, 2011). According to
Chinese scholars, Goldwind and Envision investments in financing and developing wind
energy projects in Brazil have led to economic benefits in both countries (Bai et al.,
2010).
By mirroring practices in the US, to incentivize the development of wind farms Brazilian
government has launched several fiscal programs. Noteworthy, these projects have been
aligned with Brazilian national development goals for sustainable energy production
(Hansen & Zambra, 2020).
PRC-Brazil wind energy collaboration is executed through various organizations and
initiatives, focusing on partnerships and investments, especially in regions of Northeast
Brazil (Chen et al., 2009). Chinese investments in Brazil are mostly channeled through
Brazilian government initiatives such as the Programme of Incentives for Alternative
Electricity Sources (PROINFA), which aims to increase the use of alternative energy
sources and enhance Brazil’s renewable energy capacity, by including wind, biomass, and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
228
small hydroelectric power in Brazil’s electricity mix. Through PROINFA Brazil has aligned
wind farm development with the PRC’s sustainable energy objectives (Ma et al., 2021).
Thus, facilitating PRC’s contributions to Brazil’s renewable energy development (Deng et
al., 2020; Wang et al., 2023). Chinese scholars emphasize that such joint policy shifts
have created favorable conditions for future collaboration (Zhao et al., 2013). Yet,
despite these positive developments, Chinese scholars admit that challenges such as
cultural differences, regulatory barriers, and logistical issues persist, requiring enhanced
strategic planning (Chen et al., 2009).
Additionally, Brazilian institutions such as the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency
(ANEEL) and the Energy Research Office (EPE) provide essential research data on
renewable energy generation to PRC. Other mechanisms such as the Auction of
Alternative Sources have been further institutionalized to promote this collaboration
(Vardiero et al., 2020).
Brazilian scholars note that the technological transfer of PRC’s wind turbine technology
has boosted Brazil’s renewable energy capacity and simultaneously contributed to
advancing innovation in Brazil’s local industries (Diagne et al., 2020).
Chinese scholars note that the main motivation for the PRC’s collaboration with Brazil lies
in strategic diversification attempts of PRC’s energy investments abroad to enhance PRC’s
national energy security, in line with its broader geopolitical objectives (Han et al., 2015).
The main policy framework governing this bilateral collaboration is executed through
initiatives like the BRI, which is also the driving force of PRC’s foreign policy (Deng et al.,
2023).
As reported by the PRC’s official Belt and Road Energy Cooperation Network, BRI is
beneficial to Brazil as it aims to leverage its influence to enhance Brazil’s national
development strategies. For example, Brazil has announced ambitious plans for
renewable energy development by 2030 aiming to increase the proportion of renewable
energy in the country’s energy matrix to 45%. Which includes a shift towards non-
hydropower renewable sources like wind, solar, and biomass (一带一路能源合作网, 2019).
To Enhance infrastructure and energy sector collaborations, PRC-Brazil signed the “Ten-
Year Cooperation Plan,” (十年合作计划)(2012-2021) which allowed Brazil to align its
national development strategies with PRC’s renewable energy strategies under the BRI
umbrella. This reflects Brazil’s commitment to diversify its energy sources to support
economic growth. BRI serves as the core platform for PRC to foster renewable energy
cooperation with Brazil. During Xi Jinping’s (习近平) visit to Brazil in 2014, a joint
statement was issued that underscored the importance of renewable energy production
for sustainable development (IIGF观点, 2019). In 2020, PRC’s BRI investments in the
renewable energy sector in Brazil accounted for 57% of total investments, in alignment
with PRC’s “3060 carbon neutrality goals”. Furthermore, although Brazil is not an official
member of BRI, PRC has actively advocated for Brazilian industries to join the initiative
to “leverage the BRI to foster sustainable, low-carbon growth through enhanced Sino-
Brazilian cooperation in renewable energy sectors.”(巴西《经济价值报》, 2021).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
229
As reported by PRC state-run Xinhua News Agency, a tangible example of PRC-Brazil
collaboration is the 180-MW wind energy project in Bahia [Northeastern Brazil],
developed by China General Nuclear Power Group’s Brazilian subsidiary. Xinhua
emphasizes that “this project exemplifies the integration of economic and social benefits
through shared development and technological advancements; [..] and that the project
which was completed ahead of schedule has received positive recognition for PRC’s
contributions to the local renewable energy development in Brazil and thus has
strengthened the two-state bilateral relations.”(罗婧婧, 2023).
Noteworthy, as Chinese scholars note, these interdependencies make them economically
and politically dependent. Increased political engagement primarily arises from
intensified bilateral interactions and economic impulse primarily stems from
strengthening commercial ties. This mutual dependency has made political and economic
relations more conventional and predictable (Guo, 2023).
Yet, Chinese and Brazilian academics alike view this collaboration as a positive-sum
game, where both countries benefit- PRC gains access to Brazil’s rich resources and
opportunities for technological exchange, and Brazil gains Chinese investments and
expertise in renewable energy technologies (Peng et al., 2019; Vardiero et al., 2020).
According to Chinese scholars, this partnership is focused on achieving mutual
environmental benefits while contributing to progress towards the UN’s global
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Shi et al., 2004).
The existing academic literature, while limited, recognizes that the PRC’s collaboration
with Brazil in the renewable wind energy sector is driven by strategic, economic, and
geopolitical motivations. PRC’s reliance on coal has supported its rapid economic
development but also led to significant environmental issues like acid rain. PRC’s
strategies include investments, technology transfers, and policy support, with SOEs and
private firms playing crucial roles. Despite challenges, both governments view this
partnership as beneficial for sustainable development and bilateral relations. Although
Brazil is not officially part of the BRI, its alignment with BRI-like development strategies
facilitates Chinese investments in Brazil’s renewable energy sectors, creating
opportunities for asymmetric dependencies between the two countries.
3. Official PRC’s Strategies
When PRC opened its economy to the world in 1978, it facilitated the growth of
commercial interactions between PRC and global market. This process accelerated
significantly after the PRC’s admission to the WTO in 2001. The “Going Out” Policy (1999)
was one of the first Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategies implemented to facilitate
economic growth; aiming to promote Chinese investments abroad; and enhance access
to foreign markets, natural resources, and advanced technologies to support the PRC’s
economic growth. It was launched in response to an internal crisis related to industrial
overcapacity and in connection with the PRC’s accession to the WTO. It aimed to promote
the PRC’s national interests globally by internationalizing PRC state financing and
investments to ensure long-term access to energy and raw materials from abroad. From
the PRC’s perspective, this strategy aims to transform Chinese SOEs into corporations
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
230
with global reach (Jáuregui & González, 2022). Thus, this policy is a component of the
PRC’s overall national economic modernization strategy (Nash, 2012).
In March 2001, at the East Asia-Latin America Forum, the former PRC Foreign Minister
Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) emphasized the need to foster the economic and political exchange
between the two regions through the PRC’s “South-South”(南南合作) framework (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2001). Just a couple of months later
in December 2001, PRC acceded to the WTO. Since then, its global strategy has
consistently evolved (WTO, 2024).
The adoption of the “Going Out” Policy as part of the CCP’s 10th Five-Year Plan (第十个五
年计划)(2001-2005), officially endorsed Chinese entities to enter international markets
and resources. During this period, initially, only a few Chinese companies operated in
Brazil that were supported by both governments to establish relationships and develop
the necessary financial, legal, and physical infrastructure to facilitate Chinese company
operations. In the following CCP’s 11th Five-Year Plan (第十一五规划)(2006–2010), CCP
encouraged companies to “Go further outwards.” (Policy Asia-Pacific Energy, 2024).
During this period, Chinese companies engaged in larger and more complex foreign
investment transactions internationally, using strategies such as forming joint ventures;
establishing wholly owned subsidiaries- particularly in the manufacturing sector; and
focusing on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that offer quick access to new markets and
technologies.
One of the most significant changes over the past two decades is that Brazil has assumed
an important role in PRC’s global strategy. As identified from the literature review,
building on these initial “South-South” collaborations, on June 21, 2012, in Rio de Janeiro,
both parties signed a new strategic framework- the “Ten-Year Cooperation Plan” (十年合
作计划)(2012-2022). This foundational document serves as a blueprint for the strategic
partnership between PRC and Brazil; emphasizing technology, innovation, economic
cooperation, and cultural exchanges, with a focus on renewable energy technologies,
including wind energy (中华人民共和国商务部, 2012).
PRC’s success in Brazil stems from a grand, well-calculated strategy that combines
political impulses with economic resources. Since 2012, Xi Jinping has designated Brazil
as a “comprehensive strategic partner”- the highest status of its kind. Since 2012, both
country leaders have visited each other multiple times, Xi visited Brazil 3 times and
Brazilian presidents have visited PRC 4 times. As Xi stated in 2017, “Latin America is a
natural extension of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.”(Hobbs & Torreblanca, 2022).
Brazil possesses abundant natural resources- holding a significant share of the world’s
rare earth minerals (REEs) needed for renewable energy production- which makes Brazil
an attractive region for wind energy development. While Brazil is leveraging these
resources to enhance economic growth and improve energy security, it is also witnessing
heightened PRC’s involvement.
The “Going Out” Policy is undoubtedly part of the PRC’s broader, more active foreign
policy. However, the PRC’s domestic economic conditions have also been a major driving
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
231
force. This includes growing challenges with the old growth model and changing
relationships between the government, SOEs, and banks.
Overall, the “Going Out” Policy has yielded benefits both domestically and internationally,
as capital flows that once came from the West are now reversing, creating mutual
advantages. However, the impact of the PRC’s investments and its broader “Going Out”
Policy on the global political and economic order remains uncertain. Since the policy’s
introduction at the turn of the century, Chinese companies have increasingly invested
and operated overseas. Initially a major recipient of FDI, PRC has now become a
significant source of FDI abroad. For example, the China Investment Corporation (CIC)-
PRC’s largest sovereign wealth fund, was established in 2007 with $200 billion in
investable assets which now has at least doubled (Nash, 2012). This shift exemplifies a
substantial expansion of the PRC’s financial influence beyond its borders.
Chinese investments have increasingly targeted energy and raw materials sectors- which
the PRC needs to maintain its domestic growth objectives. Significant FDI flows to
resource-rich countries and regions, like Africa, Australia, Canada, LA, and Southeast
Asia have raised global concerns that PRC may be attempting to hoard a dangerously
large portion of the world’s natural resources and implement a neo-colonial agenda that
disregards human rights and humanitarian issues (Nash, 2012).
PRC’s global strategy in renewable wind energy is supported by the “Going Out” Policy.
For example, to establish wind farms Chinese wind turbine manufacturers enter new
markets through joint ventures and technology licensing (Oxford Business Group, 2023).
The “Going Out” development strategy has been significantly facilitated by the BRI
infrastructure program- a complementary governmental effort launched in 2013 by Xi
Jinping- which aims to create new opportunities for international cooperation through
tangible large-scale infrastructure projects connecting Asia with other continents.
However, there is a tendency to underestimate the obstacles facing the BRI, both
domestically and internationally, leading to excessive optimism from its supporters and
exaggerated concerns from those fearing wider PRC influence globally (Wang, 2016).
While BRI offers opportunities for infrastructure development and economic growth in
LA, it also presents challenges and risks that must be carefully managed. PRC’s ambitious
investments in the region strengthen its influence over global supply chains, creating
new challenges and opportunities in renewable energy development and geopolitical
stability. Although Brazil is not part of BRI, Brazil must engage with BRI in ways that
maximize benefits and minimize risks.
PRC-Brazil collaboration in renewable wind energy sector is executed through strategic
frameworks like the “Ten-Year Cooperation Plan” [as part of BRI] and the “Going Out”
Policy. These frameworks facilitate the PRC’s economic presence by establishing
infrastructure projects and trade routes between PRC and Brazil. These initiatives have
facilitated significant investments and technological integration, contributing to Brazil’s
renewable energy goals, while the primary goal of these initiatives is to ultimately
transform Chinese SOEs into global corporations.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
232
4. PRC’s Energy Diplomacy and Security Implications
Energy security is a global issue and a concern of national security; only few countries
can ensure independent supply. As a large developing country with over 1.3 billion
people, PRC’s energy needs are projected to grow significantly, and PRC must continually
increase its energy supply to meet these demands. The “Going Out” Policy and the BRI
have significantly influenced the global energy market through extensive external
investments and rapid growth in the renewable energy sector. As a leader in wind and
battery technology, exemplified by companies like BYD (比亚迪汽车), PRC competes
robustly in the global technology market challenging other nations in transitioning to
renewable energy (Hilton, 2024).
Energy security remains a significant concern for PRC- influencing both its domestic and
international energy strategies. Energy investments are a critical component of the PRC’s
diplomacy, representing its initial multilateral approach to establishing global influence.
Bilateral relations with resource-rich regions, such as Africa, Central Asia, and LA, reflect
a nuanced strategy tailored to the specific characteristics and ideological preferences of
each country.
PRC’s energy diplomacy utilizes a concept of resource diplomacy, defined by David Zweig
as “diplomatic actions aimed at enhancing nation’s access to resources and its energy
supply security” (Oxford Business Group, 2023). Resource security involves ensuring a
stable provision of energy at affordable prices and the ability to transport these resources
efficiently.
PRC’s “New Security Concept” (新安全观), declared in 1996, emphasized that energy is a
primary national interest and that acquiring foreign resources is essential for achieving
this goal. While some Western analysts view PRC’s overseas energy investments as a
means to expand its hegemony, Chinese scholars argue that these investments are
primarily focused on securing energy supplies (Oxford Business Group, 2023; Zhou,
2015). Thus, it could be argued that PRC’s energy diplomacy is driven by both resource
security and economic growth, rather than solely by climate change concerns.
PRC’s bilateral relations with Brazil illustrate complex interdependence, with significant
investments in Brazil’s wind energy sector fostering mutual influence. PRC’s strategy
targets both energy-rich and developed countries to secure its vast energy needs.
Chinese analysts distinguish between “energy security” and “energy sufficiency,” noting
that since the 1970s while PRC lost self-sufficiency in energy, it has improved its energy
supply security through international cooperation (Aggarwal, 2022).
Chinese companies have rapidly expanded across Brazil, implementing projects and
providing materials to local companies to boost renewable energy production. Chinese
loans and investments finance numerous infrastructure, energy, and mining projects.
PRC’s extensive involvement in Brazil’s energy sector is part of a broader strategy to
expand its influence in LA. From 2000 to 2019 PRC invested over $58 billion in the LA
region’s energy industry (Instituto de las Américas, 2024).
PRC’s drive towards renewable energy and obtaining critical minerals is driven by large-
scale purchases and international tenders won by Chinese companies. For example, in
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
233
2020 Chinese M&As in the LA energy sector reached $7.7 billion, underscoring its
strategic vision for increased global economic influence (Bloomberg, 2020). Supported
by Chinese banks, Chinese renewable energy equipment suppliers have penetrated LA
markets by offering low-cost, competitive technologies. This state financial backing has
facilitated the development of renewable energy projects, even in the face of local
regulatory challenges (Instituto de las Américas, 2024).
This strategic involvement while beneficial, raises concerns about economic and political
dependencies on the PRC. Excessive reliance on Chinese investments could lead to
vulnerabilities in local markets and labor sectors. As PRC plays a leading role in global
wind energy development, its substantial investments and exports of wind turbines in
Brazil underscore its influence in the renewable energy sector. This strategy of capital
flow highlights Brazil’s growing dependence on Chinese technologies and financial
resources, enabling PRC to expand its global market presence in wind energy
development. Therefore, it is crucial for Brazil to develop its own energy technologies
and promote local businesses to ensure a sustainable and independent energy supply.
5. PRC Investments
PRC operates as a non-traditional partner and is a valuable external stakeholder for
Brazil. Chinese investments, trade, and relations with Brazil have exacerbated over the
last decade. PRC invests across various sectors and these investments generally align
with the publicly stated CCP objectives. From 2000 to 2020, the trade value between PRC
and Brazil increased from $1.3 billion to over $90 billion by 2020, marking a 69.2-fold
increase (Atlantic Council, 2021). Projections suggest that by 2035, this trade volume
will exceed $700 billion (Atlantic Council, 2021). Currently, PRC is Brazil’s largest trading
partner (King’s College London, 2022).
The key element of PRC’s economic growth has been government support- enabling
Chinese SOEs to gain market shares in strategically important sectors. Recently, this
support has shifted towards advancing green energy production (Ellis, 2024). Over the
past decade, PRC companies have advanced in the development of critical green energy
sectors, including hydroelectric, solar, wind, EV manufacturing, energy storage, and
transmission. The strengthened positions of Chinese SOEs in these areas enable PRC to
gain substantial profits and strategic leverage as governments worldwide transition from
fossil fuels to green energy (Ellis, 2024).
Companies supported by CCP government and banks have been key investors in LA’s
wind energy sector. In 2008 and 2016, PRC issued two policy documents, reflecting
Beijing’s strategic importance in LA region. They have facilitated the region’s transition
to renewable energy, as approximately 90% of all wind and solar technology installed in
LA is produced by Chinese companies, or partners financially backed by PRC banks. This
increasing dominance of PRC suppliers means that a disproportionately large share of
renewable energy projects in the region, directly or indirectly benefit PRC. These PRC
companies, financed by Chinese banks, use low-cost turbines and other equipment, with
technology largely appropriated from European partners (Ellis, 2024).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
234
For example, in the 2023 ranking of wind turbine manufacturers Goldwind [PRC], took
first place with 16.4 GW of projects, followed by Envision Energy [PRC] with 15.4 GW.
Next were Vestas Wind Systems [Denmark] with 13.4 GW, Winday [PRC] with 10.4 GW,
and Mingyang [PRC] with 9.0 GW, surpassing the popular General Electric [US], which
had 8.1 GW (Evwind.es, 2023). However, these gradually growing investment projects
have been associated with security and environmental issues.
Furthermore, the entry of Chinese companies into the region as “local participants” has
changed the business and political environment. In Brazil, on the one hand, it created
new opportunities for local stakeholders to access Chinese capital for large-scale projects.
On the other hand, it triggered a defensive reaction from domestic actors, who perceived
themselves as threatened. Other types of investments include FDIs, where PRC
companies either acquire local businesses or establish local branches or factories, and
local investment financing with PRC funds.
During a speech at the first summit of PRC and the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) (2015), Xi Jinping indicated that over the next decade, Chinese
investments in the region could increase to $250 billion. He emphasized that in recent
years, the PRC has become not just a trading partner and lender to the region but an
increasingly significant investor, increasing the physical presence of its companies and
people in the region (Ellis, 2018).
The maturation of economic relations, due to accumulation of experience by Chinese
companies operating in the region has merged with new international confidence in Xi
Jinping’s government to position Chinese companies for new achievements. On the other
hand, the new protectionism discourse emanating from Donald Trump’s administration
in the US (2017-2021), and its public rhetoric on issues such as immigration, has
confused and alienated important industries in LA, increasing the political desire to
cooperate with PRC, although not everyone in the region is ready to welcome PRC with
confidence and enthusiasm. The presence of PRC-backed companies and citizens working
in Brazil has raised concerns about the socio-political conditions, laws, and policies in the
region, which now impact the operations, profits, and security of these companies.
For example, in Brazil since 2003, Chinese companies have implemented 87 projects
worth $46.8 billion (Ellis, 2018). This new role of investor increases PRC’s political
influence in the region and also acquaints CCP with complex decisions about how and
when to use its growing influence to protect and promote the interests of its companies
in the region, adhering to the principles of “non-interference” in the sovereign affairs of
LA countries (Ellis, 2018). In this process, the PRC positions itself as an actor historically
and politically located in the Global South. It has achieved a significant role in the
development of renewable energy in LA, directly influencing global strategic positioning.
Consequently, LA is being shaped as a strategic platform for PRC’s positioning in the
Western Hemisphere. For example, Zhang, Y. discusses that the geostrategic projection
from Beijing to LA is embedded in a global vision where the “developing world” or the
Global South is seen as a political support base for the major project of restoring PRC’s
power at “la base” (Ellis, 2018). Thus, PRC’s growing significance in LA within the Global
South sphere holds strategic and symbolic importance.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
235
This unveils two directions explaining the systematic entry of Chinese economic
diplomacy into LA. On one hand, the geopolitical element seeks to expand PRC’s spheres
of influence, including its efforts to internationally isolate Taiwan. This pattern of behavior
benefits from the PRC’s inevitable commercial dynamism, which involves a geo-economic
strategy aimed at capturing LA’s markets, energy, natural resources, minerals, and REEs
(Ellis, 2018).
Reevaluating its bureaucratic orientation and belief in central planning, CCP forms
relationships with countries through carefully crafted and announced plans and policies,
intended for both domestic and international audiences. The government possesses
numerous political and institutional levers to coordinate its conduct even abroad. For
Chinese companies, government plans and policies are akin to the Northern Star crucial
in guiding their actions and indicating which activities abroad are officially approved and
prioritized. For Chinese companies, an important reference from the “Going Out” Policy
is the 2008 “White Paper” (中国对拉丁美洲和加勒比政策文件) on LAC states, which outlined
CCP’s intentions to develop interactions across almost all sectors, ranging from political
and economic to military, considering a wide range of sectors to promote trade and
investment exchanges with the region.
Another significant policy indicating the CCP’s approach was the "1+3+6" trade
interaction concept (中拉“1+3+6”合作新框架) announced by Xi Jinping in July 2014, during
his visit to Brazil for the BRICS summit in Fortaleza. Where Xi emphasized the unified
nature of Chinese operations in LA, along with the three main means of implementation,
which are trade, loans, and investments, and the six key sectors that were their
operational priorities in the region, including- energy and natural resources,
infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, science and technology
innovations, and information technology. The “1+3+6” concept was also incorporated
into the PRC-CELAC cooperation plan (2015-2019), which was intended as a roadmap for
fostering relations with PRC. Both were mentioned in the second “White Paper” on PRC’s
policy towards LA, published in November 2016, highlighting that the priority of these six
economic areas is an official government policy to direct Chinese investments, loans,
trade, and other activities in the region.
At the national level, investments and other commercial activities are also promoted and
managed through state diplomacy, incorporating official visits, memorandums of
understanding, and other agreements, as well as the establishment and management of
contracts and “strategic partnerships”. This process is fundamentally based on diplomatic
recognition. With few exceptions, official relations are necessary for the Chinese
government to approve loans and set investment priorities in a country. Similarly,
diplomatic relations facilitate the participation of Chinese SOEs in national tenders in the
host country. For example, changes in diplomatic relations, recognizing PRC combined
with its role as a logistics and financing center for the entry of Chinese products into the
region, could open doors for significant Chinese company investments and projects in
the country. Chinese investments in renewable energy are considered the most
significant opportunity to expand trade between Asia and LA. Simultaneously, increasing
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
236
oil and gas extraction in US has prompted major Chinese renewable energy companies
to seek more attractive alternatives.
6. Prospects for Mutual Interdependence
Since 1993, PRC and Brazil have recognized the potential for a strategic long-term
partnership, emphasizing their shared identities as major developing nations. Brazil has
consistently ranked among the PRC’s top trading partners and serves as a key destination
for Chinese FDI. From 2012 to 2023, PRC was Brazil’s leading trading partner, accounting
for 22% of Brazil’s trade in 2023, amounting to $55 billion, compared to 15.9% ($40
billion) with the US- Brazil’s second-largest trading partner (TrendEconomy, 2024).
According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), Brazil appears to be a
country where PRC is investing significant resources in clean energy production in LA
(Diálogo Chino, 2024).
Although Brazil is not a member of the BRI, it is a member of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB). The PRC-Brazil partnership is marked by expanding commercial
ties and significant Chinese loans and investments. Since 2007, the China Development
Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM) have extended over $28 billion
in loans to Brazil, primarily directed toward the energy sector (Gallagher & Myers, 2020).
Brazil’s commitment to renewable energy began with the 1997 “Law 9478”, establishing
the basis of its national energy policy. This evolved into the “Ten-Year Energy Expansion
Plan” (PDE), emphasizing the development of wind energy to reduce reliance on fossil
fuels. The PDE 2031 projects that renewable energy sources will comprise about 56% of
Brazil’s total energy matrix by 2031 (Ministério de Minas e Energia, Secretaria de
Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético, 2022).
In 2002, Brazil launched the PROINFA to promote wind, biomass, and small-scale
hydropower energy (IRENA, 2015). This was later replaced by the Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA) auction procurement process, overseen by the Brazilian Electricity
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL). Noteworthy, the expansion of renewable energy aligns with
the PRC’s “Going Out” Policy, making the PRC a significant investor in this sector.
From 2015 to 2019, Chinese FDI in Brazil reached $25.9 billion, with wind energy
comprising 72% of this investment. This cooperation has elevated Brazil-PRC energy
sector collaboration to new heights, with substantial capital from Chinese investors,
manufacturers, engineering service providers, and financial institutions (Barbosa, 2020).
Chinese investments in Brazil’s wind energy sector are driven by the notable
complementarity between the two countries. Brazil’s abundant resources, expanding
capacity needs, and favorable market conditions align well with PRC’s financial power and
technological capabilities. This synergy has facilitated Chinese enterprises’ entry into
Brazil, exemplified by the investments and operations of companies like State Grid
Corporation of China (SGCC), China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), and China
Three Gorges Corporation (CTG) (Barbosa, 2020).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
237
Brazil’s wind energy sector has also benefited from PRC bank loans. For example, the
CDB granted a $56 million loan to Desenvix Energias Renováveis for constructing the
Barra dos Coqueiros wind farm in 2012. Such investments have allowed Chinese
companies to gain control over significant portions of Brazil’s wind energy capacity,
aligning future operations with their interests (Ellis, 2024).
The PRC’s active involvement in Brazil’s [and wider LA’s] energy markets reflect CCP’s
strategic vision for increased global economic strength. Through significant financial
investments and project acquisitions, PRC has established close economic and political
ties with LA countries, becoming a key player in the energy market. Such Chinese
influence could pose threats to the energy security of Brazil and other LA countries.
Elizabeth C. Economy notes, “Xi is the first Chinese leader to align the country’s
capabilities with vision and strategy to realize the ancient ‘Chinese dream of national
rejuvenation’. CCP is not satisfied with China’s position in the international system. They
seek to change the world order.” (Elizabeth C. Economy, 2021).
Similar notions are exemplified by the former Peruvian presidential candidate Julio
Armando Guzmán who noted that, “The Chinese attitude towards LA has changed.
Initially, China’s influence was primarily based on soft power, trying to convince LA
countries that China’s rise would benefit the region. Now, however, China is willing to
impose its power and use hard force to try to make countries do what it wants.” (Pettus,
2023).
According to Pedro Barbosa, PRC companies own 12% of Brazil’s wind energy production,
transmission, and distribution segments, making PRC the most significant foreign
investor in this sector. This dominant role could lead to political influence, with security
experts highlighting risks if PRC companies monopolize the electricity sector from
production to transmission and retail. Thus, it could be argued that the PRC establishes
asymmetric and coercive economic ties with other countries and uses these ties to deeply
influence local and national governments. The PRC may have been conducting
comprehensive government efforts for years, serving its objectives and undermining
democratic principles through involvement in LA. From policy analysis, it is evident that
PRC’s strategy in Brazil’s renewable wind energy sector fosters mutual dependency
through investments, technology transfer, economic growth, and energy security. The
PRC’s greater resources and financial capabilities may create asymmetry, allowing PRC
to control projects and gain advantages, making Brazil more dependent on Chinese
investments and technologies, thus creating an imbalance in opportunities and influence.
Interdependence in global politics involves mutual influence between countries; Keohane
and Nye’s theory of interdependence asserts that global politics is shaped by “complex
interdependence” among states, non-state actors, and transnational issues. They
emphasize the importance of power and interests intertwined with economic and social
interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977).
PRC’s strategy involves diverse connections, beyond governmental ties, including
business relationships, non-governmental involvement, and multinational participation
(Rana, 2015). In the renewable wind energy sector, PRC and Brazil exhibit mutual
interdependence through trade partnerships, technology transfer, and joint ventures.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
238
PRC’s investments in Brazil’s wind energy projects highlight this interdependence,
creating economic and political linkages.
PRC’s foreign and economic strategy in bilateral relations with Brazil is based on diverse
connections, including liberal market principles and national interests. This
institutionalized system indicates that PRC’s policymaking and actions with Brazil depend
on both international trade principles and national strategies. The main objective of this
cooperation is to ensure a steady supply of energy resources, natural minerals, and REEs
to support PRC’s economic growth and development, particularly in renewable wind
energy.
Nye and Keohane identified three main features of “complex interdependence”- multiple
channels, the irrelevance of military power, and the importance of international
institutions. These features are evident in PRC-Brazil relations, particularly in the wind
energy sector. PRC’s significant economic and political influence is highlighted,
emphasizing the mutual benefits and potential risks of this bilateral partnership. Keohane
(1984) states that “power is no longer used to consider behavior; rather, it provides the
language for describing political action.” This means military power is less important,
while language and communication are crucial for understanding PRC-Brazil relations.
Complex interdependence aligns with renewable energy and energy security concepts.
PRC’s institutional ties with Brazil are executed through investments, cooperation, and
policy frameworks in the renewable wind energy sector, therefore the institutional
context is crucial for understanding PRC-Brazil relations- suggesting that military power
is not the sole factor influencing IR.
Economic interdependence between PRC and Brazil includes trade, acquisition of wind
farms, investments in wind projects, manufacturing components, and control over power
grids. This interdependence is also tied to resource security, as PRC seeks access to
Brazil’s natural resources, including minerals, lithium, and REEs essential for renewable
energy development. PRC’s cooperation with Brazil significantly contributes to the
development of Brazil’s renewable energy sector, including the construction and
operation of wind farms. However, this raises energy security issues, as PRC’s energy
policies impact Brazil, making Brazil vulnerable to PRC’s decisions in the energy sector.
Addressing this cooperation is essential to balance the asymmetry of mutual dependence,
thereby reducing Brazil’s sensitivity and vulnerability to PRC. Keohane and Nye (1977)
distinguish between sensitivity- the response to costly external impacts before policy
changes occur, and vulnerability- which arises when a nation’s welfare depends on the
behavior of others. Despite PRC’s partial vulnerability and sensitivity, asymmetrical
mutual dependence in energy relations between Brazil and PRC functions as a source of
power for PRC and a potential threat to Brazil’s energy security.
PRC’s investments in Brazil’s wind energy sector demonstrate the interaction of
economic, political, and strategic interests. These investments reflect a form of mutual
economic dependence, benefiting all parties through cooperation and shared resources.
However, this mutual dependence also raises concerns about asymmetric dynamics,
potential dependency risks, and PRC’s influence over Brazil’s wind farms and energy
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
239
resources. While PRC has diversified its international relationships, Brazil is significantly
engaged with PRC, relying heavily on Chinese investments and production.
7. Insights from International Renewable Wind Energy Experts
In the context of this study, interviews were conducted with six diverse international
experts from the renewable energy industry to gauge the prospects for potential
interdependencies. These experts, who have chosen to remain anonymous, hail from
various companies and hold different professional titles. Two of the interviewees are high-
ranking employees from Goldwind-a company backed by PRC. Another two hail from
Siemens Gamesa Latam and Central Puerto Renovables, companies operating in LA, and
headquartered in Spain and Argentina, respectively. The last two interviewees are high-
level managers from two separate renewable wind energy companies, based in Denmark
and operating in Taiwan. They represent both local Taiwanese and European
professionals working in Taiwan.
The experts’ views on PRC’s involvement in the global wind energy sector, with an
emphasis on their collaboration with Brazil and the potential for dependencies, were
diverse. Post-interview, a dichotomy emerged between the perspectives of experts
working within Chinese companies and those employed by European and LA
counterparts. This dichotomy was particularly evident about mutual interdependence.
Representatives from Goldwind expressed hope for an increased PRC presence in LA,
asserting that PRC-made engines match the quality of their European equivalents.
However, when discussing the influence and collaboration between the PRC and other
nations, a divergence of perspectives surfaced. While representatives from Chinese
companies [engineer and a high-level manager from Goldwind] expressed optimism
about PRC’s involvement and dismissed dependency concerns, representatives from non-
Chinese financed companies expressed caution. While acknowledging the
competitiveness of Chinese technology, these experts, from Siemens Gamesa LATAM and
Central Puerto Renovables, showed a preference for European technology and
investments, citing their proven quality over the years. They also underscored the need
for strategic caution to prevent potential monopolization.
The discourse around mutual interdependence was a recurring theme in these interviews.
While PRC’s technological advancements and financial investments substantially
contribute to the renewable energy sector, the experts emphasized the need for balance
to avoid over-dependence. They suggested multiple strategic recommendations,
including diversification of investment and technology sources, bolstering local
manufacturing, promoting competitive supply chains, establishing robust policy and legal
frameworks to facilitate market entry for international companies, and conducting
ongoing quality and reliability assessments of imported technologies.
Interestingly, all the experts from non-Chinese companies admitted to not being
concerned about the PRC posing risks in the global wind energy market. They maintained
that their respective companies have their own vision for the future, implying an inherent
confidence in their strategic direction and resilience.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
240
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study analyzed the complex dynamics of the PRC’s engagement in
Brazil’s renewable wind energy sector. This article aimed to answer the research question
of how the PRC’s renewable wind energy strategy in Brazil contributes to creating
strategic dependencies and potential vulnerabilities associated with reliance on Chinese
capital?
Our analysis reveals that while the PRC’s strategy has indeed fostered significant
collaboration and growth in this field, it has also led to the creation of strategic
dependencies and potential vulnerabilities for Brazil. The relationship between the two
nations in this sector is characterized by mutual interdependencies, but these are notably
asymmetrical in nature. Brazil has become increasingly reliant on Chinese capital and
technology, whereas the PRC’s dependencies on Brazil are comparatively minor. This
imbalance underscores the potential risks associated with Brazil’s growing dependence
on Chinese resources in its renewable energy development.
In 1996, PRC introduced its “New Security Concept” emphasizing energy as central to
PRC’s national interests and prioritizing the acquisition of foreign resources. As one of
the world’s largest economies and leading energy consumers, PRC is also at the forefront
of renewable energy. PRC’s cooperation with Brazil in the renewable wind energy sector
is driven by strategic factors, including- resource availability, market expansion,
technology transfer, climate goals, and geopolitical aims.
To sum up, PRC’s “Going Out” Policy has advanced bilateral ties with Brazil. This strategy
promotes long-term overseas investments and cooperation to access energy and raw
materials while institutionalization of BRI has increased investments in infrastructure
projects such as wind farms and mineral extraction.
Brazil’s vast land areas, especially in the Northeast, are suitable for wind farms, and its
commitment to renewable energy aligns with PRC’s objectives. As one of LA’s largest
economies, Brazil’s energy development is crucial for PRC. The establishment of
numerous wind energy parks and the increase in Chinese investments have resulted in
rapid growth of FDI in renewable energy. To further its interests in the wind energy
sector, PRC has acquired many of Brazil’s largest wind farms and established joint
ventures.
Brazilian government policies, such as wind energy auctions, have been instrumental in
this collaboration. Consequently, Chinese companies have become major investors in
Brazil’s renewable wind energy sector, both in terms of financial investment and raw
material supply. However, this electricity sector faces risks like monopolistic control of
Chinese companies.
Our findings affirm the initial central argument that the PRC’s involvement results in
strategic dependencies for Brazil, aligning with the theoretical framework presented
earlier in this paper. However, it is important to note that these interdependencies
created by the PRC-Brazil cooperation in the renewable wind energy sector while
asymmetric, are not insurmountable. This cooperation results in greater dependencies
for Brazil compared to the PRC. It is important to also emphasize that while this
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
241
partnership does create certain dependencies for the PRC, these are relatively minor
when compared to those experienced by Brazil.
To address these challenges, we have proposed several policy recommendations aimed
at helping Brazil mitigate risks and ensure sustainable development and energy security.
These strategies are designed to leverage the benefits of international collaboration while
safeguarding national interests and reducing vulnerabilities. As the global energy
landscape continues to evolve, Brazil must navigate these partnerships strategically,
balancing the advantages of foreign investment and technology transfer with the
imperative of maintaining autonomy and resilience in its renewable energy sector.
In the future, Brazil should ensure Chinese compliance with local laws and renewable
energy policies, while evaluating whether Chinese-financed projects support Brazil’s
renewable energy, economic growth, and SDGs. Prioritizing local companies for wind
farm construction and energy production in renewable energy auctions could be
beneficial. Brazilian specialists and engineers should ensure the operation of wind farms
and manufacture quality parts that could compete internationally. Brazil should leverage
Chinese investments to expand its national electricity transmission systems, crucial for
meeting domestic needs. However, it is important that Chinese companies do not fully
control these transmission enterprises, as this poses a significant threat to Brazil’s energy
supply security. A potential solution for Brazil might be diversifying flexible deals based
on national interests with other major powers, partners, and economies. Although,
attracting FDI requires a series of measures, such as the implementation of clear
regulatory frameworks, streamlining of administrative procedures, and close cooperation
with development institutions- such robust economic growth can be secured with
strategic energy policy and resource development.
References
Aggarwal, P. (2022). China’s energy security: The journey from self-sufficiency to global
investor. https://books.google.lv/books?hl=lv&lr=&id=kYNyEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg
Atlantic Council. (2021). China-LAC Trade: Four Scenarios in 2035. Atlantic Council.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/china-lac-trade-four-
scenarios-in-2035/
Bai, S., Wang, J., Lv, G., Zhou, P., Hou, S., & Xu, S. (2010). Gis-based logistic regression
for landslide susceptibility mapping of the Zhongxian segment in the Three Gorges Area,
China. Geomorphology, 115(1-2), pp. 23-31.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geomorph.2009.09.025
Baldwin, A. David. (1980). Interdependence and power: A conceptual analysis.
https://dbaldwin.scholar.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf4596/files/dbaldwin/files/bald
win_1980_interdependence_and_power_-_a_conceptual_analysis.pdf
Barbosa, H., & Pedro, H. (2020). New Kids on the Block: China’s Arrival in Brazil’s Electric
Sector.https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/12/GCI_WP_012_Pedro_Henrique_Batista_
Barbosa.pdf
Berzina-Cerenkova, U.A. (2023). Introduction, Discourse, Rhetoric and Shifting Political
Behaviour in China. Routledge, ISBN 9781032537559
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
242
Busel, R. (2022). La geopolítica de China, Rusia y Estados Unidos en la transición
energética mundial. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/la-geopol%C3%ADtica-de-china-
rusia-y-estados-unidos-en-transici%C3%B3n-busel/
CEBC (2022). Investimentos Chineses no Brasil.
https://www.cebc.org.br/investimentos-chineses-no-brasil/
Chen, H., Yuan, W., Yuan, X., Gao, Y., Wu, N., & Zhu, D. (2009). Methane emissions
from newly created marshes in the drawdown area of the three gorges reservoir. Journal
of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 114(D18).
https://doi.org/10.1029/2009jd012410
Climatscope. (2023). Power Transition Factbook. https://www.global-
climatescope.org/sectors/power/
Coate, A. Roger, Griffin, A. Jeffrey, Elliott-Gower, Steven. (2017). Interdependence in
International Organization and Global Governance.
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.0
01.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-110
Cohen, A. (2021). China’s journey to the center of the Earth - For rare minerals.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2021/09/09/chinas-journey-to-the-center-of-
the-earth-for-rare-minerals/
Committee on Foreign Affairs. (2022). China regional snapshot: South America.
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america
Copeland, Dale. C. (1996). Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade
Expectations. https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/20/4/5/11525/Economic-
Interdependence-and-War-A-Theory-of-Trade?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Dannreuther, R. (2011). China and global oil: Vulnerability and opportunity.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41306994
Deng, H., Fang, L., Zhang, L., Yan, X., Wang, F., Hao, X., … & Zheng, P. (2023). A
comprehensive content analysis of 104 Chinese electronic cigarette manufacturing
enterprise official websites. Tobacco Control, tc-2022-057759.
https://doi.org/10.1136/tc-2022-057759
Deng, Q., Jian-jun, G., Ge, D., He, S., Jiang, B., Li, X., … & Ye, Y. (2020). Modern
optimization theory and applications. Scientia Sinica Mathematica, 50(7), p. 899.
https://doi.org/10.1360/ssm-2020-0035
Diagne, C., Catford, J. A., Essl, F., Núñez, M. A., & Courchamp, F. (2020). What are the
economic costs of biological invasions? a complex topic requiring international and
interdisciplinary expertise. NeoBiota, 63, pp. 25-37.
https://doi.org/10.3897/neobiota.63.55260
Diálogo Chino (2024). China pisa fuerte en la energía renovable de América Latina.
https://dialogochino.net/es/clima-y-energia-es/7729-china-pisa-fuerte-en-la-energia-
renovable-de-america-latina/
Dudgeon, D. (2011). Asian river fishes in the anthropocene: threats and conservation
challenges in an era of rapid environmental change. Journal of Fish Biology, 79(6),
pp.1487-1524. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1095-8649.2011.03086.x
Ellis, E. (2024). Is China Cornering the Green Energy Transition in Latin America?
https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/is-china-cornering-the-green-energy-transition-
in-latin-america/
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
243
Ellis, R. E. (2018). Hacia una asociación estratégica: Las inversiones de China en América
Latina. https://chinayamericalatina.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/WP3-Mar-2018-
REDCAEM.pdf
Energía & Negocios.com. (2023). Informe CEA: la industria eólica global instaló 117 GW
de capacidad en 2023. https://www.energiaynegocios.com.ar/informe-cea-la-industria-
eolica-global-instalo-117-gw-de-capacidad-en-2023/
Evwind.es. (2023). Goldwind to supply wind turbines for wind farm in Brazil.
https://www.evwind.es/2023/02/13/goldwind-to-supply-wind-turbines-for-wind-farm-
in-brazil/90191
Evwind.es. (2024). China dominates the top 5 in the BNEF wind turbine manufacturers
ranking for wind energy in 2023. https://www.evwind.es/2024/03/27/china-dominates-
the-top-5-in-the-bnef-wind-turbine-manufacturers-ranking-for-wind-energy-in-
2023/97526#:~
Gallagher, K., & Myers, M. (2020). Scaling back: Chinese development finance in LAC,
2019. https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Chinese-Finance-to-
LAC-2019.pdf
Geng, F., Wang, Q., Song, K., Hao, W., & Jiang, B. (2021). Visible-light-driven
photocatalytic kharasch-type addition of 1,6-enynes. Chinese Journal of Organic
Chemistry, 41(12), p. 4815. https://doi.org/10.6023/cjoc202106014
Global Wind Energy Council. (2023). Global Wind Report 2023. https://gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2023/04/GWEC-2023_interactive.pdf
Guo, J. (2023). The political economy of China–Latin America relations: The making of a
post-boom paradigm. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-023-00126-5
Han, L., Gao, B., Zhou, H., Xu, D., Wei, X., & Gao, L. (2015). The spatial distribution,
accumulation and potential source of seldom monitored trace elements in sediments of
Three Gorges Reservoir, China. Scientific Reports, 5(1).
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep16170
Hansen, L. and Zambra, D. (2020). An overview about the Brazilian photovoltaic market
development. Journal of Power and Energy Engineering, 08(08), pp. 73-84.
https://doi.org/10.4236/jpee.2020.88006
Hilton, I. (2024). How China became the world’s leader on renewable energy.
https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-renewable-energy
Hobbs, C., & Torreblanca, J. I. (2022). Byting back: The EU’s digital alliance with Latin
America and the Caribbean. https://ecfr.eu/publication/byting-back-the-eus-digital-
alliance-with-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/
IEA.org. (2024). Mineral requirements for clean energy transitions.
https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions/mineral-requirements-for-clean-energy-transitions
IIGF [观点.] (2019, August 20). 中国与“一带一路”沿线国家巴西的可再生能源合作及投融资
China and Brazil's renewable energy cooperation and investment along the Belt and Road
countries.中央财经大学绿色金融国际研究院 [Central University of Finance and Economics,
International Institute of Green Finance]. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://iigf.cufe.edu.cn/info/1012/1271.htm
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
244
Instituto de las Américas. (2024). China Afirma su Incidencia en el Sector Energético
Latinoamericano: Lo que significa para la región, los Estados Unidos y Beijing.
https://biblioteca.olade.org/opac-tmpl/Documentos/cg00916.pdf
International Energy Agency. (2011). Technology Roadmap: China Wind Energy
Development Roadmap 2050. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/8c00f1d3-
8054-4e4f-b81f-2b7a23619167/TechnologyRoadmap-
ChinaWindEnergyDevelopmentRoadmap2050.pdf
IRENA Policy and Measures Database. (2015). Programme of Incentives for Alternative
Electricity Sources - Programa de Incentivo a Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica –
PROINFA. https://www.iea.org/policies/4019-programme-of-incentives-for-alternative-
electricity-sources-programa-de-incentivo-a-fontes-alternativas-de-energia-eletrica-
proinfa
Jáuregui González, Juliana. (2022). Financiamiento e inversiones de China en energías
renovables en la Argentina.
https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/handle/11336/206179/CONICET_Digital_Nro.dac605
68-8071-4781-9dfe-a6fc8c6be0b7_C.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
Junior, P., Fischetti, E., Araujo, V., Peruchi, R., Aquila, G., Rocha, L., & Lacerda, L.
(2019). Wind power economic feasibility under uncertainty and the application of ann in
sensitivity analysis. Energies, 12(12), p. 2281. https://doi.org/10.3390/en12122281
Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world
political economy.
https://www.academia.edu/84097992/Robert_O_Keohane_After_Hegemony_Cooperati
on_and_Discord_in_the_World_Political_Economy_Princeton_Univ_Pr_1984
Keohane, Robert, & Nye, Joseph. (1977). Power and interdependence: World politics in
transition. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Keohane, Robert, & Nye, Joseph. (2001). Power and Interdependence.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396337308441409
King’s College London. (2022). Brazil-China Trade Relations.
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/lci/assets/ksspplcipolicypaper0122-brazil-china-
trade.pdf#:~:text=URL%3A%20https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kcl.ac.uk%2Flci%2Fassets%2
Fksspplcipolicypaper0122
Ma, Y., Shi, R., & Zhang, T. (2021). Research progress on triphase interface
electrocatalytic carbon dioxide reduction. Acta Chimica Sinica, 79(4), p. 369.
https://doi.org/10.6023/a20110540
Maguire, G. (2023). China widens renewable energy supply lead with wind power push.
https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-widens-renewable-energy-
supply-lead-with-wind-power-push-2023-03-01/
Ministério de Minas e Energia, Secretaria de Planejamento e Desenvolvimento Energético.
(2022). 2031 Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan. https://www.gov.br/mme/pt-
br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/plano-decenal-de-expansao-de-energia/pde-
2031/english-version/relatorio_pde2031_introducao_eus.pdf
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国商务部]. (2012,
June 25). 中华人民共和国政府和巴西联邦共和国政府十年合作规划 [The Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Ten-
Year Cooperation Plan].
http://mds.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ghlt/201206/20120608194994.shtml
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
245
Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China. (2005). Renewable Energy Law of the
People's Republic of China.
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201312/20131
200432160.shtml
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2001). Speech by Foreign
Minister Tang Jiaxuan of the People's Republic of China at the First Meeting of the East
Asia-Latin America Forum.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/3447_665449/3478_665028/3479_665
030/200104/t20010409_595140.html
Myslikova, Z., & Dolton-Thornton, N. (2023). ‘Global China’ is a big part of Latin America’s
renewable energy boom, but homegrown industries and ‘frugal innovation’ are key.
https://fortune.com/2023/07/08/china-secretly-fueling-latin-america-renewable-
energy-boom-chile/
Nascimento, A. M., Liu, L., Alves, J. R. C. S., & Oriá, P. (2021). Chinese investment in
the Northeast region of Brazil: An analysis about the renewable energy sector.
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REGE-12-2020-0147/full/html
Nash, Paul. (2012). China's "Going Out" Strategy. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/china-s-going-out-strategy
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. (2023). NEA Annual Report 2022. https://www.oecd-
nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-12/nea_ar_2022.pdf
Oxford Business Group. (2023). América Latina sigue siendo un área clave de la Iniciativa
del Cinturón y Ruta de la Seda de China. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/articles-
interviews/latin-america-remains-a-key-focus-of-chinas-belt-and-road-
initiative/#Espa%C3%B1ol
Peng, Z., Ding, H., Chen, R., Gao, C., & Wang, C. (2019). Research progress in covalent
organic frameworks for energy storage and conversion. Acta Chimica Sinica, 77(8), p.
681. https://doi.org/10.6023/a19040118
Pettus, Maj Gen Evan. (2023). The Expanding Leverage of the People’s Republic of China
in Latin America: Implications for US National Security and Global Order.
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3276716/the-expanding-
leverage-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-in-latin-america-implica/
Policy Asia-Pacific Energy. (2024). Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development.
https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/11th%20Five-
Year%20Plan%20%282006-
2010%29%20for%20National%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Development%20%
28EN%29.pdf
Presidência da República Casa Civil. (1997). Lei No 9.478, de 6 de agosto de 1997.
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9478.htm
Rana, W. (2015). Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist
and Neoliberal Thoughts.
https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_6_No_2_February_2015/33.pdf
Reportlinker.com. (2023). Wind Farm Market Overview in Brazil 2023-2027.
https://www.reportlinker.com/market-report/Wind-Power/6624/Wind-
Farm?term=wind%20farm%20data&matchtype=b&loc_interest=&loc_physical=906230
8&utm_group=standard
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
246
Shi, Z., Cai, C., Ding, S. W., Wang, T., & Chow, T. L. (2004). Soil conservation planning
at the small watershed level using RUSLE with GIS: a case study in the Three Gorge Area
of China. Catena, 55(1), pp. 33-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0341-8162(03)00088-2
State Grid Brazil Holding.br. (n.d.). Conheça nossa boa energia.
https://stategrid.com.br/#
Tomasetti, B. (2024). Economic Interdependence.
https://www.carboncollective.co/sustainable-investing/economic-interdependence
TrendEconomy. (2024). Brazil trade balance, exports, imports by country and region
2023. https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/Brazil/TOTAL
Vardiero, P., Lima, A., & Hidd, G. (2020). Wind energy in brazil: present trends and future
scenarios. International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Science, 7(10),
pp.16-28. https://doi.org/10.22161/ijaers.710.3
Villamil, J. (2020). El gigante energético chino hace una incursión en las energías
renovables mexicanas con Zuma. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-
19/china-power-giant-makes-foray-into-mexican-renewables-with-zuma
Wang, H. (2016). A deeper look at China’s “Going Out” policy.
https://www.cigionline.org/static/documents/hongying_wang_mar2016_web.pdf
Wang, Q., Wang, H., & Yu, H. (2023). Demarcation of national park boundary based on
ecological security pattern: a case study of Yarlung Zangbo Grand Canyon National Park.
自然资源学报,38(4), p. 951. https://doi.org/10.31497/zrzyxb.20230408
Webster, J., & Tobin, W. (2024). Beijing’s influence on Latin America’s energy mix is
growing—especially in renewables. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-
reports/issue-brief/beijings-influence-on-latin-americas-energy-mix-is-growing-
especially-in-renewables/
Wind Energy, The Facts. (2009). Latin America, Brazil. https://www.wind-energy-the-
facts.org/brazil.html
WTO (2024). China and the WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm
Xie, K., Jiang, M., Chen, X., Lü, Q., & Yu, B. (2021). Application of α-keto acids in metal-
free photocatalysis. Chinese Journal of Organic Chemistry, 41(12), p. 4575.
https://doi.org/10.6023/cjoc202109008
Zhao, Y., Wu, B., & Zeng, Y. (2013). Spatial and temporal patterns of greenhouse gas
emissions from Three Gorges Reservoir of China. Biogeosciences, 10(2), pp. 1219-1230.
https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-10-1219-2013
Belt and Road Energy Cooperation Network [一带一路能源合作网]. (2019, December 6). 巴
西能源发展规划 Brazil energy development planning.
http://obor.nea.gov.cn/v_country/getDataCountry.html?id=1386&channelId=31&status
=2
巴西《经济价值报》. (2021 September 19). “一带一路”的机遇 [Opportunities of the Belt and
Road] 巴西-中国：前途无量的合作”专刊之五 . 中华人民共和国驻巴西联邦共和国大使馆
Embaixada da República Popular da China. http://br.china-
embassy.gov.cn/sgxx/sghd/202109/t20210919_9592926.htm
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 222-247
PRC-Brazil Collaboration in Renewable Wind Energy:
a Case Study of Interdependencies Through the Lens of Liberal Interdependence Theory
Biteniece, Baiba & Dana Dūda
247
罗婧婧. (2023, June 5). 综述：中国和巴西清洁能源合作再创佳绩 [China and Brazil's clean
energy cooperation achieves new successes]. 新华社 Xinhua News Agency.
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/00HUTI6R.html
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
248
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUEST TO PROMOTE PORTUGUESE:
BUILDING BRIDGES THROUGH MACAU
JOÃO SIMÕES
joaosimoes@cityu.edu.mo
Assistant Professor at City University of Macau (China). He holds a Ph.D. in Portuguese-speaking
Countries Studies from the same university, a Master's degree in Chinese Studies from the
University of Aveiro, Portugal, where he studied language policy and planning of the People's
Republic of China, and a Bachelor's degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the
University of Lisbon, Portugal. Prior to his current role, he taught at Xi'an International Studies
University, China. His current research focuses on Lusophony and the interactions between
Portuguese-speaking countries and China, as well as energy geopolitics.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1437-5527.
DANIEL VERAS
daniar73@gmail.com
Professor of "China: Contacts, Culture, Identities, and Contrasts" in the Specialization/Graduate
Studies in Contemporary China program at PUC Minas (Brazil). He is also the vice-coordinator of
ALADAA Brasil (Asociación Latinoamericana de Estudios de Asia y África, Brazil chapter).
Previously, he was a researcher at the Center for Sino-Brazilian Studies at Fundação Getulio
Vargas, Brazil. He holds a Doctorate in Social Sciences, a Master's in Communication and
Semiotics, and a B.A. in Social Sciences, all from the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo
(PUC-SP). Daniel lived in China for ten years, where he studied Chinese at Nanjing University and
worked in academic Sino-Brazilian cooperation involving the Confucius Institute of São Paulo, the
Chinese Government (Han Ban), and São Paulo State University (Unesp). He taught Portuguese
language, International Relations, and Brazilian culture at Hubei University in Wuhan. From 2015
to 2016, he worked as a researcher at the Santo Andre City Hall. From 2010 to 2018, he lectured
in the annual video conference “Brazilian Society and Economics” for the Master's in Business
Engineering program at Institut Supérieur d'Ingénierie d'Affaires (ISIALM) in Le Mans, France.
Since 2016, he has been a guest professor of Sociology and Philosophy for students from the
University of Alberta (Canada), Syracuse University, the University of Missouri, the University of
Illinois, North Carolina State University, and Pine Manor College (USA) as part of the Summer
Program, CUSSA, at Shanghai Normal University and Beijing University of Technology, China. His
interests include globalization, migration, diasporas, intercultural communication, arts, identities,
contrasts, and culture. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4367-6807.
Abstract
This article explores Brazil’s role in the global promotion of the Portuguese language. Through
the lens of Cooper’s framework on the international promotion of languages, the study
investigates the intertwined political, economic and cultural motivations behind language
promotion initiatives. It analyzes Brazil’s unilateral actions as well as engagement with the
institutional framework of the Institute for the Promotion of Portuguese Language (IILP) within
the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). Drawing upon a review of scholarly
works, official reports and policy documents, the paper shows that Brazil’s foreign policy has
actively promoted the Portuguese language in certain geographies, but has yet to prioritize
China, despite significant bilateral relations between China and Brazil. Furthermore, the article
highlights the role of Macau as a valuable bridge between China and the Portuguese-speaking
countries, which has been increasingly recognized by the People’s Republic of China. The
conclusion underscores the need for Brazil to effectively leverage Macau’s strategic position
to capitalize on these opportunities.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
249
Keywords
Brazil, China, Portuguese language, language policy and planning, cultural diplomacy, Macau.
Resumo
Este artigo analisa o papel do Brasil na promoção global da língua portuguesa. Utilizando o
quadro teórico de Cooper sobre a promoção internacional de línguas, o estudo investiga as
motivações políticas, económicas e culturais que estão interligadas nas iniciativas de
promoção linguística. O presente artigo analisa ainda as acções unilaterais do Brasil, bem
como o seu envolvimento com o Instituto Internacional da Língua Portuguesa (IILP) dentro
da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). Com base numa revisão de literatura
científica, relatórios e outros documentos oficiais, este artigo revela que a política externa do
Brasil tem promovido activamente a língua portuguesa em determinadas geografias, mas não
tem dado prioridade à China, apesar da importância da relação bilateral entre os dois países.
Além disso, o presente artigo destaca o papel de Macau como ponte entre a China e os países
de língua portuguesa, que tem sido cada vez mais reconhecido pela República Popular da
China. A conclusão sublinha a necessidade de o Brasil aproveitar efectivamente a posição
estratégica de Macau para capitalizar estas oportunidades.
Palavras-chave
Brasil, China, Língua Portuguesa, política e planeamento linguístico, diplomacia cultural,
Macau.
How to cite this article
Simões, João & Veras, Daniel (2024). Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote
Portuguese: Building Bridges Through Macau. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL
15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International
Order”. December 2024, pp. 248-273. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.12.
Article received on 23 August 2024 and accepted for publication on 4 October 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
250
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUEST TO PROMOTE
PORTUGUESE: BUILDING BRIDGES THROUGH MACAU
JOÃO SIMÕES
DANIEL VERAS
1. Introduction
The promotion of a language abroad is closely linked to language policy and planning
frameworks. Several important theoretical models and empirical studies provide insights
into this link. Einar Haugen’s influential language planning model describes four main
components: selection, codifying, implementation and elaboration (Haugen, 1983).
Selecting the variety of the target language, codifying its standards, implementing
curricula and developing its use in new areas are crucial to expanding a language’s global
reach. Based on this, Robert Cooper’s work frames language planning as a socio-political
process that aims to influence the function, structure and acquisition of linguistic varieties
(Cooper, 1989). This perspective highlights how the promotion of languages abroad is
often driven by political, economic and cultural interests, and requires coordinated policy
initiatives. From this view, the promotion of a language abroad is not a neutral act, but
can be a means of exercising soft power and furthering political, economic and cultural
agendas. Governments, for instance, may support the global spread of their national
language to enhance diplomatic influence, facilitate trade or propagate cultural values.
Empirical case studies such as those compiled by Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) demonstrate
how national and regional language planning efforts have focused on expanding the use
of a language internationally through education, the media and diplomatic channels. For
example, the promotion of Mandarin, Arabic and Spanish as global languages implies
extensive policy planning and implementation.
The promotion of a language abroad is closely linked to the concepts of cultural diplomacy
and soft power. Since the 1990s, scholars have explored these links in their research. For
example, Joseph Nye’s seminal work on soft power highlights how the attraction and
appeal of a country’s policies, culture and values can be a powerful tool for global
influence (Nye, 2004). The promotion of a language abroad can be seen as a key strategy
of influence, as it allows a country to project its cultural and linguistic capital globally.
Similarly, the concept of cultural diplomacy emphasizes the use of cultural exchange and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
251
linguistic promotion as a means of promoting mutual understanding and building
relations between countries (Cummings, 2003). Language can be a powerful tool for
cultural diplomacy, as it enables intercultural communication, facilitates the
dissemination of artistic and intellectual works, and creates opportunities for immersion
and cultural exchange (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). Several studies have collectively
explored the intersection of foreign policy and language promotion across various
countries, highlighting how nations use language as a tool of soft power to extend their
cultural and political influence abroad (Gil, 2009; Diniz, 2012; Yudina & Seliverstova,
2020; Noack, 2022). In particular, Gil (2009) and Paradise (2009) examined China’s
initiatives to promote Chinese language globally as a means to increase its soft power
and achieve foreign policy goals, while Mkhoyan (2016) and Yudina and Seliverstova
(2020) discussed how various countries employ language policy and planning as an
element of their soft power strategies.
In the context of Brazil, the world’s largest Lusophone country, the promotion of
Portuguese is not only a matter of linguistic expansion but also a strategic endeavor that
aligns with the country’s cultural diplomacy and soft power initiatives. Against this
backdrop, this article examines Brazil’s pivotal role in the promotion of the Portuguese
language worldwide. The Portuguese language holds significant global importance, with
a very promising growth projection in the coming decades. As the most populous
Portuguese-speaking country, with more than 200 million speakers, Brazil occupies a
unique position in driving the worldwide spread and influence of the Portuguese language.
Some of the key factors highlighting its worldwide relevance include (Camões, 2022;
Statista, 2024; Eberhard et al., 2024):
1. Number of speakers: Currently, Portuguese is spoken by over 264 million people on
five continents. It is estimated that this number will reach almost 400 million by 2050
and exceed 500 million by 2100, with the African continent responsible for the largest
increase. Portuguese is the seventh most spoken language in the world as a native
language, and the eighth most spoken by total number of speakers.
2. As the most spoken language in the Southern Hemisphere: Portuguese has a strong
presence in regions in South America and Africa.
3. Seventh most used language among all internet users and in terms of percentage of
the top ten million websites on the world wide web
4. Adoption as the official language in multiple international organizations: Portuguese
is an official and/or working language in 32 important international organizations,
including the European Union, Community of Portuguese speaking countries, African
Union, Organização dos Estados Americanos, Southern Common Market (Mercosul),
Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos, Comissão Económica para
a América Latina e Caraíbas, Organização dos Estados Ibero-Americanos para a
Educação, a Ciência e a Cultura, Economic Community of West African States, World
Health Organization, Economic Community of Central African States, Community of
Sahel–Saharan States, Associação Latino-Americana de Integração, Zone of Peace
and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, Southern African Development Community,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
252
Union of South American Nations, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
UNESCO.
5. The fact that, while English remains the dominant language, Portuguese has managed
to create its own spaces for communication and scientific publication. Brazil has
developed the Scientific Electronic Library Online, which sees significant participation
from Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries. Additionally, there are a number
of academic repositories and open-access online knowledge platforms, particularly in
Portugal and Brazil.
Hence, the Portuguese language demonstrates a growing importance in the world
scenario, in demographic, economic and political terms. Its role is likely to be further
strengthened, especially considering the projected demographic development of
Portuguese-speaking African countries. The perception of advantage of Portuguese as a
common language stem from the high number of Portuguese speakers, the Brazilian
demography, the language’s dispersion over four continents and the consequent presence
in various regional political and economic organizations such as those identified above.
In addition, the influence of the Portuguese language can expand through demographic
growth and digital technology in a knowledge-based economy and, according to authors
such as Reto et al. (2012), Portuguese can evolve from an international language in a
linguistic bloc to a language of functional communication across the globe.
This article examines Brazil’s multifaceted role in the global promotion of the Portuguese
language. First, we analyze Brazil’s unilateral efforts in advancing the usage and reach
of the Portuguese language. Secondly, the paper explores Brazil’s engagement with
multilateral frameworks such as the Institute for the Portuguese Language (Instituto
Internacional da Língua Portuguesa, IILP) and the Community of Portuguese Speaking
Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) in coordinating language
promotion initiatives. Thirdly, the article discusses Brazil’s efforts to promote the
Portuguese language in China. Finally, the paper concludes with an assessment of Brazil’s
overall impact and strategic positioning as the world’s largest Lusophone country in the
global promotion of the Portuguese language, emphasizing the need to prioritize China
and the specific role Macau could play in this effort. The methodological approach
employed in this study consists of a literature review and an analysis of official
government documents and institutional reports, synthesizing existing theoretical
frameworks and empirical findings from previous research along with insights into the
practical implementation of Brazil's policies.
2. Brazil’s unilateral efforts in promoting the Portuguese language
Brazilian foreign policy actively promotes the Portuguese language internationally,
particularly in Latin America and Africa, through various initiatives. This includes the
establishment of Brazilian Cultural Centers (CCB) and lectureships (Diniz, 2012;
Carvalho, 2016), the implementation of language proficiency exams such as Celpe-Bras
(Diniz, 2012) and participation in the CPLP (Miyamoto, 2009; Vieira de Jesus, 2012). The
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
253
lectureship program plays a crucial role in teaching the Portuguese language and
Brazilian culture abroad (Oliveira, 2020).
Brazil’s approach to language promotion overseas has been influenced by geopolitical
interests and national security concerns (Rajagopalan, 2008). The country’s language
promotion efforts are closely tied to its foreign policy goals, such as to gain support for
reforming the UN Security Council (Beckhauser, 2018). Brazil’s rise as a regional power
has also prompted increased interest in Portuguese language education, including in
military contexts; in particular, the United States Department of Defense has
acknowledged the strategic significance of Brazil and the vital need for its military leaders
to be involved in South American operations to receive training in the Portuguese
language and culture (Waldvogel & Souza, 2018).
The promotion of Portuguese is seen by some scholars as a tool for cultural diplomacy
and for improving Brazil’s global image (Beckhauser, 2018; Mendes, 2019), with a focus
on transnational cooperation and development actions. Brazil’s efforts have been aimed
at strengthening its diplomatic relations, expanding its influence in developing countries,
and increasing its voice in multilateral forums (Vieira de Jesus, 2012). The country’s
approach to language promotion is often framed within South-South cooperation and
development aid, especially in Portuguese-speaking African countries. Ullrich and Carrion
(2014, pp. 157–158) argue that Brazil’s government support programs are being directed
towards vocational training, adult literacy and public policies, in alignment with the
country’s economic objectives. They are leveraging South-South cooperation to build
human capital and develop skilled workforces in potential areas of interest for the
expansion of Brazilian companies. However, some scholars argue that more efficient
language policies are needed to realize the full potential of Brazilian Portuguese as an
international language (Bagno & Carvalho, 2015).
Silva (2011) and Mendes (2019) recall that the policy of promoting the Portuguese
language in Brazil began in 1938 with the establishment of the Intellectual Cooperation
Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1940, the Uruguayan-Brazilian Cultural
Institute was established in Montevideo, the first Brazilian studies center and the starting
point for the establishment of the Brazilian Education Network Abroad (RBEx). The RBEx
is composed of Brazilian Cultural Centers, bilateral cultural institutes (IC), and
lectureships, and is under the authority of the Division for the Promotion of the
Portuguese Language (DPLP) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2005, the Brazilian
government decided to create the Machado de Assis Institute (IMA), in cooperation with
the Camões Institute, a Portuguese public institution devoted to the worldwide promotion
of the Portuguese language and culture. The objective of this Machado de Assis Institute
would be to disseminate Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language outside the
Lusophone space. However, as Mendes (2019) suggests, this project did not move
forward due to internal disagreements.
Brazilian foreign policy has been marked by continuous efforts to increase its influence
on the international stage. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Brazilian
diplomacy has worked to expand its room for maneuver, including seeking to become a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. From the early 1990s to the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
254
present, Brazil has been taking a more active role in the international order, “trying to
consolidate its perceived role as a constructive multilateral player” (Garcia & Coelho,
2018).
At the regional level, Brazilian foreign policy towards Latin America has consistently been
guided by the integration, aid and cooperation of its members. This is reflected in the
multiple regional associations created in recent decades, united by common purposes of
economic cooperation represented by the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the
Union of South American Nations, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States, the Latin American Integration Association, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty
Organization, among others. In this broader context of regional cooperation, Brazil has
played a significant role in promoting the use of the Portuguese language across Latin
America (Mendes da Silva, 2021).
Brazil’s foreign policy during the Lula government consolidated the political concept of
the “Global South”, seeking to strengthen relations with peripheral countries and increase
Brazil’s protagonism on the international stage, by assuming a posture of a donor country
in the field of international development cooperation, in particular in education. To this
end, the strategy was to get closer to the neighboring South American countries and the
Portuguese-Speaking African Countries. This approach aimed not only to expand Brazil's
geopolitical influence but also to position the country as a significant player in
international aid and cooperation (Ullrich and Carrion, 2014, p. 157). In this context,
cultural diplomacy became a crucial tool for reinforcing Brazil's identity and influence,
linking its foreign policy objectives to its cultural initiatives.
The Guimarães Rosa Institute (Instituto Guimarães Rosa, IGR) is the unit within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, MRE) responsible for
Brazil’s cultural diplomacy. The concept of cultural diplomacy employed by the Brazilian
government refers to the promotion of national interests in the field of foreign policy
through actions in the areas of culture, education and the Portuguese language abroad.
The IGR is comprised of four main divisions (MRE, n.d.):
− Division of Actions for the Promotion of Brazilian Culture
− Division of Multilateral Cultural Affairs
− Division of Educational Cooperation
− Division of the Portuguese Language
These divisions work together to develop and implement Brazil’s cultural diplomacy
initiatives, with the overarching goal of promoting the language, culture and education
on the international stage. The role of the IGR in promoting the Portuguese language can
be summarized as follows (MRE, n.d.):
− To propose guidelines for Brazil’s foreign policy in the areas of cultural relations,
education and the promotion of Portuguese abroad, in coordination with other
government agencies.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
255
− To promote Brazilian culture abroad to internationalize Brazil’s creative economy.
− To negotiate and oversee the implementation of international agreements in the areas
of cultural and educational relations.
− To coordinate Brazil’s participation in international organizations and meetings related
to multilateral cultural, educational, and Portuguese language promotion issues.
− To promote and oversee international educational cooperation initiatives.
− To manage the network of Guimarães Rosa Institutes abroad, which includes 24
physical units, six Brazilian Studies Centers at Brazilian embassies, and around 40
Portuguese language lectureships.
− To offer Portuguese language courses for expatriate Brazilian communities and
foreigners, as well as the CELPE-Bras proficiency exam.
− To organize courses and activities related to Brazilian dance, music, cuisine and visual
art to promote Brazilian culture.
− To administer the Leitorado Guimarães Rosa program, which places Brazilian language
and literature professors as lecturers at foreign universities to promote the Portuguese
language and Brazilian culture.
Over the past 70+ years, around 400 Brazilian lecturers have participated in the
Leitorado program, and there are currently almost 40 Guimarães Rosa lecturers
distributed across 30 countries in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe.
In addition to the official measures presented earlier for the promotion and dissemination
of Portuguese, Vianna da Cruz (2013, pp. 25–26) draws attention to other actions taken
by the Brazilian government. For example, the inauguration in 2006 of the Museum of
the Portuguese Language in São Paulo, with the objective of preserving and showcasing
the diversity of the language, celebrating it as a foundational element of culture. Another
Brazilian strategy for the promotion and dissemination of the Portuguese language,
according to the same author, was the creation of a university for the CPLP countries, the
University of International Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony, created in 2008 as a
proposal by the government of Lula da Silva to increase Brazil’s union with other
Lusophone countries; this essentially went beyond just the language aspect to
encompass also the social, economic and geopolitical factors. Prior to this, the Federal
University of Latin American Integration had been created in 2007 in Foz do Iguaçu, with
a mission to contribute to Latin American integration, through educational, scientific and
cultural exchanges.
Despite the extensiveness and significance of the network under the responsibility of the
Brazilian government for the promotion of language and culture, as the centers and
lectureships are present on five continents, Mendes (2019, p. 45) argues that this
network has very little presence in Asia, a strategic continent for the current global
geopolitical landscape. Consequently, according to this author, countries like China, India
and Russia should be more strongly benefited by the interests of promoting the language
and culture as part of Brazilian diplomacy. Along the same line of reasoning, Beckhauser
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
256
(2018) explains that Brazilian cultural diplomacy has prioritized the teaching of the
Portuguese language in countries with low representation in the international political
and economic arenas, instead of expanding it to the new emerging powers, such as
China, India and Russia. According to the author, Brazil has been betting on the creation
of Brazilian Cultural Centers (CCBs) in Latin America and Africa, as Brazilian diplomacy
seeks to publicize its image and win votes from developing countries for a future reform
of the UN Security Council. This strategy reflects the country’s attempt to strengthen its
presence and influence in regions considered priorities for its international aspirations.
3. Brazil’s engagement with IILP and the CPLP framework
The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) was conceived as a forum to
promote cooperation between Portuguese-speaking countries, a legacy of their colonial
and cultural historical ties. This community represents an attempt to unite diverse
countries on different continents—Africa, South America, Europe and Asia—under a
common vision of development, democracy and international cooperation. The idea of
creating the CPLP was first mentioned in 1983 by Jaime Gama, Portugal’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, during a visit to Cabo Verde. The proposal included rotating summits,
annual ministerial meetings and frequent political consultations, thus strengthening
dialogue and cooperation between Portuguese-speaking countries. The project gained
decisive momentum in the 1990s, thanks to the work of José Aparecido de Oliveira, then
Ambassador of Brazil in Lisbon, culminating in the first official meeting of the leaders of
these countries in São Luís do Maranhão, Brazil, in 1989. At this meeting, it was decided
to create the International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IILP), which focused
on the promotion and dissemination of the language. In 1996, the CPLP was formally
established in Lisbon, with the signing of its constitutive documents, which established
the operational bases and objectives of the community. Since then, Timor-Leste has
joined the CPLP (in 2002) after its independence, and Equatorial Guinea was admitted as
a member in 2014 (CPLP, n.d.).
The CPLP defined in its statutes the materialization of projects aiming at promoting the
Portuguese language as one of its main objectives. In order to pursue its objectives, the
CPLP has adopted, through the IILP, several measures that reveal the language policy of
the organization, insofar as it seeks to establish the major guidelines that embody a set
of strategic options regarding the relations between the Portuguese language and social
life (CPLP, 2021, p. 2).
The global strategies for the dissemination of Portuguese are reflected in the Action Plans
of Brasília (PAB, 2010), Lisbon (PALis, 2013), Dili (PADíli, 2016) and Praia (PAP, 2021),
which together provide institutional support and inform policy on the promotion and
dissemination of the language. These documents highlight the language's potential as a
global, pluricontinental and pluricentric language, well-suited for education, culture, the
creative economy, scientific collaboration, and international organizations where it serves
as an official and working language. These references to the Portuguese language reveal
the strategic thinking of the CPLP regarding the social uses associated with its language
in a perspective of consolidation and conquest of new domains of linguistic uses. The
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
257
conclusions on the assessment of the implementation of the PAB (2010) and the PALis
(2013), presented at PADíli (2016), state that the main strategic lines inscribed in the
thematic axes registered different paces in their implementation, pointing to bigger
strides in, for example, the diffusion of the teaching of the Portuguese language in the
CPLP space and among the diasporas, but slower progress in the adoption of Portuguese
in international organizations and its promotion within civil societies (CPLP, 2021, pp. 3–
4).
Miyamoto (2009) argues that Brazil’s engagement in the CPLP can be seen from two
perspectives: on the one hand, Brazil is visible as it uses the CPLP to project its own
interests abroad, i.e., the instrumentalization of the CPLP as part of Brazilian foreign
policy to maximize the use of all existing possible resources; on the other hand, it can
also be inferred that, despite the pragmatism of its foreign policy, Brazil also thinks in
terms of joint action within the CPLP to serve “global interests that would impossible to
obtain individually”.
In an interview conducted by Barão (2023) with diplomat Lilian Pinho, First Secretary
and Head of the Portuguese Language Division (DLP) of the Guimarães Rosa Institute,
the Brazilian government agency focused on cultural and educational diplomacy,
discussing the working principles of Brazilian foreign policy in the promotion and
dissemination of Portuguese, as well as the development expectations of the IILP. Pinho
begins by highlighting the importance of Brazilian foreign policy’s recent reprioritization
of focus onto culture and relations with African countries, with the recreation of the
Ministry of Culture being an important step towards strengthening inter-ministerial work,
while also exposing the need to reinstall the National Commission of Brazil in the IILP,
which had been affected under the Jair Bolsonaro administration.
Regarding the working principles that guide Brazil’s performance in the promotion of the
Portuguese language and its projection within the IILP/CPLP, Pinho stressed the
importance of networking for Brazilian language policy and its international projection,
seeking collaboration with other government agencies, civil society institutions,
universities, specialists and academics. In this sense, she marked the 70th anniversary
of the Brazilian Lectureship Program—now the Guimarães Rosa Lectureship—which funds
Brazilian lecturers to work in foreign higher education institutions in teaching and
promoting the Portuguese language, as well as Brazilian literature and culture. In 2023,
at the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the symposium that connects Brazilian
lecturers stationed in different parts of the world was brought under the scope of the
CPLP, in order to give visibility to a project that had been ongoing by Brazil and that
contributes to the IILP's mandate. According to Pinho, with this move from Brazil, the
expectation is to contribute to the improvement of the shared and transnational
management of the Portuguese language, which is one of the foundations for the
performance of the IILP/CPLP (Barão, 2023).
Finally, Pinho concludes that in addition to the Portuguese language being a language of
contact and collaboration between countries marked by colonial history, its adoption in
international contexts can also be a form of resistance to the predominance of English
and French in diplomacy and multilateral politics. However, Pinho draws attention to the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
258
fact that it is necessary to reflect on the development of the IILP and CPLP, and this
discussion needs to involve not only decision-makers, but also the active involvement of
civil societies (Barão, 2023).
As we have seen above, authors such as Beckhauser (2018) and Mendes (2019) argue
that the Brazilian government has not prioritized the teaching of the Portuguese language
in new emerging powers, including China. Other authors, such as Pestana (2019) and
Tang (2020), highlight the growing demand for Portuguese in China, driven by the
country’s economic relations and the Belt and Road Initiative. In the next section, we will
look at Brazil’s initiatives to expand the Portuguese language learning in China.
4. Brazil’s efforts to promote the Portuguese language in China
This section provides an overview of the historical developments surrounding the
promotion of the Portuguese language in China. According to Jatobá (2020), since 1949,
the teaching of foreign languages in China has oscillated between periods of openness
and restriction. Following the Chinese Revolution, the nation required time to reorganize
its society, and it was not until 1956 that Putonghua, the modern standard form of
Mandarin Chinese, was established as the official language of the People’s Republic of
China (Jatobá, 2020). A significant milestone occurred in 1960, when higher education
institutions in China began offering Portuguese language courses, driven by the growing
demand for qualified professionals.
Zhang et al. (2020) categorize the history of Portuguese language instruction in China
into four distinct periods: 1) 1960-1966; 2) 1966-1977; 3) 1978-1999; and 4) 2000
onward. This classification considers the social transformations that characterized each
period.
The 1960s were marked by global turmoil, as highlighted by Li (2012). Events such as
the Caribbean missile crisis, ideological rifts between China and the USSR, the Vietnam
War, and imperialism in Africa contributed to widespread disorder. In response to these
challenges, the People’s Republic of China was compelled to recalibrate its foreign policy.
It was during this tumultuous period that Portuguese language courses were first
introduced in Beijing’s higher education institutions, which later evolved into universities.
The second period identified by Zhang et al. (2020) spans from 1966 to 1977. The first
formal Portuguese language course in mainland China was established in 1960, at the
university presently known as the Communication University of China. The goal was to
meet the need of training translators. As Chinese relations with the USSR soured in the
1960s, Soviet translators departed from China, which urged China to train its own
translators. In order to meet this need, Beijing International Studies University (BISU)
also inaugurated its Portuguese course in the early 1960s. The Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976) brought about the suspension of admissions in universities and of the gaokao
(college entrance examination test), therefore creating an educational gap, as exposed
by Professor Victoria Almeida from the Shanghai International Studies University - SISU
(Radar China, 2022). As university activities resumed, SISU, for example, opened its
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
259
Portuguese course in 1977, with ten students (the same university had opened a mini-
Portuguese course back in 1973 but with only three students) (Wang, 2001).
As Wang (2001) points out, that first Portuguese course offered back in the early 1960s
had only 18 students. In the same year, the Institute of Foreign Languages in Beijing
(present day Beijing Foreign Studies University, BFSU) opened a two-and-a-half-year
course, with ten students all selected among Russian language interpreters. As years
went by, the city of Guangzhou also started Portuguese courses, and Nanjing University
eventually followed suit. Between 1960 and 2001, more than 400 students majored in
Portuguese language and culture in Chinese universities. Yet according to Wang (2001),
the first teachers of Portuguese language in China were Brazilian, both in Beijing and
Shanghai. Then the first teachers from Portugal came via non-state channels, and, with
time, they would outnumber the Brazilians. Due to the China-Portugal-Macau protocols,
by the 2000s, as Wang (2001) would affirm, all lecturers in Chinese universities would
be from Portugal, sent by the Camões Institute and Instituto Português do Oriente.
Initially, Chinese and Portuguese lecturers would have complementary functions, with the
former focusing on grammar and the latter on conversation and culture.
As Li (2012) points out, despite the challenges posed by the Cultural Revolution,
institutions that evolved into the present-day Communication University of China and
Beijing Language and Culture University (BLCU) graduated approximately one hundred
students proficient in Portuguese under difficult conditions and with outdated
methodologies. During the same period, Macau trained nearly forty professionals. Li
(2012) notes that while the number of Portuguese speakers in the PRC was limited, their
contributions were significant in advancing Chinese foreign policy.
Li (2017) further asserts that the first formal major in Portuguese language was
established in 1960 by the institute that later became the Communication University of
China. Subsequently, BLCU and SISU introduced their own Portuguese programs between
1966 and 1977. By the year 2000, these three institutions alone had collectively trained
around four hundred translators and interpreters throughout China.
China has also resorted to sending students abroad for Portuguese studies. After all,
sending students abroad is a resource when domestic conditions are not mature yet. This
is why in 1959 there were mainland Chinese students—seven in total—studying
Portuguese in Macau (Wang, 2001). Political turmoil inside China would also be
responsible for adopting this strategy a few years later. For example, during the Cultural
Revolution (1966–1976), a five-student group was sent to Macau to study Portuguese.
In the 1980s, more than ten Chinese were sent to Brazil as an experience abroad.
In contrast, Portuguese language education in Macau began much earlier. According to
Li (2017), Portuguese teaching commenced in the 16th century, coinciding with the
arrival of Portuguese explorers. Notably, the Colégio de São Paulo was founded in 1594.
However, it was not until the 19th century that official schools began to emerge. Li (2017)
highlights the significance of the Opium Wars in this educational evolution, listing several
schools established during that period, including Escola Comercial Pedro Nolasco da Silva
(1887), Liceu Macau (1894), and Escola Sínica (1914), which was the first translation
school. Although none of these institutions were classified as higher education
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
260
establishments, they laid the groundwork for future developments in Portuguese
language education in the region (Li, 2017).
From the 1980s on, Chinese students have gone to Portugal on scholarships from the
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Camões Institute and Fundação Oriente. The
Chinese government has also put an effort toward the diffusion of Portuguese in order to
train diplomats. In the 1990s, however, Macau would play a more important role. In the
late 1990s, the Chinese government sent 16 to 18 people to study at the University of
Macau, and by the 2000s, more than a hundred Chinese had been sent abroad by
government authorities to study Portuguese (Wang, 2001).
Diplomatic ties were also very important to motivate Portuguese teaching in China. China
established diplomatic relations with Brazil in 1974 and with Portugal in 1979. China was
also interested in establishing ties with countries like Mozambique and Angola who had
just become independent, respectively (Mozambique in 1975 and Angola in 1983). It is
also noteworthy that all these relations have been important to China all along, from then
to the present, as noted by SISU’s professor Victoria Almeida (Radar China, 2022).
Conditions were being created to make way to the 3rd phase proposed by Zhang et al.
(2020), which was 1978-1999. This context set the stage for the third phase proposed
by Zhang et al. (2020), which spanned from 1978 to 1999. This period was characterized
by the reforms and opening-up policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping.
In China, foreign languages that are taught are divided into major languages
(mainstream languages like English, Spanish and French) and minor languages (those
considered “minority” languages). Historically, Portuguese has fit into the second
category. Nevertheless, Portuguese learning has not only connected China to Brazil and
Portugal but also to countries in Africa. This way, the Portuguese language has meant
access to an important part of what is now called the Global South. In addition,
Portuguese has become an important working language. As Wang (2001) points out, to
learn Portuguese one would have to go to BFSU or SISU, for example, both of which
being top elite universities in China. This may support the argument that a career in the
Portuguese language in China is somewhat prestigious.
How would a young person choose a career related to the Portuguese language?
Especially from 1949 to 1966, a student would be assigned a major considering what the
state needed. That means this was not an individual choice. In other cases, students
applied to universities and, once selected, the universities would assign them a major
that was in demand in society. As Wang (2001) explains, that meant that Portuguese
actually chose the students, not the other way round.
The current situation of Portuguese language education in China corresponds to the
fourth phase identified by Zhang et al. (2020), which spans from 2000 to the present.
Pires (2022) conducted a comparative analysis of existing data on Portuguese language
institutions, educators, and students in the country. The analysis reveals that there are
currently 6,370 students and 221 teachers of Portuguese across 56 higher education
institutions in China; this number rises to 304 when including Macau (as of 2021).
Jatobá (2020) reviews the history of Portuguese language instruction in China and
emphasizes the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of language policy and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
261
planning in the region. He argues that this approach presents both advantages and
disadvantages. On one hand, it facilitates the analysis of language education from
multiple perspectives across different fields. On the other hand, the fragmentation of
linguistic policy into various areas of study may lead to its marginalization, rendering it
secondary both academically and socially. This subjugation to a specific discipline
diminishes the autonomy of the language as a subject of inquiry. Consequently, the
broader implications of language in shaping and influencing behaviors are often
overlooked.
Yan (2019) highlights the period after 2000 as a significant time of progress for
Portuguese language education in China. As the country has become more open and its
economy has experienced substantial growth, the number of courses and learners has
increased, accompanied by improvements in the quality of Portuguese teaching at
universities. Moreover, the evolving diplomatic and socioeconomic contexts, along with
new foreign language teaching policies in China, have contributed to this advancement.
However, these developments also present both challenges and opportunities for
Portuguese educators, particularly in the context of globalization and superdiversity. With
a growing number of Portuguese speakers, teachers face increased competition in the
job market, necessitating a deeper understanding of the realities faced by Chinese
students and a commitment to maintaining and enhancing the quality of instruction (Yan,
2019).
Radar China (2022) reports that there are 55 higher education institutions offering
Portuguese courses at some level (either an elective or free course, degree, discipline,
minor or major, undergraduate or graduate, etc.), all of which focusing on Portuguese as
a foreign language. Out of these 55, 22 are partners with Brazilian universities, with
student exchange. The main Brazilian partners are the Federal University of Rio Grande
do Sul, the Campinas State University and University of São Paulo. Among the private
ones, the Armando Álvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP) stands out. The data also shows
that there are 316 teachers of Portuguese in China, 36 of whom being Brazilian.
Nonetheless, as expected, all figures of foreign teachers came down after the COVID-19
pandemic. Currently, most teachers of Portuguese in China are Chinese, and have been
trained at BISU, BFSU or SISU.
SISU, for instance, is among the three universities that pioneered Portuguese-teaching
in China. SISU is one of few that offer a master’s degree in Portuguese. China has only
recently begun offering a doctorate in Portuguese language via the Beijing Language and
Culture University (BLCU), and, with time, Portuguese teaching has extended into other
regions and provinces—for example, from the far north to Hubei province, where the
Confucius Institute fosters much of the process. What the students acquire from these
programs is instrumental competency, allowing them to eventually become translators
and interpreters. They also obtain some knowledge on history and culture especially
pertaining to Portugal and Brazil. At SISU, Portuguese is essentially offered to third- and
fourth-year (20 to 21 years old) university students (Radar China, 2022).
The students’ background generally comprises a solid foundation in Chinese politics and
advanced English language skills. Upon graduation, many students find jobs in the private
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
262
sector, such as in the communication and marketing departments of companies like
Huawei or Xiaomi, and some of these students would go on to gain experience in other
markets, such as Brazil and Africa. Other graduates enter the public sector, securing
positions in diplomacy or state-owned enterprises with projects abroad, as reported by
Professor Victoria Almeida (Radar China, 2022).
Wang (2001) explains why, even since decades ago, the number of graduates of
Portuguese hired in Beijing has been higher than in Shanghai: a number of those
employed in Shanghai have had to subsequently leave the city because most jobs there
are in the private sector. On the other hand, Portuguese speakers are more needed for
governmental relations, and Beijing offers more of those opportunities. In diplomacy, for
example, the Chinese government tends to give preference to those majoring in
Portuguese for diplomatic positions in Portuguese-speaking countries. Also, a number of
Chinese ministries have positions and opportunities for those who speak Portuguese.
Moreover, the media offer jobs for Portuguese speakers. For example, Beijing Radio,
China Radio International (CRI), China publications in foreign languages, and Xinhua
News Agency. Academically, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also benefits from
Portuguese speakers.
Currently, across all regions of China—including Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Macau—there are more than 60 higher education institutions offering programs in
Portuguese (Zhang et al., 2020). These institutions provide a range of academic
qualifications, including bachelor's degrees, master's degrees, doctorates, and minors.
Zhang et al. (2020) also identifies emerging trends in Portuguese language education in
China, such as an increasing number of qualified teachers and a growing array of
exchange opportunities. Notably, initiatives like the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) are highlighted as significant factors driving this trend. This
indicates that China is making considerable efforts to facilitate cultural and educational
exchange. However, this raises the question: what is Brazil's role in this dynamic? The
following section will provide insights into Brazil's contributions and responses to these
developments.
In fact, Portuguese is expanding in China, but Brazil’s participation in it does not quite
match its magnitude as the biggest Portuguese-speaking country in the world. This
discrepancy is even more surprising considering that China has been Brazil’s biggest trade
partner since 2009. As Professor Victoria Almeida (Radar China, 2022) points out,
historically, Portuguese teaching in China used teachers from Portugal as a point of
reference. It is only recently that teachers from Brazil have become more prevalent. One
of the reasons for this may be because of initiatives such as the lectureship program
(Programa de Leitorado). At SISU, for example, Portuguese belongs to the Department
of Latin American and European Studies, where Spanish, Greek, Italian and others
languages are included. Chinese students often lack the background to distinguish them,
and often do not consider Brazil as part of Latin America. The teachers from Latin America
therefore have to make an effort to better introduce their part of the world to the
students. For example, the Brazilian professors may present specific facets, such as post-
colonial readings and history of their home country to offer a broader panorama of the
Portuguese language to supplement an otherwise overly Eurocentric study. Nevertheless,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
263
teaching materials from Brazil are still scarce, and while there are Chinese students who
want to go to Brazil, such opportunities are limited, and the costs are high.
From the graduates’ point of view, many of them want to find jobs in private companies,
especially those in Shanghai. They will become executives/interlocutors for Brazilians in
virtually all states of the South American country. In fact, the Chinese know less about
African Portuguese-speaking countries and East Timor than they know about Portugal or
Brazil. This is because Chinese students who choose the former countries as research
topics are rare, causing them to only acquire cursory knowledge at best. For Professor
Victoria Almeida, a significant amount of work still needs to be done in this regard (Radar
China, 2022).
In spite of the above-mentioned exchanges with Brazilian universities (partnerships with
USP, Unicamp, UFRS and UEL (Londrina State University, in Panará State)), this is still
only just a handful of the universities in Brazil. According to Almeida (Radar China, 2022),
there are far more Chinese students returning from exchanges in Portugal, whose best
universities offer exchanges with Chinese students. It is a long-term process, so it will
take long before Brazil builds a teaching culture in China. As a case in point, the
Portuguese Department at SISU is more than ten years old, but it was not until recently
that it had its first Brazilian teacher. Therefore, their course about Brazil is also only a
recent addition.
Brazil, however, has made some efforts to promote the dissemination of Brazilian
Portuguese. Brazil has established a lectureship program (Programa de Leitorado) that
sends its teachers abroad to teach Portuguese in universities in countries around the
world. Back in 2010, 13 lecturers were selected, two of whom took up positions in China:
one at BISU and the other at the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. In fact, among
all countries considered (the other being Argentina, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea
Bissau, Lebanon, Paraguay, Peru, Ukraine and Vietnam), China was the only country with
two spots. There were three canceled slots: Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba and another Peruvian
university (Brazilian Government, 2010). In 2023, 19 Brazilian lecturers were selected in
the program for a number of countries: the U.S., Peru, Greece, Bahamas, Mexico, Bolivia,
Spain, South Africa, Russia, Czech Republic, France, Chile, Finland, Israel and Italy. The
U.S., China and France each had two slots. For China, one opening was at BFSU and the
other at the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (Brazilian Government, 2023).
According to Professor Victoria Almeida (Radar China, 2022), Chinese students learning
Portuguese at SISU generally know little about Brazil beyond football and music, with
only a few students having some knowledge of social issues like corruption and racism.
This limited understanding highlights the need to deepen cultural exchange and
knowledge-sharing between the two countries. Some aficionados, in turn, appreciate
bossa nova and telenovelas/soap operas. Almeida opines that Brazil should explore
cultural diplomacy, translation of Brazilian literature as well as other initiatives. In fact,
the most translated Brazilian authors into Chinese are Jorge Amado and Paulo Coelho,
but beyond that this area is largely unexplored and has a great deal of growth potential.
Machado de Assis also has some works translated into Chinese, but only a smattering of
Brazilian course books or textbooks (on language, history or society) have been
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
264
translated. In contrast, Portugal has far more titles translated into Chinese, not to
mention the fact that most Portuguese language textbooks in China are by authors from
Portugal or by Chinese trained in Portugal.
In the 1980s, Brazilian audiovisual productions generated some appeal to Chinese
audiences. For example, the soap opera Slave Isaura and the country music duo
Milionário and José Rico obtained unexpected success and increased Brazil’s soft power,
which, for decades up to that juncture, had been mostly fueled by Brazilian football. In
the 21st century, intensified relations between Brazil and China increased cultural
exchange. For example, in 2004, the year of the presidential meeting between Presidents
Lula and Hu Jintao, the Forbidden City in Beijing housed a special exhibit called The
Amazon. In the 2010s, the Festival of Brazilian Cinema took place in Beijing and Shanghai
to showcase Brazilian productions the Chinese audiences. In 2012, a Chinese translation
of the 1968 book Meu pé de laranja lima (“My sweet orange tree”) by José Mauro de
Vasconcelos was released, along with a movie adaptation of it shown on the big screen
in Beijing, which piqued the curiosity of Chinese youth. A few years later, with the support
of the Brazilian government and the University of Macau, a Chinese translation of O
homem que sabia javanês (“The man who could speak Javanese”), a tale by Lima Barreto,
was launched. Other Brazilian authors translated in Chinese include Cristóvão Tezza and
Amílcar Bettega. Nevertheless, these are still incipient cases and really cannot be
considered enough for promoting Brazil in China. Moreover, if we juxtapose this with the
above-mentioned initiatives in Macau, where countless authors from Portugal are
translated and divulged, it becomes even clearer: the process of cultural exchange needs
the participation of non-state actors—including the media, literature and audiovisual
productions—as much as it needs commitment from governments.
Compared to Brazil, Portugal has a greater framework in Portuguese teaching overseas.
It offers lectureship programs and scholarships to Chinese students (master’s and
doctoral degrees) as well as a partnership with the Camões institute (Instituto Camões).
Portugal also facilitates acquisition of titles, besides promoting the translation of
Portuguese novels in China. In contrast, Brazil does not make such a structured effort.
As a result, at present most Chinese students of the Portuguese language tend to use
European Portuguese as a basis or at least have it as reference. In Macau, the majority
of Portuguese teachers are from Portugal (Pires, 2022). Founded in 1992, The Instituto
Camões is a public Portuguese institute that promotes Portuguese language and culture
worldwide, through cooperation and educational and cultural exchanges. This institute
has several areas of activity, including language teaching, cultural promotion and
academic cooperation. It operates Portuguese language and cultural centers in various
countries, providing Portuguese language courses and supporting the teaching of
Portuguese as a foreign language. The Institute ensures the dissemination, promotion
and teaching of Portuguese language and culture in nearly 80 countries, in cooperation
with 357 higher education institutions and organizations. The institute also organizes
cultural events, such as exhibitions, concerts and literary festivals, to showcase
Portuguese arts and heritage. Additionally, it facilitates academic exchanges and research
collaborations between Portugal and other countries Camões (n.d.-a, b).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
265
Pires (2023) conducted a comparative analysis of state policies and strategies promoting
Portuguese and Spanish as foreign languages in China, viewing Portugal and Spain as
'exporters' and China as an 'importer' of these languages. The research highlights the
global activities of institutions tasked with this mission, followed by an examination of
their implementation within China. Notably, gaps in the strategy for exporting Portuguese
to China were identified, despite a favorable context for its adoption. The author offers
recommendations for more effective use of existing resources and points out areas with
significant potential for growth. The study suggests that language teachers should act
not only as instructors but also as ambassadors for Portuguese language and culture.
Additionally, it argues that Camões, I.P. should transition from a system that primarily
benefits partner universities to one that actively promotes Portuguese language and
culture in China. In addition, it emphasizes the need to expand cultural outreach and
course offerings to the general public in mainland China.
In terms of Chinese institutions, there have been a great deal of efforts to keep cultural
exchange alive, and the Confucius Institutes play a decisive role in facilitating Portuguese
learning in China. If cultural partnerships succeed, much of it will be owed to the
Chinese’s effort. In fact, all cooperation involving the Confucius Institutes since 2004,
fostered by the Chinese government, have prompted Chinese universities to teach
Portuguese, along with the languages of the other countries involved in the cooperation.
In addition, university exchanges and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation
between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macau), both motivated by
investments in Portuguese-speaking countries, contribute to the diffusion of Portuguese.
In some cases, like at Hubei University, the Portuguese course is a preparation for
educators and volunteers before their teaching assignment at the Confucius Institutes in
Brazil.
The year of 2024 is important because it marks not only the 50th anniversary of Sino-
Brazilian diplomatic relations but also the 20th anniversary of the High-Level Sino-
Brazilian Commission on Consultation and Cooperation. Moreover, China and Brazil have
been strategic partners since 1993. In fact, Brazil is the first country with whom China
established a strategic partnership. In 2012, the partnership became a global strategic
partnership. Such an increase in level of cooperation can boost the role of Brazil in
Portuguese teaching in China.
This is all in line with the “people-to-people connections” pillar of China’s landmark Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) established in 2013. Although the BRI’s flagship projects are
related to infrastructure integration, beyond the economic and infrastructure aspects, the
people-to-people connections pillar, one of five that the BRI is based on, reflects China’s
aim and commitment to deepening cultural exchange and mutual understanding through
facilitating more human interactions. In July 2024, President Lula announced that the
Brazilian government would be joining the BRI. What this signifies—if considered in
conjunction the fact that of the more than 140 countries that have signed on to the BRI,
only 20 of them are from the Latin American region—is that though there are existing
Chinese investments in Brazil, it is possible that Brazil’s joining the BRI would bring more
opportunities of infrastructure integration and therefore more cultural exchanges.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
266
Li (2015) notes that many Lusophone countries are located along the “Maritime Silk Road
of the 21st Century.” The author emphasizes the historical significance of the Portuguese
language in the ancient Maritime Silk Road, which primarily encompassed the Indian
Ocean. Since the 15th century, following Vasco da Gama's voyages, Portuguese has
wielded considerable influence throughout the region—and it continues to do so today.
Consequently, Li (2015) argues that the Portuguese language is essential for the success
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In May 2024, Brazilian vice president Geraldo Alckmin visited China for the COSBAN
meeting, during which he met with Chinese president Xi Jinping and together announced
a number of agreements amounting to R$ 24 billion (US$ 4.49 billion) in investments,
including a broadening of the market for Brazilian coffee and a possibility to establish a
Brazil House in Shanghai. As 2024 is the year Brazil presides over the G20, the COSBAN
meeting represents a momentous occasion for Sino-Brazilian bilateral relations. Among
other agreements from the COSBAN meeting, such as enhancing satellite cooperation
and fighting poverty and starvation, was an MoU involving Portuguese language teaching
(TV GGN, 2024). In addition, result no. 4 of the meeting highlights bilateral cooperation
in many—including cultural—areas (Brazilian Government, 2024, 2024a). In 2023, along
with President Lula, the Minister of Culture of Brazil, Margareth Menezes, visited
universities and other cultural spaces, paving the way for agreements such as one signed
on audiovisual cooperation.
In November 2024, Brazil will host the highly anticipated G20 summit, an event that will
prove especially significant for China-Brazil relations as both sides look forward to the
next level of partnership: Will it involve deeper collaboration under initiatives like the
Nova Indústria Brasil Program and the new PAC (Program for Growth Acceleration)? How
will Brazil joining the BRI impact Sino-Brazilian partnership? We will be especially
interested in the answers to these questions in the context of cultural exchanges between
the two countries.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
As we have seen, the Portuguese language has shown growing importance in the global
scenario demographically, economically and politically. This relevance is expected to
continue to rise, especially given the immense development anticipated in Portuguese-
speaking African countries. Brazil plays a unique role in promulgating Lusophone
influence on the world, due to its large number of native Portuguese speakers and
presence in several regional organizations.
The Portuguese language’s potential for expansion is promising, especially with
demographic growth and the advancement of digital technologies. For Brazil, although
the promotion of Portuguese is seen as a tool for cultural diplomacy and for elevating its
global image, the country has not seized every opportunity to stamp its presence,
especially with regard to promoting itself in China despite strong bilateral economic
partnership between the two countries. How can Brazil best leverage its role as a global
Lusophone leader to promote the Portuguese language in China?
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
267
Mendes (2019) advocates for a more cooperative and transnational approach to the
global promotion of the Portuguese language, highlighting the importance of Brazil's
active and cooperative participation in multilateral policies aimed at the promotion and
diffusion of Portuguese. This includes leveraging the involvement of international higher
education institutions in Brazil. In line with this perspective, we believe Brazil can
capitalize on the current context, which encompasses several favorable factors, to adopt
a more collaborative approach to promoting the Portuguese language in China. This
favorable context can be understood across global, national, and regional/local levels.
On the global level, the new Lula administration in Brazil has tried a rapprochement with
China, and Brazil has already committed to joining the Belt and Road Initiative (CLBrief,
2024) and appointing a permanent representative at Forum Macau (TDM, 2024). This
goes beyond the misgiving and reservation that Brazil has shown over the years in
relation to Forum Macau (Mendes, 2013, pp. 288–289). The year 2024 marks two
important anniversaries in the context of Sino-Brazilian relations: the 50th anniversary
of diplomatic ties and the 20th anniversary of the High-Level Sino-Brazilian Commission
on Consultation and Cooperation. Since China established a strategic partnership in
1993—the first of its kind—with Brazil, relations between the two have evolved into a
global strategic partnership (instated in 2012).
At the national level in China, Brazil could take advantage of what is happening with the
teaching of Portuguese in mainland China. After years of rapid growth in the number of
learners of Portuguese, we are now in a phase of investing in so-called area or regional
studies. These studies refer to the interdisciplinary academic fields that focus on the
study of a particular geographic region or cultural area of the world, and go beyond just
the study of languages. Brazil’s higher education and research institutions can contribute
to strengthening China’s area studies on Portuguese-speaking countries and Latin
America by undertaking research and analysis of the social, economic, political and
cultural dynamics of the target regions. Area studies can provide a deeper understanding
of the needs, opportunities and challenges faced by partner countries. These studies play
a vital role in facilitating China’s engagement with the world, particularly within the
framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.
At the regional and local level, Brazil can take advantage of Macau’s advantages and
special status, namely the “one country, two systems” policy, the international free port,
the autonomous customs zone, the simple and reduced tax regime, and Macau’s role as
a service platform for cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries.
The “Development Plan for Appropriate Economic Diversification of the Macao Special
Administrative Region (2024-2028)” also offers opportunities with a focus on promoting
the development of key industries such as traditional Chinese medicine, the modern
financial industry, cutting-edge technology, and the MICE (meetings, incentives,
conferences and exhibitions) and culture and sports sectors (DSEPDR, 2024).
Indeed, it is time for Brazil to have a more significant presence in Macau, not only through
diplomatic channels but also by stimulating the involvement of various non-state actors
such as chambers of commerce and investment, professional associations, Brazilian
cultural centers, media outlets, art and cultural foundations, among others. This
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
268
constellation of partners can help Brazil to leverage Macau’s role as a generator of
opportunities, something that Brazil has not fully taken advantage of yet. A strengthened
presence in Macau would allow a consolidation of existing partnerships between Brazilian
and mainland Chinese universities, by bringing Chinese students learning Portuguese
closer to Brazilian companies, strengthening the connection between education and the
entrepreneurial ecosystem of the Greater Bay Area, producing locally-adapted teaching
materials for the Chinese context, ultimately bringing Brazil and China closer together
through the unique environment that Macau offers.
This article has examined Brazil’s pivotal role as the world’s largest Lusophone country
in the global promotion of Portuguese, a language that holds significant global importance
with a very promising growth projection in the coming decades. As highlighted by the
perspective of Cooper (1989), the promotion of languages abroad is often driven by
political, economic and cultural interests, and requires coordinated policy initiatives. We
have seen how Brazilian foreign policy has been actively promoting the Portuguese
language in some geographies, but without drawing its attention towards China. By
fostering Portuguese language education in China, Portuguese—despite its linguistic
challenges for non-Romance language speakers—not only deepens cultural exchanges
but also enhances mutual understanding. In the long run, the importance of cultural
rapprochement between the two countries supports Chinese businesses and institutions,
and enhances China’s engagement with the broader Lusophone world, of which Brazil is
the largest member. This engagement can help grant China access to vital resources and
markets in Brazil and Africa, potentially contributing to China’s domestic food safety and
energy security, and supporting the broader movement in financial markets to
internationalize the use of the Chinese yuan. Macau has been instrumental as a cultural
conduit between China and the Portuguese-speaking world, serving historically as a
meeting point. This role has been increasingly recognized and valued by the People’s
Republic of China. Nevertheless, while there is political will and a favorable environment
in Macau, more concerted efforts from Brazil will be required to materialize these
opportunities.
References
Bagno, M., & Carvalho, O. (2015). O potencial do português brasileiro como língua
internacional. Interdisciplinar - Revista de Estudos em Língua e Literatura.
https://periodicos.ufs.br/interdisciplinar/article/view/3850
Barão, G. (2023, May 2). Promoção e difusão da língua portuguesa como projeto regional
Parte II – O IILP/CPLP na visão da política externa brasileira. Observatório de
Regionalismo. https://observatorio.repri.org/2023/05/02/iilp-cplp-parte2/
Beckhauser, A. S. (2018). A língua portuguesa como recurso da política externa brasileira
à luz da diplomacia cultural. In Domínios de Lingu@gem (Vol. 12, Issue 2, p. 784). EDUFU
- Editora da Universidade Federal de Uberlandia. https://doi.org/10.14393/dl34-
v12n2a2018-2
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
269
Brazilian Government (2010). Edital DRI/CGCI nº. 023/2009. Leitorado em
Universidades Estrangeiras - CAPES SELEÇÃO FINAL. Brasilia-DF: Ministério das Relações
Exteriores e Departamento Cultural Divisão de Promoção da Língua Portuguesa.
https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/selecaofinal-edital-leitorado-023-
2010-pdf
Brazilian Government (2023). Edital No. 27/ 2023. Programa de Leitorado Guimarães
Rosa. Brasilia-DF: Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
(CAPES). https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/resultados-dos-
editais/26062024_Edital_2405386_SEI_2402823_Edital_27_2023.pdf
Brazilian Government (2024). Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Session of the High-Level
Sino-Brazilian Comission on Consultation and Cooperation (COSBAN). Brasilia-DF:
Ministério das Relações Exteriores. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/embaixada-
pequim/VII-COSBAN-Minutes
Brazilian Government (2024a). Alckmin meets with Xi Jinping to conclude mission to
China, securing over BRL 24 billion in credits for Brazil. Brasilia-DF: Secretaria de
Comunicação Social. https://www.gov.br/secom/en/latest-news/2024/06/alckmin-
meets-with-xi-jinping-to-conclude-mission-to-china-securing-over-brl-24-billion-in-
credits-for-brazil
Camões. (n.d.-a). Áreas de Atuação. https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/sobre/sobre-
nos/identidade/areas-de-atuacao
Camões. (n.d.-b). Identidade. https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/sobre/sobre-
nos/identidade
Camões. (2022, May 5). Dia Mundial da Língua Portuguesa. https://www.instituto-
camoes.pt/images/pdf_noticias/Dados_sobre_a_língua_portuguesa_de_2022.pdf
Carvalho, S. da C. (2016). Políticas de promoção internacional da língua portuguesa:
ações na américa latina. Trabalhos Em Linguística Aplicada, 51(2), 459–484.
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/tla/article/view/8645363
CLBrief. (2024, July 23). Brazil Open to Joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative. CLBrief.
https://www.clbrief.com/brazil-open-to-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/
Cooper, R. L. (1989). Language planning and social change. Cambridge University Press.
CPLP. (n.d.). Histórico - Como Surgiu? https://www.cplp.org/id-2752.aspx
CPLP. (2021). Plano Operacional para a Promoção e Difusão da Língua Portuguesa (2021–
2026). https://www.cplp.org/Files/Filer/1_CPLP/Lingua/Livro-Plano-Operacional-Lingua-
Portuguesa-vfinal.pdf
Cummings, M. C. (2003). Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: A
survey. Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture.
Diniz, L. R. A. (2012). Política linguística do Estado brasileiro para a divulgação do
português em países de língua oficial espanhola. Trabalhos em Linguística Aplicada (Vol.
51, Issue 2, pp. 435–458). FapUNIFESP (SciELO). https://doi.org/10.1590/s0103-
18132012000200009
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
270
DSEPDR. (2024, October). Development Plan for Appropriate Economic Diversification of
the Macao Special Administrative Region (2024-2028). Macao Special Administrative
Region. https://www.dsepdr.gov.mo/uploads/attachment/2024-03/e-book_E.pdf
Eberhard, D. M., Simons, G. F., & Fennig, C. D. (Eds.). (2024). Ethnologue: Languages
of the world (27th ed.). SIL International.
https://www.ethnologue.com/insights/ethnologue200/
Garcia, E. V., & Coelho, N. B. R. (2018). A Seat at the Top? A Historical Appraisal of
Brazil’s Case for the UN Security Council. Sage Open, 8(3).
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018801098
Gienow-Hecht, J. C., & Donfried, M. C. (Eds.). (2010). Searching for a cultural diplomacy.
Berghahn Books. https://doi.org/10.3167/978184545746
Gil, J. (2009). The Promotion of Chinese Language Learning and China’s Soft Power.
Asian Social Science (Vol. 4, Issue 10). Canadian Center of Science and Education.
https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v4n10p116
Haugen, E. (1983). The implementation of corpus planning: Theory and practice. In J.
Cobarrubias & J. A. Fishman (Eds.), Progress in language planning: International
perspectives (pp. 269-289). Mouton.
Jatobá, J. R. (2020). Política e Planejamento Linguístico na China: Promoção e ensino da
língua portuguesa. Doctorate Thesis. Português como Língua Estrangeira. Faculdade de
Artes e Humanidades. University of Macau, China.
Kaplan, R. B., & Baldauf, R. B. (1997). Language planning: From practice to theory.
Multilingual Matters.
Li, C. (2012). Ensino de Língua Portuguesa na República Popular da China durante a
Década de 60 do Século XX. In Actas do 1.º Fórum Internacional de Ensino da Lingua
Portuguesa na China (pp. 35-42). Instituto Polítécnico de Macau.
Li, C. (2015). A língua portuguesa e a estratégia económica de “Uma Faixa e Uma Rota”,
In Lei Heong Iok (Ed.). Actas do 3.º Fórum Internacional do Ensino da Lingua Portuguesa
na China (pp. 3-24). Instituto Polítécnico de Macau.
Li, C. (2017). Inspiração histórica: o ensino da língua portuguesa e a China moderna, In
Lei Heong Iok (Ed.). Actas do 4.º Fórum Internacional do Ensino de Lingua Portuguesa
na China (pp. 3-22). Instituto Polítécnico de Macau.
Mendes, C. (2013). A relevância do Fórum Macau: O Fórum para a Cooperação
Econômica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa. Nação e Defesa.
https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/9672/1/MENDESCarmenAmado_Arelevanc
iadoforumMacau_oforumparaacooperacaoeconomicaecomercialentreaChinaeospaisesdel
inguaportuguesa_N_134_p_279_296.pdf
Mendes, E. (2019). A promoção do português como língua global no século XXI. Linha
D’Água (Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 37–64). Universidade de Sao Paulo, Agencia USP de Gestao
da Informacao Academica (AGUIA). https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2236-
4242.v32i2p37-64
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
271
Mendes da Silva, A. (2021, February 3). O papel da política externa brasileira na difusão
da língua portuguesa e da Lusofonia na América Latina a partir do século XX". Revista
Relações Exteriores. https://relacoesexteriores.com.br/peb-lingua-portuguesa-
lusofonia/
Miyamoto, S.. (2009). O Brasil e a comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa (CPLP).
Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional, 52(2), 22–42.
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292009000200002
Mkhoyan, A. (2016). Soft power, Russia and the former Soviet states: a case study of
Russian language and education in Armenia. International Journal of Cultural Policy,
23(6), 690–704. https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2016.1251426
MRE. (n.d.). Instituto Guimarães Rosa? https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/cultura-
e-educacao/instituto-guimaraes-rosa
Noack, C. (2022). Politics of the Russian language beyond Russia. Edinburgh University
Press.
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs.
Oliveira, L. M. (2020). A promoção internacional do português brasileiro a partir das
práticas do Programa de Leitorado. Domínios de Lingu@gem (Vol. 14, Issue 3, pp. 947–
977). EDUFU - Editora da Universidade Federal de Uberlandia.
https://doi.org/10.14393/dl43-v14n3a2020-9
Paradise, J. F. (2009). China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes
in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power. Asian Survey (Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 647–669).
University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.647
Pestana, L. F. (2019). O ensino da língua portuguesa no âmbito da iniciativa “Faixa e
Rota.” Diacrítica (Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 366–385). University of Minho.
https://doi.org/10.21814/diacritica.446
Pires, M. (2022). Português na China: os números do ensino superior (Portuguese in
China: Higher Education in numbers). Revista Thema, 21(3), 602–614.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4160230
Pires, L. T. A. (2024). Análise do atual planeamento e políticas de português língua
estrangeira na China: comparação com o caso do espanhol língua estrangeira e
recomendações para planeamento e políticas articuladas. Doctorate Thesis, Portuguese
Studies. Política de Língua. Universidade Aberta, Portugal.
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.2/15852
Radar China (2022, May 20). A China e o ensino da língua portuguesa. Interview with
SISU Professor of Portuguese, Victoria Almeida [Video]. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1C2bXb90zw&t=597s
Rajagopalan, K. (2008). The Role of Geopolitics in Language Planning and Language
Politics in Brazil. Current Issues in Language Planning (Vol. 9, Issue 2, pp. 179–192).
Informa UK Limited. https://doi.org/10.1080/14664200802139471
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
272
Reto, L., Esperança, J., Gulamhussen, M. A., Machado, F. L., & da Costa, A. F. (2012).
Potencial Económico da Língua Portuguesa.
Silva, D. B. D. (2011). De flor do Lácio a língua global: uma análise da política linguística
para a difusão do português no mundo globalizado. XI Congresso Luso-afrobrasileiro de
Ciências Sociais. Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador-Bahia. Agosto, 2011.
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.2580.9445
Statista. (2024, Feb 19). Languages most frequently used for web content as of January
2024, by share of websites. https://www.statista.com/statistics/262946/most-common-
languages-on-the-internet/
Tang, S. (2020). O Estado, as Dificuldades e as Contramedidas do Curso de Língua
Portuguesa na China Continental Sob a Estratégia “Um Cinturão E Uma Rota” – Tendo a
Universidade de Estudos Internacionais de Sichuan como exemplo. Prolíngua (Vol. 15,
Issue 1, pp. 145–153). Portal de Periodicos UFPB. https://doi.org/10.22478/ufpb.1983-
9979.2020v15n1.52452
TDM (2024, April 24). Forum Macau: Brazil mulls appointment of permanent
representative. TDM. https://www.tdm.com.mo/en/news-detail/956310
Ullrich, D. R., & Carrion, R. M. (2014). A Cooperação Brasileira na Área da Educação nos
Palops no Período 2000-2012: Principais Atores e Projetos. Revista Sociais e Humanas
(Vol. 27, Issue 1). Universidad Federal de Santa Maria.
https://doi.org/10.5902/231717587847
TV GGN (2024, June 17). A missão do Brasil na China (COSBAN) | Observatório de
Geopolítica. Interview with Ana Tereza Marra (Federal University of the ABC Region –
UFABC), Pedro Steenhagen (Fudan University) and Victoria Almeida (SISU) [Video].
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MPrLG1Dom10&t=3229s
Vianna da Cruz, E. F. (2013). As Políticas de Divulgação e Internacionalização da Língua
Portuguesa—O Exemplo do Mercosul. [Master Dissertation, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais
e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa]. https://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/10210
Vieira de Jesus, D. S. (2012). Uma Flor Chamada Desejo: o Brasil e o poder na Língua
Portuguesa. Caderno CRH, 25(65), 309–318.
Waldvogel, D. A., & de Souza, I. S. (2018). Brazil’s Rise and Portuguese as a Strategic
Foreign Language: Preparing Tomorrow’s Military Leaders. Hispania (Vol. 100, Issue 5,
pp. 289–294). Project MUSE. https://doi.org/10.1353/hpn.2018.0070
Wang, Suoying. (2001). A língua portuguesa na China. Cadernos de PLE. Estudos
Variacionistas e Aplicados em Língua Não Materna.
https://doi.org/10.34624/CADERNOSPLE.V0I0.36769
Yan, Q. R. (2019). O desenvolvimento do ensino de português na China: História,
situação atual e novas tendências. In Y. Yan & A. Albuquerque (Eds.), O ensino do
português na China: Parâmetros e perspectivas (pp. 24-52). UFRN.
Yudina, N., & Seliverstova, O. (2020). External Language Policy and Planning as Part of
Soft Power Policy. In Proceedings of the IV International Scientific and Practical
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 248-273
Brazilian Foreign Policy and the Quest to Promote Portuguese:
Building Bridges Through Macau
João Simões, Daniel Veras
273
Conference “Anthropogenic Transformation of Geospace: Nature, Economy, Society”
(ATG 2019). IV International Scientific and Practical Conference “Anthropogenic
Transformation of Geospace: Nature, Economy, Society” (ATG 2019). Atlantis Press.
https://doi.org/10.2991/aer.k.200202.063
Zhang, Y., Lopes, I. P., & Castelo, A. (Eds.) (2020). Livro Azul - Relatório sobre o Ensino
do Português em Instituições de Ensino Superior da China (1960-2020). Macau: Instituto
Politécnico de Macau.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
274
THE GENDER GAP REVERSAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
THE CASE OF BRAZIL AND CHINA
TELI CHEN
A22092100031@cityu.edu.mo
English teacher at Hainan Vocational College of Politics and Law and a Ph.D. candidate at the
Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University of Macau (China). She
holds a Master’s degree in Foreign Linguistics and Applied Linguistics from Hainan University and
a Bachelor’s degree from the Department of English at Beijing International Studies University.
Her current research interests include English teaching and Portuguese-speaking countries. She
has published over ten articles in Chinese journals. https://orcid.org/0009-0004-2951-6817.
SUZANA LOPES SALGADO RIBEIRO
suzana.ribeiro@falaescrita.com.br
Bachelor’s degree in History from the University of São Paulo, and Master's and Ph.D. from the
University of São Paulo (2002; 2017). She is a Professor of the History Course and the Master in
Human Development, and Professional Master in Education - University of Taubaté (Brazil), and
the Master in Management and Regional Development – Southern Minas University Center
(UNIS). She is carrying out her post-doctorate at Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-
SP), and is a researcher at the Center for Studies in Oral History.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0310-0694.
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
PhD in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of Portugal in
2010, and habilitation from ISCTE–University Institute of Lisbon in 2022. From 2016 to 2017,
Prof. Leandro took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China —
One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded an Institute of European
Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the Asia-
Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was Programme
Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of
Saint Joseph in Macau. From 2018 to 2023 he was Associate Dean of the Institute for Research
on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau. He is currently Associate
Professor with Habilitation in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the
University of Macau (China). His most recent publications are: The Belt and Road Initiative: An
Old Archetype of a New Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran
(2021), Palgrave Macmillan; The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global;
Disentangled Vision on Higher Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023), Peter Lang
Publishers; The Palgrave Handbook of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics (2023), Palgrave
Macmillan; Changing the Paradigm of Energy Geopolitics: Resources and Pathways in the Light of
Global Climate Challenges (2023), Peter Lang Publishers; Portuguese-speaking Small Island
Developing States: The development Journeys of Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and
Timor-Leste (2023), Palgrave Macmillan; The Palgrave Handbook on China-Europe-Africa
Relations: Legacies and the New International Order (2024), Palgrave Macmillan.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828.
Abstract
This study investigated the reversal of gender disparity in enrollment in higher education in
Brazil and China (both of whom members of BRICS) from having more male than female
students in the past, to now having more female than male students. This reversal began for
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
275
Brazil in 1988, and for China in 2008. The paper examined factors that contributed to the
reversal through employing a qualitative methodology, including an extensive review of
literature, analysis of statistical data and official documents from the Brazilian and Chinese
governments, the United Nations, as well as the World Bank, and a comparative analysis
between Brazil and China, exploring such aspects as feminist movement, legal framework,
economic development, expansion of higher education, and demographic factors. The study
is significant as it illuminates the evolving landscape of higher education and gender dynamics
in Brazil and China to offer valuable insights for other countries for reference. In particular,
the case studies on Brazil and China can inform international efforts to address gender
disparity and create more inclusive and equitable systems not only in education but also in
other fields.
Keywords
Gender, Reversal, Higher Education, Brazil, China.
Resumo
O presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar a inversão da desigualdade de gênero nas
matrículas no ensino superior no Brasil e na China, dois países membros do BRICS. Vários
países vieram testemunhar uma transição da desigualdade de género no ensino superior,
partindo de “mais estudantes do sexo masculino do que feminino” a “mais estudantes do sexo
feminino do que estudantes do masculino”, como o caso do Brasil e da China. A inversão da
desigualdade de género no ensino superior aconteceu em 1988 e 2008 no Brasil e na China,
respetivamente. Com base neste facto, este artigo pretende responder à seguinte questão:
Quais são os fatores que contribuem para a inversão da desigualdade de gênero no ensino
superior no Brasil e na China? Para o efeito, esta pesquisa adota uma abordagem qualitativa,
incluindo uma análise de literatura, de dados estatísticos e documentos oficiais dos governos
brasileiro e chinês, das Nações Unidas e do Banco Mundial, bem como uma análise
comparativa sobre as semelhanças e diferenças entre o Brasil e a China no tocante à inversão
da desigualdade de gênero. Neste sentido, através desta investigação, pretendemos
identificar os fatores que contribuem para esta transição a partir de aspetos como movimentos
feministas, quadro jurídico, desenvolvimento económico, expansão do ensino superior e
fatores demográficos. A importância deste estudo reside em suas implicações para a
compreensão da evolução panorâmica do ensino superior e da dinâmica de género a nível
global. A análise da inversão da desigualdade de género no Brasil e na China pode servir de
referência a outros países. As perceções derivadas deste estudo de caso podem chamar
esforços globais para colmatar a questão de desigualdade de género e criar sistemas
educativos de maior inclusão e equidade. Além disso, a abordagem na questão de género no
ensino superior pode ajudar a despertar uma atenção crescente, para lidar com a
desigualdade de género em outros domínios.
Palavras-chave
Gênero, Reversão, Ensino Superior, Brasil, China.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
276
How to cite this article
Chen, Teli, Ribeiro, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro & Leandro, Francisco José (2024). The Gender
Gap Reversal in Higher Education: The Case of Brazil and China. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise
Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 274-289. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0324.13.
Article received on 10 June 2024 and accepted for publication on 15 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
277
THE GENDER GAP REVERSAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
THE CASE OF BRAZIL AND CHINA
1
TELI CHEN
SUZANA LOPES SALGADO RIBEIRO
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
1. Introduction
For many bygone decades, higher education was a luxury for women, and male had
always outnumbered female students and graduates (UNESCO & IESALC, 2021, p. 11).
However, with the rapid expansion of enrollment in education worldwide, more and more
women have had the chance to access higher education. This trend has continued to a
point that, now, a number of countries have witnessed a turnaround—i.e., there are now
more female than male students in higher education—a phenomenon referred to as
higher education’s “gender gap reversal”. Globally, this reversal commenced in 2002
(UNESCO & IESALC, 2021, p. 3), and, currently, female students are over-represented
in higher education in 74% of the world’s countries (including both developed and
developing countries) with available data (UNESCO, 2020, p.14). Brazil and China are
two of these countries.
Gender parity is measured using the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which refers to the
female-to-male ratio of a given indicator. A GPI of 1 indicates parity between the
genders; a GPI below 1 indicates disparity in favour of males, and a GPI above 1 indicates
disparity in favour of females. The further from 1 the parity index is, the greater the
disparity between females and males (UNESCO, 2024). For Brazil, a gender imbalance in
education (i.e., more men than women students) had been part of the reality for almost
450 years (Beltrão & Alves, 2009, p. 2) until the gap began to narrow in the 1980s.
Available data from the World Bank show that the GPI for higher education enrollment in
Brazil was 0.95 in 1979, 1.0 in 1983 and 1.05 in 1988 (data unavailable between 1984
and 1987), and has remained above 1.05 from then on (World Bank, 2024a), indicating
that there was already gender parity in higher education in 1983, and, by 1988, the
gender gap had already begun to reverse. As for China, the GPI for higher education
1
The authors would like to thank for the kind invitation to participate in this special issue.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
278
enrollment was below 1.0 before 2007, at 1.0 in 2007 and above 1.0 from 2008 on,
indicating gender parity in higher education in 2007, and gender gap reversal beginning
in 2008, with the GPI holding steady at 1.04 thereafter (World Bank, 2024a).
The reversal of gender gap in higher education has attracted a great deal of attention
from scholars all over the world. A number of studies have examined the phenomenon
in developed countries—especially European countries and the U.S—while some explored
the reversal’s driving forces. Riphahn and Schwientek (2015) investigated mechanisms
behind the reversal of gender gap in secondary and tertiary education in Germany, and
found that neither individual/family background nor labour market characteristics
appeared to be strongly associated with the gender gap in education, but the gap in
tertiary education was correlated with the development of class sizes and social norms.
Reijnders (2018) explains the gender gap reversal in higher education from the
perspective of changes in the wage structure and expectations about marriage in
America, and claims that the most important driving force for the reversal is the decline
in marriage rate, as single women have a greater incentive to invest in education than
single men. Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006) explored the gender gap reversal in
college attendance and graduation in America, and found that females’ increasing
expectation of economic returns from higher education contributed to their improved
college preparation and performance. Bossavie and Kanninen (2018) developed a unified
conceptual framework to formulate and test two main hypotheses, namely, tail
hypothesis and mean hypothesis, to better understand the forces behind the reversal.
Their results show that the lower variance in scholastic performance among females has
been a driver for the reversal.
Gender gap reversal in education has also attracted attention from Chinese and Brazilian
scholars. Li (2016) discusses the phenomenon of gender gap reversal in education in
China and its challenges to society, including difficulties (e.g., discrimination) that women
face when looking for good employment, wage gap between women and men with the
same educational credentials, conflicts between work and family, among others. Wang,
Wang and Hu (2022) explored the effects that gender gap reversal in education has on
how men and women match up to get married, revealing that China now faces severe
education-related marriage imbalance—the higher a woman’s education level, the more
difficult it is for her to find a husband; the reverse is also true, i.e., the less educated a
man is, the more difficult it is for him to find someone to marry—and the problem will
persist for a while. Liu and Zhang (2023) studied the gender gap reversal among China’s
undergraduates and postgraduates, but focusing mainly on data to prove the trend. Yan
and Meng (2023) divided the factors contributing to the gender gap reversal in higher
education into external (e.g., economic and social development and progress made in
gender equality) and internal factors (e.g., higher return of higher education for women
and women’s competitiveness in education compared to men in terms of academic
performance). There is also a smattering of studies on gender gap reversal in Brazil’s
education system. Beltrão and Alves (2009) analyzed the onset time of the reversal there
by laying out the development of female education and claimed that universal public
policies as well as cultural and behavioral changes were central factors during the
process.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
279
Nevertheless, most studies have focused on the situations in developed countries; few
have focused on China and Brazil. As China and Brazil have the world’s second and
seventh largest populations, respectively, and both are members of BRICS as well as
being two of the most important economies in the world, analysing the gender gap
reversal in higher education in these two countries can offer valuable insights on gender
issues for other countries not only regarding the realm of higher education but also in
other fields. This paper therefore studies and compares the Brazilian and Chinese higher
education systems from a gender perspective in an attempt to understand the factors
that have contributed to their gender gap reversal.
2. Factors Leading to Gender Gap Reversal in Brazilian and Chinese
Higher Education
Both Brazil and China have greatly improved gender equality in society, including in their
education landscape; more and more women now have access to higher education, which
gives them more opportunities to improve their lives and social statuses. The reversal of
gender gap in higher education can be attributed to both external and internal factors:
the external (i.e., environmental) factors make it possible for female students to receive
higher education, while the internal factors (e.g., motivation) allow more and more
female students to finish secondary education and enter higher education. Due to length
limitations, this paper will focus its scope on the external factors that led to the gender
gap reversal in higher education in Brazil and China. Specifically, we identify the most
common and most important factors, and explore how they created a favorable
environment to facilitate the reversal.
2.1 Feminist Movements
The term “feminism” was coined in 1837 by Charles Fourier (1772–1837), a French
sociologist and a strong advocate for women’s rights (Old Times, 2021). Feminism
originated in the U.S. and Europe, then spread to Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the
rest of the world (Mohajan, 2022: 2). Various definitions have been given on feminism,
but a unified definition has remained elusive so far. Nevertheless, feminism has a
universal goal: pursuing gender equality.
The world has witnessed four waves of feminist movement. The first one took place from
the second half of the 19th century to the early 20th century, the main goals of which
were to fight for women (especially married women)’s suffrage, education and
employment, with the focus being on suffrage. The second wave began in the 1960s and
lasted until the 1990s. This wave aimed to fight for equal education and employment
opportunities, maternity leave, birth control and abortion rights (Mohajan, 2022, p. 1).
The third wave, which began in the 1990s, embraced a spirit of rebellion in lieu of reform,
and encouraged women to express their sexuality and individuality (Pruitt, 2022). The
fourth wave of feminism began around 2012. It mainly relied on social media to improve
gender equality in society (Mohajan, 2022, p. 4). These feminist movements have helped
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
280
to involve women in different fields of society, providing them with more opportunities
to receive education, improving gender equality overall.
Brazil has experienced its own four waves of feminist movements. The focus of the first
movement was also the right to vote. It was in 1932 that the New Brazilian Electoral
Code was promulgated, which symbolizes the approval of women’s right to vote (Zarbato
& Martins, 2022: 1132). The second wave of feminist movement in Brazil began in the
1960s—a period of military dictatorship—with one of its goals being to increase solidarity
among women and improve their self-esteem (Zarbato & Martins, 2022: 1133).
Participants of the movement included exiled feminists, political activists, university
students as well as academics (Perez & Ricoldi, 2023, p. 4). The third wave was driven
by the increasingly important voice that global NGOs added to gender discussions, which
included the Human Rights Conferences of the 1990s and the Fourth World Conference
on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Perez & Ricoldi, 2023, p. 4). Finally, the fourth wave
in Brazil relates to the expanding use of the Internet (Perez & Ricoldi, 2023, p. 10).
Overall, it can be said that the feminist movements in Brazil have almost always been
aligned with feminist movements across the world.
On the other hand, China’s feminist movements were different, because of a deep-rooted
gendered hierarchy resulting from Confucian influences that dominated Chinese
societies, which, for centuries had imposed a so-called “three obediences and four
virtues” on women. The three “obediences” refer to the complete compliance of a girl to
her father and older brothers before marriage, a wife to her husband, and a widow to her
son. The four “virtues” refer to women assuming a submissive place in society and
modulating their behavior accordingly, restraining themselves in speech, clothing
themselves appropriately, and managing their households properly and cheerfully
(Cheng, 2009, p. 2260). In addition, the centuries-old practice of foot-binding prevented
women from participating in labour work and limited them to the domestic sphere,
rendering them almost fully dependent on men, resulting in an extremely low status of
women in society.
Feminist movements were introduced to China through the Chinese people’s own fight
against feudalism and imperialism, which in turn gave women hope to take back control
of their own lives. Today we consider the May Fourth Movement the first feminist
movement in China. The May Fourth Movement, which took place during the 1910s and
1920s, was mostly intellectuals protesting against not only the corruption and
incompetence of the warlord government but also foreign invasions of China. More
importantly, the movement represented an open, systematic challenge to the gender
segregation in Chinese society. and opened the door towards gender equality in all
spheres of life, ushering in equal education and employment opportunities for women
(Li, 2000, p. 2). Some of the May Fourth feminists later assumed important roles in the
Communist Party of China (CPC), which was formed in 1921. China’s national women’s
organisation, the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation (ACDWF), an official
institution to unite women from all walks of life, was established in 1949. In 1957, the
ACDWF became the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), enabling feminists to carry
out various reforms nationwide.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
281
Moreover, with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
feminists in CPC have been able to materialise their feminist objectives. In the early years
of the PRC, great achievements were made in such areas as women’s literacy, equal
employment and equal pay, political participation, reproductive health, and new public
facilities to reduce working women’s burden of childcare and housework (Wang, 2018, p.
160). However, during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted for 10 years from 1966 to
1976, the ACWF was forced to suspend itself, and women’s issues were completely
ignored (Li, 2000, p. 33). Since the economic reform which started in late 1978, great
achievements have been made in the development of women’s movement in China, and
women’s study programmes and research centres have been thriving. China can
therefore be regarded as a late bloomer in feminist movement; in turn, the movement
itself was characterised by social movements and reforms aligned with the development
of the CPC. Today, feminists in China are still devoted to improving gender equality in
the society, and people’s consciousness of gender equality is increasing.
Thanks to the influence of these feminist movements (and others worldwide), more and
more importance has been attached to women’s rights, and various actions have been
taken by different countries to improve gender equality on a global scale.
2.2 Legal Framework
Like many other countries in the world, Brazil and China had patriarchal societies that
prioritised men over women. Women have long been associated with being only
daughters and mothers responsible for housework and childcare (i.e., homemakers),
while men are breadwinners for the whole family. For Brazil, its patriarchy-induced
gender inequality was influenced by Iberian culture brought over from Portugal during
colonial times. Throughout most of Brazil’s history, labour was divided along women’s
reproductive and men’s productive roles, setting men and women into the public and
private spheres, respectively, and women were seen as not having any need to learn to
read or write (Beltrão & Alves, 2009, pp. 3, 7). In China, its patrilineal clan societies had
long valued sons over daughters, but the situation worsened during feudal times, when
Confucianism became a core ideology that dominated China for the next two millennia.
Women, considered subordinated to men, had very low status in both the family and
society; boys were given priority to receive education, while girls were confined at home.
Thanks to influence from feminist movements worldwide as well as in Brazil and China
mentioned above, a series of laws have been enacted to improve gender equality. In
Brazil, the imperial decree that provided women with the right to enroll in a university
course dates from 1881 (Beltrão & Alves, 2009, p. 4). The constitution of 1824 defined
basic education as a right of every citizen and an obligation of the state. The 1934
constitution guaranteed women’s right to vote. Brazil became one of the signatories of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Moraes, 2020, p. 7), Article 2 of
which claims that “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (UN,
1948). The Guidelines and Bases of Brazilian Education Law (LDB) made it possible for
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
282
women who were receiving teacher’s training to take part in university entry exams in
1961 (Beltrão & Alves, 2009, p. 6). The constitution of 1988 established compulsory and
free basic education for citizens aged four to seventeen (Brazil, 1988). This not only
played a significant role in increasing the number of female students, but more
importantly established an obligatory qualifying exam system for the public to fill civil
service positions. Such a system tends to favour women with university degrees to
become lawyers, economists and other professions that used to be dominated by men
(Beltrão & Alves, 2009, p. 11), in turn providing greater motivation for women to pursue
higher education. The 1998 Brazilian Federal Constitution determines that education is a
right of all and that the state and the family have a duty to provide it (UNESCO, 2021).
Furthermore, two programmes which aimed to reduce poverty in the country, namely,
Bolsa Família (introduced in 2002) and Fome Zero (FZ) (introduced in 2003), have
increased school attendance and lowered inequality, including gender inequality, in Brazil
(Villiers, 2023: 327).
In China, equality between men and women was stipulated in the constitution of the
People’s Republic of China, which was established in 1949. Subsequently, with the
implementation of the “reform and opening up” policy, a series of laws and regulations
were promulgated to promote gender equality. Moreover, after the Fourth UN World
Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, equality between men and women was
established as a basic state policy of China, symbolising that gender equality was to be
guaranteed through implementing laws and policies. Meanwhile, the Chinese government
also increased support, including enacting the Education Law in 1995, the Vocational
Education Law in 1996, a revised constitution in 2004, and a revised Compulsory
Education Law in 2006, to ensure that women have the same right, opportunities and
access to education as men (Wang & Gui, 2020, p. 81). It is clearly pointed out in Article
36 of the Education Law that “Schools and administrative departments concerned shall,
in accordance with relevant regulations of the State, ensure that females enjoy equal
rights with males in enrollment, admission to schools of a higher level, employment,
conferment of academic degrees, dispatch [sic] for study abroad, etc.” (People’s Republic
of China, 2001).
In the 1996 version of the Vocational Law, it is claimed in Article 7 that the state would
“take measures to help women receive vocational education” (People’s Republic of China,
1996), and Article 10 of the latest (2022) version reiterates that the state “guarantees
women's equal right to receiv[ing] vocational education” (People’s Republic of China,
2022). It is stated in Article 96 of the first version of the constitution (1954) and in Article
48 of 2004’s revised constitution that “Women in the People's Republic of China enjoy
equal rights with men in all aspects in political, economic, cultural, social and family life”
(People’s Government of Guangdong Province, 1954; National People’s Congress, 2004).
Finally, the Compulsory Education Law also gives girls the same right and obligation as
boys to receive compulsory education.
All of these on one hand spread the concept of gender equality and on the other enforce
the implementation of gender equality policies, which in practical ways have helped to
change people’s gender ideology, thus reducing and removing barriers between women
and education. Consequently, education, which used to be a privilege reserved for men
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
283
can now be accessed by women. This in turn has helped to increase the number of female
students, especially in higher education.
2.3 Economic Development
Economic development and education investment produce greatly positive impact on
higher education (Li, Gao & Chen, 2022). Economic development is the foundation for
higher education development, and higher education development helps to increase
women’s access to higher education. According to data from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) (2021), the GDP per capita in Brazil was 1,200 US dollars in 1980, increasing
to 2,240 US dollars in 1988 and 8,270 in 2021, with some fluctuations in between.
Particularly notable was its steady, rapid increase from 2002 to 2011, peaking at 13,630
US dollars in 2011. In China, the GDP per capita saw a massive general growth trend
from 89.5 US dollars in 1960 to 12,720.2 US dollars in 2022, with particularly dramatic
growth from the year 2001 onwards (World Bank, 2024b).
Such economic development has enabled the governments to implement compulsory
education both in Brazil and China, allowing more and more families to send their
children, both boys and girls, to pursue higher education. This has increased women’s
possibility to get education and then higher education. Meanwhile, along with the
economic development, significant achievements have also been made in poverty
reduction in both Brazil and China. With the international poverty line of $2.15 as
reference, Brazil's poverty rate decreased from 23.95% in 1981 to 12.27% in 1986 and
3.51% in 2022. Even more prominent achievements have been made in China: the
poverty rate decreased rapidly from 71.96% in 1990 to 48.14% in 1996 and 0.11% in
2020 (World Bank, 2022). Poverty reduction has further helped to reduce families’
economic burden, which has partly resulted in the increasing attention paid to children’s
education. As higher education is linked to women's socioeconomic status and their
societal role and position (Moore, 1988, p. 103), women are more motivated to seek
opportunities for education once the economic conditions allow. Moreover, women tend
not to spare any effort to stand out academically.
2.4 Expansion of Higher Education
Higher education develops in response to the need of economic development, which in
turn provides the basis for the expansion of higher education. Such expansion renders
higher education no longer a luxury, but something available to an increasing number of
people, both men and women. According to Martin Trow, higher education is developed
over three phases, namely, elite, mass and universal higher education, which are marked
by gross enrollment rates of less than 15%, between 15%–50%, and over 50%,
respectively (Marginson, 2017, p. 1). As higher education transitions from the “elite” to
the “universal” phase, the number of female students tends to increase rapidly and
exceed the number of male students.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
284
Brazil and China have both experienced an expansion of their higher education, though
the expansion happened much earlier for Brazil than China. In Brazil, as early as in the
1960s, the development of state bureaucracies and large companies opened a new job
market, and the higher education diploma constituted a guarantee of access to this
market (Sampaio, 2020, p. 14). After the abolition of slavery in 1988 and the
proclamation of the Republic in 1989, the constitution of the Republic decentralised
higher education and allowed the creation of private institutions, which led to the
immediate expansion of the higher education system (Sampaio, 2020: 7). In China, it
was not until 1977 (after the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976) that China resumed
administering college entrance examinations. After China introduced the reform and
opening up policy, the demand for higher education has increased rapidly, and to satisfy
both individuals’ and society’s need for higher education, a higher education expansion
policy was introduced in 1999. This has rapidly boosted the number of students—
particularly female—enrolled in higher education.
Table 1 below shows the expansion of enrollment and the increase of female students in
Brazilian and Chinese higher education. In China, the gross enrollment rate of higher
education in 1979 was only 1%, ten per cent lower than that of Brazil; it increased to
14% in 2003 after the higher education expansion policy of 1999, and to 17% in 2004,
which indicates that China entered the mass higher education phase in 2004.
Additionally, the GPI of enrollment in Table 1 indicates that the gender gap reversal
began in 2008, with the gross enrollment rate at that point being 22% and GPI reaching
1.04. In Brazil, the gross enrollment rate of higher education in 1979 was 11%, much
higher than that of China at the time, and it increased to 15% in 1999, which indicates
that Brazil entered the phase of mass higher education in 1999. However, Brazil’s GPI of
enrollment indicates that the gender gap reversal happened in Brazilian higher education
in 1988, when the gross enrollment rate was 11%.
Table 1 Higher Education in Brazil and China
Higher Education in China
Higher Education in Brazil
Year
Gross Enrollment
Rate
GPI of
Enrollment
Gross Enrollment
Rate
GPI of Enrollment
1979
1%
0.33
11%
0.95
1983
Not Available
Not Available
11%
1
1988
3%
Not Available
11%
1.05
1994
4%
0.53
11%
1.12
1998
6%
Not Available
13%
1.19
1999
7%
Not Available
15%
1.21
2003
14%
0.83
Not Available
Not Available
2004
17%
0.89
Not Available
Not Available
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
285
2007
21%
1
Not Available
Not Available
2008
22%
1.04
Not Available
Not Available
2009
23%
1.06
Not Available
Not Available
2014
44%
1.15
47%
1.26
2019
57%
1.2
53%
1.27
2022
72%
1.15
60%
1.32
Source: World Bank, 2024a; World Bank, 2024c.
Therefore, things are a bit different between China and Brazil in that the gender gap
reversal happened in China after it entered the mass higher education phase, while it
happened in Brazil before it entered the mass phase. Nevertheless, they have both
witnessed rapid higher education expansion, as well as dramatic increases in the number
of female students.
2.5 Demographic Factors
Data from the World Bank show a decline in fertility rate not only for Brazil and China
but across the world (Table 2). Between 1970 and 2022, Brazil’s fertility rate decreased
from 5.0 to 1.6 children per woman, while China’s decreased from 6.1 to 1.2, both now
falling below the global average. Compared with Brazil, China saw a much more dramatic
drop in fertility rate between 1970 and 1980, due to the implementation of the family
planning (i.e., one-child) policy in the 1970s.
Table 2 Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman)
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2022
World
4.8
3.7
3.3
2.7
2.6
2.3
Brazil
5.0
4.0
2.9
2.3
1.8
1.6
China
6.1
2.7
2.5
1.6
1.7
1.2
Source: World Bank, 2024d
According to the Resource Dilution theory, parents only have finite access to resources
such as time, energy and money, and as the number of children increases, the amount
of resources available to each child decreases, which will have negative impact on their
educational outcomes (Downey, 1995, p. 746). Moreover, girls will receive much less
resources (especially education, including higher education) than boys due to the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
286
aforementioned patriarchal traditions. Having fewer children will enable parents to giver
more—not to mention, equal—attention and resources (including education) to each
child, and the result of this has been significant increase in girls’ access to higher
education. Furthermore, according to Becker’s Human Capital Investment theory, people
make human capital investment decisions based on returns on the investment; those
with higher returns will receive more human capital investment (Wang, 2021, p. 8). When
girls outperform boys academically, parents become more willing to invest in their
daughters to receive higher education.
3. Conclusion
Gender gap reversal in higher education has been an ongoing global phenomenon, but,
for Brazil and China, it has already been well underway since 1988 and 2008,
respectively. The main external factors contributing to the reversal include: (1) feminist
movement, which has not only brought people’s attention to gender equality, helped
create an environment and more opportunities for women to receive higher education,
but also laid a foundation for the formulation and enforcement of laws to promote gender
equality; (2) legal framework, which ensures the implementation of gender equality
policies in reality and guarantees women’s right to education; (3) economic development,
which helps to reduce families’ economic burden and increase women’s opportunities to
receive higher education; (4) higher education expansion, which makes higher education
accessible to women and leads to tremendous increase of women students; and (5)
demographic factors, which allows women equal education resources as men. It is worth
mentioning that these factors do not work separately. Instead, the gender gap reversal
in higher education has been the combined result of all of these factors at play.
References
Beltrão, K. & Alves, J. (2009). Reversal of the gender gap in Brazilian education in the
20th century. Cadernos de Pesquisa, 39, pp. 125–156.
Bossavie, L. & Kanninen, O. (2018). What explains the gender gap reversal in educational
attainment? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8303.
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104303
Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988 [Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Brazil, 1988]. Brasília: Casa Civil, 1988.
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm
Cheng, L. (2009). Berkshire Encyclopedia of China. Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing
Group.
Downey, D. (1995). When bigger is not better: Family size, parental resources, and
children’s educational performance. American Sociological Review, 60 (5): pp. 746-761.:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2096320.pdf
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
287
Goldin, C., Katz, L. & Kuziemko, I. (2006). The homecoming of American college women:
The reversal of the college gender gap. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (4), pp.
133-156. DOI: 10.1257/jep.20.4.133
International Monetary Fund. (2021). GDP per capita-Brazil.
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPDPC@WEO/BRA?zoom=BRA&highlight
=BRA
Li, C. (2016). “男孩危机”“剩女现象”与“女大学生就业难”——教育领域性别比例逆转带来的社会性
挑战["Boy crisis", "Leftover women" and "Employment discrimination against female
college graduates": Challenges of reversed gender disparity in education]. Journal of
Chinese Women's Studies, (02), 33-39.
Li, X., Gao, Y. & Chen, Wenyi (2022). The impact of economic development on higher
education: An empirical study of the mediating effect model of education investment by
Stata software analysis. 3rd International Conference on Education, Knowledge and
Information Management (ICEKIM). Harbin, China, pp. 315-318. DOI:
10.1109/ICEKIM55072.2022.00077
Li, Y. (2000). Women’s movement and change of women’s status in China. Journal of
International Women's Studies, 1(1): 30-40. https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol1/iss1/3
Liu, J. & Z, W. (2023). 女性教育突破与学历攀登——对中国（2001—2020年）本硕博教育性别逆
转现象的研究[Breakthrough in women's education and climbing for academic
qualifications: A study of gender reversal in China's (2001-2020) undergraduate,
postgraduate and doctoral education]. China Youth Study, (08), pp. 104-112.
Marginson, S. (2017). Elite, Mass, and High-Participation Higher Education. In: Shin, J.
& Teixeira, P. (eds). Encyclopedia of International Higher Education Systems and
Institutions. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9553-1_50-1
Mohajan, H. (2022). Four waves of feminism: A blessing for global humanity. Studies in
Social Science & Humanities, 1 (2): 1-8. Paradigm Academic Press. https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/114328/1/MPRA_paper_114328.pdf
Moore, H. (1988). Feminism and anthropology. The University of Minnesota Press.
Moraes, M. (2020). Women’s history and movements in 20th-century Brazil.
https://oxfordre.com/latinamericanhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.0
01.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-863
The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. (2004). The
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/zt/qt/gjxfz/2014-12/03/content_1888091.htm
Old Times. (2021). The founder of a feminist tradition Charles Fourier.
https://oldtimes381.medium.com/the-founder-of-a-feminist-tradition-charles-fourier-
ff4fb90a993b
People’s Government of Guangdong Province. (1954). The Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China.
http://www.gd.gov.cn/zwgk/gongbao/1954/9/content/post_3353421.html
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
288
People’s Republic of China. (1996). Vocational Education Law of the People’s Republic of
China. Beijing: Law Press. ISBN 7-5036-1857-4/D·1542.
People’s Republic of China. (2001). Education Law of the People’s Republic of China.
Beijing: China Legal Publishing House. ISBN7-80083-813-7/D·778.
People’s Republic of China. (2022). Vocational Education Law of the People’s Republic of
China. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-04/21/content_5686375.htm
Perez, O. & Ricoldi, A. (2023). The Fourth Wave of Feminism in Brazil. Revista Estudos
Feministas, Florianópolis, 31(3). DOI: 10.1590/1806-9584-2023v31n383260-en
Pruitt, S. (2022). What are the four waves of feminism?
https://www.history.com/news/feminism-four-waves
Reijnders, L. (2018). Wealth, wages, and wedlock: Explaining the college gender gap
reversal. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120, pp. 537-562.
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12233
Riphahn, R. & Schwientek, C. (2015). What drives the reversal of the gender education
gap? Evidence from Germany. Applied Economics, 47(53): 5748-5775. DOI:
10.1080/00036846.2015.1058906
Sampaio, H. (2020). Evolução do ensino superior brasileiro 1808-1990 [Evolution of
Brazilian higher education, 1808-1990]. https://sites.usp.br/nupps/wp-
content/uploads/sites/762/2020/12/dt9108.pdf
UNESCO. (2020). Global Education Monitoring Report – Gender Report: A new
generation: 25 years of efforts for gender equality in education. Paris, UNESCO.
UNESCO. (2021). Brazil Inclusion. https://education-profiles.org/latin-america-and-the-
caribbean/brazil/~inclusion
UNESCO. (2024). Glossary. https://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary
UNESCO & IESALC. (2021). Women in higher education: has the female advantage put
an end to gender inequalities? Paris: UNESCO.
Villiers, D. & Villiers, A. (2023). A comparative review of education policy in Brazil and
South Africa: Divergent trends in inequality. Athens Journal of Education, 10 (2), pp.
323-344.
Wang, L., Wang, Y. & Hu, Y. (2022). 中国教育获得性别差异逆转下婚姻有效供给匹配失衡研究
[Research on the imbalance of effective marriage matching under the reversal of gender
differences in educational attainment in China]. Chinese Journal of Population Science.
Wang, W. (2021). 高等教育入学机会性别差异的变化研究 [A study on changes of gender
differences in higher education enrollment opportunities]. Xiamen University Press.
Wang, W. & Gui, Q. (2020). 高等教育机会获得的性别不平等及其变化(1982-2015) [Gender
inequality of the access to higher education and the changes from 1982 to 2015].
Tsinghua Journal of Education, 41 (1), pp. 78-86.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 274-289
The Gender Gap Reversal in Higher Education:
The Case of Brazil and China
Teli Chen, Suzana Lopes Salgado Ribeiro, Francisco José Leandro
289
Wang, Z. (2018). Feminist struggles in a changing China. In: Basu, A. (ed). Women's
Movements in the Global Era (pp. 155-181). Routledge.
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/wangzheng/wp-
content/uploads/sites/948/2021/09/2018WangZ_Feminist-Struggles-in-a-Changing-
China.pdf
World Bank. (2022). Poverty and inequality platform. https://pip.worldbank.org/country-
profiles/CHN;https://pip.worldbank.org/country-profiles/BRA
World Bank. (2024a). School enrollment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index (GPI).
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS?intcid=ecr_hp_BeltC_en_ext
&locations=BR-CN
World Bank. (2024b). GDP per capita (current US$)-China.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN&most_recent_val
ue_desc=true
World Bank. (2024c). School enrollment, Tertiary (% gross)-China.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?locations=CN-BR
World Bank. (2024d). Fertility rate, total (births per woman).
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.DYN.TFRT.IN&count
ry=WLD
Y, J. & M, D. (2023). 高等教育性别差异逆转:驱动因素与典型表征——来自宏观层面和微观层面的
经验证据[Explanations on the reversal of college gender gap in China: Factors and
characteristics—Empirical evidence from macro and micro levels]. Journal of Henan
Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), (05), pp. 95-100.
Zarbato, J. & Martins, L. (2022). Higher education and female empowerment: Possible
courses in times of pandemics. Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos em Educação,
Araraquara, 17(2), pp. 1128-1145, DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21723/riaee.v17iesp.2.16985
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
290
GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOFT POWER IN BRAZIL-
CHINA RELATIONS
ANABELA RODRIGUES SANTIAGO
anabela.santiago@ua.pt
Ph.D. candidate in Public Policies at the Department of Social, Political and Territorial of
University of Aveiro (Portugal). Furthermore, she is a Ph.D. Research Grant Holder (Fundação
para a Ciência e Tecnologia + Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau), and a Ph.D. student
member of GOVCOPP (Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies) research unit. She has
participated in several scientific projects including a scientific mission to map Chinese
investments in the agri-food sector under COST Action 18215 - China and Europe Relations
Network and CHERN Training School: China Scholarship and Policy Advice: Reaching (out to)
Decision Makers on China. Author of several articles and book chapters on global health
governance and the specific case of China. Her research activity has involved health governance,
health diplomacy, and particularly, Chinese health strategy towards global health governance.
She is currently affiliated to Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies
(GOVCOPP), University of Aveiro, Portugal/ FCT-CCCM Grant Fellow.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3897-0323.
CARLOS EDUARDO DE ANDRADE LIMA DA ROCHA
carlos.rocha@fiocruz.br
Works at the International Platform for Science, Technology and Innovation in Health
(PICTIS/Portugal) PIC Number 887111561, Oswaldo Cruz Institute - IOC, Oswaldo Cruz
Foundation - FIOCRUZ; Post-doctoral Researcher - University of Aveiro (Portugal), 2019. Carlos
Eduardo does research in International Cooperation, Health Politics and Policy, Public
Administration, Innovation and Public Policy. Horizon Europe – Project: Multi-site Application of
Open Science in the Creation of Healthy Environments Involving Local Communities (MOSAIC),
Member. Doctor of Science (DSc) – Biomedical Engineering, Public Health Management Analyst
(Science, Technology & Innovation in Public Health), Fiocruz. He is currenlty associated to
Plataforma Internacional para Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação em Saúde - PICTIS (Portugal)/
Instituto Oswaldo Cruz-IOC/Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Fiocruz, Brazil.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7118-284X.
Abstract
As a result of significant economic growth, driven by increased international trade and the
densification of urban populations – leading to a faster global transmission of diseases – health
has been a top priority in global governance in recent decades. The coordination between
national public policies and international cooperation efforts to address public health
challenges has become crucial and acknowledged by the majority of the states in the
international system (Ibanez et. al., 2022 Ibanez, 2020). This acknowledgment – together
with the awareness of the “globalization of disease” (Fidler, 2004) – conduces to the use of
Global Health Diplomacy (GHD) as an instrument of foreign policy and soft power. Due to its
ever-growing role in the international arena, China has made efforts to play a more relevant
role in health governance, especially in the Global South. In turn, as Brazil has a long tradition
and experience in GHD, and being both Brazil and China countries that are commercial
partners and integrate the BRICS, it is quite relevant to understand the evolution of their
relationship in the sphere of GHD and governance across time. In this paper, by means of a
literature review of scientific papers relevant in the field, we use a perspective based on
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
291
bilateralism to i) outline both China’s and Brazil’s positioning towards health diplomacy
between 2013 and 2023, and ii) analyse their articulation in this realm within the context of
the BRICS. The evolution of such relationship with health diplomacy at the core has been
turbulent depending on political leaderships and their respective political programs; however,
this study enables us to identify the challenges and point out best practices and potential
reinforcing partnerships for the achievement of better health for all and sustainable
development.
Keywords
Global Health Governance, Health Diplomacy, China-Brazil Relationship, BRICS.
Resumo
Em resultado de um crescimento económico significativo, impulsionado pelo aumento do
comércio internacional e pela densificação das populações urbanas – que conduz a uma
transmissão mais rápida de doenças à escala global – a saúde tem sido uma das principais
prioridades da governança mundial nas últimas décadas. A coordenação entre as políticas
públicas nacionais e os esforços de cooperação internacional para enfrentar os desafios da
saúde pública tornou-se crucial e reconhecida pela maioria dos Estados do sistema
internacional (Ibanez et. al., 2022 Ibanez, 2020;). Este reconhecimento – combinado com a
consciência da “globalização da doença” (Fidler, 2004) – conduz à utilização da Diplomacia da
Saúde Global como um instrumento de política externa e de soft power. Devido ao seu papel
cada vez maior na arena internacional, a China tem feito esforços para desempenhar um papel
mais relevante na governança global da saúde, especialmente no Sul Global. Por sua vez,
como o Brasil tem uma longa tradição e experiência em Diplomacia da Saúde Global, e sendo
tanto o Brasil como a China países parceiros comerciais e integrantes dos BRICS, é bastante
relevante compreender a evolução da sua relação nessa esfera e na esfera da governança ao
longo do tempo. Neste artigo, por meio de uma revisão de literatura de artigos científicos
relevantes na área, utilizamos uma perspetiva baseada no bilateralismo para i) delinear o
posicionamento da China e do Brasil em relação à diplomacia da saúde entre 2013 e 2023, e
ii) analisar sua articulação nesse âmbito no contexto dos BRICS. A evolução dessa relação,
com a diplomacia da saúde no centro, tem sido turbulenta, dependendo das lideranças
políticas e dos seus respetivos programas políticos; no entanto, este estudo permite-nos
identificar os desafios e apontar as melhores práticas e potenciais parcerias de reforço para a
consecução de uma melhor saúde para todos e do desenvolvimento sustentável.
Palavras-chave
Governança Global da Saúde, Diplomacia da Saúde, Relação China-Brasil, BRICS.
How to cite this article
Santiago, Anabela Rodrigues & Rocha, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da (2024). Global Health
Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise
Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp. 290-308. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0324.14.
Article received on 24 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
292
GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOFT
POWER IN BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS
ANABELA RODRIGUES SANTIAGO
CARLOS EDUARDO DE ANDRADE LIMA DA ROCHA
Introduction
Health diplomacy has emerged as critical component of international relations, especially
in the context of globalization and increasing interdependence among nations. The rapid
economic growth and urbanization observed globally have facilitated the swift
transmission of diseases across borders, making health a priority in global governance
(Fidler, 1997; Fidler, 2004; Almeida, 2020). The coordination between national public
policies and international cooperation is essential to address public health challenges
effectively. This coordination is widely acknowledged by the majority of states within the
international system (Ibanez et al., 2022; Ibanez, 2020; Lee and Gomez, 2011).
Global health diplomacy has been defined in the literature in various fields of knowledge
according to different historical and geographic perceptions as well. For the purpose of
this paper, we assume the definition given in Global Health Centre Report (2021:39):
“Global health diplomacy refers to the multi-level and multi-actor negotiation processes
that shape and manage the global policy environment for health, in health and non-
health fora”. In this sense, GHD integrates the disciplines of public health, international
affairs, management, law, and economics, among others, to address global health issues
and improve relations among countries (Katz et al., 2011). Moreover, the increasing
globalization of diseases – illustrated by outbreaks such as SARS, Ebola, and COVID-19
– has underscored the importance of robust international health policies (Fidler, 2004).
Besides globalization itself, also the expansion of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in international health, the globalization of science and pharmaceutical research,
as well as the use of militarized languages of biosecurity impact global health (Adams,
Novotny and Leslie, 2008).
In sequence, due to several factors – namely their economic relevance and wide know-
how in health governance and diplomacy – Brazil and China are two key players in
international order whose relationship is important to be understood. Brazil and China
have established a robust partnership over the years, marked by significant trade
relations and cooperation in various sectors (Herrero & Tussie, 2015). Both nations are
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
293
integral members of the BRICS group, which emphasizes collaboration among emerging
economies from the Global South. The partnership between Brazil and China extends into
the realm of health diplomacy, which serve as an instrument of soft power and foreign
policy (Herrero & Tussie, 2015). Understanding the evolution of their relationship in GHD
is crucial, given their influential roles in the Global South. The diplomatic relationship
between Brazil and China has seen various phases, with an increasing focus on
cooperation in science and technology, public health, and sustainable development. This
relationship is further strengthened by the creation of new institutional framework to
reform global governance structures and promote a multipolar world order, namely
financing institutions, such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure
and Investment Bank (Santiago & Rodrigues, 2023).
Indeed, health diplomacy can be perceived as a tool of soft power as previously stated.
Soft power, a concept popularized by Joseph Nye (1990, 2004, 2008), refers to the ability
of a country to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction rather than
coercion or payment. Health diplomacy is then a vital tool of soft power, enabling nations
to foster goodwill, build alliances, and promote their values and interests on the global
stage. As defined by Fidler (2001), GHD encompasses the policymaking processes
through which both state and non-state actors address global health challenges,
extending their efforts beyond the health sector. Similarly, Kickbusch et al., in a 2021
report by the Global Health Centre, described GHD as involving “multi-level and multi-
actor negotiation processes that shape and manage the global policy environment for
health, in health and non-health fora” (Global Health Centre, 2021:39). This perspective
underscores the complex and collaborative nature of GHD, highlighting its role in
coordinating a wide array of stakeholders and forums to effectively tackle health issues
on a global scale.
Since the end of World War II, GHD has become an essential part of foreign policy
agendas. It now plays a pivotal role in discussions related to national security,
international trade, and diplomatic relations (Almeida, 2020; Ruckert et. al., 2022;
Almeida, 2010). This development highlights the growing recognition that global health
issues are closely linked to broader geopolitical and economic stability. This connection
became particularly evident in the 1980s and 1990s during the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS
in the developing world (Mahani et. al., 2018). The widespread impact of such health
crises led to the integration of health concerns into foreign policy and international
diplomacy, establishing GHD as a distinct field (Labonté and Gagnon, 2010). As a result,
nations have increasingly recognized the importance of health diplomacy not only for
safeguarding their own citizens, but also for enhancing global health security and
fostering international goodwill (Gauttam et. al., 2020). The role of GHD, especially
through the World Health Organization (WHO), in uniting countries towards the common
goal of improving global health, has been consistently demonstrated during public health
crises, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic (Kickbusch and Liu, 2022). This
ongoing emphasis underscores the crucial function of GHD in addressing contemporary
health challenges and promoting international cooperation for a healthier world.
By using a perspective based on their bilateral relations, we can better understand the
collaborative efforts and joint initiatives undertaken by Brazil and China in the fields of
health diplomacy, by assessing how bilateral cooperation enhances their soft power and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
294
contributes to global health governance. This approach allows us to identify the
challenges and opportunities in their relationship and explore the potential for reinforcing
partnerships to achieve better health outcomes.
Methodology
This paper adopts a qualitative approach, using a literature review to explore the role of
health diplomacy in the context of Brazil-China relations within the BRICS framework
from 2013 to 2023. The research is grounded in bilateralism, emphasizing the importance
of collaborative efforts and joint initiatives between Brazil and China to address global
health and scientific challenges. The literature review involved a comprehensive set of
relevant scientific literature, including peer-reviewed journal articles, reports from
international organizations and book chapters focusing on GHD and international,
bilateral relations between Brazil and China. The literature search was conducted using
several academic databases, including PubMed, Scopus and Google Scholar, filtered by
some criteria such as articles either in English, Spanish or Portuguese, that after the
abstract reading revealed to be relevant in one or more of the key topics of the study
(global health governance, global health diplomacy, soft power, BRICS, China-Brazil
cooperation, Chinese foreign policy, Brazilian foreign policy). Some grey literature,
namely new in media, was used to complement the scientific literature. The resulting
analysis that composes this paper is grounded in a total of 76 references and aims to
make a contribution to the status quo of health diplomacy as an instrument of soft power
in Brazil-China Relations.
Brazil’s Positioning Towards Health Diplomacy (2013-2023)
Brazil has a long-standing tradition in health diplomacy, particularly through its
involvement with international health organizations and its leadership in global health
initiatives (Ibanez et. al., 2022). The country’s Unified Health System (Sistema Único de
Saúde - SUS) has been recognized as a model for public health, emphasizing universal
health coverage and equitable access to healthcare services (Paim et al., 2011). Indeed,
Brazil was the first developing nation to successfully integrate trade and public health by
effectively challenging and renegotiating the barriers to medicine access within the
framework of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). This initiative culminated in Brazil offering free antiretroviral treatment to
HIV/AIDS patients, leading to a significant decrease in AIDS-related morbidity and
mortality (Mahani et. al., 2018). In the international health arena, Brazil has been
particularly proactive, pioneering several health measures that have been adopted by
other health systems and endorsed by the WHO. Prominent examples include the
provision of universal primary care services, the strategic training and deployment of
healthcare personnel, and efforts to address the social determinants of health (Almeida
et al., 2023), as well as the role of Brazil in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) that offers valuable insights into the country's efforts to foster global health
cooperation and achieve broader foreign policy goals (Lee, Chagas and Novotny, 2010).
Indeed, in 1999, the Inter-Ministerial National Commission on the Control of Tobacco Use
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
295
was established. Supported by top government officials, this commission served as an
advisory group to shape the government's stance on FCTC negotiations. Notably, the
commission included representatives from nine ministries, such as Inland Revenue, Trade
and Development, and Agriculture. By involving all relevant stakeholders (not only direct
health-related ones), the commission ensured that tobacco control was integrated into
consistent policies across the entire government, rather than being solely a concern of
the health ministry (Lee, Chagas and Novotny, 2010).
During the 2013-2023 period, Brazil's health policies continued to prioritize these
principles, even as the country faced economic and political challenges. Brazil has
challenged the traditional model of aid, development assistance, and the typical donor-
recipient relationships by promoting 'South-South' or 'horizontal cooperation'. This
alternative framework emphasizes reciprocal learning and exchange between countries.
Unlike the conventional model, where external health aid packages are imposed, this
demand-driven approach enables recipient countries to request health aid tailored to
their specific needs (Mahani et al., 2018; Almeida et al., 2010). By fostering this model
of cooperation, Brazil not only enhances the effectiveness of health interventions, but
also empowers partner countries to take an active role in their own health development,
thereby promoting sustainable and contextually relevant health solutions.
The country has been a vocal advocate for health equity and the right to health in
international forums. Its health policies have emphasized the importance of social
determinants of health and the need for comprehensive primary healthcare (Buss and
Ferreira, 2010; Almeida, 2023). The country's commitment to these principles has been
evident in its active participation in global health initiatives and its efforts to strengthen
health systems in developing countries. Going back to the early 2000s, to further
contextualize our current period of analysis, by that time diplomacy and health in Brazil
were highly connected, with a shift in the discussion on global health towards the
priorities of foreign policy. The Lula’s government emphasized multilateralism and
integration with developing and emerging countries – particularly highlighted through the
coordination with BRICS and South America (Ibanez et al., 2022) – aiming for a policy
of international cooperation for development. In this context, within the health sector,
there was a consolidation of a universalist discourse, according to Pinheiro (2020), with
Brazil's participation in the creation of the Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative
(FPGH), which aimed to position health as an essential and strategic issue on the foreign
policy agenda. Furthermore, there was a significant regional presence with the
establishment of the South American Health Council within the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUL) in 2008. This council sought to collectively combat the H1N1 and
dengue epidemics, which were intensifying at the time, and to plan a response to the
potential arrival of Ebola on the continent (Ibanez et. al., 2022). During Dilma's
government, there was a continuation of this stance of participation in international
initiatives (Lima, 2017). However, political instability and economic constraints have
sometimes hindered the continuity and expansion of these initiatives. From 2019 until
2022, Jair Bolsonaro's tenure represented a significant shift in Brazil's health diplomacy
approach. His administration's policies were marked by a strong nationalist stance and
conservative ideology, which often resulted in a reduced emphasis on international health
cooperation. Bolsonaro's government faced intense criticism for its management of the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
296
COVID-19 pandemic, both within Brazil and from the global community (Trivellato and
Ventura, 2022; Vieira de Jesus, 2022). This criticism, combined with Bolsonaro's
skepticism towards multilateral organizations like the WHO, led to a decline in proactive
health diplomacy. Effectively, Jair Bolsonaro's administration exhibited a strong anti-
globalist stance, marked by a rejection of liberal multilateral institutions and international
treaties (Ventura and Bueno, 2021). Bolsonaro threatened to exit key agreements such
as the Paris Climate Accords and the WHO and actually withdrew from the UN Global
Compact for Migration. His government distanced itself from the Global South and
showed indifference towards South-South cooperation forums like BRICS (Trivellato and
Ventura, 2022). Overall, engagement in health diplomacy was diminished (Buss and
Tobar, 2020). Not only because of Brazil or China – but as a whole group – the COVID-
19 pandemic exposed the BRICS' internal divisions and shortcomings in their collective
policymaking and implementation, highlighting their constrained influence within the
WHO (Moore, 2022).
With his return to the presidency in 2023, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had to deal with many
issues domestically. As far as health is concerned, rebuilding the SUS after significant
setbacks stands as a top priority and a monumental challenge for Lula’s administration.
Upon taking office, President Lula was faced with a dire situation marked by severe
deterioration in health indicators (Ortega and Pele, 2023). Various stakeholders have
identified the key challenges for his administration, which include: (i) outlining a
progressive plan to increase public funding for SUS from the current 4% to 6%-7% of
the GDP, while also improving the efficiency of resource allocation; (ii) addressing
regional health disparities by implementing new governance mechanisms; (iii)
reestablishing and enhancing primary health care to function as a comprehensive,
effective, community-based model within the regionalized SUS network; (iv) managing
health market regulations to prevent costly treatments from being accessed through the
judicial system; (v) restructuring the training, placement, and provision of health
workers, introducing policies to prevent precarious working conditions, and addressing
the shortage and uneven distribution of doctors; (vi) developing a national health data
policy to support the management and digital transformation of SUS (Ortega and Pele,
2023).
Besides the domestic health issues, Lula also has made revitalizing Brazil's health
diplomacy a key priority. Lula's administration seeks to reassert Brazil's leadership role
in global health initiatives, focusing on principles of South-South cooperation and
solidarity (Ventura, 2023). Efforts are being made to rebuild relationships with
international health organizations and enhance Brazil's participation in global health
forums. In subsequent sub-sections of this paper, we focus on the health cooperation
between Brazil and China under their respective health diplomacy approach.
China’s Positioning Towards Health Diplomacy (2013-2023)
China’s health policies have evolved significantly over the past decade, reflecting its
growing influence in global affairs. The country has made substantial investments in
health infrastructure and scientific research, aiming to enhance its soft power through
health diplomacy (Hu et. al., 2017). China’s Health Silk Road initiative, part of the larger
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
297
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplifies its commitment to improving global health
through international cooperation (Cao, 2020).
Domestically, China’s health policies have focused on expanding healthcare access,
improving healthcare quality, and enhancing the country's capacity to respond to public
health emergencies (Meng et al., 2019). The country has also emphasized the importance
of innovation and technological advancement in its health strategies, investing heavily in
research and development, also as part of its “Made in China 2025” strategic plan.
Abroad, indeed, China's Health Silk Road has been a cornerstone of its health diplomacy
strategy, involving projects to build hospitals, provide medical training, and supply
medical equipment to countries along the BRI routes (Yuan, 2023; Chow-Bing, 2020).
This initiative aims to enhance healthcare infrastructure and improve health outcomes in
partner countries, while also strengthening China's influence in these regions (Gauttam
et al., 2020; Shajalal et al., 2017), a factor which is sometimes associated to the
conception of “aid with strings attached” (Tritto et al., 2024) or “old wines in new bottles”
(Alden, 2006) when compared with traditional donors’ aid. This strategy offers several
potential benefits for China. It may facilitate access to Africa's rich natural resources,
which are vital for China’s expanding economy, and it fosters a sense of gratitude and
dependence towards China. Indeed, by enhancing healthcare infrastructure and
addressing public health challenges, China can generate goodwill and create a sense of
obligation among the recipient nations, both economically and politically (Yuan, 2023).
With or without strings attached, the fact is that the Chinese government has been
proactively engaging in health diplomacy, particularly with developing countries and
notably with the African continent, as part of its wider South-South cooperation strategy.
This commitment was evident, not only before, but also during and after the COVID-19
pandemic (Killeen et. al., 2018; Cabestan, 2022). However, as illustrated in figure 1, the
high volume of Chinese medical aid exports post-COVID-19 was primarily directed
towards Asian countries. This shift is seen by many scholars as part of China's “neighbors’
diplomacy” strategy, aiming to solidify relationships and enhance influence within the
Asian region (Guo et. al., 2024; Aria et. al., 2023).
Figure 1: Distribution of Chinese medical aid exports across regions by quarter from
January 2017 to September 2022, measured by the amount in current US$
Source: Guo et al., 2024
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
298
Through its multifaceted engagements, China’s health diplomacy highlights the core
principles of South-South cooperation, focusing on mutual benefit, solidarity, and shared
developmental goals. Countries classified as 'emerging' or 'non-traditional' donors, which
have only recently increased their contributions to development finance, are reshaping
and expanding the boundaries of conventional health aid practices (McDade and Mao,
2020). This strategic approach fosters the creation of a more interconnected and
cooperative global community, where developing nations support each other in tackling
common challenges and achieving sustainable development in a more "horizontal"
manner. This stands in contrast to the traditional "vertical" model of cooperation seen in
North-South international aid (Almeida, 2010). Such horizontal cooperation not only
emphasizes development assistance but also promotes equitable partnerships and shared
growth.
In the sequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, China was said to be using what we know
as “mask diplomacy” and “vaccine diplomacy” as tools of soft power, to provide an image
of responsible power, ensuring equitable vaccine distribution, and fostering strategic
partnerships. Partly to mitigate negative perceptions following the initial outbreak in
Wuhan, China aimed to shift its image from a source of the virus to a global health leader
(Wu & Gelineau, 2021; Lee 2023). China’s COVID-19 aid during the first wave of the
pandemic – the phase of mask diplomacy – was largely reactionary and driven by
recipient countries' needs, reflecting traditional norms of non-interference rather than a
coherent strategic plan. The fragmented nature of aid implementation highlights the
challenges China faces in leveraging foreign aid for strategic purposes (Sun and Yu,
2023).
As for vaccine diplomacy, China began with vaccine trials in Brazil in July 2020, expanding
to donations and sales across Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Lee, 2023). In early 2021,
China appeared to gain an advantage with its swift delivery of medical masks and
vaccines, as Western nations lagged behind (Nolte 2023; De Luce, 2021); indeed, early
vaccine deliveries created a perception of Chinese diplomatic success compared to the
U.S. and Europe (von der Burchard, 2021; Stuenkel, 2020). By March 2021, China had
provided millions of vaccine doses to 69 countries and exported to 28 others (Huang,
2021; Lee 2023), as per figure 2. By June 2021, China had participated in COVAX to
support global vaccine distribution (MFA, 2021; Huang, 2021; Kobierecka, 2022).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
299
Figure 2: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Vaccine Diplomacy
Source: Huang, 2021
The effectiveness of China’s efforts in improving its international standing remains
debated, with mixed perceptions from global audiences (Silver et. al. 2023; Kobierecka,
2022; Silver et al., 2020). As for the case of Latin America, and Brazil in particular, the
pandemic did not dramatically alter the economic and geopolitical landscape. China
remained a major economic partner, but its vaccine diplomacy did not lead to substantial
geopolitical shifts (Nolte, 2023). China's influence in Latin America was constrained by
the effective vaccine diplomacy of the U.S. and Europe in the latter half of 2021 (Nolte,
2023).
All in all, either mask and vaccine diplomacy are part of China’s health diplomacy that,
besides the real effects in the global health landscape, serve as a tool for image repairing
and nation branding (Lee, 2023). In next section, the relation between Brazil and China
in terms of health cooperation will be further discussed within the BRICS context.
Brazil-China Articulation in Health and Science Diplomacies within
BRICS
Crises in general, and health crises in particular, usually prompted discussions about
open science and innovation, emphasizing the need for widespread experimentation and
international collaboration (Chesbrough, 2020; Roehrl et. al., 2020). We analysed the
case of Brazil and China's health cooperation in the contemporary period.
Brazil and China's health cooperation is rooted in the complementary strengths each
country brings to the partnership: essentially, China provides advanced technological and
medical resources, including manufacturing capabilities for medical equipment and
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
300
vaccines; while Brazil, on the other hand, contributes with its deep expertise in global
health, particularly in managing infectious diseases, thanks to its well-established health
institutions, such as the Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fiocruz) (Santiago and Rodrigues,
2023).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, China's ability to rapidly produce and supply medical
equipment and vaccines was crucial for Brazil. This included the provision of Sinovac’s
CoronaVac vaccine, which played a significant role in Brazil's vaccination campaign
(Santiago and Rodrigues, 2023). The partnership exemplifies how technological and
resource-sharing can enhance public health responses in times of crisis. Despite political
tensions during Bolsonaro’s administration, the health cooperation between Brazil and
China remained strong, mainly deriving from local authorities' efforts. The steady flow of
medical supplies from China to Brazil during the pandemic underscores the strategic
importance of maintaining robust health partnerships irrespective of political changes
(McBride et al., 2023). However, although Brazil has historically played a leading role in
multilateral forums advocating for the health interests of the Global South (Ventura et
al., 2020), as well as promoted innovative forms of health cooperation (Almeida et al.,
2010), its stance from the pandemic period until very recently changed:
Brazil stands out from almost all other countries for the lack of legislation
seeking to regulate and give an effective response to Covid-19 on the
federal level. In fact, there has been a systematic obstruction from the
Executive branch of government to contain the pandemic, coming from
other actors, such as the National Congress and local governments
(Ventura and Martins, 2020, p. 68).
Here, paradiplomacy plays a crucial role in finding federal and local alternatives. The shift
in relationship with China occurred during Bolsonaro’s administration led to tensions and
difficulties, especially in a pandemic context as China being the foremost producer of
masks and health equipment (Hoirisch, 2020) and also Brazil's largest trading partner
(Alvarenga et al., 2020). Despite these strains, the already referred notable
paradiplomatic efforts between Brazilian regional entities, particularly in the Northeast,
and their Chinese counterparts had a mitigating effect. For instance, the province of
Sichuan donated health supplies to Pernambuco (Alvarenga et al., 2020; Pozatti and
Farias, 2022). The current research agenda on international cooperation needs to
broaden its scope to include these emerging forms of collaboration and their effects on
national and multilateral institutions and alliances. This is particularly pertinent given that
in March 2021, Fiocruz obtained definitive approval from the National Health Surveillance
Agency (Anvisa) for the COVID-19 Fiocruz vaccine, which is produced using Chinese
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) (Valverde, 2021). The large-scale production of
this vaccine influenced the trajectory of the pandemic in Brazil and across Latin America
(Xing et al., 2023), provided that Brazil enhances its performance in the region and
continues Fiocruz's strong tradition of international cooperation (Pozatti and Farias,
2022).
Another example which is representative of the paradiplomacy efforts and also of a return
to previous stage of relations between Brazil and China is the signature of a Memorandum
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
301
of Understanding between Fiocruz and CAS-TWAS Center of Excellence for Emerging
Infectious Diseases (CEEID), to establish the Sino-Brazilian Center for Research and
Prevention of Infectious Diseases (IDRPC). The agreement aims to strengthen
cooperation in health-related science and technology, particularly in preventing and
controlling pandemics and epidemics such as Covid-19, influenza, Zika, dengue, yellow
fever, and tuberculosis, among others. This initiative includes developing global public
health goods like rapid diagnostic tests, therapies, vaccines, and medications. The IDRPC
will have headquarters in both Beijing, at the Institute of Microbiology of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS), and at the Fiocruz campus in Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro.
The Rio facilities are expected to be completed by the end of 2024 and operational by
2025 (Azevedo, 2023/ Agência Notícias Fiocruz).
The partnership was initiated before the pandemic but faced delays due to health
emergencies and political factors. However, with President Lula's recent visit to China
and the subsequent signing ceremony, the agreement has gained renewed momentum,
highlighting the deepening health cooperation between Brazil and China. The signing
ceremony emphasized the importance of this high-level and bilateral partnership,
underscoring joint research efforts, exchange of expertise, and enhanced epidemiological
surveillance capabilities.
The IDRPC will facilitate joint research projects, training programs at various levels,
technology and material exchange, seminars, conferences, and collaborative efforts in
tropical medicine. It represents a significant shift towards permanent scientific
collaboration by establishing physical centers where Brazilian and Chinese researchers
can work together extensively. This bilateral partnership aims to advance global health
systems and reduce vulnerability to emerging health crises through sustained scientific
cooperation and knowledge exchange (Pereira, 2023/ Exame).
Final Considerations
In this paper, we have explored the roles of health diplomacy as an instrument of soft
power in the context of Brazil-China relations within the BRICS framework. The evolution
of their relationship from 2013 to 2023 demonstrates the dynamic nature of health
diplomacy in shaping international relations and addressing global health challenges.
Health diplomacy has emerged as a crucial tool for enhancing soft power. Both Brazil and
China have leveraged it to strengthen their global influence. Brazil’s long-standing
tradition in health diplomacy, exemplified by its universal health coverage model and
proactive stance in international health forums, showcases its commitment to health
equity, public health and cooperation. China's Health Silk Road initiative, as part of the
BRI, underscores its strategic use of health diplomacy to enhance global health
infrastructure and foster international goodwill.
The COVID-19 pandemic further highlighted the importance of GHD. Brazil and China’s
collaboration in vaccine development and distribution illustrated how health diplomacy
could serve immediate public health needs while reinforcing diplomatic ties. China's mask
and vaccine diplomacies, despite criticisms, managed to position it as a key player in
global health leadership.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
302
The BRICS platform provides an essential context for these collaborations, promoting
collective action and mutual support among emerging economies. However, the BRICS
management of the Covid-19 pandemic revealed divisions and limitations in their
collective ability to formulate and act upon policies, with limited agency within the WHO
(Moore, 2022). This paper examines BRICS' global health diplomacy also during the
Covid-19 pandemic and finds that multiple dimensions of power are significant in global
health leadership.
Despite the successes, the relationship between Brazil and China in health diplomacy
faces challenges, including political shifts and economic constraints. The period under
Jair Bolsonaro's administration, marked by a nationalist stance and reduced international
cooperation, posed significant hurdles (Trivellato & Ventura, 2022). However, the
resilience of regional and local efforts, as well as the renewed focus under President Lula's
administration, highlights the potential for overcoming these challenges. A signal of this
is the establishment of the Sino-Brazilian Center for Research and Prevention of
Infectious Diseases which represents a significant milestone in China and Brazil’s
collaboration. This center symbolizes a shift towards sustained scientific cooperation,
aiming to develop global public health goods and improve epidemiological surveillance
capabilities. It is a testament to the potential of multilateral efforts in addressing global
health challenges effectively.
Moving forward, Brazil and China must continue to prioritize health diplomacy within their
foreign policy agendas. Strengthening their collaboration through multilateral platforms
like BRICS can enhance their soft power and contribute to global health governance. By
fostering innovative and equitable health partnerships, they can address transnational
health issues more effectively and promote global sustainable development.
References
Adams, V., Novotny, T. E., & Leslie, H. (2008). Global Health Diplomacy. Medical
Anthropology, 27(4), pp. 315–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/01459740802427067
Alden, C. (2006). Through African eyes: Representations of China on the African
continent. In SciPo/Fudan/LSE conference.
Almeida, C. (2010). Saúde Global e Diplomacia da Saúde: um início de diálogo entre
saúde e relações internacionais. Revista Eletrônica De Comunicação, Informação and
Inovação Em Saúde, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.3395/reciis.v4i1.691
Almeida, C. (2020). Global Health Diplomacy: A Theoretical and Analytical Review.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Global Public
Health. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190632366.013.25
Almeida, C., Santos Lima, T., and de Campos, R. (2023). Brazil's foreign policy and health
(1995–2010): A policy analysis of the Brazilian health diplomacy – from AIDS to ‘Zero
Hunger'. Saúde debate 47, 136. doi: 10.1590/0103-1104202313601i
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
303
Almeida, C.; Pires de Campos, R. & Buss, P. & Ferreira, J. & Fonseca, L. (2010). Brazil’s
conception of South-South “structural cooperation” in health. Reciis. 4.
10.3395/reciis.v4i1.343en.
Alvarenga, A. A., E. M. Rocha, J. Filippon, and M. A. Carvalho. (2020). Desafios do estado
brasileiro diante da pandemia de Covid-19: o caso da paradiplomacia maranhense.
Cadernos Saúde Pública 36, no. 12, pp. 1-15. doi: https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-
311X00155720
Aria, A.; Tayeb, M. and Zazai, A. (2023). China's New Approach to Neighborhood
Diplomacy: Analyzing the Economic and Political Relations with Afghanistan in the Post-
2014 Period. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Studies. 5. 94-101.
10.32996/jhsss.2023.5.8.11.
Azevedo, C. (2023). Fiocruz e instituição chinesa assinam acordo para criação de centro
de prevenção de doenças. Agência de Notícias da Fiocruz. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://agencia.fiocruz.br/fiocruz-e-instituicao-chinesa-assinam-acordo-para-criacao-
de-centro-de-prevencao-de-doencas
Buss, P. M., & Ferreira, J. R. (2010). Ensaio crítico sobre a cooperação internacional em
saúde. Revista Eletrônica De Comunicação, Informação & Inovação Em Saúde, 4(1).
https://doi.org/10.3395/reciis.v4i1.710
Buss, P.; Tobar, Se. (2020). COVID-19 and opportunities for international cooperation in
health. Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Rio de Janeiro, v. 36, n. 4, pp. 1-3
Cabestan, J. P. (2022). The COVID-19 health crisis and its impact on China’s International
Relations. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 15(3), 123.
https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15030123
Cao, J. (2020). Toward a health silk road: China’s proposal for global health cooperation.
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 6(01), pp. 19–35.
https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740020500013
Chesbrough, H. (2020). To recover faster from COVID-19, open up: Managerial
implications from an open innovation perspective. Industrial Marketing Management, 88,
pp. 410-413.
Chow-bing, N. (2020). COVID-19, Belt and Road Initiative and the Health Silk Road:
Implications for Southeast Asia. Friedrich Ebert Stitfung.
De Luce, D. 2021. China is using vaccines to push its agenda in Latin America, and the
U.S. is behind the curve, experts say. NBC News, May 23. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-using-vaccines-push-its-agenda-latin-
america-u-s-n1268146
Fidler D. P. (2001). The globalization of public health: the first 100 years of international
health diplomacy. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 79(9), pp. 842–849.
Fidler, D. (1997). The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
International Relations. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 2.
Retrieved in July 2024, from: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol5/iss1/2
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
304
Fidler, D. (2004). SARS, Governance, and the Globalization of Disease, London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Gauttam, P., Singh, B., and Kaur, J. (2020). COVID-19 and Chinese Global Health
Diplomacy: Geopolitical Opportunity for China’s Hegemony? Millennial Asia, 11(3), 318-
340. https://doi.org/10.1177/0976399620959771
Global Health Centre. (2021). 2021 Annual Report. Geneva, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, Global Health Centre.
Guo, B., Fan, V., Strange, A., & Grépin, K. A. (2024). Understanding China's shifting
priorities and priority-setting processes in development assistance for health. Health
policy and planning, 39(Supplement_1), i65–i78.
https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czad095
Herrero, M. B., & Tussie, D. (2015). UNASUR health: A quiet revolution in health
diplomacy in South America. Global Social Policy, 15(3), pp. 261–277
Hoirisch, C. (2020). Brics na Covid-19: multilateralismo, capacidade tecnológica e
colaboração em PD&I. In: Diplomacia da saúde e Covid-19: reflexões a meio caminho,
organized by P. M. Buss, and L. E. Fonseca, 213-230. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Oswaldo
Cruz.
Hu, R., Liu, R., & Hu, N. (2017). China's Belt and Road Initiative from a global health
perspective. The Lancet. Global health, 5(8), e752–e753.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(17)30250-4
Huang, Y. (2021). Vaccine diplomacy is paying off for China. Foreign Affairs, March 11.
Retrieved in July 2024, from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-03-
11/vaccine-diplomacy-paying-china.
Ibanez, P. (2020). Geopolítica e diplomacia em tempos de Covid-19: Brasil e China no
limiar de um contencioso. Revista Brasileira de Geografia Econômica. Vol. IX, n. 18.
https://doi.org/10.4000/espacoeconomia.13257
Ibanez, P., Pereira, A., and Recio, C. (2022). Saúde Global e Geopolítica: a diplomacia
como política pública e a relação dos BRICS no cenário de pandemia no Brasil. Cadernos
De História Da Ciência, 15(1). https://doi.org/10.47692/cadhistcienc.2021.v15.36538
Katz, R., Kornblet, S., Arnold, G., Lief, E., & Fischer, J. E. (2011). Defining health
diplomacy: changing demands in the era of globalization. The Milbank quarterly, 89(3),
pp. 503–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2011.00637.x
Kickbusch, I., and Liu, A. (2022). Global health diplomacy-reconstructing power and
governance. Lancet (London, England), 399(10341), pp. 2156–2166.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)00583-9
Kickbusch, I.; Nikogosian, H.; Kazatchkine, M.; Kökény, M. (2021). A Guide to Global
Health Diplomacy. Better health – improved global solidarity – more equity. Global Health
Centre. Graduate Institute of Geneva.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
305
Killeen, O.; Davis, A.; Tucker, J.; and Mason Meier, B; (2018). Chinese Global Health
Diplomacy in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges. Global Health Governance; 12(2): pp.
4–29.
Kobierecka A. (2022). Post-covid China: ‘vaccine diplomacy’ and the new developments
of Chinese foreign policy. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, pp. 1–14.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-022-00266-2
Labonté, R., Gagnon, M.L. (2010). Framing health and foreign policy: lessons for global
health diplomacy. Global Health 6, 14. https://doi.org/10.1186/1744-8603-6-14
Lee K, Chagas LC, Novotny TE (2010) Brazil and the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: Global Health Diplomacy as Soft Power. PLoS Med 7(4): e1000232.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000232
Lee S. T. (2023). Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China’s COVID-19 soft power
play. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 19(1), pp. 64–78.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-021-00224-4
Lee, K.; Gomez, E. J. (2011). Brazil's ascendance: the soft power role of global health
diplomacy. European Business Review, pp. 61-64.
Lima, J. (2017). Saúde global e política externa brasileira: negociações referentes à
inovação e propriedade intelectual. Ciência e saúde coletiva. Vol. 22, n. 7, p.2213-2221.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1413-81232017227.02652017.
Mahani, A.; Ruckert, A.; Labonte, R. (2018). Global Health Diplomacy. In: The Oxford
Handbook of Global Health Politics, Eds: Colin McInnes, Kelley Lee, and Jeremy Youde.
Oxford Handbooks. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190456818.013.7
McBride, J., Berman, N., and Chatzky, A. (2023). China's Massive Belt and Road
Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
McDade, K. K., & Mao, W. (2020). Making sense of estimates of health aid from China.
BMJ global health, 5(2), e002261. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2019-002261
Meng Q, Mills A, Wang L, Han Q. (2019). What can we learn from China’s health system
reform? BMJ; 365: l2349 doi:10.1136/bmj.l2349
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MFA). (2021). Regular press
conferences and official statements.
Moore, C. (2022). BRICS and Global Health Diplomacy in the Covid-19 Pandemic:
Situating BRICS’ diplomacy within the prevailing global health governance context.
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional. 65 (2). https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-
7329202200222
Nolte, D. (2023). China’s mask and vaccine diplomacy in Latin America: a success story?
Int Polit. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-023-00525-w
Nye, J. (1990). Soft Power. Foreign Policy, nº 80, pp. 153-171.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
306
Nye, J. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public
Affairs.
Nye, J. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 616(1), pp. 94-109.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699
Nye, J. S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 616, pp. 94–109. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996
Ortega, F.; Pele, A. (2023). Brazil’s unified health system: 35 years and future
challenges. The Lancet Regional Health - Americas, 28, 100631.
Paim, J., Travassos, C., Almeida, C., Bahia, L., and Macinko, J. (2011). The Brazilian
health system: history, advances, and challenges. Lancet (London, England), 377(9779),
1778–1797. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60054-8
Pereira, I. (2023). Fiocruz assina acordo com instituição chinesa para prevenção de
doenças infectocontagiosas. Exame. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://exame.com/brasil/fiocruz-assina-acordo-com-instituicao-chinesa-para-
prevencao-de-doencas-infectocontagiosas/
Pinheiro, L. (2020). Política Externa Brasileira e Saúde Global: encontros e desencontros
no passado e no presente. In: Seminários de Quarentena IESP-UERJ, 4, Retrieved in
July 2024, from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0ath0QIotA.
Pozzatti, A., & Farias, L. W. (2022). From emergency to structure: ways to fight Covid-
19 via international cooperation in health from Brazil. Revista Brasileira De Política
Internacional, 65(1), e006. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202200106
Roehrl, R. A., Liu, W., and Mukherjee, S. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: A wake-up
call for better cooperation at the science–policy–society interface. UN/DESA Policy Brief,
62.
Ruckert, A., Almeida, C., Ramírez, J., Guerra, G., Salgado de Snyder, V. N., Orozco, E.,
Alvarenga, A. A., Nassim de Saboya, A., Martins Dos Santos, R., Sepúlveda, D., Rivera
Vivian, E. D. C., Santos, M. D. S., Doriani, K., and Labonté, R. (2022). Global Health
Diplomacy (GHD) and the integration of health into foreign policy: Towards a conceptual
approach. Global public health, 17(6), pp. 1041–1054.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2021.1900318
S4D4C. (2020). Building Better Science Diplomacy for Global Challenges: insights from
the COVID-19 crisis. S4D4C Project/ Horizon Europe 2020. https://www.s4d4c.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/S4D4C_PolicyBrief_June2020_BuildingBetterScienceDiplomac
y_COVID-19.pdf
Santiago, A.; Rodrigues, C. (2023). The impact of the Health Silk Road on Global South
countries: insights from Brazilian health agents. Front. Polit. Sci. 5:1250017. doi:
10.3389/fpos.2023.1250017
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
307
Shajalal, M., Xu, J., Jing, J. et al. (2017). China’s engagement with development
assistance for health in Africa. glob health res policy 2, 24.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s41256-017-0045-8
Silver, L., Devlin, K., & Huang, C. (2020). Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic
Highs in Many Countries. Pew Research Center.
Silver, L.; Huang, C.; Clancy, L.; Lam, N.; Greenwood, S.; Mandapat, J.; Baronavski.
(2023). Comparing Views of the U.S. and China in 24 Countries. Pew Research Center.
Stuenkel, O. (2020). The BRICS and the future of global order. Lanham/Maryland:
Lexington Books.
Sun, Y. & Yu, B. (2023). Mask Diplomacy? Understanding China's Goals in Delivering
Medical Aid in the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs. 52. 10.1177/18681026221139499.
Tritto, A.; Haini, H. and Wu, H. (2024). Help with strings attached? China’s medical
assistance and political allegiances during the Covid-19 pandemic. World Development,
Elsevier, vol. 178(C). DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106568
Trivellato, P.; Ventura, D. (2022). The decline of Brazil in the global health field: Rupture,
loss, and reversal of leadership in the international health agenda. Latin American Policy;
v. 13, n. 2. DOI: 10.1111/lamp.12274
Valverde, R. (2021). Fiocruz entrega ao PNI primeiro lote de vacinas covid-19. Portal
Fiocruz, Rio de Janeiro, Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://portal.fiocruz.br/noticia/fiocruz-entrega-ao-pni-primeiro-lote-de-vacinas-covid-
19
Ventura, D. (2023). After testing times, Brazil is back. The BMJ; 380, p. 48.
doi:10.1136/bmj.p48
Ventura, D. F. L., J. Martins. (2020). Between Science and populism: the Brazilian
response to Covid-19 from the perspective of the legal determinants of Global Health.
Revista de Direito Internacional 17, no. 2 (2020): pp. 66-83.
https://doi.org/10.5102/rdi.v17i2.6687
Ventura, D.; Bueno, F. (2021). From global health leader to pariah: Brazil as a laboratory
for “epidemiological neoliberalism” in the face of Covid-19. Foro Internacional Vol. LXI, 2
(244). DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/fi.v61i2.2835
Ventura, D.; Ribeiro, G. Di Giulio, P. Jaime, J. Nunes, C. M. Bógus, J. L. Antunes, and E.
Waldman. (2020). Challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic: for a Brazilian research agenda
in global health and sustainability. Reports in Public Health, v. 36, n. 4.
https://doi.org/10.1590/0102-311X00040620
Vieira de Jesus, D. (2022). The Strategy of Chaos: Brazilian Foreign Policy under Jair
Bolsonaro (2019-2022). International Journal of Social Science Studies Vol. 10, No. 6;
https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v10i6.5686
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 290-308
Global Health Diplomacy as An Instrument of Soft Power in Brazil-China Relations
Anabela Rodrigues Santiago, Carlos Eduardo de Andrade Lima da Rocha
308
Von der Burchard, H. 2021. Borrell: EU’s ‘insufficient’ vaccine donations open door for
China. Politico, July 30. Retrieved in July 2024, from:
https://www.politico.eu/article/josep-borrell-eu-vaccine-donations-insufficient/
Wu, H.; Gelineau, K. (2021). Chinese vaccines sweep much of the world, despite
concerns. New York: Associated Press.
Xing, L.; Vadell, J. and Rubiolo, F. (2023). Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics:
Pandemic Diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin American Perspectives,
Issue 251, Volume 50, nº 4, pp.193-209. DOI: 10.1177/0094582X231187895
Yuan, S. (2023). The Health Silk Road: A Double-Edged Sword? Assessing the
Implications of China’s Health Diplomacy. World, Vol. 4, pp. 333-346.
https://doi.org/10.3390/world4020021
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
309
THE ZONE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: A
CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
amgalexandre527@hotmail.com
Captain in the Portuguese Navy (in reserve). He took part in several international exercises and
naval operations, mainly in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas and in the Indian Ocean.
He has a Ph.D. in International Relations from NOVA University of Lisbon and an Advanced
Studies Degree in Geopolitics from the Autonomous University of Lisbon. He has developed and
published research in recent years, mainly focused on the general theme of the oceans, from the
specific perspective of maritime security and the geopolitics of maritime spaces. He is an auditor
of the Portuguese National Defence Course, an integrated researcher at the Portuguese Institute
of International Relations (IPRI-NOVA) and an associated researcher at the Centre for Research
and Development of the Military University Institute. He regularly collaborates with NOVA
University Lisbon (Portugal), the National Defence Institute, the Atlantic Centre and the Military
University Institute. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2697-1951.
Abstract
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was established in 1986
by the countries on the east coast of South America and the west coast of Africa to promote
regional cooperation and the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The Gulf of
Guinea (GoG) is a part of Brazil’s strategic neighbourhood, but the threats that have plagued
it in this century, particularly piracy and armed robbery at sea, jeopardise freedom of
navigation and international trade in the region. The irregular activity of ZOPACAS since its
inception has not allowed it to develop specific measures to combat insecurity in the GoG.
However, there has been a shift in Brazil’s foreign policy since January 2023 as the country
seeks to increase its influence on the international arena, and particularly with countries in
the Global South. In this sense, ZOPACAS appears to be an opportunity for Brazil to take on
a growing role in the GoG. It is understood that the academic importance of this article is
centred on the evolution of ZOPACAS since its launch and its potential to become an important
regional organisation in the pursuit of maritime security in the GoG region. In these
circumstances, this study aimed at analysing ZOPACAS as an initiative capable of positively
influencing maritime security in the GoG region, using an interpretivist epistemological
framework, inductive reasoning and a qualitative research strategy, with a case study as the
research design. For that purpose, it was defined the following research question: how can
the ZOPACAS contribute to improve maritime security in the region of the GoG? The findings
show that ZOPACAS has indeed the potential to play an important role in combating the main
maritime threats in the GoG.
Keywords
ZOPACAS, GoG region, Maritime security, East coast of South America, West coast of Africa.
Resumo
O lançamento da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS), em 1986, teve como
propósito promover a cooperação regional e garantir a manutenção da paz e da segurança
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
310
dos países da costa oriental da América do Sul e da costa ocidental de África. O Golfo da Guiné
(GdG) faz parte do “entorno estratégico” do Brasil, mas tem sido fustigado ao longo deste
século por ameaças diversas, em particular a pirataria e o assalto armado no mar, que podem
colocar em causa a liberdade de navegação e o comércio internacional naquela região. O
funcionamento intermitente da ZOPACAS ao longo dos anos não permitiu o desenvolvimento
concreto de medidas para combater a insegurança sentida no GdG. Todavia, tem-se assistido
a uma mudança na política externa brasileira desde janeiro de 2023, procurando alcançar
maior relevância internacional, em particular junto de países do Sul Global. Neste sentido, a
ZOPACAS surge como uma oportunidade para o Brasil reassumir protagonismo crescente no
GdG. Entende-se que a importância académica deste artigo se centra na evolução da
ZOPACAS desde o seu lançamento e no seu potencial para se tornar uma organização regional
importante na prossecução da segurança marítima na região do GdG. Nestas circunstâncias,
este estudo teve como objetivo analisar a ZOPACAS como uma iniciativa capaz de influenciar
positivamente a segurança marítima na região do GdG, utilizando um quadro epistemológico
interpretativista, um raciocínio indutivo e uma estratégia de investigação qualitativa, tendo
como desenho de investigação um estudo de caso. Para o efeito, foi definida a seguinte
questão de investigação: como pode a ZOPACAS contribuir para melhorar a segurança
marítima na região do GdG? Os resultados mostram que a ZOPACAS tem, de facto, potencial
para desempenhar um papel importante no combate às principais ameaças marítimas no GdG.
Palavras-chave
ZOPACAS, Golfo da Guiné, Segurança marítima, Costa oriental da América do Sul, Costa
ocidental de África.
How to cite this article
Alexandre, António Gonçalves (2024). The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic:
A Contribution to Maritime Security in The Gulf of Guinea. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern
International Order”. December 2024, pp. 309-328. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0324.15.
Article received on 4 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 14 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
311
THE ZONE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION OF THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC: A CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME SECURITY IN THE
GULF OF GUINEA
ANTÓNIO GONÇALVES ALEXANDRE
1. Introduction
On 27 October 1986, on Brazil’s initiative – with the support of Argentina –, the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved resolution 41/11, which established
ZOPACAS with the goal of strengthening international peace and security (Governo do
Brasil, 2023a). In this resolution, the General Assembly called upon all South Atlantic
states
1
to promote regional cooperation for social and economic development, the
protection of the environment, the conservation of living resources and the peace and
security of the whole region (UNGA, 1986). ZOPACAS has 24 member countries from
South America and West Africa
2
. Since then, and until 2023, it has held eight meetings
between national officials from the signatory countries. However, only three of those
meetings took place in the 21st century – in 2007, 2013 and 2023 (figure 1).
Figure 1 – Ministerial Meetings of Zopacas Member Countries
1988
1990
1994
1996
1998
2007
2013
2023
Rio de
Janeiro
Abuja
Brasília
Sommerset
West
Buenos
Aires
Luanda
Montevideu
Mindelo
Source: Adapted from (Marinha do Brasil, 2023a)
Nevertheless, ZOPACAS has been addressed in Brazil’s defence framework documents.
It is set out in Brazil’s National Defence Policy issued in 2020 that one of the pillars of
1
The waters between Africa and South America (United Nations General Assembly, 1986, p. 21).
2
South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Democratic
Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uruguay (Governo do Brasil,
2023a).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
312
the national defence concept should be “to maintain the South Atlantic as a zone of peace
and cooperation” (Governo do Brasil, 2020, p. 21). The Strategy also states that:
Strengthening the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic – Zopacas will
help affirm Brazil as a relevant regional actor, increasing its influence over its strategic
environment and reducing the possibility of military interference by extra-regional
powers in the South Atlantic (Governo do Brasil, 2020, p. 33).
ZOPACAS’ irregular calendar of activities, especially during the 21st century, coincided
with the surge of the two most relevant maritime security threats in the GoG
3
: piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships. According to the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
4
, the
main difference between these threats is where the act is perpetrated. Figure 2 shows
the areas – territorial sea, high seas and exclusive economic zone – where these crimes
are carried out.
Figure 2 – Areas Where Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Occur
Source: Adapted from (UNCLOS, 1982) and (IMO, 2009)
Armed robbery at sea against ships occurs in the sovereign territory of states, that is, in
internal waters, in the territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles) or in the archipelagic waters
of an archipelagic state; piracy occurs on the high seas (beyond 200 nautical miles), but
3
The GoG includes the region’s 17 coastal countries, from Senegal in the north to Angola in the south,
and the two island states of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe (Council of the European Union,
2014).
4
Specialised United Nations agency that deals exclusively with maritime issues.
* 1NM = 1852 meters
DISTANCE TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA BASELINE IN NAUTICAL MILES (NM)*
12 NM
200 NM
HIGH SEAS
TERRITORIAL SEA BASELINE
TERRITORIAL SEA
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
PIRACY
ARMED ROBBERY
AT SEA
SOVEREIGN
TERRITORY
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO THE WATER
COLUMN AND CONTINENTAL SHELF
WATER COLUMN BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
313
this area can be extended to include the exclusive economic zones of coastal states (in
practice, it concerns incidents that occur beyond 12 nautical miles).
However, one of Brazil’s priorities must be to maintain the security of a large maritime
space with the geo-economical and geo-strategic importance of the GoG, especially
because it is a part of Brazil’s strategic environment
5
, which matches the ZOPCAS region,
as it can be seen in the figure 3.
Figure 3 – Zopacas Region
Source: Paulo Gonçalves (2024) (Rights granted by Francisco Leandro in written)
This is the motivation behind Brazil’s efforts to revitalise ZOPACAS since President Lula
da Silva was inaugurated on 1 January 2023. On 17 and 18 April 2023, after ten years
during which the initiative was essentially ignored, ZOPACAS held its 8th ministerial
meeting in Cape Verde, in Mindelo. The meeting was attended by sixteen of the 24
member states. In his opening speech, the Prime Minister of Cape Verde Ulisses Correia
5
This strategic environment consists of the priority areas of interest for Brazil: the South Atlantic and the
countries of the west coast of Africa (Marinha do Brasil, 2023b).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
314
e Silva highlighted the need to “strengthen our commitment to fight transnational
organised crime – drug trafficking, human trafficking, piracy – illegal fishing, terrorism
and cybercrime. This is vital for countries’ economic development, social peace and
stability” (Governo de Cabo Verde, 2023). During the meeting, the Brazilian Foreign
Minister said that “the time has come to unleash the potential of ZOPACAS” and proposed
“three main lines of action [...]: cooperation, institutionalisation and engagement”
(Governo do Brasil, 2023c).
The Action Plan of Mindelo (2023d) established at the ministerial meeting listed several
actions that should be taken to address some of the main maritime security threats in
the South Atlantic: “[...] deterring, preventing and combating IUU fishing [...]” (2023d,
p. 7); and “[...] strengthening cooperation in the prevention and repression of piracy and
armed robbery [at sea] against ships [...]” (2023d, p. 12).
Therefore, given the recent changes to Brazil’s foreign policy, which intends to be more
proactive in the international arena, it is relevant to analyse ZOPACAS’ short-term
potential to become a relevant initiative capable of implementing concrete lines of action
that contribute to increase maritime security in the GoG.
The following research question was defined to guide the investigation: how can the Zone
of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic contribute to improve maritime security
in the region of the GoG?
This study used an interpretivist epistemological framework, inductive reasoning and a
qualitative research strategy, with a case study as the research design. With regards to
the temporal, geographical and content delimitations, the study covers the period from
2013-2023 (during which the two most recent ministerial meetings of ZOPACAS member
countries took place), focuses on the GoG region, and analyses how ZOPACAS can
contribute to the maritime security of that region.
The chapter is divided into three subchapters, an introduction and a conclusion section:
the first subchapter discusses the most relevant frameworks for analysing maritime
security; the second addresses the securitisation of piracy in the GoG and the role that
ZOPACAS could play in the process; the third analyses the security practices that have
been implemented in the GoG and identifies how ZOPACAS could contribute to further
develop them. The findings show that ZOPACAS could play a relevant role in maintaining
maritime security in the GoG.
2. Analysis
2.1 Maritime security: frameworks of analysis
2.1.1 The concept of maritime security
This subchapter addresses maritime security and describes the most common
frameworks for analysing this concept – the semiotic approach, securitisation theory,
security practice theory and the good order at sea approach. However, in this study, only
the securitisation and security practice theories will be used to analyse the research
question.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
315
Maritime security is a relatively recent term
6
– it emerged and was added to the
conceptual edifice of international relations at the end of the 20th century – but it quickly
became widespread, making it a complex, perhaps ambiguous, disputed and even
somewhat contentious concept which can be interpreted through different approaches.
One approach which has been adopted by several theorists who have dedicated
themselves to its study
7
links maritime security to threats in the maritime domain – such
as maritime disputes between states, maritime terrorism, piracy, trafficking of drugs,
arms, people and illicit goods, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, environmental
crimes, and maritime accidents and disasters. Their main argument, according to Bueger
(2015), is that “maritime security should be defined as the absence of these threats” (p.
159). However, this approach has been criticised as insufficient, because “it does neither
prioritize issues, nor provides clues of how these issues are interlinked, nor outlines of
how these threats can be addressed”. It also creates enduring puzzles over which threats
should be included” (p. 159). Bueger (2015) also refers to a different conceptualisation,
which he calls ‘positive’, and which projects a desired “end state”, “in contrast to the
‘negative’ definition of maritime security”. Some proponents of this view see maritime
security as a “good” or “stable” order at sea
8
(p. 159).
Given the lack of international consensus on the concept of maritime security, which is
reflected in the fact that it can have a multitude of meanings and is often motivated by
political interests and different interpretations of the law, Bueger identified three
frameworks of analysis that he used to explain the similarities and differences of the
various approaches to this concept:
(1) ‘semiotics’ which intends to map different meanings by exploring the
relations between maritime security and other concepts, (2) the
‘securitization’ framework which provides the means to understand how
different threats are included in maritime security, and (3) security practice
theory which aims at understanding what actions are undertaken in the
name of maritime security (Bueger, 2015, p. 160).
2.1.1.1 The semiotic approach
One of the frameworks of analysis proposed by Bueger (2015) is the semiotic approach,
which focuses on the relationships between concepts. This approach is based on the idea
that the meaning of a term can be discovered by exploring how it relates to other terms.
That is, concepts take on relational meaning through their similarities and differences.
6
According to Germond (2015), “Before the end of the Cold War it was rarely used and primarily in reference
to sea control over maritime areas in the context of the superpower confrontation, that is to say in a
naval context” (p. 138).
7
Such as Klein (2011), who believes that maritime security includes the protection of a territory’s
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from illegal acts that occur at sea, or Feldt et al. (2013),
for whom maritime security is “the combination of preventive and responsive measures to protect the
maritime domain against threats and intentional unlawful acts” (p. 2).
8
Including Till (2009), who argues that “The importance of this ‘good order’, and the corresponding threats
of disorder, are such that navies around the world are focusing much more on their role in helping to
preserve it” (p. 286), and Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), who see maritime security as “a stable order of
the oceans subject to the rule of law at sea” (p. 1).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
316
To explore the concept of maritime security, Bueger (2015) created a matrix with four
concepts – seapower
9
, marine safety, resilience and blue economy –, each pointing to a
different dimension of maritime security (national security, the marine environment,
human security and economic development). The semiotic approach implies that, to
understand the meaning that the different actors ascribe to maritime security, one must
analyse the relationships between the four concepts.
2.1.1.2 The securitisation approach
The second framework of analysis is securitisation, a theory proposed by Buzan et al.
(1998), who defined it as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of
the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (p.
23). In a spectrum that represents the degree to which the state is involved in resolving
public issues, the issues at one end of the spectrum are non-politicised, that is, they are
not a part of public debate, and the state does not make decisions about them (it simply
does not deal with them). Issues can also be politicised, which means that the
government analyses them, makes decisions about them and allocates resources to
address them. At the other end of the spectrum are securitised issues, that is, issues
that are presented as existential threats which require emergency measures and justify
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998).
2.1.1.3 The security practice theory approach
The third framework of analysis focuses on the concrete actions of the actors involved in
maritime security. That is, what type of activities are involved when actors say they are
producing maritime security? Bueger (2015) called it an “understanding of security
politics in which practice, understood as organised patterns of doing and sayings, is the
central unit of analysis” (p. 162). This approach is similar to the securitisation approach
inasmuch as it deals with the implementation of measures that can result from the
securitisation of issues that have been deemed existential. There is a broad range of
practices involved in maritime security, more specifically in what has become known as
maritime situational awareness
10
. Security practices include a wide range of tasks that
are carried out at sea, such as maritime patrolling, area interdictions, searches of vessels
9
In the words of Mahan (1890), who coined this concept in the 19th century, “The history of Sea Power is
largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of
violence frequently culminating in war” (p. 1). However, the concept has evolved significantly during the
20th century. Till (1984) listed the sources and elements of a state’s sea power. The sources are: its
maritime community; its resources; its style of government; and its geography. The elements are:
merchant shipping; logistical bases, and; the military instrument (p. 13). In 2009, Till introduced a new
approach to the concept, in which seapower (now a single word) was something that maritime powers
possessed and that should be seen as both an input and an output. The input included navies, coastguards
and the shipbuilding and ship repair industries. The output referred to the ability to influence the
behaviour of others through their actions at sea (or from the sea) (p. 21).
10
The term is based on the fact that knowing exactly what activities are taking place at sea is vital for
maritime security. It involves a broad range of surveillance and information-sharing capabilities, including
intelligence-gathering systems – such as the Automatic Identification System – to monitor ship
movements and active surveillance through naval patrolling, aerial reconnaissance, satellite imagery and
coastal radar systems (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017, p. 1303).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
317
when there are strong suspicions of illicit practices, naval exercises and law enforcement
activities at sea – such as arrests, the transfer of suspects, prosecution, trials and
convictions. Finally, this includes coordination activities at different levels (Bueger,
2015).
2.1.1.4 The good order at sea approach
The last framework of analysis focuses on good order at sea as a requirement for the
maritime security of a given area. According to Vreÿ (2010) “The approach of good order
at sea highlights the importance and utility of safe and secure access to what the oceans
offer countries and the global community at large” (p. 122). For Till (2009), good order
at sea consists of a series of attributes – which include the good order that must exist on
land and the sea as a source of resources, as a means of transport and as an area of
domination – as well as a broad range of threats. And the sea has such relevance that
the responsibilities of the authorities and security organisations must include its
protection.
2.2 The securitisation of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
This subchapter analyses the ongoing process to securitise piracy in the GoG – the most
relevant threat to maritime security in those waters in the 21st century – and explores
the role that ZOPACAS may play in this process.
2.2.1 Securitisation theory
The discussion that took place after the Cold War regarding the content and priorities of
security and defence policies led to the recognition that there was a need to analyse the
process by which threats were constructed and issues were added to the security agenda
(Bueger, 2015). During this period, new frameworks of analysis emerged in the field of
security studies, which had, until then, focused almost exclusively on the military
instrument and on states. Buzan et al. (1998) – the main proponents of the Copenhagen
School
11
–, created a new framework to analyse the character of security dynamics across
five different sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. This
framework rejected the traditional approach, in which security was only applicable to one
of those sectors, and argued that security was a particular type of politics applicable to
a wide range of issues. Furthermore, it provided a constructivist operational method of
distinguishing the process of securitisation from politicisation to understand who could
securitise what and under what conditions (Buzan et al., 1998).
11
Mcsweeney (1996) described the publication of Barry Buzan’s book People, States and Fears in 1983 as
marking the beginning of a new field of security studies. Not long after, in 1985, the establishment of the
Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen triggered a period of intense exploration of the
problem of security, and several works on the subject were published that were sufficiently interrelated
to be dubbed “the ‘Copenhagen school’ of security studies” (Mcsweeney, 1996, p. 81). The work produced
by the Copenhagen School put innovative concepts and ideas into practice, including that of
“securitisation” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 480).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
318
Thus, the first step is to define what makes an event a security issue in international
relations. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 21) argue that “The answer to what makes something
an international security issue can be found in the traditional military-political
understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival”. And that happens
“when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent
object”. Therefore, “The special nature of security threats justifies the use of
extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). As for what distinguishes securitisation
from politicisation, these theorists assert that “Securitization can [...] be seen as a more
extreme version of politicization” (in the latter, the issue is part of public policy and
requires a decision by the government and the allocation of resources (p. 23). But the
fact that politicisation and securitisation are related does not imply that securitisation is
always carried out by the state, as it can be done through other forums. According to
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 24), “other social entities [may] raise an issue to the level of
general consideration or even to the status of sanctioned urgency among themselves”.
That is, when a securitising agent (which may or may not be the state) describes a threat
as existential, removing the issue from the sphere of normal politics, we are dealing with
a case of securitisation. Therefore, the most salient feature of securitisation is “a specific
rhetorical structure (survival, priority of action “because if the problem is not dealt with
now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure”)” (Buzan et al., 1998,
p. 26). The key concepts of this theory are “the securitising actor” (who frames an issue
as a threat through a securitising move), “the referent subject” (the entity posing the
threat), “the referent object” (the entity being threatened), “the audience” (who must
agree to confer an intersubjective status to the threat), “the context and the adoption of
distinctive policies” (which may or may not be exceptional) (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 495).
2.2.2 The process of securitising piracy in the GoG
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has always asserted that piracy (and armed
robbery at sea against ships) was a regional issue that should dealt with by coastal states
and by the African regional organisations of the GoG. This would require an integrated
response by states which involved the creation of laws and regulations to criminalise
piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships; and the development of a regional
framework for combating these threats, including information-sharing and coordination
mechanisms in the region (UNSC, 2011). The following year, the UNSC reiterated that
the GoG states had the primary responsibility to combat piracy and armed robbery at
sea against ships in the region (UNSC, 2012).
On the other hand, both threats have been on the IMO’s agenda since the 1980s. The
IMO currently has 88 international non-governmental organisations with consultative
member status, including major international maritime transport and trade associations
and organisations
12
(IMO, 2019). It would be only natural that these important entities
would influence the policies adopted by the IMO. However, almost all the resolutions
issued by this organisation during the 21st century have either served to implement
12
Such as the Baltic and International Maritime Council, the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
or the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, among many other organisations.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
319
general codes of conduct or were only approved for the Horn of Africa region. Therefore,
the IMO’s contribution to the securitising of piracy in the GoG has fallen short of
expectations, especially when compared to its decisive role in securitising piracy in the
Horn of Africa.
On the other hand, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
13
has been an important
securitising agent in combating the threat of piracy in the GoG by highlighting the attacks
that occur in those spaces and publishing reports on how the phenomenon is evolving.
Thus, it can be inferred that political decision makers do not see the problem of piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships in the GoG as an existential threat, and as such
have not felt the need to implement any emergency measures, including the use of the
military in operations to contain these threats.
2.2.3 The role of ZOPACAS
As shown in the previous subchapters, various securitising agents have endeavoured to
securitise piracy in the GoG during the 21st century. What is still lacking is a discourse
that clearly presents piracy in the region as an existential threat to important referent
objects, including international shipping, freedom of navigation, the safety of the crews
of merchant ships travelling through the region and all those who use the sea lawfully,
especially fishers. According to Buzan et al. (1998):
A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential
threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization—this is a
securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience
accepts it as such (p. 25).
In this sense, audiences have not been receptive to the arguments presented by
securitising actors. Furthermore, ZOPACAS is not even included in the range of actors
that have made the most significant efforts to present the problem of piracy in the GoG
in the 21st century as more important than other issues, and as such should be given
absolute priority. First, because in the first 23 years of this century there were only three
ministerial meetings of its member states, which is itself an indication of their lack of
commitment to the goals of this multinational partnership. On the other hand, the fact
that piracy in the GoG poses a threat to the maritime security of the entire region was
not addressed in all meetings. In fact, in the sixth ministerial summit of ZOPACAS
member states – the first in the 21st century –, maritime security issues in the South
Atlantic were barely mentioned, and the final declaration and action plan focused on the
need to revitalise the organisation and called for a reform of the UNSC to “give more
representation to developing countries” (Caldas, 2013, p. 14). Paragraph 108 of the
declaration of the 7th ministerial meeting (UNGA, 2013) held in January 2013 in
13
A specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce established in 1981 to act as a focal
point in the fight against all types of maritime crime. One of the IMB's main areas of activity is the
repression of piracy.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
320
Montevideo, Uruguay, states that the ZOPACAS signatory states: “Express concern at the
threat that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to the international
navigation, maritime security and economic development of States in the region, and
recognize the leadership role that the States in the Zone should play in this regard and
the need for a regional coordination of efforts to counter activities of piracy and armed
robbery at sea” (p. 15).
On the other hand, paragraph 110 of the declaration (2013) reads: “Urge international
partners to assist States and organizations in the region to enhance their capabilities to
counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including their capacity
to conduct regional patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint
information-sharing centres, and in the effective implementation of the regional strategy,
once adopted, as mandated in United Nations Security Council resolutions 2018 (2011)
and 2039 (2012)” (p. 15).
However, after this, there was another long period without ministerial meetings, and it
was only in 2021 that a new effort to revitalise the multinational partnership was
spearheaded by Brazil at the United Nations (Governo do Brasil, 2023a). As a result of
this initiative, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution A/RES/75/312 on
5 August 2021, which highlighted the role of ZOPACAS as a forum of interaction,
coordination and cooperation between its members and encouraged them to hold
ministerial meetings every two years, as well as to create a follow-up mechanism (UNGA,
2021). At the 8th ministerial meeting held in Mindelo, Cape Verde, in April 2023, the
member states “reaffirmed [their] determination [...] to prevent and eliminate piracy, in
particular [...] in the states located on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, in compliance with
international law” (Governo do Brasil, 2023b, p. 9). The action plan outlined at the
Mindelo ministerial meeting includes a critical task related to maritime security
cooperation, which consists of “strengthening cooperation efforts to prevent and repress
piracy, armed robbery against ships and illegal maritime activities and to protect critical
[maritime] infrastructure” (Governo do Brasil, 2023d, p. 12).
This shows that, for several years during this century, ZOPACAS played a limited role in
the process of securitising piracy in the GoG region. However, the visible efforts to
revitalise the organisation (led by Brazil) since 2021 – which led the organisation to hold
its eighth ministerial meeting in Mindelo in 2023 – and Brazil’s offer to host the ninth
meeting means that the organisation could be more committed to address the maritime
security issues in the GoG and to contribute to the securitisation of piracy in that region.
2.1 Security practices in the Gulf of Guinea
This subchapter addresses the most relevant (maritime) security practices that have
been implemented in the GoG in the 21st century, and explores ZOPACAS’ role as a
maritime security community with the capacity to become a key agent in containing the
threat of piracy in the region.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
321
2.3.1 Security practice theory
Security practice theory definitely entered the international relations lexicon after the
Cold War, as the most advanced theories about practice as a concept were developed in
the early 1990s with the introduction of constructivist ideas. In general terms, this theory
is based on the idea that an actor (in international relations) observes the practices of
other actors regarding a particular social phenomenon, speaks and reflects (about them)
and is able to participate in them. The aim is not only to provide an abstract explanation
of social phenomena, but to understand how the world works through these practices
(Bueger & Gadinger, 2014).
In addition, after the Cold War, Booth (1994) asserted that “Security is concerned with
how people live” (p. 19). For Booth, both theory and practice were politically relevant.
He argued that security studies could benefit from a variety of approaches, as long as
the focus was on people and the problems they faced on a daily basis. In essence, in
Booth’s words, “thinking about thinking is important, but so is thinking about doing”
(Booth, 1994, p. 19).
Therefore, security practice theory – now applied to the maritime domain – aims to
understand “What kind of activities are conducted when actors say that they are doing
maritime security” (Bueger, 2015, p. 162). This theory is also related to the framework
of analysis discussed in the previous chapter – securitisation –, as some of the
(emergency) measures that were implemented may stem from the process of securitising
a specific threat to a given referent object in a concrete space. According to Bueger and
Stockbruegger (2013, p. 102): “A successful securitization is organized by three
elements: an issue which is accepted as threat, a collective whose survival is threatened
by the issue, and a script for action followed by the actors of the collective or those
representing it”.
Considering the emphasis that is usually given to the representation of threats and the
use of language, the theory has focused on understanding the processes by which issues
are framed and accepted as threats and on the identity of the communities that are built
when something is presented as a threat – both of which are related to the first two
elements listed by Bueger and Stockbruegger. As a result, there is less (academic)
interest in analysing issues related to the activities that actors engage in when following
the scripts involved in successful securitisation processes (which constitute the third
element presented by Bueger and Stockbruegger). However, these authors argue that
the gap is being filled by academics who follow “practice theory”. This approach “takes
patterns of actions (practice) as the basic unit of analysis and sees questions of threat
construction and identity formation (representation) as a secondary aspect of practice”
(Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2013, p. 103). Briefly, securitisation deals with how security
“is constructed” and security practice theory examines how security “is practised”
(Krause & Williams, 2007, p. 137).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
322
2.3.2 Security practices implemented in the GoG
Several actors have implemented maritime security practices in the GoG in this century.
The role of the European Union (EU) – perhaps one of the most relevant regional
organisations involved in this process in the region – has been particularly important. It
has launched several programmes to develop the legislation, promote information
sharing, provide training and support capability building. Some of the most relevant are
the Critical Maritime Routes Monitoring, Support and Evaluation Mechanism, which
provides information, monitoring, policy analysis and expert recommendations for
projects covered by this general programme; the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network,
which supports the creation and development of the regional information-sharing
network known as the Yaoundé Architecture
14
; the Support to West Africa Integrated
Maritime Security, which aims to support the implementation of the Integrated Maritime
Strategy of The Economic Community of West African States and improve law
enforcement in GoG; the Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central
Africa, which aims to strengthen the institutional, legal and operational framework for
cross-border maritime cooperation in Central Africa; the Improved Regional Fisheries
Governance in Western Africa, which aims to enhance the regional contribution to the
sustainable use and management of fisheries resources; and the West and Central Africa
Port Security, which aims to improve port security in West and Central African countries
(European External Action Service [EEAS], 2021). Other important programmes include
the Coordinated Maritime Presences project implemented in January 2021, which aims
to strengthen the coordination of the EU’s activities in the GoG, and specifically to
improve maritime situational awareness
15
and cooperation at sea through the naval
capabilities of EU member states in the region (EEAS, 2024).
On the other hand, several programmes to support maritime capability building have
been implemented and are ongoing in the GoG, involving multilateral exercises and
information sharing. Obangame Express
16
, an annual naval aviation exercise sponsored
by the US Africa Command, is one of the most important. It is designed to improve
regional cooperation in support of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and provide maritime
domain awareness, information sharing between the maritime operations centres in the
GoG and maritime interdiction, as well as increase capabilities to counter crimes at sea
in order to strengthen safety and security in the GoG (Defense Visual Information
Distribution Service, 2024). Grand African NEMO is another large-scale exercise
conducted by the French navy since 2018 in the waters of the GoG. The fourth edition
took place in 2022 and its aim was to share knowledge and improve the operational skills
of participants in the fight against illegal fishing, piracy, maritime pollution, illegal
14
Intra-regional commitment to combat maritime crime in the GoG region signed by the Economic
Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Gulf of
Guinea Commission during the Yaoundé Summit of Heads of State in June 2013 (European External Action
Service, 2021).
15
Which consists of the fusion of data required to produce a robust depiction of maritime areas and provide
relevant intelligence to identify trends in threats, as well as areas of concern for all those who use the
sea lawfully (Alexandre, 2022).
16
The largest multinational maritime exercise in West and Central Africa (United States Africa Command,
2023). The 12th edition was held in 2023 and 19 of the 29 participating nations were also members of
ZOPACAS.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
323
trafficking and rescue at sea. About forty naval units and five aircraft were used in Grand
African NEMO 2022 (Naval News, 2022). Seventeen of the 19 GoG countries and Brazil
as a guest nation (a total of 18 ZOPACAS member countries) participated in the exercise.
In October 2023, the French Navy organised Grand African NEMO 2023, under the
auspices of the Yaoundé Architecture. Eighteen GoG nations and 10 partner nations
participated in the exercise, which covered a vast area of the ocean from Senegal to
Angola (Ministère des Armées, 2023). Once again, a significant number of ZOPACAS
member states were present at this edition.
2.3.3 ZOPACAS’ efforts to improve security practices in the GoG
As shown above, ZOPACAS has been mostly absent from the initiatives to strengthen
security in those areas of the ocean developed by various actors – both from the GoG
region and others. Most African states that are members of the organisation (such as
Brazil) have been involved in different maritime security practices over the last years,
both autonomously and integrated in partnerships, showing that these states are greatly
concerned about security in the GoG. However, they have not done so through the
organisation to which they belong – ZOPACAS –, which was set up to maintain the
security of the entire South Atlantic (which includes the GoG).
This suggests that ZOPACAS member states are convinced that they will be better
equipped to respond to the maritime security challenges posed by threats such as piracy
and armed robbery at sea against ships if they do so outside the organisation. This has
been largely due to the irregular manner in which ZOPACAS has been operating.
To identify what role ZOPACAS could actually play in terms of implementing maritime
security practices in the GoG region, two decisive factors should be considered: the
collective identity of its member states – which is linked to their colonial legacy; and a
common ideal – the maintenance of peace in the vast maritime space (the South Atlantic)
that unites them. However, this project will require an unequivocal leader. And, in this
regard, Brazil – which spearheaded the creation of ZOPACAS – is a key player for the
very survival of the organisation. Therefore, ZOPACAS must be revitalised, as Brazil will
obtain (other) important benefits from it, such as the opportunity to affirm itself as a
relevant regional actor and to increase its influence in a maritime space where extra-
regional actors are increasingly present – China being the most recent (Edwards, 2021).
The boost that President Lula da Silva has sought to lend the organisation during his
current term of office reflects Brazil’s renewed interest in revitalising ZOPACAS, and could
even change the status quo by making it the main forum of cooperation in the field of
security between the South American countries and West African coastal countries.
However, other member states such as South Africa and Argentina (which are fellow G20
members and have well-equipped armed forces) or Nigeria and Angola (African regional
powers with large oil and natural gas reserves) and Uruguay (which makes a significant
contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations) also play a relevant role
(Edwards, 2021). Some of the maritime security practices that ZOPACAS could
implement in the near future in the GoG region will not be possible without the support
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
324
of these states. Those practices include the commitment of military naval capabilities to
surveillance missions in the waters of the GoG and the collection, fusion and sharing of
maritime information, and supporting the law enforcement agencies of the coastal states
of the GoG in building their maritime capabilities.
Conclusion
After years during which it was practically absent from Brazil’s foreign policy, ZOPACAS
has been given a much higher priority since early 2023 – influenced by President Lula da
Silva –, and is poised to become a key initiative in strengthening Brazil’s foreign policy
by making the country a key actor in South Atlantic geopolitics.
The security of an area of the ocean can be studied using different frameworks of analysis
that approach it from different perspectives: from semiotics (in which the meaning of a
concept can be derived by exploring its relationships with other concepts) to good order
at sea (which focuses on the importance of the sea as a source of resources, a means of
transport and an area of domination), securitisation theories (in which threats to the
security of a referent object are presented as existential and require exceptional
measures by decision makers) and security practice theory (which focuses on the specific
activities of the actors involved in the maritime security of a region).
This article examined ZOPACAS’ role in increasing maritime security in the GoG using
two of the analysis frameworks presented above: the securitisation of the threats in that
region of the South Atlantic (piracy in particular); and the security practices that have
been implemented there.
During most of the 21st century, ZOPACAS has not played an active role in the
securitisation of piracy in the GoG. However, it could be considerably more involved in
the short term, not only because the process to securitise piracy in the GoG is far from
consolidated, but also due to Brazil’s ongoing efforts to revitalise the organisation. But
for this to happen, ZOPACAS must adopt a discourse that presents piracy as an existential
threat to all those who use the GoG waters lawfully, as this will allow it to contribute to
a securitising movement that brings the issue to the audiences that must accept it for it
to become securitised.
Brazil also plays an instrumental role in the security practices that ZOPACAS could
implement in the GoG, as most of the organisation’s African member states, with a few
exceptions (such as Nigeria and South Africa), generally lack naval capabilities to deploy
in maritime security operations to combat the threats in the GoG. This means that not
only must Brazil be able to deploy naval capabilities in the GoG more often (and over
longer periods), it must persuade its African partners (especially Nigeria and South
Africa) to create a multinational task force capable of addressing the security challenges
in the region through maritime surveillance missions and the collection, fusion and
sharing of relevant operational information and by supporting the law enforcement
agencies of African coastal states in building their maritime capabilities.
The study’s research question has thus been answered: ZOPACAS can play a relevant
role in improving maritime security in the GoG by contributing to the securitisation of the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
325
most important threat in those waters (piracy) and by adopting concrete security
practices to address the challenges currently facing the region.
In terms of limitations to this research, some difficulty was identified in accessing
information from certain ZOPACAS member states, particularly African states, in order
to better understand their future commitment to the organisation.
Due to the fact that in this article only the securitisation and security practice theories
were used to analyse the research question, it seems appropriate to propose approaching
this issue using different frameworks of analysis, namely the building of good order at
sea in the Gulf of Guinea region.
References
Alexandre, A. G. (2022). Segurança Marítima no Corno de África: O Papel do Instrumento
Militar (2008-2016) (Coleção “ARES”, 38 ed.). Lisboa: Instituto Universitário Militar.
Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). ‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases.
International Relations Vol. 30(4), 494-531.
Booth, K. (1994). Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist. YCISS Occasional
Paper Number 26, pp. 1-26.
Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy 53, pp. 159-164.
Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2017). International Affairs 93: 6. Beyond seablindness: a
new agenda for maritime security studies, pp. 1293-1311.
Bueger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2014). International Practice Theory: New Perspectives.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Masmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137395535.0003
Bueger, C., & Stockbruegger, J. (2013). Security Communities, Alliances and
Macrosecuritization: the Practices ofCounter-Piracy Governance. Em M. J. Struett, J. D.
Carlson, & M. T. Nance, Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance (pp.
99-124). London: Routledge.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Caldas, A. d. (2013). A ZOPACAS e o Brasil: o discurso e as práticas brasileiras na
iniciativa de paz e cooperação do Atlântico Sul. Brasília. Retrieved 3 April, 2024, from
https://bdm.unb.br/bitstream/10483/7908/1/2013_AdersondeOliveiraCaldas.pdf
Council of the European Union. (2014). EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea. Retrieved 25
January, 2024, from
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_strategy_on_the_gulf_of_guinea_7.
pdf
Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. (2024). OBANGAME EXPRESS 2024.
Retrieved 12 April, 2024, from
https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/ObangameExpress2024
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
326
Edwards, M. (2021). The ZOPACAS: a return to prominence? Retrieved 16 April, 2024,
from https://www.ideology-theory-practice.org/blog/the-zopacas-a-return-to-
prominence
EEAS. (2021). EU Maritime Security Factsheet: The Gulf of Guinea. Retrieved 11 April,
2024, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-
guinea_en
EEAS. (2024). Coordinated Maritime Presences. Retrieved 11 April, 2024, from
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/coordinated-maritime-presences_en
Feldt, L., Roell, P., & Thiele, R. (2013). Maritime Security – Perspectives for a
Comprehensive Approach. ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International
Security, pp. 1-25.
Germond, B. (2015). The geopolitical dimension of maritime security. Marine Policy 54,
137-142.
Governo de Cabo Verde. (2023). Cabo Verde assume presidência da Zona de Paz e
Cooperação do Atlântico Sul na reunião Ministerial de Mindelo. Retrieved 15 March, 2024,
from https://www.governo.cv/cabo-verde-assume-presidencia-da-zona-de-paz-e-
cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-na-reuniao-ministerial-de-mindelo/
Governo do Brasil. (2020). Estratégia Nacional de Defesa. Retrived 15 March, 2024, from
https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/copy_of_estado-e-
defesa/pnd_end_congresso_.pdf
Governo do Brasil. (2023a). Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul (ZOPACAS).
Retrieved 9 March, 2024, from https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-
internacionais/foruns-internacionais-1/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-
zopacas
Governo do Brasil. (2023b). Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Zone of Peace and
Cooperation of the South Atlantic. Retrieved 3 April, 2024, from
https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-internacionais/foruns-
internacionais-1/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas/arquivos/mindelo-
declaration-final-version.pdf
Governo do Brasil. (2023c). Participação do Ministro Mauro Vieira na VIII Reunião
Ministerial da ZOPACAS – 18 de abril. Retrieved 18 March, 2024, from
https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-
imprensa/participacao-do-ministro-mauro-vieira-na-viii-reuniao-ministerial-da-zopacas-
2013-18-de-abril
Governo do Brasil. (2023d). MINDELO PLAN OF ACTION. Retrieved 18 March, 2024, from
https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-internacionais/foruns-
internacionais-1/zona-de-paz-e-cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-zopacas/arquivos/mindelo-
plan-of-action-2023-traducao-portugues.pdf
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
327
Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a
Security Studies Agenda in Europe. European Journal of International Relations 1998 4,
pp. 479-505. doi:10.1177/1354066198004004004
IMO. (2009). Resolution A.1025(26) - Code of Practice for The Investigation of Crimes of
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. London.
IMO. (2019). Introduction to IMO. Retrieved 25 March, 2024, from
https://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx
Klein, N. (2011). Maritime Security and The Law of The Sea. New York: Oxford University
Press .
Kraska, J., & Pedrozo, R. (2013). International maritime security law. Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publisher.
Krause, K., & Williams, M. C. (2007). Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics
and Methods. Em B. Buzan, & L. Hansen, International Security. Volume III - Widening
Security (pp. 135-165). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Mahan, A. T. (1890). The Influence of Sea Power Upon Histroty, 1660-1783. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company.
Marinha do Brasil. (2020). Plano Estratégico da Marinha (PEM 2040). Retrieved 15 March,
2024, from https://www.marinha.mil.br/sites/all/modules/pub_pem_2040/book.html
Marinha do Brasil. (2023a). Países integrantes da Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico
Sul retomam trabalhos. Retrieved 9 March, 2024, from
https://www.marinha.mil.br/agenciadenoticias/paises-integrantes-da-zona-de-paz-e-
cooperacao-do-atlantico-sul-retomam-trabalhos
Marinha do Brasil. (2023b). Conexão Brasil-África: saiba como a Marinha contribui para
o desenvolvimento do Atlântico Sul. Retrieved 15 March, 2024, from
https://www.marinha.mil.br/agenciadenoticias/conexao-brasil-africa-saiba-como-
marinha-contribui-para-o-desenvolvimento-do
Mcsweeney, B. (1996). Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school. Review
of International Studies, 22, pp. 81-93.
Ministère des Armées. (2023). Golfe de Guinée - Bilan de l’exercice GRAND AFRICAN
NEMO 2023. Retrieved 12 April, 2024, from
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/golfe-guinee-bilan-lexercice-grand-
african-nemo-2023
Naval News. (2022). Grand African NEMO 2022 Exercise Kicks Off. Retrieved 12 April,
2024, from https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/grand-african-nemo-
2022-exercise-kicks-off/
Till, G. (1984). Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (Second ed.). London: Macmillan
Academic and Professional Ltd.
Till, G. (2009). Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Second Edition ed.).
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 309-328
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of The South Atlantic: A Contribution to Maritime
Security in The Gulf of Guinea
António Gonçalves Alexandre
328
UNCLOS. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Retrieved 29
November, 2023, from
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
UNGA. (1986). Declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic.
Retrieved 9 March, 2024, from
https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/495/19/img/nr049519.pdf?token=VP
7BaJ0IdSj0rAJFC0&fe=true
UNGA. (2013). Resolution A/67/746. Retrieved 3 April, 2024, from
UNGA. (2021). Resolution A/RES/75/312. Retrieved 3 April, 2024, from
https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n21/212/58/pdf/n2121258.pdf?token=m2V6
eDPGInTFghc5bV&fe=true
United States Africa Command. (2023). Obangame Express. Retrieved 12 April, 2024,
from https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/obangame-express
UNSC. (2011). United Nations Security Council Resolution 2018 - S/RES/2018 (2011).
New York: United Nations Security Council.
UNSC. (2012). United Nations Security Council Resolution 2039 - S/RES/2039 (2012).
New York: United Nations Security Council.
Vreÿ, F. (2010). African Maritime Security: a time for good order at sea. Australian
Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 2:4, pp. 121-132.
doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/18366503.2010.10815667
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
329
BRAZILIAN TIVA UNDER US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND IMPACT
ON EXPORT-RELATED JOBS (2000-2015)
ALBERTO J. LEBRÓN VEIGA
alebronchina@yahoo.com
Ph.D. in International Political Economics, Peking University (China) and a MA degree in Chinese
Economic Structure (Renmin University of China). His latest publications include: “西欧去工业化的
发展与影响研究: 贸易增加值与民粹主义崛起之间关系的探索” (Development and Impact of
Deindustrialization in Western European Union: Trade in Value Added and the Rise of Political
Populism). CNKI, Peking University, 2023, 1-209
(https://www.lib.pku.edu.cn/jsym/index.htm?keyword=西欧去工业化的发展与影响研究:%20贸易增加
值与民粹主义崛起之间关系的探索), “Transición del Eje Tradicional Euroatlántico al Nuevo Modelo
Euroasiático en las Cadenas Globales de Valor (1998 - 2018)”. Casus Belli, Universidad Nacional
de la Defensa (Buenos Aires - Argentina), no. 3, 2022, 73-87
(https://fe.undef.edu.ar/publicaciones/ojs3/index.php/casusbelli/article/download/51/81) y
“Political Economy of China and US Value Chains in Latin America”. Journal of Business,
Universidad del Pacífico (Lima - Peru) 14, no. 1, 2023, 87-107.
https://doi.org/10.21678/jb.2022.2031.
CARLOS M. MARTIN
2172251@ucc.edu.ar
International Relations Ph.D. candidate at Universidad Católica de Cordoba (Argentina), a
researcher at Centro de Estudios La Franja y la Ruta from Universidad Católica de Cordoba, and
the founder of Hasiapacifico, a consulting company based in the People’s Republic of China and
the Macau Special Administrative Region since 2020. Carlos M. Martin has a bachelor’s degree in
Business and Administration, a Master’s degree in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking,
and a Master’s degree in Strategic Studies and International Security.
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9501-2028.
Abstract
Domestic discussion in Brazil about its most suitable commercial partners to promote
economic development, through deeper and broader integration onto the Global Value Chain
(GVC), is a subject with divergent political narratives. Therefore, empirical evidence is crucial
to complement those political considerations with a comprehensive scientific approach on the
available sets of optimal choices for Brazil under great power strategic competition between
China and US. Even though increasing volumes of Trade-in-Value-Added (TiVA) can boost
both exports and GDP growth rates, long-term effects on labor market conditions in Brazil are
linked to variables such as industrial value-added, domestic production, vertical integration,
technological transfers and capital-labor ratios (K/L). Within the period 2000-2015, Brazilian
TiVA exchanges with China did grow at a much faster rate than those of US, thus becoming
the world second largest partner for Brazil. Through this chapter, therefore, we will measure
overall effects of TiVA exchanges with both China and US on Brazilian labor market. And will
also determine which countries/industries might become the most optimal choice for Brazil in
terms of TiVA.
Keywords
Trade in Value Added, GVC, Brazil, Great Power Politics, China, US.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
330
Resumo
A discussão interna no Brasil sobre os seus parceiros comerciais mais adequados para
promover o desenvolvimento económico, através de uma integração mais profunda e ampla
na Cadeia Global de Valor (CGV), é um assunto com narrativas políticas divergentes. Por
conseguinte, a evidência empírica é crucial para complementar estas considerações políticas
com uma abordagem científica abrangente sobre os conjuntos disponíveis de escolhas óptimas
para o Brasil sob competição estratégica de grandes potências entre a China e os EUA. Embora
o volume crescente de comércio de valor acrescentado (TiVA) possa impulsionar as
exportações e as taxas de crescimento do PIB, os efeitos a longo prazo nas condições do
mercado de trabalho no Brasil estão ligados a variáveis como o valor acrescentado industrial,
a produção interna, integração vertical, transferências tecnológicas e relações capital-trabalho
(K/L). No período 2000-2015, as trocas brasileiras de TiVA com a China cresceram a um ritmo
muito mais rápido do que as dos EUA, tornando-se assim o segundo maior parceiro mundial
do Brasil. Neste capítulo, iremos, portanto, medir os efeitos globais das trocas de TiVA com a
China e os EUA no mercado de trabalho brasileiro. Para além disso, este artigo também
determinará quais os países/indústrias que se podem tornar a escolha ideal para o Brasil em
termos de TiVA.
Palavras-chave
Comércio de valor acrescentado, Cadeia Global de Valor, Brasil, Política de Grandes Potências,
China, EUA.
How to cite this article
Veiga, Alberto J. Lebrón & Martin, Carlos M. (2024). Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic
Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs (2000-2015). Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern
International Order”. December 2024, pp. 329-353. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0324.16.
Article received on 4 January 2024 and accepted for publication on 09 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
331
BRAZILIAN TIVA UNDER US-CHINA STRATEGIC COMPETITION
AND IMPACT ON EXPORT-RELATED JOBS (2000-2015)
ALBERTO J. LEBRÓN VEIGA
CARLOS M. MARTIN
1. Introduction
This paper will estimate Brazilian TiVA exchanges with both US and China, within the
GVC, to measure their overall impact on Brazilian export-related jobs. We aim at
theorizing whether Brazil should further deepen its commercial ties with either China, US
or both; under conditions of great power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001). Bilateral TiVA
exchanges and their impact on export-related jobs, therefore, will be determinant to
assess potential optimal choices for commercial policies in Brazil when considering the
period 2000-2015.
Section 2 in this chapter will introduce a theoretical framework about optimal choices for
Brazilian commercial policies under conditions of aforementioned great power politics or
strategic competition between China and US. Several US scholars and politicians have
noted that Chinese economic engagement with the Western Hemisphere has significant
national security implications for their country (Ellis, 2005). It can be inferred, therefore,
that US has strong incentives to undermine Chinese commercial ties in Latin America
(including Brazil). However, an effective vertical integration with China has strengthened
the fundamentals for industrial development and long-term economic growth in countries
like Brazil, despite such “Chinese threat” to geostrategic interests of US. This creates a
dilemma in peripheral countries that must choose between maximizing their own
economic interests or those of US (Farrell & Newman, 2019; Vogelmann, 2020).
Section 3 will just introduce the data and related empirical evidence. Relevant variables,
from export-related jobs to TiVA magnitudes (such as Foreign Value Added -FVA- and
Indirect Value Added or DVX), will be estimated using standard input-output
computation. Interpretation of those numbers, i.e. how export-related jobs are correlated
to TiVA exchanges, will be shared in section 4. And a brief conclusion has also been
drafted in section 5.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
332
2. Theoretical framework of constraints for optimal choice in trade and
commercial policies under great power politics between China and US
The political economy of optimal choices in foreign trade policies can be analyzed from
two complementary perspectives. Academic discussion on how states interact within a
given international order, from either realist or liberal theoretical approaches, can provide
some basic understanding of policy making and strategic choices. This paper will assume
that specific economic considerations based on rational choices might pose conflicts with
hegemonic interests under conditions of great power politics between China and US.
Both realists and liberals do attach importance to the influence of great powers over a
given international order (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Even though realists have refused to
rule out international cooperation as a feasible option, it would never take place if actual
distribution of power is challenged (Grieco, 1990; Jervis, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001;
Snidal, 1991; Taliaferro, 2011). This is a reasonable assumption irrespective of recurrent
discussions about underlying reasons and different dimensions related to strategic
decision-making within countries (Buzan, 1995; Singer, 1961). Autonomy of a given
country within the international system will depend on geographical position, relative
power, resources endowment, foreign investments and technology transfers
dependence, among other variables (Lee & Thompson, 2022; Krasner, 1978). Therefore,
it can be deducted that not every country is free to pursue the materialization of its own
optimal choices, given external pressure and influence exerted from a superpower such
as US. In a nutshell, great powers can exert influence over other countries’ choices,
subordinating core interests of the latter to theirs (Beckley, 2018; Karen & William, 1994;
Taliaferro, 2004).
From an economic perspective, however, agents are expected to make optimal choices
based on rational considerations such as profit maximization. States are not an exception
and, among other spheres of action, will seek to remain competitive within the GVC. The
boom in international trade resulting from globalization has generated a gradual
geographic fragmentation of production processes. The GVC is based on “trade in tasks”
(Inomata, 2017; Xing & Detert, 2011; Xing, 2021). Since fragmentation of production
favors a drastic reduction in overall costs, increasing competitiveness has contributed to
greater trade volumes and economic growth rates (Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015,
Feenstra, 1998; Kwok, 2018). Several authors have also established a direct relationship
between domestic participation in the GVC and industrial development (Baldwin & Lopez-
Gonzalez, 2015; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Vrh, 2017). Main logic behind this
assertion is that further integration onto the GVC, either through forward (DVX) or
backward linkages (FVA), contributes to increase overall productivity (Dauth et al., 2014;
Donoso et al, 2015; Iodice & Tomasi, 2016; Lurweg & Westermeier.A., 2010; Kreutzer &
Berger, 2018). Choi et al. (2019), for instance, have provided empirical evidence that
innovation enables certain countries to improve their position within the GVC. So
industrial upgrading, which stems from sustained increases in productivity, can boost
both domestic value added and export-related jobs (Montalbano et al., 2018; Shimbov
et al., 2019).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
333
Main assumption of this paper, consistent with aforementioned literature and empirical
evidence, is that greater vertical integration onto the GVC can contribute to economic
development and create additional jobs in non-industrialized countries such as Brazil. A
virtuous circle of industrial development would require from backward linkages (FVA) to
promote a forward integration (DVX) onto the GVC. Then both variables would also result
in a positive impact on Brazilian domestic value added (DVA), overall gross exports
(EXGR) and export-related jobs (EMP).
Graph 1: Vertical integration, through backward and forward linkages, has a positive
impact on export-related jobs.
Source: Authors
Then should countries such as Brazil abandon their optimal choices in commercial
policies, interrupt its value chain integration with China and subordinate to the core
interests of hegemonic powers like US? Realists would answer in the affirmative. For
them, US-China strategic competition can be described as a battlefield which is not on
the sphere of direct confrontation but in other actors’ soil (Gill-Tiney, 2023; Treistman,
2017). Realist theorists, like John Mearsheimer (1994), warned almost three decades
ago that a wealthier China could increase its military capabilities and challenge the US-
led international order. According to realist theories like “Power Transition” or
“Hegemonic Stability”, a declining hegemon becomes more assertive as ascending
powers reduces their power gap (Feng, 2013; Gilpin, 1988). This will happen whenever
emerging powers, like China, were perceived as a threat against an international order
primarily conceived to benefit the hegemonic power (Mearsheimer, 2019; Nye, 2011).
Hence, US-China strategic competition can be depicted as a sole hegemonic power (US)
that has become more assertive against its main emerging rival (China), to prevent other
peripheral countries (Brazil) from being neutral or even deepening ties with the latter.
Such political restrictions, however, would come at the expense of efficient optimal
choices for commercial and trade policies in peripheral countries like Brazil.
FVA
DVX
DVAEXGR
EMP
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
334
The present paper, nonetheless, aims at offering some empirical evidence on potential
costs of subordinating national interests to foreign ones when pursuing non-optimal
choices in trade and commercial policies. A clear correlation between TiVA flows with
export-related jobs can help to determine some optimal choices for commercial policies
in Brazil which should not be dependent of hegemonic interests imposed from US.
3. Data and methodology
Correlations between Brazilian export-related jobs and TiVA flows have been derived from
standard Input-Output Tables (IOT). IOT are configured using Transactions (T), Value-
Added (VA) and Final Demand (FD) sets of matrixes from Eora26 MRIOT (Lenzen et al.,
2013)
1
. Here gross output (X) will be equal to the sum of intermediate consumption (T)
plus final demand (FD). Using matrix algebra notation this can be expressed as:
X = T + FD
(1)
Rearranging:
X = AX + FD
X = (I-A)-1 FD
X = L FD
(2)
Whereas X is the gross output matrix. FD is the matrix of goods that are used for final
demand (also noted as Y). A is the matrix of input-output coefficients obtained after
dividing T between X (T = AX). Thus (I-A)-1 will result in an inverse Leontief matrix
expressing the total output required both directly and indirectly to produce a unit of goods
for final demand (L).
1
The Eora26 MRIO database is available under license at www.worldmrio.com.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
335
Table 1: Basic scheme of a standard Multi-Regional Input Output Table (MRIOT)
Source: Authors
For a correct classification of industries, Brazilian IOT and EORA-26 have been
harmonized as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Classification of industries in Brazilian IOT and EORA26.
BRA IOT (Source: IBGE)
EORA26 (Source: EORA)
Agriculture and Forestry
Agriculture
Grazing and Fishing
Fishing
Crude Oil and Natural Gas
Mining and Quarrying
Iron Ore
Other Minerals and Ores
Food and Beverages
Food & Beverages
Tobacco Products
Textiles
Textiles and Wearing Apparel
Clothing
Leather and Footwear
Wood Products Except Furniture
Wood and Paper
Cellulose and Paper Products
Newspapers, Magazines and Electronic Publishing
Petroleum Refining and Coke Products
Petroleum, Chemical and Non-
Metallic Mineral Products
Alcohol
Chemical Products
Resins and Elastomers
Pharmaceutical Products
Pesticides
RoW BRAZIL CHINA USA RoW BRAZIL CHINA USA OUTPUT EXPORTS
INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIES FD AGG FD AGG FD AGG FD AGG X EXP
RoW INDUSTRIES AX(20x20)
Intermediate use
by Brazil of
exports from
RoW
AX(20x20) AX(20x20) RoW INDUSTRIES FD (20x6)
Final use by Brazil
of exports from
RoW
FD (20x6) FD (20x6)
BRAZIL INDUSTRIES
Intermediate use
by RoW of
exports from
Brazil
Intermediate use
of domestic
output X
Intermediate use
by China of
exports from
Brazil
Intermediate use
by USA of exports
from Brazil
BRAZIL INDUSTRIES
Final use by RoW
of exports from
Brazil
Final use of
domestic output
X
Final use by China
of exports from
Brazil
Final use by USA
of exports from
Brazil
CHINA INDUSTRIES AX(20x20)
Intermediate use
by Brazil of
exports from
China
AX(20x20) AX(20x20) CHINA INDUSTRIES FD (20x6)
Final use by Brazil
of exports from
China
FD (20x6) FD (20x6)
USA INDUSTRIES AX(20x20)
Intermediate use
by Brazil of
exports from USA
AX(20x20) AX(20x20) USA INDUSTRIES FD (20x6)
Final use by Brazil
of exports from
USA
FD (20x6) FD (20x6)
RoW BRAZIL CHINA USA
VA RoW VA BRA VA CHN VA USA
X = AX + Y
Exports are
calculated by
substracting
intermediate and
final use of
domestic output
to X
T MATRIX
VA MATRIX
PRIMARY INPUTS
OUTPUT
X = AX + VA
FD MATRIX
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
336
Soaps and Detergents
Inks, Varnishes, Enamels, Lacquers
Other Chemical Products
Rubber and Plastic Products
Cement and Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products
Manufacturing of Steel and Steel Alloys
Metal Products
Non-Ferrous Metals
Fabricated Metal Products Except Machines and Equipment
Machines and Equipment (including maintenance)
Electrical and Machinery
Household Appliances
Office Equipment
Electric Machines and Materials
Electronic and Communication Equipment
Medical and Optical Equipment
Passenger and Light Utility Vehicles, Trucks and Busses
Transport Equipment
Vehicle Parts
Other Transport Equipment
Furniture and Other Manufacturing
Other Manufacturing and Recycling
Electricity, Gas, Water, Sewerage and Drainage Services
Electricity, Gas and Water
Construction
Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Transport and Postal Services
Transport, Post and
Telecommunications
Information Services
Finance and Insurance
Financial Intermediation and
Business Activities
Property Services and Hiring
Business Services
Maintenance and Repair
Maintenance and Repair
Hotels and Restaurants
Hotels and Restaurants
Private Education
Education, Health and Other
Services
Private Health Services
Other Services
Public Education
Public Administration
Public Health Services
Public Administration and Social Security
EORA26 items have also been reduced from 26 to 20 following the standard classification
of IBGE for overall jobs in Brazil
2
.
2
As “Other Manufacturing”, “Recycling”, “Wholesale Trade”, “Retail Trade”, “Post and Telecommunications”,
“Transport”, “Education, Health and Other Services”, “Private Households” and “Others” have been
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
337
3.1 Brazilian export-related jobs by industry/country
First, as in Duran & Banacloche (2022), we have estimated overall employment
associated with Brazilian exports by industry/country of destination. Vector N* of
Brazilian workers by industry has been sourced from standard Supply-Use tables (SUT)
which are available at Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE)
3
.
The employment coefficient vector matrix is calculated as follows:
EC = N*x-1 = 󰇣


󰇤
(3)
Where N* is the labor factor of sector N. And Xn is the gross value of production of
sector N. Equation 4 plots the multiplier of EC:
MEC = 
(I – A)-1 =
   
   
   
   
(4)
Whereas lij comes from the Leontief inverse matrix or (I – A)-1. The matrix of technical
coefficients, which results from dividing transactions of intermediate inputs (Tij) between
the diagonalized and inverted gross value of production (xn), is labelled as the NxN matrix
of domestic technical coefficients A:
A = 
A =
   
   
   
   





A =
 
 
 
 
=
   
   
   
   
(5)
simplified to “Other Manufacturing and Recycling”, “Wholesale and Retail Trade” and “Education, Health
and Other Services”; while “Re-exports” are not considered for labor market comparisons, original
EORA26 IOT items were reduced to 20.
3
Available at https://www.ibge.gov.br/
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
338
The inverse Leontief matrix, therefore, has been derived from (5):
L = (I – A)-1
L =
   
   
   
   
(6)
Where I is the NxN identity matrix. Export-related jobs, then, will result from multiplying
corresponding Brazilian diagonalized exports by the MEC:
EMPexp = MEC ê
EMPexp =




(7)
A row sum results in the number of workers required from industry i to satisfy final
demand for exports by country (region).
Table 3: Export-related jobs by industries/countries (regions)
Source: Authors’s calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
CHN HKG MAC USA RoW CHN HKG MAC USA RoW
Agriculture 14.905 8.301 0.174 110.263 428.772 38.544 15.058 0.327 115.071 656.553
Fishing 0.836 20.544 0.058 425.326 170.078 3.094 15.436 0.053 259.168 147.476
Mining and Quarrying 7.137 0.394 0.001 8.684 23.698 42.012 0.744 0.004 14.237 60.124
Food & Beverages 1.054 2.869 0.065 20.273 81.911 8.881 7.472 0.168 29.541 190.647
Textiles and Wearing Apparel 2.506 2.524 0.023 227.049 188.034 13.302 4.663 0.045 200.327 290.803
Wood and Paper 2.396 1.302 0.007 77.287 108.096 11.514 1.902 0.012 79.222 153.370
Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 2.978 0.737 0.008 58.406 97.763 22.714 1.743 0.022 67.970 229.411
Metal Products 2.582 0.617 0.004 42.131 111.326 19.183 1.122 0.009 57.286 235.411
Electrical and Machinery 2.354 0.783 0.007 42.337 89.573 20.101 1.405 0.013 60.494 233.340
Transport Equipment 1.344 0.076 0.001 28.190 73.598 8.117 0.144 0.002 34.261 156.103
Other Manufacturing and recycling 0.424 0.056 0.001 36.682 41.683 2.195 0.082 0.002 32.588 64.181
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.919 0.183 0.002 8.624 19.757 6.997 0.387 0.005 11.702 44.410
Construction 2.131 1.010 0.002 8.202 31.989 15.519 1.982 0.005 8.139 63.674
Maintenance and Repair 0.994 0.952 0.008 28.076 51.530 6.303 1.950 0.018 29.492 101.804
Wholesale and Retail Trade 32.562 31.186 0.262 919.453 1687.537 178.112 55.092 0.508 833.398 2876.794
Hotels and Restraurants 1.690 0.320 0.012 7.499 111.052 15.134 0.763 0.041 12.222 266.710
Transport, Post and Telecommunications 12.332 2.119 0.031 97.881 271.836 101.779 4.911 0.087 144.664 719.580
Finacial Intermediation and Business Activities 7.915 1.394 0.018 60.736 183.837 76.312 3.644 0.058 99.966 521.602
Public Administration 0.016 0.114 0.001 0.020 4.662 0.132 0.169 0.001 0.019 8.535
Education, Health, Private Households and Other Services 5.212 1.025 0.016 31.283 130.882 32.910 1.868 0.039 34.106 277.334
Total 102.290 76.509 0.700 2238.402 3907.614 622.856 120.537 1.420 2123.875 7297.860
2000
2015
Unit: ˈ 000
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
339
Table 3 shows that Brazilian total export-related jobs by industry/country (region) have
almost doubled between 2000 and 2015.
3.2 Vertical integration “in” and “from” Brazil
Vertical integration has emerged as standard indicator for trade in value added (Duran &
Banacloche, 2022; Koopman et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2013). Vertical integration can be
estimated from TiVA data that has been derived in aforementioned EORA26 MRIO tables
(Aslam & Rodrigues-Bastos, 2017; Casella et al., 2019). Vertical integration “in” Brazil
will be defined as the Foreign Value Added (FVA) content of its exports generated by
other countries. Conversely, vertical integration “from” Brazil refers to Brazilian indirect
value added embodied in exports of other countries or DVX. Both variables shall be
considered to further measure Brazilian integration onto the Global Value Chain (using
an index labelled as GVC).
To estimate both FVA and DVX figures, alongside Brazilian DVA embodied in its own
exports, we calculate a matrix of value-added flows (F):
F =
   
   
   
   
F =
L ê
F =
   
   
   
   
(8)
Whereas
is the value-added coefficients matrix.
can be obtained by summing each
column of the full technical coefficient’s matrix A, putting these elements on the diagonal
of a square matrix and subtracting it from an identity matrix of the same size. L is the
full inverse Leontief matrix. And ê is the diagonalized export vector. Their product results
in the value-added flows matrix F. This, henceforth, describes how value added contained
in the exports of each industry/country (region) is generated and distributed across
countries (see Table 4).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
340
ROW CHN HKG MAC USA ROW CHN HKG MAC USA
Agriculture 58257.0 1680.7 166.6 1.2 18774.3 320319.3 25024.6 744.1 12.3 71482.4
Fishing 2127.3 52.9 6.1 0.0 542.1 7531.1 493.7 16.1 0.3 1359.2
Mining and Quarrying 192396.6 6814.0 1405.4 5.3 59860.4 1512714.5 144918.9 9231.3 69.9 318835.7
Food & Beverages 234797.9 5300.8 690.2 4.3 51590.6 1236092.9 72397.8 2642.3 41.3 192144.9
Textiles and Wearing Apparel 227047.5 12811.7 2958.9 15.1 66862.0 822652.8 123793.9 6391.1 116.5 167415.5
Wood and Paper 231722.9 7318.8 1010.7 6.4 88166.8 960513.6 75806.2 3122.9 49.7 238236.3
Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 834631.2 29856.8 2646.5 17.3 320513.3 3038020.4 293488.7 8411.7 119.0 740527.4
Metal Products 329093.4 16986.6 1431.9 7.0 124013.1 1352669.4 166903.5 4751.0 56.9 366579.6
Electrical and Machinery 823228.7 59216.1 17305.8 29.5 342274.5 3762461.6 779757.3 69518.2 276.9 845691.6
Transport Equipment 1091335.6 39645.6 5738.1 26.0 363477.9 4902829.9 471094.5 19000.4 224.8 1073490.5
Other Manufacturing and recycling 66750.7 3622.3 712.5 4.7 24860.5 280965.8 40252.0 2294.7 34.8 70627.1
Electricity, Gas and Water 3620.0 145.8 28.3 0.1 1519.4 1937.6 210.4 11.1 0.1 600.2
Construction 6718.7 291.0 46.8 0.2 2370.4 45886.9 5229.6 250.2 2.2 10302.3
Maintenance and Repair 439.5 15.3 2.6 0.0 155.4 2446.9 209.5 10.0 0.1 667.2
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18264.4 634.7 108.9 0.5 6456.7 101682.6 8706.5 414.5 5.4 27727.0
Hotels and Restraurants 17911.5 469.7 66.9 0.4 4327.3 111096.1 7274.8 296.9 4.7 18953.0
Transport, Post and Telecommunications 153868.1 5254.3 1041.4 4.4 48963.3 942650.2 81057.8 4564.9 51.1 202728.9
Finacial Intermediation and Business Activities 71911.2 3022.6 639.9 2.7 28117.6 369253.5 38861.1 2353.7 26.9 94008.8
Public Administration 1153.4 42.2 7.8 0.0 409.2 5618.5 514.2 27.6 0.3 1426.4
Education, Health, Private Households and Other Services 18714.8 713.5 111.4 0.6 6339.7 103937.0 10145.9 443.6 6.0 23233.0
FVATOT 4383990.6 193895.3 36126.9 125.9 1559594.5 19881280.6 2346141.1 134496.2 1099.2 4466037.1
ROW CHN HKG MAC USA ROW CHN HKG MAC USA
Agriculture 103189.4 17997.0 4568.4 144.0 32768.7 446219.9 85167.2 30441.1 888.2 121717.4
Fishing 392.2 22.3 89.1 0.9 1239.2 1198.4 186.4 341.5 3.1 3668.6
Mining and Quarrying 306091.4 228153.1 19077.1 117.2 119039.6 1344465.7 1867944.6 125916.8 826.0 377887.7
Food & Beverages 39465.5 2862.5 3095.3 134.9 12346.1 170347.8 30266.9 21972.7 755.2 43697.3
Textiles and Wearing Apparel 71641.0 5418.0 2474.0 25.5 24519.2 256626.4 51755.8 11179.4 136.9 71865.3
Wood and Paper 148348.7 12768.0 6830.9 45.6 115323.9 632067.8 136746.6 40408.0 287.3 407628.8
Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 342378.6 35653.0 10521.2 94.4 164539.9 1445063.8 388654.3 60914.5 565.2 508945.5
Metal Products 334981.4 24762.2 9641.6 53.8 165352.4 1442675.1 280230.6 50387.1 316.6 485576.6
Electrical and Machinery 202593.4 21656.1 8361.8 49.3 113507.4 858786.2 234146.2 42471.9 285.5 337498.2
Transport Equipment 171513.9 5982.8 1403.7 11.5 44909.2 590014.7 58135.4 8111.1 73.9 161664.7
Other Manufacturing and recycling 11463.8 898.4 235.2 2.3 5997.5 45983.3 10717.3 1396.3 14.5 22861.2
Electricity, Gas and Water 88352.3 14417.3 3094.3 26.5 39223.3 379274.6 164452.5 19461.0 164.4 126393.2
Construction 12630.4 3153.9 944.1 4.7 4206.4 40732.7 25641.6 6074.4 24.7 9925.6
Maintenance and Repair 4636.5 385.6 235.1 1.9 2010.9 16841.0 3454.6 1290.1 10.1 5271.7
Wholesale and Retail Trade 192671.4 16023.6 9771.4 80.1 83563.1 699836.7 143556.4 53611.0 419.3 219070.3
Hotels and Restraurants 16505.8 2281.4 507.2 4.7 3128.2 79042.4 30012.2 3711.0 33.4 12228.2
Transport, Post and Telecommunications 261498.9 50844.5 9290.2 96.6 91513.1 1267042.5 611030.5 66757.9 680.8 326362.2
Finacial Intermediation and Business Activities 445205.3 73989.6 14658.0 153.8 148260.5 2160012.9 948673.1 107649.2 1123.5 546887.2
Public Administration 430.7 13.2 8.1 0.6 33.4 1781.0 131.4 37.0 3.0 102.3
Education, Health, Private Households and Other Services 58785.6 9589.4 1933.1 25.7 16708.7 288990.9 117497.2 13944.4 196.8 59577.2
DVXTOT 2812776.2 526871.7 106739.7 1074.0 1188190.7 12167003.6 5188401.0 666076.4 6808.6 3848829.1
BRAZILIAN FVA IN EXPTOT TO THE WORLD PER ORIGIN
(UNIT = '000)
2000
2015
BRAZILIAN DVX TO THE WORLD PER DESTINATION
(UNIT = '000)
2000
2015
Table 4 : Brazilian GVC matrix (F)
Source: Authors
The results for Brazil are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: FVA and DVX values for Brazil by industry / country (region) in 2000-2015
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
SEC 1 SEC 2 …SEC 20 SEC 1 SEC 2 …SEC 20 SEC 1 SEC 2 …SEC 20 SEC 1 SEC 2 …SEC 20
SEC 1
SEC 2
…
SEC 20
SEC 1
SEC 2
…
SEC 20
SEC 1
SEC 2
…
SEC 20
SEC 1
SEC 2
…
SEC 20
DVX OF BRAZIL EMBODIED IN CHINA
EXPORTS
DVX OF BRAZIL EMBODIED IN USA
EXPORTS
F MATRIX
BRAZIL
CHINA
USA
DVA EMBODIED IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS
FVA FROM RoW EMBODIED IN
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS
FVA FROM CHINA EMBODIED IN
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS
FVA FROM RoW EMBODIED IN
BRAZILIAN EXPORTS
DVX OF BRAZIL EMBODIED IN RoW
EXPORTS
RoW
BRAZIL
CHINA
USA
RoW
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
341
Finally, in order to measure Brazilian backward linkages within the GVC by
partner/industry, the 

 ratio is calculated (whereas forward linkages will be noted
as 

). Adding both 

 and 

 we will also estimate the Global Value
Chain index for Brazil (GVCBRA-S).
4. Correlation between export-related jobs and TiVA in Brazil
Brazil reveals a relatively low integration onto the GVC. Its overall GVC index ranks 32th
in the world marking a value of just 0.462%
4
. China, however, is the world second largest
nation when considering both FVA and DVX flows within GVC, also ahead of US. China
and US then should be considered as “core” countries which could help other “peripheral”
commercial partners like Brazil to further integrate onto the GVC.
Table 6: Brazil position in the GVC (2015)
RANK
COUNTRY
GVC INDEX
1
Germany
6.211%
2
China
4.402%
3
USA
4.030%
4
Netherlands
2.943%
5
France
2.812%
6
UK
2.484%
7
Japan
2.417%
8
Belgium
2.404%
9
Italy
2.297%
10
South Korea
1.794%
11
Canada
1.474%
12
Singapore
1.389%
13
Spain
1.321%
14
Russia
1.079%
15
Switzerland
1.076%
…
…
…
32
Brazil
0.462%
Source: Author’s calculations from UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database
4
GVCBRA-WLD = (DVXBRA-WLD + FVAWLD-BRA) / EXGRWLD.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
342
When calculating Brazilian GVC indexes by country, as GVCBRA-S = 


 ,
empirical evidence shows a decoupling between Brazil and US alongside overall job
losses within the period 2000-2015. Yet, on the other hand, a sustained growth of
Brazil-China TiVA flows, or GVCBRA-CHN, has nonetheless contributed to substantial
increases in Brazilian exports-related jobs (508.9%)
5
.
Graph 2: There is a positive correlation between variation rates of export-related jobs
and the GVC
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
Empirical evidence also suggests a direct and stronger impact of DVX over employment
growth rates when compared to FVA. Then it could be theorized that backward linkages
incentivize variables such as DVX, thus boosting both exports and overall jobs, which
facilitate a continuous integration of Brazil onto the GVC.
5
Excluding both Macau SAR and Hong Kong SAR.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
343
Graph 3: DVX is more strongly correlated to export-related jobs than FVA
Source: Author’s calculations from UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database
Then, corresponding increases/decreases in GVC indexes are consistent with the main
assumption outlined throughout this chapter which is that TiVA exchanges have a direct
correlation to growth rates of export-related jobs. For instance, while GVCBRA-USA in
“Wholesale and Retail Trade” did register a sharp decrease, Brazilian export-related jobs
to US were also cut by -9.4%. Yet high growing rates in GVCBRA-CHN have contributed to
increase Brazilian export-related jobs in “Wholesale and Retail Trade” more than five
times (447%). This is significant since “Wholesale and Retail Trade” was also the largest
single source for Brazilian export-related jobs in 2015 (38,7%).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
344
Table 7: Variation rates of GVC indexes and export-related jobs in Brazilian “Wholesale
and Retail Trade”
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE (2000-2015)
VAR 00-15 (LOG SCALE)
CHN
HKG
MAC
USA
GVC
0.74
0.23
0.19
-0.47
EMPLOYMENT
1.70
0.57
0.66
-0.10
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
Both “Electrical and Machinery” and “Transport Equipment” have been the largest
receptors of FVA in Brazil. This implies that foreign multinational corporations did invest
in Brazil, for export purposes, while importing intermediate inputs from other countries
within the GVC. Total share of Chinese FVA embodied in Brazilian “Electrical and
Machinery” exports grew from 4.76% to 14.29%, while it decreased when considering
US (from 27.5% to 15.5%). And a similar pattern can also be seen in other industries,
such as “Transport Equipment”, where FVACHN-BRA over the total grew from 2,6% to 7,2%.
Meanwhile, US value added share embodied in Brazilian “Transport Equipment” exports
was reduced, from 24,2% to 16,6%. Therefore, even although these two industries
account for a small share of export-related jobs, growing FVACHN-BRA flows have also
contributed to increase Brazilian labor through Chinese vertical integration “in” Brazil.
Graph 4: Vertical integration in Brazil and impact on export-related jobs
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
345
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
Nonetheless, as aforementioned, correlation between vertical integration and export-
related jobs is stronger when considering forward linkages or DVX. Brazilian largest DVX
shares over the total are concentrated in industries such as “Financial Intermediation and
Business Activities” (17.2%), “Mining and Quarrying” (17%), “Petroleum, Chemical and
Non-Metallic Mineral Products” (11%), “Transport, Post and Telecommunications”
(10.4%) and “Metal Products” (10.3%). Data shows that variation rates of export-related
jobs in those industries had a direct correlation to 

 increases / decreases for the
period 2000-2015 (see Graph 5).
Graph 5: Correlation between forward linkages and export-related jobs
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
346
In addition to this, while “Financial Intermediation and Business Activities”, “Mining and
Quarrying”, “Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products”, “Transport, Post
and Telecommunications” and “Metal Products” accounted for 65.9% of overall DVX in
Brazil, export-related jobs derived from those industries just totaled 23.8%. US
industries such as “Financial Intermediation and Business Activities”, “Petroleum,
Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products”, “Metal Products”, “Wood and Paper” and
“Mining and Quarrying” accounted for 10.64% of overall Brazilian DVX exports to the
world but just 3.13% in total export-related jobs. In China, while “Mining and Quarrying”,
“Financial Intermediation and Business Activities”, “Transport, Post and
Telecommunications”, “Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products” and
“Metal Products” accounted for 18.73% of overall Brazilian DVX exports to the world,
total export related jobs in those industries were 2.57%. This just indicates that Brazilian
vertical integration “onto” China does demand less export-related jobs compared to US.
Table 8: DVX and export-related jobs over the total for selected countries / industries
(2015)
USA
DVX
EMP
CHN
DVX
EMP
Financial Intermediation
and Business Activities
2.5%
0.98%
Mining and Quarrying
8.54%
0.41%
Petroleum, Chemical and
Non-Metallic Mineral
Products
2.33%
0.67%
Financial Intermediation and
Business Activities
4.34%
0.75%
Metal Products
2.22%
0.56%
Transport, Post and
Telecommunications
2.79%
1%
Wood and Paper
1.86%
0.78%
Petroleum, Chemical and
Non-Metallic Mineral
Products
1.78%
0.22%
Mining and Quarrying
1.73%
0.14%
Metal Products
1.28%
0.19%
Total
10.6%
3.13%
Total
18.73%
2.57%
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
Biggest shares of Brazilian export-related jobs to China, over the world total by industry,
were concentrated in “Mining and Quarrying” (35.87%), “Construction” (17.38%),
“Electricity, Gas and Water” (11.02%), “Financial Intermediation and Business Activities”
(10.88%) and “Transport, Post and Telecommunications” (10.48%). Yet all those
industries put together just represented a 2.4% share over total Brazilian export-related
jobs. US five largest industries, on the other hand, had an overall share of 13.5%
(“Fishing”, “Textiles and Wearing Apparel”, “Other Manufacturing and Recycling”, “Wood
and Paper” and “Wholesale and Retail Trade”). Therefore, in absolute terms, US remains
dominant when considering Brazilian export-related jobs (accounting for 20.9% of the
total).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
347
ROW CHN HKG MAC USA
Agriculture 79.53% 4.67% 1.82% 0.04% 13.94%
Fishing 34.68% 0.73% 3.63% 0.01% 60.95%
Mining and Quarrying 51.34% 35.87% 0.63% 0.00% 12.16%
Food & Beverages 80.54% 3.75% 3.16% 0.07% 12.48%
Textiles and Wearing Apparel 57.12% 2.61% 0.92% 0.01% 39.35%
Wood and Paper 62.34% 4.68% 0.77% 0.00% 32.20%
Petroleum, Chemical and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 71.28% 7.06% 0.54% 0.01% 21.12%
Metal Products 75.21% 6.13% 0.36% 0.00% 18.30%
Electrical and Machinery 73.99% 6.37% 0.45% 0.00% 19.18%
Transport Equipment 78.59% 4.09% 0.07% 0.00% 17.25%
Other Manufacturing and recycling 64.80% 2.22% 0.08% 0.00% 32.90%
Electricity, Gas and Water 69.94% 11.02% 0.61% 0.01% 18.43%
Construction 71.29% 17.38% 2.22% 0.01% 9.11%
Maintenance and Repair 72.94% 4.52% 1.40% 0.01% 21.13%
Wholesale and Retail Trade 72.94% 4.52% 1.40% 0.01% 21.13%
Hotels and Restraurants 90.45% 5.13% 0.26% 0.01% 4.14%
Transport, Post and Telecommunications 74.11% 10.48% 0.51% 0.01% 14.90%
Finacial Intermediation and Business Activities 74.35% 10.88% 0.52% 0.01% 14.25%
Public Administration 96.36% 1.49% 1.91% 0.01% 0.22%
Education, Health, Private Households and Other Services 80.09% 9.50% 0.54% 0.01% 9.85%
TOTAL EMPexp 71.8% 6.1% 1.2% 0.0140% 20.9%
BRAZILIAN EXPORT-RELATED EMPLOYMENT (% TOTAL)
2015
Table 9: Brazilian export-related jobs shares over world total (2015)
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
Graph 6: Variation rates of Brazilian export-related jobs with China and US (2000-
2015)
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
348
Nevertheless, despite US still represents a much larger share of Brazilian export-related
jobs in absolute terms, growing TiVA exchanges with China has allowed Brazil to create
new export-related job opportunities between 2000 and 2015. Brazilian export-related
jobs grew from 2.84% to 7.33% out of the total when considering China, Hong Kong and
Macau; but were reduced from 35.4% to 20.9% in the case of US. At the same time,
Brazilian DVX to China reached a share of 23.72% in 2015, overtaking US (17.59%).
Table 10: Largest increases / decreases in Brazilian forward linkages and logarithmic
variation rates of export-related jobs (2000-2015)
USA
DVX
EMP
CHN
DVX
EMP
Construction
-0.62
-0.01
Hotels and Restaurants
1.10
2.19
Wholesale and Retail
Trade
-0.51
-0.10
Financial Intermediation and Business
Activities
1.08
2.27
Maintenance and
Repair
-0.51
0.05
Education, Health, Private Households and
Other Services
1.03
1.84
Textiles and Wearing
Apparel
-0.40
-0.13
Transport, Post and Telecommunications
1.01
2.11
Metal Products
-0.40
0.31
Other Manufacturing and recycling
1.01
1.64
Fishing
-0.39
-0.50
Electricity, Gas and Water
0.96
2.03
Source: Authors’ calculation from EORA-26 MRIOT
As shown in Table 10, all Brazilian industries without exception have boosted their export-
related jobs when increasing 

 with China. Yet, on the other hand, larger declines
of 

 correspond to either net losses or much smaller increases in export-related
jobs when considering US.
5. Conclusion
Increasing TiVA exchanges between China and Brazil constitutes a source of job creation
for the latter. But, on the other hand, a sustained decoupling with US has eliminated
114.520 export-related jobs in Brazil between 2000 and 2015. Yet export-related jobs
linked to US were one-fifth of the total in 2015. And, in the case of China, such share
was just a 6.1%.
Either considering total growth rates or overall shares of export-related jobs, China and
US are relevant TiVA partners for Brazil. Therefore, from an economic perspective,
optimal choice for Brazilian commercial policies would be maximizing TiVA exchanges
with both China and US. Brazilian continuous integration with Chinese GVC would help
the former to create more export-related jobs. And, on the other hand, a large number
of export-related jobs can be preserved in labor-intensive industries such as “Wholesale
and Retail Trade” or “Fishing” through continuous commercial exchanges with US. It
might seem obvious, therefore, that great power politics is not in the best economic
interest for Brazil.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
349
Brazil should further promote forward-linkages with China in more labor-intensive
industries such as “Wholesale and Retail Trade”, “Fishing”, “Textiles and Wearing
Apparel” or “Transport, Post and Telecommunications”. Export-related jobs of
aforementioned industries, for US, totaled 1,43 million, which is almost five-times when
compared to China. Hence, given that a unit of DVXBRA-CHN requires much less export-
related jobs compared to US, Brazil could deepen its TiVA ties in more labor-intensive
activities with China.
As aforementioned, some Brazilian largest shares of DVX are still concentrated in
extractive basic industries like “Mining and Quarrying”, “Petroleum, Chemical and Non-
Metallic Mineral Products” or “Metal Products”. Yet more labor-intensive industries, such
as “Transport Equipment” or “Electrical and Machinery”, have been increasing their


 inflows from China, thus becoming the largest destinations of overall Chinese
FVA embodied in Brazilian exports. Chinese vertical integration, in Brazil, is also
coincidental with an increase of Brazilian DVX to China. And, in the case of US, both
industries have registered a sharper decline of both 

 and 

 . Therefore,
export-related jobs have been increasing faster in those industries which shown a
deepening vertical integration with China, as opposed to US.
US might consider Brazil as a relevant supplier of raw materials which contributes to
strengthen China either through its final demand or processing trade within the GVC. And
it could also see China as a competitor in Brazilian labor-intensive industries like
“Transport Equipment” or “Electrical and Machinery”. However, despite great power
politics between declining and emerging powers in Brazil, a strategic balance of TiVA
exchanges with both US and China has contributed to increase Brazilian overall export-
related jobs about 60.7% during the period 2000-2015.
6. Data resources
The Eora Global Supply Chain Database. Retrieved in June 2024, from:
www.worldmrio.com
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE). Retrieved in June 2024, from:
https://www.ibge.gov.br/
References
Aslam, A. N., & Rodrigues-Bastos, F. (2017). Calculating Trade in Value Added. IMF.
Baldwin, R., & Lopez-Gonzalez, J. (2015). Supply Chain Trade: A portrait of Global
Patterns and Several Testable Hypotheses. The World Economy, 1682-1721.
Beckley, M. (2018). The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters. International
Security, 43(2), 7–44.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
350
Bureau of Export Administration Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security.
(1999). U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to the People’s Republic of China. Bureau
of Export Administration Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security. Retrieved
in June 2024, from: https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/doctrine/dmrr_chinatech.htm
Buzan, B. (1995). The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered.
In I. K. (Eds.), International Relations Theory Today (pp. 198-216). Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Cañon, J., & Ramírez-Díaz, C. (2022). The center and periphery concept to understand
our current liquid reality. Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 84, 323-360.
Casella, B., & al., e. (2019). Improving the Analysis of Global Value Chains: UNCTAD-
Eora Database. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
Choi, H. e. (2019). The Role of Innovation in Upgrading Global Value Chains. Global
Economic Review, 48(3).
Dauth, W., & al., e. (2014). The Rise of the East and the Far East: German Labor Markets
and Trade Integration. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(6), 1643-1675.
Donoso, V. e. (2015). Do Differences in the Exposure to Chinese Imports Lead to
Differences in Local Labour Market Outcomes? An Analysis for Spanish Provinces.
Regional Studies, 49(10).
Duran, J., & Banacloche, S. (2022). Economic analysis based on input-output tables.
Project Documents (LC/TS.2021/177). Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Ellis, R. E. (2005). U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin
America. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,.
Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: how global economic
networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42-79.
Feenstra, R. (1998). Integration of Trade and Desintegration of Production in the Global
Economy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31-50.
Feng, Y. (2013). Global Power Transitions and Implications. Pacific Focus, 170-189.
Ferchen, M. (2015, November 11). Will China Transfer More Technology to Latin America?
Latin America Advisor. Retrieved in June 2024, from: http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/LAA151111.pdf
Fortín, C., Heine, J., & Ominami, C. (2020). Latinoamérica: no alineamiento y la segunda
Guerra Fría. Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 20(3), 107-115.
Gereffi, G., & Fernandez-Stark, K. (2011). Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer. North
Carolina, USA: Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness. Duke University.
Gilbert, J., Rosati, A., & Bronner, E. (2022, February 18). How China Beat Out the U.S.
to Dominate South America. Bloomberg. Retrieved in June 2024, from:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-17/china-is-south-america-s-top-
trading-partner-why-can-t-the-us-keep-up
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
351
Gill-Tiney, P. (2023). Rising powers, subordinate monopolization, and major interstate
war [Tesis Doctoral, University of Oxford]. University of Oxford.
Gilpin, R. (1988). The Theory of Hegemonic War. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History,
18(4), 591–613.
Grieco, J. (1990). Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers
to Trade. Ithaca, Nueva York: Cornell University Press.
Inomata, S. (2017).
全球价值链分析框架：综述，《全球价值链发展报告》
. 社会科学文献出版社.
Iodice, I., & Tomasi, C. (2016). Skill upgrading and wage gap: a decomposition analysis
for Italian manufacturing firms. Economia Politica, 33(2).
Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate.
International Security, 24(1), 42–63.
Karen A., R., & William R., T. (1994). The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990.
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition. Little, Brown, and Company.
Khass, T. (2022, 01 09). African leaders must stop the continent’s dependency on
exploitative countries such as the US and China. Mail & Guardian Online.
Kim, S.-h., & Kim, S. (2022). China’s contestation of the liberal international order. The
Pacific Review, 1-26. doi:10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367
Koopman, R., Wang, Z., & Wei, S.-J. W. (2014). Tracing Value-Added and Double
Counting in Gross Exports. American Economic Review, 104(2), 459–494.
Krasner, S. (1978). Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press.
Kreutzer, F., & Berger, W. (2018). The Labor Market Effects of Offshoring of Small and
Medium Sized Firms: Micro-level Evidence for Germany. Applied Economics, 50(32).
Kwok, T. (2018). International trade and the division of labor. Review of International
Economics, 26(2), 322-338.
Lebrón, A. (2021). China-LATAM Value Chain Integration: Joint Opportunities for
Commercial and Economic Development. VI Simposio internacional sobre Relaciones
entre America Latina y Asia Pacifico. Universidad del Pacifico.
Lee, M., & Thompson, W. R. (2022). Major Powers vs. Global Powers: A New Measure of
Global Reach and Power Projection Capacity. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
Legro, J. W. (2007). What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power.
Perspectives on Politics, 5(3), 515–534.
Lenzen, M., Moran, D., Kanemoto, K., & Geschke, A. (2013). Building Eora: A Global
Multi-regional Input-Output Database at High Country and Sector Resolution. Economic
Systems Research, 25(1), 20-49.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
352
Lurweg, M., & Westermeier.A. (2010). Jobs Gained and Lost Through Trade - The Case
of Germany. SSRN Electronic Journal.
Márquez-Carriel, G., Márquez-Sánchez, F., & Vergara-Romero, A. (2023). Relationship
between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Ecuador: a perspective from
the dependency theory. Revista Universidad y Sociedad, 15(2), 49-62.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Nueva York: W.W. Norton
& Company.
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international
order. International security, 43(4), 7-50.
Montalbano, P. e. (2018). Opening and linking up: firms, GVCs, and productivity in Latin
America. Small Business Economics, 50(4).
Moyer, J., Meisel, C., Matthews, A., Bohl, D., & Burrows, M. (2021). China-US
Competition: Measuring Global Influence. Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Retrieved in June 2024, from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/China-US-Competition-Report-2021.pdf
NU. CEPAL. (2020). Los efectos del covid-19 en el comercio internacional y la logística,
Informe Especial Covid-19. CEPAL.
Nunez Salas, M. (2022). China's Investments and Land Use in Latin America. Retrieved
from https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/jgi_research/49
Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and foreign policy. Journal of political power, 4(1), 9-24.
Powell, R. (1991). Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory.
American Political Science Review, 85(4), 1303-1320.
Radway, R. J. (1980). Comparative Evoluiton of Technology Transfer Policies in Latin
America: The Practical Realities. Journal of International Law and Policy, 197-215.
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rousseau, D. L. (2002). Motivations for Choice: The Salience of Relative Gains in
International Politics. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(3), 394–426.
Shimbov, B. e. (2019). Export Structure Upgrading and Economic Growth in the Western
Balkan Countries. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 55(10), 2296-2298.
Singer, J. D. (1961). The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World
Politics, 14(1), 77-92.
Snidal, D. (1991). Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation. American
Political Science Review, 85(3), 701-726.
Snyder, J. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press,.
Taliaferro, J. (2011). Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.
International Security, 128-161.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 329-353
Brazilian Tiva Under Us-China Strategic Competition and Impact on Export-Related Jobs
(2000-2015)
Alberto J. Lebrón Veiga, Carlos M. Martin
353
Taliaferro, J. W. (2004). Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery.
Cornell University Press.
The Growth Lab at Harvard University. (n.d.). The Atlas of Economic Complexity.
Retrieved from www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu
Treistman, J. (2017). The Preemptive Paradox: The Rise of Great Powers & Management
of the International System [Tesis Doctoral, Syracuse University]. Syracuse University.
Vogelmann, J. (2020). Ascending China and the Hegemonic United States: Economically
Based Cooperation Or Strategic Power Politics? Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Vrh, N. (2017). The convergence in domestic value-added of exports in the EU. Post-
Communist Economies, 29(3).
Wang, Z., Wei, S.-J., & Zhu, K. Z. (2013). Quantifying International Production Sharing
at the Bilateral and Sector Levels. National Bureau for Economic Research. Working
Paper.
Ward, S. (2017). Revisionism, Order, and Rising Powers. En S. Ward, Status and the
Challenge of Rising Powers (pp. 10-32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank Group. (n.d.). Retrieved in June 2024, from:
https://databank.worldbank.org/
Xing, Y. (2021). Factoryless Manufacturers and International Trade in the Age of Global
Value Chains. Tokio: GRIPS.
邢予青, & Detert, N. (2011). 国际分工与美中贸易逆差: 以i-Phone为例.
金融研究
, 198-206.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
354
BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 2003: CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
ANDRÉ LUIZ REIS DA SILVA
reisdasilva@hotmail.com
Associated professor at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil). Ph.D. in Political Science
and CNPq researcher. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2593-1189.
JULI ARUSIEWICZ BERTA
juli.berta@ufrgs.br
International Relations student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and researcher
assistant which a FAPERGS scholarship. https://orcid.org/0009-0008-2013-7449.
MAIARA DE ALMEIDA CARDOZO NUNES
maiaranunes663@gmail.com
International Relations student at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and researcher
assistant which a CNPq scholarship. https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2279-3930.
Abstract
This article aims to analyze the relations between Brazil and China since 2003 to identify
major lines of continuity and changes. The specific objectives are to map the main lines of
Brazilian Foreign Policy, the perspective on the importance of China in bilateral relations and
the main differences and challenges presented. The central argument is that changes in
Brazilian Foreign Policy, especially with how Brazil perceives its position in the world and its
relationship with major powers, have conditioned relations with China since 2003, causing
fluctuations in the political relationship despite their growing economic interaction. The
methodology is based on bibliographic analysis and the examination of Brazilian public
diplomatic documents.
Keywords
Brazil-China Relations, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Lula, Dilma, Bolsonaro.
Resumo
Este artigo tem como objetivo geral analisar as relações Brasil-China desde 2003,
identificando as grandes linhas de continuidade e de mudança. Como objetivos específicos
mapear as grandes linhas da política externa brasileira, a visão sobre a importância da China
nas relações bilaterais e as principais oscilações e desafios apresentados. A metodologia de
análise está assentada em análise bibliográfica e de documentos públicos diplomáticos
brasileiros. O argumento central é de que as alterações na política externa brasileira, em
especial como o Brasil percebe sua posição no mundo e na relação com as grandes potências,
condicionaram as relações com a China desde 2003, provocando oscilações no relacionamento
político, a despeito de sua crescente interação econômica.
Palavras-chave
Relações Brasil-China, Política Externa Brasileira, Lula, Dilma, Bolsonaro.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
355
How to cite this article
Silva, André Luiz Reis da & Nunes, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo (2024). Brazil-China Relations Since
2003: Convergences And Divergences. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º
2, TD1 – Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”.
December 2024, pp. 354-367. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.17.
Article received on 1 June 2024 and accepted for publication on 30 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
356
BRAZIL-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 2003:
CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
ANDRÉ LUIZ REIS DA SILVA
JULI ARUSIEWICZ BERTA
MAIARA DE ALMEIDA CARDOZO NUNES
Introduction
The international system is facing a complex and transformative power transition,
becoming more multipolar, in which the United States, as the hegemonic leader,
considers China its main rival. China’s rise, observed in recent decades, characterized by
the shift in its growth model and rapid economic and technological development, has
challenged the U.S. position in the global order, increasing tension between the two
countries (Ross, 2020). However, the economies of China and the U.S are strongly linked
and interdependent (Li & Bernal-Meza, 2021). According to Ross (2020) the power
transition stimulates competition between Beijing and Washington but doesn't stop them
from cooperating. However, this requires pragmatic leadership. Nonetheless, China has
been expanding its economic and diplomatic ties, becoming one of the main economic
partners for many countries.
China emerges as an alternative to the current world order, challenging the division of
States into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral categories proposed by Wallerstein
(2004), as well as the maintenance of the global status quo (Li, 2020). As a rising power,
the Asian country seeks to promote multipolarity and reform international agreements to
include the interests of developing countries. It is evident, therefore, that China's rise
and the relative decline of the United States represent a shift in the global balance of
power (Can & Chan, 2020).
In the early 21st century, Brazil emerged as a significant player on the international
system, recognized as important by other powers. Brazil's place in the world is in constant
redefinition. Whether designated as an emerging power, a middle power, or a regional
power, the country's size does not allow it to play a minor role. It is within this context
of systemic transformations that one of Brazil's central challenges lies: navigate these
global changes while aiming for autonomy and internal development (Silva, 2023). To
achieve this, Brazil has pursued strategic partnerships, South-South cooperation,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
357
regional integration, and a multilateral approach (Silva, 2023). In this context, relations
with China have been fundamental for Brazil's development.
In 1974, Brazil and China established political-diplomatic relations due to the
convergence of their interests and agendas. In this context, the subsequent years were
marked by the establishment of a "Strategic Partnership'' between the two countries in
1993 and the creation of the China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation
Commission (COSBAN) in 2004. These relations had deepened to such an extent that in
2009 the Asian country became Brazil's main trading partner and the primary contributor
to the surplus in Brazil's trade balance (Brasil, 2024). Meanwhile, the international
scenario was characterized by China's economic rise and the weakening of the United
States as a global power. Concurrently, a multipolar system is increasingly emerging,
with the persistence of old and the rise of new powers, both in the Global North and the
Global South.
This article has the main objective to analyze the relations between Brazil and China
since 2003, identifying the continuity and changes up to the present day. The specific
objectives are to map the main lines of Brazilian Foreign Policy, the view on the
importance of China in bilateral relations and the main fluctuations and challenges
presented. The methodology is based on bibliographic analysis and the examination of
Brazilian diplomatic documents. The theoretical basis is in the interpretation that foreign
policy is a public policy, influenced by internal and external factors, and conditioned by
the country's capacities and constraints within the international system, as well as its
internal power bloc, political leadership, and worldview (Silva, 2004; Silva, 2023). The
central hypothesis is that changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy, particularly in how Brazil
perceives its global position and its relationships with major powers, affect the speed and
intensity of relations with China, despite the growing economic interaction.
Since the first Lula administration, which began in 2003, Brazil has increased its proximity
to China both diplomatically and economically. Brazil and China have maintained a deep
connection since the beginning of their relations, celebrating 50 years in 2024 (MRE,
2024). Therefore, it is important to understand how Brazil-China relations developed
from 2003 to 2010, the changes from 2011 to 2022, and the perspectives of Brazilian
governments on China, including the current view, cooperation, and the limitations posed
by internal and international policies.
The expansion of Brazil-China Relations since the turn of the millennium
The first Lula’s government operated on a new base of Brazilian Foreign Policy, aiming
to overcome the limitations of the 1990s and adapting Brazil to the transition in the
international system. This approach focused on deepening regional integration in South
America, reviving Brazil's multilateral tradition with a critical approach on international
asymmetries and seeking strategic partnerships with similar countries worldwide (Cervo
and Bueno, 2011; Silva, 2015). Additionally, coalition groups with variable geometry,
such as IBSA, the G20 in the WTO, and BRICS, were formed. These new coalitions
expanded the power of the participating countries, not only through an increased veto
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
358
capacity (collective obstruction) against dominant-country initiatives and proposing
proactive solutions to global challenges (Silva, 2015).
During Lula's first two governments (2003-2010), relations with China were primarily
guided by the principles of cooperation and mutual interests across various sectors
including science, technology, agriculture, education, culture, trade, industry,
infrastructure, development and multilateral affairs. During this period, Brazil tried to
align itself with China aiming for mutual development through a “Strategic Partnership”
(Silva & Frutuoso, 2011). Simultaneously, China was opening up to foreign investment
and expanding its economic presence with a bilateral and multilateral commercial
diplomacy in a quest to translate economic power into political gains (Dittmer, 2010).
With the end of the first two Lula governments, Brazil entered a new phase both
domestically and in its foreign policy. During Dilma Rousseff's presidency (2011-2016),
Brazil maintained a foreign policy similar to Lula's but faced internal crises, economic
deterioration and a political support loss aggravated by the 2008 global financial crisis.
Brazil's position in the international system remained largely unchanged. However,
domestically, the country experienced economic decline, inflation, and recession. The
government of Dilma Rousseff was marked by protests and a loss of support from
business and political sectors, culminating in her impeachment in 2016 (Silva, 2021).
From 2010 to 2014, Brazil and China strengthened their relations as China expanded its
global influence. Brazil's foreign policy focused on South-South cooperation,
universalism, and enhancing its regional leadership. Consequently, both governments
approved the Joint Action Plan (2010-2014), which aimed to promote equal cooperation,
bilateral discussions on mutual interests to deepen relations with a focus on coordination,
strategic vision, and exchange between the countries (MRE, 2010a; MRE, 2010b). This
joint plan underscored the shared interests of both parties in forming a strategic
partnership for the development of each country and their relations domestically and
internationally (Leite, 2013). The strategic partnership has been upgraded to
“comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2012 and a Global Strategic Dialogue between
Ministers of Foreign Affairs along Ten-Year Cooperation Plan was established (2012-
2021).
With Dilma’s impeachment, Vice President Michel Temer assumed the presidency of Brazil
from 2016 to 2019. During Temer's government, Brazil-China relations were not as close
as in the two previous administrations (De Sousa, Abrão & Porto, 2023). The focus was
primarily on internal crises, particularly economic challenges. The relationship with China
continued based on economic interests, especially in agribusiness, as the Temer
government has interests in economic benefits from the bilateral relationship with China
(Moreira, 2020).
In this context of internal crisis and reorientation of Brazilian Foreign Policy, Jair
Bolsonaro assumed the presidency from 2019 to 2022, proposing a shift that included
distancing Brazil from China, now seen as a threat to Brazil and the West. However, as
we will see next, this orientation was moderated by various factors. In 2023, Lula
returned to the presidency, aiming to reclaim Brazil's lost ground in international
relations. Under the slogan "Brazil is back," Lula's government adopted a foreign policy
focused on defending multilateralism and multipolarity, reestablishing South-South
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
359
cooperation, and enhancing regional articulation in South America. In this context, it also
meant revitalizing political-diplomatic cooperation within the BRICS group and expanding
partnership with China (Silva, 2023).
Over the past 20 years, Brazil and the world have undergone various changes, especially
in their relations with China, which have also adapted to the interests and objectives of
the different Brazilian governments. From 2000 to 2010, the most recurrent themes in
bilateral cooperation between China and Brazil were multipolarity, infrastructure, trade,
science and technology, global governance, and cooperation in business, trade, and
investments (MRE, 2004). With the transition to Dilma Rousseff's presidency, national
interests shifted towards a series of internal conflicts spreading across the country (Silva,
2021). Additionally, cooperation with China continued to focus on multipolarity,
international governance, science and technology, energy, mining, investments,
infrastructure, and cultural exchanges between the countries and their national subunits
(MRE, 2014).
Under Michel Temer's government, internal issues, especially economic ones, were
predominant (Moreira, 2020). The relationship with China continued to be based on
cooperation, international governance, multipolarity, investments, and free trade (MRE,
2017). During Bolsonaro's administration, relations with China were turbulent (Santoro,
2020), but they remained focused on trade, investments, agriculture, energy, science,
technology, and commercial flows (MRE, 2019). Under Lula’s new government, Brazil
seeks to increase its role in the international system and strengthen ties with developing
countries. Therefore, there is a renewed effort to enhance relations with China, aiming
for cooperation in social development, technology, multilateralism, trade, environment,
transportation, science, and technology (MRE, 2023).
Brazil-China Relations in the Bolsonaro Government (2019-2022)
In 2019, with Bolsonaro as president and Ernesto Araújo as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
there was a shift in Brazilian Foreign Policy, with significant internal and international
implications. From a bilateral perspective, the new foreign policy matrix prioritized closer
ties with developed countries and distanced itself from developing countries, selecting
ideologically aligned partnerships with the conservative right. There was also a
rapprochement with Trump's United States (2017-2021), seen as a "defender of Western
values." South-South cooperation was viewed with suspicion, while Brazil distanced itself
from the Middle East and Africa and adopted a strong anti-China rhetoric (Silva, 2023).
This transformation in Brazilian Foreign Policy was also heavily influenced by the then
Minister Ernesto Araújo's view that the West was experiencing a loss of its own identity
and that only Donald Trump was capable of saving the West. Thus, the role of Brazil's
foreign policy agenda, as a Western country, would be to fight against "globalism" and
support the recovery of the West through alliances with Western nations, especially the
United States, and the reaffirmation of the Judeo-Christian identity (Araújo, 2017). This
perception led to the country becoming increasingly isolated on the international stage
(Magalhães, 2022).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
360
Regarding the relationship with China, even before his victory in the 2018 election,
Bolsonaro faced strong criticism from the Chinese government for visiting Taiwan and for
stating that China "does not buy in Brazil, it buys Brazil" (Marra et. al., 2021). The first
years of his administration were characterized by a hostile stance (Bones, Pennaforte &
Auler, 2023). When Eduardo Bolsonaro, then a Federal Deputy, made a statement on the
social network X, formerly Twitter, blaming China for the emergence of the Covid-19
pandemic, he received a note from the Chinese Embassy in Brasília repudiating his words.
Additionally, statements by the then Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, caused
friction in Sino-Brazilian relations by suggesting that the pandemic was a strategy for
Chinese global domination. These declarations caused strains in diplomatic relations
between China and Brazil, hindering Brazil's access to vaccine supplies and mechanical
ventilators, for example (Magalhães, 2022).
Another issue that was a point of contention during Bolsonaro's government concerned
the debate over Brazil's adoption of 5G technology standards. The Clean Network
initiative, from Donald Trump's administration, received support from the Bolsonaro
government at the end of 2020, ruling out the possibility of a partnership between Brazil
and the Chinese company Huawei. At the time, Eduardo Bolsonaro stated that the alliance
with the US would enable "secure 5G without Chinese espionage" (Schreiber, 2020).
However, in 2021, after Trump left the White House, Brazil ceased to impose restrictions
on the Chinese company regarding 5G.
Despite these recurring tensions in relations between Beijing and Brasília, a movement
contrary to President Bolsonaro's position was also present during his government. This
movement, primarily linked to economic sectors such as industry and agribusiness,
recognized the need to maintain relations with China through a more pragmatic
approach. Pressure from these sectors enabled a more moderate treatment of China by
the government. For example, in June 2019, Vice President Hamilton Mourão visited the
Asian country, resulting in the reactivation of COSBAN. In November of the same year,
Chinese President Xi Jinping was received by Bolsonaro during the BRICS summit, with
the statement that "China is increasingly becoming a part of Brazil's future" (Mazui,
Barbiéri & Rodrigues; 2019).
Concerning economic and trade relations, starting with the so-called "Trade War"
between China and the United States in 2018, Sino-Brazilian trade relations grew
considerably, increasing the degree of interdependence between the two countries. These
relations were consolidated through the sale of Brazilian primary products to the Chinese
market and the purchase of manufactured goods from China by Brazil. Furthermore, the
Asian country is the main destination for Brazilian exports and the primary source of its
imports, also being the main contributor to Brazil's trade surplus (Bones, Pennaforte &
Auler, 2023).
According to the Secretariat of Foreign Trade (2024), Brazil's exports to China were
US$67.8 billion in 2020 and US$89.4 billion in 2022. As for Brazil's trade surplus with
China, it amounted to US$27.3 billion in 2019 and US$40.2 billion in 2021 (Brazil, 2024).
In contrast, Brazil had a trade deficit with the United States of US$5.1 billion in 2019 and
US$8.3 billion in 2021 (AMCHAM, 2022). Despite the political and diplomatic strain in
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
361
Sino-Brazilian relations during Bolsonaro's administration, trade between China and
Brazil reached record levels.
These indices demonstrate that Chinese pragmatism has prevailed, meaning Beijing has
chosen to prioritize its economic and trade interests. It also shows China's importance as
a consumer market, as well as Brazil's consequent dependence on the Asian country,
which is greater than Brazil's dependence on the United States (Kalout & Martins da
Costa, 2022). However, despite this strong interdependence between the two countries,
China is seeking to diversify its food suppliers, such as soybeans, by purchasing more
from countries like Uruguay, Argentina, and Canada, which could reduce long-term
dependency on Brazil (Marra; et al., 2021).
In 2020, the U.S. was the second-largest source of foreign direct investment in Brazil,
following the Netherlands (Brasil, 2021). In relation to Chinese investments in Brazil,
their volume increased significantly from 2010 onwards, especially in the energy and
manufacturing sectors. If Chinese direct investments in Brazil continue at the same pace
in the coming years, this dependency relationship could be reversed (Kalout & Martins
da Costa, 2022).
Brasil-China relations in the Third Lula’s Government (2023-)
The proposal for the new Lula’s government is to operate in a similar manner of
international relations from his two previous governments. However, contextual changes
and the learning of the last decade require adaptations to Brazilian Foreign Policy. The
first year of government allows us to evaluate the priorities in Brazilian Foreign Policy
which are the recovery of international credibility, the environmental agenda, the
strengthening of BRICS, regional cooperation, South-South cooperation and the
reinforcement of multilateralism (Silva, 2023).
Over the last two decades, Brazil and the international system passed through a lot of
changes. With that it is necessary to comprehend how the internal and external influences
affected Brazil and vice versa. For Putnam (2010), a country's internal and external
politics are interconnected. The author highlights the existence of a two-level game: at
the domestic level, actors pursue their interests and seek ways to adapt favorable policies
to those interests. At an international level, national governments maximize their
capabilities to satisfy pressures from domestic groups while minimizing the consequences
of external actions (Putnam, 2010).
Having this in mind, the two-level game, Lula’s new government aims to restore Brazil’s
international credibility in addition to maintaining a certain balance in the country’s
foreign policy. Lula returned to government with a Foreign Policy deeply affected by
various diplomatic crises caused by his predecessor and the country’s internal challenges
that Brazil is facing. In addition to that, the international landscape is turbulent, marked
by the Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine conflicts, the post-Covid-19 pandemic and
environmental crises. Thus, under Lula’s new government, Brazil is seeking to build a
multipolar order, with less inequality and the ability to support the Global South, a
different view from Bolsonaro’s administration, which prioritized Christian values and an
anti-globalist agenda (Júnior, 2023).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
362
Lula’s new government is in a difficult position, but re-establishing ties with China can be
an opportunity for Brazil’s government to build a more inclusive international order with
active participation of emerging countries. There is also a return of concepts from Lula’s
first terms, such as prioritizing development and poverty reduction, strengthening South-
South relations, focusing on coalitions like the BRICS, promoting economic growth with
income distribution, multilateralism, and the reform of organizations like the UN (De
Almeida, 2023). Therefore, relations with China are seen as an opportunity to achieve
these objectives. Thus, with China’s support, Lula’s government seeks to revive bilateral
opportunities for internal and global development goals, projecting Brazilian interests and
its international protagonism (Lopes, Almeida & De Souza, 2023).
With these new opportunities, Lula performed a State visit to China in 2023. During the
meeting, issues regarding bilateral cooperations, regional and international topics of
common interest were discussed. Both countries signed a series of agreements of
understanding in areas such as poverty and hunger reduction, food security, science,
technology, innovation, space cooperation, communication, investments, finances, digital
economy, trade facilitation and media. In terms of economy, both parties discussed the
diversification and facilitation of trade and the increase in agricultural exchange and the
resilience of production chains. The parties committed to create conditions for facilitating
more competitive and high value products to be included in bilateral trade. Both countries
agreed to encourage their companies to invest in each other, especially in areas such as
infrastructure, energy, logistics, agriculture, industry and high technology (MRE,2023).
In the matter of political factors, Sino-Brazilian relations are marked by cooperation,
mutual benefit, understanding and mutual interest in the progress of developing
countries.
Therefore, it is evident that China is utilizing a Chinese model for cooperation with the
Global South which is characterized by eight guiding principles formulated by Zhou Enlai
in 1964. These principles are: (i) Equality and mutual benefit; (ii) Unconditionality; (iii)
Relief of the burden on beneficiary countries; (iv) Self-sufficiency and independent
economic development; (v) Promotion of efficient projects with less investment; (vi)
Better quality equipment; (vii) Transfer of techniques to beneficiary countries; (viii)
Chinese experts without special privileges. Thus, China leads the development of the
Global South through trade, investment, and external assistance (Vadell, Lo Brutto, Leite
& Crivelli, 2020).
However, in Sino-Brazilian relations, it is notable that trade exchanges are characterized
by Brazil's role as a producer and exporter of natural resources, while China, in turn, acts
as an exporter of manufactured goods and capital (Cunha, Lélis, Silva & De Lima, 2012).
By investing in infrastructure and financing, China has built strong connections
worldwide, allowing the Asian country to produce higher value-added products and
creating a great interdependence and collaboration with developing countries. The debate
about the nature of economic relations with China in Brazil occurs due to the growth of
exportations in sectors with lower added value such as agriculture. On the other hand,
the advantages of these trade relations are associated with the possibilities of investment
and increased diversification of negotiations with major development centers (Rodrigues,
2022).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
363
Given the current international scenario, the re-establishment ties with China after the
Bolsonaro government and the new Lula government could be an opportunity to promote
a new Brazilian international insertion, as well as to bring incentives for an internal
reindustrialization plan, thus rescuing principles of Foreign Policy Brazilian as those of
balance and diversification (Lopes, Almeida & De Souza, 2023). The new Lula
government aims to rearticulate political and diplomatic relations, improve bilateral
relations, especially economic ones, and rebuild strategic cooperation on global issues.
In this way, the relationship with China aims to boost industrialization, technological
advancement, and greater international insertion for Brazil during Lula's new
government.
Final Considerations
During Lula's first two governments, relations with China were based on cooperation and
mutual interests in areas such as science, agriculture, culture, education, trade, industry,
infrastructure, development, and multilateralism. The Dilma government maintained
these characteristics. As a result, Lula's first government and Dilma's government
brought Brazil closer to China and the Global South. This rapprochement was strategic
as it aimed to satisfy the development interests, partnerships, strengthening of
multipolarity, and South-South cooperation of both Brazil and China.
During Michel Temer's government, the pursuit of cooperation in Sino-Brazilian relations
was maintained, primarily in the economic and trade spheres. On the other hand, Jair
Bolsonaro's government was marked by a break with Brazilian diplomatic tradition,
specifically the history of pragmatism, the pursuit of multilateralism, and autonomy. The
automatic alignment with the USA and the anti-China rhetoric weakened the strategic
partnership between Brazil and China, as well as isolated Brazil internationally.
In summary, during the analyzed period, economic interaction between Brazil and China
grew, while political relations fluctuated. The administrations of Lula, Dilma, Temer, and
Bolsonaro maintained economic interaction with China. Their differences lie in the
strategic and political closeness from 2003 to 2016, followed by political distancing during
Bolsonaro's government, and a new re-establishment starting in 2023. The new Lula
government seeks to restore Brazil's international projection, as well as rebuild global
strategic cooperation. In this context, China is a potential ally for Brazilian development
and a partner for Brazil in various international agendas.
References
AMCHAM. (2022). Monitor do Comrcio Brasil-EUA: Janeiro-Dezembro de 2021.
https://d335luupugsy2.cloudfront.net/cms%2Ffiles%2F218829%2F1706121812Monitor
_Comercio_JAN_DEZ_2021.pdf.
Araújo, E. H. F. (2017). Trump e o Ocidente. Cadernos de Política Exterior, 3(6), 323-
358.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
364
Bones, N., Pennaforte, C., & Auler, C. (2022). A Política Externa do Governo Bolsonaro:
algumas considerações críticas sobre a relação sino-brasileira. Revista Intellector, 19
(38), 3-20. https://guaiaca.ufpel.edu.br/handle/prefix/11084?locale-attribute=en.
Brasil. (2019). Em encontro com ministra Tereza Cristina, chineses prometem aumentar
investimentos no Brasil. Ministrio da Agricultura, Pecuria e Abastecimento.
http://www.agricultura.gov.br/noticias/chineses-prometem-a- ministra-tereza-cristina-
aumentar-investimentos-no-brasil.
Brasil. (2021). Relatrio de Investimento Direto – Dezembro de 2021. Banco Central do
Brasil. Disponível em: https://www.bcb.gov.br/publicacoes/relatorioid.
Brasil. (2024). Resultados do Comrcio Exterior Brasileiro - Dados Consolidados.
Ministrio da Economia.
https://balanca.economia.gov.br/balanca/publicacoes_dados_consolidados/pg.html.
Brasil. (2024). República Popular da China. Ministério das Relações Exteriores.
https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/assuntos/relacoes-bilaterais/todos-os-paises/republica-
popular-da-
china#:~:text=A%20China%20é%20o%20maior,US%24%2060%2C7%20bilhões.
Can, C. M., & Chan, A. (2020). Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on
International Order. Chinese Journal of International Review, 02(01), 2050005.
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2630531320500055.
Cunha, A. M., Lélis, M. T. C., Bichara, J. da Silva, & de Lima, M. G. (2012). Brazil In Face
of The Chinese Rise: The Risks of Regressive Specialization. AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal
of Strategy & International Relations, 2, p. 129–168. https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-
6912.30513
De Almeida, P. R. (January-March 2023). Perspectivas da diplomacia no terceiro governo
Lula, 2023-2026. CEBRI-Revista: Brazilian Journal of International Affairs, 2(5), 58–78,
2023. https://cebri-revista.emnuvens.com.br/revista/article/view/103.
De Sousa, A. T. L. M., Abrão, R. A. F., & De Souza, L. F. P. (2023). A China na política
externa do terceiro governo Lula: cem dias de reconstrução. Conjuntura Austral, 14(68),
150–162. https://doi.org/10.22456/2178-8839.133618
Dittmer, L. (2010). China´s Rise, Global Identity and Developing World. In Dittmer, L.,
& Yu, G. T. (Eds.) China, The Developing World and The New Global Dynamic. (pp. 203-
230). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hirst, M., & Maciel, T. (2022). Brazil’s Foreign Policy in The Time of The Bolsonaro
Government. In SciELO Preprints. https://doi.org/10.1590/SciELOPreprints.4771
Putnam, R. D. (2010). Diplomacia e política doméstica: a lógica dos jogos de dois níveis.
Revista de Sociologia e política, 18(36), 147-174.
https://www.scielo.br/j/rsocp/a/qZDV3KMBGGt7RQNCR37Ymkk/abstract/?lang=pt#
Júnior, P. A. V. (2023). Os redirecionamentos da política externa no novo governo Lula.
Cadernos Adenauer XXIV (2023): Novos rumos da Política Externa Brasileira, Rio de
Janeiro, 2, 9-28. https://www.kas.de/pt/web/brasilien/cadernos-adenauer/detail/-
/content/novos-rumos-da-politica-externa-brasileira-1.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
365
Kalout, H., & Costa, H. B. M. da. (2022). A rivalidade China-EUA e os interesses
estratégicos do Brasil. CEBRI-Revista, 1(2). https://cebri.org/revista/br/artigo/32/a-
rivalidade-china-eua-e-os-interesses-estrategicos-do-brasil.
Leite, A. C. C. (2013). Cooperação Sul-Sul e desenvolvimento integrado como diretrizes
da política externa brasileira: uma análise do plano de ação conjunta Brasil-China.
Monções: Revista De Relações Internacionais Da UFGD, 1(2), 67–85.
https://ojs.ufgd.edu.br/index.php/moncoes/article/view/2196
Li, X. (2020). The rise of China and its impact on world economic stratification and re-
stratification. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 34(4).
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2020.1800589.
Li, X., & Bernal-Meza, R. (2021). China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-
core competition? Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 64(1).
https://www.scielo.br/j/rbpi/a/tPFgRF7VfFkZ9hjcd6hpsFG/?format=pdf&lang=en
Marra, A. T. L., Schutte, G. R., Teixeira, A. P, Belasques, B., & Castro, B. (2021). Relações
Brasil-China no governo Bolsonaro: da ideologia ao pragmatismo. In Maringoni, G.,
Schutte, G. R., & Berringer, T. (Org.). As bases da Política Externa Bolsonarista. (pp.
229-225). Santo André: Editora UFABC.
Mazui, G., Barbiéri, L. F., & Rodrigues, M. (2019). ‘China cada vez mais faz parte do
futuro do Brasil’, diz Bolsonaro. G1.
https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/11/13/bolsonaro-recebe-presidente-da-
china-no-itamaraty-antes-de-cupula-de-lideres-do-brics.ghtml.
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2004). Comunicado conjunto entre a
República Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China (24.05.2004): Número 94,
1º semestre de 2004. Resenha Ministério das Relações Exteriores de Política Exterior do
Brasil, Brasília, 94, 328-330.
https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/images/Resenhas/Novas/Resenha_N94_1Sem_2004.p
df
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2010a). Visita ao Brasil do Presidente da
República Popular da China, Hu Jintao - 14 e 15 de abril de 2010 - Comunicado à
imprensa (15/04/2010): número 106, 1° semestre de 2010. Resenha Ministério das
Relações Exteriores de Política Exterior do Brasil, Brasília, 106, 358-361.
https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/images/Resenhas/Novas/resenha106_1_2010.pdf
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2010b) Plano de Ação Conjunta entre o
Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República Popular da China,
2010-2014. Publicado oficialmente em 15/04/2010. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-
de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/2010/04/15/plano-de-acao-conjunta-entre-o-governo-
da>Acesso em: 17 jun.2024.
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2014). Declaração Conjunta entre Brasil e
China por ocasião da Visita de Estado do Presidente Xi Jinping – Brasília, 17 de julho de
2014: número 115, 2° semestre de 2014. Resenha Ministério das Relações Exteriores de
Política Exterior do Brasil, Brasília, 115,2, 143-152.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
366
https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/images/Resenhas/Novas/Resenha_N115_2Sem_2014.
pdf
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2017). VISITA DE ESTADO À CHINA – 1º DE
SETEMBRO DE 2017: número 121, 2° semestre de 2017. Resenha Ministério das
Relações Exteriores de Política Exterior do Brasil, Brasília, 119, 2, 143-145.
https://www.funag.gov.br/chdd/images/Resenhas/Novas/Resenha_N121_1sem_2017.p
df
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE).(2019). Declaração Conjunta entre a República
Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China – 24 a 26 de outubro de 2019.
Brasília.https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-
imprensa/2019/declaracao-conjunta-entre-a-republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-a-
republica-popular-da-china-24-a-26-de-outubro-de-
2019#:~:text=Os%20Presidentes%20testemunharam%20a%20assinatura.
Ministério Das Relações Exteriores (MRE). (2023) Declaração Conjunta entre a República
Federativa do Brasil e a República Popular da China sobre o Aprofundamento da Parceria
Estratégica Global - Pequim, 14 de abril de 2023. Brasília. https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-
br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-conjunta-entre-a-
republica-federativa-do-brasil-e-a-republica-popular-da-china-sobre-o-
aprofundamento-da-parceria-estrategica-global-pequim-14-de-abril-de-2023.
Moreira, D. S. O. (2020). Continuidades e Descontinuidades nos Governos Temer e
Bolsonaro na Política Externa Brasileira (2016-2020) | Continuities and Discontinuities in
the Governments Temer and Bolsonaro in Brazilian Foreign Policy (2016-2020). Mural
Internacional, 11,1-17. https://doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2020.51549
Magalhães, D. (2022). Efeitos do antiglobalismo brasileiro sobre as relações Brasil-China
(2018-2020). Revista de Ciências Humanas: Dossiê Relações Brasil-China, 1(22), 119-
138. Disponível em: https://periodicos.ufv.br/RCH/article/view/13748.
Mota, C. V. (2020). Tensões com China - mas também negócios - aumentam em dois
anos de Bolsonaro. BBC News Brasil. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-
55268591.
Santoro, M. (2020). O Dragão e o Capitão: a China na perspectiva da direita nacionalista
do Brasil. GeoSul, 35(7), 258-269.
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/74103.
Rodrigues, B. S. (September-October 2022). Belt And Road Initiative and The
Geoeconomic Implications for Brazil. Nova Economia, 32(3), 774-801.
https://Www.Scielo.Br/J/Neco/A/B893vzt98ynbhxndkngwh9j/#
Ross, R. S. (2020). It’s not a cold war: competition and cooperation in US–China
relations. China International Strategy Review, 2(1), 63–72.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7304502/.
Silva, A.C.B, & Frutuoso, E. S. (2021). A relação bilateral Brasil-China no governo Lula -
2003 a 2011: A política de aproximação. Revista Relações Exteriores- Revista de Relações
Internacionais. https://relacoesexteriores.com.br/relacao-bilateral-brasil-china/
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 354-367
Brazil-China Relations Since 2003: Convergences And Divergences
André Luiz Reis da Silva, Maiara de Almeida Cardozo
367
Silva, André L. R. (2021). Retraction or consolidation? The follow-up phase in Dilma
Rousseff’s foreign policy (2011-2016). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional
[online]. 64(1), 1-22.
https://www.scielo.br/j/rbpi/a/JfKqtkxMJsgFhjxxWvNxyGz/?lang=en.
Silva, A. L. R. (2004). A Diplomacia brasileira entre a segurança e o desenvolvimento: a
política externa do governo Castelo Branco (1964-1967). Porto Alegre: Editora da
UFRGS.
Silva, A. (2023). Política Externa Brasileira: Qual é o lugar do Brasil no mundo? São
Paulo: Editora de Cultura.
Silva, A. (2015). Geometria variável e parcerias estratégicas: a diplomacia
multidimensional do governo Lula (2003-2010). Contexto Internacional, 37(1), 143-184.
Silva, A. L. R. (2022). De Dilma a Bolsonaro: as transformações matriciais na política
externa brasileira. Sino-Ibero American Interaction, 2(1), 1–26.
https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/sai-2022-0007/.
Schreiber, M. (2020). ‘Brasil está metendo os ps pelas mãos’ com a China, diz ex-
embaixador em Pequim após nova polêmica de Eduardo Bolsonaro. BBC News Brasil.
https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-55081541.amp.
Vadell, J. A., Lo Brutto, A., Leite, C. A., & Crivelli, A. (2020). El rol de la cooperación de
China en la transformación estructural del Sur Global. Geosul, 35(77), 451-475.
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/geosul/article/view/77452.
Wallerstein, I. (2004). World-Systems analysis: an introduction. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
368
THE LUSOPHONE BRIDGE: MACAU'S ROLE IN CHINA-BRAZIL RELATIONS
(1999-2024)
HENOCH GABRIEL MANDELBAUM
henoch@alumni.usp.br
Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (Brazil). Researcher at the
International Relations Research Center at the University of São Paulo (NUPRI-USP), and at the
Center for International Studies and Analyses at São Paulo State University (NEAI-UNESP).
Member of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Midwest Political Science
Association (MPSA), the Second Cold War Observatory (SCWO), and the Society for Hong Kong
Studies (SHKS). His current research interests are Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, and
Political Regimes, with an emphasis on Brazil, Latin America, China (including Hong Kong, Macau,
and Taiwan), and the Indo-Pacific region.
Abstract
Since the handover in 1999, Beijing has strategically used Macau's Portuguese heritage and
thriving local economy to develop closer relations with Lusophone countries. Among these
nations, Brazil stands out as an emerging power and as China's most important trading
partner in Latin America. However, it is crucial to recognize that Macau is not merely a passive
entity in this dynamic. As a Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau possesses a distinct
"actorness", empowered by its Basic Law to engage autonomously in relevant external affairs.
This study aims to dissect and understand Macau's role in the evolving China-Brazil relations
over twenty-five years. To achieve this, I will employ qualitative research methods, primarily
online archival excavation, and document analysis, focusing on official documents, local media
articles, and academic literature. Applying soft power and paradiplomacy frameworks, I will
explore how China has utilized Macau as an instrument of attraction in its dealings with Brazil.
Furthermore, I will examine Macau's endeavors to establish itself as a critical paradiplomatic
player in these interactions. Lastly, I will delve into Brazil's reactions to China and Macau's
efforts to strengthen their ties with the country and how these responses have shaped their
triangular relations.
Keywords
Macau, China, Brazil, Soft Power, Paradiplomacy.
Resumo
Desde a transferência em 1999, Pequim tem utilizado estrategicamente a herança portuguesa
de Macau e a próspera economia local para desenvolver relações mais estreitas com os países
lusófonos. Entre estas nações, o Brasil destaca-se como potência emergente e como o mais
importante parceiro comercial da China na América Latina. No entanto, é crucial reconhecer
que Macau não é apenas uma entidade passiva nesta dinâmica. Enquanto Região
Administrativa Especial (RAE), Macau possui uma “actividade” distinta, habilitada pela sua Lei
Básica a envolver-se autonomamente em assuntos externos relevantes. Este estudo visa
dissecar e compreender o papel de Macau na evolução das relações China-Brasil ao longo de
vinte e cinco anos. Para o conseguir, empregarei métodos de investigação qualitativos,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
369
principalmente consulta de arquivos online e análise de documentos oficiais, artigos dos media
locais e literatura académica. Aplicando estruturas de soft power e paradiplomacia, explorarei
a forma como a China utiliza Macau como instrumento de atracção nas suas relações com o
Brasil. Além disso, examinarei os esforços de Macau para se estabelecer como um actor
paradiplomático crítico nestas interacções. Por último, aprofundarei as reacções do Brasil aos
esforços da China e de Macau para reforçar os seus laços com o país e como estas respostas
moldaram as suas relações triangulares.
Palavras-chave
Macau, China, Brasil, Soft Power, Paradiplomacia.
How to cite this article
Mandelbaum, Henoch Gabriel (2024). The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil
Relations (1999-2024). Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 –
Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December
2024, pp. 368-380. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.18.
Article received on 15 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 10 September 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
370
THE LUSOPHONE BRIDGE: MACAU'S ROLE IN CHINA-BRAZIL
RELATIONS (1999-2024)
HENOCH GABRIEL MANDELBAUM
1. Introduction
In recent years, the relationship between China and Brazil has grown significantly. This
growth is driven by expanding economic and political ties. At the heart of this evolving
partnership is the often-overlooked role of Macau, a Special Administrative Region (SAR)
of China. Since Macau was returned to China from Portugal in 1999, Beijing has aptly
utilized its unique Portuguese heritage and vibrant economy to strengthen ties with
Portuguese-speaking countries (PSC), particularly Brazil. Nonetheless, Macau is not just
a passive player in this strategy since its status as a SAR gives it a unique ability to act
independently in many external affairs. This autonomy allows Macau to bridge China and
the Lusophone world, promoting economic, cultural, and diplomatic exchanges (Matias
dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).
Brazil is the largest PSC and Latin American country, making it a crucial partner for China.
Their relationship is marked by significant trade, investment and intersectoral
cooperation (Oliveira, 2023). Yet, the place of Macau in this bilateral relationship has not
been thoroughly explored. This paper aims to fill that gap, examining Macau's role in
Beijing-Brasília relations over the last twenty-five years. The study will use qualitative
research methods to analyze official documents, local media articles, and academic
literature. By applying soft power and paradiplomacy concepts, the research will look at
how China has used Macau to attract and influence Brazil.
Additionally, it will investigate how Macau has actively worked to establish itself as a
critical player in these diplomatic efforts. The study will consider Brazil's reactions to
initiatives by China and the MSAR, exploring how these responses have shaped the
relationship between the three. Interactions between China, Macau, and Brazil offer a
complex and fascinating case study in contemporary international relations.
2. Soft Power and Paradiplomacy: Diplomatic Tools in an Interdependent
World
In the 1970s, new international players emerged, including non-state and subnational
actors, along with new forms of exerting power in world politics beyond military might.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
371
This shift was driven by advancements in transnational communication, finance, trade,
and travel, as well as the rise of global interdependence. This new scenario begged for
the development of concepts that allowed the understanding of these fast-paced
transformations, leading to the appearance of the terms soft power and paradiplomacy
in academic circles (Al-Malki et al., 2023; Oddone, 2023).
Nye (1990) coined the term soft power, which refers to a country's ability to influence
others and shape their preferences through attraction and persuasion rather than
coercion or payment. Nye (2004) also points out that a country's soft power lies mainly
in three primary resources: culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and foreign policy (when it is
perceived as legitimate and has moral authority).
Culture encompasses the values and practices that impart meaning to a society,
manifesting in various forms. It is often categorized into high culture, which includes
literature, art, and education appealing to elites; and popular culture, which centers on
mass entertainment. When a nation's culture embodies universal values and its policies
advocate for shared values and interests, it enhances the likelihood of achieving desired
outcomes due to the bonds of attraction and duty it fosters. Commerce is just one method
of cultural transmission. Culture is also shared through personal interactions, visits, and
exchanges (Nye, 2004).
Government policies, both domestic and international, can be significant sources of soft
power. Depending on the context, these policies can have varying impacts over the short
and long term. Effective policies can enhance a nation's soft power by reinforcing its
attractiveness and legitimacy. Meanwhile, the political values a government promotes in
its domestic actions, its participation in international institutions, and its foreign policy
significantly influence the preferences of others. Governments can either attract or repel
others through the power of their example. However, governments vie for control of soft
power against a wide array of opinion leaders, including news media, corporations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and
scientific networks (Nye, 2004).
At the same time, the most encompassing and widely accepted definition of
paradiplomacy has been advanced by Noé Cornago (1999: 40), who understands it as
“sub-state governments’ involvement in international relations through the
establishment of formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with foreign
public or private entities, to promote socio-economic, cultural or political issues, as well
as any other foreign dimension of their own constitutional competences.”
Paradiplomacy is governed by strong institutional conditions, including the necessity for
political legitimacy, defined competencies, professionalized infrastructures, and financial
resources for international operations. Furthermore, it is increasingly shaped by agreed-
upon rules and is a collection of practices. When subnational governments engage in
structured international activities, they do so under the influence of international norms,
rules, and practices. Subnational governments, in collaboration with international
organizations, transnational networks of subnational governments, and academics, have
been participating in an international socialization process. This process is facilitating the
establishment of a new international institution (Oddone, 2023).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
372
More importantly, paradiplomacy can render actorness to the subnational units that use
it. Tianyang Liu and Yao Song (2020) elaborated a four-dimensional analytical framework
of the essential dimensions of international actorness in paradiplomacy: 1) authority,
which refers to the powers that allow a subnational government to engage in international
relations, albeit with certain limitations; 2) opportunity, which refers to opportunities
arising from the external environment that directly or indirectly support the role of a
subnational government as an actor in international relations; 3) capability, which refers
to opportunities generated by the external environment that directly or indirectly
enhance the role of a subnational government as a participant in international relations;
and 4) presence, which pertains to the external and internal recognition of subnational
governments as international actors by third parties.
3. Macau in the Chinese Soft Power Toward Brazil: Attracting a
Portuguese-Speaking Strategic Partner (1999-2024)
China's post-Cold War strategy heavily relies on using the soft power approach in its
foreign policy. Since 2004, China has expanded its global influence through a network of
Confucius Institutes (CI) and Classrooms (CC), modernizing state media, enhancing
overseas aid, and investing in cultural promotion. Under Xi Jinping, China intensified
these efforts, launching the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, aiming to strengthen
global trade networks and investing nearly US$1 trillion by 2023. China also established
international financial institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and the New Development Bank (NDB), to create alternatives to the US-led global order
(Kurlantzick, 2023; Leahy et al., 2023).
Meanwhile, Brazil has become more important in Beijing's foreign policy agenda since
1993, when it successfully elevated its cooperative relationship with China to a Strategic
Partnership (SP), being the first country to do so. In 2012, the Brazil-China partnership
advanced to a new level when it was elevated to a global SP as part of both countries'
response to the 2008 financial crisis. This elevation signified China's recognition of Brazil's
position within the international system (Oliveira, 2023).
Therefore, Brazil remains a highly valued strategic partner for Beijing for three primary
reasons: 1) it is a reliable supplier of essential commodities for industrial production and
capital formation, as well as foodstuffs to feed China's population of 1.41 billion while
boasting a US$ 157.4 billion bilateral trade (2023). Additionally, it serves as a significant
consumer market in Latin America for Chinese goods and services, especially in strategic
sectors such as energy, manufacturing, and information technology (Ellis, 2017; Reis,
2024); 2) it plays a pivotal role in South-South Cooperation (SSC) due to its status as a
rising power that shares China's aspiration of shifting the world order towards a
multipolar system. This includes amplifying the voice of the developing world in
international institutions and pushing for the de-dollarization of the global financial
system, a shift that both countries believe can be expedited through the joint diplomatic
efforts of BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Liu & Papa,
2022); and 3) as a regional power, it can help mitigate U.S. influence in Latin America
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
373
and compel Washington to refocus its strategic attention from the Indo-Pacific to the
Western Hemisphere (Liang, 2019; Pini, 2015).
Because of these reasons, China started to launch a soft power offensive towards Brazil
by using Macau as a major asset in this strategy, mainly in the cultural exchanges and
foreign policy initiatives. Designated as a platform between China and the Lusophone
world, due to the 442 years of Portuguese rule in the enclave (1557-1999) and the
acceptance of Portuguese as an official language alongside Chinese after the handover
to Beijing, Macau has unique characteristics to serve in this intermediary role effectively.
In addition, the increasing demand for Portuguese language courses has transformed
Macau into a prime location for linguistic and cultural training for Chinese diplomats,
interpreters, CI Mandarin teachers, and businesspeople before they begin working in
PSC, including Brazil (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).
Among Beijing's cultural initiatives, the most important one is the Cultural Week of China
and Portuguese-Speaking Countries, launched in 2008, annually held in Macau and
organized by the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade
Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau). The event is
also supported by the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Macau Special Administrative Region
(MSAR), the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau, the Macau Government Tourism Office,
the Oriental Foundation, and the Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange
between Asia-Pacific and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Mendes, 2014; Yu, 2018). For
five days, artists from Mainland China, Macau, and the PSC perform music, theatrical
presentations, dance shows, and exhibit photography, painting, and handicrafts. The
Permanent Secretariat describes the Cultural Week as "a brilliant symbol of Macau's
establishment as the center of cultural exchange between China and Portuguese-
speaking countries" (Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica
e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Macau), 2023).
In the foreign policy arena, the main initiative the Chinese government leads is the Macau
Forum. The Forum, created in 2003 by China's Central Government and coordinated by
the Ministry of Commerce (MoC), represented a groundbreaking development in
international relations. It connects China with nine Portuguese-speaking countries across
four continents: Brazil in South America, Portugal in Europe, East Timor in Asia, and six
African nations—Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and
Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea
1
. The Macau Forum’s ministerial conferences are always
held in Macau and feature a Permanent Secretariat based in the city. The Chinese MoC
nominates the Secretary-General. He is assisted by three deputy secretaries-general:
one appointed by China’s MoC, one by the MSAR, and one on a rotational basis in
alphabetical order among the PSC (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).
In 2003, the First Ministerial Conference, chaired by then-Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi,
reached an agreement to enhance Sino-Lusophone economic collaboration,
1
Equatorial Guinea joined the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 2014, and the Macau
Forum in 2022. Although Portuguese is one of the country's official languages, alongside Spanish and
French, it is not widely spoken. The only Portuguese-based creole language spoken in Equatorial Guinea
is Fa d'Ambô, which is used on the islands of Annobón and Bioko, and in the capital, Malabo. Cf. Agostinho,
2021.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
374
intergovernmental partnerships, trade, investment, entrepreneurship, fisheries,
agriculture, engineering, infrastructure development, natural resources, and human
resources. The 2010 conference aimed to elevate the Macau Forum to a higher level. The
establishment of the Training Center for PSC officials in 2010 also contributed to the
renewed momentum generated by the third Ministerial Conference (Matias dos Santos,
2020).
4. The Lusophone Bridge: Macau as a Paradiplomatic Actor in China-
Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
According to Liu and Song's (2020) framework, the MSAR has all the elements of
international actorness. Regarding authority, the Macau Basic Law (MBL) (1993), which
serves as the "mini-constitution" of the SAR and came into effect when Macau was
handed over to Beijing, stipulates that Macau "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy for
fifty years, except in foreign and defense affairs, which are the responsibilities of the
Central People's Government" (Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, 1993, Art. 12). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
MBL presents a hybrid approach to Macau's autonomy since it highlights the binominal
approach: “foreign affairs” vis-à-vis “external relations”, in which the former is the sole
domain of the Central Government while the latter comprises an authorized external
space for the SAR (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014). The MBL stipulates that the
“Macao Special Administrative Region [sic] may on its own, using the name ‘Macao,
China,’ [sic] maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements
with states, regions and relevant international or regional organizations in the
appropriate fields, such as the economy, trade, finance, shipping, communications,
tourism, culture, science and technology and sports” (Basic Law of the Macao Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1993, Art. 136).
About opportunity, the MSAR's push into an intense international engagement was mainly
prompted by China's skyrocketing real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the early
2000s, around 10.5% per year, due to the country's accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001. WTO membership committed China to further opening its
economy, reducing tariffs, and eliminating trade barriers. This created a more favorable
environment for foreign investment, leading to a surge in FDI inflows. Furthermore,
Chinese growth was favored by comprehensive economic reforms, successful State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE) restructuring, an export-led growth strategy, substantial
infrastructure investments, a favorable demographic profile, and stable governance (Yao,
2014).
This context transformed China into the second-largest consumer of energy resources
after the US, prompting Beijing to place energy security as one of its foremost priorities.
At the time, more than 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originated from the Middle
East, a dependency Beijing viewed as a strategic vulnerability due to the region's political
instability and the dominant US military presence. Consequently, China strived to
diversify its energy imports away from traditional sources in the Persian Gulf, turning to
PSC such as Angola, Brazil, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste. Additionally, Beijing aimed to
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
375
leverage the rich natural resources of PSC to sustain its rapid economic growth (Horta,
2006; Matias dos Santos, 2020).
Regarding capability, the MSAR has heavily invested in cultural and diplomatic initiatives
to increase its international influence over foreign partners. The Macanese government
has sponsored numerous academic exchanges and PSC cultural festivals, while also
providing scholarships to students from African PSC. The MSAR has also hosted many
meetings involving professionals, academics, government officials, and businesspeople
from China and PSC (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014; Yu, 2018).
Concerning presence, the MSAR now participates as a full or associate member in over
eighteen economic and cultural international institutions, including the WTO, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). Macau has consular relations with fifty-seven countries and
maintains economic and trade offices in Lisbon and Brussels. Its representative in
Brussels, where the European Union headquarters is located, is also accredited in
Geneva, the seat of the WTO and many other international organizations. Brazil's
importance is evident for Macau: its GDP is 5.15 times larger than that of all the other
PSC combined, making it the primary focus for any strategy aimed at promoting a
"greater Lusophone" commercial network. This trade relationship could effectively
stimulate the international Lusophone community and provide a means to diversify
Macau's heavy reliance on Cantonese gamblers from South China. However, the bilateral
trade between the MSAR and Brazil continues to be very small: it amounted to around
US$ 3.15 million in 2023. Macau primarily exports plastics, clocks, watches, and
machinery to Brazil. Meanwhile, Brazil exports to Macau mainly agricultural and food
products (Spooner, 2016a, 2016b; Trading Economics, 2024a).
Therefore, Macau has launched several cultural initiatives to foster closer relations with
Brazil and the other PSC. The most notable one is the Lusophone Festival (Festival da
Lusofonia), established in 1998 and held annually every October to celebrate and
promote the culture of the PSC. It also honors the Lusophone communities living in Macau
for their contributions to the region's development. Organized by the Institute for Civic
and Municipal Affairs and the Tourist Office, this traditional event features a variety of
cultural activities, including food, handicrafts, exhibitions, and concerts (Matias dos
Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).
The MSAR also actively supports academic events that connect local universities and
those from the PSC countries. The University of Macau has hosted several meetings of
the Association of Universities of Portuguese Language (AULP). In 2011, its Department
of Portuguese hosted the World Symposium on Portuguese Language Studies and
annually organizes the Day of the Portuguese Language and the Summer Course on
Portuguese Language and Culture. This course includes visits and meetings with
Macanese officials, educating participants about Macau's role as a cultural crossroads and
a platform for relations between China and the PSC (Mendes, 2014).
Despite not being directly aimed at Brazil, the international sports tournaments hosted
in the SAR have fostered people-to-people and organization-to-organization links
between Macau and Brazil. Brazilians tend to have a prominent presence in Macau's
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
376
world-class Grand Prix. For instance, "Pipo" Derani secured third place in the 60th-
anniversary race in Fall 2013, and Lucas di Grassi won the 52nd Macau Grand Prix in
2005. The top-ranked Brazilian Women's Volleyball Team has also regularly competed in
major tournaments in Macau, facing teams from China, Russia, and the USA, including
the 2011 International Federation of Volleyball Championship (Spooner, 2016b).
One of the MSAR's main diplomatic initiatives towards Brazil is its support to the Macau
Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America
(MAPEAL), a non-profit organization that focuses on the promotion of exchanges and
connections between Macau, China, and Latin America, specifically in the areas of culture,
business, tourism, academic research, publication, information exchange, and training.
Among all the events and activities, two annual events are regularly organized between
October and November/December each year. The "Latin American Cultural Festival," held
from early October until the end of November, features 9 to 14 activities to foster cultural
exchange, along with some business matching activities. Another significant annual event
is the "Latin American Pavilion" and the associated seminars/forums, which take place in
mid-October at the "Macao International Trade and Investment Fair" to foster business
cooperation and exchange (Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange between
Asia-Pacific and Latin America, 2024; Mendes, 2014).
Despite its potential, the MSAR has not yet fully realized its role as a bridge between
China and the PSC. The local business community, except for Stanley Ho's group and a
few other entrepreneurs, has not placed enough emphasis on Lusophone markets.
Additionally, some local authorities, who often focus more on internal matters than global
engagement, have shown limited commitment, and the MSAR still needs to establish a
trade and economic delegation in Brazil, as the only existing one in a PSC is in Portugal
(Matias dos Santos, 2020).
5. Brazil's Responses to China's and Macau's Soft Power Initiatives
(1999-2024)
Brazil prizes its relationship with China primarily for economic and political reasons. China
has been the largest destination for Brazilian exports since 2009 (Oliveira, 2023). Since
2012, China has been Brazil's leading supplier of imported goods. In 2023, Brazil
exported US$ 104.32 billion worth of goods to China, especially soy, iron ore, and oil,
while the country imported US$ 74.19 billion worth of manufactured goods, especially
machines and equipment (Trading Economics, 2024b). Simultaneously, Brasília
welcomes diplomatic cooperation with China to maintain its economic and political
independence from US influence and interference, thereby enhancing its bargaining
power with Washington (Liang, 2019; Pini, 2015).
Brazil's participation in the Macau Forum has become more intense over the years.
Initially, Brazil was criticized for sending low-level officials to the Forum's ministerial
conferences. However, in 2013, Brasília sent Vice President Michel Temer to the 4th
Ministerial Conference. Brazil also values the Macau Forum since it allows the country to
engage annually with China and the PSC at the same event (Mendes, 2014; Veloso,
2015; Meneses, 2020).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
377
Some observers (Mendes, 2014; Meneses, 2020; Veloso, 2015) have raised concerns
that the Forum might enhance China's influence in the African PSC, which may undermine
Brazil’s strategic interests in the region. However, Brazilian diplomats have publicly
stated that they do not see the Macau Forum as damaging to Brasília’s interests. Paulo
Estivallet, the former Brazilian Ambassador to Beijing, emphasized that Brazil values and
recognizes China's efforts to promote rapprochement with the PSC through this
mechanism. He highlighted that Brazil accounts for over 80% of China-PSC trade and is
interested in participating in initiatives facilitating business and investments between
member countries (Meneses, 2020). Brazil has also steadily engaged in China's cultural
initiatives aimed at the PSC, sending diplomats, artists, scholars, chefs, and business
delegations to the events held in Macau (Matias dos Santos, 2020). According to
Ambassador Estivallet: "Since his [sic] creation and within the limits of its capabilities,
Brazil has been seeking to participate in the initiatives promoted by the Macau Forum,
both in the economic-commercial field and in the areas of cultural, educational and
linguistic promotion" (Meneses, 2020).
It is important to note that Brazil's participation in the Macau Forum fluctuates depending
on the strength of its bilateral relations with China. Given the extensive trade volume
between Brazil and China, Brazil prioritizes its direct bilateral channels with China over
the Forum. Moreover, Chinese soft power may not sufficiently enhance Brasília-Beijing
relations due to several challenges: 1) there is an imbalance in trade, with Brazil's exports
primarily consisting of soybeans and minerals, leading to the reprimarization of Brazilian
exports; 2) the Brazilian industry struggles to compete with Chinese imports, contributing
to the country's growing deindustrialization; 3) Brazil has not formally joined the BRI,
citing the initiative's ambiguous legal frameworks and a lack of strategic information for
Brazil's productive and political sectors; and 4) China remains ambivalent toward some
of Brazil's key foreign policy goals, such as securing a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council (Lopes, 2023; Oliveira, 2023).
Regarding the MSAR's cultural and diplomatic efforts towards Brazil, the South American
country has regularly participated in its initiatives, sending diplomats, business
delegations and artists. In addition, Macau, as a place with Portuguese as its official
language, remains an attractive place to Brazilian researchers and athletes who want to
work in China since it facilitates their lives there. Nevertheless, Brazil does not view the
MSAR with the same level of importance as its relations with Beijing. Since the handover,
Brazil has made only a couple of notable visits to the MSAR. Brazil's Vice President Michel
Temer visited in 2013 for the 10th anniversary of the Macau Forum, and almost a decade
earlier, in the fall of 2004, Brazil’s Minister of Culture and renowned musician, Gilberto
Gil, made a brief appearance. However, Gil's visit was primarily for the Hong Kong music
festival, not Macau. Until Temer's visit in 2013, Gilberto Gil was the highest-ranking
Brazilian official to have visited Macau. Another issue that limits its relations with the
MSAR is that, as Brazil has outlawed gambling casinos in its territory since 1946, the
country lacks companies that can invest in the MSAR's thriving gaming industry (Mendes,
2014; Spooner, 2016a, 2016b).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
378
Conclusion
Over the past twenty-five years, the evolving relationship between China and Brazil has
highlighted Macau's unique role as a bridge between the two countries. This study
demonstrates how Macau's Portuguese heritage and status as a Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of China have been leveraged to strengthen ties with Brazil, a Portuguese-
speaking rising power in Latin America.
Following Nye’s (2004) framework, China and Macau have focused on cultural and foreign
policy initiatives to foster deeper engagement with Brazil. Besides, the MSAR has all the
elements of actorness that were advanced by Liu and Song (2020). Macau has sought to
position itself as a cultural and economic intermediary, enhancing China's soft power in
Brazil through various initiatives and collaborations. Established in 2003, the Macau
Forum has been pivotal in promoting economic, cultural, and educational exchanges
between China and the PSC, including Brazil. Macau's efforts to host the Cultural Week
of China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries and provide a hub for Portuguese language
training for Chinese diplomats and businesspeople underscore its strategic importance.
Still, several challenges remain. Apart from a few notable exceptions, the Macanese
business community has not sufficiently prioritized the emphasis on Lusophone markets,
including Brazil. Establishing a trade and economic delegation in Brazil remains an
unfulfilled need, as currently, the only such delegation in a PSC is in Portugal. From
Brazil's perspective, the country remains cautious about deepening its engagement with
China, primarily due to the asymmetry in their bilateral trade relations, skepticism about
the benefits of the BRI, and the lack of support for some of Brazil's strategic goals in its
quest to become a great power. Concerning relations between Brasília and the MSAR,
Brazil has yet to accord more political and economic importance to the region.
In conclusion, while Macau has made significant strides in enhancing China-Brazil
relations, addressing these challenges is crucial to completely capitalize on its strategic
position. Macau's distinct actorness, facilitated by its autonomy under the Basic Law, has
enabled it to serve as a vital conduit for Chinese diplomatic efforts. As Beijing continues
to expand its global influence, overcoming these obstacles will be essential to further
solidifying Macau's role in international diplomacy involving the PSC.
References
Agostinho, Ana L. (2021). Fa d’Ambô (Equatorial Guinea): language snapshot. Language
Documentation and Description. Vol. 20, pp. 123-134.
Al-Malki, Fahad K., Safranchuk, Ivan A., & Chernov, Daniil N. (2023). Actorness of small
power: the case of Qatar. Journal of Globalization Studies. Vol. 14, pp.119–128.
Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People' s Republic of China.
(1993, March 31). Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Retrieved in August
2024, from https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/the-basic-law-of-the-
macao-macau-special-administrative-region-of-the-
prc#Chapter%20I%20General%20Principles.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
379
Cornago, Noé (1999). Diplomacy and paradiplomacy in the redefinition of international
security: dimensions of conflict and cooperation. Francisco Aldecoa, and Michael Keating
(eds), Paradiplomacy in action: the foreign relations of subnational governments.
London: Frank Cass, pp. 40–57.
Ellis, Robert E. (2017) The strategic context of China's advance in Latin America: an
update. Observatoire de la Chine, pp. 2-7.
Horta, Loro (2006, June 22). China’s Portuguese connection. Yale Global Online.
Retrieved in August 2024, from https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-
portuguese-connection.
Kurlantzick, Joshua (2023). Beijing's global media offensive: China's uneven campaign
to influence Asia and the world. New York: Oxford University Press.
Leahy, Joe, Kynge, James, and Parkin, Benjamin (2023, October 22). Ten years of China’s
Belt and Road: what has $1tn achieved? Financial Times. Retrieved in August 2024, from
https://www.ft.com/content/83501dd5-fe6d-4169-9d83-28a8cf46e681.
Liang, Wei (2019). Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin
America. Journal of Chinese Political Science. Vol. 24, pp. 433–449.
Liu, Tianyang, and Song, Yao (2020). Chinese paradiplomacy: a theoretical review. Sage
Open. Vol. 10, pp. 1-14.
Liu, Zongyuan Z., and Papa, Mihaela (2022). Can BRICS de-dollarize the global financial
system? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lopes, Dawisson B. (2023). De FHC a Bolsonaro: a emergência da política externa pós-
diplomática. José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (org), Alexandre Uehara (ed) 25 anos de
politica externa brasileira 1996-2021. São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, pp. 47-73.
Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America
(2024). About us. Retrieved in August 2024, from https://www.mapeal.org/about-us.
Matias dos Santos, José C. (2020). Macau and China-Portuguese-speaking countries
relations: from nation (place) branding to soft power. Meng U Ieong (ed) Macau 20 years
after the handover: changes and challenges under “One Country, Two Systems”.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Mendes, Carmen A. (2014). Macau in China's relations with the Lusophone world. Revista
Brasileira de Política Internacional. Vol. 57, pp. 225-242.
Meneses, João P. (2020, May 21). Brazil. Harmful or “interested in participating”? Macau
News Network. Retrieved in August 2024, from https://www.macaubusiness.com/brazil-
harmful-or-interested-in-participating/.
Nye, Joseph S. (1990). Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power. New
York: Basic Books.
Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York:
Public Affairs.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 368-380
The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)
Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum
380
Oddone, Nahuel. (2023, February 22). Paradiplomacy. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
International Studies. Retrieved in August 2024, from
https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.
0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-797.
Oliveira, Henrique A. de (2023). Brasil e China: a institucionalização de um modelo de
parceria e cooperação. José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (org), Alexandre Uehara (ed)
25 anos de politica externa brasileira 1996-2021. São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, pp. 325-
354.
Pini, André M. (2015). A crescente presença chinesa na América Latina: desafios ao
Brasil. Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional, pp. 21-31.
Reis, Henrique (2024, January 9). Comércio entre Brasil e China: 2023, um ano de
recordes históricos. Comex do Brasil. Retrieved in August 2024, from
https://comexdobrasil.com/comercio-entre-brasil-e-china-2023-um-ano-de-recordes-
historicos/.
Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a
China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Macau). Apresentação. 15a Semana Cultural da
China e dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. Retrieved in August 2024, from
https://semanacultural.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/home.
Spooner, Paul B. (2016a). Macau's trade with the Portuguese-speaking world. Journal of
Global Initiatives. Vol. 11, pp. 137-162.
Spooner, Paul B. (2016b). Macau and Brazil: from the World Trade Organization to a
major gaming city. Asian Education and Development Studies. Vol. 5, pp. 327-341.
Trading Economics (2024a). Brazil imports from Macau. Retrieved in July 2024, from
https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/imports/macau.
Trading Economics (2024b). China imports from Brazil. Retrieved in July 2024, from
https://tradingeconomics.com/china/imports/brazil.
Veloso, Isabel (2015). O Fórum Macau e a CPLP nas estratégias de cooperação sul-sul
da China e do Brasil na África. Perspectivas: Revista de Ciências Sociais. Vol. 45, pp. 41-
62.
Yao, Yang (2014). The Chinese growth miracle. Philippe Aghion, and Steven N. Durlauf
(eds), Handbook of economic growth. Oxford: North-Holland, pp. 943-1031.
Yu, Huichun (2018). Cultural exchanges between China and Portuguese-speaking
countries: Macao platform. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities
Research. Vol. 215, pp.198-201.
OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15, N.º 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:
The rise of modern International Order
December 2024
381
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY:
AN IMPORTANT PART OF CURRENT SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS
CHEN JIANFEI
mc35836@umac.mo
Master student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau (China). Her research
interests include Latin American politics, peace and conflict in the Latin American region, Latin
America in the context of South-South relations, and development issues in Third World
countries.
Abstract
The evolution cooperation pattern in regard Sino-Brazilian cooperation, has extended to
climate and sustainability concerns in light of the United countries Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. The importance of this subject rests with
the fact that two of the top 10 world economies are advocating for the principle of "common
but differentiated responsibilities” and making it an important part of their bilateral
relationship. By analyzing government documents, policies, and major projects related to
climate change mitigation, the addresses various approaches, cooperation and improvement
in bilateral and multilateral efforts. In this study, we argue that the risen to power of President
Lula offered opportunities for deeper cooperation between Brazil and China to navigate
external pressures and actions to protect the climate. Thus, Brazil and China are not only able
to protect tropical rainforests, but also contribute significantly to ameliorate the global climate
and promote sustainability.
Keywords
Brazil, China, Climate Changes, Environmental Diplomacy.
Resumo
O padrão de evolução da cooperação sino-brasileira estendeu-se às preocupações climáticas
e de sustentabilidade à luz da Convenção-Quadro dos Estados Unidos sobre Alterações
Climáticas (UNFCCC) e do Acordo de Paris. A importância deste assunto reside no facto de
duas das 10 principais economias mundiais defenderem o princípio das “responsabilidades
comuns mas diferenciadas” e do Brasil e da China terem tornado esta preocupações numa
parte importante da sua relação bilateral. Neste estudo, defendemos que a ascensão ao poder
do Presidente Lula ofereceu oportunidades para uma cooperação mais profunda entre o Brasil
e a China para lidar com pressões externas e ações para proteger o clima. Assim, o Brasil e a
China não só são capazes de proteger as florestas tropicais, como também contribuem
significativamente para melhorar o clima global e promover a sustentabilidade.
Palavras-chave
Brasil, China, Alterações Climáticas, Diplomacia Ambiental.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
382
How to cite this article
Jianfei, Chen (2024). Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-
Brazilian Relations. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 – Temathic
Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December 2024, pp.
381-390. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.19.
Article received on 6 August 2024 and accepted for publication on 4 October 2024.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
383
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY:
AN IMPORTANT PART OF CURRENT SINO-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS
CHEN JIANFEI
Introduction
The global concern on climate change has becoming more and more an urgent topic and
it’s the defining issue of our time. With the challenges led by shifting weather patterns
and rising sea levels, nations worldwide are building strategic partnerships to combat this
existential threat. Among these alliances, the relationships between Brazil and China
plays a significant role in environmental sustainability (United Nations, n.d.).
As two of the world's largest economies and greenhouse gas emitters, the cooperation
between Brazil and China does have the potential to be an important part of global
environmental policy. The joint declaration of deepening comprehensive strategic
partnership between the two nations in 2023 acknowledged the imperative to confront
the impacts of climate change. This acknowledgment pushed the establishment of a
specialized committee under China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation
Committee, focused on environmental protection and climate change reduction (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2023).
The book Brazil-China Relations in the 21st Century: The Making of a Strategic
Partnership by Maurício Santoro and Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More
Effective Global Agreements by Susskind et. al. provided the main inspiration for this
paper. The content on news and government websites was also a source of reference.
They provide factual references, theoretical support, and inspiration for ideas. This study
examines both the internal and external challenges encountered in cooperation while also
discussing the potential prospects and relevance of Brazilian-Chinese collaboration for
other Latin American countries, particularly those with rainforests, and for global South-
South cooperation.
The research objective is to analyze Brazil–China relations regarding climate change by
scrutinizing their bilateral cooperation and commitments within multilateral platforms,
focusing on policy documents and diplomatic exchanges. It will explore opportunities,
challenges, and prospects for enhanced cooperation between the two countries in climate
action and sustainable development.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
384
Literature Review
According to Susskind et. al. (2014), environmental diplomacy specifically addresses the
significance of agreements and negotiations related to global environmental importance
and concerns. It refers to the function of international treaties, agreements and accords
in promoting cooperation and settling disputes pertaining to environmental matters.
According to this supposition, a variety of factors can be used to assess whether
environmental treaty-making procedures are successful or unsuccessful, including the
involvement of civil society, the strength of scientific consensus, and the execution of
accords. The various issues of climate change diplomacy are also made clear by the rise
of new academic subfields such as environmental security, global environmental
governance, and environmental peacebuilding. By putting these different theoretical
concepts to practical use, environmental diplomacies are able to reach agreements that
are not only beneficial to the environment, but also enhance international relations by
discussing these common and shared environmental issues (Susskind et al., 2014).
Examining Brazil-China ties in the subject of climate change provides important points of
view into the changing nature of global cooperation to tackle environmental issues. Since
the early 1990s, both nations (Brazil and China) have actively participated in climate
change negotiations, especially through their memberships in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This early participation
significantly highlights Brazil's and China's importance as major actors in global climate
governance (Santoro, 2022).
The literature also discusses the consequences of China's and Brazil's status as countries
in the process of industrialization with abundant natural resources and biodiversity. Both
nations have committed to combating climate change and protecting the environment,
despite having different political systems. Their cooperation in climate diplomacy
demonstrates their understanding of the value of group action in addressing global
warming in addition to their shared interests (Santoro, 2022) (Cheng, 2022).
Methodological approaches focusing on policy responses related to climate change,
provide a comprehensive understanding of the strategies adopted by Brazil and China in
climate challenges (Barbi, 2016). By analyzing government documents, policies, and
major projects related to climate change mitigation, the addresses various approaches,
cooperation and improvement in bilateral and multilateral efforts. Overall, the literature
on Brazil-China relations shows the importance of understanding the interactions
between political, economic, and environmental factors in solving climate change issues.
Historical Background
Brazil and China have strong partnerships including economic cooperation, diplomatic
exchanges, and cooperation in various fields. From the establishment of diplomatic ties
in 1974 to the upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012, their
relationships have flourished (Santoro, 2022). In the twentieth century, both Brazil and
China went through the periods of intensive development primarily focusing on economic
growth and industrialization. During this time, environmental concerns took a backseat
as the primary goal was to use natural resources for agricultural and industrial purposes
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
385
(Furtado, 2005; Shapiro, 2001). This history resulted in significant environmental
problem, including deforestation, pollution, and loss of biodiversity (Watts, 2010).
At the beginning, both Brazil and China didn’t focus much on international environmental
agendas, viewing them as they will slow down the developmental projects (Correa do
Lago, 2007). In Brazil, the military regime prioritized economic expansion in the Amazon,
while China was on a path of opening and reform. Environmental concerns were covered
by the pursuit of economic growth.
The tide began to turn in Brazil during the democratization of the 1980s, marked by the
emergence of a vibrant environmental movement, particularly in the Amazon region.
Figures like Chico Mendes, a leader of rubber workers, gained global recognition,
symbolizing the growing environmental consciousness of the era. Institutional
developments, including the establishment of agencies dedicated to environmental
protection, laid the base for future environmental policy and diplomacy (Santoro, 2022).
In 1992, Brazil took a significant step towards holding the global environmental
cooperation by hosting the UN Conference on Environment and Development, known as
the Earth Summit. This event represented the adoption of important agreements such as
Agenda 21, the Convention on Biodiversity, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC, especially, laid the base for international cooperation in
climate change by recognizing the need for emission reductions (Santoro, 2022).
In climate change negotiations, both Brazil and China advocated for the principle of
"common but differentiated responsibilities," as mentioned in the UNFCCC. This principle
acknowledged the historical responsibility of developed nations for greenhouse gas
emissions while recognizing the shared but differentiated responsibilities of developing
countries (Santoro, 2022).
In the historical context, the trend of cooperation between China and Brazil on climate
change is on the rise. China already has a good understanding of the local situation from
its long history of political, economic and historical cooperation with Brazil, which has laid
the foundation for the positive trend of cooperation on climate change that follows.
Current Status of Climate Change Cooperation
Brazil and China jointly released a statement in April 2023 pledging to confront the
climate crisis together and acknowledge it as one of the greatest challenges of the
modern era. At their meeting in Beijing, President Xi Jinping and President Lula da Silva
agreed that combating climate change and establishing a just and prosperous global
community are crucial and important (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024).
Both states emphasized the need to combine immediate climate responses with
conservation and cooperation to achieve sustainable development goals. They agreed to
broaden, deepen, and enrich bilateral cooperation in the field of climate change, following
the principles of the United countries Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. They also confirmed again their commitment to the
Paris Agreement's objective of limiting global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees
Celsius over pre-industrial levels, with efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
They also expressed determination to strengthen multilateralism and oppose
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
386
unilateralism, emphasizing the importance of international solidarity and cooperation in
addressing climate change. In terms of concrete actions, both countries have undertaken
various joint initiatives, policies, and projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, promoting renewable energy, and enhancing climate sustainability. These
include efforts in transitioning to sustainable and low-carbon economies, developing
smart cities, investing in green infrastructure, fostering green industries, and promoting
renewable energy sources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024).
Furthermore, Brazil and China are also cooperating on technology development and
sharing, particularly in monitoring forest cover through initiatives like the China-Brazil
Earth Resources Satellite Program (CBERS). They also intend to exchange knowledge and
best practices in rain forest protection, sustainable management, ecosystem
regeneration, and vegetation restoration Both countries are engaging in policy dialogues
and sharing experiences in climate financing, aiming to mobilize resources effectively and
sustainably for climate-related projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). Brazil and
China have established a subcommittee on environment and climate change under the
China-Brazil High-Level Coordination and Cooperation Committee. This will provide a
platform for continued dialogue, coordination, and joint action on climate issues (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2024).
Overall, the current situation of cooperation between Brazil and China in climate change
reflects a commitment to sustainable development and international cooperation.
Challenges and Opportunities
The relationships between Brazil and China in climate change leads to both challenges
and opportunities that will shape global environmental governance in the 21st century.
One of the significant challenges is from the different approaches of past Brazilian
administrations towards environmental protection. While President Lula's holds a positive
attitude on this, like establishing the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples and proposing
Amazon-centric summits and conferences, which signifies a commitment to
environmental preservation, the legacy of former President Bolsonaro's policies did not.
Bolsonaro's unwillingness for environmental concerns and his initial withdrawal from
hosting COP25 have played a negative role on Brazil's international environmental image.
This difference within Brazil's governance creates challenges in making climate actions
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). Moreover, the competitive situation between the
United States and the European Union for global climate governance leadership intensify
external pressure on Brazil's Amazon policy. The influence from these key international
actors complicates Brazil's efforts to balance sovereignty with protective environmental
measures in the Amazon region. However, this pressure also shows an opportunity for
Brazil to establish its own leadership and engage in effective multilateral cooperation,
and its influence in global climate governance (Zhou, 2013).
On the other hand, Brazil and China share common ground in addressing climate change,
particularly in tropical rainforest protection. China also has a large range of forests and
successful experiences to protect them. Both countries have advantages in protecting
these vital ecosystems and reducing climate change. The common ground of interests
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
387
provides a good way for cooperation, and Brazil and China can exchange their strengths
and resources to advance sustainable practices and policies.
Brazil has been formally elected as the host country for COP 30. The Minister for the
Environment and Climate Change and head of the Brazilian delegation, Marina Silva,
declared that COP 30 will be hosted in the city of Belém do Pará. It will be the first time
that the Amazon, an important biosphere for combating climate change, would host a
UNFCCC COP. This will bring new platforms and new initiatives for cooperation between
Brazil and China (XINHUANET, 2023). The risen to power of President Lula offered
opportunities for deeper cooperation between Brazil and China to navigate external
pressures and actions to protect the climate. Brazil and China are not only able to protect
tropical rainforests but also contribute significantly to global climate and sustainability.
China and Brazil should increase their cooperation and exchanges in the environmental
field. The feasibility of expanding environmental cooperation between the two countries
is high. They have many points of convergence of interests; at the same time, their
development and transformation tasks are similar, and they have the same demands for
international cooperation.
This study considers that in the future, Brazil-China cooperation in the fields of climate
change, clean and renewable energy, and green economy will push the environmental
collaboration between the two countries to a new stage. From today's perspective,
Chinese diplomacy in the current international situation shows a new development trend,
which is the gradual increase in the sense of independence and innovation. The
cooperation between China and Brazil on climate change will help strengthen the
discourse and leadership of the two countries on related issues.
Case Studies: Brazil-China cooperation in Climate Change Initiatives
Brazil and China have done significant cooperations across various sectors, reflecting a
shared commitment to environmental sustainability. This case study is into three key
efforts between the two countries in climate change, including renewable energy, forest
protection, and climate change strategies.
Case 1: Renewable Energy Research and Development
Brazil and China have been doing robust research on renewable energy since 2009,
primarily as a result of the establishment of the Brazil-China Center for Climate Change
and Energy Technology Innovation. Located in Tsinghua University and the Federal
University of Rio de Janeiro, this institute acts as an innovative existence for scientific
research and development, with a focus on the manufacture of biofuel from various oil
sources. Both countries have made great progress in the conversion of oils into renewable
liquid-form fuels through bilateral agreements and cooperative research initiatives,
demonstrating the effectiveness of cooperative efforts in creating sustainable energy
solutions and future (Paulino, 2017).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
388
Case 2: Wind Energy Expansion and Technology Transfer
Brazil and China have led the world in wind energy expansion during the last ten years,
contributing very significantly to the rise in installed wind capacity in both countries.
Extensive cooperation in research and development across institutional, public, and
private sectors has facilitated this expansion. Among the noteworthy projects are
partnerships in Earth observation satellite programs, which established the groundwork
for later cooperations in renewable energy technology.
While cooperations in private sector have encouraged innovation through cooperative
design projects and licensing agreements, public sector partnerships have facilitated
information sharing and technology transfer, such as the Brazil-China Center for Climate
Change and Energy Technology Innovation. These initiatives demonstrate how Brazil and
China are collaborating to advance the development of sustainable energy, wind energy
(Bae & Velasco, 2014).
Case 3: Forest Protection and Climate Change Mitigation
As demonstrated by bilateral agreements and cooperative projects, Brazil and China have
increased their cooperation in the areas of climate change, energy transition, and forest
protection in recent years. In Beijing, Minister Marina Silva made a statement highlighting
this partnership, which includes activities to combat environmental crimes, encourage
sustainable land use practices, and improve commodity traceability. In order to
accomplish the common and shared goals, both countries seek to enhance environmental
protection through technology exchanges and strategic partnerships. Their commitment
to international cooperation and group efforts in addressing global climate concerns is
further demonstrated by their signing of a joint declaration on climate action (Ministério
do Meio Ambiente e Mudança do Clima, 2023).
The case studies presented above shows us the different aspects of Brazil-China
cooperation in climate change, including renewable energy research, wind energy
expansion, and forest protection. These efforts not only show the potential for mutual
benefits but also show the important roles of international cooperation especially between
countries with large economies like Brazil and China.
Conclusion
Regarding climate change, Brazil and China have a complex relationship. This research
stated that these two powerful countries are directing the worldwide response to climate
change through the discussion of their initiatives, including renewable energy research,
wind energy, and forest protection. A major step in their joint statement of a
comprehensive strategic relationships in 2023 is Brazil and China's commitment to
solving climate change. In addition to confirming the two states’ understanding of the
importance of climate threats, the declaration asks for greater action and cooperation.
Despite the challenges from domestic politics and external pressures, such as those from
the United States and the European Union, Brazil and China have built common ground
interests in protecting vital and important ecosystems and solving climate change issues.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
389
Considering the future, the risen to power of President Lula offered prospects for deeper
cooperation between Brazil and China, as well as other rainforest countries, to resist
external pressures (from US or EU), protect their own goods and solve the climate change
issues. Brazil and China have the potential to not only safeguard rainforests but also
make substantial contributions to global climate change mitigation and sustainability by
improving their strategies and using multilateral platforms. The climate change of the
21st century is going to be more complex and deeper, and the cooperation between Brazil
and China can enhance the green perspective and discourse beyond the western world.
In conclusion, the complexity of Brazil-China cooperation on climate change
demonstrates both the advantages and disadvantages of international cooperation in
solving climate crisis. The relationships between Brazil and China are one of the hopes
and futures for collective action in saving the world for future generations as we deal with
the central issue of our day. The respective efforts of Brazil and China and the results of
their cooperation provide a model and template for developing countries.
References
Bae, H.; Velasco, Z. (2014). Brazil-China Wind Energy Technology Cooperation. GSDR
Prototype Briefs.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5565Brazil-
China%20Wind%20Energy%20Technology%20Cooperation.pdf
Barbi, F. (2016). Governing Climate Change in Brazil and China: Mitigation Strategies.
Journal of Chinese Political Science, 21, pp. 357–370.
BBC News. (2022, Nov 17). COP27: Brazil is back on the world stage; Lula tells climate
summit. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-63625698
Cheng, Jing (2022). Brazil Development Report. Beijing: Social Sciences Literature
Publishing House.
Correa do Lago, A. (2007). Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: O Brasil e as Três Conferências
Ambientais das Nações Unidas. Brasília: Funag.
Furtado, C. (2005). O Mito do Desenvolvimento Econômico. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China and the Federative Republic of Brazil
on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. (2023, Apr 14).
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/2023-04/14/content_5751581.htm
Ministério do Meio Ambiente e Mudança do Clima. (2023, Apr 14). BRASIL-CHINA Brasil
e China terão ampla cooperação em proteção de florestas, transição energética e
rastreabilidade, diz Marina Silva. https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-
br/assuntos/noticias/brasil-e-china-terao-ampla-cooperacao-em-protecao-de-florestas-
transicao-energetica-e-rastreabilidade-diz-marina-silva
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2024). Relations between
Brazil and China.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/nmz_680924/1206_680974/s
bgx_680978
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1
Thematic Dossier
Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order
December 2024, pp. 381-390
Climate Change and Sustainability: an Important part of Current Sino-Brazilian Relations
Chen Jianfei
390
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023, Apr 5). Li Qiang meets
Brazilian President Lula.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202304/t20230415_11059794.shtm
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023, Apr 14). Xi Jinping
holds talks with Brazilian President Lula.
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202304/t20230414_11059
493.shtml
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2023, Apr 16). China-Brazil
Joint Statement on Combating Climate Change (full text).
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202304/t20230415_110599
04.shtml
Paulino, C. A. A. (2017). A cooperação internacional para o Clima: caso Brasil e China.
Trabalhos Completos Apresentados nos Seminários Temáticos da VI Reunião de
Antropologia da Ciência e Tecnologia, v. 3, n. 3.
https://ocs.ige.unicamp.br/ojs/react/article/download/2816/2678/12640
Santoro, M. (2022). Brazil–China Relations in the 21st Century: The Making of a Strategic
Partnership. Palgrave Macmillan Singapore. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-
0353-3
Shapiro, J. (2001). Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in
Revolutionary China. Cambridge University Press.
Susskind, L. E.; Ali, S. H.; Hamid, Z. A. (2014). Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating
More Effective Global Agreements. Oxford Academic.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199397976.001.0001
United Nations. (n.d.). Global Issues Climate Change. https://www.un.org/en/global-
issues/climate-change
Watts, J. (2010). When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind – Or
Destroy It. Scribner.
XINHUANET (2023, Mar 15). Brazil announces it will host the 2025 United Nations Climate
Change Conference. http://www.news.cn/world/2023-05/27/c_1129649836.htm
Zhou, Lingni. (2013). Policy shifts in the Brazilian Amazon in the context of the US-EU
climate leadership game. Latin American studies, 45(1).