

NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

TURKEY-CYPRUS: PROMETHEUS UNBOUND OR THE CATHARSIS OF AFRODITE?

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We know the origin of the unit dealing with external relations of the European Commission's General Secretariat is Turkey's application for membership in the Customs Union in 1959. The proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent republic impacted the development of the relationship between the EEC and Turkey (Katselli, 2006). The Ankara Agreement's preamble "resolved to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty by the joint pursuit of the ideals underlying the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community." Alain Peyrefitte reports that De Gaulle examined the Ankara Association agreement with Turkey from a long-term strategic perspective in the context of the wall's fall and tended to subsume the EEC under a French confederalist design on Europe¹. This is the likely origin of the provision in the 1964 agreement: the EU does not exclude the possibility of Turkey acceding the European Communities². Thus, Franco-German interests and security strategies were at stake from the outset of Turkey's relationship with Europe. From the EUI archives, it transpires there were concerns among the EC member states about the state of development of Turkey and the implications for the EU policies and budget of Turkish accession to the EEC. These concerns are also reflected in the Ankara agreement. This was not going to change. The interrelationship between the Franco-German structured rivalry and European integration

¹ Peyrefitte (1994).

² Quoted in Reiners (2021).



is starting to be studied systematically and in more detail³. It is not unlikely that the timing of adopting the Elysée-treaty forging the Bonn-Paris axis followed the failure of negotiations linked to the German question⁴. It was subsequently resolved as part of NPT negotiations that the German quest for atomic parity would unfold within a European framework through the note submitted by Willy Brandt to the NPT conference.⁵ What has been lacking is a study into the relationship between EU Foreign Policy-making, the Structured Franco-German rivalry, and European law.

As Europe responds to threats from the USA, Russia, and China, European civilization must evolve to thrive. This requires wise decision-making, the development of a vision, and that our beloved leaders are held accountable to achieve a new synthesis in Europe's long history. None wants to return to a Concert of Europe or a modified balance of power. Instead, we are creating something "new" and "right" in Europe. This is not only a conflict in Cyprus that Turkish scholars have readily recognized without specifying the factors involved in moving from conflict management to conflict solution⁶. In this piece, I argue that a solution to the Cyprus conflict flows from understanding and addressing the strategic stakes the central actors attribute to the grand bargain between Turkey and the EU combined with party political competition, financial aspects, and negotiators' skills. An integrated political and economic approach is to be adopted, joined with a well-thought-out strategic plan for the achievement of the political goals of the European integration project. Care needs to be exercised at several levels to succeed. This also involves translating academic projects into organizational attributes and better communication from the EU.

I ask: How to proceed between Turkey and the EU? How to advance the EU-Turkey relationship? What are Europe's interests? In response to the EU Commission's 2021 enlargement report, the European Parliament urged the European institutions to communicate consistently between themselves vis-à-vis Turkey⁷. So what are the objectives the EU is pursuing vis-à-vis Turkey? First, the EU wants to prevent the organization of an alternative Europe between Turkey and Russia⁸. Second, the EU core intends to adopt a constitutional treaty⁹. Third, the EU is haltingly pursuing defense integration¹⁰. Fourth, a compromise between France's critical engagement with Germany¹¹ and Germany's asymmetrical federalization of Europe is sought¹². Fifth, the EU pursues value-based foreign policy¹³. These objectives are complex and require internal and external realignment. Thus, strategic patience is advised. Sixth, Turkey's membership application will continue to be assessed on its own merits and on an equal basis with the other candidate countries.¹⁴ For instance, EU-Turkey could adopt a joint action plan on good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in conjunction with

³ Krotz & Schild (2015).

⁴ Trachtenberg (1999).

⁵ William Burr (2018)

⁶ Dalay (2021) & Ker-Lindsay (2012)

⁷ Report on the 2021 European Commission Report on Turkey [online],
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0149_EN.html

⁸ Keltikli (2019) & Facon (2022)

⁹ Teker (2021)

¹⁰ Quille (2006), Merand, Foucault & Irondele (2008), Mérand & Angers (2013) Howorth (2014).

¹¹ Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2001).

¹² Pedersen (1998)

¹³ Keukeleire & Delreux (2022).

¹⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6088



establishing a school in Istanbul on the same topics. Ankara could adopt a Turkey-Transparency International anti-corruption package comprising institution-building, policy, and legislation. The EU Commission also highlights Turkey's alignment with CFSP statements. There are misgivings about the appeal to and use of populist Islamist forces in Turkey and the emergence of identity politics in Türkiye¹⁵. Those, conversely, who have been purged as part of the crack-down after the coup attempt in 2016 will be safer by keeping a low profile until a professional administration is restored. And an end is made to Turkey's authoritarian bend¹⁶, a personal tragedy and a by-product of Erdogan's power grab fused with an Anadolu sense of revenge¹⁷. Turkey lives in a tough neighborhood. Some EU member states are concerned about letting in Turkey without comprehensive peace in the Middle East and about Turkey's added value to the collective. On its side, the EU must deliver on the Migration Pact, augment the Customs Union, implement the agreed visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, and pay out the promised funds to Ankara for providing security to the European Union¹⁸. There is no reason to be petty. EU could also do more to partner with Turkey on its policies towards Iraq¹⁹, Syria²⁰, the Black Sea²¹, Caucasus²², and Central Asia²³.

Cyprus's departure point must be reconciliation and peace between Greece and Turkey²⁴. This could comprise establishing working parties in all areas of dispute on the model of Turkey's relationship with Azerbaijan and KSA. However, people-to-people programs and a historian commission might also be added. Pending progress between Athens and Ankara on the 25-point Positive Agenda and the Joint Action Plan and its extension into the political realm through establishing working parties in all areas of dispute²⁵, progress on Cyprus will be possible. Next, according to Andreas Theophanous, an international refugee settlement commission is needed to address compensation for Cypriot refugees, agree on rules and modalities for rehousing, and manage the question of property rights²⁶. A UNESCO Fund could be established to restore destroyed cultural artifacts in Cyprus²⁷. This could be accompanied by a De-securitization program and confidence-building measures backed by the EU & UN²⁸, followed by an agreement on exploiting energy resources in natural waters²⁹. Finally, a trilateral Border Commission between Libya-Turkey-Greece could ensue. Based on this, the EU Commission could study Northern Cyprus' relationship with the EU³⁰. In return, Turkey could lift its veto on the Ankara protocol to the Customs Union so that a trading relationship emerges based on

¹⁵ Levin (2011) Yaman & Dönmez (2023)

¹⁶ Duzgun (2022) & Neuman (2021).

¹⁷ Consequences of the Intcen report on the coup in Turkey[online]
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-000601_EN.html?ssp=1&darkschemeovr=0&setting=da-DK&safesearch=moderate

¹⁸ Carroado (2019)

¹⁹ Duman & Aygün (2023)

²⁰ Phillips (2018) Baucher (2021) Rabinowich & Valensi (2022).

²¹ Roxandra (2012), Acikmese & Triantatyfollou (2017), Pokaev, Sovga & Chaplina (2021)

²² Hunter (2017), Amolnik & Weiss (2021), Haxthausen (2021), Avdaliani (2022).

²³ Brannen (2016)

²⁴ Kontos (2022)

²⁵ Ioannides (2023).

²⁶ Theophanous (2017)

²⁷ Clausen (2013)

²⁸ Adamides (2020) , Hampson & ôzerdem (2022) ICC (2024).

²⁹ Goren, Limon & Sözen (2023).

³⁰ Adalouglu (2009)



international law and mutual recognition³¹. This ought to provide the conditions for political negotiations in Cyprus, a conflict with its own dynamic, as noted by President Erdogan.

According to Sözen, the bilateral negotiations in Cyprus could be relaunched by resuming work at the point where they were left off³². This implies the resuscitation of the political and technical working parties and addressing outstanding issues at the presidential level. Based on this, a consensus must be forged between the two communities' leaders on common institutions and external security within a federal constitution, the constitutional order of choice. A national body for a re-unified Cyprus would require a constitutional assembly, which could comprise Andras Sajó, Tom Ginsburg, and Bruno de Witte as international experts. The two entities are constituents of the constitution-making process, and the two Presidents are convenors of a constitutional assembly. The Cypriot constitution should be inclusive, specific, and flexible to endure³³. A broad spectrum of both societies should be represented in the community. It is understood that women, the people, minorities, youth, migrants, settlers, and interest groups are included in the Cypriot constitution-making process. The specificity of the Constitution's provisions could be facilitated by forging prior political negotiations on constitutional issues, security, governance, territorial aspects, settlers, the four fundamental freedoms, and the economy at expert and negotiator levels. The EU Commission could be involved in this pre-negotiation. The Constitution should contain provisions on judicial review and a constitutional amendment to be flexible. A unified army must be forged under the command of the Cypriot President, who is to be elected by the people of Cyprus³⁴. If a Greek-Cypriot is elected as President, his Vice-President must be a Turkish Cypriot and vice-versa. There should be one judiciary system and country-wide and communal policing- René: One Foreign Service, Border Management organization, Investment & Tourism Agency, and Integrated Tax-system. I anticipate Turkey to phase out its security presence. The same applies to Great Britain. There should be provisions on the executive, legislature(s) and courts, rights, and scope (monitoring elections, ombudsperson, anti-corruption, minorities). Contingency decisions concerning abolishing the guarantor system also belong in the new Cypriot constitution. In short, Cyprus' vision for a solution to the conflict appears sound, although flexibility on Anatolian settlers on the island, procedural aspects, and the process of constitution-making appear nearby. On this basis, I anticipate continuity in action.

Thus, I turn things a little upside-down, addressing emotional aspects cluttering progress, emphasizing the design of the constitution-making process³⁵, and changing the sequencing of moves geared towards a political compromise. The constitution is brought to a referendum – not the settlement plan. It is only at the moment of adoption of the new Cypriot constitution that the President informs the EU that the territorial application of the *acquis* may now be extended to the whole island under a jointly agreed form, upon

³¹ European Parliament postpones vote on protocol to Ankara agreement
[online][https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/presse/pr_info/2005/EN/03A-DV-PResse_IPR\(2005\)09-21\(00563\)_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/presse/pr_info/2005/EN/03A-DV-PResse_IPR(2005)09-21(00563)_EN.pdf)

³² Sözen (2017)

³³ Ginsburg & Melton (2014)

³⁴ The EU Commission could scrutinize the election law given the bad experiences in Cyprus.

³⁵ Ginsburg (2012).



which TRNC is integrated into the EU³⁶. I propose that the timeline put on the roll-back of foreign militaries could begin from the date of adoption of the Cypriot constitution. Terminating the Treaty of Guarantee could ensue by mutual consent due to changed circumstances.

The assumption is that Greeks are federalists, listen to Berlin and Paris, and care about Cyprus. I want to emphasize that Turkish elites are pro-European, power-oriented, and pragmatic. Turkey likely adopted negotiation tactics to extract concessions from the EU after the Kosovo War. This was initially successful based on the transatlantic four-pronged deal emerging from the US-EU summit on 21 June 1999 in Bonn³⁷. Or was it Cologne? The intervention by the US was widely anticipated at the diplomatic level ahead of the US-EU Summit. Thus, central EU member states concorded internally in a working group – Quint Chypre – where it was decided that Turkish membership would come at a “price” (David Hannay). Turkey then prepared itself to play along, while a period of push-ups and negotiations ensued based on the four-pronged US-EU package deal, likely a multi-bilateral anorak for a “done deal” whereby France agreed not to exclude Turkey from the talks on Cyprus’ future in return for Great Britain’s support for the Franco-German grand bargain, i.e., the development of a common European defense. Thus, - to coin Claude Martin - the EU’s approach to enlargement, and by extension, to Turkey would be “global, inclusive, evolutionary”.

On this basis, playing the Cyprus card proved a highly realistic proposition and a stratagem, maximizing Turkey’s leverage from a position of relative weakness. TRNC subsequently voted yes to the Annan IV plan, while Turkey turned its back on Europe when its stratagem failed as Cyprus adopted coercive bargaining. At an emotional level, this meant a smooth transition from being a historical presence in Europe to being a member of the EU was thwarted. It also meant Bill Clinton’s attempt to organize Europe around the bilateral-time of the US’s links to the middle powers in Europe failed, even as his bid to steal a march on the EU by playing France and Germany out against each other were to be rectified. Or, as Joshua Fischer said in a casual remark in Firenze in 2001 during his visit to EU: “He was a strong one.” The poet puts it like this: “Like a cornered animal cunning, I concealed my game, my stake, my bet from your gaze.”

The EU Commission’s attempt to channel Franco-German power into a Constitutional Treaty by acting as host to the Quint Chypre was similar to leading to a shipwreck. This relative failure also doesn’t explain why the Helsinki Headline Goals on the rapid reaction corpse have remained a pie in the sky. There seems to have been no political will to enact

³⁶ Protocol 10 on Cyprus, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12003T/PRO/10&from=ES>

³⁷ Ilcus (2000). I was relayed that a conversation between Kohl and Chirac took place in 1997 in Turkey along the following lines: Kohl: “I have given up the Deutschmark. Now, I want influence over France’s defense policy”. Chirac replied: “Deal. I want Turkey in the EU, then”. This is the origin of article 17 in the Amsterdam treaty, later amended by TFEU 42 in the Lisboa treaty. And this is why I recall the regional grand bargain on Turkey underlying the 1999 transatlantic package deal, if not underpinning it. This piece of high politics, still undocumented in physical form, is alluded to in the literature and reverberates through the EU machinery. I hope to document it in the book to evolve out of my thesis. That is to say, the historical and political context against which the grand bargain between EU and Turkey unfolds is a struggle over Europe’s political order, which coincides with the question of the Euro-pean post-Cold War security architecture. This also allows us to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong, what is emergent or needs to be strengthened, how to apply practical rationality, and how best to participate in the earthly realities through the mediation of a humanized cosmic order.



politically binding plans nor reflect upon how to implement the EU's treaty-bound obligations to each other and the citizenry.

Turkish interests, however, are linked to the anchoring of its modernization project in Europe. The positions throughout the EU integration project and, by implication, the objectives pursued by the EU core and Turkey are gradually converging. Moreover, Turkey connects the Kurdish issue to the Cyprus conflict in their strategic percepts. In plain language, the Turkish Army doesn't want to be taken in the ass and the front simultaneously. The TRNC is a sub-division of Turkey, and Ankara controls Lefkosa in strategic matters. Turkey has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, a by-product of the deterioration in the bilateral relationship with the EU.³⁸ Thus, the time for a solution is becoming ripe. Indeed, a fresh approach is warranted as part of a broader effort to stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean, strengthen Europe's energy security, and move the EU toward a sustainable equilibrium based on satisfying the EU's objectives in "a strategic and forward-looking manner."³⁹

Of course, the EuCo is free to express itself on various options for the next phase of the European integration project. Still, they should rely on the historical record and the political context within which that political choice is based on the suitable course of action between the EU and Turkey. There are well-laid foundations, which were renewed following the unification of Germany. They should also avoid false discourses – by affirming the past and negating the option⁴⁰. A harmonious solution is possible now. The future has an old heart.

Or, to coin Cicero: I have often and deeply resolved this question in my mind: whether a command of the dossier has been beneficial or detrimental to men and cities concerning the desired political order in Europe. When I consider the debacle over the Constitutional Treaty, and when I call to mind also the role of France, Germany, and Italy in the formation of the European nation-state⁴¹, I see that it is by no means the most insignificant portion of their distresses which has originated from the conduct of the most influential leaders. But, at the same time, when I set myself to trace the various attempts, with the aid of written memorials and documents, affairs which, because of their historical record, bear witness to unconstructive attitudes to a settlement in Cyprus by the former French ambassador to Germany, lack of coordination and ripeness as well as clumsiness by the UN and EU Commission⁴², and sabotage by Russia⁴³, I perceive the need for political leadership assisted by wisdom and facilitated by diplomacy and cemented by friendships and interaction.

At the EU level, treaty reform is now urgently needed. The departure point for this is a two-step process⁴⁴. In the first instance, the simple procedure for treaty change will be

³⁸ Kutlay & Önis (2021).

³⁹ European Council Conclusions, 30 June 2023 [online] <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7-2023-INIT/en/pdf>

⁴⁰ Wigen (2010).

⁴¹ Kohn (1967)

⁴² Hannay (2004)

⁴³ Drousiotis, (2023)

⁴⁴ The Franco-German Summit on 22 January 2023 established a working group - Groupe de Douze – which envisages three stages: (1) immediate reforms, (2) IGC25, and (3) Convention. Immediate reforms are extensions of majority voting in certain areas of foreign policy, enlargement, and taxation) Article 7 related sanctions on the rule of law, and stronger citizen participation. The next milestones: The Granada Informal Foreign Minister Meeting and the EUCO December 2023 will decide on a suitable way forward.



enacted to strengthen the EU's global role and enhance the EU's democratic legitimacy, considering the Conference on Europe's Future proposals. This also allows for a division of labor between member states and the supranational institutions. This should facilitate addressing the underlying issues and resolving the strategic stakes the actors attribute to the grand bargain between the EU and Turkey. However, I do not intend for the blood of the Bull to be spilled on the earth of barbarians. On the contrary, I want to lead and guide the evolving EU. A convention will likely be convened in the second sequence when the EU's enlargement to West-Balkan approaches. In parallel, harmonizing the Eurozone's debt issuance calendars around Italian, French, and German benchmarks, administered by a debt management office in ECB, could be decided on⁴⁵. The deepening of the European integration project will accompany the widening of the EU. Thus, a proper foundation for an enlarging European Union will be laid not on sand but on a rock. Perhaps the Cyprus conflict is a microcosm of the Euro-Pean Union. The plan is to forge a state-like fiscal-military actor out of the EU to manage the Franco-German structured rivalry veritably and move Europe forward effectively and creatively. It is really about seizing the moment and fully exploiting the situation. *Sich Bessinnen* on leadership, clear communication and a coherent approach. This contrasts with a process without a *sujet*, if not without an agent or agency⁴⁶.

If a certain logic applies, Turkey could accede after the accession of the West-Balkan countries. The point is not only – to coin Orhan Pamuk – that the relationship between Turkey and Europe constitutes a prism on the development of The European Union and Turkey, but also that we are in this together. If the EU and Turkey are together, nothing is impossible; if we are divided, all will fail. Thus, the EU needs to weigh in and maximize the probability that a future multipolar system is well-managed and as democratic as possible.

No later than at the point of Georgia's accession⁴⁷, a Council of Ministers in the formation of Europe-Ministers could be created employing a democratically elected Senate representing the member states⁴⁸. This is the paradox of a good solution. As the supranational leadership is strengthened, the European Council could increasingly assume the role of a Council of Prytanians.

Can you follow me?

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³⁸ Cohen (2007).

⁴⁶ Bracani (2021)

⁴⁷ German & Kokacia (2023)

⁴⁸ Noël (2022).



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