Under the Biden administration, efforts were made to revive nuclear negotiations with
Iran, but these attempts met repeated cycles of progress and suspension, ultimately
failing to accomplish a renewed agreement. At the end of Biden’s administration, renewed
instability in the Middle East emerged following Hamas’s attack on Israel. Shortly after
returning to office in 2025, President Trump initiated a new round of nuclear negotiations
with Iran. However, within a short period—reportedly as soon as the following month—
the U.S. launched a surprise strike on Iranian nuclear facilities using bunker-buster
munitions. Subsequently, the Trump administration justified further military action by
claiming the detection of an “imminent threat,” conducting joint strikes with Israel that
targeted senior Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In response,
Iran warned that the U.S. had crossed a critical red line, and the possibility of direct
U.S.–Iran war became a tangible reality observed by the international community.
At present, Iran has moved to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz, posing a severe
military threat by restricting the passage of oil tankers belonging to the U.S. and its allies
and partners. Contrary to earlier expectations by the Trump administration that the
situation would be resolved quickly, this development introduced an unanticipated level
of disruption. In the end, the U.S. called upon its allies—including European countries,
South Korea, and Japan—to participate in the case more actively. However, when
European states, particularly those within NATO, collectively declined to engage, the
Trump administration defined his call as a “test” of alliance commitment and proceeded
to explore ceasefire negotiations with Iran independently.
This sequence of events illustrates the extent to which the Trump administration
approached alliances in instrumental and asymmetric terms. The decision to strike Iran
was marked by a lack of transparent justification and proceeded without sufficient
domestic support or prior consultation with allied states. Only after encountering strategic
difficulties did the administration turn to its allies, not through cooperative coordination,
but through pressure framed as requests for deployment, thereby attempting to draw
them into the conflict. Given Iran’s geopolitical significance in global energy security,
allied states had strong incentives to approach such involvement extra cautiously not to
be entrapped together.
In the case of South Korea, dependence on imported energy reaches approximately 90
percent, with around 70 percent of oil imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. As
tensions escalated, oil prices rose by approximately 20 percent within two weeks
compared to pre-crisis levels. Although the South Korean government sought to respond,
the prolonged nature of the conflict—contrary to initial U.S. expectations—led to rising
costs in oil-related products, including rubber and plastics, as well as increased exchange
rate volatility. These effects are directly hitting the public. While the Iranian ambassador
to South Korea stated that South Korea is not a hostile state, he also implicitly suggested
that non-cooperation with the U.S. would be conditional for this position (Seo, 2026).
In this context, the reluctance of allies to participate in military deployment was met by
the Trump administration’s characterization of the situation as a test of commitment.
This framing, alongside attempts to reduce a matter involving national survival and
human security to rhetorical positioning, can be interpreted as reflecting a diminished