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EDITORIAL

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Editorial – Carmen Amado Mendes e Isabel Murta Pina

EDITORIAL

CARMEN AMADO MENDES

ISABEL MURTA PINA

This special issue is the result of collaboration with the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre (also known as the CCCM). This issue is one in a series of collections of articles presented at the CCCM China Conferences. These conferences are held annually in the spring of each year, and the authors of the articles in this issue actively participated in the 2022 Conference. The CCCM itself is a scientific research centre based in Lisbon, under the auspices of the Portuguese Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education. The mission of the CCCM is to produce, promote, and disseminate knowledge about Macau and China in general, and act as a platform between Portugal and the People's Republic of China, as well as more broadly, between Europe and Asia.

On this occasion, the special issue contains a total of seven articles, two of which are in Portuguese, and the remaining five in English. The first two articles make up a section titled **Historical Perspectives.** The section commences with an article by **Teddy YH Sim** and **Dennis De Witt** that provides new and important insights into the social history of the Melaka-Singapore region in the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century.

The focus of the article is directed to a discussion of the Portuguese and inter-married Portuguese communities in Melaka during the long period after the fall of Melaka, spanning the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, and by extension to the close lineage links between this settlement (Melaka) and Singapore, and similarly to communities in Singapore in the immediate period following its founding (1819). The article also introduces discussion of Dutch and British activities in the region and provides detailed support for the research conclusions that are reached.

The second article by **Cristina Bahón Arnaiz** focuses on the origins and development of Christianity in Korea, covering almost the entire twentieth century, from 1907 onwards, and includes reference to events that occurred in the current century. The author convincingly details the closely related origins of the core doctrine of two important and widely known Christian movements, namely the Unification Church and Jesus Morning Star (JMS). Similarly, to several other Korean new religious movements, or NRMs, the founders of the Unification Church and Jesus Morning Star both emphasized their doctrine as being new and unique.

The Unification Church was founded by self-proclaimed messiah Moon Sun-Myung in 1954 and established in the US around the 1970s, while Jesus Morning Star was launched by the self-proclaimed messiah Jung Myung-Seok in 1982. Both founders claimed to be the second coming messiah and preach what they call a "new" biblical canon or a "new" gospel that Jesus has exclusively revealed to them to complete his mission on earth. However, as the author convincingly shows, their narratives are closely interrelated, and they emanate from the same grassroots.

The **Contemporary Perspectives** section of the special issue commences with a timely article by **Anabela Santiago** that specifically examines Chinese contemporary political governance, both at the domestic and international levels, in the years from 1978 until 2022. This is a period that saw a significant overall shift in Chinese ambitions, and in parallel a change in perception of China at the international level, as a global power. The author suggests that there does not actually exist any academic consensus regarding whether Chinese governance is aiming to reshape the current global order or whether it is adapting and integrating within it and sees two different tendencies emerging from the scientific community. While one advocates a form of peaceful rise with China as a 'status quo power', the other perceives a growing 'China threat' as being the reality. The author presents an extensive and balanced study, grounded on a literature review analysis using materials accessed from the Scopus Elsevier database, together with an incisive analysis of twenty-one journal articles.

The second and third articles in this section focus on **Chinese international diplomacy**. The first of these two papers, which is co-authored by **Emilio Hernández-Correa** and **Ricardo Gúdel**, examines China's strategic utilization of its burgeoning sports industry, and specifically football, to achieve global influence, and analyses the implications of this approach. The paper clearly reveals and details how the Chinese leadership has orchestrated policies to transform the nation from one that principally hosts sporting events to a nation that is aiming to become a global powerhouse in the highly competitive world of sports. The authors point out that Chinese government initiatives also integrate the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with sports diplomacy, thus further amplifying China's soft power. China's acquisitions of European football clubs may consequently be understood as being emblematic of a multifaceted strategy, blending cultural and economic influence, and shifts in foreign investment policies and state support have noticeably influenced the trajectory of Chinese investments in foreign football clubs.

The second article focusing on diplomacy, written in Portuguese by **Li Guofeng**, deals with the active promotion internationally of **Chinese gastronomy** as a form of soft-power diplomacy. To research the vast and complex field of Chinese gastrodiplomacy, Li Guofeng develops theoretical perspectives advanced by Sam Chappel-sokol and Paul Rockower, as well as other specialists, to understand gastrodiplomacy as a long-standing and effective means to achieve nation branding. Explaining that the Chinese authorities selects delegations from cities famous for their cuisine, such as Canton, Chengdu, and Tianjin, to act as representatives of China, Li Guofeng quotes Rockower who wrote in 2014, "Highlighting the unique characteristics of China's different regional cuisines, regional and urban-level gastrodiplomacy could be a new form for Chinese diplomacy," and continues to quote scholars who have found that there exists a degree of coordination

in Chinese promotion of its gastronomy in its diplomatic activities that is not noticeable in other nations with outstanding cuisines, such as Thailand, Japan, and Peru.

The fourth article in the **Contemporary Perspectives** section, written by **Zhidong Hao**, consists of a critical analysis of the **contemporary education system** in the People's Republic of China. The author argues that higher education system in China is simultaneously going through a process of totalitarianization, and of democratization, at present. On the one hand, the author sees the existence of organizational controls and ideological indoctrination of students, as well as cooptation of faculty members by the Party-state. On the other hand, the author suggests that democratic breakthroughs also exist, for both the students and the teaching professors. Drawing the conclusion that whatever happens within the 'ivory towers' of the university world will inevitably affect what happens outside them in society at large, the author proposes that the outcome is, yet, undecided. The result as to whether the Party-state ultimately tends towards totalitarianism or democracy depends on the result of an ongoing tug-of-war between the forces existing in the state and society. The author bases his views on an analysis of available data, viewed from the perspective of research field of the sociology of higher education.

The fifth article in **Contemporary Perspectives** section, which is also the concluding article in the special issue, turns to the field of **international banking and investment**. Writing in Portuguese, the author **João Sabido Costa** provides a detailed overview, stretching up to 2021 of the origin and development of two banks, and analyses their activities as international investment providers. The Asian Development Bank/ADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank/AIIB are both multilateral institutions created in the Asia-Pacific region. They aim to promote the development of their area of activity, and the AIIB is furthermore authorized by its statutes to operate in countries that are not regional members. The presence of European Union shareholder countries, or countries with similar international perspectives, in both banks, and their commitment and performance make both institutions privileged forums for international discussion on the main themes related to development. Furthermore, the fact that both Banks recognize, among others, the Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) and the Paris Agreement as their main strategic objectives allows for a shared and rational dialogue between countries, continents, and regions, even when grounded in diverse cultural and intellectual backgrounds.

The special issue, when viewed as a whole, provides new, and original, insights into a range of developments in Chinese and Korean society, both in pre-modern times, and up to the present, and as such are fully in-line with the mission and aims of the CCCM.

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TRADE, ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ASSIMILATION IN THE PORTUGUESE-CREOLE COMMUNITY IN THE MELAKA-SINGAPORE REGION, 1780-1840

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His research interests lies in the Portuguese colonial enterprise in the East, in particular on India, of which he has published several papers and two books (Portuguese enterprise in the East: Survival in the years 1707-57 (2011) and Portuguese colonial military in India: Apparition of control 1750-1850 (2022)). He is also the editor of Piracy and surreptitious activities in the Malay Archipelago 1600-1840 (2014) and Maritime defence of China: Ming general Qi Jiguang (2017). Apart from the above, he is also interested in communities of mixed ethnicities (such as the Peranakans and Kristangs) in the Malaya-Singapore region (Singapore).

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Abstract

The story of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese/Portuguese Eurasian community in Singapore and Malaysia saw increasing voice (albeit in different intensity) on both sides of the border to assert their identities. While the theories and modelings of mixed race and related studies for contemporary society have made great strides in progress, similar paradigms are not always been applied to the study of communities in history. Past paradigms (involving theory of tribe) have been applied to the study of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Southeast Asia, such as by L. Andaya, focuses to some extent on the attributes (traits/outcome) of the community. This paper induces a few perspectives about the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in the Singapore-Melaka region which showed them to locate themselves in more than one strata of society. At the extreme, certain sub-groups could even hold more than one identity. With the sub-group affiliated with the Dutch, which was most well-supported in evidence, the traits were maintained implicitly and explicitly in the families through the women married into them as well as the posts held under the Dutch cum indigenous colonial administration. With the transition into the British era, Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities embraced Anglicized influence in Melaka and Singapore while the lower sub-groups were very likely indigenized further. The political economy of the Dutch (and British) activities in the East Indies impacted directly to mold the traits and behaviors of the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese sub-communities; influencing at times to some extent on the faith and religious aspect of these sub-communities. The formative influences of the 1780-1840 that the Dutch and British colonial authorities left behind set the tone of the development of these sub-communities in the next hundred years or so.

Keywords
Mixed race (studies), mixed/creole Portuguese, transitional period 18-19th century, tribe theory, Melaka (Malacca), Singapore, Dutch/British colonial period in Malaya

Resumo

A história da comunidade portuguesa/mista portuguesa/portuguesa euroasiática em Singapura e na Malásia viu aumentar as vozes (embora em intensidade diferente) em ambos os lados da fronteira para afirmarem as suas identidades. Embora as teorias e modelos de raça mista e estudos relacionados para a sociedade contemporânea tenham feito grandes progressos, paradigmas semelhantes nem sempre são aplicados ao estudo das comunidades na história. Paradigmas anteriores (envolvendo a teoria da tribo) foram aplicados ao estudo das comunidades portuguesas / portuguesas mistas no Sudeste Asiático, tal como por L. Andaya, que se concentra até certo ponto nos atributos (características/resultados) da comunidade. Este artigo induz algumas perspectivas sobre as comunidades portuguesas / mistas portuguesas na região Singapura-Malaca que mostraram que se localizam em mais do que um estrato da sociedade. No extremo, certos subgrupos poderiam até ter mais do que uma identidade. Com o subgrupo afiliado aos holandeses, que foi mais bem apoiado em evidências, as características foram mantidas implícita e explicitamente nas famílias através das mulheres que as obteram através do seu casamento, bem como os cargos ocupados sob a administração colonial holandesa e indígena. Com a transição para a era britânica, as subcomunidades portuguesas/mistas portuguesas abraçaram a influência anglicizada em Malaka e Singapura, enquanto os subgrupos inferiores foram muito provavelmente ainda mais indigenizados. A economia política das actividades holandesas (e britânicas) nas Índias Orientais teve um impacto directo na formação dos traços e comportamentos das subcomunidades portuguesas/mistas portuguesas; influenciando, por vezes, até certo ponto, a fé e os aspectos religiosos destas subcomunidades. As influências formativas de 1780-1840 que as autoridades coloniais holandesas e britânicas deixaram para trás definiram o tom do desenvolvimento destas subcomunidades nos próximos cem anos ou mais.

Palavras-chave

Raça mista (estudos), português misto/crioulo, período de transição do século XVIII-XIX, teoria das tribos, Malaca, Singapura, período colonial holandês/britânico na Malásia

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TRADE, ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND ASSIMILATION IN THE PORTUGUESE-CREOLE COMMUNITY IN THE MELAKA-SINGAPORE REGION, 1780-1840

TEDDY YH SIM

DENNIS DE WITT

Introduction and brief literature review

The contemporary situation in the last two decades in Singapore and Malaysia has (re-)surfaced the issues of the Eurasian sub-communities in these respective societies. In Malaysia as in Singapore, the attempt of these sub-communities to assert their identities was needed to engage the local and national politics of the day. The forces of market, post-colonial and globalization propensities have also elicited new stresses and awareness that generated decentralized tendencies that lend a hand to the survival (and/or revival) of the sub-communities. The contemporary issues, not surprisingly, raises the awareness that certain developments in historical societies; albeit fueled by more traditional forces-in-operation, manifested similar and dissimilar trajectories with later societies in which the Eurasian communities were a part of. A recent work by Brenda Yeoh *et al.* (2019) on the Eurasian community in parts of Southeast Asia revealed about the perceptions of individuals of the community in the post-colonial and post-independence context. The comprehensive literature survey of the subject-matter probed the mixed-race studies temporally and spatially, this diversely defined community had to negotiate with power relations as well as (new) processes of globalization in order to forge their identity and survival. Further in terms of spatial survey, the mixed race (mestiço) studies in South America are highlighted because it is 'most' sophisticated being performed there. On Southeast Asia, the works of G.L. Chew and Z.L. Rocha for instance are highlighted how marriages, colonial legacies, development of languages (etc.) created sublime if not obvious differentiation between the mixed race and other segments of the community. Embedded in the researches and multi-perspectival approaches is the canvassing (not exclusively) for the historical angle, in particular in G.L. Chew's *A sociolinguistic history of identities in Singapore;* advocating for a 'middle path' (between essentialism and constructivism that "allowed for participation of human beings in the dynamics of history" (Chew, 2013: 10). Specifically on historical Southeast Asia, Brenda Yeoh et al. pointed out the research on mixed-race is 'most sophisticated'

in Dutch or French colonial studies[1]. It is noted that mixed-race studies are more multi-perspectival, often including a historical angle. The coverage on the different (niche) geographical areas continues to be uneven. This is affirmed to some extent in, for instance, in P. Havik and M. Newitt edited *Creole societies in the Portuguese colonial empire,* which did not feature any chapter on Southeast Asia despite coverage on varied regions around the world (Havik and Newitt, 2015). Historical/colonial studies on communities in Malaya is still relatively lacking compared to studies on the East Indies.
Focusing the (literature) survey on the (early) modern periods in Southeast Asia, there existed limited but specific studies such as by J. Villiers (1986), R. Daus (1989), R. Fernando (2004), J. Taylor (2005), N. Hussein (2006), S. Bosma and Raben (2008), Halikowski-Smith (2011) and D. De Witt (2012). The brief listing revealed several trends about the sub-field of mixed-race studies linking specifically to 'Eurasians' in the Archipelagic (in particular, Singapore-Malaya) region. i) Research done in the 1980s on the Portuguese in Southeast Asia focused on the 'formal' jurisdiction of the group in the region (specifically Melaka) and its associated (historical) phase in the 15-16th century period. At the same time, Daus' work (1989) also shed light on some traits and developments of the Eurasian community in Melaka (and the region); this community appeared to have evolved into broad sub-classes. ii) In the post-2000 period, Hussein's work added intricate details to the Portuguese mixed-race community in Melaka while Fernando's article (2004) made particular note about the broader petty and diverse trading community that peruse the Malacca Straits. De Witt's article in 2012 made refinements to the understanding of the community in Melaka in the areas such as the mutual perception of status, the intermediary status of the Portuguese Eurasians (etc.). iii) On the Dutch or French colonial studies that Brenda Yeoh et al. pointed out to be potentially contributive to modern studies, these were usually located in the period of high imperialism although there were some allusions to the early modern period. Further, Halikowski-Smith's work (2011), although focusing on early modern Siam (Ayuthaya), made the connection to archipelagic (Portuguese) diaspora (from Makassar). Some take-aways from Dutch studies relating to the period under investigation were: the Dutch (and the British during the 1811-16 interregnum) attempted to modify the customs and traits of the Portuguese mixed-race community (apparently without too much success). The underclass, involving those who resisted the colonial reforms, also most likely belonged to the marginalized sub-groups. A paradigm that was adopted to analyze the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-groups in Southeast Asia (Halikowski-Smith 2011, earlier in Andaya & Andaya 1995) was the modeling of the tribe. With the loss and passing of the Portuguese Melaka in the 17th century, the adoption of the modeling of the tribe to examine the Portuguese in Southeast Asia was an apt fit for a collection of sub-communities that continued to keep-up certain aspects of Iberian customs and cultural characteristics. The progress of historiography on the theory of the tribe and mixed-race studies, in conjunction with issues arising in contemporary society in the associated

[1] Yeoh's study naturally focused on the evolution of 'race' in the Dutch and French (colonial) studies because these two colonial states had been most proactive in applying 19th-century ethnology in the governance of their colonies. Early definitions of a 'race' referred to a division in humankind based on differences in origins, (geographical) distribution and distinctive (biological) characteristics. A mixed race sub-group arose when the different racial groups interbred and evolved along a path of hybridity.

(Eurasian) communities in Singapore-Melaka, are gradually compelling a re-look of these communities; in particular, of their developments in the past.

A plausible hypothesis that can undergird this paper which professes to re-explore and examine the Portuguese-creole communities in the Melaka-Singapore region in the historical period (1780-1840) is: The surviving Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Southeast Asia continued to keep-up some/certain aspects of Portuguese culture inherited from shades of community life lived prior (when the Portuguese held power in Melaka). With sub-groups devolving into intrinsically identifiable assemblage of people, whether permanently settled in a place or forming part of the larger sojourning network, the description of these sub-groups could take on a more complex and diverse picture, in line with more advanced/later work done on tribe theory and mixed-race studies. More importantly, the transition of the sub-groups in a period of changing hegemonies (in particular, 18-19th centuries) gave rise to an amalgamated but less-than-unitary set of cultural characteristics/identities that would define the evolutionary path of the mixed Portuguese / Eurasian communities in the next hundred years or more in the Singapore-Melaka region (broadly speaking, peninsular Southeast Asia).

The focus of this paper is directed to the discussion of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Melaka in the long period after the fall of Melaka (17th-early 19th century), and by extension of the close lineage links between this settlement (Melaka) and Singapore, similarly communities in Singapore in the immediate period following its founding (1819). In terms of the structure of this paper, the lines of probing and investigation approach the research along three strands of inquiry in the main body (of the paper). First, the authors will re-visit the argument fielded by L. Andaya and probe into the sub-groups and characteristics mooted by the eminent Southeast Asian scholar. Second, the authors will probe into the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese sub-groups that existed in the Singapore-Melaka region and the identities (tagging with the associated traits/characteristics) which they existed in. Third, the authors will attempt to make an analysis and explanation on the evolved form of the sub-communities from the perspective of the changing Dutch-British political economy, their attitude towards religion and their broader environmental background. The limits of the analytical approach undertaken in this paper may be briefly broached: evidence for the communities-in-investigation (especially the minority or marginalized groups) in the early modern transitioning into the modern period is fairly limited. Therefore, this paper hopes to utilize extant sources, including secondary ones, and attempt a re-look of these. In the process, some degree of theorizing may be merited.

Issues of ethnic diversity and framework

L. Andaya (1995) referred specifically to four relatively diverse sub-groups across the East Indies region (*casados,* native Christians, *Marijkers,* and *Pampangers*) who were married Portuguese (descended from Albuquerque's initiative) or were converted locals, Indian slaves as well as Filipino mercenaries. Andaya posited that these sub-communities were linked by a set of common traits (creole language, Catholic religion and European dress) inherited from their Portuguese heritage. The sources of Portuguese/mixed Portuguese cultural presence and perpetuation in Southeast Asia depended to some extent on the maintenance of the mixed (including the slave) population. Later scholars such as Stefan Halikowaski-Smith (2011) drew upon the paradigm of the tribe for his

work on the Portuguese community in Ayuthaya and explored the static and transitional aspects of their traits. The Portuguese community in Ayuthaya was bolstered partly from sub-communities from the other parts of archipelagic Southeast Asia. The idea of the 'tribe', as used in these works, referred to a group or groups of people, likely of the same ethnicity, maintaining activities (political, economic etc.) at the most basic level of societal organization. Apart from the main thesis, Andaya also conjectures that the identity of the creole groups attenuated (or was weakened) at the beginning of the 19th century; arising from the loss of traits that members in the group usually practiced. This, according to Andaya, arose when the Dutch shifted their favor and needs towards the native slave population in substitution for the mixed Portuguese ones. This resulted in the reduced need for the use of the language and Portuguese-styled dressing; which eventually spelt the demise of the Portuguese community (tribe) in the region. Even if Catholicism continued to be practiced, the catechism and mass were conducted in the native Malay language (!) (Andaya, 1995: 138-42).

We can take a closer look at the groups mooted by Andaya to probe the general characteristics of mixed Portuguese or creole groups and whether these typified the sub-groups inhabiting in the Singapore-Melaka region. Of the four sub-groups [*Casados*, *Mardijkers* (ex-slaves / later members Tugu community), native Christians (Maluku), *Pampangers* (Luzon / Maluku)] discussed by Andaya, the *casados,* followed by the native Christians and ex-slaves, had the most potential of embracing the creole Portuguese characteristics. The *Pampangers*, while they were employed by the Portuguese (or Spanish), were also likely to adopt some of these characteristics. *Casados* most likely inhabited in the established colony-settlements of the *Estado da Índia.* A. Theodoro de Matos has prior distinguished between formal and informal Portuguese colonies in the East although in light of contemporary paradigms, the path of inquiry might align better with reality if one does not over-stress on the boundaries between the two types of settlements. Amongst the traits highlighted for discussion in connection with the sub-community (language, religion and dress), the *casados* (and to some extent, the native Christians and ex-slaves) were most likely to embrace these traits in the 'formally-occupied' ports/enclaves (such as Melaka and Timor) in Southeast Asia. Across Archipelagic Southeast Asia, different places and settlements had received Portuguese injection in resources and manpower from the 16th century. While Melaka, and later Timor, was 'formally' conquered, one could locate several *feitorias* (factories) in Banda, Makassar, Martaban and Tenasserim as well as a variety of *fortalezas* (fortresses) in the other islands, such as in the Spice islands (Villiers, 1986: 52). There, the broader typification discussed by Fernando probably better described the itinerant, sojourning and settled mixed Portuguese sub-groups in the region. Even in the formally conquered Timor, 'miscegenated Portuguese', known as *topasses*, who although had been typified to dress in *chapeu* and partial European dressing, comprised of Portuguese, Florenese, Timorese, Indians, Dutch deserters (etc.) in reality. The implication was that the Portuguese mixed communities in the different parts of Southeast Asia, not least in the Singapore-Melaka region, was likely to be diverse in composition (Jesus Espada, 2003: 163-71).

Of the other sub-groups discussed by Andaya, native Indian Christians in the Bengal sea had been known by certain family names, which were Portuguese-sounding. Specifically, the portrait of Portuguese /mixed Portuguese individuals from a locality in Hughli in the

17th century wore a short-top headgear, linen shirt, doublet (or jerkins) and breeches mimicking the European fashion of the different periods (Halikowski-Smith, 2011: 232). These individuals and sub-groups frequently sailed across the Bengal sea and traded in Southeast Asia.

Andaya had acknowledged the importance of Melaka in the 16-17th century. Transitioning from the 18th to 19th century, while the trade and port (of Melaka) was 'still important' in the 1780-90s, this (trade) suffered to some extent in the 1820s as the port became a feeder facility to Singapore. There has been a conjecture that other than the limited presence in Melaka (in the 18th century), the diaspora of the mixed Portuguese people between the different (British) settlements only amounted to 'a trickle' because Portuguese / mixed Portuguese had been gravitating to and residing in mainland as well as outside Southeast Asia (Fernando, 2004; Fernando, 2006)[2]. Those who settled in Melaka and those who perused the port from outside constituted two rather distinct sub-groups, probably overlapped by peddler-type individuals from the bazaar. The ex-slaves (or *Mardijkers*), exemplified by the Tugu people in Batavia, usually wore a hat, spoke some degree of creole Portuguese, and attended church as well as relished or kept-up with some musical activities (kroncong Tugu) and festive observations (rabo-rabo). Dutch rule in Batavia, typified by a highly privilege-based colonial society in additional to Governor-generals who were keen to promote Dutch values and urban culture in the society they governed in the 18th century marginalized this mixed-race group; leading to a deterioration of the identifiable traits over time.

The mercenaries (*Pampangers*), discussed by Andaya, and who were recruited and deployed by the Portuguese and Spanish, appeared to originate from Luzon in the Philippines and likely to be Christianized. The attainment of the Iberians in war and weaponry reached its prime in the 16th and 17th century, this manifested in the form of a vibrant mercenary market in mainland Southeast Asia. The availability of the excess military labor arose partly from the diaspora that resulted from the fall of Melaka and other places in Southeast Asia where the Portuguese had been ousted from. At the tail-end period of the early modern era transitioning into the 19th century (1780-1820), native

[2] Discussion with Dr Radin Fernando, a specialist on Southeast Asia on the early modern trade of the region, revealed that other than the (stabilized) presence in Melaka in 18th century (referring to the diasporic trickle of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese in the Dutch and British colonial settlements), the group was more gravitated to and resided in greater numbers on the mainland (Southeast Asia). Mainland Southeast Asia was a highly commercialized place in the 17-18th centuries, whether referring to Burma during the Taungoo period, Siam under the Ayuthaya dynasty, or the increasingly assertive Nguyen-controlled Cochin China, although incessant wars also occurred between these entities (most notably between the first two). The fall of the Taungoo and Ayuthaya kingdoms and the re-constitution of these states under the Konbaung and Chakri dynasties in 1752 and 1782 respectively were registered in primary and secondary sources to be difficult periods for the Portuguese or their mixed compatriots in terms of opportunities in commerce or military labor hire. In terms of the religious influence that the Portuguese had on mainland Southeast Asia via the Padroado (royal patronage) and the Company of Jesus, these saw the most progress in two 'provinces' instituted by the Company which also oversaw activities in Ayuthaya. Despite the numerically smaller group in Cochin China relative to that in Tonkin, this group saw 'more steady' development. However, all these came to an end with the suppression of the Jesuits and the Tayson revolt in the 1770s. The most probable draw for the remnant Portuguese not coming down to archipelagic Southeast Asia was the availability of the overland routes across the mainland amidst the instability occurring in the different periods. A number of these routes not surprisingly stretched across the narrowest part of the Siam-Malay peninsula to link up to the Gulf of Siam; where ports (such as Bangkok and Saigon) along the inner lining of the Siamese gulf and coasts of Cochinchina were revived or become prosperous in the first decades of the 19th century. Hence, the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities were 'comfortably' settled in Penang at the northern end of the Malay Peninsula when the settlement and port was founded there.

rulers in Asia who possessed the wealth and resources preferred to hire French trainers and mercenaries and Iberian employability as mercenary was diminished. A caricature of Portuguese mixed-race mercenary from Pagan in Burma in the late 18th century revealed a dwindling hire donning an unconventional headgear, doublet and breeches (the last worn without any stocking; in addition to the dispensation with footwear) (see picture 1 in Appendices). To assess the arguments fielded by Andaya, in particular, the extent to which they depicted the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese communities in Melaka (and by extension, in Singapore) from 17th – early 19th century: i) The different sub-groups discussed represented the archetypes of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese groups (tagged to the associated traits) in Southeast Asia. Of the four groups highlighted, three of these groups could lend a hand to describe the groupings found in post-1641 Melaka to some degree. ii) Andaya also pegged the survival of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Southeast Asia to the injection of creole members from the slave communities in particular. Accordingly, the fading of the mixed Portuguese community was the result of the diminution of the slave community; replaced by (a preference) for the native slave labor. The traits of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities survived in the later part of the 19th century because there was a 'revival' in these communities in the Melaka-Singapore region (Pereira, 2015). iii) Andaya's utilization of the model of the 'tribe' highlighted the social/primal/intrinsic characteristics of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities. There is room for the conception of the modeling to incorporate more sophisticated theoretical development (of the tribe) as well as perspectives from other subject disciplines.

The modeling of the 'tribe', applied in L. Andaya and S. Halikowski-Smith's works, can be perceived along a more malleable scale of social traits and/or combined with more modern theories/paradigms to arrive at a more holistic and realistic view of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-groups in Singapore-Melaka history. A key agenda that arises is whether, and to what extent, a coherent framework can be crafted to describe mixed-race groups. Contemporary works such as that of C. Chivallon (2008) has attempted to map a typology of the theories and modeling that have engaged the 'notion of creolization'. There existed different quadrants of theories that emphasize the 'process', 'outcome' (product) or a mixed of both in terms of the mixed-race developments. In the discourse, the hybrid/postmodern diaspora model stresses on the process (in line with the thrust of cultural studies) while the classical/continuity model stresses on the manifested traits (or outcome/product) of the mixed-race community. In-between, there are anti-classical and/or Caribbean models which stress on variant aspects of 'performative creoleness' (which could in turn be process- or outcome-based, depending on whether the attention is on the performative traits or their deconstruction)[3]. Andaya's identification of the primal characteristics (language, religion and dress) can correspond to the concrete aspects of the 'performative creoleness', of the different mixed Portuguese sub-groups in Southeast Asia (*casados,* native Christians, *Marijkers,* and *Pampangers*). In modellings of neo-tribalism, advocation is made for the conception of the 'tribe' to be beyond the traditional hierarchical association with more primal societal traits (Vorobjovas-Pinta, 2021). To be sure, Andaya also accounted for

[3] 'Performative creoleness' refers to something representational and semiotic (eg. a trait, which can be encapsulated in signs and symbols); that can be observed in a language or culture (etc.) associated with a group.

why the traits associated with the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities were able to be sustained before the 19th century (and why these faded afterwards). The schema might be applied more intently to niche sub-groups operating in the Singapore-Melaka regions. Portuguese/mixed-race persons pegging to a scale of social-economic stratification, for instance, might be linked to the diverse (economic) activities undertaken by people from this sub-group in the formal and informal world; and even eclectic sub-groups such as the Sephardic Portuguese might be incorporated in the related analytical discussion. Hence, more modern works, advocating for diverse contemporary manifestations of the mixed-race (or specifically, Eurasian) sub-groups, not only confer a multi-perspectival angle to the study of mixed-race (Portuguese) sub-groups in Singapore-Melaka settlements but unravel more about the processes of their development in historical time.

Apart from the association between certain cultural traits and the creole Portuguese group, one might observe that the maintenance of cultural traits in the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-groups in Singapore-Melaka regions (themselves far from being homogenous) was contingent upon the group undertaking or collaborating in economic activities linked (or not linked) to the hegemonic group. The incorporation of additional variables such as their economic preoccupation, in combination with more contemporary modeling and/or conditions of historicity, could give rise to a more sophisticated picture of the grouping(s) (i.e., a picture that combines economic and cultural indicators). A preliminary conjecture may in fact be laid down at this point; to be taken up in discussion and verified in the next section. Groups on opposite ends of the societal spectrum – those who drew closer in economic collaboration with the hegemonic group (whether with the Dutch/British in Melaka or with the British in Singapore) and those who stayed at arm's length from the hegemonic group - exhibited their own tendencies to be reinforced or ramified/divested in the traits they practiced (Shils, 1981)[4]. Generally, all sub-groups were affected to some extent as the hegemonic powers (gradually) imposed their controls in the settlements discussed (Melaka and Singapore). Those who drew nearer to the Dutch (or British) became more Dutchified or Anglicized[5], those who were little affiliated to the hegemonies-in-power and were marginalized became more indigenously miscegenated although Fernando (2004) reminded us that there was some aversion to this trend. It appeared that the sub-groups in the middling of the scale of sub-communities residing or sojourning, for instance, in Melaka had the most chance of

[4] The conflicts of tradition are manifested in: i) ramification – refers to a tradition breaking-up into parts (and continuing in some ways); ii) diverstiture (disaggregation) – a tradition evolving new facets while retaining aspects of the primary custom or practice; iii) attenuation – diminution of a tradition through conscious or unconscious interference; iv) dissolution (and resurgence) – death of a tradition or revival after its disappearance.

[5] The mixed Portuguese who trailed the British in the region had begun to adapt to the Anglicized culture in a number of ways: i) although "it was easy for Eurasians to pass as Europeans", there was some differentiation with Portuguese/mixed Portuguese dressing compared to British style; […] (refer pictures in Appendices). They also adopted other British daily practices and customs; ii) In terms of language, there was increasing preference for English vis-à-vis creole Portuguese; iii) There was also a beginning tendency for Portuguese/mixed Portuguese to alter family names or nationality in order to facilitate their daily activities and trades. In Penang (British Straits Settlement) in the Malay Peninsula, Europeans or mixed Europeans wore a tricom with an even narrower brim. They wore a vest with long or no sleeves and their trousers stretched to the ankles fitted with shoes (rather than boots, with no apparent stocking on the outside). This represented as an initial part to the 'more stable' identity formed in the 'Golden age'.

preserving their identities although this would again be mediated by the larger environment (Singapore or Melaka) in operation.

Survey of Portuguese/creole sub-communities in Melaka-Singapore

The transitionary period (1780-1830) signaled a shift in the broader climate of trade and colonial interference along the Straits of Melaka. The resulting change in the pattern of commerce and activities heralded to some extent a new mode of affairs for the colonial and indigenous players in the region (British-Dutch rivalry, experimentation of free port system etc.). The nature of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese community in Melaka was in part a function of the interaction with external arrivals (in particular, traders) as well as the measures enacted by the colonizers governing the settlement. The link between the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese and trading community in Melaka was interceded by the matrimony of mixed Portuguese women to (Dutch) burghers (Hussein, 2007: 273-80, 287-90). R. Fernando has written in some detail on the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese (Fernando termed the latter as Luso-Asian) and made the observations that: i) case study personages (from the earlier part of 18th century) showed them to be making different self-identifications (such as 'burgher', 'Marijker' and 'black') in the harbormaster's records of Melaka when they visited the port at different times (Fernando, 2004)[6]. ii) Fernando made careful distinction between the Portuguese and mixed Portuguese (Luso-Asians), highlighting that the former was found in fewer numbers than the latter in the Straits of Melaka. iii) The malleability in identities was linked to the 'assimilative process' that had been deemed to have 'completed' by the 18th century. It was also likely that historical actors manifested different identities at different times in order to facilitate their trades. Mixed Portuguese persons underwent miscegenation in a couple of ways: i) Portuguese persons marrying indigenous women; ii) non-Portuguese persons embracing the Catholic faith, claiming a lineage that involved some element of Portuguese ancestry. Going into the 19th century, while the sub-communities in Melaka interacted with Straits (Penang and Singapore) and other urban (for instance, Kuala Lumpur) settlements, few mercantile persons (of Portuguese origins) were arriving in Melaka. The reduction of interaction with fresh input and influence from Iberia potentially left remnant mixed Portuguese culture in a stasis although it continued to evolve vis-a-vis the cultures of the other sub-communities. The remnant Portuguese persons in Southeast Asian archipelago (specifically Singapore-Melaka region) attempted to maintain their identity by marrying fellow Portuguese or other European families where possible.

Although L. Andaya has highlighted culturally or socially-related traits (language, religion and dress), broader economic (occupational) trait might be considered as a contributary input and characteristic of the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese sub-communities. The line of inquiry taken out so far appeared to reinforce the observation that the sub-communities under investigation were likely to conserve or divest (or abrogate) with the cultural/social traits associated with them. The Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities in Melaka were far from being homogenous; one can detect more than one segment in this community, for instance: i) members of the community who sought Dutch employment or acted as intermediaries for them; ii) mixed Portuguese women

[6] A regular trader by a Portuguese-sounding name 'Joseph de Andrade' appeared to have retrograded in the identity status, from Portuguese to burgher, and even black (or maardijker).

who were married to Dutch colonial officials or merchants/burghers; iii) segments of the community which sought their own livelihood at arms-length from the colonizers (etc.).
Tombstones from the St. Peter's church as well as collaborative evidence from other sources revealed how families which possessed more Portuguese-sounding names or how certain families of Dutch origins took in mixed Portuguese women in marriage or fielded a (mixed Portuguese) family member working in the Dutch colonial administration. Of the families which had Portuguese-sounding names: there were the Pereira. In connection to the period investigated in this paper, tombstones in St. Peter's Church (Melaka) revealed about Francisco E. Pereira's first son (who died as a baby; himself born in Melaka in 1833); as well as a certain Josė Almeida Pereira. There were also the Souza (see diagram 1 in Appendices). The first generation of the family to have their tombstones located in St Peter's were born in the 1780s (Manoel Francisco de Souza and siblings). Dr Manoel Francisco's activities appeared to be focused in Penang where he advised Francis Light and finally retired in Melaka. The offspring of Manoel Francisco (João Manuel) appeared to have constituted a major out-branch.
Of the Dutch families in Melaka which had mixed Portuguese elements: First, there were the Hendriks, although it was unclear how far the Dutch descent Hendriks family's history went back to in Dutch Melaka, there was a certain Jacob Hendriks born around 1790 who served as a clerk, coroner and interpreter from 1820 to 1831, and married to Johanna Catharina Alwis (b. 1789) in Melaka. Her surname suggests that she was probably an Asian but was a Christian and followed the local Portuguese culture. She died in 1826 and was buried in the (Roman Catholic) St. Peter's Church. One of Jacob's daughter (Petronella Catharina Hendriks) was also married in 1837 to João Manoel de Souza, a Portuguese Eurasian from the town (Christiaans, 1818-1825; geneanet.org). Then, there were the Minjoots. The Minjoot family of Melaka was said to be descended from their progenitor named Bastiaan Minjoot (sometimes also written as Mejoodt and Majoor) who came from South Holland and married to a Portuguese Eurasian lady by the name of Miguela de Costa (with several children). When the preacher Johannes Theodorus van der Werth of the new Dutch Reformed Church arrived at Melaka in 1762, he found that members of the Dutch Reformed Church did not understand Dutch and engaged Cornelis Minjoot (son of Bastiaan Minjoot) as a Portuguese language teacher there. The offspring of Bastiaan Minjoot down the line, going, for instance, into fourth generation and British times (after 1824), were married regularly to Eurasian ladies in Melaka (Christiaans, 1818-1825; British Library; Geneanet; Geni). Whether under the Dutch or British periods, the Minjoot family, drawing upon a list of Portuguese who served as daily watchmen in the districts of Tranquerah, Bunga Raya or Banda Hilir in Melaka in 1825, fielded names such as Marcelino Minjoot, Adrian Minjoot, Jacob Minjoot, Federick Minjoot, Frans Minjoot and Cornelis Minjoot (for Bunga Raya) as well as Miquel Minjoot and Ignasio Minjoot (for Banda Hilir) (Christiaans, 1818-1825; British Library;Geneanet; Geni). Third, there were the Spykermans. The Spykerman family name was originally spelled as Spijkerman. The first Spijkerman who arrived in Asia in the year 1739 was Johannes Spijkerman and they had four children. One of the children (Jan Spijkerman) married a certain Johanna Correa (in 1768). Their children were also married to persons with Portuguese-sounding names (for instance, Manoel Francisco de Souza, Theodosa Menesa (also Theodora Menezes)) (Christiaans, 1818-1825; Geneanet; Geni). Fourth, there were the Thomazios (previously spelled as Tomasius). The first Tomasius in Melaka was Jan Christoffel Tomasius, who

originated from the town of Maastricht, now located in the province of Limburg in the Netherlands. While he was in Melaka, he was married to a Portuguese Eurasian lady by the name of Elisabeth Nonnes. The Tomasius family not only absorbed mixed Portuguese women in marriages but also extended in influence to important local sources of power (for instance, the Koeks) (Christiaans, 1818-1825). Yet other families that could be traced from the cemetery of St. Peter's church were: on the Velges, Maria Laseroe (Lázaro), the wife of Abraham António Velge (1775-1856), who was president of the Dutch court of justice of Melaka, was laid in St. Peter's. From the Lázaro family, the tombstone of Silvestre Lázaro (1786-1855) was located in St. Peter's; his siblings, born from the similar period in the 1780s, were also found there but there was no revelation of their vocations or activities. Some of Silvestre's descendants appeared to have shifted to Singapore later after the fourth generation (1890s). Finally, from the Leynard family, the tombstone of Henry J. Leynard is traced from 1829 (Teixeira, 1963). Some of the descendants only made their mark in Kuala Lumpur at the beginning of 20th century as the city became more prominent in the 1890s.

Referring to the limited statistics over the long haul in the Appendices, while the population of Melaka grew in the 18th and 19th century (for instance, 9000+ in 1750 and 19000+ in 1817 compared to around 4-5000 in the 17th century), the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese population had remained stable slightly before or after 1500 (see table 2 in Appendices). This implied that the population increase in Melaka over time came from the other ethnic groups (most notably, the Malays) although up to the 1820s, the birth rate of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-community had always had a slight edge over the mortality rate. In the different areas where Portuguese/mixed Portuguese resided, there was a sharp decline in the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities in Bukit Cina and Bungaraya while the numbers remained dynamic in the main Melaka town, Tranquerah and Banda Hilir. While the lands were bought over by Chinese in the more affluent suburbs (eg. Bukit Cina), parts of Banda Hilir (and its inhabitants) were by contrast gradually being povertized. The productivity of lands in the suburbs had suffered from stagnancy during the Dutch period. The British administrators who took-over the town from 1824 had hoped to replace the Dutch (permanent) lease system with a more decentralized system where licenses were managed by local leaders (penghulus) and landowners. Although there was some progress in the size of the acreage cultivated towards the mid-19th century, this was achieved under a challenging environment (poor irrigation system, resistance from the locals etc.). Mixed Portuguese who owned lands there and who were marginalized were likely to be divested with their properties. The stasis that set-in for sub-groups which were marginalized, whether in Malaya or Singapore, rendered social groups in this strata similar characteristics notwithstanding the immediate difference in time and space. The mixed Portuguese had been living by the sea since the Portuguese times in the 17th century. It is still a part of some members of the creole or mixed Portuguese community in the modern day. Men went fishing to supplement their livelihood. They usually went out in small wooden perahus or pushed through the shallows and coastal waters. Specific sources have identified the location of dwelling of the less well-endowed sub-group to be located in places outside the Melaka town (for instance, at Tanquerah, from the beach to Bandar Hilir, as well as Bungaraya) while the more privileged sub-group were located in the western suburb of kampong

Serani at Jalan Portugis (within the fortified old town) (Daus, 1989: 16: Hussein, 2007: 199-200; Wikimedia commons AMH-6618-NA)[7].

To surmise the discussion at this point, there was: first, a diverse mixed Portuguese trading community that was moving to some extent between port-settlements in the Straits region and facilitating the import/re-export trade of Melaka. This by no means was homogenous and the itinerant group probably interacted with the local population to some extent and the change in its characteristics was reflected in part the broader trend. Of the selected sub-communities discussed, families with Portuguese-sounding names or originated from Dutch ancestry fielded members who sought Dutch employment and acted as intermediaries for them or took mixed Portuguese women as spouses. Mixed Portuguese sub-groups in the middling scale of status or which were marginalized to some extent had some chance of preserving the traits in language and religion because the transitions over the 18th to 19th century forced them to huddle closer. This, in addition to the increasing degree of religious freedom (beyond the initial period) granted by the colonial authorities, permitted Portuguese/mixed Portuguese to revive their faith. In terms of the identities assumed and their associated traits, Havik and Newitt (2015) have reminded readers to better appreciate the process of creolization and syncretism when perceiving creole communities as these evolved a path of distinctive (if complex) rather than a amalgamated diluted culture(s) (Havik and Newitt, 2015). Indeed, other Europeans (other than Dutch and English, French and even Germans) were arriving and contributing to the diversity in the European/mixed European community Melaka by 1825 (Lim and Jorge, 2006: 230). The language appeared to be preserved but saw increased English (and probably native) 'interference' in its usage (Arkib Negara, Melaka, church books, church meeting 19 April 1820, church meeting 7 June 1820). There was also possible intermingling in marriage union between mixed Portuguese/Eurasian sub-community with other (for instance, Chinese/Peranakan) sub-communities; seen in mutual borrowing of words in the Kristang and Peranakan languages as well as costume in womenfolk in the community (see table 4 in Appendices). Beyond this, there was relatively little evidence for dressing (apart from sporadic references to Portuguese/mix Portuguese dressing in India or British/European dressing in Penang) (see pictures 2 and 3 in Appendices).

The diversity and complexity in the identities of Portuguese/mixed Portuguese was demonstrated further from the varied case studies of sub-groups which travelled and/or eventually resided in Singapore. From M. Teixeira's survey of the tombstones at fort Canning, a number of observations can be made (see also diagram 3 in Appendices). There were families, such as the Almeida and Silva (see Appendices), which came from Macau to Singapore. Members from the Almeida family congregated around the second generation before and in the immediate period after Singapore's founding. The Macanese continued to migrate to Singapore up to the 1860s. There were Portuguese and/or mixed Portuguese personages such as the Jeremias who were engaged in the informal economy

[7] Further discussion with Dennis De Witt affirmed that in the olden days, Eurasians lived in Kampung Serani and it was located within the fortified old town of Malacca. There were also Eurasians living at Tranquerah, outside the town ramparts. During British times, the main concentration of Eurasians was at Tranquerah in the north and at Banda Hilir in the south. There were also smaller groups of Eurasians living around just outside the town, such as at Bukit Cina, Bungaraya and Pengkalan Rama. See map of Malacca and environs AMH-6618-NA, *Wikimedia commons*. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AMH-6618-NA_Map_of_Malacca_and_environs.jpg.

(illicit trade from Diamond harbor) and shifted to areas that were not fully controlled by the colonial powers (such as Kedah and Ambon) as the British increased their presence in the Bay of Bengal after 1760 and encroached on the coasts of Burma in the early 1800s (Subrahmanyam, 2012). There were also Portuguese who came from Brazil such as the Farrão. The liberalization of trade by the Portuguese Crown in the 18th century prohibiting trade exchanges between Brazil and the Indian Ocean as well as developments of the north American hemisphere not only brought more Americans to the East but also some Portuguese from there (Brazil became independent in 1822). They traded in the East Indies and Indochina especially in the newly erected colonies such as Penang where the priests also partook in local politics (Blusse, 2008). The Portuguese/mixed Portuguese also followed the British to newly established settlements and ports. There were, for instance, the Reutens (marriage with Pinto family who was appointed to pirate-enforcing duties), who came from Penang to Singapore (Texeira, 1963: 321-22)[8]; the Leicesters (for instance, Edward Banaby Leicester arriving in Singapore in 1827), who came from Bencoolen and Penang; as well as the Rodrigues and Velges who came from Melaka. Portuguese persons and families (such as Jeremias, Farrão, Reutens, Leicesters) who were affiliated more intently with the European stock transited from Penang to Singapore and/or were involved in a variety of mercantile, ecclesiastical, security activities. From the letters of Pope, traders of the Portuguese, Armenian as well as a host and overlap of these and other ethnic origins, who were operating from Calcutta (and Madras), relied on a 'special' relationship with the British traded legitimately or illegitimately across the eastern Indian ocean with settlements in the East Indies (Bulley, 1992: 25 and 40).

Havik and Newitt's (2015) urging for a more nuanced appreciation of creolization evolving a path of distinctive, complex and multifaceted culture should take on a stronger argument in this essay. The degree of (further) miscegenation between early Eurasians and individuals of indigenous ethnic or diverse European origins was even more highlighted in Singapore. In this respect, one should not forget the Sephardic Portuguese, who although not part of mainstream Portuguese, should perhaps be considered to be part of the, if eclectic, Portuguese diasporic out-groups. In the colonies, many New Christians, assuming they were converted, moved to the New World, with a fair number going to the East (Eastern Sephardim). With the Inquisition conducted periodically (also) in the East (especially in Goa and Melaka), the drive to reform the colonized communities attained a certain degree of intensity (for instance, undertaken by Jesuit priest Francis Xavier). It is here that the continuity of the (Portuguese) Jewish community between the era of Portuguese Melaka and post-1641 Melaka was most fragmented. Although the website of the 'Singapore Jews' indicated the 'first Jews were of Baghdadi origins [and they were large enough to form a synagogue', another '(virtual) Jewish world' website credited the same group as being from Sephardic origins (Fernando, 2004; Bieder and Lau, 2007).[9] Regardless of their origins, the overlapping traits that this sub-group had

[8] Teixeira highlighted 2 instances of the Pinto (Painter), who were affiliated with the Reutens, themselves involved in appointment(s) in the marine service, leading schooners against pirates in the Straits of Melaka.
[9] Refer also to websites *Singapore Jews* (http://singaporejews.com) on the Jews in Singapore. The Jews were only classified in the (Newbold and Braddell) census from 1830. Fernando pointed out that a regular visitor to the port of Melaka by the name of 'Issac Abraham' was identified as a 'black' and 'burgher' at different times; there was some likelihood that he was also of Sephardic origins.

with the Portuguese creole community included language (early modern form of Portuguese) and religion (New Christian conversion). The creole Portuguese (Kristang) in Melaka bore resemblance to early modern Portuguese. New Christian Sephardim who did not revert to Judaism was likely to follow the other mixed-race to embrace the Reformed Church in the East Indies.

Apart from the argument on diversity, the economic function(s) undertaken by the group was a key indicator of the community preserving or divesting with a cultural/social trait. In the context of the accelerated commercial developments in Singapore at the beginning of the 19th century, Portuguese/mixed Portuguese who possessed some wealth and enterprising spirit ventured to set-up business proprietorships in the town. Highlighting the case study of the Velges, other than helming prestigious posts in Melaka, one of the children of Abraham António Velge, Jan Hendrik Velge (also known as John Henry Velge) was skipper of a private ship and worked as a warehouse keeper in Riau between 1824 and 1826. He married in Semarang (Indonesia) in 1830. John Henry Velge founded the firm 'Velge Brothers' in Singapore. He also acted for the Portuguese Mission Church as an agent for their properties in Singapore. The firm in Singapore found itself in trouble and went into insolvency; bankrupting John Henry in the process (Christiaans, 1818-1825; Geneanet; Geni). In his position as lay administrator for the Portuguese Mission, he became the center of attention as accusations of fraud, mismanagement and slander were brought against him. It was said that John Henry, who lived in a big house at Beach Road, was good friends with Dr. Jose d'Almeida from Macau, who also lived at Beach Road (see diagram 2 in Appendices). Both their homes were the center of Singapore's social scene with frequent social gatherings and dances. John Henry returned to Melaka and retired there in the latter years. John Henry's friend, Jose d'Almeida, who was a medical doctor on a Portuguese warship, took a decision to settle in Singapore while sailing through the region. Jose initially set-up a dispensary in Singapore and after a bout of agency work, he went on to set up a trading firm, Jose d'Almeida & Co., in 1825 which was renamed Jose d'Almeida & Son when his son joined the company. By the time Jose d'Almeida died in 1850, the company had grown to become one of the largest and most respected firms in the settlement (Ong, 2019). The Velge and Almeida families represented the sub-strata in the newly-formed straits society that would be most aligned with the new (British) colonizer in Singapore. Of particular interest, the Velges provided service to the Portuguese Mission, then nominally under the Diocese of Melaka which was either vacated or supervised by the Holy See. It might be noted from the sideline that mixed Portuguese in Singapore were likely to attend, apart from the Catholic churches, the other congregations such as the St. Andrew Cathedral (which was Anglican in affiliation) (Lim and Neo, 2021)[10]. The Almeida represented a facet of the very limited (fresh) injection of 'Portuguese-ness' in the region. They, together with the Velges, were conceived more along the economic line of division (even) in early Singapore rather than along lines of cultural traits. In any case, mixed Portuguese ladies who were married to Dutch officials in Melaka appeared, according to a contemporary account, might continue

[10] Portuguese priest Francisco da Silva Pinto e Maia who arrived in 1825 conducted mass in a friend's house until the construction of a chapel on Beach road in 1833. The Cathedral of good shepherd (Singapore) was founded in 1832. In the later period, the St. Joseph church appeared to serve the religious needs of the Eurasian community while the Cathedral of good shepherd served the needs of the European community-at-large. See 'St. Joseph church' and 'St. Andrews cathedral' hosted by Singapore Infopedia.

to face a certain degree of discrimination in the 18th – early 19th century (Hussein, 2007: 280)[11].

Examining the limited statistics for the period after 1824-30 in the Appendices, the influx of the Portuguese/mixed (Eurasian) sub-groups were noted to fluctuate between 2 to over 70 per cent (see table 3 in Appendices). The magnitude of the shifts, which appeared considerable, was limited in absolute figures; compared to more substantial changes in numbers that the Chinese community experienced. Summing-up on the relatively diverse sub-communities surveyed in Singapore, the sub-groups did trace from very different backgrounds; which came from the Straits Settlements, Malaya and the larger archipelago, as well as from regions farther away such as India and Brazil. Considerations could even be made for sub-groups which overlapped with other minority sub-groups, such as the Jews and the Armenians. Early Portuguese/Eurasian pioneers from the Almeida and Velge families, riding the wave of economic boom in Singapore as well as acting as agents for the Portuguese Mission (religious establishment), helped sustain the traits of the mixed-race community although there were also greater propensities for the sub-groups on the island to miscegenate as well as devolve into sub-stratums of the colonial society. Specifically, the language was likely to be more miscegenated in Singapore, compared to developments in Melaka, given a more diverse and mixed pattern of lineage evolving there. Second, the religion also appeared to be preserved in the community to some extent, witnessed by the chapel (St. Joseph) set-up along Beach road although Portuguese/mixed Portuguese were more susceptible to the different Christian traditions as they became English-speaking towards mid-(19th)century.

Accounting for the evolved pattern/traits of communities in region-of-study

The previous section has shown the diversity that was existing in the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese sub-communities in the Singapore-Melaka region. The different sub-groups were involved in the different loci of (economic) activities although (only) the activities that were linked with the colonial hegemonies in governance were relatively more evident. This section will extend the inquiry of the economic paradigm to look at the larger environment of trade and the political economy of the Dutch and the British in the Singapore-Melaka region to see how these had affected the evolution and trajectories of the Portuguese / mixed Portuguese sub-communities in the region during the transition from the 18th to 19th century. Other than the economic factor, the paper will also discuss 'religion' in context of the Dutch and British colonial policies as this input has always loomed large in Portuguese historical studies. Re-connecting to Chivallon's (2008) typology, if Andaya's approach is focused on the outcome (or product/traits), this section of the paper can focus more on the 'process' to account for the interjecting forces and factors that molded the sub-communities under research.

[11] A certain engineer captain Walter C. Lennon stated in his account and journal that the Governor of Melaka (1788-95) might not have been offered the government house as evidence probably because of his wife who was likely to be a Portuguese-Eurasian. Although she had not been out of Melaka, she appeared, to Lennon, to be affable, well-dressed and -bred. It might be noted further, although not stated in Hussein's Trade and society in the straits of Melaka, that the governor's wife was actually the natural sister of Adriaan Koek.

Survey studies have pegged the Portuguese diasporic figures to be not more than 10,000 across the four centuries (before 20th century) of the Portuguese abroad. The numbers might have fluctuated in the different centuries although the proportion leaving for Asia dwindled from the 17th century (Boxer, 1970). Up till the 17th century, prestigious nobility and second- or later-born from nobility families continued to be dispatched to the East to take-up functionary roles in the *Estado da Índia* ((Portuguese) State of India). With the fall of Melaka (in Southeast Asia) in 1641, sub-groups could be detected flowing out to Macau, mainland Southeast Asia (specifically Ayuthaya) as well as to the Archipelagic islands (such as Benjamasin in Borneo and Makassar in Celebes). Portuguese who remained in Asia 'married' (*casavam*/*casado*) and consolidated their resources/positions in settlements still governed by the Portuguese (such as Macau) (Subrahmanyam, 2012; Clarence-Smith, 1985). Those who settled in or moved about between places not under Portuguese control became more adaptable and enterprising although without the support of raw/coercive power, they were generally weaker in their interactions with fellow European or indigenous powers (Sim, 2014). Remnant mixed Portuguese traders, who were indigenized (/assimilated) to some extent and could field a variety of identities, served in the function of the intra-regional (Southeast Asia) petty traders. The trade between the Bay of Bengal and the coast of China was a brisk one for half a century between 1780-1830. This commerce was partaken by European, indigenous and creole traders. Portuguese and English competition for the opium trade during the period under discussion is fairly obvious in the documents of the archives. There was, for instance, the Rosa family which featured family members as participants in the Straits of Melaka in legitimate and illegitimate trade. Letters from a naturalized Portuguese Armenian also revealed that (remote branches of) the Rosa family continued to be involved as business associates in the Asian trade (AHU cx. 20 no. 33; cx. 30 no. 74; cx. 46 no. 1; AM, serie III 04-01; serie III 26-01)[12]. In the 1780s-90s, Melaka was "still an important port" (Hussein, 2007: 35). The Portuguese group still registered a compatible number of arrivals with the English in the 1760s (13 vs 17) but began to pale from the competition from 1770 (20 vs 40) but managed to increase its activities up till 1785 registering 36 vessels (a number comparable to that managed by the burghers at 37) (see table 1 in Appendices) (Bulley, 1992: 90). Trade revolving around Melaka was largely based on intra-Southeast Asia exchanges although through the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, the port's trade was diminishing in volume, vis-à-vis a rising Penang and later, an even more rapidly ascending Singapore.

As more studies on globalization in historical time scale emerged, the issue(s) of whether the activities of colonial powers constituted as the dominant force or merely a subset of larger forces-at-work was also located at the center of discussion. A 2019 (re-)edition of a work on the British empire and century for instance made distinction between imperialism (empire) and globalization (Parsons, 2019). A feature of globalization, regardless of the propagating push or pull factors, was the increasing migration, movement and miscegenation of people in the (final phase of the) early modern period. Tracing the increased British activities from the Bay of Bengal to Singapore (the most southern point of the Asian continent) in the transition from the 18th to 19th centuries –

[12] A number of members in the Rosa family in the generation of the 1780-1820 were preoccupied with vocations such as in the military and charity house (misericordia). The links of the Rosas to the Armenian Matheus Joannes can be located in his outstanding obligations.

seen in their annexation of Calcutta, the intervention in Burma, the setting-up of Straits Settlements – a host of people, including the Portuguese, trailed the British in places that witnessed their intervention. In Melaka for instance, part of this flow of people might be related to British-induced policies that encouraged certain ethnic sub-groups (for instance, Chinese laborers) to follow their ventures in the region, the other sub-groups (such as petty traders) were likely to be part of the indigenous and/or generic regional network and traffic (Rappa, 2013: 87 and 197-220)[13].

Owing to the hostile nature of the takeover in 1641, the immediate measures undertaken by the Dutch attempted to suppress and regulate the remnant mixed Portuguese in the settlement of Melaka; these measures were relaxed gradually afterwards in the 150 years that followed. Although British measures in Melaka were not as harsh, they hoped to impress on the inhabitants that new colonizers had taken over the town. Both the Dutch and British utilized the mixed Portuguese communities to some extent although sub-groups which could not engage the needs of the new authorities became marginalized (Turnbull, 1983). In Archipelagic Southeast Asia, the manipulation of the religion appeared to be 'more obvious' in the Dutch compared to the British colonial measures. Although creolized Portuguese-at-large were supposed to have assimilated to some extent, this evolved along the paths of an upper and lower classes in the port-settlements (of Melaka and Singapore). The Dutch had at various points attempted to influence the traits and customs of this mixed-race class. With the group that had seeped into some degree of marginalized profession and poverty, there was some aversion to indigenization. Meanwhile, the upper class strove to draw nearer to the reigning (Dutch or English) colonial culture. Hence, being in the upper or lower classes could lead to erosion of the identified Portuguese traits. The woman folk in the creole-affiliated families, apart from religion and festivals, were most likely to contribute to the day-to-day maintenance of creole customs.

How unique was the British colonial model compared to the Dutch? While comparative works may be available to compare the Dutch and British (early) imperialism, this is not always undertaken with enough specificity in relation to the contexts of Southeast Asia or (minority) sub-groups under rule in the colonies. Dutch style of administration and rule in Melaka took the approach of the council-kapitan system. Extending from the Portuguese period, the areas organized prior (Banda Hilir, Tranquerah etc.) were inherited to some extent in the Dutch period although according to N. Hussein, the ward for the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese did not have its superintendent until 1780 probably because "they were a weaker sub-community" (Hussein, 2007: 200 and 202). The general picture of weakness was not consistent across different parts of the settlement. In the sub-district of the town (Herenstraat), there was Portuguese-European (Quintiliano de Graca) presiding presumably over the European / Eurasian area aside from the Dutch-burgher (Joost Keok) and Chinese captains. A relatively limited tax was imposed on the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese compared to the Chinese or Malays/Kelings (Hussein, 2007: 214). Elsewhere in the suburbs of Melaka, the Malays and Portuguese/mixed Portuguese were also portrayed to inhabit in greater numbers compared to the Chinese and Dutch. The Dutch appeared to rely on the Eurasians to fill

[13] The mixed Portuguese in Melaka married with (free) Dutch burghers to some extent. The mixed Portuguese were not always Catholics and 'their dance' was not always embraced by the other sub-groups.

the middle and lower ranking posts in the colonial administration. They were also "employed as night watchmen, a position of some importance with regards to the security of the fortress". The Dutch had gradually focused their trade and economic focus in Batavia even before their conquest of Melaka in 1641. The impact was that Melaka became "lifeless and [dull]" with "[its] streets deserted, houses abandoned and shops shut" over the long haul from the 17th century to 1822 (De Witt, 2008: 84).

The British approach (after 1824) by contrast hoped to 'broaden' jurisdiction to a wider group of representatives (including appointing pengulus in the countryside). Melaka, Penang and Singapore were raised briefly to the status of the Presidency between 1826-30 (before reverting to a Residency). Cross-referencing developments in the other Straits Settlements (Penang and Singapore) and across time (to the 1860-80s), the continued limitations (port and suburb agricultural lands) faced by Melaka relegated the port-town to a 'mediocre' status. The implication of this was – although the British (also) favored Eurasians in the nascent British colonial civil service, members of the sub-communities faced limited opportunities for progression (notwithstanding the ability of the group to adapt); this was verified by the fact that plans for reviving or expanding the administration and security of the town was shelved time and again (Turnbull, 1983: 262). Hence, the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese in the town of Melaka huddled amongst themselves and grew steadily from the 18th to 19th century (compared to the other ethnic sub-groups). Also, as discussed in the earlier section, the volume of migrants moving from Melaka to Singapore appeared to be a limited stream, rather than an exodus.

During the take-over of Melaka in 1641, the highly capitalistic VOC had the economic and pragmatic concerns of the conquered settlement at the center of their attention. Hence, the language and religious policies erected were reasonably 'generous' towards the remnant Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in the city. It should also be noted that the tolerant language policy was to serve the agenda of the Dutch Reformed clergy as well (who were to preach the new religion in a familiar language). Although the Catholics in Melaka did not take-up the Dutch proposal to surrender, no punitive measure was undertaken against them although some (religious) restrictions were embedded in their execution (Borschberg, 2010)[14]. Amongst the diasporas that fled the city, the bishops of Melaka went over to Timor (an adjunct of Macau) with the last appointee affirmed by the Portuguese metropole government and the Holy See in 1783. Arising from the cooperation occurring between Portugal and Holland during the War of Spanish Succession, the Dutch permitted the grant of a piece of land (from a convert) for the St. Peter's church to be built in 1710 and the Archdiocese 'delegated the Catholics [there] to the Vicar of the church' (Teixeira, 1963: 7-8). In the long interval of the Dutch rule, it was understood that the (remaining) Catholic clergy were reluctant to turn "their allegiance to the Dutch because of the conflict of interest that such an oath would inevitably entail" although a priest (Father Manuel Teixeira) was "always stationed in Melaka, who came from Macau or Goa to attend to the spiritual needs of the faithful"

[14] The practical consideration was – the church and monasteries of Melaka possessed "buildings, orchards, estates (including real estate in urban areas) as well as ecclesiastical treasures". The Dutch appeared to have a much more 'liberal' policy towards religion, as reported by a special commissioner who provided alternative inputs to the management of Melaka after its conquest (in 1641).

(Borschberg, 2010: 113; Teixeira, 1963: 7). Overall, the part of the population who intermarried or drew closer to the Dutch lost 'a little more' of their traits. Although Dutch policies became more benign over time, the sidelining of Melaka (in the Dutch and British periods) ironically limited opportunities for development for the mixed Portuguese group in the town. The British interregnum in Melaka by contrast appeared to make a more obvious distinction between the different (secular versus religious) spheres of jurisdiction and tended to rely on missionary activities advocating for an educational agenda in swaying its subject populace. Whether in Melaka or Singapore, converting to the religion of the new colonial authorities could serve as an alternative to survival, even if the move compromised aspects of the traits of the community. There appeared to be a certain degree of desire to retain their faith in Melaka relative to Singapore in the periods of transition.

Towards the end of the century (1890s), both the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Melaka and Singapore were revived, albeit to a different extent in both places. The precursor of the state of the communities could be found in the early part of the (19th) century where the diversity and traditional characteristics were manifested simultaneously in the sub-groups individually in each place. By the late 19th century, on top of being engaged in business, Portuguese/mixed Portuguese (or Eurasian) sub-groups began to fill many intermediate and more specialized posts in the British colonial civil service (formed from mid-century) and associated professional positions that arose (for instance, teachers, doctors, nurses). In Singapore, although the upper echelons of the Eurasian population were blooming (approximating to what M. Braga-Blake hailed as 'a golden age'), those located down the scale continued and managed to preserve aspects of their traits. Nevertheless, differentiations continued to exist in the communities in Melaka and Singapore. Linking-up with Andaya's observation that there was a shift in the preference in the type of slaves (which eventually led to the diminution of the mixed Portuguese traits and culture in the Dutch East Indies), the impetus of the British in the disuse of slaves in this part of Southeast Asia impacted on the characteristics of the communities further. The British declaration of the abolition of slavery was made in 1834, there had been, in the meantime, an aversion to (any form) of slavery practiced by the indigenous rulers in the British-native encounters[15]. The instance of the Naning revolt (1831 - 1832) was at least connected in part to the reaction to the eradication (without compensation) of the bond- and debt-slavery that transpired as part of local custom and life. Although the slaves constituted a 'sizeable' part of the mixed Portuguese community, the abolition of the custom seemed to have a relatively benign effect in Melaka or even Batavia (Kehoe, 2015; Choudhury, 2014). The ample room for business and trade as well as the relatively liberal atmosphere in the Melaka-Singapore region permitted the different mixed Portuguese sub-groups to survive better. By contrast, the Tugu and associated sub-groups in the lower strata did not fare as well in the Dutch colonial areas (Daus, 1989; Pereira, 2015). While diversity undergirded both British settlements, the availability of opportunities and the propensity for change was much greater in Singapore compared to Melaka arising from more rapid developments in the former.

[15] On 6 December 1819, being the birthday of the then crown prince, and future king William II of the Netherlands, Jan S. Timmerman Thyssen (Dutch Governor of Malacca 1818-1822) made a speech announcing plans for the abolition of slavery in the colony of Malacca. Clearly, plans to abolish slavery had begun earlier - before the British takeover.

Some conclusions

The story of the Portuguese/mixed and Portuguese/Eurasian community in Singapore and Malaysia saw an increasing voice (albeit in different intensity) on both sides of the border to assert their identities. While the theories and modellings of mixed race and related studies for contemporary society have made great strides in progress, similar paradigms are not always been applied to the study of communities in history. Past paradigm (involving theory of tribe) has been applied to the study of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in Southeast Asia, such as by L. Andaya, focuses to some extent on the attributes (traits/outcome) of the community. This paper induces a few perspectives about the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese communities in the Singapore-Melaka region which showed them to locate themselves in more than one strata of society. At the extreme, certain sub-groups could even hold more than one identity. With the sub-group affiliated with the Dutch, which was most well-supported in evidence, the traits were maintained implicitly and explicitly in the families through the women married into them as well as the posts held under the Dutch cum indigenous colonial administration. With the transition into the British era, Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities embraced Anglicized influence in Melaka and Singapore while the lower sub-groups were very likely indigenized further. The political economy of the Dutch (and British) activities in the East Indies impacted directly to mold the traits and behaviors of the Portuguese/mixed Portuguese sub-communities; influencing at times to some extent on the faith and religious aspect of these sub-communities. The formative influences of the 1780-1840 that the Dutch and British colonial authorities left behind set the tone of the development of these sub-communities in the next hundred years or so. Perhaps the conditions affecting the sub-community to keep or discard certain cultural practices may be (crudely) encapsulated by a mixed Portuguese (Kristang) saying "Cuma galinya kereh pusah obu. Ngka sabeh ki kereh pegah, ki kereh lagah" (Portuguese - Como uma galinha que quer botar ovas. Não sei o que quer segurar, ou o que quer deixar ir) (Marbeck, 2004: 71).

Appendices

Table 1 - Ship arrivals to Melaka in designated years

Nationality	1761	1785
Malay	54	242
Chinese	55	170
Dutch	4	-
Burgher	11	2
English	17	37
Portuguese	13	36

Source: Table adapted from Fernando, R. & Reid, A. (1996), Shipping on Melaka and Singapore as an index of growth, 1760-1840. *South Asia,* vol. XIX, p. 70 (table 3).

Table 2 - Population of the town of Melaka 17th and 18th centuries

Year	Portuguese-Eurasian (including European)	Malay	Chinese	Total population
1675	1463	597	160	5324
1766	1668	3135	1390	7216
1817	1667	13988	1006	19647
1826	2236	16121	4125	28447
1829	500	1900	3900	7200

Source: Hussein, N. (2007). *Trade and society in the Straits of Melaka, 1780-1830.* Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, pp. 164, 166 and 176.

Table 3 - Population of Singapore 1824-30

Year	Europeans	Native Christians	Indo-Britons	Total population
1824	74	74	-	10683
1825	84	132	-	11851
1826	111	206	-	12907
1827	87	188	-	13725
1828	108	193	-	14885
1829	122	272	-	17664
1830	92	345	29	16634

Source: R.S. Braddell, *et al*. (1991). *One hundred years of Singapore,* vol. 1. OUP, pp. 355-56.

Table 4 - Borrowing between Baba and Kristang words

S/N0	Baba Malay	Kristang	Portuguese	English
1	Gereja	Greza	Igreja	Church
2	Minggu	Dominggu	Domingo	Sunday
3	Pesta	Festa	Festa	Celebration
4	Sekolah	Skola	Escola	School
5	Tempu	Tempu	Tempo	Time
6	Oloji	Olozi	Relógio	Clock
7	Almari	Almari	Armário	Cupboard
8	Buyong	Buyong	Boião	Pot
9	Garfu	Garfu	Garfo	Fork

10	Meja	Mesa	Mesa	Table
11	Sabun	Sabang	Sabão	Soap
12	Bolu	Bolu	Bolo	Cake
13	Tempra	Tempra	Tempero	Gravy
14	Pau	Pang	Pão	Bread
15	Kobis	Kobis	Couve	Cabbage

Source: Peranakan Association Singapore (2006). *Being Baba: Selected articles from the Peranakan magazine*, Epigram.

Diagram 1 - Lineage of Souza family



Source: Information consolidated from Teixeira, M. (1963). *The Portuguese missions in Malacca and Singapore.* Agencia Geral do Ultramar, pp. 287-305.

Diagram 2 - Lineage of Almeida family



Source: Information consolidated from Teixeira M. (1963). *The Portuguese missions in Malacca and Singapore.* Agência Geral do Ultramar, pp. 249-84.

Diagram 3 - Deceased in grave slabs in Fort Canning cemetery



Information consolidated from Teixeira, M. (1693). *The Portuguese missions in Malacca and Singapore*. Agência Geral do Ultramar, pp. 285-412; original: Padshanama, Hughli (1632).

Picture 1 - Dressing of Eurasian mercenary in (mainland) Southeast Asia

Source: Halikowski-Smith, S. (2011). *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 242; original: Ananda ok-Kyaung, Bagan (1785).

Picture 2 - Dressing of Portuguese / mixed Portuguese in Bengal (India)

Source: Halikowski-Smith, S. (2011). *Creolization and diaspora in the Portuguese Indies.* Brill, 2011), p. 232; original: Padshanama fol. 32.

Picture 3 - Dressing of British / Europeans in Georgetown (Penang)



Source: Tate, D.J. (1989). *Straits Affairs: The Malay world and Singapore.* John Nicholson Ltd., p. 43.

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NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: UNIFICATION CHURCH AND JESUS MORNING STAR (JMS)

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Abstract

Christianity has a relatively short history in Korea, yet it has grown rapidly, consolidating the biggest percentage of Christians among East Asia. Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist churches are some of the mainline Protestant denominations in the country. Furthermore, alternative Christian groups, also referred to as new religious movements (NRMs), started to appear in the country after 1907 Pyeongyang's Great Revival Movement and expanded during the Korean War (1950-1953). Some of the most dynamic groups at the moment are Guwonpa, the World Mission Society of God, Shincheonji Church of Jesus the Temple of the Tabernacle, the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification and Christian Gospel Mission. This paper will focus on the origin of these two last groups' core doctrine, widely known as Unification Church and Jesus Morning Star (JMS) or Providence. Similar to other Korean NRMs, both founders emphasize their doctrine as new and unique, yet this paper will bring light to show how their narratives are interrelated and emanate from the same grassroots, namely Kim Sung-do, Baek Nam-ju and Kim Baek-moon[1].

Keywords

Unification Church, new religious movements, JMS, South Korea, messianism, NRM.

Resumo

O cristianismo tem uma história relativamente curta na Coreia, mas no entanto tem crescido rapidamente, consolidando a maior percentagem de cristãos na Ásia Oriental. As igrejas presbiterianas, metodistas e batistas são algumas das principais denominações protestantes do país. Além disso, grupos cristãos alternativos, também referidos como novos movimentos religiosos (NMRs), começaram a aparecer no país após o Movimento do Grande Reavivamento de Pyeongyang, em 1907, e expandiram-se durante a Guerra da Coreia (1950-1953). Alguns dos grupos mais dinâmicos do momento são Guwonpa, a Sociedade Missionária Mundial de Deus, a Igreja Shincheonji de Jesus, o Templo do Tabernáculo, a Federação das Famílias para a Paz e Unificação Mundial e a Missão Evangélica Cristã. Este artigo concentrar-se-á na origem da doutrina central desses dois últimos grupos, amplamente conhecidos como Igreja da

[1] Romanization of Korean follows the Revised Romanization of Korean system, including for place names. Individual´s own personal names do not follow a standardized romanization in most of the cases. Therefore, *hangeul* was included when necessary to avoid confusion.

Unificação e Jesus Morning Star (JMS) ou Providência. Semelhante a outros NMRs coreanos, ambos os fundadores enfatizam a sua doutrina como nova e única, mas este artigo chamará atenção a como as suas narrativas estão inter-relacionadas e emanam das mesmas bases, nomeadamente Kim Sung-do, Baek Nam-ju e Kim Baek-moon[2].

Palavras-chave

Igreja da Unificação, novos movimentos religiosos, JMS, Coreia do Sul, messianismo, NMR.

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[2] A romanização do coreano segue o Sistema da Romanização Revista do Coreano, inclusive para nomes de lugares. Os nomes próprios dos indivíduos não seguem uma romanização padronizada na maioria dos casos. Portanto, o *hangeul* foi incluído quando necessário para evitar confusão.

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: UNIFICATION CHURCH AND JESUS MORNING STAR (JMS)[3]

CRISTINA BAHÓN ARNAIZ

Introduction

It is not an exaggeration to say that the United States of America has the largest number of new religious movements (NRMs), some of them with wide international coverage, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormonism and the Church of Scientology. Since the ratification of the Constitution of the United States in 1788, the free exercise of religion has been permitted, contributing to the proliferation of significant religious diversity in the country. The terminology referring to these alternative religions is large, including cults, marginal religions, sects and new religious movements (NRMs). This last term, originated in the 1970s, is commonly used by scholars as a neutral, non-pejorative phrase (Lewis, 2012).

Similar to the US, South Korea hosts some of the most sizable Protestant congregations in the world. Seoul's Yoido Full Gospel Church was included in the Guinness Book of World Records as the largest church in the world in 1993, with around 700,000 members at that time. While the number of NRMs originated in South Korea from the 19th century is ambiguous, it is thought that around 500 groups have been established since then, including those which gradually collapsed (Kim, 1998). Despite the fact that Korean NRMs are hermetic-secretive congregations, controversies related to these groups have made headlines in the country, some of them even capturing global attention. The biggest scandal, concerning former president Park Geun-hye and Choi Soon-sil, Park's spiritual mentor, culminated with the first impeachment since democracy was established in South Korea, and a 22-year prison sentence. Choi Tae-min (1912-1994), father of Choi Soon-sil, was the founder of Yongsaegyo (영세교, 永世教), a syncretistic new religion which combines elements from Buddhism, Christianity, *tonghak* and Shamanism. In line with this incident, the sinking of the Sewol ferry, in which more than 300 passengers dead, including around 250 high school students, was related to a Christian-rooted group, the Evangelical Baptist Church, better known as Guwonpa, or the Salvation Sect. Yoo Byung-eun (1941-2014), an entrepreneur-pastor and leader of the cult, was the former chief of Semo Group, a ferry operator which went bankrupt during the Asian financial crisis. After

[3] This work is part of the research project titled "Memory and Forgetting across the Borders in East Asia (PID2021-124485OB-I00)", funded by the Spanish State Research Agency within the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities of Spain.

the bankruptcy, Yoo's family is believed to have continued operating ferry companies, together with Chonghaejin Marin, the operator of Sewol. Other recent controversies associated with Christian groups are the involvement of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus in the spread of the Covid-19 virus in South Korea; the National Revolutionary Party's Huh Kyung-young (허경영), also known as the leader of Heaven Palace cult, being a candidate in the 2022 South Korean presidential election, and the assassination of the former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He was assassinated by a man who allegedly repudiated Abe's promotion of the Unification Church in Japan as Abe delivered video speeches at the Universal Peace Federation (UPF), a Unification Church related organization. These are only some of the recent incidents related to Christian religious groups, yet more could be mentioned.

Notwithstanding the important contributions related to Korean Christian NRMs in Korean, the study of these groups in the West is still insufficient, as it only extends to an introductory overview of these new movements. This article will focus on two prominent NRMs in South Korea: The Federation for World Peace and Unification, commonly known as the Unification Church, and the Christian Gospel Mission, better known as Jesus Morning Star (JMS). The former, founded by the self-proclaimed messiah Moon Sun-myung in 1954 and established in the US around the 1970s, is probably one of the most influential Korean NRM in the US and Japan, in terms of political and economic ties with local governments. The latter, launched by self-proclaimed messiah Jung Myung-seok in 1982, is infamous for sexual abuse and rape allegations, both nationally and overseas (especially in Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan). Similar to other Korean Christian NRMs, both founders claim to be the second coming messiah, by preaching what they call a "new" biblical canon or a "new" gospel that Jesus has exclusively revealed to them to complete his mission on earth. Despite the emphasis on uniqueness and newness, the fact is that these groups' narratives are usually interrelated and emanate from the same roots. This paper will present the origin of the Unification Church's *Divine Principle* and JMS's *Thirty Lessons* by introducing the three main figures from whom the core teachings were derived.

Reverend Moon and the Divine Principle

Moon Yong-myung (1920-2012) was born on January 6, 1920[4] in the North Pyeongan province in North Korea close to the Yalu River and Liaoning province in China. He later changed his name to Moon Sun-myung (文鮮明), probably due to the negative biblical connotations of the dragon *yong* (龍), which was the first syllable of his first name. Being the fifth of eight siblings, his family converted to Christianity after two elder siblings, a brother and a sister, became seriously ill. On the Easter Sunday of 17 April, 1935, Moon had his first spiritual encounter with Jesus at the age of fifteen[5], while praying on Mount Myodu (Euh, 2008). During this first mystical experience, Jesus encouraged Moon to continue his unfinished mission, literally saying "You must take on a special mission on Earth having to do with Heaven´s work" (Moon, 2009). From that day on, he immersed himself in what he called "the Word of God" which subsequently became the basis of his

[4] According to the lunar calendar.

[5] Ages are counted according to international age. He was 16 years old in Korean age.

biblical exegesis for the *Divine Principle*. According to Breen (1997), Moon's teachings combine a syncretistic interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, with elements included from other religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Shamanism and Confucianism. Further, in October 1945, Moon stayed for six months at Israel Monastery, founded by Kim Baek-moon (김백문), an important figure in Moon's theology who will be mentioned in the following pages.

Up to 1945 North Korea, and especially Pyeongyang, was the epicenter of Christianity on the Korean peninsula. However, after the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953), Busan, originally considered as the land of Buddhism, became a refuge for Christians who had escaped from the north. Consequently, Busan became the fortress of Korean Christianity during that period (Tark, 2006). Moon, who was imprisoned in the North Korean Labour Camp of Heungnam in 1948 for a public disturbance with a five-year sentence, escaped to Busan shortly after being freed by the UN troops in October 1950 (Euh, 2008; Moon, 2009). This became a turning point in his life. He founded the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity in Seoul in 1954, which later changed its name to the Family Federation of World Peace and Unification, widely known as the Unification church. He published the compilation of his doctrine in the book *Divine Principle* in 1957 and married for the second time with Han Hak-ja in April 1960; she became the "True Mother" inside the Unification Church. In 1971, Moon and his family settled temporarily in the United States where he expanded his religious, diplomatic, and political influence in the West. The diplomatic achievements of his group include the sponsoring of the International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences (ICUS), which recruited more than 900 participants including Nobel laureates; the Professors World Peace Academy (PWPA); and the Unification Theological Seminary (UTS). Furthermore, it created the newspaper *The Washington Times* in 1982, and established NGOs such as The Women's Federation for World Peace (WFWP) and the Universal Peace Federation (UPF), a United Nations-affiliated NGO instituted in 2005, which hosts the Summit for Peace on the Korean Peninsula with participants from more than 160 nations. The UPF's World Summit held in February 2022 was chaired by the former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, and featured virtual speeches from Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe, and the attendance of political celebrities such as former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and former US Vice President Mike Pence, among others (Pokorny and Zoehrer, 2022). The Unification Church progressively expanded into a movement named as the Unification Movement or Unificationism, which aims to extend religious, cultural, diplomatic, politic and economic influence worldwide, in search for "unity among all major religions, and, on that basis, build the Kingdom of God on earth or *Cheonilguk* (天一國)"[6] (Mickler, 2006: 1).

The *Divine Principle* or *Exposition of the Divine Principle* is a compilation of Moon's main theological beliefs, written during his stay in Busan with the assistance of Yu Hwo-weon, an early disciple. The book is divided into two main parts. The first part consists of seven chapters: the principle of creation, with a section related to the purpose of creation; the human fall, eschatology and human history, with a section about the last days; the Messiah — his advent and purpose of his second coming, resurrection, predestination and Christology, with a section concerning the Trinity and the Holy Spirit. The second part focuses on the providence of restoration, the period of preparation for the second

[6] For further information about Unificationism in America, see Bromley and Shupe 1979 or Mickler 1980.

advent of the Messiah and the second advent itself. Despite its length at 536 pages, and its complexity, the first two chapters, related to the principle of creation and the fall, contain the main pillars of the Unification Church doctrine.

In the opening chapter, creation is viewed in terms of the Taoist concept of duality, with the creation of man and woman being the most complex level of complementary opposites. The chapter covers the purpose for the creation of the universe and humanity, emphasizing the three blessings mentioned in Genesis 1:28 which are: "to be fruitful (mature and ready to bear fruit), multiply and have dominion over creation" (Moon, 1996: 43). Chapter two connects the purpose of creation exposed in Genesis 1:28 with the fall of Adam and Eve. According to Moon's exegesis, God created Adam and Eve and established them in the Garden of Eden with the purpose that they would first spiritually and physically mature and become God-centered individuals. After this, he would bless them with a God-centered marriage, having children and multiplying as God-centered families. These families would eventually populate a God-centered world, receiving the last blessing of domination over the creation. However, Eve succumbed to Lucifer's temptation, which is represented as a serpent in the book of Genesis. She ate the fruit from the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil and then gave it to Adam, who ate it with her. Before they fell, Adam and Eve were not ashamed of their nakedness, yet directly after taking the fruit "the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked, so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves" (Genesis 3:6). Thereafter, in Genesis 3:16, God punished the woman with severe childbearing pain. These verses illustrate Moon's vision of the fall as the sin of sexual immorality, and eating the forbidden fruit of sexual intercourse with Satan represented as the snake, and afterwards with Adam, before becoming God-centered individuals. Hence, they sexually "fell" before being ready to receive God's blessing of marriage. Accordingly, she received the "essence of his evil nature and multiplied an evil lineage from which our sinful society descended" (Moon 1996, 64). This 'original sin interpretation' connects with the concept of restoration, the second cornerstone in Unificationism. For Moon, Jesus was not able to restore God's Kingdom since he died before marrying. Therefore, a new Adam must come and conclude God's mission of creating a God-centered family, becoming the "True Father" of humanity. In this way, his wife, or the "new Eve", would become the "True Mother" and they would begin a new era called the "Complete Testament". Furthermore, Moon claimed that the messiah would be born in Korea between 1917 and 1930, where Moon coincidentally was born in 1920. Beside the main doctrine compiled in the *Divine Principle*, Moon continuously preached further revelations, "centered on the role that he and his family played in laying special foundations for the restoration of God's Kingdom" (Barker, 2018: 23).

Pastor Jung and the Thirty Lessons

Jung Myung-seok (1945-), who was born in Seokmak-ri, region of Geumsan, South Korea, proclaimed himself in 1982 as the messiah and founded the Christian Gospel Mission, widely known as JMS or Providence[7].

[7] For English bibliography related to Christian Gospel Mission check Nathalie Luca's PhD dissertation, book, and articles (1994, 1997, 1998, 1999-2000).

Jung, who is the third of five brothers and has one sister, embraced Christianity when he was still in elementary school after Presbyterian missionaries dispensed free Bibles to each family in Seokmak-ri. Unable to continue his education at middle school due to extreme poverty, he was immersed in faith, having his first spiritual encounter with Jesus at the age of thirteen[8]. Since then, he claims to have maintained an ascetic life of prayer, fasting and evangelism, including reading the Bible over 2,000 times over 20 years, which concluded with the theological enlightenment comprising the *Thirty Lessons*, which is the JMS core doctrine. After enlisting for the Vietnam War twice, on June 1, 1978 he departed to Seoul to start his mission as "the second coming of Jesus". In 1982, he founded the MS Gospel Association, which later changed its name to the Christian Gospel Mission (Jang, 2004). Jung's *Thirty Lessons* is divided into three different levels: beginner, middle and advanced. Despite its length, his core doctrine can be summarized as the purpose of creation, the fall, and judgment of fire, with the exposition of three different time periods: Old Testament, New Testament and Complete Testament; the second coming, Holy Son and the rapture.

Although there are some differences with the Unification Church, which may be the object for further studies, important similarities can be noticed between the core doctrines of Jung and Moon. The first is related to the fall. Jung claims to have learned directly from Jesus, struggling over 18 years, until he realized that the fall was a sexual sin. Likewise, he emphasizes his own sexual purity as the main condition why these unique revelations were given to him (Jung, 2016), yet Moon proposed this theory before Jung did. With regard to the purpose of creation, Jung bases his doctrine on the same verse as Moon, Genesis 1:28, which introduces three different blessings: be fruitful (the blessing of growth, self-perfection or individual heaven); increase in number and multiply (the blessing of marriage, starting a family or family heaven); and rule the creation (the blessing of governance or heaven on earth). However, Jung developed a theory proclaiming that human beings were created to become God's brides (disregarding their gender)[9]. Due to the sexual fall, humans lost their value as brides and fell to the level of servants. Hence, the purpose of creation is to restore to their level to that of a bride. In this way, Jung is both considered the first bride in front of the Trinity and the bridegroom of humanity as the Holy Son's body (Oh, 2010). These two lessons, considered as the core doctrine in JMS or Providence, connect with the idea of restoration into brides and the transition to a new time period. Accordingly, the Old Testament is considered a time of servants, the New Testament a time of children, and the Complete Testament a time of brides, with its main representatives being Moses, Jesus and Jung respectively (Jung, 2016). Beside these core teachings which emphasize chastity before marriage[10], similarities with Moon's *Divine Principle* can be observed in their vision of resurrection, the last days, predestination, the notion of a Korean messiah, and the shamanic concept of spiritual possession and spirits working through the body of a person. In this way, scholars view the *Thirty Lessons* as a plagiarism, a sub-Unification Church, a cult secluded from the Unification Church, or "a sort of updating of the Unification Church doctrine" (Luca, 1997). In fact, Jung's name can be found in the Unification Church registers dated

[8] For more details check https://jungmyungseok.net/pastor-jung-myung-seok/.

[9] The bride theory was first exposed by Lee Yong-do (이용도).

[10] In case of JMS, there is a group of people (both female and male) who do not marry and remain celibate, known as faith stars, who devote their lives to serve God and Jung. According to Taiwan's JMS data, there are 110 faith stars in Taiwan, from which 67.2% of them are female (Tsai and Peng, 2022:56).

1975. He was registered as a member on March 20, 1975, and lectured on Moon's doctrines occasionally (Roh, 2013). Jung lately compared Moon to John the Baptist and himself to Jesus, alleging that Moon's mission finished in 1978, the year when Jung proclaimed himself as the second coming messiah and departed to Seoul (Jang, 2004). Additionally, Jung's numerology proposed in the advanced lesson "A Time, Two Times, and Half Time" has also been confirmed as having been first published by the unorthodox theologian Han Enok (한에녹) in his book *Eternal Gospel,* published in 1947.

In this way, although Jung himself assures his followers that they have received a unique and new gospel, which Jesus exclusively revealed to him because of his devotion, chastity and spiritual submersion, the reality is that Jung's *Thirty Lessons* is mainly based in Moon's *Divine Principle*. The question is whether Moon actually compiled his doctrine himself. In fact, there is nothing new under the sun and despite the emphasis on uniqueness and newness claimed by both Jung and Moon, their core theologies emanate from three main sources: Kim Sung-do (김성도, 1882-1944), Baek Nam-ju (백남주, 1902-1949) and Kim Baek-moon (김백문, 1917-1990).

The Foundation of Native Korean Christian NRMs: Kim Sung-do, Baek Nam-ju and Kim Baek-moon

In the early twentieth century, two important revival movements occurred in Wonsan and Pyeongyang, in present day North Korea, which contributed to the growth of Protestantism and the emergence of native Korean Christian NRMs. Wonsan Revival Movement (1903-1906), led by Mary Culler White, a Methodist missionary, and Louise Hoard McCully, a Presbyterian missionary, expanded to Pyeongyang with the rise of the Great Revival Movement (1907-1910)[11]. Though this paper does not focus on the possible reasons for the rise of mysticism and Christian spiritual revival in the peninsula, it is important to emphasize the syncretism of religions in Korea and how religious tradition, referring to shamanism, has set the foundation for assimilating new religions into the ongoing religious history (Chung, 1959). In fact, evidence of shamanist practices remaining in Korean Christianity are well-known (Martin, 2002). The northern part of the peninsula became the center for Protestantism and alternative phenomena until the end of the Japanese colonization in 1945, and the establishment of the communist regime in North Korea (Tark, 2006).

Kim Sung-do (김성도, 1882-1944) is commonly considered as the founder of native Korean Christian NRMs. Although she was not the first person who announced a union with Jesus, or expanded prophetic activities in the country, her theology inspired a large number of groups that emerged after the Korean War, including the Unification Church or JMS. Born on July 1, 1882[12] in Cheolsan, in the North Pyeongan Province of North Korea, she converted to Christianity after miraculously recovering from a psychological

[11] The expansion of the 1907 Pyeongyang's revival movement, widely known as the Great Revival Movement, was documented by missionaries at the time, being a well-studied phenomenon in Korean Christianity. For empirical considerations on the revival check *Gold in Korea* (1936) by William Newton Blair. For further noteworthy sustained academic publications in English check *The History of Protestant Missions in Korea*, 1832–1910 by Lak-Geoon George Paik (1980).

[12] According to the lunar calendar.

disorder that developed after the birth of her second son in 1906. She visited shamans and tried conventional medicine, yet none of them relieved her symptoms[13]. It was after attending church for three months, under the advice of a deaconess encouraging her to believe in Jesus, that she totally recovered. Her first mystical experiences began during the March 1st Movement protests in 1919, when she engrossed in prayer for the country's independence, and in 1922, after Jesus encouraged her to pray for the world's Christianity. One year later, in 1923, she alleged that Jesus had incarnated within her, and thus, dwelled in her body[14] (Choe, 1999). The essence of her theology can be summarized as follows (Choe, 1999: 37):

> a) The root of original sin was not caused by simply eating the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. According to Kim, metaphors in the Bible should be interpreted. Indeed, original sin did not emerge from dietary disobedience, but it was due to the sexual intercourse between Eve and Satan, disguised as a snake, and afterwards with Adam. Hence, Kim was the first person in Korea who claimed sexual immorality as the root of the original sin.
> b) Despite the orthodox belief that Jesus's crucifixion was part of God's plan to redeem the sins of mankind, Kim maintained that Jesus was not supposed to die, but that he was expected to live and preach the gospel until he naturally passed away. Therefore, she emphasized the unfair death of Jesus as the result of ignorance and disbelief by the Jewish people. Furthermore, this exegesis was used to promote the second coming of a messiah, as the only way to complete the first failed plan.
> c) God is filled with sorrow due to firstly, Adam's sexual fall and, secondly, the death of Jesus caused by humanity's scepticism. Between the paradox of free will and theological determinism, which connects omniscience to predestination, Kim emphasized human's free will over omniscience. Thus, none of the incidents above were part of a divine plan, but the result of mankind's ignorance.
> d) Contrary to the popular belief that Jesus would return on clouds (Revelation 1:7, Daniel 7:13, Matthew 24:30, Luke 21:27), Kim stated that the clouds represent the body of a woman, meaning that the coming messiah would be born from a woman, just like any other human on earth, and denying any divine nature. Likewise, the shamanic concept of *ipsin* or union with Jesus' spirit was emphasized. The chosen person would spiritually unite with Jesus and become his body just as John the Baptist received the spirit of Elijah in the Old Testament (Mal 4:5-6, Matt 11:14).
> e) The messiah will be Korean, and Korea will become the second Israel, being admired, and recognized by the world.

Being expelled from the Presbyterian Church in 1925, Kim held services at home, healed and taught her followers about her beliefs, emphasizing the importance of repenting, sexual abstinence for married couples and celibacy for those who were single. Soon, her followers started calling her the New Lord (Breen, 1997). Significant parallels are found

[13] Despite the importance of Kim Sung-do in the field of Korean NRM studies, Choe Joon-hyun (최중현) was the first person who compiled a detailed bibliography of Kim based on primary sources. Since most of Kim and her followers' descendants live in the south, he was able to gather their testimonies, including Kim's son memories.

[14] This phenomenon is expressed in Korean as *ipshin* (入神), which literally means that God enters and dwells within a body. This connects with the shamanic ritual of *kangshin* (降神) or spiritual possession.

in Kim Sung-do's theology with the doctrines of Moon and Jung, including their core principle related to the fall as being sexual immorality. In order to understand the way these revelations were transmitted from Kim to both these founders, two key figures must be analyzed: Baek Nam-ju and, last yet most relevant, Kim Baek-moon.

Baek Nam-ju (백남주, 1902-1949), born in Gapsan, North Korea, on 3 January 1902, graduated with honours from the Pyeongyang Theological Seminary, and was specially recognized for his proficiency in Greek and Hebrew. After graduating in 1930, he moved to Wonsan and worked at the Wonsan Women's Seminary, teaching Greek, Hebrew and his self-translated versions of the *Gospel of John*, *The Imitation of Christ* by Thomas A. Kempis, and *The Confessions* by St. Augustine of Hippo (Choe, 1999). Wonsan did not only have a strong Protestant foundation due to the Wonsan Revival Movement (1903-1906), which led to the Pyeongyang Great Revival (1907-1910), yet it was also the epicentre of mysticism, along with Kim Sung-do's Cheolsan region. Wonsan was the birthplace of Yu Myung-hwa, a former Methodist member who claimed that Jesus had incarnated in her body in 1927, and thus that she was united with him. Whilst it is not clear the exact date Baek joined Yu's prayer meetings, records show it may have been around 1932. Baek had previously been influenced by the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) and Sundar Singh (1889-1929), and sympathized with mysticism and spiritual phenomena. In June 1932, Yu prophesied the establishment of a new era, that he named the "Path of a New Life". The history of salvation was divided into three different stages: firstly, the Old Testament, secondly the New Testament, and finally the "Path of a New Life", each of them guided by a different central figure according to the age.

In 1933, Baek published a booklet with Yu's core revelations, including the division of the three ages, and gave the date of birth of Jesus as January 3. He also emphasized the importance of prayer and revelations, excluding the Bible as the only source of spiritual realization, and the possibility for every person to receive the spirit of Immanuel, and thus, become Immanuel's body[15] (Choe, 1999). A year later, in June 1933, Baek and Lee Yong-do, together with others, followed Yu's prophecy of building a church, and established the so-called Jesus Church. In parallel with the Jesus Church, an annexed monastery that was named Wonsan Shinhaksan was founded, with Baek as the chairman. The aim of this place was to teach and train future pastors, regardless of their gender, providing seminaries and practicing ascetic lives. In 1934, Baek's behaviour drastically changed. He was spotted entering the room of a female seminary student every night around 2-3 a.m. and leaving after dawn, yet he maintained that he was devoted to dawn prayer. Baek, who was married, ordered his wife to undergo a fast for forty days. Despite her initial refusal, she finally obeyed and died within a month. Two months later, Baek held a ceremony called "heavenly wedding" (天國結婚) on a snowy night at 3 a.m., and officially married the student who had recently become pregnant and gave birth to a girl. As a result, Baek was expelled from both the Jesus Church and Wonsan Shinhaksan within a year (Choe, 1999). The next place to which he travelled was Kim Sung-do´s home in Cheolsan region. He was not alone, as he was always accompanied by a faithful disciple, Kim Baek-moon. When both Baek and Kim arrived to Cheolsan, Kim Sung-do had around 130 followers, a number that had slightly increased after both of them joined the group and helped lecturing and holding revival meetings.

[15] Immanuel's name is used referring to Jesus. Check Isaiah 7:14.

According to the memoirs of Chung Su-won, Kim Sung-do's grandson, Baek was overwhelmed after listening to his grandmother's new interpretation of the Christian scriptures (Chung, 1986). In 1935, Baek registered Kim´s church as the Holy Lord Church or Seonju Church (성주교회, 聖主敎會), at the Religious Affairs Division of the Japanese General Government. However, the Holy Lord Church scattered and ultimately dissolved after Kim's death in April 1944. Persecutions from the colonial authorities, opposition from the mainstream churches, Kim's death and Korea's division hampered the continuity of the Seonju Church. Baek's ministry was not rooted, and he moved to the south in 1946, where he worked as a teacher until his death in 1949 (Choe, 1999). However, the alternative theology of these ephemeral individuals became a long-lasting foundation for successive Christian NRMs in the country due to one key figure: Kim Baek-moon.

Kim Baek-moon (김백문, 1917-1990), born in North Gyeongsang province, South Korea, was the second child of a family of four sons and two daughters. In 1934, he travelled to Wonsan when he was only 17 years old and became a disciple of Baek Nam-ju. Kim did not grow up in a Christian family, yet it was due to Kim Nam-jo, a member of the Jesus Church, that he converted to Christianity and became influenced by mysticism. Baek was still in Wonsan at the time they met, but he soon left for Cheolsan, after he had been expelled from both the Wonsan Shinhaksan and the Jesus Church. Kim's admiration of Baek endured despite the scandal, and he followed his spiritual mentor to Cheolsan to join wth Kim Sung-do's group. When Seongju Church was founded in 1935, Kim Baek-moon presided at the opening ceremony. Also, he lectured people at Seongju Church and assisted Baek during his revival meetings. However, his stay in Cheolsan was relatively short, as he enrolled in Joseon's Institute of Theology (朝鮮神學院) in Seoul around 1940. Allegedly having been tortured by the Japanese Government for rejecting Shintoism, he escaped to Paju, in South Korea, where he later established the Israel Monastery[16] (Choe, 1999).

On March 2, 1946, an extraordinary phenomenon defined a milestone in the history of the group. Kim affirmed that he had had mystical experiences since 1937, yet on March 2, 1946 he stated that the Holy Spirit came down to him during a spiritual gathering with thirty-three followers at 11:00 a.m. During this mystical experience, Jesus appeared, and Kim started preaching unusual revelations regarding Korea's role as the new chosen country, and the second Israel. For this reason, March 2, 1946 was interpreted as the date of the Jesus' second advent, which Kim designated as the "Heaven-opened Day" or Gaecheonjeol (개천절/開天節)[17], and he considered himself as being the body of Jesus. Accordingly, March 2, 1946 was the beginning of a new era, to which was given the name of the Complete Testament, while March 1, 1946 became the end of the New Testament (Euh, 2008).

Kim Baek-moon's relevance in Korean Christian NRMs history lies in his having three main books published, compiling the basis of this alternative theology for the first time.

[16] It is not clear the exact month or year when the Israel Monastery was founded. Most authors affirm it was in August 1945, right after the liberation of Korea, yet others debate it was in 1944.

[17] Gaecheonjeol originally refers to the date when Hwanung descended from heaven to live on the earth. This is related with Dangun and the creation of the first Korean state of Kojoseon in 2333 BC. This day started to be commemorated from 1909, during the Japanese colonial rule, to vindicate the ethnic hegemony of the Koreans. At present, Gaecheonjeol is commemorated every 5, October as the National Foundation Day.

Neither Kim Sung-do, nor Baek Nam-ju recorded their doctrines, which meant that they disappeared with the groups' dissolutions, and the division of the peninsula. However, due to Kim's documenting his efforts, this new biblical interpretation did not disappear, and was spread to the south and became the canon for countless groups in the country, including the Unification Church and JMS. Despite the continuation of the books in *Theology of the Holy Spirit* (聖神神學) published in January, 1954; *Basic Principle of Christianity* (基督教根本原理) released in March, 1958; and *Theory of Personality and Faith* (信仰人格論) published in October, 1970; Kim's core doctrine can be summarized as three main ideas (Euh, 2008: 216-221):

a) The history of Salvation is divided into three different periods, connecting it to the concept of the Trinity. In other words, each entity of the Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) fulfils its role during a different time period. In this way, God governed the Old Testament, the Son ruled the New Testament, and the Holy Spirit controls the third and last stage when the second advent takes place, named the Complete Testament. According to Kim's theological vision, the Old Testament and the New Testament referred to an old and a new promise respectively. Just as the name the Complete Testament indicates, it is the time when God completes or fulfils this promise. Furthermore, March 2, 1946 is considered as the last day of the New Testament, also as the first day of the Complete Testament. Despite the alleged uniqueness and singularity of this exegesis presented in the *Theology of the Holy Spirit* (聖神神學), the truth is that Kim simply elaborated Baek's idea of the "Path of a New Life".

b) Kim distinguished Jesus's physical nature and spiritual nature by using two different names: Jesus and Immanuel. Jesus referred to the human body and Immanuel to the spirit. In this way, the second coming was interpreted spiritually, where the spirit (Immanuel) descends to earth and uses the body of a chosen person. Kim proclaimed himself as being the Messiah, denying Jesus' physical coming, and emphasizing his mission to his followers. Once again, the shamanic concept of spiritual possession was nothing new, but existed as a similar phenomenon among Kim's predecessors.

c) The original sin was the result of sexual transgression. Kim differentiated the concept of salvation into 'spiritual salvation' and 'solving the problem of hereditary sin'. Jesus' redemption involved salvation from spiritual death and reconciliation with God. However, solving the problem of hereditary sin, meaning sexual transgression, could only be done by a person who reveals the essence of the original sin and guides humanity, so as to "restore" it to the original state before the fall. Therefore, Kim emphasized "restoration" beyond salvation. This core doctrine is summarized in the *Basic Principle of Christianity*, which is divided into three parts: the principle of creation, the principle of the fall, and the principle of restoration. To this extent, Kim Sung-do's influence is indisputable, yet he enhanced it by including the concept of restoration, which he used to justify and emphasize his mission as the second coming messiah.

Similarly to his predecessors, Kim Baek-moon failed to succeed in gathering a consistent number of followers, and in conserving a well-organized group. Yet his books established the theological foundation for most of the NRMs that emerged after the Korean War,

including Unification church and JMS. After his death in December 1990, his group had only around 25 active members (Choe, 1999). This number progressively decreased to 5 people who still considered themselves as Kim's disciples in 2002, while none of them celebrated any gathering at the Israel Monastery (Choe, 2002).

Conclusion

In parallel with the US, South Korea not only hosts some of the biggest churches in the world, but also produces numerous Christian NRMs, some of which have significant political and economic ties behind-the-scenes. Despite the continuous scandals and controversies related to these alternative groups, this topic is insufficiently addressed within Korean society, probably because of the damage this could cause to the country's image, as recently popularized by the *hallyu* wave. This paper focused on two leading NRMs in South Korea, namely the Federation for World Peace and Unification, commonly known as the Unification Church, and the Christian Gospel Mission, better known as Jesus Morning Star (JMS) or Providence. The former is probably still the largest and most influential NRM in the West.

Like any other Korean Christian cult, both founders justify themselves as being the second coming Messiah, as having received exclusive and original revelations from Jesus, and preaching what they call a "new" biblical canon, or a "new" gospel. However, in reality the narratives of these two organizations are neither new or exclusive. In fact, their core doctrines are interrelated and emanate from the same roots, i.e., Kim Sung-do, Baek Nam-ju, and Kim Baek-moon.

This does not mean that the two teachings are exactly the same, but important similarities are obvious in both Jung and Moon's core doctrines. Furthermore, when compared to Kim Baek-moon's *Basic Principle of Christianity,* which was divided into three chapters — the principle of creation, the principle of the fall and the principle of restoration — the foundations of the core doctrines of Moon and Jung are clearly visible. Moon stayed for six months in Kim Baek-moon´s Israel Monastery before establishing his own movement. Similarly, Jung was a member of the Unification Church from 1975 onwards. The same is true of Kim Baek-moon, since he compiled Kim Sung-do's and Baek Nam-ju's theologies, yet explicitly claimed them as his own original revelations.

To conclude, this paper has identified the origins of the narratives of two major Korean Christian NRMs. Despite their founders' allegations of authenticity and originality, historical evidence demonstrates that there is nothing new under the sun. What has been, will be again, and what has been done, will be done again.

Figure 1 – Religions in South Korea, 2018



Source: *Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of the Republic of Korea* (2018)[18]

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CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PERCEPTIONS AND EVOLUTION

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to present a literature review about the concept of 'Governance' within the Chinese context. When it comes to Chinese governance, most of the studies are centered in corporate governance. Despite it is a relevant topic, this is not part of this literature review scope of analysis. Instead, this paper focuses on Chinese contemporary political governance, both at internal and external levels, from 1978 until 2022. The research gap this literature review seeks to answer is if Chinese governance is reshaping the current global order or fitting into it. There is no academic consensus regarding this matter, neither from the field of Chinese studies, nor from political sciences. Mainly two different tendencies emerge from scientific community: (i) one advocating peaceful rise and China as a 'status quo power'; and (ii) the other one advocating 'China threat' as a reality. Factors that evidence both of them are analyzed in this paper that reconfirm the ambiguity of China's position towards Chinese governance and its position in global order.

Keywords

Governance, global order, multilateralism, status quo power, revisionist.

Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma revisão de literatura sobre o conceito de 'Governança' no contexto chinês. Quando se trata de governança chinesa, a maioria dos estudos centra-se na governação corporativa. Apesar de ser um tema relevante, não faz parte do âmbito de análise desta revisão de literatura. Em vez disso, este artigo centra-se na governação política contemporânea chinesa, tanto a nível interno como externo, de 1978 a 2022. A lacuna de investigação que esta revisão da literatura procura responder é se a governação chinesa está a remodelar a actual ordem global ou a enquadrar-se nela. Não há consenso académico sobre este assunto, nem no campo dos estudos chineses, nem nas ciências políticas. Principalmente duas tendências diferentes emergem da comunidade científica: (i) uma que defende a ascensão pacífica e a China como uma "potência de status quo"; e (ii) o outro que defende a "ameaça da China" como uma realidade. Os factores que

evidenciam ambos são analisados neste artigo, que reconfirmam a ambiguidade da posição da China em relação à governação chinesa e a sua posição na ordem global.

Palavras-chave

Governança, ordem global, multilateralismo, poder do status quo, revisionista.

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Anabela Santiago

CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PERCEPTIONS AND EVOLUTION

ANABELA SANTIAGO

Introduction

Due to the fact that societies are dynamic and, as a consequence their arrangements and needs change over time, politics and ways of governing must adapt over historic periods. As most of societies in Western countries are already embracing neo-liberalism since a long time, the term 'government' has slightly changed into 'governance', over the last decades, as neo-liberalism ideologies started to reform the way governments behave. As pointed out by Levi-Faur (2012: 27):

> "The plurality of the modes of control reflect and reshape new ways of makingpolitics, new understanding of institutions of the state and beyond the state and allow us to explore new ways for the control of risks, empowering citizens and promoting new and experimentalist forms of democratic decision-making".

Amongst several different definitions of 'governance' according to the sphere of scientific area to which researchers belong, there is a common factor that is transversal to all of them: the factor of change, mostly referred in literature as 'shift'. The point is to understand what kind of shift we are dealing with (Levi-Faur, 2012).

China has also shifted from 'government' to 'governance' itself. However, due mostly to cultural aspects in interpretation of concepts, its position regarding inner and global governance is not very clear. Although different perspectives will be outlined in the findings section, from this literature review, it is possible to trace most common tendencies in all analyzed papers: (i) the difficulty to understand China's position and goals in international society; (ii) its primacy for national interests over foreign policy; (iii) its soft power and non-interference strategy; and finally, (iv) the different conceptions of multilateralism and power.

Thus, this article is structured in the following way: this introduction is followed by the methodology section, explaining the pathway for the procedures of this research, followed then by the findings section, which is divided into main areas of analysis emerging from the literature review – (i) governance; (ii) new global order; hegemony vs. multilateralism; (iii) status quo power vs. revisionist power associated to global governance. Finally, the conclusions section emphasizes the key ideas on the overall analyzed topic, which is the concept of 'governance' in China and its evolution from 1980's until current days, concurring for the reshaping or preserving of current international order standards.

1. Methodology

This paper highlights the main characteristics of Chinese political governance and its role in global order. The conclusions emerge from a literature review that was conducted based on a primary search of articles in Scopus Elsevier scientific database. The choice of Scopus as central database for this documents search is due to the fact that it is to be one of the most relevant scientific database in social sciences domain, specifically in the area of public policies, englobing the most well-reputed journals. Two combined set of keywords were used in order to obtain the range of papers to be selected. In one hand, searching for the expression "Chinese governance", 81 articles were found. On the other hand, searching for "People Republic of China", plus "governance", 359 results were found. Some articles were the same in both combination of keywords used for the search, so duplicated papers were removed and from the remaining universe of articles, a selection was carried out according to some established criteria: the ones containing "China" and "governance" in the keywords and the most cited ones (>90 citations). So, following these criteria definition and after a first read of abstracts and keywords, 21 journal articles were selected according to their relevance for the theme of governance and to the historic period under analysis (from 1978 to 2022), that is to say from the Chinese reform of opening-up until current days. The research strategy englobing the steps herein mentioned is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Steps of research strategy



Source: own elaboration

The final 21 selected articles were read in depth and categorized according to their scope. Some additional scientific literature was taken into account after the reading of the core set of 21 articles, in order to better frame the context and analysis itself.
In the next section, the concepts will be assessed according to "Chinese specificities" and their relations of causality and interdependence; they will be described to obtain an overview of the role of governance in contemporary China.

2. Findings

As already indicated, the literature review was carried out according to the scope of the analyzed articles, which were categorized in accordance with the main perspective developed by the authors. Then, several approaches were found in the existing literature: (i) the concept of governance itself in its core meaning; (ii) the concepts of 'Chinese threat' and 'peaceful rise; and (iii) governance associated with new global order. All of these approaches are fully developed in sections below.

2.1 Concept of governance

There are many definitions of the term 'governance', however it is hard to find in literature one that is completely precise and unambiguous due to the different perspectives from which it can be described: political science, public policies, public administration, international relations, economy and so on. In this paper, our assumptions will be based in the assumption defended by Rhodes (1996: 652), which is that governance implies a "change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule or the new method by which society is governed". As per Jie Lu (2015:5), "governance is conventionally understood as the exercise of power to structure, regulate, and coordinate the relationships among the populace in the management of their public affairs. In addition, Michel Foucault, a French social theorist, developed a similar concept – 'governmentality' – as "a means of understanding shifts in relations between knowledge, power and subjectivity in the context of early modern Western societies" (Sigley, 2006: 490).

According to the United Nations (2012), the principles of good governance are: (i) participation; (ii) rule of law; (iii) transparency, responsiveness, equity, and inclusiveness; (iv) orientation to consensus; (v) and finally, accountability. By its turn, the Asian Development Bank has set out four basic elements of good governance in major part similar to the previous ones: (i) accountability; (ii) predictability; (iii) participation; (iv) and transparency (Lahtinen, 2010). The accumulated knowledge provided by years of research in this topic leads us to also acknowledge that institutions have a critical role to play in governance (Jie Lu, 2015).

Regarding the specificity of the concept applied to Chinese case, we can trace a brief historical trajectory of its evolution from the birth of People's Republic of China (1949) until current days. Actually, Mao Zedong – Chinese CCP leader from 1949 onwards – challenges the Western-dominated global governance, counterweighting with the core guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy even until today – the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. After the reform of opening-up in 1979, China started to adhere to international institutions standards and "adapted many domestic laws to conform to those of other countries" (CFR, 2023). In the sequence of Chinese great economic progress, its role in global governance was enhanced, with China even creating in last two decades its own multilateral and regional arrangements, as well as governance institutions, such as the ASEAN, the BRICS, the Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), taking part then as a rule-maker (CFR, 2023; Noesselt, 2022). However, also at local levels, governance suffered a restructuration as Chinese villages faced a significant rural-to-urban migration of population seeking better benefits frequently associated to urban areas (Jie Lu, 2015).

To better understand Chinese application of governance mechanisms, one should understand primarily the politics and ideology of socialist market economy and all its components in a separated way, and the new challenges it poses, such as: the 'glocal' politics, the emergence of 'community building', the emergence of concepts of 'choice' and 'citizens' participation' in policies, and moral conduct, as well. Nevertheless, to understand Chinese governance implies also understanding non-liberal contexts and more particularly "the complex socio-historical terrain of modern China" (Sigley,

2006:489). In fact, in Chinese government's discourses, a socialist market economy does not require a 'retreat of the State'; instead, it requires a changing in its approaches by combining wisely neo-liberal and socialist strategies (Sigley, 2006). The Party itself perceives its action in a different way: from a 'revolutionary' Party to a 'ruling' one whose commitment is now, amongst other duties, to lead to a government that is 'service-oriented' (Sigley, 2006; Palmer and Winiger, 2019).

Despite a certain degree of acceptance of neo-liberal ideals, translated by the progressive acceptance of international accounting practices and the membership into neo-liberal institutions and international organizations, like World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, amongst others, the government is very assertive in its conviction that the market economy requires a strong and powerful political system and, thus, the State should not retreat, but should 'regroup' and implement governance in a 'socialist manner' (Sigley, 2006). The Chinese concept of governance incorporates then elements of market-oriented economic reforms and state-led development (Hu, 2020). Overall, one can observe that across time, from Mao (and even previously in imperial periods) to contemporaneity, Chinese system of governance have been a unique balance between authoritarianism, centralization; and political and administrative decentralization (Bardhan, 2020).

This mix of neo-liberalism and authoritarianism acquires a particular dimension in Chinese case, but this is not an exception, as it is possible to observe in Sigley (2006: 491): "In the case of China, it is crucial to understand that although Maoist socialism, for example, may seem as far removed from systems of Western liberalism as one can imagine, all 'modern' systems of government are cut from the same cloth". This crucial aspect leads us to questions of global governance and new global order that are treated in next sub-section.

2.2 New global order: hegemony vs. multilateralism

The period of emergence of academic studies about the 'China rise' was in the first decade of new millennium, because previously international society had not realized the proportion of such phenomenon and the consequences of China's rapidly growing economy for global order and, particularly, global governance. Currently, there is no doubt, namely in academic field, that China is a new agent in global governance, whether it pretends to be as such or not.

The point is to assess to what extent it leads to a peaceful and harmonious global order or to a conflicting one, or even, in another perspective, to a hegemonic power or a multilateral one (Gu *et al*., 2008). Currently, under Xi Jinping leadership – which is more assertive than previous leaders – China affirms that the established institutions serve the agenda of Western powers and are, for that reason, somehow obsolete (Drysdale, Triggs and Wang 2017; Krign and Gallagher, 2019). In fact, China's position is to combat any form of unilateralism or hegemony, defending true multilateralism, advocating for more equitable, effective and inclusive global development with a view to sharing the future of development that lead to the current President Xi Jinping motto of "community of shared future for mankind" (Athar, 2021).

Independently of the pathway followed, the point is that China already constitutes a huge competitor for the access to energy and natural resources worldwide. Besides that, China has big amounts of currency reserves, and investments in foreign sovereign debts, so its

decisions in this field can create a huge impact in international order. Finally, it is important to outline that the country also plays an important role in environmental issues, as it is responsible for a big proportion of world's greenhouse gases emissions (Erbach and Jochheim, 2022).

To analyze these aspects and respective impacts, various authors have indicated in their studies three main schools of thought: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. From the realist perspective, every rising power tends to impose its ideology and materialistic power (Friedberg, 2005) and China is not different, such as Mearsheimer (2001: 400) said: "China, like all previous potential hegemons, [will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon". According to this perspective, China is not likely to achieve a peaceful rise; it is instead seen as a threat that challenges the hegemonic power of United States of America (Gu *et al*., 2008). Indeed, in recent years, especially after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the world has been witnessing a growing tension and rivalry between the two countries: what was initially only seen as a trade war, soon derived into some political tensions with the Taiwan question, the case of Xinjiang alleged violation of human rights, the use of narratives such as the "Chinese virus" and a number of other episodes of tension.

In turn, the liberalist perspective tends to see an interdependent order, derived from an economic interdependency between trading states. The key aspects of liberalist point of view are mutually reinforcing mechanisms, such as: (i) economic interdependence; (ii) international institutions; (iii) and democratization (Friedberg, 2005). In the case of China, liberalists tend to defend the concept of 'peaceful rise' as they believe that bilateral or multilateral economic exchange promotes shared interests and good relations which aims at preserving peace and avoid any kind of conflict (Friedberg, 2005). Regarding international institutions, numbers are revealing: People's Republic of China has been increasing its membership in international governmental institutions and in international non-governmental organizations, as well. For example, between 1977 and 1997 the membership of formal governmental institutions, according to Friedberg (2005) increased from 21 to 52. Even the issue of democratization as perceived in the West is for the liberalists, especially for the most optimistic wing, just a question of time. In fact, according to liberalism ideology, a rising per capita income leads to habits of freedom, which in turn leads to democracy (Friedberg, 2005).

Finally, from the constructivist perspective, all political relations are 'social constructions' that are not only the result of trade and economic transactions, or even of material factors like military forces and institutions, but also the result of intangible factors, namely: cultural identities, strategic beliefs and norms (Wendt, 1999; Mendes, 2012). Thus, concerning China, the more it is embedded in global institutions, the more its objectives will comply with universal standards represented by these institutions (Friedberg, 2005). China is currently a major player in world politics and should assume itself as such. Its performance in terms of global governance is now much more at stake, because "with great power comes great responsibility" (Friedberg, 2005).

2.3 Status quo power, revisionist one – what to expect relating to global governance

In literature, one finds essentially two divergent thoughts about China's position in global governance. One related to China's 'peaceful rise' and another related to what is called

as 'China threat', as already referred. This one has emerged at first and is, for the majority of its defenders, inevitable. Indeed, Kagan (2005: 1) uses history to state that:

> "The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power".

Thus, according to this perspective, China is a conservative state that aims to a revisionist reform in global governance and, consequently, has to be contained by current powers of global order (Callahan, 2005). As China is a rising power, it is by definition dissatisfied with United States' hegemony according to *real-politik* argument (Johnston & Johnston, 2013). Besides that, revisionist powers in their more radical position normally reject the primary institutions of international society, as they do not identify themselves with their ideological bases (Buzan, 2010). Indeed, despite it aligns with some old institutions especially in the UN agencies, China also belongs to recent economic and political arrangements, especially regional ones such as the BRICS and the ASEAN (Stuenkel, 2020). In a rapidly changing international order, new arrangements especially involving the Global South (developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean) have arisen; China has actively sought to strengthen its ties with these countries through various diplomatic, economic, and developmental initiatives and the so-called South-south cooperation in an attempt to counter-balance the hegemony of the Global North (Alden *et al*., 2005; Gray and Gills, 2016).

On the other hand, there is the reverse thought, the one which emphasizes China peaceful rise. This involves an accommodation to the rules of international society and institutional structures and a re-adaptation effort of established powers in order to adjust to new disposition of power as well (Buzan, 2010). According to Gonzalez-Vicente (2015:96): "In its attempt to present itself as a benign power, the Chinese state has elaborated a discourse that separates diplomatic aspects from other interrelated dimensions, such as economics, politics at scales other than the interstate system, society and culture".

In addition, based on Chinese culture, there is a spirit of individual's sacrifice for the greater good of the group, which can lead to the famous parable used in games theory, the Prisoner's dilemma (Wang, 2016). As one evidence of Chinese effort to comply with the norms of international arena, it has been increasing its responsible membership in international organizations at regional and global levels, as a way of proving its intention to rise peacefully and comply with the status quo order (Callahan, 2008). The compliance with status quo order is one consequence of current Chinese priority to sustain the economic development achieved so far, adopting a dual-circulation model in its 14th Five-years Plan for sustainable development (Javed *et al*., 2023).

To achieve this economic sustainability, China needs stability in international relations, both at the regional and at the global levels and this leads to a shift in policies from Mao Zedong revolutionary character and antagonism regarding Western-dominated status quo, to Deng Xiaoping's policy of scientific development within the status quo order (Buzan, 2010). By its turn, the objective of President Hu Jintao leadership (2003-2013) of having a harmonious society and, by extension, a harmonious world is no more sufficient to sustain the continuation of peaceful rise (Buzan, 2010).

The concept of community itself has been re-valorized and transformed into a specific institutional model within systems of governance (Bray, 2006). From 2000 onwards, the community is designated as "the basic unit of urban social, political and administrative organization", originating a new rationality of urban governance, overall after the massive migration of peasants and rural workers into urban areas in 1980's (Bray, 2006). Facing new challenges like increased demands for child care and elderly assistance, the central government has expanded the scope of community services even into areas including "culture, health, environment, education, morality, policing, grassroots democracy and 'Party building'" (Bray, 2006). Communitarianism is then seen as a flexible new technique of governance. It is even extrapolated to foreign policy through Xi Jinping motto of "Community of Shared Future for Mankind", which represents a vision for global cooperation and solidarity, aiming to address common challenges and promote a more inclusive and prosperous world for all. Its implementation and effectiveness will depend on the willingness of countries to engage in genuine dialogue, mutual respect, and collective action (Chen, 2021; Zhao, 2018).

The "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" is not limited to government-to-government cooperation, but also extends to people-to-people exchanges, cultural dialogue, and mutual understanding. It encourages collaboration in areas such as trade, investment, science and technology, education, and cultural exchanges, with the goal of fostering harmony and common development (Zhao, 2018).

While the concept has gained traction in certain international forums and has been embraced by some countries, it has also faced criticism and skepticism. Critics argue that the community of shared future may be used to advance certain countries' geopolitical interests or to promote a particular vision of global governance that may not align with the principles and values of all nations.

3. Discussion/ Conclusions

Governance is a complex concept because it englobes various fields of analysis. This literature review analyzed the concept and its relation with two major topics that derived from the in-depth reading of the selected articles: the new global order (hegemony vs. multilateralism) and the kind of position that China assumes in this global order (status quo vs. revisionist power). The new global order might be translated into a transition from a unipolar world order whose hegemony belongs so far to the United States of America, to a multipolar world power composed by United States, Europe, China, Africa and other developing states mainly from the Global South.

The definition of 'governance' considered in this study was the one given by Tony Saich (2004: 22) as it relates directly with political science domain: "the functioning of government institutions and administrative departments to the broader issues of how individual citizens, groups and communities relate to the State". Regarding the specificity of the concept applied to Chinese case, it results from a range of characteristics, but we can point out the main influential one, that is: the combination of a capitalist economy with a one-party ruled, socialist and authoritarian political system, which challenges the global governance status quo. In fact, at the global level, neo-liberal principles regarding global governance remain dominant and if China continues to pursue its political nationalism with emphasis on 'China Dream' values, then its governance is likely to be more efficient and influent at the regional level, especially in the Global South. It is quite

difficult to characterize China's position as a developing country aiming at fairer trade conditions for other nations in the same case, tending thus to be a revisionist power; or, on the contrary, an emerging power with its own interests in the maintenance of the current order, shouldered by the World Trade Organization, being, for such reasons, a status quo power. One can argue that during Maoist period, China was a revolutionary revisionist power, while since the reform of opening-up and mostly since its entry into World Trade Organization in 2001, it tends to be acting more in accordance with a status quo power, in a logic of 'peaceful rise'.

According to this literature review, it is possible to conclude that, starting from the late nineties, and especially after 2001, China has been assuming a pragmatic and apolitical model of governance, in an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of success of alternatives to the Western dominant neo-liberal modes of governance; despite it is, at the same time, adopting some new liberal techniques of governance. Finally, regarding the research goal that oriented this study, it is possible to conclude that taking into consideration the various perspectives observed in this review, it is quite difficult to define China as a revisionist power or as a status quo power, because it presents a combination of characteristics that pertain to both and it has been very successful in this blend of features that turns Chinese governance so peculiar.

For now, its main concern is its national governance issues in order to secure the Party-State's main goal of economic growth sustainability, equitable distribution of income, social cohesion and harmonious society with a revival of socialist values and Confucian morality. In order to achieve this, translating its national growth into political bargaining power, China is considering the global order and the 'peaceful rise' strategy as a subtle way to obtain, at first, its domestic goals. It is then possible to conclude that, for the near future, despite great progression in its path, China has a long way ahead to construct a stronger sense of international society and mature its governance mechanisms.

This literature review identified the major aspects of governance applied to Chinese context and suggests that more works would be interesting to be conducted with the purpose of shedding light on other dimensions of the concept, namely on public and private governance, e-governance and meta- governance.

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KICKING POWER PLAY: CHINA'S FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY AS A GEOPOLITICAL FORCE

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Abstract

This article examines China's strategic utilization of its burgeoning sports industry, specifically football, as a means of global influence and the implications of this approach. The study draws on an analysis of policy documents, academic literature, and empirical examples to explore the evolution of China's sports diplomacy and the role of football in this context. The research elucidates how China's leadership has orchestrated policies to transform the nation from hosting sporting events to becoming a global powerhouse. The government's initiatives underscore this ambition, integrating the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with sports diplomacy further amplifying China's soft power. The concept of guanxi, deeply rooted in Chinese society, influences business relationships, also impacting sports diplomacy. The study showcases China's European football club acquisitions as emblematic of a multifaceted strategy blending cultural and economic influence. Shifts in foreign investment policies and state support have influenced the trajectory of Chinese investments in foreign football clubs. This research contributes to understanding how China leverages its sports industry for global influence and the complex interplay of politics, economics, culture, and diplomacy. The analysis underscores the adaptation of established concepts like guanxi in sports diplomacy. It elucidates China's evolution from hosting sporting events to actively shaping global sports diplomacy. The study further underscores the broader implications of China's approach, and the transformation of football as a soft power tool. As China redefines its role in the global sports arena, this research offers insights into its evolving strategies and the multifaceted implications for international sports and diplomatic relations.

Keywords

China, guanxi, soft power, sport, strategy.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a utilização estratégica que a China faz da sua crescente indústria desportiva, especificamente do futebol, como meio de influência global e as implicações desta abordagem. O estudo baseia-se numa análise de documentos políticos, literatura académica e exemplos empíricos para explorar a evolução da diplomacia desportiva da China e o papel do futebol neste contexto. A investigação elucida como a liderança da China orquestrou políticas para transformar a nação de anfitriã de eventos desportivos numa potência global.

As iniciativas do governo sublinham esta ambição, integrando a Belt And Road Initiative (BRI), ou Iniciativa Faixa e Rota, com a diplomacia desportiva, amplificando ainda mais o soft power da China. O conceito de guanxi, profundamente enraizado na sociedade chinesa, influencia as relações comerciais, tendo impacto também na diplomacia desportiva. O estudo retrata as aquisições de clubes de futebol europeus por parte da China como emblemáticas de uma estratégia multifacetada que combina influência cultural e económica. As mudanças nas políticas de investimento estrangeiro e no apoio estatal influenciaram a trajetória dos investimentos chineses em clubes de futebol estrangeiros. Esta investigação contribui para a compreensão de como a China aproveita a sua indústria desportiva para obter influência global e a complexa interação entre política, economia, cultura e diplomacia. A análise ressalta a adaptação de conceitos consagrados como o guanxi na diplomacia desportiva. Ele esclarece a evolução da China, desde a organização de eventos desportivos até a definição ativa da diplomacia desportiva global. O estudo sublinha ainda as implicações mais amplas da abordagem da China e a transformação do futebol como uma ferramenta de soft power.

À medida que a China redefine o seu papel na arena desportiva global, esta investigação oferece perspetivas sobre a evolução das suas estratégias e as implicações multifacetadas para o desporto internacional e as relações diplomáticas.

Palavras-chave

China, guanxi, soft power, desporto, estratégia.

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KICKING POWER PLAY: CHINA'S FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY AS A GEOPOLITICAL FORCE

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RICARDO GÚDEL

Introduction

China's growth in its influence in the global sports business is no secret. The fact that Chinese investors acquire and invest in sports properties throughout Europe, in international leagues and teams, or are part of the sponsorship of Formula 1, basketball championships or tournaments on the world tennis circuit no longer surprises. China has realized the possibilities the world of sports offers on the international stage. The world looks at China, but China, too, looks at the world.

As the most popular viewed sport in the world, football is no stranger to this circumstance and has proven to be a great pole of attraction. The development of the Chinese professional football system, and its growing influence worldwide, is being driven by different strategies and investment plans from the government. The list of clubs under Chinese control has grown substantially in recent years. At the same time, the Chinese Super League and its investments have led to significant signings from the most established European and Latin American leagues. Likewise, Chinese companies and investors with high purchasing power have been encouraged to invest in events, equipment, facilities, agencies and sponsorships as an internationalization strategy underscoring the soft power present in Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing has made football one of its top sporting priorities over the past decade. President Xi Jinping makes no secret of his obsession with football. A year before becoming president, he commented that he had three wishes: for China to qualify for the World Cup, to organize the World Cup on Chinese territory, and to win the World Championship. The dream of Chinese football is still present as a sport, but also as an instrument and master key to internationalization, development, and progress.

In recent years, China's football industry has witnessed a boom, followed by a steep decline. Initially, driven by governmental ambitions and private investments, Chinese clubs aggressively secured top-tier international players and coaches. However, this influx of capital did not align with foundational grassroots development, leading to an unsustainable growth model. Many clubs soon grappled with financial issues, unable to sustain the high salaries and other commitments, leading to defaults and, in some cases, bankruptcy. This top-heavy approach, aiming to elevate China's global football status rapidly, compromised long-term competitiveness and stability. Thus, the football bubble in China has burst in the last years preceded by a global diplomacy strategy and the use of football as a geopolitical tool. This paper delves into the soft power implications of these developments in the Chinese football industry.

Theoretical framework

Chinese football dream

Since the 1980s, one of China's goals has been to become the world's most significant sports power. The strategies for this purpose have led it to compete with the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom to become the country with the most gold medals at the Olympic Games. This success is the result of government effort and planning.

After its return to the International Olympic Committee in 1979, China established an "Olympic strategy", which was applied from 1980 (Hong & Zhouxiang, 2013). However, at first, it was not a successful plan. After the poor results in the 1988 Seoul Games, during the 1990s and 2000s, an elite sport system was implemented: *Juguo Tizhi*. This time it did work, and China hosted the 2008 Olympic Games and won 51 gold medals compared to 36 for the United States (Leite Júnior & Rodrigues, 2017). Thereafter, China needed to replicate its success in Olympic sports with football. Thus, the then vice president Xi Jinping declared in 2009, after the success of the Beijing Olympics, that the results in football were low and that the country should promote football (Wang, 2009).

After the 2008 Beijing Olympics, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao issued directives aimed at transitioning the nation from being a "country of major sporting events" to a global sports powerhouse (Tan, 2015). Subsequently, President Xi Jinping intensified the pursuit of this objective by his proclamation of the "Three World Cup dreams": participating in the World Cup, hosting the World Cup, and winning the World Cup (Tan & Bairner, 2018). In order to transform China into a future global football power, the Chinese government unveiled the Medium- and Long-Term Football Development Plan (2016-2050), and the National Football Field and Facilities Construction Plan (2016-2020) in April 2016.

Moreover, on October 20, 2014, the State Council of China issued a national strategic policy, titled "Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Sports Industry and Promoting Sports Consumption". At this juncture, the first declaration emerged in which the highest echelon of the government acknowledged sport as a significant industrial sector, and furthermore designated it as one of the new focal points for Chinese economic growth (Laurell, et al., 2021). This strategy envisioned that by 2025, the Chinese sports business would evolve into a market with an approximate value of $815 billion, yielding an annual Gross Value Added (GVA) of around $250 billion, which roughly translates to between 1.2% and 1.5% of the national GDP (Liu, Zhang y Desbordes, 2017).

On March 16, 2015, China accompanied this strategic policy with another strategic plan, the "Comprehensive Reform Plan to Drive the Development of Football in China". As a follow-up strategy to implement the 2015 plan, on April 6, 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission, China's principal planning body, introduced the "Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Chinese Football Development (2016-2050)", a 35-year football development plan outlining short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. Its aim is to evolve into a dominant football power in Asia by 2030, and a global football superpower by 2050. The objective was to establish a novel management approach for this sport with distinctive indigenous features. The medium-term goal was to increase the number of adolescent football players, and to attain leadership status in Asia in both football competitiveness and in the organization of professional league matches. Furthermore, China expected the women's football team to regain its status among the world's foremost football powers (Leite Júnior & Rodrigues, 2017).

An essential strategy in the Chinese football industry is promoting grassroots football and training national players to become professionals. With this aim, the goal of reaching 50 million practitioners in this sport by 2020 was set, with the expectation that most local talents would emerge effortlessly. In 2011 specialized football schools began to open, focusing on elite players' development. In addition, in 2021, the General Administration of Sport of China encouraged constructing critical cities to develop national football. With

this ambition, in the next few years, China would develop 16-18 football cities for the expansion of football, and in the longer term, by 2035, football would be the driving force for China to become a sports power (Li & Nauright, 2021).

This cascade of strategic policies and initiatives, while ambitious in terms of domestic football development, is also indicative of China's broader intent to leverage football as a diplomatic tool. Coined as "football diplomacy", this involves the integration of sports into a nation's foreign policy to foster goodwill, improve bilateral relations, and elevate its global status. China's aggressive roadmap to become a football superpower by 2050 can be seen in this light. It is not just about fostering national pride or enhancing domestic sporting capabilities, but also about building a prominent soft power tool in its diplomatic arsenal. The establishment of football schools and the vision of creating football cities demonstrate a commitment to nurturing talent and projecting football as a symbol of China's rising influence and ambition on the world stage. As these endeavours progress, the symbiotic relationship between sport and diplomacy will underscore China's strategy, wherein football becomes a medium to amplify its global outreach and diplomatic clout.

Soft power strategy

The Beijing Olympics represented a pivotal moment in China's engagement with the international arena, underscoring a fusion of local and global dynamics, and playing a critical role in spurring the advancement of elite football in the nation (Giulianotti, 2015). While Beijing's distinction of hosting both the Summer and Winter Olympic Games by 2022 is noteworthy, the mere organization of such mega-events might not suffice in advancing China's sports industries for geopolitical aims. Considering the football industry through the lens of Joseph Nye's soft power theory, the appeal to foreign audiences becomes paramount.

The success of the soft power approach hinges upon the attractiveness of the final product (Callahan, 2015). The Chinese Super League (CSL), operational since 2004 and following the sport's professionalization in 1994, emerges as a central player. This league has forged ties with diverse industrial sectors, predominantly real estate, and construction. Such affiliations can be attributed to various dynamics, including initiatives to entice entrepreneurs into football club investments (Chadwick, Widdop, and Parnell, 2016), thereby catalyzing the sport's appeal within the real estate business domain.

In this context, China adopted the approach of utilizing football as a geopolitical tool and, within this strategic framework, devised a high-performance, international-oriented sport with the potential to reaffirm national identity. Furthermore, China could harness football to promote the country's image regarding international acceptance (Allison & Monnington, 2002) and establish international relations through the so-called soft power (Brentin & Tregoures, 2016). To this end, when establishing the CSL, the development of new regulations for a transfer market and player mobility became crucial. This facilitated player transfers and enabled their movements on a global scale with competitive labour conditions, thereby supporting the internationalization of the industry. Consequently, after various attempts with different systems, China developed a football labour market partially akin to the European model, eventually transitioning to a free transfer system in 2010 (Shuo, Tangyun and Fang, 2016), 16 years after the industry's professionalization.

Researchers consider the surge of Chinese companies' investment in the European football market over the last decade as a form of soft power (Connell, 2018). During this period, Chinese investors bolstered their European influence through this means. Investment trends experienced substantial fluctuations over the decade. Europe emerged as the primary recipient of such investment, to the detriment of other global leagues where Chinese clubs had invested, albeit to a much lesser extent, in prior years. In this

regard, international relationships with recipient clubs in the transfer market also varied. The proportion of players acquired from the top four European leagues (England, Germany, Italy, and Spain) increased from 6% in the 2011-2012 season to 65% in the 2017-2018 season. However, one aspect has remained relatively constant throughout the decade. Chinese clubs' investment in CSL or lower divisions players comprises around 20-30% of the total investment, slightly decreasing in years of more excellent overall investment. Thus, China has continued to emphasize the development of domestic talent even while considering the use of the football industry in the geostrategic landscape.

Upon analyzing China's overseas investments on a broader scale, it is noteworthy that the two most recent five-year plans, though differing in certain aspects, share standard features. The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) marks the first instance of a reference to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). More significant overseas investment, infrastructural activities along the BRI route, and demonstrating tangible outcomes through foreign aid are highlighted as crucial points. This plan also acknowledges the significance of sports as an emerging sector capable of fostering economic growth and employment. It advocates for the development of the sports industry, including the promotion of winter sports, the expansion of the fitness industry, and the hosting of international sports events in China (United Nations Development Programme, 2016).

Meanwhile, the Fourteenth Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlines a long-term development goal for 2035 of adhering to future openness policies, attracting ODI flows, and promoting ODI through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), albeit with heightened sustainability. Within the sporting realm, this plan refers to the continued reinforcement of the sports industry, expansion of sports participation within the country, and incorporation of measures to enhance public health and well-being, promote physical education in schools, and stimulate sport-related economic development. The primary narrative of the 14th Plan is one of continuity, with some innovations and expanded ambitions (United Nations Developemt Programme, 2021).

The most ambitious strategy pursued by the Chinese government, the Belt and Road Initiative, encompasses sport among its principal objectives. This is so much the case that in July 2017, the China National Tourism Administration of Sport of China launched the "Action Plan for the Development of Sports Tourism along the Belt and Road (2017-2020)". This strategic plan aimed to propel the growth of sports tourism in China and along the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), while fostering increased cooperation with different countries along the route through sports tourism (Leite Junior & Rodrigues, 2023). Football was not exempt from this, and the integration of sports tourism, football, and the BRI in China has been unfolding through various football exhibitions and tournaments (Table 1).

Table 1 - Sample of events related to the use of football in the BRI strategy

Location	Year	Tournament	Countries involved
Shenyang	2017	One Belt One Road Football Tournament	China, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Zambia, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Ghana
Haikou	2017	The "Belt and Road" Haikou Youth Football Tournament	China, Croatia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore
Mangshi	2017	"Colorful Yunnan, Belt and Road" International Football Open	China, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Cambodia, East Timor and Croatia

Guangxi, Zhuang	2017	China-ASEAN International Youth Football Tournament	China, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the People's Republic of Korea
Shanghai	2018	Shanghai "Belt and Road" Culture and Soccer Winter Camp	China, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Panama
Hainan	2018	Hainan: "Belt and Road" Cup	China, Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic and Hungary

Source: Leite Junior & Rodrigues, 2023

Furthermore, mention of the well-known concept of Stadium Diplomacy concerning the construction of infrastructure abroad is essential. China has built over 140 sports facilities worldwide since 1958, significantly emphasising investment in the African continent (Vondracek, 2019). In this manner, China secures access to specific raw materials while also addressing the overcapacity in its construction sector (Jin *et al*., 2021). Within this context, African countries become entangled in grand projects that, while providing a sense of development, erect structures that do not necessarily enhance the quality of life for local inhabitants (Dubinsky, 2021). Additionally, with Africa's evolving priorities towards local industrialization, it remains to be seen how China will adapt its investment strategies and whether such infrastructural projects will still be central to its engagement with the continent.

This inflow of investment for the football and sports industry's development has been regarded as a soft power strategy. However, akin to the BRI, it can also be considered an intelligent power strategy with distinct Chinese characteristics—melding cultural influence with economic clout. This modus operandi has transformed into a hallmark of the country's identity and serves as the driving force behind China's foreign policy, encompassing various investments and projects. Infrastructure, finance, culture, education, interpersonal relations, political relations among states, and even the football industry are not exempt from these investments. It combines elements of hard power, such as economic investments, with a soft power strategy, encompassing the promotion of Chinese culture or enhancing China's image. It is ideal for disseminating its soft power strategy (Brînză, 2018).

An example of this was the acquisition of a 56% stake in the football team RCD Espanyol of Barcelona in November 2015. This move corresponds to a series of interests associated with the Maritime Silk Road in the Mediterranean Sea, as the port of Barcelona holds a strategic location. Owning a local football club can serve as a political and economic tool of persuasion, functioning as an effective instrument to attempt to exert influence or establish connections. This operation was not the first instance of a Chinese company's involvement in Spanish professional football. Presently, the Chinese conglomerate Hutchinson manages the most critical container terminal at the port of Barcelona, and China has become the top trading partner of the port of Barcelona, serving as a key entry point for Chinese vehicles into the European market. Such geostrategic manoeuvres have been recurring throughout the decade in the complete or partial acquisition of numerous European clubs (see Table 2).

Table 2: Sample of Chinese investments in European football clubs from 2014 to 2021.

Club	Country	Year of acquisition	Company
Club Atlético de Madrid	Spain	2014	Dalian Wanda Group
ADO Den Haag	Netherlands	2014	United Vansen
RCD Espanyol de Barcelona	Spain	2015	Rastar Group
City Football Group	England	2015	China Media Capital Holdings & CITIC Group
FC Sochaux-Montbéliard	France	2015	Ledus
Slavia Praga	Czech Republic	2015	CEFC China Energy Company
Northampton Town	England	2015	5USport
West Bromwich Albion	England	2016	Yunyi Guokai Sports Development Limited
Aston Villa	England	2016	Recon Group
Wolverhampton	England	2016	Fosun Group
OGC Nice	France	2016	NewCity Capital
AJ Auxerre	France	2016	ORG Packaging
Inter Milan	Italy	2016	Suning
Granada	LaLiga	2016	Wuhan Double/ Link International Sports Limited
Birmingham Sports Holdings	England	2016	Trillion Trophy Asia
Olympique Lyonnaise	France	2016	IDG Captial
AC Milan	Italy	2017	Sino-Europe Sports Investment Management Changxing Co., Ltd
Barnsley	England	2017	PMC/NewCity Capital/ BFC Investment Company Limited
Southampton FC	England	2017	Lander Sports Development
Inter Milan	Italy	2019	Lion Rock Capital
FC Thun	Switzerland	2019	PMC/NewCity Capital
KV Oostende	Belgium	2020	PMC/NewCity Capital
AS Nancy Lorraine	France	2020	PMC/ NewCity Capital
FC Den Bosch	Netherlands	2021	PMC/ NewCity Capital
Esbjerg Fb	Denmark	2021	PMC/ NewCity Capital

Source: own research

However, the shift in China's foreign investment policy also manifested itself in the withdrawal of investments, resulting in an outflow of Chinese capital from many of the clubs that had been wholly or partially acquired. Among those listed in Table 2, notable instances include the divestment and withdrawal of stakes in the City Football Group, Aston Villa, Club Atlético de Madrid, Wolverhampton, OGC Nice, AC Milan, and Southampton, among others, following the loss of state support.

Guanxi as a critical tool in Chinese international football diplomacy

The complexity of personal relationships finds a stable and deeply pervasive embodiment in Chinese society known as *guanxi*, which transforms individual identity into a collective one, whether within familial, educational, or work contexts. This interdependence also facilitates the population's ready adoption of the narrative of collective effort and the need to contribute towards shared objectives. *Guanxi* closely intertwines with Confucian social norms. *Guanxi* comprises two interconnected aspects: a utilitarian dimension based on mutual interests, beneficial purposes, and an affective or caring dimension, where emotional closeness gauges the quality of *guanxi* (Hernández & García , 2023, pp. 36-37).

In a second sense, *guanxi* is an institutionally defined system developed within contemporary Chinese society. The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of Chinese business infrastructures and related institutions have reinforced the reliance on personal *guanxi* for success and protection. In this scenario, frequent interactions and exchanges between individuals from two companies or organizations lead to enhanced institutional collaboration. This collaboration is nurtured by mutual trust, information exchange, and acquiring resources and advantages to improve business performance. Its significance in business has been extensively studied (Zhang & Hong, 2016, pp. 19-39). Pursuing mutual benefit in relationships involving exchanges is a fundamental tenet of Chinese thought, influencing the negotiation process based on concessions made by parties. This also shapes the ultimate content of agreements, which must be balanced and fulfil parties' expectations (Hernández & García, 2023, p. 38).

Guanxi has defined business and personal relationships in China for thousands of years. Additionally (Luo, 2001), explains that the Chinese executive system is highly complex and bureaucratic, with different levels such as central offices, provincial, municipal, district, and street-level offices, as well as various departments and divisions, including the General Administration of Sport, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Education. For this reason, a positive relationship with national and regional public administration can assist companies in resolving conflicts, for instance, with suppliers and buyers. It can also provide some support to these enterprises. Moreover, it is worth recalling that before the significant investment bubble in Chinese football, the government had advised companies and investors to invest in the CSL. Thus, researchers understand football in China as a mean to forge relationships and participation rather than a way to generate revenue within a broader business portfolio (Xue *et al*., 2020; Chadwick, 2022).

Another significant reason explaining the interrelation of the football industry with other sectors could stem from the success story of Evergrande, which transformed from a provincial real estate contender into a national magnate (Sullivan, 2017). Both private and state-owned enterprises observed the success of Evergrande in domestic and continental football tournaments, prompting them to start investing in the football industry. Sponsorship of the CSL was relatively inexpensive prior to 2015 due to the instability of the Chinese football league during the previous decade. Therefore, Evergrande acted like a "planet" attracting numerous "satellites" through the force of gravity, such as powerful state entities like Luneng, Greenland, and SIPG, as well as influential private entities like Suning and Jianye investing in football clubs (Tan & Bairner, 2018).

Although this relationship may seem surprising, the truth is that it has been highly significant in the recent history of this league. As Liu, Skinner, and Grosman (2020) point out, club owners are the primary funding source for CSL clubs, primarily because they have had few other investors. Until recently, the club's name served as advertising space for its leading investor, deterring other potential sponsors. This relationship can also

shape the clubs' business models. Furthermore, this becomes evident when comparing clubs managed by private enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Clubs owned by private enterprises tend to exhibit more flexible and efficient management processes, whereas those under state ownership display bureaucratic organizational practices. Typically, privately-owned clubs possess more significant financial resources and exhibit a quicker response capacity to poor results. However, a commonality among all the companies owning CSL clubs is their greater focus on business objectives than football-related ones.

In summary, the football industry in China has employed diverse investment and internationalization strategies in addition to player expenditures. Over the past decade, we can distinguish partial or total club acquisitions, sponsorships, and the hosting of mega sporting events. In the last two decades, China has hosted significant international events.

The 2008 Beijing Olympics marked a watershed moment in demonstrating the nation's transformation and economic potential. Recent additions to this list include the 2022 Winter Olympics and the hosting of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Championship in 2023. China not only hosts major international events but also uses national sports infrastructures to host foreign league and club events. For instance, the French Cup finals were played in China, first in Beijing in 2014 and subsequently in Shenzhen in 2018 and 2019. In this context, the French Professional Football League (LFP) and the French Football Federation (FFF) jointly established an office in Beijing in 2017, intending to expand the reach of French football in China. Through these events, China aims to shift the focus of sports enthusiasts, particularly football enthusiasts, towards its league.

Discussion and conclusions

China's strategic employment of football, and more broadly, the sports industry as a tool for global influence and soft power projection, is manifestly articulated through the analysis. Framed within its mid-20th century economic openness and interdependence, football, despite its initial languid growth, has burgeoned as a critical domain of interest, especially post-1992, primarily propelled by domestic economic reforms (Tan, 2015; Tan & Bairner, 2018).

The recent tumult in China's real estate sector, particularly epitomized by the Evergrande scenario, poses queries about the longevity and robustness of China's financial commitment to football and, more expansively, its soft power projection. Coupled with Africa's pivot towards local industrialization, it holds the potential to recalibrate China's global influence, encompassing its soft power dynamics. Financial and geopolitical challenges cloud China's image as a reliable economic actor. This may impact on its cultural and diplomatic sway in tandem (Liu, Skinner & Grosman, 2020; Sullivan, 2017). In football, such external financial and geopolitical perturbations cast shadows on the perception of China as a steadfast economic player, thus impacting its cultural and diplomatic sway. Should China turn more introspective to stabilize its economy, its global soft power projection, especially in sports, might wane.

Moreover, the role of guanxi, a quintessential relational concept in China, is pivotal in understanding the dynamics at play. This interdependent relationship approach, nourished by Confucian social norms, has been integral to China's sports diplomacy, crafting meaningful relations and collaborations (Hernández & García, 2023). In this regard, China's orientation towards foreign investment, as mirrored in the acquisitions of European football clubs and its subsequent withdrawal in numerous instances, underscores its diplomatic strategy's mutable and frequently volatile nature in sports. This trend might be influenced by a medley of factors, spanning from shifts in domestic policies to broader geopolitical challenges.

However, what remains salient is that despite manifold investments and strategies, economic sustainability and a long-term strategy for football remain subjects awaiting comprehensive address. The integration of sports diplomacy within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) epitomizes how China has aspired to meld economic and geopolitical ambitions, although the veritable fruition of this endeavour remains a matter of conjecture (Brînză, 2018).

Conclusions

This study underscores China's dynamic and multifaceted approach to utilizing its sports industry, particularly football, as an instrument of global influence and soft power projection. The Chinese leadership has strategically orchestrated the evolution from hosting major events to becoming a prominent player in the international sports arena, with policies to foster sports development and enhance international engagement.

The upheaval in China's real estate sector, epitomized by the Evergrande situation, coupled with Africa's pivot towards local industrialization, holds the potential to recalibrate China's global influence, encompassing its soft power dynamics. In the sphere of football, such external financial and geopolitical perturbations might cast shadows on the perception of China as a steadfast economic player, thus impacting its cultural and diplomatic sway. Should China turn more introspective to stabilize its economy, its global soft power projection, especially in the realm of sports, might wane.

Although there have been substantial investments in player transfers, partial or total acquisitions of European clubs, or sponsorships, the use of the industry as a geopolitical tool has impeded the sustainability of such expenditure and the establishment of a strategy that could translate China's international success and recognition in the sporting industry to football. In this regard, the integration of sports diplomacy within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) showcases China's nuanced integration of economic and geopolitical pursuits. However, the plans implemented in 2016 - the Chinese Football Development Medium- and Long-Term Plan (2016-2050) and the National Football Field and Facilities Construction Plan (2016-2020) - represent a shift in the industry's development strategy, contextualizing the government's objectives within a medium - and long-term framework to achieve the long-desired competitiveness. The lack of economic sustainability following the investment period and the real estate crisis impacted football. Thus, the country's sports objective has shifted in favour of a more economically sustainable approach, with a significantly reduced investment profile and a strong emphasis on grassroots sports. China exemplifies that the use of sports as a soft power tool is less about economic profitability and more about a geopolitical strategy that relies on guanxi to forge relationships on the international stage.

As China redefines its role on the international stage, its evolving sports diplomacy strategy will likely continue to impact foreign investments, regional relationships, and global perceptions. Understanding China's utilization of football and sports diplomacy enhances our comprehension of its broader geopolitical aspirations and the innovative ways it wields soft power. This research provides a lens through which to observe the ever-evolving dynamics of China's engagement with the international community and its multifaceted influence through the prism of sports diplomacy.

Limitations and future research

Firstly, this analysis examines sports diplomacy in China from a perspective exclusively centred on football, potentially overlooking a broader landscape within the study's scope. Moreover, the qualitative approach might provide a somewhat nuanced perspective on the motivations, strategies, and challenges in China's efforts concerning sports diplomacy.

Future research could direct attention towards how China can strategically leverage football once again as a geopolitical tool while ensuring the industry's sustainable development to regain international competitiveness. Additionally, it would be insightful to analyse the perspectives of local communities regarding the development of CSL football clubs and the growth of grassroots sports within China to evaluate the broader implications of these initiatives comprehensively.

The limitations highlighted in this study offer opportunities for forthcoming research to delve further into the intricate aspects of China's sports diplomacy, thereby providing a more comprehensive comprehension of the motivations, challenges, and impacts of its strategies on the global sports arena and international relations.

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GASTRODIPLOMACIA CHINESA NO PRESENTE E NO FUTURO

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Resumo

A gastrodiplomacia é uma nova dinâmica da diplomacia pública/cultural, que vários países estão a usar para promover o soft power. Na última década, à medida que foram lançados programas gastrodiplomáticos que produzem efeitos ressaltantes, encontram-se cada vez mais trabalhos significativos neste campo. Porém, este não é o caso para da China. Este é um país, por um lado, com uma vasta riqueza de recursos gastronómicos e, por outro lado, tem promovido ativamente o soft power internacionalmente. Portanto, para o desenvolvimento da área de gastrodiplomacia, não é lógico faltarem análises sobre o caso chinês. Ao pesquisar informações relevantes nos sites do Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros da China e China Public Diplomacy Association, desenvolvemos este trabalho para analisar o que foi feito, particularmente pelo Estado chinês, na gastrodiplomacia e, em seguida, quais são os possíveis desafios para a gastrodiplomacia chinesa.

Palavras-chave

China, diplomacia cultural, diplomacia pública, gastrodiplomacia

Abstract

Gastrodiplomacy is a new dynamic of public/cultural diplomacy, which several countries are using to promote soft power. In the last decade, as gastrodiplomatic programs have been launched that produce outstanding effects, more and more significant work has been found in this field. However, this is not the case for China. This is a country, on the one hand, with a vast wealth of gastronomic resources and, on the other hand, has actively promoted soft power internationally. Therefore, for the development of the area of gastrodiplomacy, it is not logical to lack analyzes on the Chinese case. By searching for relevant information on the websites of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China Public Diplomacy Association, we developed this work to analyze what has been done, particularly by the Chinese State, in gastrodiplomacy and then what are the possible challenges for Chinese gastrodiplomacy.

Keywords

China, cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, gastrodiplomacy

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GASTRODIPLOMACIA CHINESA NO PRESENTE E NO FUTURO

LI GUOFENG

Introdução

A China, atualmente, é uma potência cujas ações têm impacto em quase todo o mundo. Este país, além de desenvolver o *hard power* (poder duro), tem também dado atenção à promoção do *soft power* (poder suave), um conceito criado por Nye que se refere inicialmente aos recursos não-materiais dum país, tais como valores, políticas e cultura[1]. (Nye, 2004) Segundo Nye, *hard power* é "threats or payments" enquanto o *soft power* é a capacidade de "entice and attract" (Nye, 2008, p. 95) Sendo uma das civilizações mais antigas do mundo, o País de Meio (*Zhōngguó*/中国) não perde oportunidade para aproveitar a sua cultura como uma ferramenta diplomática. No discurso chinês, o *soft power* é muitas vezes definido como *Wénhuà ruǎnshílì* (*soft power* cultural/文化软实力), ou seja, a cultura é a fonte mais importante do *soft power*. Desde o mandato do presidente Hu Jintao no início do século XXI, a China tem enfatizado a importância de promover o *soft power* internacionalmente (Júnior & Rodrigues, 2019, p. 85). Agora, segundo o site do Instituto Confúcio[2], foram estabelecidos mais de 500 Institutos Confúcio em 154 países/regiões. Além desta instituição dedicada ao ensino do mandarim, há também outras instituições e atividades que promovem a cultura chinesa, por exemplo, Centros da Cultura Chinesa, *Happy Chinese New Year* etc.

A cultura é um conjunto de símbolos, tangíveis ou intangíveis, da nossa civilização em que a gastronomia é uma parte indispensável da identidade de um país. "Food is a universally vital part of our lives, representing history, traditions, and culture. Each of us relies on food not only to survive, but to comfort ourselves, communicate with others, and connect us to our forebears" (Chapple-sokol, 2013, p. 161). Embora os conceitos só

[1] De facto, o conceito do *soft power* está sob discussão. Por um lado, o *soft power* refere-se meramente aos recursos não-materiais (e este é a distinção clara do *soft* e *hard power*). Por outro lado, há outra opinião: a essência do *soft power* reside no efeito que produz e não necessariamente o recurso em si, isto é, em certos casos, os recursos duros podem também produzir o *soft power* (ensaio militar/apoio humanitário operado pelas forças armadas etc.). Entrar no debate sobre o *soft power* não é objetivo deste trabalho, entretanto, consulte o mais recente artigo de Nye para obter a perspetiva dele veja-se: Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept. *Journal of PoliticalPower 14* (1): 1–13.

[2] *Confucius Institute*, http://ci.cn/#/site/GlobalConfucius/?key=3.

sejam criados recentemente, a comida tem uma longa história por ser um veículo de *soft power* e diplomacia pública/cultural.

Devido à globalização, as fronteiras culturais tornam-se cada vez menos claras. Dito por outras palavras, encontrar comida exótica onde vivemos já não é nada difícil, mas era algo inimaginável no passado. Aproveitando esta tendência, alguns países estabeleceram uma nova forma de diplomacia cultural. Em 2002, a Tailândia lançou o programa *Globai Thai* que tenta aumentar o número dos restaurantes tailandeses mundialmente para, além de promover a própria comida nacional, melhorar a perceção do povo estrangeiro em relação à Tailândia. Esta ação foi denominada por *The Economists* (2002) como *gastrodiplomacy*. Posteriormente, outros países participaram igualmente nesta nova prática, o que ofereceram matéria-prima de investigação. Na última década, assistimos a um *boom* na investigação da gastrodiplomacia.

Entretanto, mesmo assim, não se encontram trabalhos significativos para a gastrodiplomacia chinesa, o que é curioso, porque este é um país com uma gastronomia diversificada e tem promovido a sua cultura no estrangeiro. Rockower (2014) propôs várias dicas para a gastrodiplomacia chinesa, entretanto, ainda não geraram influências significativas. Li, por sua vez, tem conduzido várias investigações sobre a gastrodiplomacia chinesa, por exemplo, analisar o papel dos restaurantes chineses (Li, 2022) e a tradução dos menus do ponto de vista gastrodiplomático (Li, 2023). Estes trabalhos explorativos deram os primeiros passos ao início da investigação da gastrodiplomacia chinesa. Contudo, falta uma análise holística da gastrodiplomacia chinesa, sendo esta o objetivo desta investigação.

Neste trabalho, desenvolvemos duas questões: 1) O que foi feito na gastrodiplomacia chinesa, particularmente, pelas autoridades chinesas? 2) Quais são os desafios para o desenvolvimento da gastrodiplomacia chinesa no futuro?

Para responder as questões, seguimos uma metodologia quantitativa. Procuramos, através das palavras-chave, informações sobre a gastrodiplomacia chinesa nos sites, nomeadamente do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (MNE) e da *China Public Diplomacy Association*. Estes dois sites são representativos, porque são das instituições diretamente relacionadas com a diplomacia da China: um deles é oficial enquanto outro é social. Tanto o processo de recolhimento de dados quanto as análises dos mesmos, na forma de análise de conteúdo, serão mostrados no ponto 3. Este trabalho será o primeiro a investigar a gastrodiplomacia da China duma forma holística. Espera-se que se possa contribuir para o saber nesta área.

1. Gastrodiplomacia

A comida desempenha sempre mais papéis para além de nos alimentar. Na Antiguidade, a partilha de comida funciona como um laço importante para manter relações com os familiares e membros da tribo. A palavra "companhia" vem exatamente do "*cum pane*" do latim, o que literalmente significa "pessoa com quem se partilha o pão" (Spence, 2016, p. 1). Já nos séculos dos Descobrimentos, o intercâmbio de comida (especiarias,

ingredientes, etc.) é uma parte indispensável, e até às vezes, é o motivo das viagens ultramarinas.

Embora a gastrodiplomacia seja um termo recente, o uso da comida para fins diplomáticos não é nada novo. "The importance of food and commensality is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of diplomacy" (Chapple-sokol, 2013, p. 163) Chapple-sokol conclui que a comida é utilizada de várias formas nas relações internacionais antigas, tais como banquetes para diplomatas estrangeiros, atributo aos reis, demonstração do poder etc. (*Ibidem*).

Afinal, de que modo funciona a comida nas relações diplomáticas? Esta pergunta é fundamental para todos os conceitos relacionados com a comida nos estudos da diplomacia. No fundo, a lógica é simples e compreensível. Em primeiro lugar, a comida em si é algo que contem pouco componente político ou ideológico, por outras palavras, é algo universal. Esta universalidade e neutralidade traz-lhe uma vantagem de servir como uma boa ferramenta da diplomacia pública. Em segundo lugar, na ordem lógica surge o papel da comida/refeição na *decision-making* (tomada de decisões). Ao comer, tornamo-nos sempre mais abertos, simpáticos e acessíveis, pois a atmosfera duma refeição é normalmente confortável e relaxante. Spence (2016) conduz uma investigação bastante interessante onde conclui que, ao comer, o corpo humano irá ativar mais neurotransmissores agradáveis, tais como endorfinas, o que ajuda a estabelecer ligações amigáveis com os outros com quem se está a partilhar a refeição, o que, em última análise, aumenta a recetividade das pessoas aos conselhos, sugestões e pedidos dos outros. Em terceiro lugar, a comida é uma representação da cultura que contém informações e valores únicos duma nação e, juntamente com a sua neutralidade política, abre caminho para mais diálogos além da comida em si. Quando estamos sentados a comer uma comida, é provável que estejamos a falar não só desta comida, mas também de mais temas relacionados com a cultura e o país a que pertence.

Entretanto, a utilização da comida nas relações internacionais antigas limitava-se basicamente ao nível superior, isto é, tinha pouco a ver com o público dum país. Os académicos (Chapple-Sokol, 2013; Rockower, 2019) tratavam esta atividade como *Culinary Diplomacy*, referindo-se ao uso da comida nas ocasiões diplomáticas formais.

Agora, a gastrodiplomacia é um conceito um pouco diferente. Devido à globalização, as fronteiras da cultura nacional tornam-se menos claras, ou seja, provar uma comida exótica já não é exclusivamente acessível aos poderosos ou ricos. A gastrodiplomacia, atualmente, concentra-se mais ao nível popular, enfatizando-se a experiência da gastronomia da massa popular do país-alvo. É nesta questão do alvo que reside a diferença entre *culinary diplomacy* e *gastrodiplomacy*.

Entretanto, os dois termos continuam a ser utilizados em alternativa, sem se distinguirem (Li, 2023)[3]. De facto, há vários conceitos próximos da gastrodiplomacia que devemos distinguir:

[3] Aqui, vemos um jogo das palavras dos académicos: se partimos rigorosamente dos significados das palavras, tanto *culinary (connected with cooking or kitchens)* quanto *gastronomy (the art and knowledge involved in preparing and eating good food)* não são exatamente preciosas aqui (*Cambridge Dictionary*, https://dictionary.cambridge.org). Entretanto, usa-se estas palavras só por causa de terminologia.

TABELA 1 - Conceitos próximos com a gastrodiplomacia

Termo	Definição
Food Diplomacy	"Food diplomacy entails? the use of food aid and food relief during a period of crisis or catastrophe" (Rockower, 2019, p. 206)
Culinary Diplomacy	"Culinary diplomacy is characterized by the use of food for diplomatic pursuits, namely the use of cuisine amid the overall formal diplomatic procedures." (Rockower, 2019, p. 206)
Gastrodiplomacia	Promoção sistemática da comida nacional para criar laços afetivos e emocionais com o público do país-alvo, abrindo a porta a mais intercâmbios.
Gastronacionalismo	Promoção sistemática da comida no doméstico para a identidade nacional.
Relações Públicas (marketing da comida)	Promoção da comida nacional para fins industriais, económicos ou do negócio.

Fonte: criação do autor

Uma questão muitas vezes levantada nesta área é que há muitos que acham que a gastrodiplomacia é só uma campanha de marketing. Podemos dizer que há certamente técnicas de marketing nas campanhas gastrodiplomáticas, contudo, o objetivo não é meramente vender a comida nacional.

Para uma boa prática da gastrodiplomacia, há vários passos de funcionamento. Primeiro, transmitir as mensagens e os valores culturais ao público-alvo através da comida (ou qualquer atividade relacionada com a comida). Segundo, aproveitando a sua preferência pela nossa comida, fazer o público-alvo querer saber mais sobre o país representado pelo prato. Terceiro, temos de converter esta preferência da comida e a curiosidade do público-alvo acerca o nosso país em benefícios verdadeiros. Quando foi criado o termo de "gastrodiplomacia" por *The Economists* em 2002, já foram identificados três objetivos fundamentais: 1. Promover a comida nacional. 2. Impulsionar o turismo. 3. Aprofundar relações com o povo dos outros países (*The Economists*, 2002).

Em relação ao fundamento teórico, apesar de que a gastrodiplomacia é ainda nova nos estudos internacionais e que há ainda muitos espaços por preencher e por serem dialogados, os académicos deste campo chegaram a um consenso no seu fundamento teórico: soft power, diplomacia pública[4] e *nation branding* (Chapple-sokol, 2013; Solleh, 2015; Rockower, 2019)[5]. Devido à limitação e à natureza deste trabalho, não vamos elaborar um grande debate sobre as bases teóricas da gastrodiplomacia. De uma forma resumida, a comida faz parte da cultura, sendo esta a fonte do *soft power* (Nye, 2004).

[4] Partindo-se da perspetiva de Cull (2008), a diplomacia cultural é um dos componentes da diplomacia pública, portanto, não se refere à diplomacia cultural e à parte neste trabalho.

[5] Para alguém interessado na gastrodiplomacia: as obras de Sam Chapple-sokol e de Paul Rockower são "clássicas" e fundamentais nesta área. As obras de Chapple-sokol têm uma caraterística mais teórica e académica enquanto as de Rockower são mais práticas.

E "Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country's soft power" (Nye, 2008, p. 96). Quanto ao *nation branding*, como referimos, encontram-se sempre técnicas de marketing na gastrodiplomacia. Aqui, usa-se um símbolo cultural (comida) para criar uma ligação entre a comida-local e o *brand* para o país, por exemplo, quando falamos de pizza, pensamos na Itália; quando falamos de *jamón*, pensamos na Espanha etc. Até agora, já se encontram várias campanhas da gastrodiplomacia em todo o mundo, mas sobretudo no Este e Sudeste da Ásia (White *et al.*, 2019, p. 135).

TABELA 2 - Principais campanhas gastrodiplomáticas

País	Ano da campanha	Nome da campanha
Tailândia	2002	*Global Thai/Thailand: Kitchen of the World*
Malásia	2006 2010	*The Malaysia Kitchen Programme* *Malaysia Kitchens for the World*
Coreia do Sul	2009	*Korean Cuisine to the World*
Taiwan (República da China)	2010	*All in Good Taste: Savor the Flavors of Taiwan (Dim sum diplomacy)*
Perú	2012	*Cocina Peruana para el Mundo*
Austrália	2014	*There´s nothing like Australia - Restaurant Australia*

Fonte: criação do autor

Para além das acima identificadas, há também outros países que realizaram atividades gastronómicas, por exemplo, Espanha, os Estados Unidos etc. Entretanto, devido à sua escala de operação ou nível de público-alvo (por exemplo, no caso dos EUA, é mais diplomacia culinária), não as consideramos gastrodiplomacia.

Em suma, a gastrodiplomacia, fundamentada em *soft power*, diplomacia pública e *nation branding*, visa a promover sistematicamente a comida nacional ao povo estrangeiro com o intuito de criar laços afetivos e, por conseguinte, abrir mais caminhos de intercâmbios. Por outras palavras, a gastrodiplomacia não tem que ter fins políticos no início nem precisa de dar efeitos imediatos. "[Gastodiplomacy] ultimately shape long-term public diplomacy perceptions in a manner different than targeted strategic communications" (Rockower, 2012, p. 236).

2. Diplomacia pública da China

Quando se fala da diplomacia pública, existe uma pré-condição importante que é ter a noção do tipo de que estamos a falar. "O termo «diplomacia pública» foi criado em 1965 por Edmund Gullion para os EUA vencerem a Guerra Fria, ou seja, com o objetivo de influenciar as populações de outros países, fora do governo, sendo esta outra forma de evolução pacífica" (Wang, 2014, p. 43). Se partimos dessas ideias originais de Gullion, a diplomacia pública partilha muitas semelhanças com a propaganda. Neste sentido, a República Popular da China tem praticado a diplomacia pública desde cedo.

Chen (2016) divide a diplomacia pública da China em três fases, Fase Inicial (1949-anos 70), Fase Transitória (anos 80–fim da Guerra Fria) e Fase Institucional (pós-Guerra Fria). A primeira fase é dominada principalmente por ideologias, pois, nessa altura, a China estava ao lado da URSS e esteve dez anos sob a Revolução Cultural (1966-1976). Por isso, a diplomacia chinesa era de exportar ideias revolucionais e meramente políticas ao estrangeiro.

No fim dos anos 70, quando Deng Xiaoping implementou o plano de Reforma e Abertura, a China deixou de estar presa às questões ideológicas. A comunicação internacional do país adotou duas linhas ao mesmo tempo, "propaganda ao exterior (对外宣传/*Duìwài xuānchuán*)" e "intercâmbio humano e cultural (人文交流/*Rénwén jiāoliú*)". Explicando, a promoção da cultura chinesa começou a ter papel importante. E é neste tempo que os primeiros Centros da Cultura Chinesa foram estabelecidos no estrangeiro[6].

Na Fase Institucional, a China começou a adotar estratégias mais sistemáticas do que antes, criando instituições dedicadas exclusivamente à diplomacia pública, nomeadamente o SCIO (*State Council Information Office*). Ao mesmo tempo, os líderes do partido também estão cientes de que a propaganda já está fora da nossa era, portanto, mudaram o nome do Departamento de Propaganda para Departamento de Publicidade.

Entretanto, à luz do surgimento do conceito do *soft power* e desenvolvimento das tecnologias de comunicação, a diplomacia pública tradicional, isto é, a nascida na Guerra Fria, já não satisfaz os requisitos atuais. Portanto, os académicos falam de *New Public Diplomacy* (NPD) ou *Public Diplomacy 2.0* (por exemplo: Cull, 2013; Gilboa, 2008; Pamment, 2013). As duas novidades são, primeiro, o ator da diplomacia pública não é apenas o Estado, mas também as organizações não-governamentais e até indivíduos. Segundo, a nova diplomacia pública exige uma comunicação *two-ways* (nos dois sentidos). De acordo com Cull (2008, p. 31), *listening* (ouvir) ao público-alvo faz parte da diplomacia pública.

No caso chinês, há ainda um longo caminho para a NPD. A República Popular da China, por natureza, é um regime altamente centralizado. As principais instituições da diplomacia pública são basicamente dominadas, de uma forma muito óbvia, pelo Governo, por exemplo, *Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries* e *China Public Diplomacy Association* (CPDA). Se aceder à plataforma da CPDA[7], irá descobrir que as reportagens, notícias e até o estilo da plataforma são quase iguais ao site do MNE chinês. A participação dos atores não oficiais na diplomacia pública chinesa é pouca. Wang (2014), do mesmo modo, salienta a importância da "diplomacia social" para enriquecer os canais da diplomacia pública da China. Há também outra questão fundamental que é a da credibilidade. A China, por mais que contribua para a diplomacia pública, será sempre considerada uma ameaça devido ao seu tamanho físico e ao Sistema

[6] Os primeiros dois Centros foram estabelecidos em Maurícia e Benim em 1988. Ver-se em https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/中国文化中心.
[7] *China Public Diplomacy Association*, http://www.chinapda.org.cn.

de Tianxia (Sistema de Tributo) no passado[8] (Wang, 2014, p. 46). Após a análise da diplomacia pública chinesa através do CGTN[9], Rawnsley conclui que, embora a China investa bastante nas "infraestruturas" do *soft power* e na diplomacia pública, a eficiência dos mesmos é, por um lado, difícil de medir e, por outro lado, o problema mantém-se sempre: as pessoas não acreditam nela (Rawnsley, 2015). Portanto, a diplomacia pública chinesa enfrenta obstáculos não só nas estratégias de topo, mas também nas medidas concretas e na questão de eficiência.

3. A gastrodiplomacia chinesa no presente: o que foi feito?

Para saber o que foi feito na gastrodiplomacia chinesa, efetuámos uma análise de informações contidas nos sites do MNE e CPDA. Nos dois sites existe um motor de pesquisa onde colocamos as palavras-chave para obter dados. As palavras-chave utilizadas na pesquisa foram: 美食公共外交 (*Měishí gōnggòng wàijiāo*/gastronomia-pública-diplomacia), 美食外交(*Měishí wàijiāo*/literalmente: gastronomia-diplomacia) ou simplesmente 美食 (*Měishí*/gastronomia). A pesquisa foi realizada até ao dia 28 de março de 2023. E, devido aos limites do presente trabalho, o intervalo das informações pesquisadas está compreendida entre os anos 2013 e 2023.

No site da CPDA, não encontrámos nenhum resultado válido, isto é, informações diretamente relacionadas com a gastrodiplomacia chinesa entre 2013-2023. Entretanto, isto *per si* já é uma informação importante: a maior associação chinesa da diplomacia pública não tem qualquer informação sobre a gastronomia nacional. Porém, no site do MNE, encontram-se 209 resultados e, após excluirmos os resultados inválidos (por exemplo, participação de diplomatas chineses na degustação da comida local; atividades da diplomacia culinária), restam 100.

Para estas cem informações válidas, foram criados cinco indicadores para as categorizar: País-alvo; Papel da parte chinesa (organização/participação); se for organizado pela parte chinesa, quem é exatamente o organizador (oficial ou civil); Natureza da atividade (meramente gastronómica ou, num contexto mais amplo, cultural) e Forma de atividade (degustação, promoção audiovisual e outras).

Todo este processo, verificar a validade e a codificação das informações, foi repetido por um outro revisor para reduzir a subjetividade. Quando há diferença da codificação entre os dois anotadores, o problema é discutido até se chegar ao consenso. Os dados encontram-se disponíveis no anexo.

Após a análise dos dados, descobrimos que a China tem práticas gastrodiplomáticas na última década. O país organiza e participa em eventos gastronómicos dirigidos ao público do país-alvo.

[8] O Sistema de Tianxia, ou Sistema de Tributo, é um conjunto de regras que a China estabeleceu para gerir as suas relações com os outros países, principalmente, países à volta dela. Sob este sistema, a China considerava-se o centro do mundo e os restantes eram países que a subordinavam e tinham que lhe oferecer tributos. Para mais informações, consulte o livro Da China (*On China*) de Henry Kissinger ou artigo de Shiu Sin Por para ter uma ideia geral (https://www.globalasia.org/v15no2/cover/tianxia-chinas-concept-of-international-order_shiu-sin-por).

[9] CGTN é um canal de comunicação ao exterior da autoridade chinesa, veja-se: https://www.cgtn.com.

Os atores da gastrodiplomacia chinesa não são apenas oficiais, isto é, embaixadas e Institutos Confúcio, mas também civis, por exemplo, associações da comunidade chinesa. E para além das atividades de degustação, a promoção da comida chinesa via métodos audiovisuais também é uma técnica utilizada. Por exemplo, o documentário *A Bite of China* tem versões na língua estrangeira e está a ser promovido noutros países (Li, 2023; Zhang, 2015).

TABELA 3 - O que foi realizado na gastrodiplomacia chinesa?

País-alvo	Países na Ásia, África, Europa, América (Norte, Central e Sul) e Oceânia (Lista completa no anexo)
Organização ou participação	Organização:49 Participação : 51
Organização	Oficial: Embaixada chinesa; Institutos Confúcio; Autoridades chinesas que vêm da China Civil: Associação chinesa local
Forma de atividade	Degustação; Promoção audiovisual; Outras (aulas de culinária)
Natureza de atividade	Meramente gastronómica e cultural

Fonte: criação do autor

De acordo com os resultados, a gastrodiplomacia chinesa apresenta três principais caraterísticas. A primeira é a *Track 2 Diplomacy*, que é realizar atividades diplomáticas não só ao nível nacional mas também local, sendo este que a China se diferencia da gastrodiplomacia dos outros países. A maior parte dos países que praticam a gastrodiplomacia, principalmente países de *small-middle power*, escolhem apenas uma única comida para representar a comida nacional, por exemplo, a Coreia do Sul promove o *kimichi*, o Japão promove o *sushi*, etc. Entretanto, no caso chinês, como este é um país com culturas regionais e étnicas distintas, as províncias e até cidades chinesas vão ao estrangeiro para promover a sua comida local. Por exemplo, nas informações que encontrámos, Chengdu, Tianjin, Xangai, Cantão etc. enviaram a delegação municipal para organizar eventos gastronómicos. Esta caraterística está em conformidade com a proposta que Rockower deu à autoridade chinesa: "É bom para a China incentivar atividades sub-governamentais organizadas por diferentes regiões para promover a gastronomia local" (Rockower, 2014, p. 87). "Destacando as características exclusivas das diferentes gastronomias regionais da China, a gastrodiplomacia a nível regional e urbano pode ser uma nova forma para a diplomacia chinesa" (Rockower, 2014, p. 87).
A segunda caraterística é que o modo chinês é "selvagem", o que é um ponto, de certa maneira, negativo. "A China começou a adotar algumas das melhores táticas da gastrodiplomacia, mas estes esforços têm sido em grande parte espontâneos" (Rockower, 2014, p. 87). É verdade que a autoridade chinesa está a organizar ou participar em eventos gastrodiplomáticos, contudo, falta uma estratégia superior para coordenar a gastrodiplomacia chinesa. Por outras palavras, a promoção da comida

chinesa está a desenvolver-se duma forma sem plano, através dos restaurantes chineses, da sua diáspora etc.
A terceira caraterística é a coexistência da gastrodiplomacia e diplomacia culinária. Na nossa pesquisa, foram descobertas também informações sobre a diplomacia culinária, por exemplo, convidar os diplomatas de outros países a degustar a comida chinesa, promover a comida chinesa aos políticos e empresários locais etc.

4. A gastrodiplomacia chinesa no presente: desafios

Rockower (2019, p. 209) resumiu em sete pontos as caraterísticas comuns das campanhas gastrodiplomáticas bem-sucedidas dos outros países. Com base nisto, comparamos o caso chinês para explorar os possíveis desafios da gastrodiplomacia chinesa.

TABELA 4 - Caraterísticas comuns dos programas gastrodiplomáticos

• expansion of restaurants to serve as forward cultural outposts through soft-loan financing programs;
• furthering of access to authentic local ingredients for culinary outpost restaurants around the globe;
• facilitation of chef participation in cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy;
• inclusion of chefs within the formal diplomatic process and in the diplomatic protocol of state dinners and functions;
• promotion of cuisine in conjunction with cultural diplomacy events like night markets or film screenings;
• public cooking classes, cooking master classes and mass cooking demonstrations, often staged in multiple locations; and
• recognition of national cuisine or select dishes in the pantheon of the United Nations Edu cation, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) "intangible cultural heritage of humanity."

Fonte: Rockower, 2019, p. 209

Primeiro, a questão do modo selvagem, que acabámos de mencionar no último ponto, tem que ser resolvida. A gastrodiplomacia, sendo uma forma da diplomacia pública, demora tempo a ter efeito. Nunca podemos pensar que depois dum jantar os outros vão ficar logo a gostar de nós. A China é, sem dúvida, uma possível grande potência da gastrodiplomacia, uma vez que já não precisa de procurar *hardware* para este efeito. A sua culinária já está espalhada em todo o mundo devido às comunidades chinesas. Porém, se não houver organização, estes recursos não podem gerar efeitos significativos. Ao contrário, no caso de Tailândia, Japão, Peru e até de Taiwan (Ruddy, 2014; Zhang, 2015), vemos uma coordenação da autoridade, porque só a autoridade tem o poder de conciliar no topo os eventuais recursos da gastrodiplomacia. Entretanto, aqui surge mais um desafio: que papel terá a autoridade na gastrodiplomacia? Precisa-se dum maior esforço da autoridade chinesa, porém, se o papel dela é muito óbvio na gastrodiplomacia, volta-se à questão de credibilidade. A gastronomia é o recurso mais neutro, pelo menos

parece que é, para promover o *soft power*. Por isso, acrescentar demasiado ênfase político na gastrodiplomacia causa o risco de parecer propaganda. Numa entrevista feita pelo autor para um outro trabalho, Rockower (Li, 2023) argumenta que nem tudo tem que ser político e a missão da gastrodiplomacia é, antes de tudo, estabelecer laços emocionais.

Em segundo lugar, as técnicas da gastrodiplomacia chinesa são monótonas. Nos dados que encontrámos, a maioria dos eventos (92%) é meramente degustação da comida nas feiras, e esta é uma forma que todos usam. Entretanto, alguns países inovam na realização das atividades para trazer mais novidade. Por exemplo, "a Coreia do Sul tem o *Bibigo Food Truck* nas cidades norte-americanas para servir a comida tradicional do país." (Zhang, 2015, p. 12) No caso de Malásia, por sua vez, as campanhas gastrodiplomáticas foram encaixadas no *Night Market*, que é um evento com atividades culturais em maior escala. (Rockower, 2019, p. 209)

Terceiro, a questão de autenticidade e qualidade da comida é um outro fator com que a China se deve preocupar. Li (2022) defende que o que estamos a promover é uma comida exótica para o público-alvo, portanto, se se perder a autenticidade, perder-se-á o sentido da gastrodiplomacia.

No caso chinês, os restaurantes chineses estão em todo o mundo, porém, muitos deles vendem comida não "chinesa", ou seja, vendem pratos chineses ajustados segundo o sabor local ou, simplesmente, vendem outra comida asiática. Em Portugal, após a Operação Oriente em 2006, vender *sushi* é um fenómeno comum nos restaurantes chineses. Por vezes, ironicamente, quando se pergunta qual é o prato representativo na culinária chinesa, há pessoas que respondem *sushi* (Li, 2022, p. 93).

Em relação a isto, o governo tailandês criou umas regras para certificar os restaurantes tailandeses de qualidade no estrangeiro. No caso do Japão, "To safe-guard consumers overseas from «bad» Japanese food experiences, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries formed a panel of experts, to inspect Japanese restaurants globally for authenticity, chastising those that were not up to standard" (Raynolds, 2012, p. 53). Ao proceder deste modo, por um lado, assegura-se a experiência de qualidade aos clientes, por outro lado, a imagem da culinária nacional, transmitindo-se a comida nacional *verdadeira*. Do ponto de vista de *nation branding*, o que estamos a promover tem de ser algo da nossa identidade, ou seja, é representativo e identitário. Portanto, garantir o acesso dos estrangeiros à comida chinesa autêntica e o acesso dos atores aos ingredientes de qualidade são tarefas relevantes na gastrodiplomacia chinesa.

5. Conclusões

Resumindo, a China está a utilizar a sua comida para fins gastrodiplomáticos, estando as embaixadas, Institutos Confúcio e entidades relevantes chinesas a organizarem eventos de gastronomia. Da mesma forma, participam também em eventos organizados por outros governos e pelas comunidades chinesas locais. A gastrodiplomacia chinesa mostra certas caraterísticas distintas dos outros países, por exemplo, o modo selvagem e *Track 2 diplomacy*.

Entretanto, trata-se de atividades isoladas, estando em falta uma estratégia de longo prazo e de topo. Juntamente com a questão da credibilidade, a China deverá repensar e melhorar subtilmente o papel do governo neste processo.

O presente trabalho responde a dois questionamentos relevantes à gastrodiplomacia chinesa. Ao identificar o que foi feito e analisar os possíveis desafios, dando uma visão compreensiva para conhecer o *status quo* da gastrodiplomacia chinesa. Entretanto, há que reconhecer os limites desta investigação. Por exemplo, entrevistar diplomatas chineses neste campo (ou de âmbito mais geral, da diplomacia pública/cultural) poderia complementar e fornecer outras informações para a análise.

Primeiro, apontando para investigações futuras, após o desenvolvimento de duas décadas, chega à altura de fazer uma revisão de literatura sistemática nesta área para consolidar a base teórica e resumir os avanços do conceito da gastrodiplomacia, evitando produções científicas repetidas. Segundo, será também interessante comparar o modo da gastrodiplomacia das grandes potências (Estados Unidos, China, etc.) com as outras potências *small-middle* para verificar as diferenças e o porquê.

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ANEXO

PESQUISA DE INFORMAÇÕES

	Ministério de Negócios Estrangeiros			*China Public Diplomacy Association*		
Palavras-chave (2013-2023)	美食公共外交 /*Měishí gōnggòng wàijiāo*	美食外交/ *Měishí wàijiāo*	美食/ *Měishí*	美食公共外交/ *Měishí gōnggòng wàijiāo*	美食外交/ *Měishí wàijiāo*	美食/ *Měishí*
Resultados totais	12	41	156	32	0	0
Resultados válidos	0	5	95	0	0	0

CODIFICAÇÃO DAS INFORMAÇÕES VÁLIDAS

Indicadores	**Resultados**
País-alvo	**Ásia:** Paquistão x2, Tailândia x3, Uzbequistão x5, Tadjiquistão x4, Mongólia, Malásia, Kuwait, Bangladesh x2, Qatar, Índia x2, Emirados Árabes Unidos x2 **África:** Gana, Gabão, Maurício X6, Zimbábue x2, Ruanda x3, Egipto x3, República do Congo, Nigéria x3, Senegal x2, Marrocos, Namíbia **América do Norte:** Canadá x11, Estados Unidos x5, México x4 **América Central:** Nicarágua, Costa Rica, Antígua e Barbuda, Trindade e Tobago x2, Granada x2 **América do Sul:** Peru, Brasil, Uruguai x2, Columbia, Equador **Europa:** Suíça x2, França x5, Chipre x2, Eslováquia, Irlanda, Grécia, Roménia, Croácia **Oceânia:** Austrália x5, Vanuatu
Organização ou participação	**Organização:** 49 **Participação:** 51
Organizador	**Oficial:** Embaixada chinesa 28; Institutos Confúcio 3; Autoridade chinesas vêm da China: 9 **Civil:** Associação chinesa local 9
Formas de atividade:	**Degustação:** 92 **Promoção audiovisual:** 6 **Outras:** 2 aulas
Natureza de atividade	**Gastronómica:** 91 **Cultural:** 9

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TOTALITARIANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE NATION'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

The argument of my paper is that higher education in China is going through a process of totalitarianization and democratization at the same time. On the one hand there are organizational controls and ideological indoctrination of students and cooptation of the faculty by the Party-state. On the other hand, there are democratic breakthroughs on the part of both students and professors. Whatever happens in the ivory tower inevitably affects what happens outside of it. Whether the Party-state is going in the direction of totalitarianism or democracy depends on the result of the tug-of-war between the forces of totalitarianization and democratization in both state and society. My analysis is based on an examination of the available data in research from a perspective of the sociology of higher education. I hope that a better understanding of what happens at the university and the role of higher education in China's development will help all the stakeholders of higher education in making wiser policies and practical decisions.

Keywords

China, Higher Education, Democratization, Totalitarianization, Intellectuals.

Resumo

O argumento do meu artigo é que o ensino superior na China atravessa um processo de totalitarização e democratização ao mesmo tempo. Por um lado, existem controlos organizacionais e doutrinação ideológica dos estudantes e cooptação do corpo docente pelo Partido-Estado. Por outro lado, há avanços democráticos por parte de estudantes e

professores. O que quer que aconteça na torre de marfim afeta inevitavelmente o que acontece fora dela. Se o Partido-Estado está a caminhar na direcção do totalitarismo ou da democracia depende do resultado da disputa entre as forças da totalitarização e da democratização, tanto no Estado como na sociedade. A minha análise baseia-se na análise dos dados disponíveis em pesquisas sob uma perspectiva da sociologia do ensino superior. Espero que uma melhor compreensão do que acontece na universidade e do papel do ensino superior no desenvolvimento da China ajude todos os intervenientes no ensino superior a tomarem medidas e decisões práticas mais sábias.

Palavras-chave

China, Ensino superior, Democratização, Totalitarização, Intelectuais.

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Zhidong Hao

TOTALITARIANIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE NATION'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

ZHIDONG HAO

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s own experience tells us that whoever controls the intellectuals and university students will control the future of the country. Thus, totalitarianization or democratization in higher education is of paramount importance for the ruling CCP's goal to keep power in its own hands. Success in control of the university is an indication of success in other fields of life.

My argument in this paper is that totalitarianization and democratization in higher education in China happen at the same time, although the former is the dominant mode under the current CCP rule. The two are at a stalemate. But political repression and economic growth are not enough to legitimize the CCP control, and in the long run, the Party will have to democratize if it wants to stay in power. An analysis and understanding of how totalitarianization and democratization work in higher education is important for us to understand in which direction China may go in the future since colleges and universities play an important role in the political development of the entire nation.

It is true that what we discuss in this paper cannot represent all of higher education in China since most of our data is based on studies of only a few higher education institutions in China. Statistics for 2017 show that China had 2,913 colleges and universities with a student number of close to 38 million (Ministry of Education, 2018a). But they should still give us a fairly good idea of what is happening in higher education since the political nature of the Chinese state makes it probable that what happens in one university will happen in other universities as well.

In the following pages, I first explain the nature of the Chinese state in terms of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Then I examine the historical role of higher education from a sociological point of view. Thirdly and fourthly, I illustrate the totalitarianization and democratization of college students and professors respectively. This will be followed by a conclusion.

The Nature of the Chinese State: From Authoritarianism to Totalitarianism

It seems that China is entering a new era. It may be entering a revolutionary period following Deng Xiaoping's reform and Jiang Zemin's and Hu Jintao's rejuvenation (see Cheek, 2015, on the three recurring periods in China's modern history and Zhidong Hao 2020a for an explanation). If many scholars believe that the eras of Deng, Jiang, and Hu were characterized by resilient authoritarianism (Nathan, 2003; Minxin Pei, 2003), the Xi Jinping era may be moving towards totalitarianism, or in Fukuyama's (2020) term, "aspiring" totalitarianism, or what Ringen (2016) calls "perfect dictatorship". I call this a totalitarianization process.

What is the difference between authoritarianism and totalitarianism? Huntington (1991:12) defines a traditional authoritarian regime as one that "is characterized by a single leader or a small group of leaders, no party or a weak party, no mass mobilization, possibly a 'mentality' but no ideology, limited government, 'limited, not responsible, political pluralism,' and no effort to remake society and human nature." This might be true under Deng, Jiang, and Hu when collective leadership by the standing committee members of the Politburo was emphasized, the CCP occasionally tried to place more responsibility on the administrative leaders rather than the Party leaders, and limited civil society organizations were encouraged. To be sure, there was still a one-Party dictatorship, and the Marxist ideology was strongly adhered to, at least verbally. But the society by and large was more open than under Mao. So it makes sense for scholars like Andrew Nathan and Minxin Pei to debate a resilient authoritarianism.

But things have changed since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Although Xi has inherited many control mechanisms from the previous eras, as we will discuss later, he has consolidated them in various ways so that the system now more resembles totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt's (1958) seminal work on the origins of totalitarianism discussed "the Leader's absolute monopoly of power and authority" or the regime's "unlimited power" (pp. 405 and 456), absolute control (p. 341), ideological indoctrination (pp. 6, 341), terror (p. 341), organization (p. 364), and concentration and extermination camps (p. 437). Huntington (1992:12) further defines a totalitarian regime as one that is characterized by "a single party, usually led by one man; a pervasive and powerful secret police; a higher developed ideology setting forth the ideal society, which the totalitarian movement is committed to realizing; and government penetration and control of mass communications and all or most social and economic organizations" (see also Fukuyama, 2020)

The reeducation camps in Xinjiang are not concentration camps but they do bear many similarities. China under Xi also embodies other characteristics of totalitarianism. Every corner of the country is under the Party's control (*dong xi nan bei zhong, dang shi lingdao yiqie de*東西南北中，黨是領導一切的), and all in China will have to submit to one ruler (*dingyu yizun*定於一尊). Nobody can "issue groundless criticism of the CCP decisions and

policies" (*wang yi zhongyang* 妄議中央), meaning that no-one can criticize the Party-state and its paramount leader for whatever they do. The dominant ideology will be the "China dream" (*zhongguo meng*中國夢), or the revival of the Chinese nation, an ideal society everybody is supposed to be committed to realizing. The CCP branches have to be established in civil society organizations (if there are still any left) and even in private enterprises. The traditional mass media has to follow the Party line closely, and social media is closely watched so that anything that might deviate from the Party line will be quickly deleted. So almost all the indicators of totalitarianism are there. It then makes sense to talk about totalitarianism and totalitarianization at this stage of China's development with the understanding that it is built on the authoritarian mechanisms created by Xi's predecessors, and in many senses, it is reverting to Mao, or in Fukuyama's (2020) terms, reviving "parts of the old Maoist model."

But at the same time, there are also forces of democratization. After all, Chinese intellectuals and political elites have strived for more than a century for the democratization of China. As Cheek (2015) points out, democracy is an enduring idea throughout the past 100 years and more (see also Zhidong Hao, 2020a). Even in earlier eras, there was a tradition of literati activism critical of the royal court (Elman, 1989). The Chinese democracy movement later has gone through many forms in many generations including Liang Qichao's democracy for the elites, Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, Chiang Kai-shek's stages from military rule to provisional constitutional rule and then to constitutional rule, and Mao Zedong's democratic centralism and people's democratic dictatorship, etc. Mao won the support of many intellectuals in his revolution because he claimed to build a democratic state. Many believed him first and then were disappointed. But that has not stopped intellectuals from continuing to strive for the democratization of China, for example, in the 1950s by the so-called "rightists", and in the 1980s by student movements and open-minded Party leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Even when Xi Jinping is moving toward totalitarianism, some human rights lawyers, university professors, and other intellectuals have continued to challenge Xi's policies on the suppression of the freedom of speech, on the Party's ethnic policies, the Belt and Road Initiative, etc. although such efforts have become increasingly difficult inside China.

In a nutshell, totalitarianization and democratization coexist even though the former dominates China now. How does higher education fare in this tug-of-war between the two, then? That is what this paper wants to explore. But first I will examine the historical role of higher education in China's political development from a sociological point of view before we come to the politics of higher education in contemporary times.

The Historical Role of Higher Education in China's Political Development

igher education, public or private, plays at least three roles: to serve the interests of the state, to produce professional and independent new knowledge, and to produce democratic citizens. Kant thought that the mission of the university "was to serve two primary functions: first, to provide educated bureaucrats for the state, and second, to conduct research whose goal was the production of new knowledge" (cited in Taylor, 2010: 18). This covers at least the first two roles. Weber (1973: 20) says that the state may require those in the university to sing the tune of him whose bread they eat. So, if the state provides for the university, higher education serves the interests of the state. Consequently, universities do serve the state, even if it is totalitarian or authoritarian. This is also the first role discussed above.

But Weber apparently thinks that there is a problem here. He says that "such a castration of the freedom and disinterestedness of university education, which prevents the development of persons of genuine character, cannot be compensated by the finest institutes, the largest lecture halls, or by ever so many dissertations, prize-winning works and examination successes" (Weber, 1973: 20). He seems to say that higher education should not be influenced by the state or other particular interests and should remain free and disinterested from partisan politics in teaching and research. This appears to speak to the second role of professional and independent knowledge production. So, he apparently acknowledges the first role but believes that it should not go too far.

The third role of the university being a gadfly, or conscience of society, or a critic of unjustness and unfairness in society, i.e., a democratic role, does not seem to get much attention. Even Marx, who was so concerned about social justice, alienation, class struggles, etc., did not dwell on the role of higher education in social development. But we can see this from a Marxian point of view in Gramsci, for example, when he talks about ideological or cultural hegemony of the ruling class, or in Louis Althusser when he talks about the subjugated groups' "submission to the rules of the established order" (cited in Yan Xiaojun, 2014:495). Gramsci also discussed organic intellectuals who serve the interest of the bourgeois state (see Zhidong Hao, 2015:105). Such hegemony can only be countered by a critical stance developed by intellectuals. Hence the third role of higher education, a critical role, a challenge to an unjust system, and a call for a more democratic system. In Henry Giroux's (2018:157) words, higher education has a potential role as a public sphere capable of educating students as informed, critical thinkers capable of not only holding power accountable but also fulfilling the role of critical agents who can act against injustice and resist diverse forms of oppression. Qian Liqun (2012) calls this a reflexive, inquisitive, critical, creative (in thought, culture, and scholarship) role, or in a word, a revolutionary role of the university. So, when Durkheim talks about higher education "as a means of cultural transmission, socialization, social control, or social processes" (Clark, 2007: 5), it can go all the three ways. Students can be socialized into or influenced by knowledge of totalitarian ideologies, or democratic

understandings, or disinterested professionalism. Social control and processes can exist in any of these directions. Higher education is the foremost battleground for these political struggles, and does play important roles in all the three ways.

Let us now take a look at how such socialization, social control, and social processes happened in Chinese history, especially before Deng's opening and reform era in the late 1970s. We will see especially how higher education produced both intellectuals who sustained autocratic and dictatorial rule, whom we may also call "organic intellectuals," and rivals who challenged the incumbent government (Perry, 2015: 1-2, on the distinction; Perry, 2020).

In imperial China, as Perry (2015: 2-4) points out, the Confucian examination system served "as a mechanism to attract, evaluate, and enlist intellectual talent for government service" who helped sustain the system for centuries. They helped unify the written language, homogenize political culture, standardize academic curricula, and coopt the intelligentsia. The literati entered into alliance with the monarchy and "provided the knowledge of precedent and statecraft that could legitimize power and make the state work" (Perry, 2015: 4-5, citing Arthur Wright).

But higher learning in imperial China also produced opposition leaders (Zhidong Hao, 2003: 26-29). These include Kong Fu, the eighth-generation grandson of Confucius, who participated in the peasant uprising led by Chen Sheng and Wu Guang against the Qin dynasty; the leading scholars and university students in Eastern Han (25-220), "who launched a critical movement against the current politics, government policies, and the conduct of members of the imperial household as well as the eunuchs and the emperor"; Pi Rixiu (ca. 833-883), a famous poet and thinker, who joined the Huang Chao uprising against the Tang dynasty (618-907); the Donglin Academy scholars led by Gu Xiancheng in the beginning years of 1700s, who "spoke out against exploitation by government officials" and "demanded open criticism and reform" (see also Elman, 1989); and Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864), who started the Taiping Rebellion. This tradition was inherited by later revolutionaries like Sun Yat-sen, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and of course Mao Zedong. It is true that this critical and revolutionary role was not the dominant role played by higher education in imperial China as compared to its supportive and organic role, but there is also no doubt that higher learning did produce not only opposition thoughts, but opposition leaders as well.

This is also true in the revolutionary era of Mao Zedong. To serve the interests of the CCP state, the new government in 1949 "abolished all private colleges and universities (religious and secular alike) and implemented a Soviet-style system of specialized academies and institutes under tight communist Party control" (Perry, 2015: 8). The goal was to transform higher education into a place to train the Party's own supportive and organic or establishment intellectuals, i.e., to be both "red" and "expert." It succeeded to a great extent, but it did not prevent elite intellectuals and college students from criticizing the Party-state for its dictatorial power and advocating for democratization in the so-called Hundred Flower Movement in 1957 (Zhidong Hao, 2003: 73-86).

Similar events happened after Deng Xiaoping came to power in late 1970s. He reopened the universities and again wanted to train students to serve the Party-state. But many students immediately started the Democracy Wall Movement in 1978-79 to challenge the Party's rule and wanted more democratization (Perry, 2015: 10-12; Zhidong Hao, 2013: 96-103). The student protests in 1986-87 and then again in 1989 did the same. Again, we see the tug-of-war between totalitarian control and democratic challenge.

We will now examine the totalitarianization and democratization in higher education and the roles they are playing in China's political development after the suppression of the democracy movement in 1989, but especially under Xi Jinping. As I discussed at the beginning of the paper, if we can term the 'Deng, Jiang, and Hu era' as a period of mostly authoritarianization, we will see how higher education has gradually evolved in the direction of totalitarianization, along with democratization. And this has played a big role in the Party's goal of stability maintenance.

The Totalitarianization and Democratization of Students under Xi

As I said earlier, many totalitarian controls were already in place before Xi. By totalitarian controls, I mean tight organizational and ideological controls. I will first discuss these two political controls of students and then move onto how these controls leave many cracks in the system which make students' democratic resistance possible. This section discusses students and the next section discusses the research and teaching of professors, but in the same spirit of controls and breakthroughs.

Organizational Controls of Students

Organizational controls that have been in place since the Jiang Zemin era are now strengthened. Organization and propaganda are the key to totalitarianism, as I quoted Arendt earlier. In fact, it has been true ever since Mao, and they are exemplified in colleges and universities. For example, there are four kinds of student organizations. At the highest level are Student Party Branches (SPB) composed of all the Party members in a student unit, like a class (班級), or a year cohort (年級), or a department, depending on the number of students involved. At Tsinghua University's Department of Mechanical Engineering, for example, 17% of undergraduate students and 63% of graduate students were Party members in 2018 (Ministry of Education, 2018b). A Party branch can be formed as long as there are at least three members. The SPB "is in charge of recruiting new Party members, conducting regular political reviews of ordinary students, recommending candidates for student cadre appointments, collecting information on students' 'trends of thoughts' (*sixiang dongtai* 思想動態), and making decisions on important matters related to the interests of the entire unit" (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 500). Perry (2015: 18-19) also discusses peer surveillance and pressure, which we will further discuss below.

The second important level of student organization is the Communist Youth League (CYL) "staffed by full-time Communist Party cadres with the assistance of part-time student cadres" (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 504). The role of the CYL is *to advise the student union [the next level organization], manage student groups/societies [the fourth level organization], and oversee all student activities held on campus…to educate and guide the youth…in the direction set by the Communist Party.* (*Ibidem*)

The SPB is more or less behind the scene, which is why the Party secretary of Tsinghua University's Department of Mechanical Engineering mentioned that they were working on "identifying Party members" (黨員亮身份) so that everybody would know who is a Party member, and non-members can easily connect with the Party (Ministry of Education, 2018b). In this case, the CYL and the SPB are interconnected, but it is the CYL that is doing the day to day ideological and political work with the next two levels of student organizations.

The student unions and other groups of recreational activities (like a climbing club) or of academic nature (like a reading club) are the third and fourth levels of student organization. These student groups are under the CYL's systematic and thorough political control. Their formation has to be approved by the faculty-level Party committee and the university-level CYL. The CYL also controls their activities by controlling their use of classrooms, meeting spaces, bulletin boards, and funding. The CYL also performs an annual review of these groups, and any group deemed politically sensitive will not be renewed. This way none of these student groups will be able to engage in any activity whose contents, format, or audience may be of a problematic nature in their eyes. No matter what, they are also banned from inter-university collaboration for student group activities (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 504-505).

In addition to those four kinds of organizations, there are also student informants who report on student problems and professorial deviations from the Party line. They are directly controlled by university-level political cadres and will "monitor their classmates and report any 'radical remarks'" to political officials (Yan Xiaojun, 2014:509). The details of their reports can include whether particular students have difficulties in their studies, or mental irregularities, or online postings and chat-room contents that may be too radical or provocative. Mental illnesses can be "broadly construed to include ideas and inclinations that the state deems politically dangerous" (Perry, 2015:19). In the case of problematic online postings, student informants are supposed to write rebuttals to counter more "outrageous" remarks. More serious cases will be investigated. Informants do these things round-the-clock, and it is a 24-hour monitoring project (Yan Xiaojun, 2014:509).

Ideological Control of Students

By ideological control, I mean their educational contents. The Party-state makes sure that more students major in science and engineering than in humanities and social

sciences. This is important not only in that vocational training provides better job opportunities but in that fewer students in humanities and social sciences may mean fewer possible rebels that the Party-state has to deal with. For example, out of the more than 5.7 million university graduates in 2010, 71% majored in science, engineering, agriculture, medicine or managerial science (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 505).

But the most important measure is ideological indoctrination. After the suppression of the democratic movement in 1989, Deng Xiaoping placed the blame on China's universities for their lack of Chinese Marxist education. Jiang Zemin, the then CCP general secretary, required that China's revolutionary history be taught from elementary school to university. Beginning in the late 1990s, university students in the arts and social sciences were required to complete 315 academic hours of political education courses and students in the physical sciences and engineering disciplines, 210 academic hours. The contents of that education included Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, patriotism, collectivism, and socialism with Chinese characteristics. And they keep adding more contents as new theories are developed like Jiang Zemin's "three represents" (i.e., the CCP represents China's advanced productive forces, advanced culture, and people's basic interests) in the late 1990s, and Hu Jintao's "scientific development" in the early 2000s. (For the above discussion, see Yan Xiaojun, 2014:501). After Xi Jinping came to power, his "China dream" and a series of his important talks (*xilie zhongyao jianghua* 系列重要講話) are now a must, along with the so-called core values of socialism.

Such ideological indoctrination has to be couched in terms of the Chinese culture. So the Party-state also emphasizes "instruction in 'cultural proficiency' (*wenhua suzhi* 文化素質) and 'national character' (*guoqing* 國情), which presents Chinese history, art, philosophy and literature in ways that postulate an organic connection and essential compatibility between the splendors of China's ancient 'tradition' and its contemporary 'socialist' system" (Perry, 2015: 20). Classroom teaching is often supplemented by "theaters, museums, field trips to ancient and revolutionary historical sites, invited lectures by distinguished scholars and public intellectuals, research projects by renowned teams of social scientists and humanists, and so forth" (Perry, 2015:20). The CCP's legitimacy can thus be rationalized.

Some students find political education necessary for setting up their basic values and world outlook, and accept it as is as they have done since elementary school (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1002). They may have reservations about its quality and may not be interested in it, but they accept it.

Such ideological indoctrination is based on the prohibition of counter arguments in class or in research. The most famous prohibition, called the "Seven No's" that was promulgated in 2013, includes the following: civil society, civil rights, universal values, legal independence, press freedom, the bourgeois class with money and power, and the historical wrongs of the Party (Zhidong Hao, 2015: 116-117). Yuan Guiren, the Minister of Education (2009-2016), made several infamous requirements of colleges and

universities in China in 2015, including the one that no textbooks on Western values should be allowed. Among the speeches to be absolutely prohibited (*juebu yunxu*決不允許) in class are speech that attacks the Party's leadership and smears socialism, opinion that is against the constitution and the law, and complaints about one's own misfortunes (Ministry of Education, 2015).

The above organizational and ideological measures seem to make the CCP's political control quite total, hence totalitarianization. And surveys of university students found that they score fairly high on indicators of patriotism and national identity, and only 43% of them answered "yes" to the question "Is democracy good?" (Perry, 2015: 21). However, 43% represents a lot of people. So, the control is apparently not total. In the following pages, I will discuss democratic breakthroughs.

Democratic Breakthroughs among Students

As I discussed earlier, totalitarianization and democratization are two sides of the same coin. Democracy as an idea has never died in China since it was introduced more than a century ago, and democratization as a movement has persisted. As we will see below, despite the totalitarianization efforts in higher education we discussed above, efforts at democratization have also endured.

In the examples I give below, I view any dissent against the Party-state ideology as a democratic breakthrough. After all democracy is built on incremental steps that include freedom of speech, civil society, and democratic movements of all kinds. "A survey of university students conducted in 2003 found that 76% of these surveyed disagreed either generally or completely with the 'socialist principle of collectivism' as taught in political education classes" (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 502). Another survey in 2009 found that "only 12.92% of student applicants for Party membership claim they actually 'believe in Communism,' while the rest all cite materialistic purposes" (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 506). Such survey results call into question whether those CCP and CYL members, as well as their followers in universities, are actually as loyal to the Party-state and its political ideology as they appear to be, and whether the sophisticated and thorough schemes of political organization and indoctrination are really all that successful.

It is true that these survey results may be interpreted as some kind of "'fatiguing, depoliticizing, cynicism-producing effects' of the official political discourse", and such political indoctrination may actually "create a prevailing atmosphere of detachment from any form of political life on PRC university campuses" and a resultant docile student body (Yan Xiaojun, 2014: 503). But we can still view this as a silent defiance, or at least a lack of interest, and such a politically alienated or nonchalant student body as fertile ground for democratic consciousness raising. After all, if the regime is on constant watch for defiant and radical sociopolitical thoughts and behavior, as we discussed above, that means such thoughts and behavior exist, and they may very well be the democratic thoughts and behavior that existed in the 1980s.

Some students do criticize political education courses as being boring and not including critical thinking. They believe that "the training in critical thinking and freedom in expression through discussion should have been the major educational function of universities" (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1003). In the same research, more than half of the students the researcher interviewed reported they had little interest in political education courses, saying that they were dull and dry, boring, and uninteresting. They would ditch such classes, or just do their own stuff in class, or just take a nap in class. In one class the researcher observed, a course on Marxism, almost no students were listening. They were either sleeping or browsing web pages on their own computers (*Ibidem*, p. 1003). These students might be crying out for more critical and enlightened content.

Such silent defiance culminated in a protest gathering at this university on December 18, 2019. Several hundred students gathered at a dining hall in Fudan University singing their university anthem which contained words like "academic independence," "freedom of thought" and "freedom from political and religious controls" (*xueshu duli, sixiang ziyou, zheng luo jiao wang wu jiban*學術獨立、思想自由、政羅教網無羈絆). They were protesting a recent charter revision which deleted words such as shared governance between professors and students and democratic management (*shisheng zhixue, minzhu guanli*師生治學、民主管理). Most of the 43 changes in the charter dictate that the university adheres to the leadership of the CCP in every aspect of university life, follows the Party lines, and serves the CCP and socialism with Chinese characteristics. Similar revisions have been made in the charters of other universities, such as Nanjing University and Shaanxi Normal University (Redden, 2019; Wang Qi, 2019; Zhen Shuji, 2019).

A more recent protest movement is probably the most striking. In late November 2022, students over 100 university campuses took to the streets in many major cities in China to protest the overly strict COVID rules, like sealing off buildings and apartments, that had probably contributed to a deadly fire in an apartment building in Urumqi in Xinjiang. Protests continued into early December 2022 though on fewer campuses. In addition to the abolishment of the harsh COVID measures, they wanted democracy, the rule of law, and freedom of expression (Leung & Sharma 2022; Mimi Leung 2022). As a result, at least partly, the harsh measures were abolished but the democratic demands are again unfulfilled. Still the latter are apparently alive and well in university students' minds.

Such protests are rare indeed, but they nonetheless indicate that students have underlying feelings towards high-handed political suppression. It is probably not wrong to assume that more such breakthroughs may lead to real social and political change. They have the potential to become an organized threat to the Party's authoritarian and totalitarian rule.

The Totalitarianization and Democratization of the Faculty Under Xi

The totalitarianization and democratization of the faculty happen at the same time as students are put under all kinds of organizational and ideological controls while making

occasional democratic breakthroughs. Indeed, the control measures and oppositional breakthroughs of the faculty may be different, but they are similar in nature.

The Cooptation of Professors in Research and Teaching

We discussed earlier how imperial China and Mao coopted intellectuals to serve the state interests and make them organic to the state. The same has continued in the post-Tiananmen era since 1989 onwards to bring them under control by various means. One of the means is to make them into bourgeoisified and professionalized intellectuals so that they will, hopefully, disengage themselves from politics, and the other is to make them into organic intellectuals so that they will be part of the establishment in protecting the status quo (see Zhidong Hao, 2003, chapters 4 and 5). In the Hu and Xi eras, such measures to bring intellectuals under control have become more sophisticated, and authoritarianism has been moving toward totalitarianism. Acquiescent intellectuals play a pivotal role in sustaining autocratic rule, and the state seems to have won the allegiance of the intelligentsia and been able to prolong its reign (Perry, 2015: 2) to some extent.

Measures to coopt the intellectuals are many. "Among the most powerful instruments in the PRC's toolkit for taming the universities is the package of assessment measures" (Perry, 2015:26). Professors have to do research in certain topics and teach in certain ways in order to be rewarded with increased salaries and professional promotion or they will be punished, and even lose their jobs. It is also true that they have to fulfill productivity targets in order to be rewarded. And they have to publish in international venues to help their university to reach world-class university status. These are ways to take their time away so that they will be less engaged in politically subversive criticisms and activities, as Perry (2015: 26-27) observes.

As for what topics professors can and cannot research, an analysis of the state and provincial grant structures in 2014 finds that the kind of research professors could do

> *concentrate on the study of the Sinicization of Marxism – that is, socialism with Chinese characteristics, the China dream, the study of Xi Jinping's talks (especially in provincial grant topics); historical, cultural, and environmental studies; and various political, social and economic policy studies* (Hao and Guo, 2016: 1049).

None of the grant topics dealt with civil society, controversial CCP history, contemporary ethnic relations in Tibet and Xinjiang, or constitutionalism. The Seven No's are indeed untouchable. As one professor comments, "If you don't work for the government, your research won't be recognized" (Hao and Guo, 2016: 1049). Our analysis of professors' research topics in history, economics and business administration, philosophy and sociology, politics and public administration, and law, finds that 90% of them are organic and professional, i.e., supportive of the Party-state and non-sensitive (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1053).

Furthermore, all the academic lecture topics at seminars and symposiums have to be censored, and international scholars' topics have to be approved by the university level authorities based on regulations issued by the Ministry of Education (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1001). Social science scholars receive special attention.

Scholars based in the West who do academic investigations in China are also subject to various restrictions. One survey found that "Roughly 9% of China scholars report having been 'taken for tea' (to be interrogated and admonished) by authorities within the past ten years; 26% of scholars who conduct archival research report being denied access; and 5% of researchers report some difficulty obtaining a visa" (Greitens and Truex, 2018; Redden, 2018a). In addition, about two dozen of the 500 scholars who responded either had their computer or other materials confiscated, or experienced temporary detention by police or physical intimidation during field research, especially in Tibet and Xinjiang (see Zhidong Hao, 2020b). In other words, even foreign scholars have to cooperate or they cannot do research in China.

In teaching, professors are supposed to serve the key function to train students to be firm believers in and successors of socialism, and most of them do try to do just that (Hao and Guo, 2016:1048). Sun Yat-sen University (2017) in Guangzhou issued a notice to faculty members about ten things they cannot do in class. The top three are criticism of the Chinese Constitution, of the CCP's leadership in China, and spreading religious superstition (meaning any religion).

As one professor comments:

> *We live in a real society, which is ruled by the CCP. They have an ideology backed up by political power and a political structure. This is the foundation of the [socialist] identity. If we sabotage this identity, there may be more serious social problems. As university professors, we should respect this reality* (Hao & Guo, 2016:1048).

This professor believes that one role of education is to foster the Party-state ideology and propagate what he believes to be "positive energy" (正能量).

While this professor wants to play an active role in supporting the Party, other professors simply find that there is just no alternative. A social science professor observes that they must be the spokespersons of the dominant ideology. They cannot touch on sensitive issues such as civil society; otherwise, they would be punished (Hao and Guo, 2016: 1048-1049).

The situation is exacerbated when other control measures are put into place. It is reported that almost all the classrooms in colleges and universities throughout China have surveillance cameras installed (Huang Yuxin, 2018). National security agencies are directly involved in policing professors' classroom behavior and discourse, in addition to student informants we mentioned above, and they are also monitoring what is posted on the university's LAN (local area network) regarding their teaching materials. The violators of Party ideology would be invited to "have tea" or "coffee" with state security agents,

and required to write confession papers, if not directly fired (Du Xiaoxin, 2018:1001; for more violations of academic freedom in China, see also Zhidong Hao 2020b). Academics are "caught between serving governmental agendas and pursuing their own goals as an academic community" (Qiang Zha & Hayhoe, 2014: 42). And most of the time they have to do the former. University administrations are in full cooperation with the national security agencies in enforcing such kind of political controls.

Democratic Breakthroughs among Professors in Research and Teaching

Again, I am considering all dissent against the Party-state indoctrination and all advocacy for freedom of thought, speech and press as democratic breakthroughs. To be sure, there are no sustained organized democratic movements among professors. But their resistance to the Party-state suppression of academic freedom is also obvious. The *Liaoning Daily* (*Liaoning ribao*遼寧日報), a provincial newspaper, called people's attention to such resistance when it published an open letter to university professors of philosophy and social sciences on November 13, 2014. According to the newspaper report, some professors were not identifying with the CCP's theories on socialism and socialist politics. They lacked feeling for the Party-state. They compared Mao Zedong to ancient emperors, "cast doubt on important policies of the Party-state, and want China to follow the Western road of political development" (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1039).

In terms of research, just as students were alienated by political indoctrination, professors were also alienated by being required to do research that they do not want to do but they have to do, for purposes of salary increase and professional promotion. One professor comments that this way they were creating a lot of academic garbage (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1050). As we mentioned above, such an arrangement is intended to keep academics busy so that they will not be able to play more professional and critical roles (see also Hao & Guo, 2016: 1050, citing Robert Merton). One professor comments that the purpose of this is to give you some money so that you will shut up (Ibid.). Professors follow the Party line and do what they are told to do so as to maintain a good living. But that is politically alienating since they are becoming cogs in the machine with no free spirit, no creativity, no new thinking, and no respect for themselves.

To break out of this alienation, some professors try to compromise. One professor, for example, wrote on social media advocating the Party control of NGOs but still emphasizing the importance of them (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1050). Other professors try to do research on critical and politically sensitive topics although they are few, just 11% according to our tally of professors' actual research from five faculties and departments in one university (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1053). And they usually do it in a roundabout way. They approach problems like democratization, or the lives of children of peasant workers left behind with their grandparents, in such a way that they are helping the Party-state to solve practical problems by offering alternative solutions (*Ibidem*, p. 1054).

Still other professors are more direct, yet still roundabout in the criticism in their research. One professor in a provincial university

> *promotes the use of "citizen" when the term of "civil society" becomes sensitive. He claims that to deny universal values, as the dominant ideology does, is to deny Marxism. He calls on the Party-state to practice constitutionalism, saying that the constitution does not give state power to the governing party* (Hao and Guo, 2016:1054).

He has published over 100 articles advocating democracy in his own blogs and used his own money to publish a book on democratization. But this somewhat "deviant" behavior has become increasingly impossible.

In teaching, professors in natural sciences know that they need to teach students how to discover problems and to have a sense of the problem (問題意識) (Hao and Guo, 2016: 1052). That is being critical and democratic. This training of critical thinking must have been correlated with the emergence of natural scientists becoming democracy advocates, as in the case of Fang Lizhi in the 1980s. As Foucault (1980: 132) points out, a "specific" intellectual can also be a "universal" intellectual concerned about truth and justice possibly because of the nature of his or her scientific work (see also Zhidong Hao, 2003: 322-323).

Even though politically correct uniform textbooks are required, professors may use them only as references. They may use materials they themselves choose, or ask students to look for different information from the textbook on a topic, for example, the Boxers Rebellion, so that they will be aware of different viewpoints. They may introduce different points of view and let students judge for themselves. On sensitive topics, they do not challenge the official line but rather they put them on the table, like civil rights and equality issues, and ask students themselves to think how the Party-state should deal with them (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1052; Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1007-1008). They think that the textbooks are doing too much preaching, always emphasizing the legitimacy and greatness of the Party, without talking about its mistakes in the past. They are too doctrinal and one-sided, lacking historical accuracy. They want to teach the students real history (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1007). Or they analyze the CCP cadre system and the relationship between the Party and the state from a totally academic point of view, without providing any value judgement (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1005).

Professors can also avoid direct mention of sensitive words but still get the meaning across by other means. For example, when teaching about nation-state building and democracy, one professor discussed the situation of a minority group. He did not name it but drew a map on the board and students immediately knew that he was referring to the Uygur in Xinjiang. And he spoke as if he was talking about Ukraine. Or they fake their point of view and let students know they do not really mean it by using facial expressions, etc. (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1004-1005).

Other professors, however, take a more direct and critical stance in teaching. One professor made a point of teaching students to think logically and scientifically. He explored topics such as land reform in the late-1940s and early 1950s, spoke on the media about the relationship between the government and the masses from the perspective of the latter, and wrote on social media about his critical ideas. Another professor directly challenged the Party jargon and advocated truth and sincerity (Hao & Guo, 2016: 1054). They discussed Western values in class in defiance of the Minister of Education warning that they were not allowed to do so. They discussed the advantages of Western political systems, introduced contents that challenged the legitimacy of the CCP, criticized CCP censorship, and pointed out the wrongs of the Party in the past like the Great Leap Forward and the three years of famine in the late-1950s and early 1960s. In interviews, some told the researcher that the country was built on lies and violence, and they were trying to tell the truth. And they also invited students to challenge the professors themselves (Du Xiaoxin, 2018: 1006-1008). But again, this is increasingly impossible now.

The fact that quite a number of professors got into trouble for their speech in class or on social media is an indication of how widespread the democratic breakthroughs were, even if they are less so now. Iliham Tohti of the Central Minzu (Ethnicities and Nationalities) University has been sentenced to life in prison for advocating in the classroom, and on social media, for the rights of the Uyghur minority. The following professors were fired because of their online and/or in-class speech, criticizing the CCP and its state:

Tan Song of Chongqing Normal University (Luo Siling, 2017);
Deng Xiangchao of Shangdong Jianzhu University (Lin Ping, 2017);
Shi Jiepeng of Beijing Normal University (Shi Tao, 2017);
Yang Shaozheng of Guizhou University (Ling Yun, 2018);
Wang Gang of Hebei Engineering University (Mingpo, 2018);
You Shengdong of Xiamen University (Mingpo, 2018);
Zhou Peiyi of the University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Alice Su, 2020);
Liang Yanping of Hubei University (Alice Su, 2020);
Xu Zhangrun of Tsinghua University (Buckley, 2020; Alice Su, 2020);

More examples of faculty revolts and punishments are given in the Scholars at Risk's yearly report (e.g., in 2019), and the list keeps growing.

If they are not sacked, they receive warnings from their respective universities. Yu Jianrong, a researcher and professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was called into the Party secretary's office and warned about his online and offline social activism (Hao & Guo, 2016:1045). Sun Peidong quit her job at Fudan University and left

China because she could not bear the sever restrictions on her teaching and speech (Alice Su, 2020).

Some who are retired keep speaking up, like Zhang Ming (a historian) of Renmin University in Beijing. But there can be consequences: Cai Xia of the Central Party School was expelled from the Party and lost her pension and other retirement benefits (Buckley 2020). Others have moved to foreign countries and escalated their criticism of the Party-state, like Zhou Xiaozheng (a sociologist).

Still others who currently work at universities try in various ways to have their voices heard, like He Weifang and Zhang Qianfan of Peking University, although they are often silenced. In March 2022, five prominent history professors from top Chinese universities signed a letter condemning the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and 121 alumni from several of China's top universities in and outside China signed a petition calling on "the Chinese government to honor commitments made to Ukraine under UN Security Council Resolution 984, which provides security assurances to countries without nuclear weapons" (Sharma, 2022). They were quickly censored.

Although it is a rare situation, some administrators do support critical thinking. Yang Yuliang, president of Fudan University (2009-2015), encouraged students to become critical thinkers in his commencement speeches and gave faculty space for unhindered academic research. He said that teachers should not be afraid of authority, or political leaders (Du Xiaoxin, 2018:1002). Two other famous examples of such administrators are Jiang Ping, former president of China University of Political Science and Law (1988-1990), and Liu Daoyu, former president of Wuhan University (1981-1988).

All of the above professors serve as a democratic counter force against the established intellectuals we discussed earlier. It is democratization against totalitarianization.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have analyzed the nature of the Chinese state from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, the role of higher education either in supporting the state as an organic and professional part of the establishment, or in revolting against the state as a democratic or revolutionary force. Mostly, I have discussed the totalitarianization and democratization of students, and co-optation or control of faculty and their democratic breakthroughs. I would like to draw several conclusions.

First, the organizational control and ideological indoctrination of students on the one hand and the co-optation of professors in research and teaching on the other seem to be fairly successful. After all large-scale student protest movements are very rare and they would be quickly put down. In a 2011 survey, when asked whether democracy is a good thing, 53.6% of those who had an undergraduate education and 45.0% of those who had a graduate education said that it all depends on whether it fits into the Chinese situation (Zhang Mingshu, 2013:16). That is precisely the Party line. Different countries follow different lines of development, and the CCP is leading the people of China in a democracy

with Chinese characteristics (*Ibidem*, 15-16). So, about a half of those with a college education support the Party line. We cannot be sure, however, that the respondents in such surveys will always tell the truth of what they really think especially in an authoritarian or dictatorial state where it is risky to tell the truth. The fact that many ardent patriots who were against Western values end up studying, living and/or working in the West may be a good indication of just that.

Another more recent survey is equally interesting (Chen Xinyu, 2020). A professor surveyed his class of 109 students, 25.69% of whom were from humanities, 19.27% from sciences, and 55.05% from engineering. This distribution of disciplines is close to the real distribution we discussed earlier. Students were asked how they viewed the diary of Fang Fang, which reflected what happened when the entire city of Wuhan was closed down during the coronavirus epidemic in February and March 2020. The diary is viewed as being fairly critical of the way the government handled the crisis.

This survey found that about 51% of the class were against the diary, and only 22% supported it. The remaining 27% did not have an opinion. Many of those who were against it thought that the diary helped overseas hostile forces attack China, and 60% of them thought that whatever one says, one should put the nation's interest in first place, or *guquan daju* (顧全大局, think about the big picture). Similar to the first survey we discussed above, the numbers indicate some success for the Party's organizational control and ideological indoctrination.

Second, at the same time, 79% of those surveyed also believe that everybody has the freedom to describe whatever they see, and express their viewpoints at any time. And there were still 22% who supported the diary. In terms of the first survey, 43.3% of the undergraduates and 50% of the graduate students surveyed thought that democracy was a good thing (Zhang Mingshu, 2012: 16). One can say that there still exists a tug-of-war between totalitarianization and democratization. The organizational control and ideological indoctrination of students are only partly successful, and one can still see many democratic breakthroughs.

Third, if the Party wants to go along the route towards totalitarianism, what we have discussed in this paper will continue in the future. Totalitarianization may not bring Mao-style totalitarianism, as in the past, although we cannot be totally sure. But if the Party wants to go in the direction of democracy, it would not be very difficult either, since it has the organizational capacity to do so. The only thing it needs is ideological transformation, and most of its fellow travelers will continue to follow the Party. Furthermore, democracy remains an enduring idea, as we discussed in the paper, and many students and professors are already its strong supporters. According to the 2011 survey, 58.5% of those who had a middle school education or lower, and 53.7% of those who had a high school or vocational school education thought that democracy is a good thing (Zhang Mingshu, 2013: 16). As I mentioned above, lower percentages of people among those who have a post-secondary education (43.3%) and those who have a post-graduate education (50%) thought the same, but they are still decent numbers.

Fourth, higher education played a key role in the political development of the country. The totalitarianization and democratization of students and faculty will spill over to the world outside the ivory tower. What happens in higher education happens outside it as well. The role of colleges and universities, and whatever happens there, will have serious implications for the whole country.

Fifth, a study of academic freedom, totalitarianization, and democratization of higher education is crucially important because of its importance in the political development of the county. More studies should be done on what happens there, the role of the educated elites in all walks of life, and how higher education should be improved as a result. Certainly, more studies should also be done on the social requisites for democracy, such as economic development, education, political culture, religion, political leaders, political legitimacy, urbanization, civil society, and how these factors function individually or interdependently, and effect democratization, etc. (Huntington, 1991: 37-38, 107; Lipset, 1993, 1994).

Perry (2015: 33) acknowledges that Western social scientists like John Dewey, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Edward Shils all believed in a direct relationship between higher education and democratization, i.e., the former has a positive influence on the latter. She says then that these days, however, "the most 'enlightened' autocrats are betting billions of dollars otherwise. The Chinese example suggests that their wager might not be misplaced."

But just as Hannah Arendt (1958: 489) commented, "enlightened totalitarianism" may be wishful thinking. The "enlightened" autocrats may find that their totalitarianization project is riddled with pitfalls, and their fortune can be reversed at an unexpected time. After all, education does have an important impact on democratization although, of course, it is not the only factor.

Minxin Pei (2013: 2020) points out that political suppression is not a sustainable measure for stability maintenance. The regime cannot rely on this and its economic performance for its legitimacy. Economic growth may be a recipe for autocratic success in the short term (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005), but in the long run, the regime has to find its legitimacy in democratization (see Zhidong Hao, 2017). Higher education does facilitate "the creation of a large pool of potential opposition leaders, thereby increasing the supply of rivals to the incumbent government" (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005:83; Perry, 2015: 33).

Like it or not, higher education will continue to supply not only the personnel but also the oppositional thoughts against totalitarianization and for democratization. Setting the rules of the game and rigging them to suit their interests, "autocratic states are not passive observers of political change" (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2005: 80). But neither are democratization pursuers. At the very least, totalitarianization and democratization will continue to be engaged in a tug-of-war. Who eventually wins will depend on the political, social, and economic circumstances at the time. But the role of higher education can never be underestimated.

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O BANCO ASIÁTICO DE INVESTIMENTO EM INFRAESTRUTURA E O BANCO ASIÁTICO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO – O SEU CONTRIBUTO PARA O RELACIONAMENTO ENTRE A EUROPA E A ÁSIA.

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Resumo

O Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento/BAsD e o Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestrutura/BAII são duas instituições multilaterais criadas na região da Ásia-Pacífico. Ambos visam promover o desenvolvimento da sua área de atuação (O BAII também está autorizado pelos seus estatutos a operar em países que não sejam membros regionais). A presença de países acionistas da União Europeia (ou com uma perspetiva internacional afim) em ambos os Bancos e o seu empenho e atuação nestes tornam ambas as instituições fóruns privilegiados de discussão internacional e global sobre os principais temas relacionados com o Desenvolvimento. Além disso, o facto de ambos os Bancos reconhecerem, entre outros, os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (Agenda 2030) e o Acordo de Paris como seus principais objetivos estratégicos permite um diálogo comum e racional, entre países, continentes e regiões, mesmo que baseado em diversas origens culturais e intelectuais.

Palavras-chave

Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento, Ásia-Pacífico, Agenda 2030, Acordo de Paris, parâmetros do diálogo internacional sobre Desenvolvimento.

Abstract

The Asian Development Bank/ADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank/AIIB are two multilateral institutions created in the Asia-Pacific region. Both aim to promote the development of their area of activity (BAII is also authorized by its statutes to operate in countries that are not regional members). The presence of European Union shareholder countries (or countries with a similar international perspective) in both Banks and their commitment and performance in them make both institutions privileged forums for

international and global discussion on the main themes related to Development. Furthermore, the fact that both Banks recognize, among others, the Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030) and the Paris Agreement as their main strategic objectives allows for a common and rational dialogue between countries, continents and regions, even if based from diverse cultural and intellectual backgrounds.

Keywords

Multilateral Development Banks, Asia-Pacific, 2030 Agenda, Paris Agreement, International Development Dialogue Installments.

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JOÃO SABIDO COSTA

Enquadramento

> *Um banco multilateral de desenvolvimento (MDB, na sigla inglesa) refere-se a uma instituição financeira internacional, licenciada por pelo menos duas nações, a fim de promover o desenvolvimento económico e o crescimento em países mais pobres ou menos desenvolvidos. Os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento surgiram após a Segunda Guerra Mundial para renovar os países atingidos pela guerra e promover a estabilidade económica (Gordon, 2021)*[1]

Significa isto que os Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento resultam de uma conjugação de esforços internacionais que visa responder a necessidades de desenvolvimento e combate à pobreza a nível mundial. Por outro lado, como referido pela Ministra das Finanças da Indonésia, país então Presidente do G20: os Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento destacam-se, desse modo, como potenciais intermediários de acesso a financiamento por países em dificuldades e de criação de bens públicos globais/"global public goods" (*apud* Tanaka, 2019). Portugal participa como acionista em diversos destes Bancos: no Banco Europeu de Investimento (BEI), no Banco Europeu para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BERD), no Banco de Desenvolvimento do Conselho da Europa (CEB), mas, também, no Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (BAfD), no Banco Interamericano para o Desenvolvimento (BID) e na CAF Corporação Andina de Fomento /Banco de Desenvolvimento da América Latina. Das instituições com sede na Ásia, Portugal é membro, desde 2002 - na sequência da independência de Timor-

[1] "A multilateral development bank (MDB) refers to an international financial institution, chartered by at least two nations, in order to promote economic development and growth in poorer or less-developed countries. Important takeaways: Multilateral development banks came into existence after World War II for revamping war-struck countries, and promoting economic stability".

Leste e no contexto da adesão do novo país a essa instituição -, do Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento (BAsD) e membro fundador do Banco Asiático de Investimento e Infraestruturas (BAII).

Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento/BAsD – Asia Development Bank

O Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento[2] foi criado no início dos anos 60, através de resolução da 1ª conferência ministerial sobre cooperação económica asiática realizada pela "United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) – que depois se tornou a United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific"- com o objetivo de promover o crescimento económico e a cooperação numa das (então) regiões mais pobres do mundo. Foi inaugurado em 19 de dezembro de 1966. Nessa altura, as prioridades eram a produção alimentar e o desenvolvimento rural, através de empréstimos, participações de capital, prestação de garantias financeiras e serviços de aconselhamento técnico.

Procura, como instituição, maximizar o impacto das suas políticas através do diálogo, consultorias, mobilização financeira e cofinanciamento. Segundo o artº 2 do Acordo fundador, serão recipientes de ajuda membros regionais em desenvolvimento - indicados de forma atualizada na Estratégia de 2018 do Banco (*Strategy*, 2018, p. 1, nota 1, p. 12 e segs.). O Artº 2/v do Acordo fundador prevê a cooperação "em rede" do Banco com as Nações Unidas e outras entidades, públicas e privadas, ligadas ao desenvolvimento da região.

São, também, elaborados estudos para "compreender" a região, como pressuposto da concessão de empréstimos nos setores da energia, transportes, agricultura e finança.

Nos anos 70, com o "choque petrolífero", dedica-se a apoiar projetos na área da energia, com vista a conseguir a autonomia da região. Procura, também, aproveitar o recurso a fundos disponibilizados por outras entidades. Em 1970, o Banco faz a primeira emissão de "bond", no Japão, no valor de $USD 16,7 milhões. Em 1974 é criado o "Asian Development Fund", com vista à emissão de empréstimos bonificados a países beneficiários que o necessitem.

Nos anos 80, a segunda crise do petróleo leva o Banco a reforçar o seu foco em infraestruturas energéticas e sociais. Isso implicou iniciativas de microfinanças, ambiente, educação, planeamento urbano, saúde, bem como promoção de mulheres e meninas[3].

[2] Quando não especificamente indicada a fonte, todas as referências são retiradas do sítio eletrónico oficial da instituição, consultado à data indicada nas Referências;

[3] Nesse sentido vai, por exemplo, o documento "The Role of Women in Development", de 1985 que procura incluir a Mulher nos benefícios do Desenvolvimento, portanto estabelecendo (ou visando) um estatuto de igualdade com o homem. O Relatório anual do Banco relativo a 1989 (final dessa década) refere, tendencialmente, nesse âmbito, ações na área educacional, de formação profissional e, também, de autonomia financeira empresarial. Percebe-se, no entanto, tratar-se, ainda, de uma área sensível, quando relacionamos, por exemplo, os programas promovidos nessa década, pelo Banco, relativos ao acesso de meninas ao ensino básico no Paquistão e o brutal atentado contra a jovem Malala, naquele país, já nas

Com a crise financeira de 1997, o BAsD centra os seus projetos e programas na consolidação financeira regional e na criação de redes de segurança social. Foi, também, estabelecida a "Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility".

Em 1999, a redução de pobreza torna-se um objetivo transversal a toda a atividade do Banco.

Os anos 2000 são, de início, marcados pelos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio[4] e pela SARS (Síndrome respiratória aguda grave), bem como pelo combate à gripe das aves, à Sida e aos desastres naturais. Em 2009, o capital do Banco atinge $USD 165 mil milhões.

Em 2010, a Ásia parece ter reemergido como um dos motores do crescimento global, não obstante a permanência de uma grande desigualdade social. São, entretanto, retomadas as operações do Banco no Myanmar, país membro desde 1973, embora tendo novamente em 2021, devido à situação no país, sido suspensas algumas delas.

O Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento tem, atualmente, 68 membros, 49 dos quais da região. Membros não formalmente soberanos, como Hong Kong e Taiwan, são designados de forma especial (por exemplo, "Hong Kong, China", tendo a República Popular da China apadrinhado a adesão, após a transição do exercício da soberania, da nova Região Administrativa Especial, nos termos do artº 3/3 do Acordo fundador)[5].

O seu Conselho de Governadores é o órgão máximo de administração, que integra um representante por cada Estado Membro. O Conselho de Direção, composto por 12 membros, 8 dos quais regionais, é eleito pelo Conselho de Governadores e tem por competência supervisionar as finanças da instituição, aprovar o orçamento administrativo, bem como aprovar as políticas do Banco e as operações de empréstimo, financiamento e consultoria.

O capital autorizado inicial do Banco foi de $US 1 mil milhões, divisível em capital efetivamente subscrito e "callable", aquele cujo cumprimento, estando comprometido – mas ainda não pago – à instituição por parte dos acionistas, poderá ser apelado ou chamado ("called") por aquela em caso de necessidade e nos termos dos estatutos aplicáveis. O artigo 4/3 do Acordo fundador prevê a possibilidade de autorizar o aumento desse volume de capital por maioria qualificada (número de Governadores e poder de voto em termos do capital subscrito) do Conselho de Governadores. A cada 5 anos, os Governadores podem ponderar um aumento de capital.

primeiras décadas de 2000, punindo-a por advogar esse mesmo acesso. Idealmente, nos dias de hoje, a política de Desenvolvimento tende a considerar o estatuto feminino como automaticamente transversal a toda a política de cooperação. Trata-se, naturalmente, de um aspeto que, só por si, exigiria um desenvolvimento e análise muito maior;

[4] Os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio foram os oito objetivos internacionais de desenvolvimento para o ano de 2015 que foram estabelecidos após a Cimeira do Milénio das Nações Unidas em 2000, após a adoção da Declaração do Milénio das Nações Unidas. Foram substituídos pela Agenda 2030 (Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável);

[5] Estando a adesão dependente de se tratar de países da região ou países não-regionais desenvolvidos, quando membros da ONU ou das respetivas agências especializadas, e membros associados da Comissão Económica das Nações Unidas para a Ásia e Extremo Oriente quando os países responsáveis pelo seu relacionamento externo sejam membros do BAsD e submetam o pedido de adesão;

Por outro lado, o Artº 36 do Acordo refere a irrelevância das características políticas e da política seguida pelos membros, isto é, não são julgados, em princípio, o tipo de regime político local e a política seguida, em termos de valores governativos. [6]

Entre os membros fundadores não regionais, encontravam-se, dos atuais membros da União Europeia, a Áustria, Bélgica, Dinamarca, Finlândia, Alemanha, Itália, Holanda e Suécia. Posteriormente, aderiram França (1970), Espanha (1986), Irlanda (2006). Portugal aderiu em 2002, como já referido, devido à independência e adesão de Timor-Leste. Outros países "like minded" também fundadores foram os Estados Unidos, Canadá, Noruega e Reino Unido.

Não obstante a presença, desde o início, de membros não regionais no Banco, determinadas cláusulas do Acordo asseguram que o capital subscrito pela região não desça abaixo de 60% do total (por exemplo, artº 5 do Acordo fundador). Por outro lado, nenhum país possui, pela sua capacidade de voto, um poder de veto no Banco, embora, conjuntamente, os Estados Unidos e o Japão o possam fazer (Ransdell, 2019, p. 136).

O Artº 14/(iii) do Acordo prevê a possibilidade de qualquer país membro impedir, quando entenda, uma ação do Banco no seu território.

Em 2018, o Banco adotou a sua já mencionada Estratégia 2030 (ano final), onde, nomeadamente, define o sucesso do desenvolvimento da região como imprescindível para serem atingidos os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável – e correspondente Agenda para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento -, os objetivos do Acordo de Paris de 2015, do "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction" e a "Addis Ababa Action Agenda" ("Strategy", II, nº 12, III, nº 20). Por outro lado, indica o propósito de que a sua ação promova e reproduza "boas práticas" através da região e além dela, como refere dever o sistema internacional de Instituições Financeiras Internacionais funcionar como um todo combinado (*Ibidem*, III, nº 22)

Esclarece ainda que a ajuda em termos bonificados e mais favoráveis ("concessional") se dirigirá aos seus membros mais pobres e vulneráveis, não descurando, nesse contexto, aqueles que venham a evoluir acima dessa qualificação (*Ibidem*, V[7]). Apoiará também, nos países alvo, reformas que aumentem a capacidade institucional (Ibidem, IX, nº 96). Essa capacidade será enquadrada pela cooperação regional no que respeita a regulamentação e supervisão financeira (*Ibidem*, VI, nº 61 e 66).

[6] Isto, provavelmente, para evitar a aparência de cedência à imposição de valores ditos ocidentais, isto é, de inspiração histórica inicialmente europeia. Contudo, prova de que não é exatamente assim é a rejeição, por ambos os bancos, da adesão da República Popular Democrática da Coreia (vulgo Coreia do Norte);

[7] "33. Concessional finance. ADB will direct its concessional finance from both concessional ordinary capital resources (OCR) lending and the Asian Development Fund (ADF) grant to support ADB's poorest and most vulnerable DMCs (developing member country). Many FCAS (fragile and conflict-affected situations) and SIDS (small Island developing states) are eligible for concessional assistance. ADB will also consider additional support for countries graduating from concessional assistance. The efficient use of ADF grants in the future will be reviewed in close consultation with ADF donors. ADB will also continue to mobilize external concessional resources through ADB-managed trust funds and cofinancing with bilateral and multilateral partners".

Será de mencionar, no capítulo dedicado ao setor privado (*Ibidem*, VII), a necessidade de planear projetos "bancáveis"[8], com vista a serem atraentes para esse tipo de investimento (*Ibidem*, nº 72). Isso implica, também, o aperfeiçoamento do perfil de risco dos projetos, através dos instrumentos disponíveis, como os de promoção de crédito e gestão de risco (*Ibidem*).

O Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestrutura/BAII (em inglês "Asia Investment Bank for Investment in Infrastructure")

O Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestrutura[9] iniciou a atividade em 2016 por iniciativa da China, após o seu anúncio em outubro de 2013. O seu início foi um pouco confuso[10], devido a não ser completamente percetível a real intenção da China, bem como a ligação do projeto com a "Belt and Road Initiative"[11] (consistindo num plano de criação de infraestruturas terrestres e marítimas ligando a China e a Ásia a outras partes do mundo, nomeadamente à Europa). Aliás, está prevista a possibilidade de o Banco atuar fora da Ásia (Artº 11 do Acordo fundador), como tem acontecido.

A direção da entidade depende, como no caso anterior de um Conselho de Governadores (1 por membro) e de um Conselho Diretivo. Integra ainda, no contexto de um "Senior Management Team" o Presidente, cinco Vice-Presidentes, o "Chief Risk Officer", o "Chief Financial Officer" e um "general counsel".

A elegibilidade de novos membros é definida enquanto integrem o "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)" ou o Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, bem como quando se trate de entidades não-soberanas, mas cujo país responsável pelo seu relacionamento externo é membro do BAII (caso de Hong Kong, que aderiu em 2017). A competência para questões de adesão é do seu Conselho Diretivo, bem como do Conselho de Governadores, embora o método de decisão na matéria não pareça completamente claro (Ransdell, 2019, p. 127). Do mesmo modo, a adesão de Taiwan (Membro do BAsD desde 1966 com a designação de "Taipei, China") ao BAII não veio a concretizar-se, devido a Pequim exigir aprovar a nomenclatura pela qual se tornaria membro. Detendo 26, 5735% do poder de voto, a China tem, na prática, poder de veto nas decisões do Banco, embora tal não tenha necessariamente de se manter em caso de expansão futura de participações no mesmo (*Ibidem*, p. 140).

O Banco teve um capital inicial de US$ 100 mil milhões. Eventuais aumentos de subscrições individuais carecem de uma Super Maioria (Arts. 5º /2 e 28/2/ii do Acordo

[8] Isto é, mostrando serem investimentos minimamente seguros e previsivelmente rentáveis;
[9] Para uma panorâmica dos objetivos e parâmetros de atuação do Banco ver, por exemplo "Trends and disruption", 2022. Quando não especificadas, as referências são extraídas do sítio eletrónico oficial do Banco;
[10] Ou, pelo menos, "debatido", para quem acompanhou o processo;
[11] Bem como a outras iniciativas envolvendo a China no âmbito dos BRIC ("The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", 2015, p. 1);

fundador), possibilitando, na prática o veto da China. Esta exigência da Super Maioria (maioria dos Governadores e maioria do poder de voto - Artº 28/ii) repete-se em várias partes do Acordo fundador.

Aderiram ao projeto diversos países da União Europeia, mas não de forma coordenada ("The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", 2015) Tal foi o caso, em 2015, da Áustria, da Alemanha, do Luxemburgo, da Holanda. Em 2016, da Dinamarca, da Finlândia, de França, da Irlanda, da Itália, de Malta, da Polónia, da Suécia. Em 2017, da Hungria, de Portugal, de Espanha. Em 2018, da Roménia, de Chipre (como membro regional). Em 2019, da Bélgica, da Grécia. Em 2021, da Croácia.

Entre países europeus, são ainda membros a Noruega (2015), Suíça (2016) e Reino Unido (2015 – agora fora da União Europeia) e Islândia (2017).

De entre países da CPLP, de referir que Timor-Leste aderiu ao Banco em 2017 como membro regional, detendo um poder de voto de 0,1446% e o Brasil, em 2018, sendo detentor de um poder de voto de 0,8361%.

O Banco não conta com a participação, nem dos Estados Unidos, nem do Japão, embora, para alguns peritos, estes estariam, talvez, dispostos a aderir com o estatuto de observador, se tal categoria fosse prevista nos estatutos (Ransdell, 2019, p. 129).

Por outro lado, a adesão de Taiwan (Membro, como referido do Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento desde 1966 com a designação de «Taipei, China») ao BAII não veio a concretizar-se, devido a Pequim exigir aprovar a nomenclatura pela qual se tornaria membro.

Segundo os estatutos, está assegurado aos membros regionais 75% do capital subscrito e nove dos doze Diretores.

Embora o espírito dos seus estatutos e a prática seguida não pareça favorecer a concessão de créditos bonificados ("concessional"), foi, em 2018, criado no Banco o "Project Preparation Special Fund" para ajudar os países menos capacitados na preparação de projetos de desenvolvimento.

Do mesmo modo, a "Special Fund Window for Less Developed Members" é o novo fundo especial com o objetivo de tornar os empréstimos do BAII mais acessíveis para os membros menos desenvolvimentos. A estrutura foi testada pela primeira vez no quadro da "Covid-19 Crisis Recovery Facility" e foi expandida como uma estrutura regular em março de 2022. Trata-se, assim, de uma questão em discussão no âmbito do Banco.

Também, o Banco não pode envolver-se nas questões políticas internas de Estados Membros (Artº 31/2). Prevalecerão apenas critérios de natureza económica (embora pareça difícil definir o que isso seja e como se comprova, no cômputo das decisões tomadas).

Em setembro de 2020 foi adotada uma Estratégia (*AIIB Corporate Strategy*, 2020) que indica, desde logo, a intenção do Banco de trabalhar em conjunto com outras instituições de desenvolvimento (*Ibidem*, "Introduction", parágrafos. 2 e 6/iii e p. 19). Define como objetivos o cumprimento, em 2030, dos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável e o

Acordo de Paris ("*AIIB Corporate Strategy"*, 2020, pág. 4, 12, 18)[12]. Salienta que entre os "Core Values" do Banco ("Lean", "Clean" and "Green"), se destaca a garantia da manutenção de altos padrões internacionais através do seu "Environmental and Social Framework/ESF" (*Ibidem*, 2020, p. 7) que incorpora os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (*Ibidem*, p. 15) , bem como do "Project Priorization and Quality Framework" (*Ibidem*, p. 8) e do "Risk Management Framework" (*Ibidem*, p. 9). Do mesmo modo, reger-se-á por princípios de sustentabilidade financeira, bem como de uma ação responsável e rentável

Reflexão

De notar que ambos os Bancos, não obstante definirem-se como "asiáticos", não cobrem exatamente a mesma região. Nesse sentido, a do BAII define-se como a área classificada como Ásia- Pacífico pelas Nações Unidas[13], enquanto a do BAsD remete para os Termos de Referência da Comissão Económica das Nações Unidas para a Ásia e Médio Oriente (Ransdell, 2019, p. 126, nota 5). Ambos os Bancos têm, também, vindo a rejeitar a adesão da Coreia do Norte. Segundo autores como James Ransdell (2019) que faz uma comparação – eminentemente estatutária - entre os dois Bancos, a sua estrutura e modo de funcionamento (Ransdell, 2019, 151 – 152), há, naturalmente diferenças entre eles, mas não necessariamente essenciais (tendo em atenção que a mera disparidade de datas de criação induziria, só or si, a inovações funcionais). Desse modo, o BAII parece menos exigente e potencialmente interventivo a nível de reformas nos países alvo no que diz respeito à monitorização dos projetos que financia e capacidade efetiva de o fazer, inclusive devido à escassez de pessoal próprio no local (embora isso possa, até, chocar com a grande possibilidade estatutária de investimento local em capital, cuja aplicação, naturalmente, tem de ser gerida). Isso poderá igualmente ser um obstáculo à prestação de ajuda técnica, geralmente também requerida, o que se pode refletir na eficácia da ajuda ao Desenvolvimento prestada. Por outro lado, como já referido, o BAII aparenta um menor gosto pelo risco financeiro que se manifesta em menor predisposição para ajuda bonificada, para além das iniciativas mencionadas.. Para outros autores (Griffith-Jones *et al*., 2016), embora perspetivando-se, talvez, mais eficiente e economicamente sustentável face ao Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, o Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestrutura poderá ser negativamente afetado pelos seus métodos de concursos públicos, gestão do risco e, como referido, supervisão de projetos mais simplificados.

Também para Ransdell, o BAII pode ter dificuldades, de vária espécie, em operacionalizar o "Environmental and Social Framewok" como base de implementação de projetos, desde logo atendendo a menor experiência (2019, p. 126 e 127, 148 e segs.).

[12] Ou outros, prosseguidos pelos seus membros (*Corporate Strategy*, 2020, p. 14);
[13] Embora com a possibilidade de alteração pelos Governadores (Acordo fundador, artº 1/2);

Contudo, a própria dinâmica de funcionamento – implicando uma constante e renovada interpretação das normas fundadoras - e as exigências dos vários acionistas, nomeadamente regionais, poderá levar o Banco a encontrar soluções para o que possa aí existir de problemas, pelo menos a nível técnico.

A estrutura dos Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento é um processo em curso em que, inevitavelmente, experiências são feitas e testadas e inovações são reciprocamente acolhidas. Hoje-em-dia, o desafio enfrentado por esses Bancos – conforme refletido no "Boosting MDBs' investing capacity (2022). An Independent Review of Multilateral Development Banks' Capital Adequacy Frameworks", elaborado no âmbito do G20 – o problema é diminuir, de forma objetiva transparente e objetiva, o risco do financiamento do Desenvolvimento, com vista a mobilizá-lo sem baixar o "rating" de países (recetores ou prestadores de ajuda) e instituições (como os Bancos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento).

No plano político, o facto de o Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento ser integrado (e, eventualmente, "controlado" pelos Estados Unidos, ajudado pelo Japão) e o Banco Asiático de Investimento em infraestrutura o ser pela China, poderia indiciar uma cisão nos modelos de desenvolvimento defendidos pelo "Ocidente e pelo Oriente", pelo menos em termos de mentalidade e não necessariamente geográficos (Griffith-Jones *et al*., 2016). Tal pode, também, prender-se com uma, por vezes alegada divergência entre os Estados Unidos e Estados Membros da União Europeia relativamente à oportunidade de criação do BAII (Bustillo & Maiza, 2018).

Contudo, o facto de o BAII continuar a funcionar e, aliás, para quem seguiu mais proximamente esse processo de criação, no meu caso, a partir do Canadá, parece que, nem uma, nem a outra vertente deve ser empolada. Como já referido, especialistas como Ransdell (2019, p. 129) admitem que, tanto os EUA, como o Japão poderiam ter aceitado serem observadores do BAII se essa possibilidade tivesse sido considerada nos estatutos. Aliás, como já referido, a própria UE não teve uma abordagem articulada da questão de um novo Banco. Divergência terá existido, claro, pois uns aderiram, e outros não, à iniciativa. Poderá, é, ser um pouco ousado atribuir a esse aspeto uma relevância geoestratégica ao assunto, pela qual os EUA se teriam, na altura, batido muito mais empenhadamente (e eficazmente)[14].

E neste momento, pelo menos, também a questão do Financiamento do Desenvolvimento é demasiado séria e premente para que alguém pense em boicotar o BAII só por motivos políticos.

[14] Exemplo de um braço de ferro estratégico entre, respetivamente, os Estados Unidos e os Estados beneficiários pode ser considerado o do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, onde Washington conseguiu impor (contra a tradição da instituição de Presidentes latino-americanos) um cidadão norte-americano, eventualmente com vista a contrariar uma possível influência da China na região, também na sequência de um processo no qual muitos estados latino-americanos quebraram relações com Taiwan, estabelecendo-os com a República Popular da China. Nesse caso, o Presidente norte-americano acabou por ser afastado, embora por motivos não-políticos, sendo substituído por um cidadão brasileiro, atual Presidente do Banco.

Do mesmo modo, a China terá em atenção o risco de uma tentativa de proeminência excessiva no BAII para a existência eficaz da instituição. Mas, segundo se percebe, continua a ser um empenho da União Europeia a solidez financeira da instituição, a sua disposição para trabalhar com outras Instituições Financeiras Internacionais (numa perspetiva de cooperação, partilha de conhecimento, experiências e boas práticas – para além, da potencialização da capacidade de ação), continuar a desenvolver modelos e capacidades de monitorização, dando destaque à ação da respetiva "Complaints-resolution Evaluation Unit".

Tal não significa, no entanto, que não surjam, entre os membros, inclusive regionais e não regionais, de cada um dos Bancos (BAsD e BAII), divergências e perceções distintas na interpretação sistémica desses objetivos, consoante as perspetivas estratégicas, posicionamentos próprios e, mesmo, valores culturais. De referir que uma das principais preocupações europeias, neste caso, face ao BAII foi a da importância de a nova instituição respeitar critérios de boa governança[15], em termos de prescrições económicas e padrões sociais económicos, observadas, em regra, noutras instituições do género ("The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", 2015, p. 5) (Randsell, 2019, p. 126).

Será de referir que, para qualquer país, e não apenas para a China, a política da cooperação para o desenvolvimento como a prosseguida como cada um dos Bancos referidos constitui parte essencial da sua ação externa, sendo uma via da sua projeção no mundo. Não se lhe pode, pois, criticar isso. O que estará em causa são os critérios e parâmetros pelos quais essa política é prosseguida. Idealmente (pelo menos para a União Europeia e países "likeminded"[16]), deseja-se que esse esforço internacional de Desenvolvimento se baseie em padrões tendencialmente consensuais a nível internacional com vista a não ser distorcida a essencialidade e transparência do seu objetivo. Tal não colide, naturalmente, com o que de inovação e novidade deva haver nesse esforço, também através de novos atores do desenvolvimento como o Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestrutura. Ainda de especial importância foi o facto de Bancos assinarem, em 2 de maio de 2016 um Memorando de Entendimento ("Memorandum", 2016). Este estabelece, nomeadamente, como parâmetros de atuação, nomeadamente, os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável e o Acordo de Paris (*Ibidem,* ponto 3, "bullet" 5).

[15] Que pressupõem um desempenho responsável, transparente, previsível, participativo e dinâmico, implicando critérios de Justiça e de Segurança (valores básicos do Direito), bem como um enquadramento institucional e operacional adequado à garantia desses princípios.

[16] Que, sem uma definição precisa (uma vez que não há completa convergência de pontos de vista entre países), se refere, neste caso, a uma partilha de valores geralmente tidos como de inspiração europeia e ocidental (sua origem histórica), expressos no valor e proteção da pessoa, liberdade, democracia e Estado de direito. Normalmente, os países considerados "likeminded" (ou "com uma perspetiva internacional afim") da União Europeia são, só como exemplo, a Suíça, os Estados Unidos, o Canadá, a Austrália, mesmo o Japão. Pode-se inclusive dizer que, para além de uma designação genérica, o estatuto de "likeminded" se vai comprovando, tendencialmente, perante a abordagem de situações concretas, criando-se, assim, uma tradição jurisprudencial de formas de reação e atuação que contribui para uma certa previsibilidade de posicionamento;

Conclusão

Tudo isso continua a constituir "food for thought" e debate dentro das estruturas do BAII. Por outro lado, no que respeita ao Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, o mesmo constitui, também, um "fórum" de discussão entre inúmeros países, nos quais se apresentam diferentes perspetivas, opções e sensibilidades.

Não considero, contudo, nesse âmbito que o referido debate seja, forçosamente, um ponto de cisão e confronto, um jogo de soma zero, não chegando a existir consenso, por vezes, entre os próprios "ocidentais". Recordemos, por exemplo, como se revestiu de alguma polémica, motivando a divisão entre os membros não regionais, a aprovação, a 26 de agosto de 2021 do primeiro financiamento num Estado-membro da União Europeia (UE), nomeadamente à Hungria.

Na verdade, segundo se entende, "(…) quando duas (ou mais) vontades entram em confronto, o produto final do debate é já um (…) resultado, diferente do que cada uma delas desejou" (Bobone, 2002, p. 12). É isso que constitui um verdadeiro espírito de diálogo, mais substancial, enquanto contínuo e institucionalizado, balizado por normas e parâmetros de referência.

Há, igualmente, um aspeto relevante que é "a capacidade de se fazer ouvir". Qualquer Estado acionista desses Bancos tem, a par com as reconhecidas limitações derivadas do capital investido e, inerentemente, do poder de voto[17], um acesso igual aos fóruns de debate[18]. Quer dizer: a circulação de ideias não depende apenas da riqueza, ou da riqueza investida do país concreto[19] (embora, naturalmente, o "peso" político-económico-diplomático de cada Estado membro não deixe de se refletir no debate, cujas conclusões operacionais dependerão, sempre, da sua viabilidade política e financeira).

Consideramos, também que um grande contributo para tal diálogo advém da existência de arquétipos comuns, como são, para nomear os que consideramos principais, pela sua tendencial unanimidade internacional, os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável e o Acordo de Paris. Não que a sua mera enunciação dispense argumentação e exclua diferendos. Contudo, consideramos que deles se pode afirmar o mesmo que Jacques Maritain (1967, 86/87) dizia do fundamento teórico da estrutura internacional de Direitos Humanos: " (…) uma espécie de resíduo comum, uma espécie de lei comum não-escrita, no ponto de convergência prática das ideologias teóricas e das mais diferentes tradições espirituais".

Do mesmo modo, a mera enunciação de preceitos e tópicos não é suficiente para a sua eficácia, sem uma correspondente e contínua interpretação que possibilite a sua

[17] Ransdell, 139 e 152;
[18] Por exemplo, como se extrai, no que respeita ao seu Conselho Diretivo *das "Rules of Procedure of the Board of Directors" do BAII;*
[19] Pode também citar-se, por exemplo, o Artº 30/1/(ii) do Acordo fundador do BAsD, prevendo que um eventual aumento do número de Diretores possa ter em atenção a representatividade de "smaller less developed member countries" (embora a referência vise membros regionais);

aplicação[20]. É esse processo que exige o diálogo, através da participação no Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento e no Banco Asiático de Investimento em Infraestruturas de países da Ásia, da Europa, e das outras regiões do mundo. Trata-se, assim, de um diálogo tendencialmente (e idealmente) global, não só porque o leque de acionistas em ambos os bancos, é geograficamente muito diversificado, mas porque a ação das duas instituições só será verdadeiramente eficaz caso integrada num processo alargado em que o Desenvolvimento global seja encarado como um todo, enquadrado por parâmetros negociais comuns.

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