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Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology,
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September 2026
24
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT IN THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AFD)
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
JEONG-AE CHOI
ja@jnu.ac.kr
Associate Professor, Chonnam National University Gwangju (Republic of Korea).
Abstract
The far-right German party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), made a dramatic leap in the
February 2025 German federal election, securing 20.8% of the vote and emerging as the
second most popular party. This development poses a serious challenge to the so-called
“firewall” (Brandmauer) that has historically excluded far-right parties from Germany’s
political mainstream. This study provides a theoretical analysis of how the AfD has generated
and leveraged cleavages within the established German party system, and how existing
parties have responded by exploiting those divisions to consolidate their own positions. The
analysis traces the origins of the AfD, compares its founding platform to subsequent electoral
manifestos, and examines the evolution of its ideology. The rise of far-right parties in Germany
has been predominantly influenced by developments in the former East German regions. This
phenomenon is primarily interpreted within a socioeconomic context, encompassing the
increase in immigrants and refugees, and the subsequent decline in employment
opportunities. This study aims to draw implications for peace in light of the rise of far-right
parties. By examining the German case-which is already experiencing challenges, and regional
conflicts following reunification-, this research ultimately seeks to contribute to the
construction of a peaceful and democratic society.
Keywords
Far-right parties, Alternative für Deutschland, German politics, ideological evolution,
socioeconomic cleavages.
Resumo
O partido alemão de extrema-direita, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), registou um avanço
dramático nas eleições federais alemãs de fevereiro de 2025, obtendo 20,8% dos votos e
emergindo como o segundo partido mais popular. Esta evolução representa um sério desafio
à chamada «barreira de proteção» (Brandmauer) que, historicamente, tem excluído os
partidos de extrema-direita da corrente dominante da política alemã. Este estudo apresenta
uma análise teórica sobre a forma como o AfD gerou e aproveitou as divisões no seio do
sistema partidário alemão estabelecido, e como os partidos existentes responderam,
explorando essas divisões para consolidar as suas próprias posições. A análise traça as origens
do AfD, compara a sua plataforma fundadora com os manifestos eleitorais subsequentes e
examina a evolução da sua ideologia. A ascensão dos partidos de extrema-direita na
Alemanha tem sido predominantemente influenciada pelos desenvolvimentos nas antigas
regiões da Alemanha Oriental. Este fenómeno é interpretado principalmente num contexto
socioeconómico, abrangendo o aumento do número de imigrantes e refugiados e o
subsequente declínio das oportunidades de emprego. Este estudo visa extrair implicações
para a paz à luz da ascensão dos partidos de extrema-direita. Ao examinar o caso alemão —
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
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Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
25
que já enfrenta desafios e conflitos regionais na sequência da reunificação —, esta
investigação procura, em última análise, contribuir para a construção de uma sociedade
pacífica e democrática.
Palavras-chave
Partidos de extrema-direita, Alternative für Deutschland, política alemã, evolução ideológica,
clivagens socioeconómicas.
How to cite this article
Choi, Jeong-Ae (2026). Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its
Implications. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of
Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in Contemporary Europe and Asia, VOL. 17 Nº. 1,
TD3, September 2026, pp. 24-40. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0626.2
Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted on February 6, 2026.
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
26
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT IN THE GERMAN ALTERNATIVE FÜR
DEUTSCHLAND (AFD) AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
JEONG-AE CHOI
Introduction
The far-right German party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), made a dramatic leap in
the February 2025 German federal election, securing 20.8% of the vote and emerging
as the second most popular party. This figure represents a doubling of the 10.3% share
received in the 2021 election, signifying the inaugural instance of a non-traditional party
attaining second place. Germany is currently confronted with a predicament concerning
the recognition of the AfD as a significant political entity. Historically, the ascent and
mainstreaming of far-right parties in Germany was regarded as implausible within the
European context. Nevertheless, the recent success of the AfD poses a substantial
challenge to the so-called “firewall”
1
that has traditionally excluded far-right parties from
mainstream German politics.
The present study initiates with a theoretical analysis of the ways in which the AfD has
generated cleavages within the established German political system. The study examines
how existing parties have utilized these cleavages to consolidate their own positions and
traces both the origins of the AfD and the process by which it has refined and exploited
such divisions. The present study has been conducted for the purpose of comparing the
foundational platform of the AfD with the electoral manifestos that the party has
subsequently published. In addition, the study will analyse the evolution of the party's
ideology. The present study aims to re-evaluate the ideological direction of the AfD and
its identity as a political party through this analytical process.
The emergence of far-right political parties in Germany has been predominantly
influenced by developments in the former East German regions. This phenomenon is
predominantly interpreted within a socioeconomic context, encompassing the increase in
immigrants and refugees, and the subsequent decline in employment opportunities. The
present study aims to draw implications for peace in light of the rise of far-right parties.
1
Political firewall (or Brandmauer in German): A tacit or explicit agreement among mainstream parties to
politically isolate extremist parties, whether far-right or far-left. This strategy specifically entails: (1) categorical
exclusion from coalition government formation; (2) refusal of parliamentary cooperation; and (3) public
declarations of political distance. The rejection of coalition formations among political parties is, on occasion,
employed as a term 'cordon sanitaire'.
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
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This research seeks to contribute to the construction of a peaceful and democratic society
by examining the German case. The German case is already experiencing challenges
related to immigrants, refugees and regional conflicts following reunification.
Theoretical Analysis
Since the 1980s, the primary catalyst for the surge in far-right parties across Europe has
been the issue of immigration. Immigration to Western Europe saw a notable increase in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, with a significant influx from the former Yugoslavia,
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. In accordance with the prevailing immigration
theory, the social impact of immigration, in conjunction with elevated levels of economic
insecurity, engendered the emergence of far-right political parties that were opposed to
immigration. This was due to the perception that immigration was associated with
unemployment and crime. From this standpoint, far-right parties evolved into single-
issue parties that represented pervasive xenophobia.
The second causal factor was rooted in a sense of political alienation. The prevailing
sentiment of voter discontent with established political parties, particularly with regard
to their responses to pressing issues such as economic growth, unemployment,
corruption, crime, and immigration, has resulted in a pervasive climate of distrust. The
far right has been observed to profit from protest votes cast against well-established
political parties. This phenomenon can be attributed to the success of the far right in
disseminating anti-establishment messages, coupled with their own lack of governing
experience
2
.
A review of studies discussing party structure within the scholarship on AfD and far-right
parties indicates that the core element behind the rise of AfD is resistance to and rupture
from established politics. The political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is
positioned in a political landscape that encompasses both materialism and
postmaterialism, in which it competes with the postmaterialistically re-radicalized
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Grüne). Within the left-right spectrum, it is in direct opposition
to Die Linke, while along the moderate-radical axis, it engages in conflict with other
established political parties
3
.
Such patterns of conflict are not unique to the AfD. For instance, the Grüne also
experienced a rupture from established parties during the 1980s. In the Grüne party,
members who subscribed to a realist political philosophy, with a particular emphasis on
the party's transformation into a governing party and the pursuit of pragmatic policies,
emerged as the dominant faction. This shift in ideological orientation led to a moderation
of the party's previously radical character
4
. In summary, although the Grüne party
2
Karapin, R. (1998). Radical-right and neo-fascist political parties in Western Europe. Comparative Politics,
30(2), 213–234; Betz, H.-G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe. New York, NY: St. Martin’s
Press; Kitschelt, H., & McGann, A. J. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3
Jung, B.-G. (2023). The emergence of AfD and changes in the ideological structure of the German party
system. European Studies, 41(2), 17.
4
Jung, B.-G. (2023). The emergence of AfD and changes in the ideological structure of the German party
system. European Studies, 41(2), 17-18.
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
28
emerged amid the diffusion of postmaterialist values as a significant social consciousness,
the subsequent incorporation of postmaterialism by mainstream political parties
prevented the formation of a wholly new axis of cleavage. Consequently, the Grüne were
able to assimilate into the prevailing political structure.
Amidst these developments, it can be argued that the AfD has succeeded in establishing
a new and robust axis of cleavage. In other words, the recent rise of AfD can be
interpreted as a form of resistance to established politics-a feat that the Grüne was
ultimately unable to achieve. The transformation of the German party system has already
been the subject of academic debate; for instance, the disappearance of the so-called
“0.5 party” that once held the casting vote, and the emergence of third and fourth parties
as kingmakers, have led to the expectation that, following Sartori’s typology of party
systems under competitive conditions, Germany’s party landscape will be reorganized
into a moderate multiparty system
5
.
The Cleavage theory, as conceptualized by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, focuses
on the emergence of groups with divergent political interests along social lines of
division
6
. Lipset and Rokkan paid particular attention to the processes through which
such cleavages manifest, leading to the formation of competing political blocs. For
instance, society may be divided along economic lines, regional lines, or racial lines,
resulting in collective opposition that is expressed through party competition in elections.
Herbert Kitschelt further developed this theoretical framework by arguing that the
structure of party competition is defined by positions on three core issues: citizenship,
process, and resource allocation. The concept of “Citizenship” is theorized as a spectrum
ranging from cosmopolitan to particularistic politics; The term “process” is employed to
denote the mode of social decision-making, with authoritarian politics favoring
hierarchical decision-making and radical-liberal politics emphasizing participatory
processes; and “resource allocation” concerns the distribution of social resources, with
two opposing poles of political redistribution and market-based allocation
7
. According to
these dimensions, the AfD has adopted an extreme image by positioning itself in
opposition to established parties (citizenship), has employed modern approaches such as
the use of social media (process), and has taken a strong stance against redistribution,
garnering significant support in the former East German regions (resource allocation).
In this model of European party competition, Kitschelt classifies and explains the
competitive models of German parties, arguing that the traditional left–right pattern of
competition has, as a result of social changes in advanced capitalist societies, gradually
shifted to a new axis of political cleavage: ‘left-libertarian’ versus ‘right-authoritarian’
8
.
Meanwhile, in his 2004 revision of the theory, Kitschelt explains that the distribution of
political preferences is not static but continues to diversify.
5
Jeong, H.-M. (2013). “Non-mainstream Parties and Changes in the German Party System,” EU Studies, No.
33, pp. 335–374.
6
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives.
New York, NY: The Free Press.
7
Kim, Y.-T. (2017). The change of the German Green Party’s basic program and the structure of party
competition in Germany. Korean Journal of Party Studies, 6(1), 193–214.
8
Kitschelt, H. (2004). Germany: Beyond the Stable State. London: Routledge.
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29
Figure 1. Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure
Source: Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992).
This revision was necessitated by critiques of the new radical right, as Kitschelt’s earlier
model had failed to acknowledge the rise of an authoritarian working-class segment that
demonstrated a preference for social redistribution in economic matters
9
. Kitschelt’s
argument posits that the future model of political competition is likely to undergo
unpredictable changes, given the fundamental nature of preference formation, which
links markets, organizations, and socio-cultural spaces to political positions. The model
of party competition that Kitschelt described, spanning from the 1980s to the millennium,
is illustrated in the following figure.
The current AfD advocates radical liberalism and market-based resource allocation, which
can be illustrated as follows in the model
10
. Kim Young-tae (2017) explains the position
of the Grüne as that of radical-liberal cosmopolitans, and notes that AfD, in terms of its
location and its resistance to the authoritarian interpretations of mainstream politics,
shares a similar foundation. The key difference, however, is that while the Grüne is
positioned in favor of political redistribution, AfD is situated on the side of market-based
allocation.
As Kitschelt’s theoretical framework posits, the ongoing fragmentation of political
preferences necessitates a multidimensional analytical approach. The potential
transformation of the working class and other popular strata into authoritarian-oriented
segments, along with emerging forms of class differentiation that diverge from
conventional patterns of political redistribution and market-based allocation, signals a
need for reinterpreting contemporary social orders through novel perspectives.
Increasingly, structural shifts along the axes of digitalization, resource allocation, and
supply chain security are evolving into more active and central forces of political-
9
Kitschelt, H. (2003, May). Diversification and reconfiguration of party systems in postindustrial democracies.
Accountability and Representation in European Democracy Conference, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European
Studies, Harvard University.
10
Kim, Y.-T. (2017). Changes in the basic program of the German Green Party and the structure of party
competition in Germany. Korean Journal of Party Studies, 6(1), 193–214.
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
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30
economic change. This development demands renewed theoretical attention to the
dynamics of class formation and policy realignment.
Figure 2. Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure, 1980–2000
Source: Kitschelt, Herbert. (2003)
Figure 3. Position of AfD in Kitschelt’s Model of European Party Competition Structure
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Changes in the AfD’s Platform
The AfD adopted its Basic platform(Grundsatzprogramm) in 2016, a document which
meticulously delineates the party’s policy orientations and positions. It is important to
note that 2016 marked the commencement of internal factionalization within the AfD.
The party began to divide along populist lines, particularly concerning economic issues
and migration
11
. The table of contents of the AfD’s 96-page Grundsatzprogramm is
organized into fourteen chapters. The contents are as follows when classified by policy
domain. The opening chapter, titled “Democracy and Fundamental Values,” posits that
the prevailing political parties offer no viable alternatives in their policy stances. This
assertion is characterized by the AfD as a structural constraint that poses a grave threat
to democracy and the rule of law (p. 9: “Schlanker Staat für freie Bürger”). The party’s
initial prioritization of economic policy is evident in sections such as “Europe and the
Euro,” “Economy, Digitalization, and Consumer Protection,” and “Taxes and Finance.”
With respect to foreign policy, the AfD places significant emphasis on the preservation of
national independence and sovereignty, adopting a critical stance toward supranational
integration. While the party expresses support for the maintenance of NATO, it stipulates
that German participation in military interventions should be contingent upon alignment
with Germany’s security interests. In regard to the situation with Russia, the AfD has
expressed support for the reduction of tensions.
Table 1. Table of Contents of the AfD’s Basic Platform
Category
Chapter
Democracy
1. Democracy and Fundamental Values
Economic
Policy
2. Europe and the Euro
10. Economy, Digitalization, and Consumer Protection
11. Taxes and Finance
12. Energy Policy
Foreign
Policy
3. Internal Security and Justice
4. Foreign and Security Policy
Social Policy
5. Labor Market and Social Policy
6. Family and Children
13. Nature Conservation, Agriculture, Environment
14. Infrastructure and Housing
Culture,
Identity
7. Culture, Language, and Identity
8. Education and Research
9. Immigration, Integration, and Asylum
The most emphatic stance in the basic platform is on culture and identity. In the section
on “Education and Research,” the party addresses the normalization of social policies,
such as opposition to integrated schools and support for traditional educational systems.
The party also opposes gender studies and sex education. However, the section then
transitions to issues related to migration, refugees, and integration, including opposition
11
Choi, J.-A. (2018). Background of the rise of far-right parties in Germany: Focusing on the Euro and migrant
factors. Oughtopia, 33(1), 39–67.
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to the integration of Islamic education. Keeping the basic platform in mind, the following
section compares the AfD’s manifestos from three different elections.
Table 2. Comparison of the Table of Contents of the AfD’s Manifestos from Three Elections
2017 Federal Parliament Election
Platform
2021 Federal
Parliament Election
Platform: Germany,
but normal
Democracy
1. Defense of German Democracy
1. Democracy and the
Rule of Law
Culture,
Identity
5. Refugees Need Borders: Migration
and Refugee Policy
6. Islam in Conflict with the Liberal
Democratic Basic Order
7. Welcoming Culture for Children:
Family Support and Demographic
Development
8. Education and Schools: The Courage
for Differentiation
9. Culture and Media
9. Islam
10. Immigration,
Refugees, Integration:
Acting Humanely and
Rationally – Protecting
Germany
16. Culture
17. Media
Economic
Policy
2. The Euro Has Failed: Currency,
Monetary, and Financial Policy
10. Taxes and Finance, Economy and
Jobs
3. The EU and Europe
4. Taxes and Finance
5. Economy: Blue Deal
6. The Euro Has Failed
Foreign
Policy
3. Finance and Taxes
4. Monetary Policy – The Failure of the
Euro System
7. Foreign and
Defense Policy
8. Internal Security
Social
Policy
11. Social Policy
12. Our Health System Is at Risk
13. Ending Hostility to Technology:
Energy and Climate
14. Maintaining and Expanding
Transport Networks, Strengthening
Housing Construction, Developing
Rural Areas
15. Environmental, Nature and Animal
Protection, Consumer Protection, and
Agriculture
2. Freedom and
Responsibility
11. Family Policy
12. Labor and Social
Policy
13. AfD’s Pension
Concept
14. Health Policy
15. Education,
Science, and Research
18. Construction,
Housing, Rental
19. Climate, Energy,
Technology, and
Digitalization
20. Mobility and
Infrastructure
21. Agriculture,
Environment, and
Consumer Protection
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In recent years, the AfD has participated in three electoral processes and issued three
electoral manifestos. Quantitatively, the 2017 manifesto is 74 pages in length and
commences with a focus on the defense of German democracy. In the 2017 election, the
AfD emerged as a prominent party, garnering 12.6% of the vote. The party’s most
significant support base is in the former East German regions, where in 2017, 21.2% of
the population expressed support for the AfD, which is nearly double the 10.7% of the
former West German regions. In the aftermath of unsuccessful bid to secure
parliamentary representation in the Bundestag during the 2013 election, the AfD initiated
a systematic electoral engagement starting in 2017, accompanied by the formulation a
comprehensive manifesto. This iteration of the manifesto is distinguished by its concise
chapters and direct, assertive language.
The year 2017 marked the commencement of profound debates and confrontations
surrounding the subjects of migrants and refugees. In this context, the manifesto of the
AfD notably incorporated content pertaining to refugees and Islam. The section on
education and schools was titled “Courage for Differentiation,” and it explicitly and
actively expressed opposition to religions, particularly Islam
12
. The term “Volk”
(people/nation) appeared 67 times. With regard to foreign policy, the manifesto
expounds on internal security, with a particular emphasis on the issue of terrorism. In
the context of addressing pressing concerns regarding public safety, a range of subjects
were discussed, including strategies to combat foreign crime and enhance investigative
capabilities. These measures were presented as a series of actions aimed at safeguarding
citizens’ well-being, collectively referred as an anti-terror response.
In terms of social policy, the AfD is in opposition to the ideology of gender and places
significant emphasizes traditional forms of family and marriage. With regard to education
policy, the party rejects integrative ideological education and strongly criticizes both
comprehensive policies and Muslim-related educational programs. Furthermore, the AfD
places a higher value on practical, field-oriented education than on theory-centered
approaches. The party particularly asserts that the educational rights of German children
are being infringed upon by immigrant children who lack sufficient language skills. The
AfD opposes the Bologna bachelor system and has advocated for a return to the
traditional Magister/Diplom system. The manifesto further asserts the necessity of
academic neutrality in educational institutions, contending that these institutions have
become laboratories for left-wing social experimentation.
With regard to the matter of immigration policy, the AfD has highlighted demographic
issues in Europe and Africa. Specifically, the party he noted that while Europe is facing
with a decline in population, Africa and Islamic countries are witnessing a rapid surge in
population growth, leading to significant demographic imbalances and substantial mass
migration. In summary, a substantial segment of the 2017 electoral manifesto asserts
that German society is experiencing a threat to its cohesion as a result of immigration.
12
For example, the manifesto rejected minarets (the towers of Islamic mosques) as symbols of Islamic power
and opposed the call to prayer by muezzins. According to the manifesto, the muezzin’s call asserts that no god
exists except Allah, which the AfD described as religious imperialism. This stance contradicts the contemporary
practice of tolerant coexistence among religious communities (p. 35).
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A significant proportion of the manifesto on culture, media, and social policy addresses
or is underpinned by issues related to immigration.
In the realms of economic, social, and technological policy, the AfD persists its use of
contentious language. The political party’s economic policy is predicated on the premise
that Germany should withdraw from the Eurozone and actively advocate for the
reintroduction of a national currency, such as the Deutsche Mark. Market-related policies,
including taxation, are predicated on the principle of minimizing state intervention and
upholding a free market order as a core value. With regard to climate change, the AfD
has adopted a skeptical stance regarding the scientific consensus on the matter,
characterizing it as a form of ideology. In a variety of social and technological policy
areas, including climate, energy, transportation, and housing, the party has expressed a
strong opposition to international norms, with a particular emphasis on those established
by the European Union.
The 2021 electoral manifesto underwent a substantial expansion, increasing from 15
chapters in the previous version to 21 chapters. During this period, the AfD received
10.3% of the vote. The party’s primary support base remained in the former East German
regions, with the widening gap of 19.8% in the East versus 8.2% in the West, compared
to 2017. A comparative analysis of the 2021 manifesto reveals a shift in the utilization of
chapter headings, which have become more attributed to the employment of objective
nouns as chapter titles, a departure from the emotive or declarative phrases that
characterized previous manifestos.
It is noteworthy that the chapter entitled “Chapter 9: Islam” is written with a discernible
objective. The primary contention in this discourse is that the critique of Islam, akin to
the critique of any other religion, should be safeguarded by the principle of freedom of
expression. The manifesto demands a comprehensive prohibition on the wearing of
burqas and niqabs in public spaces and asserts the imperative a addressing any form of
discrimination against indivisuals of Jewish heritage. For instance, on page 84, the
following assertion is made: “Jewish life in Germany is threatened not only by right-wing
extremists but also from Muslims who harbor animosity towards Jews and Israel. Attacks
on Jewish people and anti-Semitic insults must be consistently prosecuted.
13
”
The prevailing tone in this section evokes a sense of threat posed by Islam. The
employment of terms such as “Parallelgesellschaften” (parallel societies),
“Friedensrichter” (Sharia judges), and “Dschihadisten” (jihadists) is a recurring
phenomenon, with the intent of conveying the notion that Islam poses a systemic threat.
Exclusionary language is also readily employed; for instance, direct references are made
to organizations such as the “türkisch-islamischen Anstalt für Religion (DITIB)” and the
“Muslimbruderschaft” (Muslim Brotherhood), while strong terms such as “abolition,”
“ban,” and “cessation” are repeatedly used for emphasis.
Examining the manifesto for the general election held in February 2025 and comparing
it with previous versions reveals the AfD’s evolving trajectory. First, the table of contents
13
“Jüdisches Leben wird in Deutschland nicht nur von Rechtsextremisten, sondern zunehmend auch von juden-
und israelfeindlichen Muslimen bedroht. Angriffe auf Juden sowie antisemitische Beleidigungen müssen
konsequent strafrechtlich geahndet werden.”
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Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in
Contemporary Europe and Asia
September 2026, pp. 24-40
Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
35
has shifted from provocative phrases to more objective language. While the 2017
manifesto featured assertive and emotive headings, and the 2021 version was more
specific and issue-oriented, the 2025 manifesto adopts concise and neutral terminology.
For example, the 2017 heading “Refugees Need Borders: Migration and Refugee Policy”
changed to “Immigration, Refugees, Integration: Acting Humanely and Rationally -
Protecting Germany” in 2021, and then to simply “Refugee and Immigration Policy” in
2025.
Second, the AfD continues to emphasize a sense of crisis, particularly in its hardline
stance on refugee and immigration policy (“Deutschland muss wieder selbst entscheiden,
wer ins Land kommt” - Germany must once again decide for itself who enters the
country). The party still employs emotionally charged terms such as “massive
Zuwanderung” (mass immigration), “unverantwortliche Politik” (irresponsible policy),
and “Überforderung” (systemic overload). However, the 2025 manifesto uses far more
indirect language than previous versions. The chapter on Islam has disappeared, and
there is no overt criticism of Muslims. While the manifesto still implicitly criticizes
immigrants, the tone is noticeably more subdued. For instance, phrases like “Kriminalität
steigt, Gefährdung der inneren Sicherheit” (suggesting a link between increased
immigration and crime) are less direct than before, and immigrants and refugees are
described as a “Belastung der Sozialsysteme” (burden on social systems) without explicit
hostility. Some immigrants are framed as “Sozialtouristen” (welfare tourists), indicating
a continued, albeit more subtle, critical stance.
Third, the AfD now attaches the term “ideology” to pragmatic issues in an effort to
deconstruct the discourse surrounding ideology itself. One of the party’s key issues is
climate policy, on which it maintains a strong position. For example, the AfD utilizes
chapters on democracy to argue against climate initiatives such as the Green Deal,
repeatedly criticizing the EU’s Green Deal as “planned economy” and “climate ideology.”
The party’s stance on electric vehicles is also unequivocal: technological development
and market forces, rather than ideology-based prohibitive policies (auf ideologischer
Verbotspolitik), should determine outcomes. Interestingly, the AfD does not use the term
“ideology” indiscriminately. In the 2025 manifesto, the word appears 44 times, most
frequently (seven times) in the chapter on “Agriculture, Environment, Climate.” By
employing the term “ideology” in areas not typically interpreted as ideological, such as
climate and media, the AfD seeks to shed the risks associated with grand ideological
discourse and instead project a pragmatic image.
The Limits of the Moderation of the AfD and Its Implications
As demonstrated in the preceding analysis, the AfD has undergone a shift in its ideological
orientation, endeavoring to present a more pragmatic facade. These efforts are
inextricably linked to the party's ongoing survival. The German Federal Constitutional
Court has observed that the AfD is susceptible to being designated as a far-right party
14
.
Since 2021, there have been ongoing debates regarding the far-right tendencies of the
AfD. In the current discourse, the argument has been posited that the prohibition of anti-
14
Deutschlandfunk. (2025, May 5). AfD-Verbotsverfahren: Was spricht dafür und was dagegen?
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
36
democratic parties or organizations constitutes a tool available to a well-defended
democracy, thereby providing grounds for the potential dissolution of the AfD. The legal
foundation for such a prohibition is articulated in Article 21 of the Basic Law
15
.
However, in February 2025, a majority vote in favor of initiating the ban procedure was
not achieved. While 124 members of parliament supported the motion, but this was
insufficient to bring it to a vote in the Bundestag. Historically, the Federal Constitutional
Court has prohibited the formation of political parties that exhibit Nazi tendencies, as
evidenced by the banning of the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) during the 1950s. Similarly,
the German Communist Party (KPD), which demonstrated Stalinist leanings, has also
been disbanded. While it is possible to follow the ban procedure based on the Court’s
judgment, concerns have been raised that such a process is not only complex but could
also harm the democratic system itself.
Conversely, the capacity of the AfD to attain full moderation, given its present
momentum, remains a subject of speculation. A potential avenue through which far-right
forces may evolve towards a more moderate stance is through a process of “de-
demonization.” A proximate illustration of this phenomenon can be observed in France,
where Marine Le Pen's strategy of disavowing her father's controversial views proved
effective in the 2011 electoral campaign, thereby enabling her to attain a level of electoral
success that her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, had not been able to achieve during the
1970s. In the period under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the National Front
(subsequently renamed the National Rally) underwent a transformation that led to its
adoption of an image consistent with the traditional right-wing party. This shift was
evident in the outcomes of the general elections
16
.
An alternative perspective reveals that the moderation of political parties has been
demonstrated through the case of the Grüne. The efforts directed towards the moderation
of the AfD are associated with the party's capacity to contribute to the promotion of
peace. The following strategies are among those that the AfD can employ toward
moderation. At the ideological level, the party could adopt a strategy of expanding toward
the center, a process exemplified by Grüne. Secondly, it could potentially facilitate the
restoration of relations with major parties and contribute to the breakdown of the cordon
sanitaire. Thirdly, the initiative has the potential to expand its support base. However, it
should be noted that these three conditions are also closely related to the limitations of
the AfD's moderation.
Firstly, if the AfD continues to moderate its stance, the party risks losing its dedicated
and fervent support base. The formation of the AfD was predicated on the presence of
profound ideological divisions, a factor that has been intricately intertwined with the
party's identity. The AfD, founded in 2013, initially emerged as a moderate right-wing
party that opposed the euro. However, in 2016, due to internal divisions, a faction that
emphasized anti-Islam and anti-immigrant stances gained control and expanded its
15
Parteien, die nach ihren Zielen oder nach dem Verhalten ihrer Anhänger darauf ausgehen, die freiheitliche
demokratische Grundordnung zu beeinträchtigen oder zu beseitigen oder den Bestand der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland zu gefährden, sind verfassungswidrig(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 21).
16
Cho, H.-S. (2024). The French parliamentary election and European populism: The success and limitations
of the National Rally (RN). Legislative Studies, 30(3), 38–66.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3
Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in
Contemporary Europe and Asia
September 2026, pp. 24-40
Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
37
influence. In the face of the inability to identify pragmatic solutions to the substantial
influx of refugees, the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 resulted in the arrival of new refugees
from Ukraine. Concurrently, Germany encountered supply chain disruptions, the impact
of the COVD-19 pandemic, and an economic downturn, precipitating a decline in public
trust in the established political parties. During this period, the AfD party experienced
significant growth, capitalizing on prevalent anxieties regarding the future and distrust
of the political establishment. It is evident that the most significant basis for the
proliferation of far-right political entities in Europe is the prevailing sentiment of
disillusionment with established left- and right-wing parties. The ascendance of the AfD
in Germany can be interpreted as a manifestation of this disillusionment with
conventional political discourse. In essence, the capacity of the AfD to effectively
assimilate is inherently constrained.
Secondly, due to the political isolation of the AfD, Germany's major parties adhere to a
strategy of non-cooperation with the AfD, a practice referred to as the "Brandmauer"
(firewall). This phenomenon functions as a structural impediment, hindering the
incorporation of the AfD into the political mainstream, irrespective of any policy
moderation. In contrast, France's response entailed the exclusion of radical policy
stances, thereby embarking on a course of moderation. The RN (Rassemblement
National), while maintaining an anti-elite rhetoric, has also recruited elites from
institutions such as Sciences Po and ENA into its leadership. Moreover, it relinquished its
stance on exiting the eurozone, progressively adopting a stance that advocated for the
reform of Europe in accordance with French national interests. In the case of Italy's
Giorgia Meloni, it is evident that she has demonstrated a capacity to adapt to the norms
and institutional frameworks of the EU. This adaptation is characterized by the adoption
of a pragmatic policy approach, which contrasts with the advancement of extreme policy
agendas
17
.
Thirdly, the AfD has garnered substantial support in the former East Germany.
Transcending its geographical limitations necessitates broadening its electoral base
beyond this regional stronghold. For instance, in the aftermath of reunification,
sentiments of political and economic marginalization—manifested in the perception of
being relegated to "second-class citizenship"—fueled not only nostalgia for socialism but
also aspirations for national resurgence. Consequently, this socio-political context
contributed to elevated levels of support for radical ethnic nationalism and cultural
conservatism in these regions.
While the AfD has achieved considerable nationwide expansion by 2025, securing second
place in the February 2025 federal election, significant geographical disparities persist.
The party continues to command over one-third of votes in eastern states, whereas its
support in western regions remains comparatively modest. The party's challenge has
evolved from a mere matter of geographical expansion to one of consolidating support
across diverse regional contexts. Moreover, it is imperative to overcome its current state
of political isolation to achieve governing power. Absent such consolidation, the AfD faces
a quandary that fundamentally restricts its progress toward political normalization.
17
Cho, H.-S. (2024). The French parliamentary election and European populism: The success and limitations
of the National Rally (RN). Legislative Studies, 30(3), 56-57.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3
Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in
Contemporary Europe and Asia
September 2026, pp. 24-40
Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
38
Specifically, the party risks losing its core eastern base while failing to garner sufficient
mainstream acceptance in the west.
Meanwhile, the AfD continues to face significant challenges in altering its perception
nationwide, particularly within the former West Germany, where its reputation remains
predominantly negative. The social underpinnings that foster support for the AfD in
former East Germany encompass economic disparities and regional imbalances,
phenomena that are also evident in countries such as Italy. While the party's robust
support base has undoubtedly contributed to its rise, it is also a significant factor that
hinders the party's capacity to consolidate its expansion through moderation. The party's
electoral prospects in the Western regions are characterized by volatility and dependence
on protest voting. Conversely, any strategic shift toward moderation may result in the
alienation of the radical core in the Eastern regions, which is crucial for maintaining
organizational stability and ideological coherence.
Conclusion
Thus far, we have analyzed the electoral support for the AfD in Germany has been
conducted, along with an examination of its implications. Moreover, the challenges
associated with consolidating geographic and regional support have been thoroughly
assessed. This support is imperative for the party's evolution. Finally, an analysis has
been conducted to determine the ways in which the party has attempted to overcome its
political isolation. The crux of this quandary is the paradox of moderation. The AfD has
solidified its position as a novel pole of opposition by capitalizing on divisions within the
established order. However, it now faces inconsistencies in its attempts to moderate its
conduct in order to gain acceptance into that very establishment.
The German case offers several critical implications. First, the most salient grievance
among former East German citizens— and a primary catalyst for the far-right party's
ascendance— centers on labor market anxieties. These populations regard refugees and
immigrants as direct competitors for employment, a perception that has fueled both
economic marginalization and socio-political alienation. The electoral entrenchment of
the AfD in the former East Germany must be understood within this economic and social
context, where citizens have gravitated toward the party's ethno-nationalist and anti-
immigration platform as a response to perceived structural disadvantages. Consequently,
a more comprehensive examination of the immigrant issue within the context of social
alienation in the former East Germany after German reunification is imperative. It is
imperative that this examination encompass a thorough assessment of the social
integration of immigrants.
Secondly, it is imperative to perpetually examine methods of social integration by
evaluating not only the federal government of Germany but also the practices of state
governments. North Rhine-Westphalia is the region with the largest immigrant population
in all of Germany, possessing a long history of migrant workers. The state government's
social integration education is characterized by its comprehensive approach to
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VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3
Thematic Dossier – Geopolitics of Anxiety: Ideology, Identity, and (Un)Bordering in
Contemporary Europe and Asia
September 2026, pp. 24-40
Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
Jeong-Ae Choi
39
educational integration, encompassing both formal and informal educational settings
18
.
Consequently, despite having the highest proportion of foreigners, North Rhine-
Westphalia continues to demonstrate the highest level of social inclusion. A more in-
depth analysis is particularly necessary regarding bodies such as the Social Integration
Council for immigrants and native residents. The government's endeavors to foster social
integration are inherently deficient without the active involvement of local residents. The
cultivation of awareness and policy-level reflection, complemented by active social
discourse, is instrumental in fostering vigilance against the far-right and nurturing a
healthier democracy.
Thirdly, a high level of micro-level analysis of social conflicts is necessary, enabling the
development of multi-layered approaches to resolve them. In the case of Germany, it is
imperative to undertake a more comprehensive analysis of the support base for the AfD,
with a particular focus on examining the patterns of AfD support among both younger
and older generations. The emergence of far-right political parties can be attributed to
various factors, including economic inequality, population decline, and political alienation.
These factors vary in their impact across different generations and geographical regions.
Society exhibits diversity across economic and social strata, with multiple interests
intermingling.
This finding aligns with the previously emphasized importance of social integration and
connects to the significance of social integration education targeting not only immigrants
but also the general public. The recent rise of far-right politics, evident not only in
Germany and Korea but also in numerous other nations, is indicative of a prevailing trend
of polarization. The solution to this issue is found in the facilitation of discussions
concerning integration at the individual, regional, and societal levels. This complexity
necessitates a multifaceted approach, as addressing one aspect alone would not suffice.
The interconnected nature of these dimensions, akin to the interlocking gears of a
machine, underscores the necessity for a holistic perspective.
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VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 3
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Ideological Shift in the German Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd) and its Implications
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