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NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

FROM GEO-ECONOMICS OF THE “ASIA-PACIFIC” TO GEO-

POLITICS OF THE “INDO-PACIFIC”

RICHARD HIGGOTT

richardhiggott0@gmail.com

Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy in the

Brussels School of Governance (https://brussels-school.be/team/richard-higgott), Visiting Fellow

in the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute and Emeritus Professor of

International Political Economy at the University of Warwick (United Kingdom).

Introduction

Crafted over the last 60+ years, the member states of the EU, or most of them, have

always had a very Cartesian, legal formalistic view of regionalism. They have taken, not

unreasonably, a certain degree of pride in their regionally integrative bona fides. This

pride was underwritten by a Balassian logic of progressive economic integration,

especially in the last two decades of the 20

, and the now clichéd assumptions about the

relevance of Europe’s “normative power. These positions were accompanied by an

unstated assumption that processes of regional development in other parts of the world

would, even if slowly, progress along a similar path to that espoused in Europe. The

assumption was that the European model was exportable.

With hindsight we now appreciate this was not to be. Assumptions about the power of

European ideas and practices in region building, underwritten by both a political naivety

and an intellectual hubris, simply did not come to pass. The route to regionalism in the

Asia Pacific has been, and is, many things. But one thing it is not is a facsimile of the EU

road to integration. Cartesian legal formalism has found little or no fertile ground in Asia.

Asians have chosen not to learn from other regions. The drivers of region in Asia have

This short note is a transcript (more or less) of a public lecture delivered at the University of Lisbon,

Symposium Europa e Asia: Construeções e Interações Num Mondo Dividio, April 16, 2024. It has

rudimentary footnoting. It draws on a much longer paper that can be found online at LSE/IDEAS

(https://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS.) The longer paper carries extensive documentation and citation to support

the arguments advanced in this short essay.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, Nº. 1 (May 2024 – October 2024), pp. 372-379

Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

373

been both local and global. Two global factors that have proved to be pivotal —

globalisation and geopolitics — are the subject of this paper.

Recognising that we are witnessing the changing relationship between globalisation and

geopolitics as categories of both global and regional order, it is the purpose of this paper

to look at contemporary regional urges in Asia through these lenses. The changes that

are coming about are underwritten by both ideational narrative and policy practice. At

the analytical level, this short paper focuses on the ideational narrative, specifically the

juxtaposition of the declining ideational hegemony of neo-liberal economics and the rising

ideational hegemony of realist geopolitics. The analysis is illustrated empirically by a

brief discussion of the declining interest in the geo-economics of the “Asia Pacific” as a

hosting metaphor and the rising focus on the geopolitics of the “Indo Pacific” that reflects

the intensification of global great power competition between the USA and China.

Ideas Have Consequences: From Globalisation to Geopolitics

The relationship between theory and practice is more important than many in the policy

world often assume. It is more complicated and less understood than we appreciate. We

all too often ignore the degree to which ideas cast massive policy shadows. As Keynes

noted:

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right

and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.

Indeed, the world is ruled by little else”

Geopolitics, as both idea and practice — overshadowed empirically and intellectually after

the end of the Cold War — is back. It is currently the most powerful ideational metaphor

in the lexicon of international politics. Nothing symbolically emphasises this better than

the rise and decline of the annual Munich Security Conference and the Davos World

Economic Forum. And as IISS data demonstrates, even without the Ukraine war and the

Gaza conflict, interstate conflict and the absolute number of conflicts are growing

Globalisation is not dead, but it is challenged now more than any time since the end of

the Cold War (and especially since the GFC of 2008). The hegemonic neo-liberal

(Hayekian) paradigm is increasingly questioned and exhibits paradoxes too significant to

ignore (see the analyses of Dani Rodkrik, Joseph Stiglitz and Branco Milanovic).

Specifically, the unalloyed benefits of globalisation are over-hyped, and the negative

externalities under-played. For sure, globalisation has been a major generator of gross

aggregate welfare (lifting nearly 1 billion out of poverty)

. But it has also been a major

generator of inequality. Its negative distributional consequences have fueled socio-

Keynes, John Maynard (1935). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money: p 383. (Note: here

his reference is also to political philosophy; not economics alone.)

See Mia, T. Irene (ed.) (2023). Armed Conflict Survey, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies,

https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/armed-conflict-survey/2023/editors-introduction/ And the Editors ‘A

Return to Interstate Conflict,’ World Politics Review, December 18, 2023,

World Bank, Lifting 800 million people out of Poverty, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-

release/2022/04/01/lifting-800-million-people-out-of-poverty-new-report-looks-at-lessons-from-china-s-

experience

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, Nº. 1 (May 2024 – October 2024), pp. 372-379

Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

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political resentment against cosmopolitan elites. It has been a key influencer of the rise

of anti-globalism, populist and nativist politics and anti-immigration

Accompanying these changes we have also seen the emergence of a new mercantilism

reflected in the rise of protectionism, a declining support for an open global economy and

multilateral institutions. These trends are captured in the words of Joe Biden’s NSC Chief,

Jake Sullivan

. His “New Washington Consensus (Industrial Policy, IRA, Chips Acts.

delinking, reshoring, onshoring) and the Economist’s identification of the trend towards

“homeland economics” are representative of the dominant discourse du jour.

If it is autumn for globalization, it is clearly springtime for geopolitics. But, like

globalization, geopolitics has its plusses and minuses. It clearly enhances and heightens

our risk awareness, and we do need good geopolitical risk analysis in an age when the

USA and China are becoming increasingly competitive. It is not wrong for states to be

concerned about China’s, at times aggressively, forward leaning practices in international

relations (I am not a naive liberal). China needs to be watched. The question is how we

watch it and what policy prescriptions to adopt? There is a fine line between deterrence

and provocation.

Language matters and the excessive of zeal of advocates of either discourse—be they

neo Hayekians or hard realist security specialists—can be incubators of extreme

prescriptive policy positions. The logic of realist geopolitics can be self-fulfilling.

Notwithstanding views of deterrence theory, realist geopolitical logic invariably privileges

Thomas Hobbes’s “disposition for war.” This leaves us with a difficult question to answer:

“Will modern geopolitical analysis, with its search for threats and enemies, in fact simply

exacerbate rather than mitigate political strategic competition and conflict between the

US and China?”

Of course, the discourse of geopolitics is very different to that of globalization. A concept

arguably measured in millennia rather than centuries, its recent origins can be traced to

analyst/practitioners such as Mackinder, Spykeman, Mahan in the early 20

century,

Kissinger and Brzezinski in the second half of the 20

century and the proliferating off

the shelf geopolitics of the early 21

century (Hal Brands, et al, 2023). There are both

liberal and authoritarian strands of geopolitical thought to be found in the modern era.

But central to both strands is the “balance of power”, which may be seen as the

strategist’s equivalent of the economist’s “equilibrium”. The discourse of geopolitics in

the post-Cold War era is a metaphor for great power competition (GPC)

. GPC is largely

bilateral, transactional, and indeed geographical. All other elements of global conflict

There is a vast literature on populism in all its guises. I discuss the populist critique of globalisation relevant

to this essay in Higgott, Richard (2022). States, Civilisations and the Reset of World Order, London:

Routledge. On populism generally see Muller, Jan Werner (2017). What is Populism? London Penguin and

Oswald, Michael (2022). The Palgrave Handbook of Populism, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

See ‘Remarks by National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership’,

Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, April 27, 2023, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-

remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-

economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/

See Hal Brands (2023). ‘The Field of Geopolitics offers both Promises and Perils’, Foreign Policy, December

28, 2023: https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/28/geopolitics-strategy-eurasia-autocracies-democracies-

china-russia-us-putin-xi/#cookie_message_anchor and Casten Nickel, ‘What do we talk about when we talk

about the return of geo-politics?’ International Affairs, 100 (1) 2024.

https://academic.oup.com/ia/issue/100/1?login=false.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, Nº. 1 (May 2024 – October 2024), pp. 372-379

Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

375

should be seen as secondary. There is little room for multilateral collective action problem

solving here.

At the empirical level, talk of economic interdependence and integration declines as talk

of conflict in the security domain grows stronger everyday and great power rivalry surges

after a brief post-Cold War uni-polar moment. Further, the discourse of geopolitics is

replete with the language of threat inflation. Whatever China does is read by the USA in

zero sum terms and as a precursor to future aggression. The need to confront what is

seen as a rising competition from China is the only element of bipartisanship in

Washington politics.

China, in US strategic jargon, is the “pacing threat”. But there are two big differences

from the days of the US-Soviet Union Cold War. First, the US and China are economically

interdependent in a way that US and Soviet Union never were. Second, despite Biden’s

democracy-authoritarian divide, neither of the great powers are leaders of ideologically

coherent blocs. The world may be bifurcated, but it is neither bi-polar nor multi-polar. It

is fuzzy.

States have become hedgers.

We should learn from the hegemony of neo-liberal globalization here. In the early days

of neo-Hayekian ideational hegemony, we saw only the benefits of economic globalization

and none of its problems. We must not repeat the mistake in our new-found love affair

with geopolitics. We need to take account of the negative externalities too. Especially the

self-fulfilling properties of much of the language of geopolitics: great power rivalry,

regional security dilemmas and threat inflation. We must ask if geopolitics is fulfilling a

similar role to that of the early phase of economic globalisation? If Hayekian liberalism

was economics without liberalism—that is not much more than simply unfettered free

markets—then is geopolitics international relations without liberalism too? Is geopolitics

international relations absent qualifying notions of interdependence and diplomacy?

Words Have Consequences: From “Asia Pacific” to “Indo Pacific”

As Amitav Acharya noted, Asia Pacific was a term coined by economists. Indeed, the

language of (neo) liberal economics drove the idea of the “Asia Pacific”. It reflected the

privileging of a trade liberalism and open regionalism. While it cannot be discussed here,

the intellectual history of the evolution of APEC is a fascinating story of modern

diplomacy. The Indo-Pacific, says Acharya on the other hand, was coined by strategists.

The language of geopolitics is driving the idea of the “Indo Pacific”. It has become the

discourse of the official and unofficial security policy communities of USA and its allies.

While others too—Indonesia and ASEAN especially—also use the idea and language of

Indo Pacific, their understanding is driven by a more open, less geopolitical, more

cooperative understanding of region and with much less of anti-China focus; positions

are articulated in the 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

For the USA, economics, more than security, drove the development of the Trans-Pacific

Partnership (TPP) as the centrepiece of President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”. But on his first

day in office, Donald Trump withdrew the US from the TPP. Joe Biden did not attempt

See Higgott, Richard and Reich, Simon (2022). ‘The Age of Fuzzy Bifurcation: Lessons from the Pandemic

and the Ukraine War’ Global Policy, 13 (5), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.13141.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, Nº. 1 (May 2024 – October 2024), pp. 372-379

Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

376

to reverse this. The US DoS formalised the idea with the concept of a Free and Open

Indo-Pacific in 2019.

It was seen as a means to consolidate the QUAD (India, Australia,

Japan).His policy has in fact reflected substantial continuity with Trump’s. Biden’s

priorities were always geopolitics and security.

His primary aim has been to build a grand alliance against what he sees as the

systematically competitive growth of Chinese power; to contain, if not rollback, Chinese

global influence was to be capped. US international economic policy (and technology)

was effectively securitised via practices such as sanctions, the Inflation Reduction Act

and Chips Act. In simple terms, when it comes to the Indo Pacific and China, Biden and

his advisers, are what we might call “primacists”—a strategy that reflects a misreading

of the changing nature of power considerations in the contemporary world order.

The Indo Pacific is not a neutral description of region: but one designed to counter a

China dominated regional order. Concern with China, at the heart of US grand strategy,

dominates the views of both its official and quasi-official analytical policy community

within the DC Beltway.

The geopolitical imagining of the Indo-Pacific discourse has the

China threat at its centre. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific, according the 2022 US National

Security Strategy, is the ‘epicentre of 21

Century geopolitics’

. Only a small part of the

US analytical community thinks that while China needs to be watched closely, it is not

the existential and geopolitical security threat it is thought to be

At the policy level the dominant discourse, especially in think tanks such as AEI, the Cato

Institute, CSIS, AEF, Atlantic Council is now, rivalry driven, virulently geo-political and

anti-China. Even the CFR and Brookings are carrying fewer discussions of the prospects

for cooperation and conflict mitigation as opposed to conflict. At the extreme, in 2019,

that most hawkish of Cold War organisations, the Committee for Present Danger

underwent a resurrection. China was substituted for the Soviet Union in its full title

But, at a time when the Trans-Atlantic world is learning what the Economist calls

“homeland economics”, and asking how Indo Pacific geostrategic tensions affect it and

what it can do to contain them, many Asian countries are developing an important

portfolio of economic institutional cooperation. Note, TPP did not collapse with US

withdrawal. It became CPTPP and is clearly a viable, if less significant, organization.

Similarly, RCEP is fulfilling an increasingly relevant regional role as it gears up since its

recent ratification. The AIIB, legitimate criticism of its modus operandi notwithstanding

has become, against US wishes, a key component of regional economic statecraft.

Department of State A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision Washington, D.C: 4 Nov.

2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4 Nov2019.pdf.

See Jentlesen, Bruce (2020). ‘Refocussing US Grand Strategy on Pandemic and Environmental Mass

Destruction’, The Washington Quarterly, 43 (3): pp. 9-12.

The White House, National Security Strategy (2022). October, p. 37.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-

Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

See Weiss, Jessica Chen (2022). ‘The China Trap: US China Foreign Policy and the Perilous of Logic of Zero-

Sum Competition’, Foreign Affairs, September-October, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-trap-

us-foreign-policy-zero-sum-competition , Fravel, M. Taylor et al. (2019). ‘China Is Not an Enemy,’

Washington Post, July 3, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-

counterproductive/ and Dan Murphy, ‘Is the United States Overestimating Chinese Power’, The

Conversation, March 1, 2024, https://theconversation.com/is-the-united-states-overestimating-chinas-

power-220014

To be found at: https://presentdangerchina.org.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

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The US, in contrast to the turn of the century, is not in a good position 25 years on. It is

not involved with any of the above major economic initiatives. APEC, the quintessential

site of economic institutional activity in the Asia Pacific, that includes the US, is running

out of steam. And the economic pillar of the Biden Indo Pacific strategy—the Indo-Pacific

Economic Framework for Prosperity introduced in May 2022—has had little positive

impact on the regional economic discourse to-date.

For Australia the change of language from the Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific reflects a

dramatic change in its strategic culture. In the last decade, and especially since 2018 it

has transitioned from being a cooperative regional middle power leading in the building

of an open economic Asia Pacific and strong economic links with China to client state

status as the strongest US regional ally in anti-China camp

. In the last quarter of 20th

century Australia was at forefront of movement for open regionalism in the Asia Pacific.

The Bob Hawke (1983-91 and Paul Keating (1991-96) governments worked hard to

address Australia’s regional liminality. In the discourse of the day they wanted Australia

to be both in and of the Asia Pacific, not a European outpost

. It was a period of sure-

footed regional economic policy. In 1989 Hawke kick ed off APEC as focal point for

regional economic dialogue and Australia grew its economic relationship with China and

closer links with ASEAN neighbours.

Australian foreign policy has lost its sure footedness since the end of the first decade of

the 21

century. This has been illustrated by two major diplomatic blunders: (i) Prime

Minister Scott Morrison’s 2021 call for China Covid Inquiry (at US bidding) which

generated a massive deterioration in the relationship with China and a fierce Chinese

trade response. (ii) The apparent duplicity involved in the cancellation of France’s

submarine contract with Australia in favour of the AUKUS agreement, which reflects in

many ways the culmination in the changing nature of Australian strategic culture. I am

not suggesting the US forced AUKUS on Australia. Australia has always been a willing

participant in the US regional project. Rather, the anti-China inspired AUKUS is merely

the latest stage in the US regional primacy project

. Putative US primacy in the region

is in many ways “primacy by invitation”, especially from Australia, Japan and South

Korea.

The Indo Pacific narrative emerged in Australia in 2013 Oz Defence White Paper. It took

root as a neologism over the decade since then and Australia moved firmly towards the

US geopolitical view of Indo-Pacific under the government of Bill Morrison between 2018

and 2022. Australia signed on as a faithful US ally greater than at any time since Vietnam

when Prime Minister Harold Holt, was “All the Way with LBJ!!”

On the early period see Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers; Australia

and Canada in an Evolving World Order, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002; Higgott, Richard,

Leaver, Richard and Ravenhill, John (eds). Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?

Boulder, Colorado, Reinner, Lynn (1993) and Mack, Andrew and Ravenhill, John (eds) (1994). Pacific

Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia Pacific Region, Melbourne: Allen and

Unwin.

See Higgott, Richard and Nossal, Kim Richard (1997). ‘The International Politics of Liminality: Relocating

Australia in. the Asia Pacific,’ The Australian Journal of Political Science, 32 (2): 169-86,

https://doi.org/10.1080/10361149750887

Prashad, Vijay (2022). ‘Australia: A Frontline State in a New Cold War’, Pearls and Irritations, December

15, https://johnmenadue.com/australia-a-frontline-state-in-the-new-cold-war/.

https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/afa/fatal-shores-aukus-is-a-grave-mistake/3081

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

Vol. 15, Nº. 1 (May 2024 – October 2024), pp. 372-379

Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

378

As the paper has suggested, ideas and policy discourse have consequences. There is a

direct US input into the security discourse of the Canberra policy community. Documents

are replete with the geo-political jargon and phrases of direct US origin. This discourse

is reflected in the annual Annual AUSMIN meetings. And the US Defense Intelligence

Agency even have their own people working in-house in the Australian Defense

Intelligence Organisation in Canberra.

The predominance of the Indo Pacific voice has given rise to what I call a “discursive

disequilibrium” in the debate over Australia’s strategic culture. It has been fostered by

what former Australian Ambassador to China, Geoff Raby, calls the “China Threat

Industry” stoking the narrative that “China is the existential threat”. A former head of

the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Heather Smith, talks of the

“hijacking” of the Australian “economics establishment” by the” security establishment”.

The security paradigm, unsurprisingly, permeates Canberra institutions such as the ONA,

ASIO, ASIS, some key think tanks, especially the very hawkish Australian Security Policy

Institute (essentially a quasi-autonomous arm of government) and of course the highly

influential Murdoch press, notably the Australian

But the discursive disequilibrium notwithstanding, there is a diminishing domestic

consensus on AUKUS in Australia, be it the issue of submarine provision or greater

defence industrial integration between the US, the UK and Australia. The national is

debate growing. Central to this debate are some basic questions of cost and technical

consideration, especially a doubt (even in the pro AAUKUS camp) of the ability of the UK

to deliver its part on time and on cost. Most important however are growing

considerations of strategy and politics. Australia’s leading security specialist, Hugh

White, describes it as the “most disastrous defence policy mistake in Australian history.”

He notes an excessively elongated implementation time frame, a dubious political

viability and commitment of the US and the UK over time, a gap in US expectations and

Australian commitments and the vaulting ambitions of AUKUS being out of step with

Australia’s middle power traditions and international status. White challenges the largely

untested assumption in the wider Australia security establishment that AUKUS

axiomatically makes Australia safer

Conclusion: Be careful what you wish for

As noted, ideas and words have consequences. They are not just rhetorical or heuristic

academic devices as the paper has demonstrated with its juxtaposition of the ideational

and policy fortunes of globalisation and geopolitics as organizational/normative

narratives of world order. The growing influence of the discourse of geopolitics is creating

See Scrafton, Mike (2023). ‘Abandoned Sovereignty: Australia’s Intelligence Function Colonised by the US’,

Pearls and Irritations, Dec. 31, https://johnmenadue.com/abandoned-sovereignty-australias-intelligence-

function-colonised-by-us/ and ‘Shutting Down ASPI: Hugh White, Peter Jennings and China’, Pearls and

Irritations, Nov. 30, 2021, https://johnmenadue.com/shutting-down-aspi-hugh-white-peter-jennings-and-

china/, James Curran, ‘Excess Baggage: Is China a Genuine Threat to Australia, Australian Foreign Affairs,

19, October 2023, 27 and Heather Smith, ‘Australia in a Fragmenting World’, AIIA National Conference,

November 13, 2023, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australia-in-a-fragmenting-world/

On AUKUS, see Hugh White, ‘AUKUS is a Grave Mistake’, Australian Foreign Affairs, 20, February 2024,

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Notes and Reflections

From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-Pacific”

Richard Higgott

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new mental maps. Asserting the geopolitical over the geo-economic casts major global

and regional policy shadows.

In empirical terms the new mental maps privilege the Indo Pacific over the Asia Pacific.

This change downplays the discourse of cooperative open economic regionalism at the

expense of a discourse of geopolitical strategic competition. While not denying the need

for good geopolitical analysis, a consequence is that it can give rise to threat inflation,

exacerbate rather than contain great power rivalries, and generate regional security

dilemmas.

The argument of the paper was illustrated by a discussion of the changing US view of the

Indo Pacific and how Australia’s security culture has changed to accommodate it. Change

in Australian strategic culture is based on two assumptions: (i) that the US will contain

China’s continued economic and political rise; (ii) that the US approach to the Indo Pacific

will remain consistent. Both assumptions are, at best, problematic. Two reasons: (i) It is

not necessary to be Kishore Mahbubani to assume China’s rise will continue

. (ii) US

foreign policy, and by extension support for Australia, is at the whim of the US

presidential system and all its attendant consequences. A second Trump administration

is never far from peoples’ thoughts. We have seen a reversion in Australian strategic

culture: from that of a concerned international, and regional, citizen practicing a modest

“middle power” role back to that of a client state of the US. It is band wagoning of a

recklessly high order.

How to cite this note

Higgott, Richard (2024). From Geo-Economics of the “Asia-Pacific” to Geo-Politics of the “Indo-

Pacific”. Notes and Reflections, Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15, Nº.1, May-

October, pp. 372-379. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.15.1.04

See inter alia, Mahbubani, Kishore (2021). Has the US Lost it? London, Penguin, 2018; Has China Won?

New York, Public Affairs, 2020 and The Asian 21

Century, Singapore: Springer.