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VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD 1
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June 2026
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CULTURAL IBERISM AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA
JIEUN KIM
cozo223@gmail.com
Lecturer at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Seoul, Republic of Korea). She received her
doctoral degree from the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in comparative literature. She
translated Fernando Pessoa and Florbela Espanca into korean.
Abstract
Fernando Pessoa envisioned “Iberismo” (or Iberism) not as a project of political federation or
economic union, but as a form of cultural cooperation rooted in shared historical and spiritual
traits. For Pessoa, one of the defining characteristics of Iberia is its “non-Latinity” — a
disposition that distinguishes it from Latin Europe by embracing Arab and Islamic influences
and fostering openness toward the Other. This openness is also evident in Portugal’s historical
role as a mediator and exchange hub among Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe through
the Atlantic Ocean, reflected in the Portuguese people's “plasticity” and “cosmopolitanism.”
This study has sought to explore the applicability of Iberism as an analytical framework for
models of unification on the Korean Peninsula. While political unification remains the
normative ideal pursued by both Koreas, the prolonged reality of division has led to a growing
proportion of South Korean citizens adopting increasingly pessimistic views toward political
integration. Economic federation, in turn, represents an even more challenging domain of
cooperation, given the stark structural contrasts between the two systems—capitalism and
socialism, open free trade and a closed, state-led industrial model. Moreover, the economic
gap between North and South Korea continues to widen, further constraining the feasibility of
economic integration. With respect to cultural cooperation, which constitutes the primary
focus of this study, existing forms of exchange have largely been temporary and event-driven
in nature. In response, this article proposes more sustained collaboration in the fields of
cultural heritage research and transmission, areas that can make substantive contributions to
a shared understanding of Korean identity. Finally, affective forms of integration, as captured
by the notion of -philia—denoting mutual affection toward the other—must be regarded as
the least attainable form of integration in the contemporary Korean context, where enduring
ideological conflict continues to foreclose the possibility of socially legitimate cross-border
affinity.
Keywords
Iberism, Unification, Korea Peninsula, Iberia Peninsula, Cultural cooperation.
Resumo
Fernando Pessoa concebia o «Iberismo» (ou Iberismo) não como um projeto de federação
política ou de união económica, mas como uma forma de cooperação cultural enraizada em
traços históricos e espirituais comuns. Para Pessoa, uma das características definidoras da
Península Ibérica é a sua «não-latinidade» — uma disposição que a distingue da Europa latina
ao abraçar influências árabes e islâmicas e ao promover a abertura para com o Outro. Esta
abertura é também evidente no papel histórico de Portugal como mediador e centro de
intercâmbio entre África, as Américas, a Ásia e a Europa através do Oceano Atlântico, refletido
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Cultural Iberism and its Applicability to the Korean Peninsula
Jieun Kim
77
na «plasticidade» e no «cosmopolitismo» do povo português. Este estudo procurou explorar
a aplicabilidade do Iberismo como quadro analítico para modelos de unificação na Península
Coreana. Embora a unificação política continue a ser o ideal normativo perseguido por ambas
as Coreias, a realidade prolongada da divisão levou a que uma proporção crescente de
cidadãos sul-coreanos adotasse visões cada vez mais pessimistas em relação à integração
política. A federação económica, por sua vez, representa um domínio de cooperação ainda
mais desafiante, dados os contrastes estruturais marcantes entre os dois sistemas —
capitalismo e socialismo, comércio livre aberto e um modelo industrial fechado e liderado pelo
Estado. Além disso, o fosso económico entre a Coreia do Norte e a Coreia do Sul continua a
alargar-se, limitando ainda mais a viabilidade da integração económica. No que diz respeito
à cooperação cultural, que constitui o foco principal deste estudo, as formas existentes de
intercâmbio têm sido, em grande parte, de natureza temporária e motivadas por eventos
pontuais. Em resposta, este artigo propõe uma colaboração mais sustentada nos campos da
investigação e transmissão do património cultural, áreas que podem dar contributos
substanciais para uma compreensão partilhada da identidade coreana. Por fim, as formas
afetivas de integração, tal como captadas pela noção de -filia — que denota afeto mútuo pelo
outro —, devem ser consideradas como a forma menos alcançável de integração no contexto
coreano contemporâneo, onde o conflito ideológico duradouro continua a excluir a
possibilidade de uma afinidade transfronteiriça socialmente legítima.
Palavras-chave
Iberismo, Unificação, Península da Coreia, Península Ibérica, Cooperação cultural.
How to cite this article
Kim, Jieun (2026). Cultural Iberism and its Applicability to the Korean Peninsula. Janus.net, e-
journal of international relations VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1 – Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula
in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and Transnational Perspectives, June 2026, pp. 76-91. DOI
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0426.5
Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted for publication on February 12,
2026.
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Cultural Iberism and its Applicability to the Korean Peninsula
Jieun Kim
78
CULTURAL IBERISM AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
JIEUN KIM
Introduction
Iberismo, or Iberism, which advocates for the union or integration of the two nation-
states located on the Iberian Peninsula—Spain and Portugal—can be historically traced
back to the medieval Reconquista. During this period, the shared struggle against
Moorish rule, conducted under a Catholic ethos aimed at territorial reclamation,
contributed to the consolidation of a common Catholic identity across the peninsula. In
the nineteenth century, the unification movements in Italy and Germany once again
influenced political and intellectual currents within the Iberian Peninsula. Toward the late
nineteenth century, the strategic significance of cooperation between Spain and Portugal
became evident during the guerrilla warfare waged jointly to resist Napoleon’s invasion
of the peninsula.
Entering the twentieth century, Iberism was increasingly articulated within cultural and
intellectual spheres. Modernist writers and artists such as Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935)
and Almada Negreiros (1893-1970) promoted Iberist ideas by emphasizing cultural
exchange, shared historical consciousness, and the potential for a broader Iberian unity.
Their contributions reframed Iberism less as a purely political project and more as a
cultural and civilizational one.
Analytically, Iberism is commonly divided into three interrelated dimensions: political
Iberism, economic Iberism, and cultural Iberism. Political Iberism encompasses a wide
spectrum of proposals, ranging from the complete assimilation of the two nations to
various forms of federal unification that preserve the sovereignty of each state. Certain
strands of political Iberism adopt a mergerist or absorptionist perspective. A notable
example is Spanish Secretary of State Pío Gullón’s La Fusión Ibérica (1861), which
proposed the incorporation of Portugal as a province of Spain. Such positions, however,
have historically provoked strong resistance from the Portuguese perspective and
highlight the asymmetrical power relations embedded within some Iberist discourses.
Economic Iberism is most clearly exemplified by proposals for an Iberian customs union,
such as the Iberian Zollverein advocated by the Spanish diplomat Sinibaldo de Mas. In
the contemporary context, Spain and Portugal’s accession to the European Economic
Community (EEC)—the precursor to the European Union—has institutionalized forms of
economic cooperation, including customs integration, within a broader European
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Cultural Iberism and its Applicability to the Korean Peninsula
Jieun Kim
79
framework. This development has effectively embedded Iberian economic collaboration
within supranational structures rather than bilateral unification projects.
Cultural Iberism refers to initiatives and discourses that emphasize cultural exchange,
mutual recognition, and shared heritage between Spain and Portugal. While culture
cannot be analytically separated from political and economic contexts, cultural Iberism
is often distinguished as a separate category because it is the preferred framework of
those who reject political unification while nonetheless advocating for intensified cultural
interaction as beneficial to the overall development of the Iberian Peninsula (Isasi 72).
As Isasi notes, cultural Iberism remains organically linked to political and economic forms
of Iberism, despite claims to its autonomy (Isasi 68).
In addition to these categories, Isasi proposes a further conceptual distinction: lusophilia
and hispanophilia, referring to individuals who express sustained admiration for and
intellectual engagement with the culture of the neighboring nation (Isasi 68). Broadly
construed, this orientation may also be understood as a form of cultural Iberism, insofar
as it embodies affective and cultural investment in transnational Iberian exchange.
Spanish novelists such as Juan Valera (1824-1905) and Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936)
are frequently cited as representative lusophiles. Valera, in particular, founded La Revista
Peninsular in 1856 and contributed extensively to discussions of the cultural and
intellectual traditions of both Spain and Portugal, thereby fostering a trans-Iberian
cultural dialogue.
Thus, from the past to the present, Iberism has evolved and transformed in various
forms. Among these, cultural Iberism, which particularly emphasizes cultural exchange
and cooperation, has contributed to differentiating and redefining the cultural identities
of the two Iberian nations from other European countries. This paper examines the basis
for Fernando Pessoa's advocacy of cultural Iberism and its key characteristics, exploring
the possibility of applying it to the Korean Peninsula. Of course, it is fair to say that the
Iberian Peninsula and the Korean Peninsula share almost no commonalities beyond their
geographical status as peninsulas. While the two nations of the Iberian Peninsula have
long maintained distinct national identities, the Korean Peninsula is a single nation
divided only since 1945 through the Korean War. Although they share an identity based
on a common history and ethnicity, over 80 years of division have led to a persistent lack
of exchange. Consequently, differences now outweigh similarities in many areas,
including political systems, economic systems, and culture. Against this backdrop, this
study seeks to explore how cultural Iberism might influence cultural exchange on the
Korean Peninsula.
Iberism: Cultural Exchange and Identity Exploration
Iberia between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic
Fernando Pessoa defines the Iberian Peninsula as “the Iberian spirit is a fusion of the
Mediterranean spirit with the Atlantic spirit” (Pessoa 1980:12). Here, the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic, its defining characteristics, can be seen as representing European
tradition and cosmopolitan spirit, respectively. If the Mediterranean Sea, which served
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Cultural Iberism and its Applicability to the Korean Peninsula
Jieun Kim
80
as the conduit for the Roman Empire into the Iberian Peninsula, represents the
peninsula's past—transmitting civilizations like Catholicism and Latin—then the Atlantic
Ocean can be seen as the future space: a springboard toward new continents and a
symbol of adventure into the unknown world. Orlando Ribeiro also highlights Portugal's
unique geographical position, bordered by both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, as
crucial to understanding the nation in his work Portugal, o Mediterrâneo e o Atlântico
(2011). According to Ribeiro, the Mediterranean is a space enabling coexistence between
refined Europe and vast Africa, extending the spirit of that coexistence across all of
Europe, while the Atlantic embodies the meaning of an open path leading anywhere in
the world (Ribeiro 143).
The most crucial requirement of Iberism, as emphasized by Pessoa, is precisely the
Atlantic. In the poem “Atlantimo,” he writes:
Iberian Hegemony.
The Atlantic conception of life.
Spiritual imperialism
1
.
For Pessoa, the Atlantic is more than a mere geographical feature. As mentioned earlier,
if the Mediterranean represents the European tradition linked to Greco-Roman culture,
the Atlantic is the conduit where the self and the other, Europe and non-Europe, meet.
As Boaventura explains, Portugal has served as a conduit for encountering diverse
nations across the globe, differing in race and culture, and bringing their cultures to
Europe. Portugal perceived itself as possessing an “open border(fronteira aberta)”(59)
and viewed its society as deeply imbued with ‘internationalism’ and ‘exoticism’
(Boaventura, 2013: 59). As Jieun Kim also highlighted the symbol of the Atlantic derived
from this is largely connected to three characteristics of Portugal and the Iberian
Peninsula: “non-Latinity,” “plasticity,” and “cosmopolitanism” (Kim 2025).
Iberity and non-Latinity
First, “non-Latinity” refers to the Islamic-receptive culture of the Iberian Peninsula. Both
Portugal and Spain are the only nations on the European continent to have embraced
Arab culture. Pessoa defined Iberity(Iberidade) as “Ibero-Roman-Arabic” (Pessoa
1980:16), emphasizing the ‘Arabic’ element. Regions of Portugal and Spain, subjected to
centuries of Arab Moorish rule, were profoundly influenced by Arab culture in architectural
styles, linguistic elements, and emotional sensibilities. This perspective is reflected in the
passage from “Atlanticism”: “We are against Rome, because Rome came to destroy
within paganism the lucid vision of life”
2
(Pessoa 1979:76).
1
Hegemonia Ibérica/ A concepção atlântica da vida/ O imperialismo espiritual. (Pessoa, 1979, p. 76).
2
Somos contra Roma, porque Roma veio destruir no paganismo a visão lúcida da vida. (Pessoa, 1979:76)
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Jieun Kim
81
Particularly in the essay “The Non-Latin Nature of Iberia” (A Não-Latinidade da Ibéria),
he refutes the common designation of Iberia as part of the ‘Latin cultural sphere’. He
argues that while it did derive from the Roman Empire, Iberia possesses its own distinct
culture, differentiated from that of Italy and France. Pessoa questions why Portugal and
Spain are called Latin nations based on 1) etymological reasons (their linguistic origins
in Latin) and 2) geographical reasons (their Mediterranean location), while countries like
France, Romania, Italy, Greece, and Turkey are not. Instead, Pessoa proposes a new
classification for European nations, arguing that the Latin nations inheriting Roman
civilization are France and Italy. According to his classification, Europe can be broadly
divided into Slavic, Germanic, Latin (Italy, France), Oriental (Greece, Turkey, Russia,
Persia, the Balkans), and Iberian (Spain, Portugal). Through this classification, Pessoa
seeks to avoid confining the Iberian Peninsula solely to the ‘Latin’ label, which would limit
it to Catholicism and the Latin cultural sphere. His argument can be interpreted in two
ways: first, as an exploration of the distinctive identity shared uniquely by the Iberian
Peninsula. Indeed, the influence of Islamic-receptive culture remains evident in
architectural styles and other aspects to this day.
The second reason can be seen as a reaction against and a check on the so-called Latin
cultural sphere countries like France and Italy, which held cultural hegemony at the time.
Indeed, in his poem “Atlanticism,” Pessoa referred to ‘Rome’ and ‘Paris’ as “enemies.”
We are against Rome, because Rome came to destroy the lucid vision of life
in paganism. We are against England, because England came to destroy,
[...]. We are against France, because France came, with its democratism and
its plebeian liberalism, to destroy the remnants of paganism that existed
among us
3
.
The term ‘Latin’ is also particularly relevant to the Latin American region. It is widely
acknowledged that the common designation of Latin America as ‘Latin America’ stems
from the influence of the 19th-century French political scientist Michel Chevalier. When
Chevalier used the term ‘Latin America,’ he considered France part of the ‘Latin’ cultural
sphere and created it to highlight similarities between ‘Latin America’ and France.
(Mignolo 2005:77-80) In other words, he used the term ‘Latin America’ to legitimize
France's influence and intervention within the region. Pessoa, seemingly in opposition,
emphasizes the distinctions between the Iberian Peninsula and ‘Latinness’. He argues
that Latin America is a region where ‘Iberianness’ is stronger than ‘Latinness’, seeking to
justify cultural imperialism there. His aim was to expand the sphere of influence of Iberian
culture across this vast region and use it as a springboard to build a more powerful Iberia.
(1) the spiritual domination of Central and South America, and thus cultural
imperialism in the New World, (2) the definitive conquest of North African
3
Somos contra Roma, porque Roma veio destruir no paganismo a visão lúcida da vida. Somos contra Inglaterra,
porque Inglaterra veio destruir, [...]. Somos contra França, porque a França veio, com o seu democratismo e
o seu liberalismo plebeu, destruir os restos de paganismo que havia entre nós. (Pessoa 1979:76)
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Jieun Kim
82
territories, where our kinsmen, the Arab and Berber races, reside [...]; (3)
the military destruction of France (and Italy)
4
.
Meanwhile, plasticity and cosmopolitanism are also concepts linked to non-Latinness. As
Boaventura noted earlier, Portugal, with its ‘open borders,’ possesses plasticity between
the familiar and the foreign, tradition and change, Europe and other cultures, Christianity
and other religions. (Boaventura 2013:64) Pessoa also views Iberia's characteristic as a
society where culture has developed by embracing polytheistic cultures and coexisting
with others.
Thus, in the process of understanding the Iberian Peninsula's cultural characteristics that
differentiate it from other European nations, we see Iberian identity being newly defined.
Cultural Iberianism thus contributes to conceptualizing and rethinking the identity of the
Iberian Peninsula. This aspect is also applicable to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
For cultural exchange between South and North Korea, it is necessary to first identify the
cultural commonalities between the two Koreas. In this process, one is led to reconsider
the unique characteristics of the Korean Peninsula that differentiate it from other nations
and reveal its distinct differences.
Possibility of Adaptation in Korean Peninsula
Four types of unification model
As explained earlier, applying Iberian nationalism from the Iberian Peninsula to the
Korean Peninsula is unrealistic in many respects. First, the two nations on the Iberian
Peninsula have maintained distinct national identities since Portugal's founding in 1139.
In contrast, Korea was a unified dynastic state from Unified Silla (676-935) through the
Korea Dynasty (918-1392) to the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910), only to become divided
in 1948 when the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
established separate governments. The Korean Peninsula is currently in a state of
armistice, and the Constitution of the Republic of Korea defines North Korea as part of
its territory.
5
This represents a significant difference in perspective: whether it is a
federation of separate nations or the reunification of a formerly unified country.
Nevertheless, applying cultural Iberism to various unification policies for the Korean
Peninsula could contribute to establishing and advancing realistic and effective unification
strategies based on the cultural commonalities and similarities inherent to the peninsula.
Just as Iberism is classified into four types, the unification models for the Korean
Peninsula can also be categorized into four types. We will examine the policies for each,
their respective meanings, and their effectiveness. Classifying the Korean Peninsula
unification models according to the four types of Iberism yields: political unification,
economic unification, cultural unification, and affection for the counterpart (pro-
4
(1) o domínio espiritual das Américas do centro e do sul, e assim o imperialismo de cultura no Novo Mundo,
(2) a conquista definitiva dos territórios do Norte de África, onde vi vem os homens nossos parentes, as raças
árabes, berberes, [...]; (3) a destruição militar da França (e da Itália) (Pessoa, 1980:13).
5
“The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.” (Article
3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea).
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83
North/pro-South). First, political unification is fundamentally what the South Korean
government aims for. South Korea has maintained a dedicated Ministry of Unification
within its executive branch since 1969, demonstrating the national-level oversight and
management of the task of ‘unification’. In every presidential election, candidates
invariably present unification-related policies toward North Korea alongside economic,
livelihood, and welfare policies. This underscores how crucial political integration is as a
task for South Korea.
South Korea's unification policy has shifted direction slightly with each change of
government. During the First Republic, immediately following division, North Korea was
not recognized, and the government advocated for ‘absorption unification’ and
‘unification by force’. However, by the Third and Fourth Republics, North Korea began to
be recognized and viewed as an entity for peace and coexistence. The 1972 ‘July 4 North-
South Joint Statement’ agreed upon during this period established the three major
unification principles of independence, peace, and national unity. However, in reality, it
was also a period of confrontation between North and South Korea under authoritarian
regimes. Entering the Sixth Republic, discussions on implementing concrete unification
policies began through the 1991 “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression,
Exchange, and Cooperation between the South and the North (Inter-Korean Basic
Agreement).”(National Archives of Korea, 2018) In 1994, the Kim Young-sam
administration announced the ‘Plan for Reunification Based on a Community of the Korean
Nation’. This remains the official reunification roadmap to this day. It proposes three
stages: First, through reconciliation and cooperation, restore national homogeneity.
Second, establish a North-South Union, creating a dialogue mechanism via a summit
meeting body between the two Koreas. The final stage involves completing a unified
nation, enacting a unified constitution, and establishing a single-state, single-
government system through general elections.(Ministry of Unification, n.d.) Above all, it
emphasizes peace, prioritizing unification achieved through autonomous and democratic
consultation rather than war or force. In 2000, the Kim Dae-jung administration realized
the first inter-Korean summit, pledging peaceful coexistence and exchange through the
‘June 15 Joint Declaration’. The Kim Dae-jung administration is also credited with
introducing a new paradigm in inter-Korean relations by implementing its North Korea
policy, known as the Sunshine Policy. Since then, inter-Korean summits have been held
a total of three times. The second summit took place under the Roh Moo-hyun
administration in 2007, and the third under the Moon Jae-in administration in 2018.
Meanwhile, North Korea advocates a federal unification plan based on the three
unification principles of self-reliance, peace, and national unity outlined in the July 4
North-South Joint Statement. However, South Korea's analysis indicates that North Korea
internally still characterizes inter-Korean relations as hostile, maintaining an adversarial
view of unification.(North Korea Information Portal, 2024)
After 80 years of division, the reality is that many South Koreans today hold negative
perceptions of unification. According to the 2024 ‘Unification Awareness Survey’ statistics
from Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, negative
perceptions toward unification are increasingly on the rise. Notably, among those in their
20s, only 22.4% responded that ‘unification is necessary,’ while 47.4% answered that it
is 'not necessary.' Similarly, among those in their 30s, 23.9% responded that unification
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Jieun Kim
84
is necessary, while a significantly higher 45.0% responded that it is not necessary.
(Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 9)
Limitations and Possibilities of Economic Union
With regard to the second category—economic unification—the Iberian case and the
Korean Peninsula present markedly different structural conditions. While Spain and
Portugal have sustained economic cooperation within the institutional framework of the
European Union, including participation in a customs union and, for Spain and Portugal
alike, the adoption of a common currency, the establishment of comparable economic
arrangements between North and South Korea remains highly constrained. In the Korean
context, the formation of institutions such as a customs union is rendered nearly
impossible by the fundamentally divergent economic systems of the two states.
South Korea operates under a capitalist economic system characterized by a private-
sector-led market economy, where private property ownership is legally guaranteed and
resource allocation is largely mediated through market mechanisms. In contrast, North
Korea adheres to a state-led socialist planned economy in which private property
ownership is prohibited, all productive assets are owned by the state, and economic
resources are allocated administratively by central authorities. These internal structural
differences are further reinforced by opposing external economic orientations. South
Korea actively pursues trade liberalization and integration into the global economy,
whereas North Korea maintains a largely closed economic structure, marked by limited
engagement with international trade and foreign capital.
Perhaps most salient is the magnitude of the economic disparity between the two Koreas.
As of recent estimates, South Korea’s gross national income per capita stands at
approximately 47.25 million won, while that of North Korea is estimated at 1.59 million
won, reflecting an income gap of nearly thirtyfold.(KBS, 2024) South Korea’s
contemporary economic position is the result of rapid industrialization and export-
oriented development policies implemented in the aftermath of colonial exploitation and
the devastation of the Korean War. Policies facilitated what has been widely described as
the “Miracle on the Han River,” transforming South Korea from one of the world’s poorest
countries into a high-income industrialized economy.
By contrast, North Korea persisted in a rigid socialist economic model and maintained a
closed stance toward international exchange even as other socialist and post-socialist
states initiated economic reforms and integration into the global economy from the 1980s
onward. This path dependency has resulted in chronic economic stagnation and
increasing marginalization within the global economic order. Consequently, the structural
asymmetries between the two Koreas far exceed those observed between Spain and
Portugal prior to their integration into European economic institutions.
A comparison of key economic indicators for South and North Korea in 2023 further
illustrates the depth of these disparities, underscoring the structural obstacles that limit
the feasibility of economic unification on the Korean Peninsula.
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Table 1. Major Economic Indicators of North and South Korea (2023)
Category
Population
(thousand
persons)
Nominal
GNI
(trillion
KRW)
GNI per
capita
(million
KRW)
Economic
Growth
Rate (%)
Total
Trade
Volume
(billion
USD)
Government
Budget
(billion USD)
North
Korea
(A)
25,708.8
40.9
158.9
3.1
27.7억
91.3억
South
Korea
(B)
51,712.6
2,443.3
4,724.8
1.4
12,748.0억
3,418.0억
(B/A)
2.0
29.7
-
460.4
37.4
Source: Bank of Korea (2024, July 26)
Due to this overwhelming economic disparity, South Korean public opinion has
increasingly identified the anticipated economic burden of unification as the primary
reason for opposing reunification (Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 15).
According to survey results from 2024, economic burden ranked first at 33.9 percent,
followed by concerns over social problems that might emerge after unification at 27.9
percent. Differences in political systems between the two Koreas ranked third at 19.2
percent, while socio-cultural differences ranked fourth at 14.6 percent.
Despite these substantial constraints, several models of inter-Korean economic
cooperation have nonetheless been explored. Among the most prominent examples are
the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism Project. The
Kaesong Industrial Complex originated from agreements reached in 2000 and entered
full operation in 2005, following the provision of electricity, telecommunications
connectivity, and infrastructure construction by South Korea. By approximately 2015, a
total of 123 South Korean firms were operating in the complex, employing 54,988 North
Korean workers. The project aimed to designate Kaesong as an international free
economic zone and develop it into a central economic hub in Northeast Asia. However,
due to escalating security concerns—most notably North Korea’s nuclear tests and long-
range missile launches—the South Korean government suspended the operation of the
complex in 2015.
Similarly, discussions surrounding the Mount Kumgang Tourism Project began in 1998,
and in 2002 North Korea designated the Mount Kumgang area as a special tourism zone.
The introduction of overland travel in 2003 significantly increased visitor numbers.
However, the project was indefinitely suspended following the fatal shooting of a South
Korean tourist in 2008. Prior to its suspension, the cumulative number of visitors had
nearly approached two million.(National Archive of Korea, 2018)
Both projects were implemented through agreements between South Korea’s Hyundai
Group and North Korea’s Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. The institutional arrangements
of these initiatives further highlight the structural differences between the two economic
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systems: while private enterprises played a leading role on the South Korean side, the
North Korean side operated under direct state control.
Figure 1. Kaesong Industrial Complex
Figure 2. Mount Kumgang Tourism
Project
Source: The Joongang (2024, July 4), Hankyoreh (2019, October 19)
The Realities and Prospects of Inter-Korean Cultural Exchange
Inter-Korean cultural exchange and cooperation have taken place across a range of fields,
including music, performing arts, sports, and cultural heritage preservation. In the South
Korean context, cultural exchange initiatives have also been implemented through
government-affiliated institutions, such as agencies under the Ministry of Unification,
which operate various cultural experience programs. Nevertheless, these exchanges have
largely remained event-driven and short-term in nature, lacking institutional continuity
and sustainability. Although there appeared to be renewed momentum for cultural
exchange following the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics and the inter-Korean
summits, such efforts have since stagnated, and cultural interaction between the two
Koreas remains limited.
Within Iberist discourse, cultural Iberism is often presented as a more pragmatic and
feasible form of integration than political Iberism. In the Korean case, however, this logic
does not readily apply. According to a 2024 survey asking South Korean respondents
what they most strongly associate with the concept of “unification,” the majority (62.3
percent) identified unification as the political integration of North and South Korea into a
single state. The second most common response (19.8 percent) defined unification as
the free movement of people and goods across the border, while 11.6 percent associated
unification with intensified economic cooperation between the two Koreas. By contrast,
only 6.2 percent of respondents conceptualized unification in terms of cultural
convergence, such as the narrowing of differences in values, culture, and education
(Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 12).
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Table 2. South Korean people's perception of unification (2024)
Image of Unification
2024 (%)
political integration
62.3
unification with intensified economic cooperation
11.6
unification as the free movement of people and goods
across the border
19.8
unification in terms of cultural convergence
(differences in values, culture, and education)
6.2
others
0.1
Despite limited institutionalized exchange, a significant number of North Korean residents
are exposed to South Korean popular culture. Although the North Korean authorities
regard the consumption of Hallyu as a threat to regime stability and impose severe
sanctions, South Korean films, television dramas, and music continue to circulate through
illicit streaming channels and informal distribution networks. Exposure is not merely
passive; North Korean youth, in particular, demonstrate strong enthusiasm for South
Korean popular culture. As Taekbin Kim’s research indicates, South Korean dramas and
films represent one of the few accessible windows to the outside world for North Korean
residents (Kim 2025: 185). However, the growing popularity of Hallyu has been
accompanied by intensified state surveillance and censorship. In 2024, testimonies
emerged alleging that individuals were executed for distributing and viewing South
Korean television dramas. (YTN News 2024, July 29)
With regard to music and live performances, inter-Korean exchange was relatively active
in the period following the implementation of the Sunshine Policy, particularly from 1998
through the early 2000s. A notable feature of these exchanges was that performances
were primarily organized and led by South Korean private broadcasting companies and
cultural institutions. In 1999, major South Korean broadcasters such as SBS and MBC
hosted performances in North Korea featuring then-popular idol groups, mainstream
singers, and ballet companies. Throughout the early 2000s, South Korean artists
continued to perform in North Korea, including joint concerts in which performers from
both Koreas shared the stage. Prominent South Korean singers such as Kim Yon-ja, Lee
Mi-ja, and Cho Yong-pil also held solo concerts. These cultural exchanges declined
following the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang in 2008 but
were partially revived in 2018 in conjunction with the inter-Korean summit meetings,
which included renewed performances in North Korea.
Thus, cultural exchange has been significantly influenced by political circumstances and
security issues. In South Korea specifically, cultural exchange tended to increase during
the presidencies of progressive parties and decrease during those of conservative parties.
There was also a tendency for cultural exchange to temporarily increase when global
sporting events like the Olympics or World Cup were held in Korea.
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Persistent Ideological Conflict and the Impossibility of -philia
Unlike cases of lusophilia or hispanophilia, expressions of affection or admiration across
the Korean divide are subject to intense ideological scrutiny. In the Korean context, for a
South Korean to express positive sentiment toward North Korea—or for a North Korean
to express affinity for South Korea—constitutes a politically sensitive act that may trigger
accusations of ideological deviance or disloyalty. Although South Korea formally
guarantees freedom of thought and ideology, enabling the expression of pro-American,
pro-European, or pro-Chinese orientations, the articulation of a pro–North Korean stance
(ch’inbuk) remains effectively proscribed in practice.
This asymmetry reflects the persistence of ideological conflict between the two Koreas,
even more than eighty years after national division. The enduring legacy of the Cold War,
reinforced by ongoing security tensions and divergent state ideologies, continues to
structure the boundaries of permissible affect, identification, and cultural orientation. As
a result, the emergence of affective dispositions analogous to lusophilia or hispanophilia—
grounded in mutual admiration and cultural affinity—remains severely constrained on the
Korean Peninsula.
This structural constraint can be further understood through the lens of affective
nationalism and securitized identity formation. In divided societies, affect is not merely
a private disposition but a politically regulated domain, in which emotional orientations
toward the “other side” are subject to surveillance and moral judgment. On the Korean
Peninsula, expressions of sympathy, admiration, or cultural affinity toward the opposing
regime are frequently interpreted through a security-centered framework, wherein
affective attachment itself becomes politicized and securitized.
From this perspective, the near impossibility of -philia in the Korean case is not simply a
matter of individual prejudice or public opinion but the outcome of a historically
entrenched regime of ideological boundary-making. The prolonged division, sustained by
military confrontation and antagonistic state narratives, has produced rigid symbolic
boundaries that delimit not only political allegiance but also permissible forms of
emotional identification. Consequently, positive affect toward the other Korea is readily
conflated with ideological betrayal or national disloyalty, thereby foreclosing the
emergence of socially legitimate forms of cross-border admiration.
This stands in sharp contrast to the Iberian case, where lusophilia and hispanophilia could
develop as culturally sanctioned orientations despite historical conflict and rivalry. In
Iberia, the absence of an unresolved military standoff and the gradual normalization of
interstate relations allowed affective affinities to be articulated within literary, intellectual,
and cultural fields without being framed as threats to national security. In Korea, by
contrast, the unresolved armistice and the persistence of mutual securitization have
prevented affect from being disentangled from ideological allegiance.
Moreover, the asymmetry between the two Koreas further complicates the emergence of
-philia. While South Korean society formally upholds freedom of expression, the legal and
discursive legacies of anti-communism continue to restrict the social legitimacy of pro–
North Korean sentiment. In North Korea, state control over ideology and cultural
consumption entirely precludes the open articulation of admiration for South Korea. As a
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result, even when cultural fascination or curiosity exists—particularly among North
Korean youth exposed to South Korean popular culture—it remains confined to the
private or clandestine sphere and cannot crystallize into a publicly recognized or
institutionally supported form of -philia.
Taken together, these dynamics suggest that cultural affinity alone is insufficient to
generate durable forms of transnational affect in the absence of political and ideological
de-securitization. Unlike the Iberian context, where cultural exchange could precede or
substitute for political integration, the Korean case demonstrates that sustained
ideological confrontation fundamentally constrains the social conditions under which
affective orientations such as -philia can emerge. Any discussion of cultural
rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula must therefore account not only for cultural
policy or exchange mechanisms but also for the deeper structures of ideological
governance that regulate affect, loyalty, and belonging.
Conclusion: Practical Suggestions for cultural cooperation and its
obstacles
As discussed earlier, the concept of cultural Iberism articulated by Fernando Pessoa
functioned as a means of re-examining national identity by reflecting on the
commonalities shared by the two states of the Iberian Peninsula. Going beyond the
cultural realm, Pessoa sought to elevate characteristics distinctive to Iberia—such as
plasticity and cosmopolitanism—to the level of a civilizational project. This intellectual
endeavor must be understood within the historical context of the early 1910s, a period
marked by the intensification of nationalist sentiment and a widespread aspiration to
build strong and prosperous nation-states.
In contrast, as demonstrated by contemporary South Korean perceptions of unification,
many Koreans today no longer regard unification as an imperative grounded solely in the
idealized notion of a shared ethnic identity (Han minjok, Han ethnicity). Instead, public
attitudes toward unification are increasingly shaped by pragmatic considerations,
including security threats and anticipated economic burdens. Under these conditions,
cultural exchange can be understood as a practical and comparatively low-cost
mechanism for reducing the immediate burden associated with political unification, while
simultaneously mitigating the sense of disconnection between the two Koreas.
Among the various forms of cultural exchange, cooperation in the field of cultural heritage
holds particular potential for contributing to the reconstruction of national identity on the
Korean Peninsula. Despite their current political division, North and South Korea share a
long historical trajectory and a common body of cultural heritage. Through cultural
heritage exchange, the two Koreas can identify and reaffirm their cultural and historical
commonalities while minimizing the disruptive effects of ideological conflict. Such
cooperation also enables joint efforts in the preservation and transmission of shared
cultural assets.
In particular, the domain of intangible cultural heritage—including social customs,
seasonal rituals, traditional attire, and foodways—offers significant opportunities for
collaboration. Even without framing such initiatives explicitly as preparatory steps toward
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unification, joint research and exchange in this area can substantially enhance mutual
historical understanding. In this regard, Donghwan Yun argues that North and South
Korea should pursue concrete outcomes such as the joint inscription of shared intangible
cultural practices on UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of
Humanity (Yun 2018: 135). Similarly, Lee Gui-young emphasizes the importance of
establishing physical spaces dedicated to the transmission and performance of intangible
cultural heritage. He proposes the creation of exchange venues—potentially within or
near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—where recognized heritage practitioners from both
Koreas could engage in sustained and substantive interaction (Lee 2021: 198).
From a policy perspective, Jeong Eun-mi of the Korea Institute for National Unification
offers three key recommendations directed toward South Korea’s newly inaugurated Lee
Jae-myung administration. First, she advocates for a model in which civil society
organizations and local governments take the lead in socio-cultural exchange initiatives,
as government-led programs are more susceptible to ideological controversy and
partisan conflict. Second, she emphasizes the need for a phased roadmap accompanied
by clearly defined channels of communication to ensure the continuity of cultural
exchange. Finally, she underscores the importance of institutional support, including legal
and administrative reforms, to guarantee the stability and sustainability of such
exchanges over time (Jeong 2025: 3–4).
As many experts have observed, inter-Korean cultural exchange continues to depend
heavily on the orientations and political will of incumbent leaders. As a result, such
exchanges tend to take the form of temporary, event-driven initiatives. For this reason,
it is essential to establish mechanisms that enable sustained and institutionalized cultural
exchange, insulated from changes in political leadership and fluctuations in ideological
conflict.
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