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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024)
78
UKRAINE EFFECT: ARE WE GROPING FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER?
ROOPINDER OBEROI
roberoi2019@gmail.com
is Fellow at Institute of Eminence, Delhi School of Public Policy and Governance & Professor at
Department of Political Science, Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi. She did her M. A, M.Phil.
and Ph.D. from University of Delhi (India). In the Year 2009 she was awarded a Postdoctoral
Research Fellowship by the University Grant Commission. She specializes in the area of Political
Science, Public Administration, Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainable Development and
Social Enterprise. She was awarded UKIERI: UK-India Education and Research Initiative (2017 -
2020) Joint Project between University of Delhi and University of Huddersfield, UK. She received
Emerald Literati Network Awards for Excellence 2016, UK for article - Hierarchical Networks for
Global Corporations: Emerging Unstructured Complexity in Regulatory Landscape in
Sustainability after Rio (2015) Emerald Books. She has published books on Corporate Social
Responsibility and Sustainable Development in Emerging Economies, Lexington Publisher, and
U.S. (2015) Globalization Reappraised: A false Oracle or a talisman? Vajpeyi, D and Oberoi, R,
Lexington Books, USA, 2017 Revisiting Globalization: From Borderless to Gated Globe, Springer,
UK 2018. Her latest book is Social Enterprise in Higher Education Sector, Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, UK, 2021. She is on the Editorial Board of Social Responsibility Journal, UK. She has
contributed nearly 40 papers in various peer reviewed national and international journals and
presented 35 papers at national and international conferences in the field of Public
Administration, New Governance Paradigm; Corporate Governance, Social Enterprise and
Corporate Social Responsibility. She is member of Indian Institute of Public Administration, India
Policy Foundation and she is also on the advisory board of Research Committee 35 (Technology
and Development), International Political Science Association
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
received a Ph.D. in political science and international relations from the Catholic University of
Portugal in 2010, and his habilitation from ISCTE–University Institute of Lisbon in 2022. From
2016 to 2017, he took part in a post-doctoral research programme on state monopolies in China
— One belt, one road studies. In 2014, 2017 and 2020, he was awarded the Institute of
European Studies in Macau (IEEM) Academic Research Grant, which is a major component of the
Asia-Europe Comparative Studies Research Project. From 2014 to 2018, he was the Programme
Coordinator at the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities at the University of
Saint Joseph in Macau. From 2018 to 2023 he was the Associate-Dean of the Institute for
Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau. He is currently
Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Sciences at
the University of Macau (China). His most recent books are: Steps of Greatness: The Geopolitics
of OBOR (2018), University of Macau; The Challenges, Development and Promise of Timor-Leste
(2019), City University of Macau; The Belt and Road Initiative: An Old Archetype of a New
Development Model (2020), Palgrave Macmillan; Geopolitics of Iran (2021), Palgrave Macmillan;
The Handbook of Special Economic Zones (2021), IGI Global; Disentangled Visions on Higher
Education: Preparing the Generation Next (2023), Peter Lang Publishers; The Palgrave Handbook
of Globalization with Chinese Characteristics (2023), Palgrave Macmillan; Changing the Paradigm
of Energy Geopolitics: Resources and Pathways in the Light of Global Climate Challenges (2023),
Peter Lang Publishers; and Portuguese-speaking Small Island Developing States: The
development Journeys of Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Timor-Leste (2023), Palgrave
Macmillan, ORCID: 0000-0002-1443-5828
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 78-97
Ukraine effect: are we groping for a new world order?
Roopinder Oberoi, Francisco José Leandro
79
Abstract
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the contemporary world order - and with it the
global energy, manufacture, supply, and financial systems in deep distress. In many ways the
war recaps the appalling horrors of the two world wars. The conflict between Moscow and Kiev
is unfolding against the backdrop of other correspondingly significant crises and cataclysms,
for instance the continuing coronavirus pandemic, worsened tensions namely in the U.S. -
China relations, U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, uncertainty in the Sahel Region, the
unending civil war in Yemen, increased nuclear polarization in North Korea, and lead to a new
pattern of European rearmament. The cost of war is having geopolitical and economic
ramifications on the rest of the world. The Russian aggression in Ukraine is manifestation of
the struggle for a new world order. Russia and China are openly challenging the Pax
Americana, far beyond the visible economic realm. The recent Global Security Initiative (GSI)
put forward by the Chinese President, in the April 2022 at BOAO forum, the narratives
associated to Shangri-La 2022 defense talks, the Global Development Initiative proposed at
the UN General Assembly 2021 and the Global Think Tank Network for Democracy Studies,
underlined this evidence. As asserted by Kuo, the GSI is “Blueprint for integrating China’s
security priorities and practices (…) Using the U.N. aegis, Beijing is promoting China as
a primus inter pares dispute arbiter, architect of new regional security frameworks, and
trainer of security professionals and police forces in developing countries” (Kuo, 2023). But
the question how the next world order will look like remains open. The Russian war in Ukraine
has fast-tracked a shift in the world order forcing a renewed balance of power. There’s an
extensive assessment that the “Ukraine effect” could be as sweeping in restructuring global
relations as significant as the chain of events following the breakdown of the Soviet Union in
1989 expect that this time the power shift might be away from Washington hegemony. Since
President Vladimir Putin attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, there is proliferation of
research and academic papers about the future shape of world order. Therefore, these
developments beg questions: Is the idea of an “end” to history is fallacy? Are there no key
difficulties within liberal policies that can fuel struggle and contradictions? Is Ukraine a wake-
up call for Western Liberal order? Do liberal democracies need to pay cognizance to rapidly
emerging new international order which is less weighed down by old ideological loyalties but
is more realist and transactional and driven by national interests? How can we comprehend
China-Russia open diplomatic alignment? This paper provides an analytical discussion on New-
Cold War developments and the emerging world order in the backdrop of ongoing struggles
and power rebalancing. In this regard, the manuscript addresses some of the main features
of the new international power configurations system, apparent drifts, and new threats in
international relations.
Keywords
Ukraine War, New World Order, Liberal Order, Post-Cold War Era, U.S., China, India, Russia.
Resumo
A invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia veio perturbar a ordem mundial contemporânea e, com ela,
os sistemas energéticos, de produção, de abastecimento e financeiros mundiais estão em
profunda crise. Em muitos aspectos, a guerra recapitula os horrores terríveis das duas guerras
mundiais. O conflito entre Moscovo e Kiev está a desenrolar-se no contexto de outras crises
e cataclismos correspondentemente significativos, por exemplo, a continuação da pandemia
do coronavírus, o agravamento das tensões, nomeadamente nas relações entre os EUA e a
China, a retirada dos EUA do Afeganistão, a incerteza na região do Sahel, a interminável
guerra civil no Iémen, o aumento da polarização nuclear na Coreia do Norte e um novo padrão
de rearmamento europeu. O custo da guerra está a ter ramificações geopolíticas e económicas
no resto do mundo. A agressão russa na Ucrânia é uma manifestação da luta por uma nova
ordem mundial. A Rússia e a China estão a desafiar abertamente a Pax Americana, muito para
além do domínio económico visível. A recente Iniciativa de Segurança Global (GSI)
apresentada pelo Presidente chinês, em abril de 2022, no fórum BOAO, as narrativas
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Ukraine effect: are we groping for a new world order?
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associadas às conversações de defesa de Shangri-La 2022, a Iniciativa de Desenvolvimento
Global proposta na Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas de 2021 e a Rede Mundial de Grupos
de Reflexão para Estudos sobre a Democracia, sublinharam esta evidência. Como afirma Kuo,
a GSI é "um plano para integrar as prioridades e práticas de segurança da China (...) Usando
a égide da ONU, Pequim está a promover a China como árbitro de disputas primus inter pares,
arquiteto de novos quadros de segurança regional e formador de profissionais de segurança
e forças policiais nos países em desenvolvimento" (Kuo, 2023). Mas a questão de saber como
será a próxima ordem mundial continua em aberto. A guerra russa na Ucrânia acelerou uma
mudança na ordem mundial, obrigando a um novo equilíbrio de poder. Há uma avaliação
alargada de que o "efeito Ucrânia" pode ser tão abrangente na reestruturação das relações
mundiais como a cadeia de acontecimentos que se seguiu ao colapso da União Soviética em
1989, com a expetativa de que, desta vez, a mudança de poder possa estar longe da
hegemonia de Washington. Desde o ataque do Presidente Vladimir Putin à Ucrânia, em 24 de
fevereiro de 2022, proliferam as investigações e os trabalhos académicos sobre a futura
configuração da ordem mundial. Por conseguinte, estes desenvolvimentos levantam
questões: Será que a ideia de um "fim" da história é uma falácia? Não haverá dificuldades
fundamentais nas políticas liberais que possam alimentar a luta e as contradições? Será a
Ucrânia um sinal de alarme para a ordem liberal ocidental? As democracias liberais devem ter
em conta a rápida emergência de uma nova ordem internacional, menos condicionada pelas
velhas lealdades ideológicas, mais realista e transacional e orientada por interesses nacionais?
Como podemos compreender o alinhamento diplomático aberto entre a China e a Rússia? Este
artigo apresenta uma discussão analítica sobre os desenvolvimentos da Nova Guerra Fria e a
ordem mundial emergente no contexto dos conflitos em curso e do reequilíbrio de poderes. A
este respeito, o artigo aborda algumas das principais características do novo sistema de
configuração do poder internacional, as aparentes derivas e as novas ameaças nas relações
internacionais.
Palavras chave
Conflito armado na Ucrânia, Nova Ordem Mundial, Ordem Liberal, Era Pós-Guerra Fria, EUA,
China, Índia, Rússia.
How to cite this article
Oberoi, Roopinder; Francisco José Leandro (2023). Ukraine Effect: Are we Groping for a New World
Order?. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, Vol14 N2, November 2023-April 2024.
Consulted [online] in date of last view, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2.3
Article received on February 24, 2023 and accepted on September 18, 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 78-97
Ukraine effect: are we groping for a new world order?
Roopinder Oberoi, Francisco José Leandro
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UKRAINE EFFECT: ARE WE GROPING FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER?
1
ROOPINDER OBEROI
FRANCISCO JOSÉ LEANDRO
Introduction
The Russian-Ukraine conflict is one of the most unrelenting crisis of current times. It has
political, geo strategic, economic and social implications globally. There is a fundamental
concern that the continuing Russia-Ukraine is threatening the world order. The crisis has
subsequently been argued as presenting the risk of escalating into a Cold War, which
could put the normal world order to a severe imminent threat (Guchua et al., 2022).
NATO has condemned Russia’s war on Ukraine in the strongest possible terms, and calls
it “the biggest security threat in a generation” (NATO, 2022). With this emerging concern,
there is a strong relevance to examine the topic and understand it in the context of global
political debate. Russia’s attack of Ukraine, stunned the world. The brazen attack was
the start of the largest land war in Europe since World War II and has led to enormous
dislocation of the Ukrainian residents, loss of life, and the decimation of Ukrainian cities
and infrastructure. It has redrawn geopolitical energy supply lines; reinforced coalitions
among Western countries and expanded rifts with China; put the use of nuclear weapons
on the table for the first time in decades; and taught us the significance of collective
global leadership in moments of crisis.
Current drifts and recent strategic credentials point toward an additional ramping up of
geopolitical rivalry, growing economic protectionism and fragmentation, and a slackening
of the structures of the intercontinental order. This research paper seeks to provide a
multidimensional view of the Russia-Ukraine war by evaluating its primary triggers and
probing the efforts to address the war from an international perspective. In this vein, this
manuscript reflects on questions such as: What is the future of international order? Is
global governance undergoing an alteration, reflecting the deep shifts in power that have
occurred over the past decade, especially the rise of China and the growing impact of the
Global South? Furthermore, it provides an analytical discussion on New-Cold War
1
Disclaimer: This paper represents the opinions of the authors, and is the product of academic research. It
is not meant to represent the position of the organizations that the authors may be associated with, nor
the official position of any sovereign state. Any errors are the fault of the authors.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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developments and the emerging world order in in the backdrop of ongoing struggles and
power rebalancing. In this regard, the authors address some of the key structures of the
new global power arrangements system, ostensible drifts, and new threats in
international relations. Thus, the prime purpose of the study is to examine the diverse,
but coordinated roles that various states in helping settle the Russia-Ukraine war, as an
opportunity to power rebalancing.
Ukraine War and Divergent Responses
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been labelled as a turning point in contemporary history,
a crossroads analogous to the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001, the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, and even the shooting of John F. Kennedy in 1963. German Chancellor Olaf
Scholz has proclaimed, “we are at a Zeitenwende - a turning point” (Micklethwait and
Wooldridge, 24 March 2022). Global institutions are being tried and tested once again
and hard-edged chauvinism has reappeared as a force equally democracies and
authoritarian states. From the European standpoint, the U.S. seems to be relinquishing
its international leadership responsibility. In the meantime, Moscow is exploiting every
chance to pit European partners against one another. The intensification of partisanship,
rise in populism, increased use of disruptive technologies and the Covid-19 pandemic has
only strengthened the multipolarity and has led to fragmented the diffusion of power,
both geographically and in its resolutions.
Ukraine a nation at the intersection of Asia and Europe has become a catalyst and trigger
for radical upheaval and perhaps the crucible of a new world order. On day one of Russian
Invasion Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred to the war as “dawn of New
Iron Curtain” (REUTERS/Umit Bektas, February 23, 2022), this resonated with the U.S.
and West who have framed the conflict in ideological footings that an autocratic Russia
is waging a brutal and unprovoked war against Ukraine, as the country desired to adopt
the Western liberal model. This tactical narrative has been less effective in marshalling
the like-minded democracies and is arithmetically tricky. Biden’s call to make Putin
“pariah on the international stage” failed to mobilize the “democratic cooperative
network” (Grieco & Jourdain, 14 June 2022). The Russia-Ukraine conflict is illustration of
number of new self-assured players that are playing significant role in shaping the global
system. According to Colarossi, Anatoly Antonov justified his nation's "special military
operation," the term the Kremlin uses to avoid calling the invasion a war, by saying it is
meant to halt the West's expanding dominance worldwide (Colarossi, 18 April 2022).
Anatoly Antonov further added that “We don't want the United States or other NATO
countries to use this territory against the Russian Federation” (Colarossi, 18 April
2022). But the affair has begun much before. Russia sent shockwaves throughout the
world by annexing Crimea on 18 March 2014.
The same unacceptable political and military occupation, together with military presence,
often disguise as peacekeepers, has been repeated in Transnistria (Moldovia), Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Artsakh as part of the revitalization of the former soviet empire.
Apparently, the only visible consequence of this unprovoked and illegal occupation of
Crimea was the Russia expulsion of the G8. However, the occupation of Crimea has
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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ignited the roots of a complex confrontation that has reverberated to this day, serving
as a precursor to the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine and setting in motion a
prolonged standoff between Russia and the West, which “we are still dealing with the
ripple effects of these events years later” (Chausovsky, 10 March 2021).
The 2022 invasion of Ukraine extended the arc that commenced in 2014. Russia’s wild
attack on Ukraine is hastening the global tectonic shift. The Western alliance on the other
hand have straightforward ethical and strategic reasons for supporting Ukraine war. Their
position is Ukraine is the prey of Russian aggression and this is challenge to the
democratic world. West has to collectively defend the rules-based global liberal order
from Russian President Vladimir Putin and therefore isolate the Russian Federation:
Sanctions, G8, WEF and Arctic Council, stand as clear examples or forums that excluded
Russia – a clear set back in terms of advancing multilateralism. These drivers have been
the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three
decades.
The war against Ukraine, launched by the Kremlin in response to the West’s
refusal to accept it demands to fundamentally revise the post–Cold War
security arrangements, has put an end to the few remaining hopes of
managing the tense relationship through such channels as the NATO–Russia
Council, the Normandy format to resolve the stalemate in eastern Ukraine,
and the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue (Rumer & Sokolsky, 2022).
Nevertheless, the moral fervour manifest in the Western retort to Russia’s war on Ukraine
has been conspicuously vague. “Russia’s ally, Belarus which is a member of the Moscow-
led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union, is a
reflection of Russia’s own institutional connectivity, has allowed Russian forces and
weaponry to be stationed on its territory. Belarus has directly and openly backed the
Russian Federation. China has taken a stance of “active neutrality”, with Chinese
authorities blaming the U.S. and the NATO for bringing “Russia-Ukraine rifts to a critical
point” and accusing Washington of using the conflict to attempt to “contain Russia and
China” (Chausovsky, 21 April 2022). Another significant player in the Russia-Ukraine
conflict is Turkey, who wants to be a key mediator in the conflict and wishes to capitalize
the opportunity to brand its NATO allies as well as to preserve the existing ties with
Russia. Even though Turkey is a member of the NATO, it also has deep financial and
energy connection with Russia and has declined to participate in Western led sanctions.
At the same time, Turkey has supplied Ukraine with crucial weaponries such as TB-2
drones and has assisted Kyiv diplomatically. Turkey has been committed to facilitate the
implementation of different stages of the agreement to export cereals from Ukraine and
from Russia (REUTERS, September 5, 2023). This fact has provided Turkey influence with
Ukrainians and the Russians equally, exemplifying the ever more multifaceted web of
power relations in current multipolar age.
Other central global players like India, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Israel and Indonesia
have continued their stance of being non-committal and acted to protect their national
strategic interests. States such as India, Angola and Mozambique, decided to abstain
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voting in UN resolutions intended to punish Russia thereby exhibiting strategic
ambivalence. India values long and deep military and economic ties with Russia, and has
taken benefit of reduced bills to buy more Russian oil which it has doubled from 2021.
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 March 2022 - ES-11/2. Humanitarian
consequences of the aggression against Ukraine (A/RES/ES-11/2) was favoured by 140
countries in the 193-member assembly. Four states - Syria, Belarus, North Korea, and
Eritrea - joined Russia in voting against, while 38 abstained and 10 were absent” (UN, 2
March 2022).
The OPEC countries similarly continued with their agreement with Russia rather than
conform with U.S. demand to increase oil production so as to relieve inflationary
pressure. Other nations like China have declined to overtly reprimand Russia. The
reflexively pro-Russian régimes like Belarus and Syria, with their large financial and
military dependency on Moscow provides reasonable explanation for being supportive of
Russia’s stance towards Ukraine. In September 2023, the North Korea's leader Kim Jung
Un visited to Russia, raising the world’s attention for the possibility of military support to
President Vladimir Putin (Bubalo, 2023) as associating the country to the circle of Russia
effective supporters. In Middle East states, particularly those flush with cash, apply their
agency and discretion in defining the depth and scope of Russian impact in the region
than is recognized. Some countries are taking nonaligned posture to probably effort as
mediators to bring peace in the region.
On the diplomatic front, Middle Eastern states that have engaged with Russia,
including America's Arab security partners, have deferred on joining the
Western-led condemnation of Russia's aggression and refused to join efforts
to isolate Russia economically. In many cases, again, this is more of a form
of local signalling, especially by the Gulf monarchies, to convey discontent
with America's supposed inattentiveness to their security needs rather than a
full-throated embrace of Russia (Wehrey, 19 May 2022).
Saudi Arabia despite close military alliance with the U.S. has rejected Washington’s
demand to supply more oil to help ease inflation caused by price surge, ensued due to
the Western sanctions on Russia, whose production fell by a million barrels a day since
its attack on Ukraine. The shared outlook of some of these countries is that they consider
the Ukraine war as a regional conflict where it’s not in their nation interest to get openly
involved. This is antithetical to U.S. and European Union position who consider this as a
serious risk to global balance of power, stability and outright violation of International
the law and norms underpinning the global order after World War II.
In Africa, the President of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau Umaro Sissoco Embalo visited
Russia in July 2023, anticipating the 50th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic
relations. No public statements about Ukraine conflict had been released, but the visit
has been seen as an expression of political solidarity. In South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa
President expressed that Washington’s persistent push of NATO expansion contributed
to revving up a catastrophe in Europe, which ultimately led to belligerent stance by
Russia. These countries are in the making of emerging multivalent global order a reality.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Nearly half of the world is following “another narrative” which is divergent from the U.S.
consensus. For many of these states belonging to Global South, Washington has been
hypocritical given the West past of abandoning these same moralities when suitable. For
example, NATO’s unilateral involvement in Kosovo in 1999, commenced without a UN
Security Council Resolution, and the 2003 Iraq war to attempt regime change started on
the incorrect information that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and add
to this 2011 intervention in Libya, which also went outside the terms and conditions of
the S/RES/1973 passed on 17 March 2011 imposed a number of restrictions on Muammar
al-Qaddafi regime, and more recently U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan after 20 year
and leaving behind political anarchy and citizens in disarray has led questioning of the
decision by U.S. and West. These diverse attitude challenges the Washington’s efforts to
consign Russia as pariah state status misses the mark of unanimous response. The
moralizing lectures have fallen on deaf ears in Global South who have on occasion
countered irritably to the arm twisting from West. They have indeed, undermined the
legitimacy of all United Nations System, specially the UNSC as the governing body of the
international security order.
These advances highlight serious dysfunctionality in U.S. outmoded alliances with Arab
autocracies and a rising global movement of multipolarity well-defined by the pre-
eminence of self-interest instead of shared moral standards and guidelines. There is also
some indication that the Arab community is apprehensive of Washington's aims and
strategies in this region – particularly its past history of military intrusions and dual values
on human-rights violations. Realistic political positions and need to safeguard the benefits
they derive from their association with Moscow is playing out in open. “Russia’s new
position was best labelled as sub-imperialist: a regional power that generally plays by
the rules of Euro-Atlantic capitalism, yet is able to dictate its own terms of integration
into the global economy. Another useful term for this strategy is “sovereign globalisation”
(Matveev, 14 April 2022) Chausovsky puts it bluntly: “(…) the Russia-Ukraine conflict has
revealed the complexity of the power architecture of the world. While the U.S. was once
in a dominant position in the global order, it now faces more competition from the likes
of Russia and China, while presumed allies like Turkey, India and even certain EU states
like Hungary have carved out their own independent roles vis-à-vis the conflict”
(Chausovsky, 21 April 2022).
Understanding Post-Cold War Reality
Kamel asserts that "It does not seem far-fetched to claim that future generations will
consider the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War as one of the meaningful moments in the shift
of the balance of power from West to East" (Kamel, 2022). The Russia-Ukraine conflict,
is deeply altering the world structures and spaces of influence. It is actually provoking a
new divide. Indeed, Zhang Weiwei, director of the China Institute of Fudan University,
termed Russia aims at radical restructuring of the world order. He assumes that besides
“looking to realize the "demilitarization and de-Nazification" of Ukraine, Moscow has a
reflective determination by launching military action against Ukraine: Russia desires to
overthrow the post-Cold War unipolar world order led by U.S. hegemony, foster the
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formation of a novel multi-polar order in which Russia will be a key player” (Ning, 15 May
2022).
NATO may appear united but the crack in the overall stand against Ukraine is visible and
the 31 member-states, a U.S.-led alliance, is facing disparagement for not doing enough
to support Kyiv. Furthermore, the conflict has invigorated an argument that NATO’s
eastward expansion was an error that perpetuated to the current crisis. Huge internally
displace and refugee outflows and an associated humanitarian emergency is
overwhelming the capacity of EU governments and relief activities to deal with. “More
than 14 million people have fled their homes since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
United Nations (UN) says. Indeed, almost seven million left for neighbouring countries,
while eight million people are displaced inside Ukraine itself” (BBC News, 2 June 2022).
With the collapse of erstwhile USSR and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s the
world shifted away from bipolar division and this had a double influence on international
relations. On 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev had declared, in the address at
the United Nations, that USSR will no longer interfere in the matters of its Eastern
European satellite states. Those states could follow liberal democratic systems, which
Frank (1988, p. 2575) asserted as “steps in the right direction”. Until the end of the Cold
War, the conservative understanding in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were
outmoded notions and mostly resolved complications. On both sides of the Cold War, the
tendency appeared to show that the world was moving toward internationality rather
than xenophobia or chauvinism. As an outcome of the danger of nuclear warfare,
excessive importance was placed on democracy and human rights, financial
interdependency, and steady acceptance of universal philosophies, it became trendy to
speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movements. This marked the prescribed
start of the end of the Cold War.
USSR military and ideological retreat from Eastern Europe and the Third World countries
brought about democratization of in many nations which were hitherto ruled by Marxist
totalitarianisms, and led to noteworthy advancement in resolution of numerous Third
World skirmishes that had developed during protracted Cold War since 1940’s. The
decrease in East West tension, led to in a substantial waning in inter-state conflicts, many
of which ensued due to the ideological power bloc rivalry. Glasnost has liquidated a
regime founded on misapprehension and falsehoods. Practically nobody in the Eastern
bloc now trusts USSR-led socialism can contest with the Western liberal ideas and
capitalism in terms of financial performance and liberties. Marxism dominance and
promises of classless and stateless society as a means of understanding and directing
society stood discredited.
Conversely, it has been imprudent to assume that the world really moved to neo liberal
order and that there was Washington consensus. Fukuyama (1989) argued that with the
breakdown of the Soviet Union, the last political substitute to liberalism has been
rejected. Fascism was discredited after the World War II, the Communism had collapsed
and in China, political and economic reforms seemed to be moving in the course of a
more integrated global economy. The world looked as the Hegelian imagination -
progressive history as the process of conflict between ideas has reached its ultimate goal
by establishing liberal institutions - representative government, free markets, and
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consumerist culture globally. There was “Common Marketization and New World Order”
and the world has achieved homeostasis. “It seemed as if there would be a global
convergence around a set of universal values — freedom, equality, personal dignity,
pluralism, human rights. Fukuyama predicted greater geopolitical stability in the world”
(Brooks, 8 April, 2022). Fukuyama (1989), summarised it “What we may be witnessing
is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war
history, but the end of history as such (…) That is, the end point of mankind's ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government." The “endist” proposition guaranteed that U.S. faces no grave
threats to its hegemony and that it will continue to be the foremost authority in a global
neo liberal order. Currently, it is said that Fukuyama was perhaps hasty to assume the
future, all too certain that he could envisage the progression of political progress in
advance. Perhaps Fukuyama ignored any discrepancies to the set pattern of dominant
Western liberalism. However, as the Berlin wall collapsed and the Cold War ended, Hirst
(1989) published Endism where he attacked Fukuyama prognosis with deeper and
nuanced foresight.
The breakdown of the “Soviet Empire” has been followed by the rise and return of many
grave struggles and wars in several parts of the world. Some of these new battles are
happening within the former Soviet Union, for example the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the hostility in Chechnya. However, some wars
also emerged or deepened in numerous states outside of it and several Third World armed
conflicts, in which the superpowers were not intensely involved during the Cold War have
continued after it. Moreover, in 1989, Fukuyama ignored that China was still an
unyielding state in spite of extensive market reforms and the expectations that Russia
would come under liberal democracy fold after the Cold War persist as authoritarian
regime (Fukuyama, 2016).
Ethnopolitical conflicts aside, there have been other threats to international order that
are, indeed, beyond the full control of major powers, even the U.S., the victor of the Cold
War. The most notable ones include religious militancy, terrorism, North-South conflict,
and severe competition over scarce resources. The post-Cold War period also saw the
revival of North-South economic antagonism. "The very notion of an “end” to history is
pernicious (…) Democracy is deeply compromised. The record of liberalism after 1945
needs serious critical attention. Western Europe, the U.S. and Japan all offer ample
evidence of the failings of liberal political institutions” (Hirst, 2019). Liberal capitalist
economy is not the predictable concomitant and bulwark of liberal democracy. Unfettered
financial system can equally pose substantial danger to political democracy, when it
allows exceptionally unequal influence of advantaged economic and corporate actors.
Growing economic globalization in the post-Cold War era does not appear to be breaking
the historical stratifications between the North and South.
The phenomenon of the economic dependence of the developing countries on
the multinational companies from the industrialized countries is named today
neokolonialismus, what refers to the economic exploitation of these countries,
which resembles the conditions in the colonial age in various regards. With
global problems like the climate change, a further dimension of injustice is
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added: Whereas the problems are caused over proportionality in the North,
the consequences of the desertification or extreme weather conditions occur
over proportionally in the South. This extends to the threat to the existence
of numerous small island states, which will no longer exist if the sea level
continues to rise any further (Seligson; Passe-Smith, 2003).
The unregulated free market does not guarantee economic equality as it aggravates
unrestrained concentration of economic activity in the hands of few (Hirst, 2019). The
consequence has been growing wealth dissimilarity and class antipathy. The rise of right-
wing populist espousal of ultra-nationalism has been undermining for the European Union
led to Brexit as well. The rise of religious fundamentalism in recent years within the
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim traditions has been widely noted. One is inclined to say
that the revival of religion in some way attests to a broad unhappiness with the
impersonality and spiritual vacuity of liberal consumerist societies. The other major
"contradiction" potentially unresolvable by liberalism is the one posed by nationalism and
other forms of racial and ethnic consciousness. But it is not clear that nationalism rep
resents an irreconcilable contradiction in the heart of liberalism. In the first place,
nationalism is not one single phenomenon but several, ranging from mild cultural
nostalgia to the highly organized and elaborately articulated doctrine of National
Socialism. Only systematic nationalisms of the latter sort can qualify as a formal ideology
on the level of liberalism or communism (Fukuyama, 2014).
The simple existence of a rising China “with Chinese characteristics”, created an
alternative pole of ideological attraction, and as such constituted a threat to liberalism.
As depicted by Table 1, China’s contribution to global GDP is estimate to soon reach 1/5
of the total sum, surpassing the U.S.. China now is global economic power that echoes
its own benefits and methods, rather than merely following the lead of prevailing
organizations. China definitely will be strategic winner, if Ukraine becomes a protracted
trial of strength between Russia and the West.
Table 1 – China’s GDP and Share Global GDP
Year
1990
2000
2010
2015
2020
2022
2028
GDP
360,86B
1,21T
6,09T
11,06T
14,69T
17,96T
>21T
Share Global
GDP
4%
7,24%
13,62%
15,97%
18,14%
18,84%
19,72%
Source: World Bank and Statistica (2023)
Even if “America will continue to be the world’s leading military power. But China’s
growing anti-access/area denial (ACAD) capabilities cuts U.S. edge at least in the East
Asian region” (Acharya, 2019). China is challenging the U.S. visions on regionalism and
globalism by its very strategically laid out projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative
and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). These are directly tied to enhancing China’s
own interests and priorities. The Belt and Road Initiative is trying to getaway of the U.S
monopoly and the immediate aim of the several ports, corridors and railway lines is to
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avert the interruption of Chinese supply routes. If China gets ahead in tying Europe closer
through extensive Belt and Road Initiative, this will be big leap for China and Russia
towards their aim of neutralising U.S. domination in Eurasia. In the same line of
reasoning, the GDI, builds on the B&RI, and consolidates the international development
cooperation agenda and seeks to place China as the key development partner for the
Global South.
The Trump Administration and its “make America great again”, left a legacy of demise in
the global leadership, pushing the European leadership to be uncertain about the long-
lasting transatlantic relationship. China has smartly explored this weak link, advancing
new levels of cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels, namely at Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), at BRICS+, at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), at Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), at ASEAN +, in Africa,
in South America, and in the Middle East. Russia and China now share a mutual rival in
the United States, that has global competences and existence that they perceive as
challenging their national and security interests in their sphere of influence. In particular,
with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, he is aiming to finish the work on important mission of
demolition underhandedly reinforced by numerous world leaders, especially Chinese
President Xi Jinping. Together, these leaders want to disrupt what they perceive as U.S.
hegemony over the global structure and challenge the belief that the world is bound by
a shared set of morals embodied in transnational laws and maintained by organizations
such as the United Nations. China and Russia made explicit observations about a “new
world order”, suggesting that the Ukraine fight and the sanctioning of Russia is going to
have farther-reaching significances than hitherto assumed. Xi Jinping’s line of thinking
was reflected when China’s foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin told that “China-
Russia cooperation has no limits, and that our striving for peace has no limits, our
upholding of security has no limits, our opposition towards hegemony has no limits”.
Moscow and Beijing will continue efforts to “advance global multipolarity and the
democratization of international relations” (Ellis, 30 March, 2022).
The new post-cold war world order they are trying to establish is dominated by opposing
alternative models of global governance and each political unit seeking to influence its
own geopolitical space. Putin basically plans that a larger Russia encompassing part of
Ukraine will be one completion of his 2020 declaration that “Russia is not just a country.
It’s really a separate civilization” (Moscow Times, 2020). “This struggle should be viewed
in civilizational, not just geopolitical terms (…)” declared Charles Kupchan, a former
senior U.S. official and now scholar at Georgetown University. “It is at once and the same
time sui generis, particular to Putin and Russia, but also is part of a broader increase in
ethnonationalism and its role in global politics, as well as the backlash to globalization”
(Hirsh, Foreign Policy, 10 April 2022). With his attack on Ukraine, which President Putin
believes is an inextricable part of Russia, he is resonating what President Xi has also
sought to do when he called for the reconstruction of Chinese philosophy and civilization
“the utmost vision for the Chinese nation in contemporary history” (Hirsh, 10 April 2022).
Zhang (2012) asserted that “China is today the only nation in the world which has
combined the world’s lengthiest continuous civilization with a huge modern state”.
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China resents the degree to which the West imposed its presumably collective principles
on the global system in the post-war period, which has favoured U.S. hegemony.
Simultaneously, the U.S. reads China’s pledge to forging a multipolar order based on
diverse ideals and determined by different standards more beneficial to non-Western
countries as China aims to be a foremost global authority in the process. These two
viewpoints on the imminent global order drives larger disagreement and generates the
atmospherics of a “new Cold War,” even if the U.S. and China state they want to evade
it. Global pressure and antagonism from Western powers draws these two nations closer
“Trade between China and Russia exceeded $107.7 billion in 2020 and experts estimate
this may be more than $130 billion considering the rising price of bulk commodities this
year” (Xin & Wenwen, 24 May 2021). Both countries believe that U.S. defence plans, for
instance missile defences positioned in Europe and the Asia-Pacific as a risk to their safety
and an effort by the U.S. to deny them the capacity to put off or strike back against it in
the incident of war. Russia’s close partnership with China has removed the prospect of a
military conflict between two of them to the margins, while the worsening bond with the
U.S. has raised the awareness of danger from its treaty ally Japan. According to Arbatov
(2021) there are tangible consequences of China’s nuclear build-up; if China continues
with stated strategies to enlarge its nuclear arsenal to level of the U.S. and Russia, this
will lead to a three-way arms race and the tactical nuclear equilibrium that presently
exists will be “radically destabilized” as an outcome.
By way of example Lora Saalman cites several Chinese experts’ speculations
on strategic stability between the U.S. and China. They note that its key
difference from the U.S.-Russia strategic relations lies in the fact that it is not
based on approximate nuclear missile parity. In this context they argue that
China should build sufficient “comprehensive power”, including economic,
political and military might, to be on par with the other two nations and thus
prevent them from dominating in any strategic talks (Arbatov, Alexei;
Dvorkin, Vladimir; Oznobishchev, Sergey, 2012, p. 29).
Russia’s continuing the war in Ukraine and intensifying strains with the West means
Moscow has no substitute to the “no limits” policies with China, which leaves it no room
to jeopardize even the slightest worsening of relationship with Beijing. Moreover, the
multilateral global scheme, namely in the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, is disintegrating
and some even believe is not truly representative of current global powers and influence
and are getting replaced by institutions such as the G20, which brings together countries
from both the North and the South, on a more equitable footing than the UN Security
Council or the IMF. Micklethwait and Wooldridge (24 March 2022) wrote, “geopolitics is
definitively moving against globalization - toward a world dominated by two or three
great trading blocs.” This broader context, and especially the invasion of Ukraine, “is
burying most of the basic assumptions that have underlain business thinking about the
world for the past 40 years.” We are entering a more composite patchwork of bilateral,
regional and plurilateral structures and coalitions. “The country composition of the G20
reveals that it consists of a set of 10 highly aligned Western countries composed of the
G7 plus Australia, South Korea, and the European Union and a set of six non-Western
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countries that make up the BRICS group composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South
Africa, and Mexico” (Bradford, 4 May 2022). Even parallel institutes such as BRICS+,
ASEAN, QUAD others are evolving partnerships between regional governments.
The 2023 BRICS summit advanced the 2017 China proposal to start the BRICS expansion
process. The BRICS + (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Ethiopia, Egypt, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates), are not only a “new global
economic paradigm in the making” (Gouvea & Guiterres, 2023), but also, they represent
an antagonist alignment vis-à-vis the U.S. centred leadership. Particularly interesting is
the case of Brazil. In April 2023, when president Lula from Brazil travelled to China, the
agenda was driven by economics, and among the dozens of accords expected to be
finalized during the visit is one regarding the joint Brazilian-Chinese construction of
CBERS-6 satellites, a model that “has improved technology that allows for efficient
monitoring of biomes such as the Amazon Rainforest even on cloudy days” (Arias, 2023).
President Lula also attended the former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s inauguration
in Shanghai as head of BRICS’s New Development Bank, and carefully implied the need
to diversify the international currencies to conduct international payments. In relation
the Ukraine War, the narrative of the Brazilian President clearly shows intentional
vagueness and ambiguity as he claimed U.S. was “stimulating the fighting” (when he was
in China on 10 April 2023), as he suggested Ukraine should cede Crimea (in early April)
and as he condemned the “violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity” (after the visit of
Serguei Lavrov to Brazil on 17 April 2023) (Associated Press, 2023). It appears that
Brazil, as a regional power, is seeking a share within the process of building a new global
order.
In addition, the OECD has predicted “that by 2060, the GDP of the developing world,
including China and India, would surpass that of advanced OECD and non-OECD
countries: 57.7 percent to 42.3 percent” (OECD, 2012). In 2020 Joe Biden wrote that
the United States needs to “get tough with China” (Planet Money, 2020). Beijing “is
playing the long game”, he argued, “by extending its global reach, promoting its own
political model, and investing in the technologies of the future. Washington understands
that it is competing with Beijing to determine not only whose economy and military are
more dominant but also whose principles of governance are more worthy of global
leadership.” (Sher, 2022). Washington denial to come to Ukraine support with
unswerving military backing is particularly disturbing. China is keenly observing the
power play and positioning of west. U.S. reaffirmed backing for NATO, promoting the
QUAD, investing in AUKUS, reinforcing trilateral security collaboration with Japan and
South Korea and renewed arrangement with the Philippines indicates the U.S. return to
multilateralism against Beijing's assertiveness to have closer allies and partners in the
region.
Thus, the inquiry about whether the Russia-Ukraine battle declines or consolidates
Washington’s position in the international arena remains an open one and is perhaps too
early to respond. Partially, this will be contingent on the way in which the war pans out
in reality. But essentially, the response will also hinge on whether the U.S., Russia, China
or others competing for global supremacy and part will form the connectivity flows in
tactically effective ways and that will incorporate the probable idea of the imminent of
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the global order. What is apparent is that the multiplex nature of the international global
order is here to stay, and the power architecture will be determined by this dynamic and
composite struggle over tactical connectivity. On the top of all uncertainty, there is the
result of the coming U.S. presidential election in 2024.
Concluding Observations
Recalling that the prime purpose of the study is to examine the diverse, but coordinated
roles that various states in helping settle the Russia-Ukraine war, as an opportunity to
power rebalancing, there is a looming reality: we are building blocks, instead of
multipolarities. Geo-economics influence and Western hostility are the foundations of the
new invisible walls.
Indeed, the world is very different from the post-World War II, where the U.S. arose as
the world’s foremost power, neither we are seeing typical characteristics of multipolar
world. Amitav Acharya calls this a “multiplex world combines multiplicity and complexity
(…) It’s a world of multiple actors in global affairs that are nonetheless bound by complex
forms of interdependence” (Acharya, 2014). We are building blocks instead of promoting
globalization and multilateralism. “Geopolitics is conclusively moving against long-
standing global order toward a world dominated by two or three dominant trading blocs:
an Asian one with China at its core and maybe Russia as its energy supplier; an American-
led bloc; and possibly a third centred on the European Union, with the Europeans largely
allied to the U.S. but anxious about it also. Other powers will equivocate between these
two or three great blocs, much as they did during the Cold War” (Micklethwait;
Wooldridge 24 March 2022).
Kissinger (2014) argues that, “The contemporary quest for world order will require a
coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate
these regional orders to one another (…) New World Order is phase of histrionic
transformation in the global politics. It is essentially associated to the idea of global
governance predominantly in the characteristic of a cooperative effort to recognize,
diagnose, and tackle international challenges that a nation or state cannot handle on its
own”. Fundamentally, “new-world-order” defined as definite epoch of global uncertainty
where noteworthy fluctuations in geopolitics occurred due to armed war or financial
disaster, lead to a restructuring of the global socio-political system. Contemporary global
politics is fragmented, wavering by crosscurrents, inconsistencies, and multivalent
forcefields, not singular ideas. Internal political pressures engendered by social divisions
drive internal political supremacy over addressing global existential requirements. “Fierce
independence, assertion of uniqueness, and willpower for autonomy characterize
indigenous expression and spill over into the global public square creating greater
diversity and cross-cutting tensions. These countervailing forcefields now ripple through
global forums and international institutions, issues, and challenges, and define the new
global order. The tensions between the West and the non-Western world are central,
significant, and involve many countries” (Bradford, 4 May 2022).
The hurried retreat of U.S. from Afghanistan, the historic divisions within the European
Union intensified by the Ukraine – Russia conflict, offered Russia and indirectly China the
prospect to fashion the new form of the new world order. The new formulation is
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dependent on the concept of a multi polar world order, hostile to the idea of western
democratic liberal order, which has become weaponized due to the U.S. dollar reserve
system, trade wars and systematic sanctions. The Ukraine conflict fast-tracked the
formation of strategies of the new world order by announcing Russia as a key player in
the multipolar conflict, which has destabilized the security structure of Europe. “I think
the war in Ukraine and the desperate steps taken by The West to curtail Russia, is really
a story of the formation of a new world order. This is not just about Ukraine. It is not just
about Russia. These are mere actors in the bigger stage of shifting global politics. This
story is geopolitics at its best. I believe we are seeing a new world order playing out in
front of our eyes” (Heerden, 12 May 2022).
The Ukraine conflict is much more than just re-establishing Russia’s power on its previous
colony. It is more about a tactical repositioning by Russia to take up global status. The
ongoing conflict in Ukraine make it apparent that Russia and China are aligning
themselves to fill the strategic vacuum due the waning global role of the U.S. The global
balance of power is shifting quickly as global and regional powers try to secure their place
in the newest world order after decades of global U.S. dominance. As Roy states “After
the conflict playing out in Ukraine, it would be a bi-polar world, with a tri-polar tendency.
There would be conflicts galore and shadow boxing matches” (Roy, 24 February 2022).
To succeed in a multivalent global order is to take cognizance of growing intricacies,
paradoxes, and contrariness as certainties; delink subjects from one another to avert a
particular difference from disrupting other functional relationships; decentralise
international negotiating avenues from one another; plan varied ways to work on
subjects that are noticeably diverse; reassure varying groups of country representatives
to lead on diverse issues; foster plurilateral groups by rotating their arrangement from
issue to issue; embrace diversity; sidestep blocs; offer innovation; emphasis on
substance; and dial back on polemics. This new era of intricacy, inconsistency, and
polyvalent forcefields calls for new methods which are categorized by better candidness
to multiplicity, transformation, and eclecticism and driven more by real-world specifics,
functional understandings, knowledge-based policymaking, and an intense sense of
global necessities to address systemic challenges and existential threats. In a multivalent
world, these methods would be more operative and valuable than using international
forums to try to advance morals, political predilections, and polemic alterations. In a
complex world, we must avoid building blocks, but to strive to create global, multi-level
and multipolar structures, in which multipolarities are perceived as forces for stability.
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