commitments expressed in the context of ALBA for the protection of the environment,
and the rainforest in particular (Kozlff, 2010).
For example, in IIRSA’s framework, a team of technical experts from Venezuela, Brazil
and Argentina planned for the construction of a new pipeline across Venezuela’s Guayana
region and the Amazon. Inclusively, the Russian firm Gazprom had expressed interests
in what was considered ‘the most ambitious physical infrastructure initiative in South
America’ (Márquez, 2006). The project was the source of much controversy, alarming
environmentalists from the ‘Red Alerta Petrolera-Orinoco Oilwash’, who expressed
concern about the Amazon rainforest and indigenous populations. This network of
environmentalists explained that the IIRSA project describes an offer of energy extraction
that is cleaner than oil, but that risks major spilling in a region where the pipeline would
be vulnerable to natural disasters or sabotage that could cause damages to the
environment and to local communities. Furthermore, the Wayúu community also
expressed great concern with IIRSA’s project, which was complementary with
Corpoluzia’s plan for the expansion of coal extraction in the Zulia (Montiel, 2010, p. 215).
Once again, the growing tension between the national pursuit of economic development
and the expressed commitments to environmental protection and participatory
democracy of the various actors constituting the historical bloc of the Bolivarian
Revolution became evident. On the one hand, ALBA member states were under enormous
pressure to develop economically, to industrialise, to become autonomous regarding
energy resources and vis-à-vis international donors. Additionally, economic development
is seen as the only way these states can reduce poverty, one of the main goals of the
Bolivarian Revolution. But, on the other hand, economic and technological development,
especially based on resource extraction models, usually have great environmental costs,
which causes tensions between ALBA member countries’ governments and the CMS’s
social movements.
As mentioned earlier, ALBA sought to present an alternative framework to address
environmental issues with the ultimate objective of respecting the principle of buen vivir.
In terms of ALBA’s narrative, it aimed to defend the oppressed and the vulnerable, like
the indigenous communities (Watts and Depledge, 2018). However, despite this rhetoric,
ALBA’s member states continued to rely on hydrocarbons’ revenues for social missions
and development promotion while stripping communities from meaningful participation
in environmental policies and development projects (Cutler and Brien, 2013, p. 227).
Venezuela, for example, has been accused of shutting out NGOs from domestic
environmental policy making and supressing dissent and national social movement’s
protests. Concomitantly, protected areas in Bolivia and Ecuador have been explored for
gas and oil even against the resistance of indigenous peoples, mostly in the context of
IIRSA initiatives (Watts and Depledge, 2018; Cutler and Brien, 2013, pp. 226–229).
Thus, the environmental issue demonstrates the fundamental developing tensions, and
even fractures, between the various actors constituting the historicaj bloc supporting the
Bolivarian Revolution as a counter-hegemonic movement, and its transnational
institutionalization in ALBA. This fracture was publicly acknowledged in the follow-up to
the People’s World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, held
in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April 2010. The conference gathered an estimated thirty
thousand people from 135 countries, including the presence of many regional NGOs and