OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 17, Nº. 2
November 2026-April 2027

JANUS.NET
e-journal of International Relations

GLOBAL SOUTH DIPLOMACY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: A COMPARISON OF THE AUTONOMOUS STRATEGIES OF INDONESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

FATHAN RAFIQI
fathan.rafiqi.psc24@mail.umy.ac.id
Master of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Indonesia).
https://orcid.org/0009-0005-6678-4471

MUHAMMAD FAJHRIYADI HASTIRA
m.fajhriyadi.psc24@mail.umy.ac.id
Master of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Indonesia).
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0900-0782

ALI MAKSUM
amaksum@gmail.com
Master of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Indonesia).
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7571-7709

Abstract

This article compares how Indonesia and South Africa exercise strategic autonomy as Global South middle powers in a multipolar order, and finds that autonomy is domain-specific rather than uniformly institutionalized or uniformly coalition-dependent. Using a qualitative comparative case study design anchored to 2022–2025, spanning Indonesia's G20 presidency, both countries' foreign policy white papers, and Indonesia's accession to BRICS, the study analyzes six dimensions: diplomatic autonomy, institutional autonomy, coalition-building capacity, economic constraint, normative orientation, and partnership diversification. Evidence from UN General Assembly voting records, BRICS and G20 declarations, and bilateral trade data shows that Indonesia's autonomy is most visible in unilateral positioning, it voted to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine despite its non-alignment doctrine, but its institutional consistency is more contingent on presidential preference than bureaucratic continuity, as its reversal on BRICS membership between the Widodo and Prabowo administrations demonstrates. South Africa's autonomy is most visible in coalition agenda-setting; it secured BRICS's 2023 expansion and placed IMF governance reform on the bloc's agenda during its chairship, but its unilateral positioning is constrained by both doctrine and a shrinking diplomatic budget, evident in its consistent UN abstentions and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's declining capacity. Both states, however, show a comparable and unaddressed dependency on China in their trade structures, suggesting a shared ceiling on autonomy that neither state's institutional or coalition strategy has yet overcome. The article contributes to Global South diplomacy scholarship by proposing that strategic autonomy be treated as a multidimensional, domain-specific condition rather than a single scalar property, and by demonstrating this through evidence from primary voting and trade rather than doctrinal statements alone.

Keywords

Global South, Strategic Autonomy, Comparative Foreign Policy, Indonesia, South Africa, BRICS.

Resumo

Este artigo compara a forma como a Indonésia e a África do Sul exercem a autonomia estratégica enquanto potências médias do Sul Global numa ordem multipolar, e conclui que a autonomia é específica a cada domínio, em vez de estar uniformemente institucionalizada ou depender uniformemente de coligações. Recorrendo a um desenho de estudo de caso comparativo qualitativo, centrado no período de 2022 a 2025 — abrangendo a presidência da Indonésia no G20, os documentos de orientação da política externa de ambos os países e a adesão da Indonésia ao BRICS —, o estudo analisa seis dimensões: autonomia diplomática, autonomia institucional, capacidade de formação de coligações, restrições económicas, orientação normativa e diversificação de parcerias. Os dados provenientes dos registos de votação da Assembleia Geral da ONU, das declarações do BRICS e do G20 e dos dados sobre o comércio bilateral mostram que a autonomia da Indonésia é mais visível no posicionamento unilateral — o país votou a favor da condenação da invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia, apesar da sua doutrina de não alinhamento —, mas a sua consistência institucional depende mais da preferência presidencial do que da continuidade burocrática, como demonstra a reviravolta na adesão ao BRICS entre as administrações de Widodo e Prabowo. A autonomia da África do Sul é mais visível na definição da agenda das coligações; o país assegurou a expansão do BRICS em 2023 e colocou a reforma da governação do FMI na agenda do bloco durante a sua presidência, mas o seu posicionamento unilateral é limitado tanto pela doutrina como por um orçamento diplomático em declínio, o que se torna evidente nas suas abstensões consistentes na ONU e na capacidade cada vez menor do Departamento de Relações Internacionais e Cooperação. Ambos os Estados, no entanto, revelam uma dependência comparável e não abordada da China nas suas estruturas comerciais, sugerindo um limite comum à autonomia que nem a estratégia institucional nem a estratégia de coligação de nenhum dos dois Estados conseguiu ainda ultrapassar. O artigo contribui para os estudos sobre a diplomacia do Sul Global, propondo que a autonomia estratégica seja tratada como uma condição multidimensional e específica de cada domínio, em vez de uma propriedade escalar única, e demonstrando-o através de evidências provenientes de votações primárias e do comércio, em vez de apenas declarações doutrinárias.

Palavras-Chave

Sul Global, Autonomia Estratégica, Política Externa Comparativa, Indonésia, África do Sul, BRICS.

How to cite this article

Rafiqi, Fathan, Hastira, Muhammad Fajhriyadi & Maksum, Ali (2026). Global South Diplomacy in a Multipolar World: A Comparison of the Autonomous Strategies of Indonesia and South Africa. *Janus.net, e-journal of international relations*. VOL. 17, Nº. 2, November 2026-April 2027, pp. 425-444. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.17.2.21

Article submitted on 6 November 2025 and accepted on 16 July 2026.

GLOBAL SOUTH DIPLOMACY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: A COMPARISON OF THE AUTONOMOUS STRATEGIES OF INDONESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

FATHAN RAFIQI

MUHAMMAD FAJHRIYADI HASTIRA

ALI MAKSUM

Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in global governance, characterized by the emergence of a multipolar system in which countries of the Global South began to assert themselves as active participants rather than passive recipients of global policies. This transformation reflects a shift from the dominance of the Global North toward a more inclusive distribution of power, where Southern countries actively shape international norms and institutions. Indonesia and South Africa exemplify this new dynamic. Both nations, once subject to colonial structures, now engage strategically in multilateral diplomacy to promote collective Southern interests (Mpondo, 2024; Qobo & Nyoni, 2021). Their rise illustrates how the Global South has evolved from a reactive to a proactive force in world politics, redefining agency through regional leadership, moral legitimacy, and institutional participation that challenge the historical asymmetry of global governance.

This article argues that Indonesia and South Africa's strategic autonomy diverges by domain rather than by degree. Comparing UN General Assembly voting records, BRICS and G20 outcome documents, foreign ministry budget and staffing data, and bilateral trade statistics between 2022 and 2025, this study finds that Indonesia's autonomy is most demonstrable in unilateral positioning, for example, voting to condemn Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine despite a non-alignment doctrine that might have predicted abstention, while its institutional consistency is more dependent on presidential preference than on bureaucratic continuity, illustrated by the reversal between President Joko Widodo's 2023 decision not to join BRICS and President Prabowo Subianto's decision to do so in 2025. South Africa's autonomy, conversely, is most demonstrable in coalition agenda-setting, securing BRICS's first expansion in over a decade during its 2023 chairship and placing IMF governance reform on the bloc's agenda, while its unilateral

positioning remains constrained by both its non-alignment doctrine and a foreign ministry operating under declining budgets and high vacancy rates.

This distinction matters because it reframes what "comparing" Indonesia and South Africa should mean. Prior literature has largely treated the two states as separate country cases loosely connected by the shared label of "Global South agency" (Boisjolie, 2015; Mabera, 2019). This article instead argues that the more useful comparative unit is not the country but the analytical dimension: asking not simply "how autonomous is Indonesia and how autonomous is South Africa" but "in which specific domains does each state's autonomy show up, and what mechanism sustains or constrains it there."

The theoretical framework draws on four established bodies of work: Global South and postcolonial international relations theory, which frames Southern states as constitutive rather than peripheral actors in global order (Acharya, 2021; Tickner & Blaney, 2020); the agency literature in international relations, which treats structural position and actor agency as mutually constitutive (Barnett & Duvall, 2005); alignment theory, concerning how states balance or bandwagon relative to major powers (Walt, 1987); and the strategic autonomy literature, concerning the institutional and material conditions under which smaller or middle powers preserve independent policy space (Korhonen, 2008).

The theoretical framework of this study is predicated on four fundamental pillars. Initially, the theories of the Global South and postcolonialism are examined. These theories emphasize narrative resistance to the dominance of the Global North (Acharya, 2021; Tickner & Blaney, 2020). Secondly, the concept of agency in international relations, as outlined by Barnett & Duvall (Barnett & Duvall, 2005), positions Global South countries as actors capable of influencing global structures. Thirdly, Walt's (Waltz, 1979) alignment theory elucidates the balancing and bandwagoning choices of countries in dealing with major powers. Fourthly, the autonomy framework underscores the significance of strategic independence (Korhonen, 2008). The integration of these four theories enables a comprehensive analysis of how Indonesia and South Africa navigate their foreign policy strategies amid geopolitical pressures and domestic demands.

This study aims to answer two questions: (1) in which specific dimensions do Indonesia's and South Africa's exercises of strategic autonomy converge or diverge, and (2) what mechanisms, institutional, economic, or coalition-based, sustain or constrain autonomy in each dimension. The contribution is twofold. Theoretically, the study proposes treating strategic autonomy as a multidimensional, domain-specific variable rather than a single scalar property, evidenced through six comparative categories rather than asserted through doctrinal language. Empirically, it grounds this claim in primary voting records, summit outcome documents, and trade data rather than relying on secondary characterizations of both countries' foreign policy postures.

Literature Review

Previous literature has largely emphasized the Global South's structural limitations rather than examining these countries' agency. For example, Tickner & Blaney (2020) highlight the normative tendency of international relations studies, while Fitriani (2021) shows that Indonesia's role in ASEAN and the G20 is often positioned as middle power activism

without examining how alignment and autonomy shape diplomatic strategy. Similarly, research by Alden & Schoeman (Alden & Schoeman, 2022) positions South Africa more as a "complement" to China's interests in BRICS rather than an autonomous actor. Another study by Qobo & Nyoni (Qobo & Nyoni, 2021) confirms that South Africa faces a dilemma between maintaining autonomy and building strategic alignment in the BRICS and AU forums. This analytical gap reveals a research void that needs to be filled with comparative studies focusing on the differences between discourse (declarations of non-alignment and autonomy) and concrete practices in multilateral forums.

Furthermore, the study by Li & Carey (Li & Carey, 2021) emphasizes that BRICS offers an alternative financial architecture, even though its legitimacy is questionable. Prashad (Prashad, 2022) shows how the Global South is attempting to counter neoliberal hegemony through political solidarity. Policy data from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024), Chatham House (2025), and ISEAS (2025) illustrate a fundamental shift in Indonesian diplomacy towards multi-alignment. Meanwhile, findings from Mpondo (2024), Carnegie (2023), and Nkuna (2024) show that South Africa faces a dilemma between universal values and national interests in a multipolar forum. This necessitates systematically examining how agency, alignment, and autonomy are exercised in practice, not just in discourse.

Theoretically, this study offers an integration of the theories of the Global South, postcolonialism, agency, alignment, and autonomy into a single conceptual framework. Practically, this research can provide input for policymakers in Indonesia and South Africa to navigate foreign policy strategies amid increasingly complex multipolar dynamics. By focusing on a comparison of these two Global South countries, this research is expected to broaden academic understanding of how Southern countries negotiate, adapt, and maintain autonomy on the global stage.

Methodology

Research Design

This study employs a qualitative comparative case study design, using narrative literature synthesis as its method of data treatment. The design is comparative rather than purely descriptive: Indonesia and South Africa are treated not as two independent case narratives but as paired observations analyzed against a shared set of analytical categories (as detailed in the Analytical Framework and Comparative Categories). Narrative synthesis was chosen over systematic review because the research questions concern the interpretation of doctrine, discourse, and institutional practice, material that is heterogeneous in form (white papers, speeches, secondary analyses, multilateral communiqués) and not amenable to the standardized coding protocols systematic reviews require (Snyder, 2019). This choice carries a trade-off addressed directly in the limitation, which is that narrative synthesis affords interpretive depth at some cost to replicability.

Case Selection: Indonesia and South Africa

Indonesia and South Africa were selected using a most-similar-systems logic combined with practical considerations of source accessibility. Analytically, both states share three characteristics that make them comparable rather than merely juxtaposed: (1) each holds a codified, decades-old doctrine of non-alignment predating the current multipolar moment, Indonesia's *politik luar negeri bebas aktif* (1948) and South Africa's post-1994 Ubuntu diplomacy; (2) each occupies a structurally similar "bridging" position between the Global North and South, Indonesia through ASEAN and G20 membership, South Africa as a founding African member of BRICS; and (3) each has recently issued a formal foreign policy white paper that makes doctrine explicit and comparable at the same historical moment. In practice, case selection was also shaped by the accessibility of official documents and secondary literature in English, a constraint that likely biases the evidence base toward internationally circulated policy statements over domestically oriented material, as discussed in limitations. This is a two-case comparison, not a sample intended to generalize to "the Global South" as a category; findings are read as theory-building propositions about institutional embeddedness and coalition dependence, not as representative claims.

Data Sources and Selection Criteria

Three categories of sources were used: (1) official policy documents, including Indonesia's Foreign Policy White Paper 2024–2029 and South Africa's White Paper on Foreign Policy (DIRCO, 2023); (2) institutional and multilateral outcome documents, including G20 Bali Leaders' Declaration (2022), BRICS Johannesburg II Declaration (2023) and BRICS Foreign Ministers' statements, UN General Assembly resolutions and voting records, and DIRCO budget statements; and (3) peer-reviewed academic literature on Global South agency, strategic autonomy, and the foreign policies of both states. Inclusion criteria: sources published between 2018–2025 (allowing pre-2022 sources needed to establish doctrinal continuity); sources directly addressing Indonesian or South African foreign policy, Global South diplomacy, strategic autonomy, or middle-power theory; official government, UN, or multilateral documents, regardless of publication date, where they define doctrine or record a vote still relevant to the analysis. Exclusion criteria: sources addressing domestic policy areas without a foreign-policy or international-positioning dimension.

Analytical Framework and Comparative Categories

This study operationalizes strategic autonomy along six analytical dimensions applied identically to both cases: diplomatic autonomy (independent positioning in multilateral votes and statements), institutional autonomy (bureaucratic capacity to sustain doctrine across administrations), coalition-building capacity (ability to shape rather than merely join coalition agendas), economic constraint (degree of dependency on a single major-power partner), normative orientation (extent to which foreign policy is justified in values-based versus procedural terms), and partnership diversification (number and balance of major-power relationships maintained concurrently).

Data Analysis Procedure

Analysis proceeded in three stages: (1) within-case coding of each source against the six categories above; (2) cross-case comparison within each category, generating the propositional claims presented in Section 4; (3) theoretical synthesis, relating the comparative findings back to the strategic autonomy and Global South agency literatures to identify where existing theory holds, and where the Indonesia–South Africa comparison suggests refinement.

Limitations

Three limitations should be acknowledged. First, narrative synthesis, while suited to interpretive questions, does not permit the same replicability as systematic review protocols; a different researcher applying the same six categories might weight evidence differently. Second, reliance on English-language and internationally circulated sources likely privileges the externally facing dimension of both states' diplomacy over domestically contested or vernacular-language debates about foreign policy. Third, anchoring the study to the 2022–2025 window captures a high-visibility period (G20 presidency, new white papers, Indonesia's BRICS accession) but may understate longer-run historical continuities or discontinuities not visible within a three-year aperture.

Result and Discussion

Agency and Alignment in Indonesia and South Africa's Global Strategies

The transformation of global power configurations after the Cold War has provided unprecedented opportunities for Global South countries to reposition themselves as autonomous actors in shaping the international order. This transformation is both structural and ideational, as Southern states begin to articulate their agency through policy innovation, institutional participation, and strategic alignment. Indonesia and South Africa exemplify this process through their multi-layered diplomatic engagement that blends historical narratives, pragmatic choices, and normative commitments. Both countries employ strategic flexibility manifested in varying forms of alignment and autonomy to pursue national interests while maintaining legitimacy within the broader Global South discourse (Winanti & Alvian, 2021).

Indonesia's diplomatic trajectory illustrates the exercise of *agency through adaptive alignment*. Indonesia has operationalized this principle beyond its historical non-aligned stance by adopting a multidirectional engagement pattern rooted in the long-standing doctrine of politik luar negeri bebas aktif (free and active foreign policy). In contemporary practice, this has evolved into what Wicaksana (Wicaksana, 2024) terms a "partial multi-alignment" strategy allowing Indonesia to deepen partnerships with competing global powers while preserving strategic autonomy. For instance, its proactive diplomacy during the 2022 G20 Presidency underscored a strong advocacy for the Global South by linking domestic priorities such as digital transformation and equitable energy transition to global reform agendas (G20 Indonesia, 2022; Pugu, 2024). This initiative reaffirms Indonesia's

identity as a "norm entrepreneur" that blends developmentalist discourse with pragmatic statecraft (Sidiropoulos, 2020).

Empirically, Indonesia's agency is reflected in its dual function as a regional stabilizer and global bridge-builder. Within ASEAN, Indonesia maintains leadership in managing intra-regional disputes and promoting consensus-based diplomacy. At the same time, its membership in the G20 provides a platform to articulate collective Southern concerns in global economic governance. The Chatham House report (House, 2025) notes that Indonesia's capacity to mediate between conflicting interests among major powers derives from its domestic stability and institutionalized diplomatic culture. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023, 2024) also institutionalized this approach by emphasizing the continuation of inclusive multilateralism and economic diplomacy under the 2024–2029 priorities. Nonetheless, the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute (2025) cautions that Indonesia's growing strategic engagement with China, particularly under Prabowo Subianto's leadership, may recalibrate the balance of its multi-alignment posture; the reversal on BRICS membership between the Widodo and Prabowo administrations, discussed further below, is a concrete instance of this recalibration. Hence, Indonesia's diplomacy exemplifies the dialectical tension between agency and dependency, as pragmatic economic imperatives continually test normative independence.

In contrast, South Africa's global agency is deeply intertwined with its post-apartheid identity and continental leadership aspirations. Its Ubuntu diplomacy, as outlined in the White Paper on Foreign Policy ((DIRCO), 2023),reflects an effort to merge domestic democratic values with an outward-looking South–South solidarity agenda. Within this framework, South Africa positions itself as a normative actor advocating inclusivity, equality, and justice in global governance. However, as Mpondo (2024) notes, internal structural limitations, ranging from bureaucratic fragmentation to inconsistent policy coordination, frequently constrain the translation of these ideals into coherent foreign policy a constraint with a concrete institutional counterpart: DIRCO's own budget fell from R6.9 billion in 2023/24 to R6.57 billion in 2024/25, which the Minister linked to a "very high vacancy rate" negatively affecting operations, with the department even deferring a mission-staffing cycle for lack of funds in 2024. The result is a form of constrained agency wherein domestic institutional weaknesses often undermine external activism.

The BRICS framework represents both an opportunity and a constraint for South Africa's alignment strategy. Through BRICS, South Africa aspires to reform the global financial architecture and amplify developing economies' voices (Acharya, 2021; Alden & Schoeman, 2022; Li & Carey, 2021); as BRICS chair in 2023, it secured the bloc's first expansion in over a decade and placed a concrete institutional demand a third African seat on the IMF's executive board on the table, though that specific ask was not adopted by consensus. Nevertheless, the Russia-Ukraine war has exposed contradictions in its foreign policy. South Africa abstained on the UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia's invasion in March and October 2022, citing the need to preserve space for dialogue rather than declaring a position, and its continued energy engagement with Russia provoked skepticism regarding its commitment to democratic values (Mkhize, 2024). The Carnegie Endowment (2023) further argues that this pragmatic non-alignment has eroded the moral capital previously attached to South Africa's global

image. Consequently, South Africa's agency oscillates between value-based diplomacy and material dependency, a dilemma emblematic of broader Global South politics in an era of geopolitical polarization.

Comparatively, Indonesia demonstrates a higher degree of institutionalized agency due to its cohesive diplomatic bureaucracy and stable foreign policy traditions, while South Africa exhibits a more reactive posture influenced by domestic political contestation (Boisjolie, 2015; Mabera, 2019). Indonesia's ability to integrate its developmental agenda with multilateral frameworks illustrates how *agency* can be exercised through institutional legitimacy rather than material power. Conversely, South Africa's fluctuating stance within BRICS reveals how *alignment without autonomy* risks reinforcing asymmetrical dependencies on larger partners such as China and Russia (Mesquita & Seabra, 2020; Taylor, 2009). This institutional continuity, however, should not be overstated as static: Indonesia's own reversal on BRICS membership, detailed in the following section, shows that its doctrine's application is more contingent on presidential preference than its bureaucratic stability alone would suggest.

Both countries, however, utilize historical narratives as strategic capital. Indonesia revitalizes the spirit of the Bandung Conference to project itself as a moral leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity and anti-hegemonic cooperation. South Africa, conversely, mobilizes its liberation history as a source of soft power legitimacy in Africa and beyond. These historical identities underpin their pursuit of *symbolic agency*, a form of legitimacy-building that strengthens diplomatic standing in multilateral forums (Agensky & Barker, 2012). The interplay between historical symbolism and pragmatic adaptation illustrates how Southern diplomacy is simultaneously normative and instrumental.

Nevertheless, differences in alignment strategies between Indonesia and South Africa remain evident. Indonesia prioritizes consensus-based diplomacy through ASEAN's institutional mechanisms, while South Africa often navigates between normative commitments and pragmatic necessities, particularly regarding economic cooperation with authoritarian regimes (Rennkamp & Naidoo, 2011). The asymmetry in domestic capabilities further accentuates this divergence: Indonesia's cohesive bureaucratic structure enables continuity, whereas South Africa's institutional fragmentation constrains long-term consistency.

In sum, both Indonesia and South Africa exemplify distinct yet convergent modes of Southern agency in global governance. Indonesia's adaptive multi-alignment model demonstrates that principled flexibility can sustain strategic autonomy, whereas South Africa's moral diplomacy highlights the struggle to reconcile normative leadership with structural dependence. The comparison underscores that agency within the Global South is neither uniform nor absolute, it is a negotiated outcome shaped by domestic capacity, historical trajectory, and the ability to maneuver within the constraints of a multipolar system (Bhattacharya, 2024). Through this lens, both nations illuminate how alignment, when combined with agency, becomes a vehicle for asserting autonomy in a complex and contested international order.

Autonomy and the Quest for Strategic Space in Global Governance

Autonomy has re-emerged as a central pillar of Global South diplomacy in an increasingly multipolar and fragmented world. For countries such as Indonesia and South Africa, autonomy is not merely about the refusal to align militarily with extraordinary powers but building the strategic capacity to negotiate, resist, and innovate within the global order. This understanding reflects a shift from autonomy as isolation toward autonomy as *relational empowerment* a means to preserve national sovereignty while engaging cooperatively with diverse partners. Both Indonesia and South Africa recognize that the pursuit of autonomy requires not only principled diplomacy but also institutional resilience and the ability to adapt to rapidly shifting global contexts (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015).

Since its independence, Indonesia's *politik luar negeri bebas aktif* has provided a normative foundation for maintaining flexibility and independence in international affairs. This principle enables Indonesia to navigate between global rivalries while remaining actively involved in shaping international norms. Over the decades, the "free and active" principle evolved from a declarative posture into a pragmatic diplomatic strategy that blends non-alignment with proactive engagement. Shekhar (Shekhar, 2018) observes that Indonesia's grand strategy in the 21st century reflects this duality, remaining neutral in great power rivalries yet assertive in promoting peace, development, and regional stability. Within this context, autonomy functions as a living principle, allowing Indonesia to pursue economic partnerships with China and the United States while reinforcing its leadership in ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific.

South Africa has pursued a comparable but contextually distinct path. Its post-apartheid foreign policy, guided by Ubuntu diplomacy, emphasizes mutual respect, justice, and solidarity. Within BRICS and IBSA, South Africa leverages its Global South identity to advance reform of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations and the IMF (Shaw et al., 2009), an agenda given concrete form during its 2023 BRICS chairship, when it secured the bloc's admission of five new members and placed IMF board reform on the agenda, even though that specific proposal was not adopted by consensus. These efforts are part of a broader strategy to assert Africa's collective voice and to enhance the continent's bargaining power. However, autonomy for South Africa also entails balancing its commitment to democratic values with the necessity of maintaining pragmatic ties to major economic partners such as China and Russia. In this sense, autonomy becomes a contested terrain that reflects both a postcolonial state's moral aspiration and the pragmatic demands of survival in a global capitalist system.

The dilemmas of autonomy are most visible in moments of global crisis, and the two countries' responses to Russia's invasion of Ukraine illustrate this with more specificity than a shared "neutral stance" would suggest. On 2 March 2022, when UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 ("Aggression against Ukraine") came to a vote, 141 states voted in favor, 5 against, and 35 abstained. South Africa abstained, alongside Namibia and Senegal, with its UN ambassador explaining the decision on the grounds that the resolution "does not create an environment conducive for diplomacy, dialogue and mediation." South Africa abstained again on the October 2022 resolution condemning Russia's annexation referenda (ES-11/4). This position, while it drew international criticism, was consistent with its long-standing commitment to non-alignment and

diplomatic independence. Western actors interpreted this neutrality as moral ambiguity, while South Africa defended it as an assertion of sovereign decision-making a pattern several commentators have linked to the African National Congress's Soviet-era relationship with Moscow. Wulf and Debiel (2015) suggest that such postures mirror the "club model" of global governance, where emerging powers seek autonomy by forming informal coalitions like BRICS as counterweights to Western-dominated institutions.

Indonesia's position on the same votes was more assertive than the phrase "similar diplomatic posture" would suggest. Indonesia voted in favor of both ES-11/1 and ES-11/4, formally condemning Russia's invasion and the subsequent annexation referenda, rather than abstaining. The divergence narrows on a later, narrower resolution: on the November 2022 reparations resolution (ES-11/5), both Indonesia and South Africa abstained, alongside Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia, suggesting both states draw a line between condemning the initial act of aggression and endorsing subsequent punitive mechanisms. Read as a whole, the voting record indicates that Indonesia's non-alignment doctrine tolerated unilateral condemnation of a sovereignty violation in a way South Africa's did not, even as both states converged in declining to endorse enforcement measures against a major partner. This refines, rather than overturns, the broader institutional-versus-coalition-dependent framing advanced in this article: Indonesia's institutional stability manifests partly as a willingness to take unilateral positions, while South Africa's coalition orientation manifests partly as a preference for procedural language "dialogue," "mediation" over declarative judgment, consistent with what Agensky and Barker (2012) describe as the "restoration of Southern agency," in which non-alignment functions as an active expression of principled independence rather than passivity. Indonesia's capacity to uphold this position stems from the stability of its domestic institutions and the coherence of its diplomatic apparatus. Rodiyah et al. (2020) further argue that Indonesia's experience with local autonomy and democratic consolidation has strengthened its ability to project consistency in global forums, merging internal legitimacy with external credibility.

Both Indonesia and South Africa have adopted hedging as an adaptive strategy to sustain autonomy amid uncertainty. Hedging enables them to engage with competing major powers while minimizing dependency on any single actor. Indonesia, for instance, maintains strong security cooperation with Japan and the United States, while simultaneously accepting investment from China's Belt and Road Initiative and, since January 2025, holding full BRICS membership (Vinodan & Kurian, 2024). South Africa employs a similar tactic through its BRICS engagement and its trade with Western markets. Nevertheless, hedging is not without risks: when economic dependence on one actor deepens excessively, autonomy can be indirectly eroded. Indonesia's exports to China stood at roughly 25 percent of its total in 2023, with China supplying over 30 percent of its imports; South Africa's trade deficit with China widened to $9.71 billion in the same year, with its export basket increasingly concentrated in raw materials. Neither country's diplomatic hedging has yet translated into a comparable reduction of this economic concentration, which qualifies how much protection either state's diversification strategy actually provides. Marques and Eberlein (2021) warn more generally that transnational business entanglements often reshape domestic decision-making structures, thereby narrowing the policy space of developing states.Multilateral diplomacy thus becomes the principal arena for exercising and expanding strategic

autonomy. Indonesia leveraged its 2022 G20 presidency to position itself as a normative advocate for developing countries, prioritizing vaccine equity, climate governance, and digital transformation. Meanwhile, South Africa continues to use BRICS as a platform to demand reform in global financial governance (Moldicz, 2025), with its 2023 chairship the clearest instance of this to date. These initiatives reveal how autonomy in the Global South increasingly operates through coalition-building and agenda-setting, not isolation. The power to define priorities within multilateral institutions becomes a crucial expression of agency, enabling both countries to amplify their voices while safeguarding independence.

History also plays an indispensable role in legitimizing autonomy. Indonesia consistently invokes the legacy of the 1955 Bandung Conference as the moral foundation for its diplomatic leadership. South Africa situates its global engagement within the narrative of its anti-apartheid struggle. Both employ historical experience as *soft power capital* to assert moral legitimacy in international affairs (Weatherbee, 2014). However, the gap between rhetoric and practice remains a persistent challenge. Declarations of neutrality and anti-hegemony often coexist with economic dependencies or strategic compromises (Hino Samuel Jose, 2022). This contradiction underscores that autonomy in the Global South is inherently relational—constantly negotiated between idealism and pragmatism.

Global South states have strengthened South–South cooperation through frameworks such as IORA, G77, and BRICS+ to address such contradictions. These initiatives seek to construct alternative channels for trade, technology exchange, and policy coordination (Shaw et al., 2009). However, coordination challenges persist, including disparities in institutional capacity and economic development. Rodiyah et al. (Rodiyah et al., 2020) argue that South–South cooperation risks remaining symbolic rather than transformative without a collective vision and diplomatic coherence. Thus, the pursuit of autonomy requires not only solidarity but also strategic coordination and governance innovation that reflect shared Southern realities.

Looking forward, autonomy must be understood as an evolving practice rather than a fixed principle. Indonesia and South Africa's experiences reveal that genuine autonomy lies in the ability to shape global norms while maintaining domestic policy independence. This demands political courage, institutional innovation, and adaptive foresight (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015). As Moldicz (Moldicz, 2025) notes that strategic autonomy today involves balancing foreign policy principles with developmental priorities. Ultimately, autonomy is not isolationism but the art of equilibrium, creating room for maneuver in a tightly interdependent world. By doing so, Indonesia and South Africa reaffirm that Global South actors are no longer mere objects of global politics but active architects of a more equitable and inclusive international order.

Reframing Southern Agency through Strategic Coalitions

In the 21st century, which is increasingly driven by institutional fragmentation and multipolarity, countries from the Global South are increasingly aware that individual cooperation is not enough to strengthen their position in global governance. Economic and geopolitical pressures from the post-pandemic era show that facing the rivalry of major powers individually puts Southern countries in a vulnerable position. Therefore,

there is a growing trend towards flexible coalitions, both in the form of minilateral and South-South formats, which have the potential to expand diplomatic maneuvering space while increasing collective bargaining power (Heiduk, 2024). These coalitions are not merely symbols of solidarity, but practical mediums for incorporating issues such as global vaccine access, just energy transition, and digital governance into the global agenda. Empirical evidence of this can be seen in platforms such as BRICS, G77, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which attempt to consolidate the voices of Southern countries to address the inequalities of the international system (Iswardhana, 2021; United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 2023).

Conceptually, this approach brings about a shift: from placing a single country as the leading actor in international diplomacy to viewing coalitions as collective actors collective agencies capable of changing the dynamics of a global structure that previously favored the North. The literature on minilateralism highlights that small, issue-specific formations with relatively quick decision-making mechanisms can be an effective alternative to slow multilateralism (Adiputri, 2024; Heiduk, 2024; Roy, 2023). In the context of the Global South, such coalitions usually consist of three to nine countries, focusing on technical cooperation or sectoral policies to strengthen joint capacity (Kleinman & Kolb, 2011; Zubaidah et al., 2023). Thus, collective cooperation is not merely normative solidarity, but a pragmatic and adaptive diplomatic strategy: countries such as Indonesia and South Africa can use these coalitions to expand their relative influence, bringing domestic or regional issues to the global level through a collective format with greater negotiating effectiveness.

A prominent empirical example is BRICS and its expansion into BRICS+. This group illustrates how the aggregation of emerging countries can strengthen the Global South's claim to representation while presenting internal challenges. The expansion of membership in 2023–2024 adds demographic, resource, and geopolitical legitimacy dimensions to the collective, but also increases the heterogeneity of interests among members (Cochrane, 2024; Kumar, 2022). For South Africa, BRICS means space to demand reform of the international financial architecture; for Indonesia, it means opportunities to expand markets and influence multilateral economic policy. However, this expansion poses a dilemma: the larger the bloc, the more difficult it is to reach substantive consensus, so that an initially promising agenda-setting can be diluted if coordination and institutionalization mechanisms are weak (Cochrane, 2024; Haryono et al., 2024; Vinodan & Kurian, 2024). In this sense, coalitions are not an automatic guarantee; their success depends on internal structures and the quality of cooperation.

At the regional level, smaller coalitions that are closer to national realities are also essential as "laboratories" for collective practice. IORA emphasizes maritime economic, maritime security, and blue economy agendas, which are highly relevant to coastal countries and can be used as a pathway to strengthen their global position (International Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), 2024). On the other hand, ASEAN, with Indonesia as a key actor, provides lessons on consensus-based diplomacy. Although slow, its mechanisms enable member countries to translate historical leadership into practical influence on environmental, trade, and regional stability issues. This regional experience can then be elevated to the global level, as in Indonesia's 2022 G20 Presidency, which strengthened the regional agenda in the global economic forum (G20 Indonesia, 2022;

Khairunnisa, 2024). Thus, these regional coalitions have two functions: strengthening domestic/regional capacity and expanding into the global arena as mini-bases of influence.

For coalitions to be operational and not merely rhetorical, three key mechanisms are needed: (1) a clear agenda-setting, where issues can unite members and have global influence; (2) adequate technical capacity to develop realistic policy options and joint implementation; and (3) funding sources or resource-sharing mechanisms for concrete projects, not just declarations (UNCTAD, 2022; World Bank, 2022). Southern countries leading coalitions often also provide 'intellectual capital contributions' experts, data, or pilot projects enhancing their discourse's credibility. When these three mechanisms operate simultaneously, coalitions can produce tangible deliverables such as vaccine access mechanisms, green financing facilities, or technology transfer instruments, which global institutions can then adopt or follow up. Without these three elements, coalitions risk becoming symbols of solidarity without real effect, which ultimately weakens the legitimacy of the countries involved.

Of course, coalitions are not without major challenges. The heterogeneity of objectives and disparities in capabilities among members are major obstacles. When coalition members have different economic and political priorities, compromise can be difficult and undermine collective credibility. There is also a risk that Southern coalitions could be 'instrumentalized' by major powers to pursue unilateral agendas a criticism raised, for instance, regarding whether China could use Global South platforms to expand its own influence (Omelicheva & Carter, 2024). Disparities in technical and fiscal capacity among members also create leadership imbalances within coalitions, giving rise to the dominance of stronger parties and eroding the position of weaker countries. Therefore, internal organizational design leadership rotation, transparency mechanisms, dispute resolution is crucial to maintaining the authenticity and sustainability of coalitions.

For Indonesia and South Africa, the lessons learned from the dynamics of these coalitions are practical and actionable. First, it is important to select issue-specific topics that can attract broad support (e.g., green transition financing, vaccine manufacturing capacity, digital data governance) and then become leadership issues within the coalition. Second, invest in domestic technical capacity, think tanks, policy laboratories, coordinated negotiation units, so that the countries concerned are not just signatories to declarations, but have the ability to produce deliverables. Third, establish a concise financing mechanism (pooled funds or facility) at the coalition level as an instrument for implementing pilot projects, as practical deliverables strengthen the diplomatic legitimacy of southern countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2022; World Bank, 2022). Politically, this requires a balance between rhetoric of solidarity and management of domestic interests: the coalition must be designed so that its results can be claimed as tangible benefits for the domestic public, so that diplomacy functions not only as a showcase but also as a fundamental development tool.

Drawing from the comparative insights above, Table 1 summarizes the practical policy levers, primary risks, and key institutional actors shaping Indonesia's and South Africa's coalition diplomacy strategies within the Global South framework discussed above. The comparison is organized so that the same analytical categories apply to both countries

directly, rather than as a standalone summary: each row reflects a point of divergence or convergence already established in the preceding discussion.

Table 1. Summary of Policy Levers, Key Risks, and Main Actors in Coalition Diplomacy

Dimension	Indonesia	South Africa	Policy Implication
Primary coalition lever	G20 presidency (2022); ASEAN consensus diplomacy; new BRICS membership (2025)	BRICS chairship (2023); IBSA; African Union bridging role	Indonesia's leverage lies in convening heterogeneous forums; South Africa's lies in agenda-setting within BRICS specifically
Key institutional risk	Doctrine stable, but application increasingly leader-contingent (BRICS reversal, Widodo→Prabowo)	Doctrine stable, but implementing capacity shrinking (DIRCO budget cut, high vacancy rate)	Different failure modes require different remedies: institutional insulation from leadership turnover (Indonesia) vs. budget/staffing restoration (South Africa)
Main actors	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Office of the President; G20/ASEAN secretariats	DIRCO; BRICS Secretariat; African Union	Concentration of decision-making in the presidency (Indonesia) versus a resource-constrained ministry (South Africa) are each a distinct point of institutional vulnerability
Unresolved coalition ask	Full G20 consensus condemning Russia (not achieved, 2022)	Third African seat on IMF executive board (raised but not adopted, 2023)	Neither state's coalition leadership has yet converted agenda-setting into a binding adopted outcome on its signature ask

Source: compiled by the authors from G20 and BRICS outcome documents, DIRCO budget statements, and UN Digital Library voting records, 2025.

Theoretically, reframing Southern agency through strategic coalitions requires a paradigm shift: from the state as the sole unit of analysis to coalitions as collective actors capable of shifting the global agenda. In practice, the success of coalitions depends on institutional design, technical capabilities, financing mechanisms, and inclusive leadership. In the future, the most successful Southern coalitions will not be those that atomistically replicate Western structures but combine minilateral flexibility, historical legitimacy (such as the Bandung or anti-apartheid legacies), and a focus on technical deliverables. This combination can transform claims of representational struggle into substantive influence in global governance. Thus, reframing agency through coalitions is not merely a diplomatic strategy; it is an instrument of institutional transformation that gives Southern countries greater room for maneuver in a rapidly changing multipolar order (Acharya, 2018; Heiduk, 2024; Heiduk & Wacker, 2021; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2022).

Conclusion

Indonesia and South Africa's diplomatic trajectories illustrate how strategic autonomy operates not as an abstract normative claim but as a practice shaped by institutional capacity, historical legitimacy, and coalition strategy. Indonesia's adaptive multi-alignment approach, grounded in the enduring doctrine of politik luar negeri bebas aktif, demonstrates a form of agency in which normative flexibility coexists with pragmatic engagement, sustained above all by a cohesive diplomatic bureaucracy, though the Widodo-to-Prabowo reversal on BRICS membership shows this institutional stability to be more contingent on presidential preference than a purely bureaucratic-continuity account would suggest. South Africa's Ubuntu diplomacy, while normatively resonant and increasingly effective at agenda-setting within BRICS specifically, as its 2023 chairship demonstrates, remains constrained by domestic structural weaknesses, most concretely a shrinking and understaffed foreign ministry, and by a more circumscribed, coalition-mediated form of unilateral positioning, as its consistent UN abstentions on the Russia-Ukraine votes indicate.

This comparison confirms the article's central proposition, that Indonesia demonstrates a more institutionally embedded form of strategic autonomy while South Africa exercises a more coalition-dependent form, shaped by its normative commitments and domestic constraints, while also showing that the distinction is not absolute. The UN voting evidence in particular indicates that Indonesia's autonomy also has an assertive, unilateral dimension not fully captured by "institutional embeddedness" alone, and that South Africa's coalition-dependence coexists with real, if contested, agenda-setting achievements, such as its IMF reform push. Both countries, moreover, share a largely unaddressed vulnerability: deepening trade dependency on China that neither state's diplomatic diversification has yet reduced.

Theoretically, this study integrates Global South and postcolonial theorizing, the agency literature, alignment theory, and the strategic-autonomy literature into a single comparative framework, and demonstrates that within this framework, autonomy is exercised differently, not merely to different degrees, by institutionally embedded and coalition-dependent Global South middle powers. Methodologically, its use of narrative literature synthesis, supplemented in this revision with primary voting records and institutional budget data, allows discursive claims about non-alignment and autonomy to be checked against documented multilateral practice rather than accepted at face value. Empirically, it demonstrates that autonomy in the Global South is not reducible to a single mechanism: Indonesia's case shows autonomy sustained through institutional continuity but tested by leadership-driven reversals, while South Africa's case shows autonomy pursued through coalition agenda-setting but constrained by resource scarcity.

For Global South diplomacy in a multipolar order, the practical implication is that neither institutional embeddedness nor coalition membership is sufficient on its own to guarantee durable autonomy, and that both must contend with a shared economic ceiling that neither Indonesia's nor South Africa's diplomatic strategy has yet lifted. Indonesia and South Africa, as illustrative cases, reveal both the promise and the limits of coalition diplomacy, and point to the value of examining autonomy as a historically situated and institutionally mediated practice rather than a fixed doctrinal commitment. In sum, the pursuit of Southern autonomy is best understood not as a settled condition but as an

ongoing, differently structured negotiation in each case, one that this comparison suggests future research should track through concrete institutional and economic indicators rather than through doctrinal language alone.

References

Acharya, A. (2018). *Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Acharya, A. (2021). *Constructing global order: Agency and change in world politics*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108992342

Adiputri, R. D. (2024). Interpreting multilateral diplomacy in the Indonesian Parliament's debates on climate crisis and sustainability. *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, *45*(1), 152–168. https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2024.2380551

Agensky, J., & Barker, J. (2012). Indonesia and the liberal peace: recovering southern agency in global governance. *Globalizations*, *9*(1), 107–124.

Alden, C., & Schoeman, M. (2022). South Africa's foreign policy and BRICS: Between resistance and accommodation. *International Politics*, *59*(4), 553–571. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00398-5

Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in international politics. *International Organization*, *59*(1), 39–75. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050010

Bhattacharya, S. (2024). Non-alignment in the era of the Global South. In *Non-alignment in the era of the Global South: Bhattacharya, Samir*. New Delhi, India: ORF, Observer Research Foundation.

Boisjolie, T. J. (2015). *Emerging Development Partners and Aid Governance: Examining the Role of'Aid Effectiveness' in South African and Indonesian South-South Cooperation*.

Cochrane, L. (2024). Shifting global dynamics: An empirical analysis of BRICS+ expansion and its economic, trade, and military implications in the context of the G7. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *10*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2333422

Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). (2023). *South Africa's foreign policy white paper update*. Government of South Africa.

Endowment, C. (2023). *South Africa in the emerging world order*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

G20 Indonesia. (2022). *G20 Indonesia Presidency: Official report*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.

Gindarsah, I., & Priamarizki, A. (2015). *Politics, Security and Defense in Indonesia: The Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy BT - Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order* (C. B. Roberts, A. D. Habir, & L. C. Sebastian (eds.); pp. 130–154). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397416_7

Haryono, H., Utari, W., Rahmawati, D. A., Endarto, B., & Sanusi, R. (2024). Evaluating the role of BRICS in shaping global economic governance: A comparative analysis of

policy approaches and outcomes. *The Es Economics and Entrepreneurship*, *3*(02), 172. https://doi.org/10.58812/esee.v3i02.400

Heiduk, F. (2024). Minilateralism and pathways to institutional progression. *Contemporary Politics*. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2416566

Heiduk, F., & Wacker, G. (2021). Indonesia grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, strategic narratives and limitations. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, *8*(2), 151–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970211004613

Hino Samuel Jose. (2022). From Indo-Pacific Centrality To Strategic Autonomy: Asean – Us Perspective. *Indonesian Journal of International Relations*, *6*(1), 205–228. https://doi.org/10.32787/ijir.v6i1.311

House, C. (2025). *Indonesia's foreign policy and strategic autonomy*. Chatham House.

International Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). (2024). *Guide to IORA (as at Aug 2024)*. IORA Secretariat.

ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. (2025). *Indonesia's foreign policy outlook under Prabowo*. ISEAS Report.

Iswardhana, M. R. (2021). Indonesia's South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) as the Future of Diplomacy for World Solidarity to Overcome the COVID-19 Pandemic. *Global South Review*, *2*(1), 25. https://doi.org/10.22146/globalsouth.62532

Khairunnisa, B. W. (2024). Indonesia's Engagement in Cultural Diplomacy Shaping its International Image. *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research*, *7*(05). https://doi.org/10.47191/ijsshr/v7-i05-86

Kleinman, S., & Kolb, K. H. (2011). Traps on the Path of Analysis. *Symbolic Interaction*, *34*(4), 425–446. https://doi.org/10.1525/si.2011.34.4.425

Korhonen, P. (2008). Autonomy in international relations: A conceptual approach. *Review of International Studies*, *34*(1), 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210508007940

Kumar, A. (2022). Uneven geographies in SSC. *Third World Quarterly*, *43*(4), 721–739. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2035357

Li, X., & Carey, R. (2021). BRICS and the global financial architecture. *Third World Quarterly*, *42*(6), 1134–1151. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1904396

Mabera, F. (2019). Africa and the G20: A relational view of African agency in global governance. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *26*(4), 583–599.

Mesquita, R., & Seabra, P. (2020). Go global or go home: Comparing the regional vs. global engagement of Brazil and South Africa at the UN general assembly. *Politikon*, *47*(3), 361–384.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. (2024). *Prioritas politik luar negeri 2024–2029*. Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia.

Mkhize, M. C. (2024). South Africa's 'Quiet Diplomacy' towards Russia-Ukraine Conflict. *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies (Formerly Ubuntu : Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation)*, *13*(1).

Moldicz, C. (2025). Achieving Strategic Autonomy: Balancing Foreign Policy and Economic Development Goals. In *Indonesia's Economy After Joko Widodo: Economic Growth and Transformation* (pp. 101–130). Springer.

Mpondo, M. (2024). An analysis of South Africa's foreign policy priorities on Africa: The domestic–foreign policy nexus 2018–2022. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *31*(1), 85–103. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2024.2345678

Nkuna, V. M. (2024). South Africa's non-alignment and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. *African Journal of International Affairs*, *27*(2), 45–62.

Omelicheva, M. Y., & Carter, D. B. (2024). The geopolitical logic of humanitarian aid amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In *The Diplomat*.

Prashad, V. (2022). *The struggle makes us human: Learning from movements for socialism*. Monthly Review Press.

Pugu, M. R. (2024). Unraveling Indonesia's Diplomacy in the Pacific Region. *International Journal of Social Service and Research*, *4*(02), 522–532. https://doi.org/10.46799/ijssr.v4i02.681

Qobo, M., & Nyoni, S. (2021). South Africa's foreign policy dilemmas in BRICS. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *28*(2), 223–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2021.1925113

Rennkamp, B., & Naidoo, D. (2011). Shifting governance in STI: an analysis of the global governance institutions and their impact on South African policy. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *18*(1), 63–85.

Rodiyah, R., Arifin, R., & Steven, S. (2020). Local Autonomy and Federalism: How Indonesia Deal with Democracy in the Global Governance? *Pandecta Research Law Journal*, *15*(2), 342–358.

Roy, I. (2023). Southern Multilateralism: India's engagement with Africa and the emergence of a multiplex world order. *Journal of International Development*, *35*(4), 566–582.

Shaw, T. M., Cooper, A. F., & Chin, G. T. (2009). Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance? *Politikon*, *36*(1), 27–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589340903155385

Shekhar, V. (2018). *Indonesia's foreign policy and grand strategy in the 21st century: Rise of an Indo-Pacific power*. Routledge.

Sidiropoulos, E. (2020). South Africa in global development fora: Cooperation and contestation. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda: Contested Collaboration* (pp. 409–434). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57938-8_19

Snyder, H. (2019). Literature review as a research methodology: An overview and guidelines. *Journal of Business Research*, *104*, 333–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.07.039

Taylor, I. (2009). 'The South Will Rise Again'? New Alliances and Global Governance: The India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum. *Politikon*, *36*(1), 45–58.

Tickner, A. B., & Blaney, D. (2020). *Claiming the international: Worlding beyond the West*. Routledge.

UNCTAD. (2022). *Trade and development report 2022: Development prospects in a fractured world*. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (2022). *South-South cooperation for climate adaptation and sustainable development*. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. (2023). *Mid-term review of UNOSSC strategic framework 2018–2021*.

Vinodan, C., & Kurian, Anju Lis. (2024). Strategic Autonomy and India's Hedging Policies in the Indo-Pacific. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, *11*(4), 475–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970241282095

Walt, S. M. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances/Cornell Univ*. Press.

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley.

Weatherbee, D. E. (2014). *International relations in Southeast Asia: the struggle for autonomy*. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.

Wicaksana, I. G. W. (2024). Partial multi-alignment in Indonesia's foreign policy. *Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia*, *12*(2), 233–251.

Winanti, P. S., & Alvian, R. A. (2021). Indonesia's South–South cooperation: when normative and material interests converged. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, *21*(2), 201–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz021

World Bank. (2022). *Global economic prospects: Coping with high inflation, war, and uncertainty*. The World Bank Group.

Zubaidah, S., Widianingsih, I., Rusli, B., & Saefullah, A. D. (2023). Policy Network on the Kotaku Program in the Global South: Findings from Palembang, Indonesia. *Sustainability*, *15*(6), 4784. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15064784