OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global

Context: Security, Culture, and Transnational Perspectives

June 2026

THE UK’S RESET DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE EU: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE

ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE ERA OF POLYCRISIS

EUICHAN SHIN

081syc@naver.com

Assistant Professor at the Department of European Studies, Dongduk Women’s University, Seoul

(South Korea). Euichan Shin is Assistant Professor at the Department of European Studies at

Dongduk Women’s University. He received his PhD in International Area Studies with a

specialization in the European Union (EU) from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

Abstract

This article examines the United Kingdom’s post-Brexit reset diplomacy toward the European

Union and explores its implications for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula in the era

of polycrisis. Moving beyond the binary framing of rupture versus reversal, it argues that the

reset represents a form of pragmatic diplomacy characterised by selective and functionally

bounded cooperation conducted within enduring political and legal constraints. Conceptually,

the article links polycrisis to a diplomatic environment in which adaptability, risk management,

and issue-specific coordination take precedence, understanding it not merely as the

coexistence of multiple crises but as their interaction across security, economic, and

institutional domains that structurally limits diplomatic choice. Empirically, it shows how the

UK–EU reset has unfolded through incremental initiatives aimed at stabilising interaction in

specific policy areas, while deliberately avoiding the reopening of foundational disputes

associated with Brexit. Building on this analysis, the article extends its framework to the

Korean Peninsula, which is similarly shaped by interacting security dilemmas, great-power

competition, contested sanctions governance, and geoeconomic fragmentation. Rather than

proposing the UK–EU reset as a transferable policy model, it identifies broader analytical

lessons on diplomacy under persistent structural constraint, arguing that peace and security

are more plausibly advanced through multi-vector, issue-specific engagement and strategies

of risk containment than through comprehensive settlement efforts or assumptions of

institutional convergence.

Keywords

Polycrisis, Pragmatic diplomacy, UK–EU reset, Institutional constraints, Korean Peninsula

peace.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a reorientação da diplomacia do Reino Unido em relação à União Europeia

após o Brexit e explora as suas implicações para a paz e a segurança na Península da Coreia

na era da policrise. Ultrapassando o enquadramento binário entre rutura e reversão, defende

que essa reorientação representa uma forma de diplomacia pragmática, caracterizada por

uma cooperação seletiva e funcionalmente delimitada, conduzida dentro de restrições políticas

e jurídicas duradouras. Conceitualmente, o artigo associa a policrise a um ambiente

diplomático em que a adaptabilidade, a gestão de riscos e a coordenação específica em torno

de questões específicas têm precedência, entendendo-a não apenas como a coexistência de

múltiplas crises, mas como a sua interação nos domínios da segurança, da economia e das

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

instituições, o que limita estruturalmente as opções diplomáticas. Empiricamente, mostra

como o reinício das relações entre o Reino Unido e a UE se desenrolou através de iniciativas

incrementais destinadas a estabilizar a interação em áreas políticas específicas, evitando

deliberadamente a reabertura de disputas fundamentais associadas ao Brexit. Com base nesta

análise, o artigo alarga o seu quadro à Península Coreana, que é moldada de forma

semelhante por dilemas de segurança interativos, competição entre grandes potências,

governação contestada das sanções e fragmentação geoeconómica. Em vez de propor o

reajustamento das relações entre o Reino Unido e a UE como um modelo de política

transferível, identifica lições analíticas mais amplas sobre a diplomacia sob restrições

estruturais persistentes, argumentando que a paz e a segurança são promovidas de forma

mais plausível através de um envolvimento multivetorial e específico a cada questão e de

estratégias de contenção de riscos do que através de esforços de resolução abrangentes ou

pressupostos de convergência institucional.

Palavras-chave

Policrise, Diplomacia pragmática, Reajustamento das relações entre o Reino Unido e a UE,

Restrições institucionais, Paz na Península Coreana.

How to cite this article

Shin, Euichan (2026). The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace on the

Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations VOL. 17 Nº.

1, TD 1 – Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives, June 2026, pp. 58-75. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0426.4

Article submitted on December 31, 2025 and accepted for publication on February 9,

2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

THE UK’S RESET DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE EU: IMPLICATIONS

FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE ERA OF

POLYCRISIS

EUICHAN SHIN

Introduction

The post-Brexit trajectory of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union

(EU) has frequently been interpreted through a dichotomous lens of rupture versus

reversal. Early policy narratives following the 2016 referendum emphasised regulatory

autonomy, strategic diversification, and the pursuit of a “Global Britain” agenda beyond

Europe. Yet, nearly a decade after Brexit, this binary framing has proven insufficient for

capturing the evolving dynamics of UK–EU relations. As post-withdrawal legal

arrangements have intersected with wider geopolitical and economic disruptions, the

space for either sustained strategic detachment or institutional reintegration has become

increasingly constrained.

Rather than maintaining a posture of confrontation or seeking a return to pre-Brexit

integration, the UK has gradually adopted a calibrated approach toward the EU that

prioritises functional cooperation within the limits of the post-Brexit settlement. This

recalibration became politically explicit following the Labour Party’s return to government

in July 2024. The new government articulated its European policy as a “reset” of relations

with the EU, explicitly distancing this strategy from any intention to reverse Brexit or to

re-enter core integration frameworks such as the Single Market or the Customs Union.

Parliamentary briefings describe this approach as one aimed at reducing friction and

improving cooperation while preserving the legal and political outcomes of withdrawal

(UK Parliament, 2025a).

The concept of “reset diplomacy,” as employed by the UK government, thus denotes an

effort to normalise relations and enhance policy coordination without reopening the

foundational terms of Brexit. Importantly, this approach frames cooperation as a practical

and technical matter rather than a symbolic or constitutional one. By emphasising

continuity with the existing legal architecture, the reset seeks to depoliticise aspects of

UK–EU interaction while leaving core sovereignty claims formally untouched.

This paper argues that the UK’s reset diplomacy toward the EU is best understood as an

adaptive response to conditions of polycrisis. Polycrisis refers to the interaction and

mutual reinforcement of multiple crises including geopolitical, economic, security-related,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

and institutional that together constrain policy options more severely than any single

crisis in isolation (Lawrence et al., 2024). In the European context, the prolonged war in

Ukraine, energy insecurity, disruptions to global supply chains, and the economic

adjustment costs associated with Brexit form an entangled crisis environment. Recent

scholarship emphasises that polycrisis should be treated not as a temporary phase, but

as a durable condition characterised by persistent uncertainty and the erosion of clear

crisis-exit strategies. Under such conditions, policy approaches premised on rigid

sovereignty or comprehensive disengagement tend to generate escalating costs.

Three structural pressures are particularly relevant in shaping the UK’s reset diplomacy.

First, the deterioration of the European security environment since 2022 has reinforced

the strategic importance of close coordination among European states. Although the UK

remains firmly embedded in NATO, the war in Ukraine has highlighted operational and

industrial interdependencies linking European security actors, including EU institutions

and non-member partners (European Council, 2025a). This has increased the practical

relevance of EU-level coordination even for states formally outside the Union.

Second, uncertainty surrounding the future orientation and reliability of U.S. global

engagement has encouraged European governments to diversify security cooperation

and strengthen regional coordination mechanisms. This context has sharpened incentives

for structured UK–EU engagement in defence and security-related areas, particularly

where transatlantic guarantees alone appear insufficient.

Third, domestic economic pressures linked to post-Brexit trade frictions have generated

growing demand for targeted forms of cooperation with the EU. Regulatory divergence

has produced tangible costs in areas such as agri-food trade and carbon pricing, where

small and medium-sized enterprises embedded in EU-facing supply chains are

particularly exposed (UK Parliament, 2025b).

Within this environment, reset diplomacy can be characterised as a form of pragmatic

diplomacy. In this paper, pragmatic diplomacy refers to an interest-driven, problem-

oriented approach that prioritises practical outcomes over ideological coherence or

comprehensive institutional alignment. Rather than pursuing either full regulatory

autonomy or deep reintegration, pragmatic diplomacy operates through modular and

sector-specific arrangements that can be negotiated incrementally and adjusted over

time. Such an approach is particularly suited to polycrisis conditions, where overlapping

risks and political uncertainty limit the feasibility of comprehensive bargains.

Empirically, the UK–EU reset has unfolded through a series of concrete initiatives since

2023, gaining momentum after the 2024 change of government. These include the

restoration of regular political summitry, efforts to construct a new framework for

strategic partnership, and negotiations over partial economic and regulatory

coordination. While none of these developments amount to a reversal of Brexit, they

collectively represent a shift away from confrontation toward managed cooperation.

Beyond the European case, this paper suggests that the UK’s reset diplomacy offers

analytically relevant insights for South Korea. The Korean Peninsula is likewise situated

within a polycrisis environment shaped by great-power rivalry, alliance uncertainty,

economic fragmentation, and persistent security dilemmas. The value of this comparison

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

lies not in institutional similarity, but in the shared condition of constraint under which

diplomacy unfolds. Examining how a middle power such as the UK navigates cooperation

and autonomy under crisis entanglement contributes to broader discussions on

diplomatic strategies for maintaining peace and stability in environments where

comprehensive solutions remain politically and structurally out of reach.

Polycrisis and Pragmatic Diplomacy: A Theoretical Framework

Polycrisis and State Behaviour under Structural Constraint

The concept of polycrisis has gained analytical prominence as scholars have sought to

capture the growing complexity and instability of the contemporary global order. Unlike

conventional crisis frameworks that treat shocks as discrete, sequential, and sectorally

bounded, polycrisis refers to a condition in which multiple crises interact and reinforce

one another across domains. These interactions generate systemic effects that cannot

be adequately understood through linear or compartmentalised analysis.

The intellectual origins of the concept can be traced to Edgar Morin’s critique of modern

governance, which emphasised the interdependence of economic, political, ecological,

and social systems. Morin argued that crises in complex societies do not simply

accumulate over time. Instead, they become mutually constitutive, gradually eroding the

capacity of institutions to respond through reductionist or siloed approaches (Morin &

Kern, 1999). This insight is particularly relevant for contemporary international politics,

where policy responses in one domain increasingly produce indirect consequences in

others.

Building on this tradition, Lawrence et al. (2024) define global polycrisis as the causal

entanglement of crises spanning multiple global systems, in which interconnected

dynamics significantly diminish collective prospects. They identify three mechanisms

through which polycrisis unfolds. Common stresses exert simultaneous pressure on

multiple systems, while domino effects allow shocks to propagate across policy domains.

Over time, feedback loops further intensify instability. This formulation shifts analytical

attention away from the frequency or scale of individual crises and toward the structural

conditions under which crises interact.

Within European studies, polycrisis has become a central lens for interpreting governance

dynamics since the late 2000s. Zeitlin, Nicoli, and Laffan (2019) argue that the EU’s

experience of overlapping crises, including financial instability, migration pressures,

Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, has not produced a uniform

trajectory of either integration or disintegration. Instead, polycrisis has reshaped political

incentives and institutional practices. This has contributed to differentiated integration,

the use of experimental policy instruments, and a growing reliance on informal

coordination. Importantly, this literature emphasises that polycrisis does not determine

outcomes in advance. Rather, it alters the constraints within which political actors

operate.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

From a broader international relations perspective, polycrisis affects state behaviour by

increasing uncertainty, shortening decision horizons, and heightening sensitivity to

cumulative and indirect effects. In such environments, the costs of policy rigidity rise

substantially. Strategies grounded in ideological consistency, whether they prioritise

sovereignty maximalism or normative integrationism, risk generating spillover effects

that undermine performance in adjacent domains. As a result, states embedded in dense

networks of interdependence increasingly prioritise flexibility, reversibility, and risk

management in their external relations.

Polycrisis thus introduces a form of structural constraint that differs from traditional

accounts centred on power asymmetry or formal institutional dependence (Lawrence et

al., 2024). Constraints arise not only from external actors or legal rules, but also from

the interaction of crises that narrow the range of politically and economically viable

choices. This perspective helps explain why states may pursue cooperation even in the

absence of trust or normative alignment. Under conditions of polycrisis, cooperation

becomes less a reflection of shared values and more a pragmatic response to systemic

risk.

For the United Kingdom, the post-Brexit period coincides with precisely such a condition

of structural constraint. Economic adjustment costs associated with withdrawal from the

EU, the destabilisation of European security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, energy

insecurity, and uncertainty surrounding transatlantic relations together constitute a

sustained polycrisis environment. These overlapping pressures increase the relative costs

of prolonged confrontation with the EU and make selective cooperation a rational

adaptation rather than a normative concession. In this sense, polycrisis does not merely

provide background context for UK–EU relations. It actively reshapes the strategic

calculus through which post-Brexit diplomacy is conducted.

Pragmatic Diplomacy as an Adaptive Response to Polycrisis

Within environments characterised by structural constraint and persistent uncertainty,

pragmatic diplomacy emerges as a distinctive mode of foreign policy adaptation. In this

article, pragmatic diplomacy refers to an interest-driven and problem-oriented approach

that prioritises practical outcomes over doctrinal coherence or comprehensive

institutional alignment. Rather than seeking to resolve underlying political conflicts or to

establish stable end-states, pragmatic diplomacy focuses on managing immediate

challenges within the limits imposed by domestic politics, institutional arrangements, and

external pressures.

The conceptual roots of pragmatic diplomacy can be traced to philosophical pragmatism,

which emphasises experimentalism, learning through practice, and the evaluation of

ideas based on their consequences rather than their conformity to abstract principles.

Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009) introduce this orientation into international relations

scholarship by arguing that pragmatism enables policy-makers to navigate complex

environments through selective and situational reasoning. From this perspective,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

diplomatic action is guided less by theoretical consistency than by assessments of

feasibility under specific conditions.

In practical terms, pragmatic diplomacy manifests itself in several recurring patterns.

Cooperation is typically organised around discrete policy areas rather than

comprehensive agreements. Institutional arrangements are treated as provisional and

subject to adjustment, rather than as fixed endpoints. Fragmentation and differentiated

participation are accepted as normal features of contemporary governance, particularly

in contexts where political consensus is limited. These features align closely with practice-

oriented accounts of diplomacy, which emphasise routines, informal coordination, and

tacit knowledge as central to the functioning of international cooperation (Pouliot &

Cornut, 2015).

Changes in the structure of contemporary diplomacy further reinforce the relevance of

pragmatic approaches. Hocking (2016) observes that diplomatic practice has become

increasingly network-based and polycentric, reflecting the diffusion of authority across

state and non-state actors and the proliferation of issue-specific policy arenas. In such

settings, diplomacy rarely unfolds through singular negotiating forums or comprehensive

treaties. Instead, it operates through overlapping channels that connect governments,

international organisations, and specialised agencies. Pragmatic diplomacy is well suited

to this environment because it does not depend on hierarchical institutional control or

normative convergence.

Importantly, pragmatic diplomacy should not be conflated with opportunism or policy

inconsistency. Although it avoids rigid doctrinal commitments, it remains strategically

purposeful. Its defining feature lies in the prioritisation of feasibility and risk mitigation

under conditions of uncertainty. In polycrisis environments, this often results in

cooperation that is limited in scope and framed in technical terms, thereby reducing

domestic political exposure while preserving the possibility of future adjustment.

From this perspective, pragmatic diplomacy occupies a middle ground between classical

realist and liberal institutionalist approaches. It does not reject cooperation in favour of

unilateral power projection, nor does it assume that durable cooperation requires deep

normative alignment or institutional integration. Instead, it treats cooperation as a

contingent and context-dependent practice shaped by structural constraints. This

orientation is particularly relevant for actors operating outside formal membership

frameworks, such as the UK in its post-Brexit relationship with the EU, where political

red lines limit the scope of institutional engagement but do not eliminate functional

interdependence.

Under conditions of polycrisis, pragmatic diplomacy thus represents not a temporary

deviation from established strategies, but a durable mode of adjustment. As overlapping

crises continue to interact across security, economic, and institutional domains,

diplomatic practices that emphasise flexibility, reversibility, and issue-specific

coordination are likely to remain central to the management of international relations.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

Analytical Implications for the Study of UK–EU Relations

The combined perspective of polycrisis and pragmatic diplomacy provides a coherent

analytical lens for understanding the United Kingdom’s reset diplomacy toward the EU.

Polycrisis generates shared pressures across security, economic, and institutional

domains that weaken the viability of ideologically rigid positions. In such environments,

diplomatic strategies premised on either sustained confrontation or comprehensive

reintegration tend to incur escalating political and material costs. Pragmatic diplomacy

offers an alternative logic by enabling cooperation to proceed within clearly recognised

constraints.

This framework helps explain both the timing and the form of the UK–EU reset. The

recalibration of relations did not emerge from a fundamental reassessment of Brexit as

a political project. Instead, it reflected a gradual adjustment to the cumulative pressures

generated by overlapping crises. Security uncertainty, economic volatility, and regulatory

interdependence interacted to narrow the range of feasible policy options, making

selective cooperation increasingly attractive even in the absence of political trust or

normative convergence.

Analytically, the emphasis on modular and issue-specific cooperation is particularly

significant. Rather than pursuing a single overarching agreement, the UK–EU reset has

unfolded through discrete initiatives that address concrete policy needs while avoiding

politically sensitive questions of institutional membership. This approach reduces the risk

that setbacks in one domain will undermine cooperation in others. It also allows both

parties to recalibrate engagement over time in response to changing conditions, a feature

that is especially valuable in polycrisis environments characterised by uncertainty and

rapid change.

The framework further highlights the importance of recognising political and institutional

constraints as constitutive elements of diplomacy rather than as obstacles to be

overcome. In the UK–EU case, domestic political red lines in the UK and legal-institutional

limits on the EU side shape not only what forms of cooperation are possible, but also how

cooperation is framed and justified. Treating these constraints analytically helps explain

why the reset has taken an incremental, technically oriented form rather than moving

toward deeper institutionalisation.

Finally, this perspective clarifies the distinction between cooperation and convergence.

The UK–EU reset demonstrates that functional cooperation can be sustained without

shared long-term integration goals or normative alignment. Cooperation emerges as a

contingent practice aimed at managing specific risks rather than as a pathway toward

systemic transformation. This insight is central to the broader argument of the article, as

it allows the analysis to move beyond debates over integration outcomes and toward a

more grounded understanding of how diplomacy operates under conditions of structural

constraint.

By establishing these analytical implications, this section provides a conceptual bridge

between the theoretical discussion of polycrisis and pragmatic diplomacy and the

empirical analysis of the UK–EU reset that follows. It sets the stage for examining how

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

these dynamics have been translated into concrete diplomatic practices, while remaining

attentive to the limits imposed by post-Brexit political and institutional realities.

The UK–EU Reset under Polycrisis: Structural Pressures and Pragmatic

Diplomacy

Structural Pressures in a Polycrisis Environment

The recalibration of UK–EU relations has continued to unfold within a polycrisis

environment characterised by persistence rather than resolution. Since 2025,

overlapping security, economic, and institutional pressures have not stabilised into a new

equilibrium. Instead, they have evolved in ways that reinforce one another, further

constraining diplomatic choice. Within this context, the UK–EU reset has increasingly

been framed not as a discretionary policy initiative, but as a functional response to

sustained uncertainty.

From a geopolitical perspective, the European security landscape remains unsettled.

Although the war in Ukraine has entered a protracted phase, its implications for European

defence planning and strategic coordination have deepened rather than diminished. The

EU has continued to expand its role in defence-industrial coordination and sanctions

governance, while debates over burden-sharing and strategic autonomy have intensified

(European Council, 2025b). These developments underscore the extent to which

European security governance now operates across multiple institutional layers, including

NATO, EU frameworks, and partnerships with non-member states. For the UK, this has

increased the practical costs associated with sustained distance from EU-level

coordination, even as formal boundaries related to membership remain firmly in place.

Economic pressures have likewise persisted and accumulated. Post-Brexit trade frictions

continue to intersect with broader challenges related to supply-chain resilience, energy

security, and sluggish growth. Parliamentary briefings published since 2025 indicate that

non-tariff barriers and regulatory divergence have become structural features of UK–EU

economic relations rather than transitional effects (UK Parliament, 2025c; House of Lords

Library, 2026). Over time, the cumulative impact of these constraints has heightened

political sensitivity to the economic costs of limited cooperation, particularly in sectors

where regulatory divergence generates disproportionate adjustment burdens.

What distinguishes this phase of UK–EU relations is not the emergence of new crises, but

the interaction of existing ones. Security uncertainty, economic adjustment, and

institutional separation increasingly reinforce each other, narrowing the range of

politically viable strategies. Under such conditions, approaches premised on either

sustained confrontation or comprehensive reintegration become difficult to sustain. The

reset should therefore be understood less as a change in strategic ambition than as an

effort to manage exposure to systemic risk within a prolonged polycrisis environment.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

Security Recalibration and Cooperation beyond Membership

Security cooperation has remained central to the evolving UK–EU reset, particularly as

the limits of purely alliance-based frameworks have become more apparent. Although

NATO continues to function as the primary pillar of European collective defence, the

expansion of EU-level initiatives in defence-industrial coordination, procurement

cooperation, and military mobility has increased the functional relevance of EU

institutions for European security governance (European Commission, 2022). This

development does not displace NATO’s role, but it does complicate the institutional

landscape within which European security cooperation now operates.

By early 2026, this dynamic had translated into renewed discussions concerning UK

participation in selected EU defence-related mechanisms (Tidey & Jones, 2026). Public

statements and media reporting suggested that the UK government was reassessing its

position on engagement with EU initiatives linked to joint procurement and industrial

capacity-building. These discussions were framed explicitly in functional terms. Rather

than signalling a move toward institutional reintegration, they reflected shared concerns

regarding capability gaps, production constraints, and the sustainability of defence

support in a prolonged security crisis.

This recalibration points to a layered approach to security cooperation. The UK has

continued to emphasise the primacy of NATO and the transatlantic relationship, while

increasingly acknowledging that effective European security governance depends on

coordination across multiple institutional venues (European Council, 2025b). Cooperation

beyond formal membership thus emerges as a strategic compromise. It allows the UK to

retain political autonomy while reducing the operational costs associated with exclusion

from EU-led coordination frameworks. Under conditions of persistent security

uncertainty, this form of pragmatic engagement becomes less an exception than a

practical necessity.

Economic and Regulatory Adjustment after Brexit

Economic and regulatory adjustment constitutes a second core dimension of the UK–EU

reset. While the Trade and Cooperation Agreement continues to provide the baseline

framework for bilateral economic relations, its limitations have become increasingly

visible as regulatory divergence intersects with broader shifts in industrial and climate

policy. EU initiatives related to economic security and climate governance have generated

external pressures on UK firms integrated into European value chains, particularly in

sectors characterised by tight regulatory coupling (European Commission, 2023).

By early 2026, sector-specific negotiations had moved from abstract debate toward

exploratory discussions focused on technical and transitional arrangements. In the agri-

food sector, renewed attention to sanitary and phytosanitary measures reflected growing

concern over supply disruption, administrative burden, and competitiveness (UK

Parliament, 2025d). Similarly, discussions surrounding emissions trading coordination

were driven less by normative alignment than by awareness that regulatory divergence

could impose asymmetric costs in an already strained economic environment.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

These developments highlight the evolving logic of economic cooperation under the reset.

Regulatory coordination is increasingly framed as a tool for risk mitigation rather than

convergence. By pursuing targeted adjustments in areas where divergence generates

disproportionate costs, the UK seeks to stabilise economic interaction with the EU while

maintaining the political narrative of post-Brexit autonomy. This pattern is consistent

with the broader logic of pragmatic diplomacy under polycrisis, where cooperation is

justified by functional necessity and bounded by political constraint.

Political and Institutional Constraints of the Reset

Despite growing incentives for cooperation, the scope and form of the UK–EU reset

remain shaped by enduring political and institutional constraints on both sides. These

constraints help explain why the reset has taken an incremental and selective form rather

than evolving into a comprehensive framework for renewed integration.

In the UK, Brexit continues to carry significant political salience. Successive governments

have reiterated commitments to core Brexit red lines, including the rejection of EU single

market membership, the customs union, and free movement of persons. These

constraints limit the political feasibility of deep or highly visible forms of integration and

steer policy toward technocratic, sector-specific arrangements that attract less public

scrutiny (House of Lords Library, 2026). As a result, the reset is framed in terms of

normalisation and improvement rather than reversal.

On the EU side, institutional constraints are equally consequential. The legal architecture

of the EU and concerns about precedent-setting restrict the depth of cooperation that

can be extended to third countries without corresponding obligations (Fabbrini, 2020).

Internal divergences among member states regarding the strategic value of closer

engagement with the UK further complicate efforts to institutionalise cooperation beyond

narrowly defined areas.

Taken together, these constraints reinforce a modular approach to the reset. Rather than

pursuing a single overarching agreement, both parties have favoured incremental

progress through discrete initiatives and structured dialogues. This approach allows

cooperation to advance where mutual benefits are clear while containing political and

legal risks. In this sense, the reset reflects not a transitional stage toward reintegration,

but a relatively stable equilibrium shaped by the enduring legacies of Brexit and the

pressures of polycrisis.

Implications for Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula

Polycrisis on the Korean Peninsula: Interlocking Security and

Geoeconomic Pressures

The Korean Peninsula constitutes a paradigmatic case of polycrisis in which security,

geoeconomic, and institutional pressures interact in ways that significantly constrain

diplomatic choice. Unlike episodic crises that can be addressed through discrete policy

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

interventions, the peninsula is shaped by the persistence of unresolved confrontation,

the accumulation of risk across domains, and the absence of stable mechanisms for crisis

exit. These conditions generate a structural environment in which policy flexibility is

limited and the costs of miscalculation are particularly high.

At the core of this polycrisis lies the unresolved legacy of the Korean War and the

continued development of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear

and missile capabilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly reported

that it remains unable to conduct verification activities in the DPRK, while continuing to

monitor relevant facilities through open-source and satellite-based information (IAEA,

2024). This lack of verification does not merely represent a technical limitation. It

constitutes a structural source of uncertainty that complicates risk assessment and

undermines the predictability required for sustained crisis management.

Sanctions governance forms a second, closely related layer of polycrisis. While United

Nations Security Council sanctions formally remain in place, their enforcement and

monitoring have become increasingly contested. Resolution 2680 (2023) extended the

mandate of the Panel of Experts only on a temporary basis, and the Panel’s final report

documented persistent evasion practices and growing obstacles to coordinated

enforcement (United Nations Security Council, 2024). The subsequent termination of the

Panel’s mandate has introduced an additional element of institutional fragmentation,

weakening shared situational awareness and complicating multilateral coordination.

A third dimension of polycrisis emerges from the growing salience of geoeconomic

competition. Global debates on economic security, supply-chain resilience, and

technological controls increasingly intersect with traditional security concerns. The World

Economic Forum (2026) identifies geoeconomic confrontation and the weaponisation of

economic interdependence as among the most significant short-term global risks. For the

Korean Peninsula, these dynamics are particularly consequential. South Korea’s security

remains anchored in alliance commitments, while its economic model is deeply embedded

in global value chains exposed to strategic trade controls and technological decoupling.

What distinguishes the peninsula’s polycrisis is not the presence of multiple challenges

per se, but the way in which these pressures reinforce one another. Nuclear risk

intensifies sanctions politics, sanctions governance intersects with great-power rivalry,

and geoeconomic competition feeds back into security calculations. Under such

conditions, diplomatic strategies premised on comprehensive settlement or linear

progress become difficult to sustain. The polycrisis of the Korean Peninsula should

therefore be understood not as a temporary convergence of challenges, but as a

structural condition that narrows the space for diplomatic manoeuvre and elevates the

importance of risk management (World Bank, 2024).

Analytical Lessons from Pragmatic Diplomacy under Polycrisis

The UK–EU reset examined in Chapter 3 does not offer a transferable institutional model

for the Korean Peninsula. Its analytical relevance lies instead in the mechanisms through

which diplomatic cooperation has been recalibrated under conditions of structural

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

constraint. These mechanisms provide insight into how diplomacy functions in

environments where comprehensive settlements are politically and institutionally

unattainable.

A first analytical lesson concerns the logic of selective cooperation. Under polycrisis

conditions, attempts to pursue all-encompassing agreements tend to raise the political

threshold for engagement to a level that is difficult to sustain. The UK–EU reset illustrates

how cooperation can be organised around discrete functional domains without reopening

foundational disputes. Analytically applied to the Korean Peninsula, this suggests that

limited forms of engagement may remain possible even when progress on core security

issues is blocked, not because political relations have improved, but because functional

coordination serves to manage specific risks.

A second lesson relates to incrementalism and modularity. Rather than constructing a

single overarching framework, the reset has proceeded through layered and reversible

arrangements that contain political exposure. This feature is particularly relevant in

contexts characterised by domestic political volatility and security uncertainty.

Incremental mechanisms allow interaction to continue without requiring irreversible

commitments or assumptions of linear progress.

A third lesson concerns the treatment of constraints as constitutive elements of

diplomacy. In the UK–EU case, domestic political red lines and institutional limits are not

framed as temporary obstacles to be overcome, but as parameters within which

cooperation is designed and justified. Strategic documents produced by the Republic of

Korea similarly acknowledge that national security policy operates at the intersection of

military threats, economic security, and great-power competition (Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2022). Recognising these constraints analytically reduces the

risk of overestimating the feasibility of ambitious diplomatic initiatives in structurally

constrained environments.

Finally, pragmatic diplomacy under polycrisis underscores the distinction between

cooperation and convergence. The UK–EU reset demonstrates that functional cooperation

does not require institutional convergence or normative alignment. Cooperation emerges

as a contingent practice aimed at managing specific risks rather than as a pathway

toward political reconciliation or systemic transformation. For the Korean Peninsula,

where institutional integration analogous to the European experience is neither feasible

nor analytically appropriate, this distinction is particularly significant.

Taken together, these analytical lessons do not point toward solutions or policy

prescriptions. Instead, they clarify how diplomacy adapts when its scope is narrowed by

persistent uncertainty and structural constraint. In this sense, pragmatic diplomacy

under polycrisis provides an interpretive framework for understanding diplomatic practice

in high-risk environments rather than a blueprint for conflict resolution.

Multi-Vector Cooperation and Risk Management on the Korean Peninsula

If the Korean Peninsula is understood as a setting shaped by polycrisis, diplomatic

engagement oriented toward a single institutional or strategic track is unlikely to provide

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

a stable basis for managing risk. An analytically more appropriate framing is multi-vector

cooperation, understood here not as a prescriptive strategy, but as a descriptive concept

capturing the plurality of channels through which interaction is organised under

conditions of structural constraint.

In the international relations literature, multi-vector foreign policy has been used to

describe how states navigate competitive environments by cultivating pragmatic relations

with multiple power centres rather than aligning exclusively with a single actor. Research

on secondary and middle powers emphasises that such an approach is not driven by

ideological neutrality, but by efforts to preserve autonomy and manage exposure to

external risks in environments where dependence on any single partner may generate

vulnerability (Vanderhill et al., 2020). This conceptualisation provides a useful analytical

lens for examining diplomatic practice on the Korean Peninsula, where structural

constraints limit the feasibility of singular or linear approaches to engagement.

Empirically, elements of multi-vector engagement are already visible in the peninsula’s

diplomatic landscape. South Korea’s security posture remains anchored in alliance-based

deterrence, while its diplomatic practice extends across multilateral institutions, regional

partnerships, and issue-specific forms of coordination. This plurality reflects a context in

which no single framework is capable of addressing the full range of security, economic,

and geopolitical pressures confronting the peninsula.

From an analytical perspective, the significance of multi-vector cooperation lies in its

relationship to risk management across domains. Geoeconomic tensions associated with

supply-chain restructuring, technological controls, and industrial policy increasingly

interact with traditional security concerns. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development has noted that economic security risks linked to global value chains

and strategic technologies now directly shape national security calculations, particularly

for economies deeply embedded in international production networks (OECD, 2024).

Under such conditions, disruptions originating in one domain can rapidly spill over into

others.

In this context, dispersing diplomatic engagement across multiple vectors may reduce

the likelihood that shocks cascade uncontrollably across policy areas. Security escalation

can disrupt economic and diplomatic channels that contribute to broader stability, while

unmanaged geoeconomic confrontation may exacerbate security dilemmas. Multi-vector

engagement, understood analytically, draws attention to how diplomatic practice can

mitigate such cross-domain spillovers without presupposing convergence or political

reconciliation.

Domestic political dynamics constitute an additional dimension of risk under polycrisis.

Survey research conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification indicates that

public attitudes toward inter-Korean relations and unification have become increasingly

heterogeneous and contingent (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2025). This

variability complicates the sustainability of diplomatic initiatives that rely on singular

narratives or narrowly defined policy tracks. Viewed analytically, multi-vector

engagement highlights how diplomatic interaction can persist despite fluctuations in

domestic preferences.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

Importantly, multi-vector cooperation does not imply strategic ambiguity, nor does it

entail the dilution of existing security commitments. It also does not presuppose progress

toward conflict resolution. Its analytical value lies in drawing attention to how diplomacy

under polycrisis prioritises risk containment, adaptability, and systemic resilience over

linear advancement toward settlement. In this sense, multi-vector cooperation captures

a mode of diplomatic practice oriented toward stabilising interaction in an environment

where uncertainty is not episodic, but enduring.

Conclusion

This article set out to examine the United Kingdom’s reset diplomacy toward the

European Union as a case of pragmatic cooperation under conditions of polycrisis, and to

explore its analytical implications for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. Rather

than interpreting the reset as a transitional step toward reintegration or as a symbolic

political shift, the analysis conceptualised it as a mode of diplomacy shaped by enduring

structural constraints and overlapping sources of uncertainty.

Drawing on the concept of polycrisis, the article argued that contemporary international

politics is increasingly characterised by the interaction of multiple crises across security,

economic, and institutional domains. In such environments, diplomatic strategies

premised on comprehensive settlement, institutional convergence, or linear progress

become difficult to sustain. Instead, diplomacy tends to prioritise adaptability, risk

management, and functionally bounded forms of cooperation. Chapter 2 established this

analytical framework by linking polycrisis to pragmatic diplomacy as a mode of

adjustment rather than an exception to established practice.

Against this backdrop, Chapter 3 analysed the UK–EU reset as an empirical illustration of

how diplomacy operates under constraint. The reset has been driven not by normative

convergence or a return to pre-Brexit integration, but by cumulative pressures associated

with security uncertainty, geoeconomic competition, and regulatory interdependence.

Cooperation has therefore proceeded in selective and incremental ways, bounded by

persistent political and institutional limits on both sides. Rather than resolving underlying

disputes, the reset has stabilised interaction by enabling limited coordination in specific

domains while preserving domestic political constraints.

Chapter 4 extended this analytical lens to the Korean Peninsula, which constitutes a

particularly acute case of polycrisis. The analysis demonstrated that unresolved military

confrontation, contested sanctions governance, and intensifying geoeconomic pressures

interact to narrow diplomatic choice and elevate the costs of rigidity. Rather than offering

policy prescriptions, the discussion identified analytical lessons regarding how diplomacy

functions when comprehensive solutions are structurally out of reach. In such settings,

diplomatic practice is more plausibly oriented toward managing risk, containing cross-

domain spillovers, and sustaining engagement through multiple and issue-specific

channels.

Taken together, the findings of this article suggest that diplomacy in the era of polycrisis

is increasingly judged not by its capacity to deliver definitive outcomes, but by its ability

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

to reduce systemic risk and stabilise interaction under conditions of persistent

uncertainty. The UK–EU reset illustrates one such mode of pragmatic adjustment. Its

relevance for the Korean Peninsula lies not in what it achieves, but in how it operates

under constraint. By focusing on the forms and logics of diplomatic practice rather than

on institutional end-states, this article contributes to a broader understanding of how

peace and security may be pursued when resolution itself remains a long-term horizon

rather than an immediate possibility.

References

European Commission. (2022). European defence technological and industrial base.

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/

European Commission. (2023). European economic security strategy (Communication).

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/

European Council. (2025a). EU–UK summit, 19 May 2025.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/05/19/

European Council. (2025b). European Council conclusions on European defence and

security.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-

council-conclusions-on-european-defence-and-security/

Fabbrini, F. (2020). Brexit and the future of the European Union: The case for

constitutional reforms. Oxford University Press.

Friedrichs, J., & Kratochwil, F. (2009). On acting and knowing: How pragmatism can

advance international relations research and methodology. International Organization,

63(4), 701–731. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990142

Hocking, B. (2016). Diplomacy and foreign policy. In R. A. W. Rhodes & P. ’t Hart (Eds.),

The Oxford handbook of political institutions (pp. 596–614). Oxford University Press.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2024). Application of safeguards in the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (GC(68)/15). https://www.iaea.org

Korea Institute for National Unification. (2025). KINU Unification Survey 2025: Executive

summary.

https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/module/report/view.do?category=76&idx=128339

Lawrence, M., Homer-Dixon, T., Janzwood, S., Rockström, J., Renn, O., & Donges, J. F.

(2024). Global polycrisis: The causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement. Global

Sustainability, 7(e16), 1-36. https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2024.1

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. (2022). Strategy for a free, peaceful, and

prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Press-

Releases/view?articleId=6733&type=O

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

Morin, E., & Kern, A.-B. (1999). Homeland Earth: A manifesto for the new millennium.

Hampton Press.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2024). Global value chains

and economic security. OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org

Pouliot, V., & Cornut, J. (2015). Practice theory and the study of diplomacy: A research

agenda. Cooperation and Conflict, 50(3), 297–315.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715574913

Tidey, A., & Jones, M. G. (2026, February 3). EU and UK to ramp up talks on closer ties

10 years after Brexit referendum. Euronews.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/03/eu-and-uk-to-ramp-up-talks-on-

closer-ties-10-years-after-brexit-referendum

UK Parliament, House of Commons Library. (2025a). Resetting the UK’s relationship with

the European Union (Research Briefing).

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10207/

UK Parliament, House of Commons Library. (2025b). The UK–EU reset: Next steps after

the May 2025 summit (Research Briefing).

http://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10312/

UK Parliament, House of Commons Library. (2025c). Statistics on UK–EU trade (Research

Briefing CBP-7851).

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7851/

UK Parliament, House of Commons Library. (2025d). The 2026 review of the Trade and

Cooperation Agreement and the UK–EU reset (Research Briefing CBP-10390).

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10390/

UK Parliament, House of Lords Library. (2026, January). UK–EU relations: Proposals for

customs union and connections with the EU single market.

https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-eu-relations-proposals-for-customs-union-and-

connections-with-the-eu-single-market/

United Nations Security Council. (2023). Resolution 2680 (2023) (S/RES/2680).

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil

United Nations Security Council. (2024). Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted

pursuant to resolution 2680 (2023) (S/2024/215). https://digitallibrary.un.org

Vanderhill, R., Joireman, S. F., & Tulepbayeva, R. (2020). Between the bear and the

dragon: Multivectorism in Kazakhstan as a model strategy for secondary powers.

International Affairs, 96(4), 975–993. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa061

World Bank. (2024). Poverty, Prosperity, and Planet Report 2024: Pathways out of the

polycrisis. World Bank. https://polycrisis.org/resource/poverty-prosperity-and-planet-

report-pathways-out-of-the-polycrisis/

World Economic Forum. (2026). The global risks report 2026 (21st ed.).

https://www.weforum.org

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 58-75

The UK’s Reset Diplomacy Towards the EU: Implications for Peace

on the Korean Peninsula in the Era of Polycrisis

Euichan Shin

Zeitlin, J., Nicoli, F., & Laffan, B. (2019). Introduction: The European Union beyond the

polycrisis? Journal of European Public Policy, 26(7), 963–976.

https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1619803