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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº.1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global

Context: Security, Culture, and Transnational Perspectives

June 2026

NORTH KOREA: BACK TO THE FUTURE IS NO SOLUTION

MICHAEL REITERER

michael.reiterer@vub.be

Professor for International Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance

(Belgium). Adjunct Professor for International Politics, University of Innsbruck (habilitation 2005,

PhD equivalent), Webster University/Vienna, LUISS/Rome, Danube University/Krems; Guest

professorships at Ritsumeikan University/Kyoto, Kobe and Keio University/Tokyo. Associate

Fellow – Global Fellowship Initiative, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Senior Advisor at

Centre for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS), Washington DC, Austria Institute for Europa and Security

Policy (AIES) Vienna, and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW); extensive

list of publications. Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea (2017-2020),

Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein (2007-2011) rtd. Previously Minister, Deputy

Head of EU-Delegation to Japan (2002-2006); ASEM Counsellor (1998-2002); Minister-

Counsellor, Austrian Mission to the European Union (1997-98); Counsellor, Austrian Mission to

the GATT (1990-92); Austrian Deputy Trade Commissioner to Japan (1985-88) and Western

Africa (1982-85). Panellist at WTO dispute settlement; Co-chair Trade of Joint Group of Trade

and Environment Experts, OECD. Honorary citizen of Seoul (2020); Order of Merit in Silver with

Star, Government of the Republic of Austria (2018).

Abstract

Recalling the 75th anniversary of the Korean War and its implications for global security, the

paper contrasts the peaceful international relations within the EU with the reliance on military

force in East Asia. Based on the comprehensive relationship between South Korea and the EU,

security cooperation has increased also in terms of hardware (arms sales). It could be

intensified to meet the challenges posed for securing supply chains and global trade policy.

The paper addresses the geopolitical dynamics involving North Korea, Russia, and China,

analysing the impact of these new strategic alliances and military cooperation that have

emerged. While denuclearisation should remain the long-term goal, there is a need to rethink

of traditional policies towards North Korea, considering technological advances, lessening of

legal constraints, upending of the goal of unification by the North and the negative examples

of powers having abandoned nuclear arms. ‘Back to the Future’ in applying traditional tools

and instruments is no longer an option – neither for South Korea, nor the European Union.

"Forward to the Past", learning from history but adapting those lessons to new realities rather

than simply repeating old patterns, must be the new direction. To preserve some influence

outside the US-China-Russia triangle and in recognition that there is only one security, the EU

needs to strengthen its engagement in East Asia, based on its comprehensive security

approach. This could include nominating an EU Special Representative for Northeast Asia to

contribute to trust building, reopening of lines of communication and bring diplomacy back to

prevent the flareup of another hot spot.

Keywords

Korean Peninsula, European Union, resilience, strategic cooperation, might-is-right.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

Resumo

Recordando o 75.º aniversário da Guerra da Coreia e as suas implicações para a segurança

global, o artigo contrasta as relações internacionais pacíficas no seio da UE com a dependência

da força militar na Ásia Oriental. Com base nas relações abrangentes entre a Coreia do Sul e

a UE, a cooperação em matéria de segurança tem vindo a aumentar também no que diz

respeito ao equipamento militar (venda de armas). Esta cooperação poderia ser intensificada

para responder aos desafios colocados pela segurança das cadeias de abastecimento e pela

política comercial global. O artigo aborda a dinâmica geopolítica envolvendo a Coreia do Norte,

a Rússia e a China, analisando o impacto destas novas alianças estratégicas e da cooperação

militar que surgiram. Embora a desnuclearização deva continuar a ser o objetivo a longo

prazo, é necessário repensar as políticas tradicionais em relação à Coreia do Norte, tendo em

conta os avanços tecnológicos, a diminuição das restrições legais, a reviravolta no objetivo

de unificação por parte do Norte e os exemplos negativos de potências que abandonaram as

armas nucleares. «Regressar ao Futuro» na aplicação de ferramentas e instrumentos

tradicionais já não é uma opção — nem para a Coreia do Sul, nem para a União Europeia.

«Avançar para o Passado», aprendendo com a história mas adaptando essas lições às novas

realidades, em vez de simplesmente repetir velhos padrões, deve ser a nova direção. Para

preservar alguma influência fora do triângulo EUA-China-Rússia e reconhecendo que existe

apenas uma segurança, a UE precisa de reforçar o seu envolvimento na Ásia Oriental, com

base na sua abordagem abrangente em matéria de segurança. Isto poderia incluir a nomeação

de um Representante Especial da UE para a Ásia Nordeste, a fim de contribuir para a

construção de confiança, a reabertura de canais de comunicação e o regresso da diplomacia

para evitar o surto de outro foco de tensão.

Palavras-chave

Península Coreana, União Europeia, resiliência, cooperação estratégica, «o poder faz a razão».

How to cite this article

Reiterer, Michael (2026). North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1 – Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global

Context: Security, Culture, and Transnational Perspectives, June 2026, pp. 5-23. DOI

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0426.1

Article submitted on December 31, 2025, and accepted for publication on February 6,

2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

NORTH KOREA: BACK TO THE FUTURE IS NO SOLUTION

MICHAEL REITERER

Introduction

The 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War serves as a poignant reminder

of the ongoing security tensions in East Asia. The Korean Peninsula remains entangled in

unresolved conflict (Taiwan, South and East China Sea, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan…)

and global security challenges, exacerbated by new strategic alliances in the region.

The coincidence of this anniversary of the Korean War and that of the Schuman

Declaration highlights the contrast between the peaceful system of international relations

within the EU, albeit not in the whole of Europe – Ukraine - and the mistrust and reliance

on military force that persist in East Asia. South Korea is technically still at war with North

Korea, as is Japan with Russia because of the Kurile Islands (Northern Territories).

For South Korea, this conflict at its doorstep, requires full attention. This needs a foreign

policy building international cooperation to control and solve this internationalised

conflict. At the same time, the country must shoulder international responsibility as a

major economy and as a technology provider.

The EU's engagement in East Asia must evolve to address these complexities through

innovative diplomacy, comprehensive security approaches, and updated policy

strategies.

The main conclusion this paper will develop is that it is necessary for the EU to adapt its

critical engagement strategy towards North Korea and embrace innovative diplomacy to

maintain or build some influence in Northeast Asia. By fostering deeper partnerships with

South Korea and Japan and addressing North Korea’s nuclear threat through deterrence

and dialogue, the EU can contribute to regional stability and uphold the principles of a

rules-based international order.

Considerable Change of the Geopolitical Context

As a sort of Cold War and tensions have persisted in Asia since the end of the Great

Pacific War, recognition and standing as a global political player is still measured

according to military and political parameters. Economics is crucial but not enough to be

counted in as one of the big players – geo-economics is just one part of geo-politics, the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

arms race has persisted, not least because of China’s heavy investment in building a blue

water navy.

COVID 19 brought some change: the importance of supply and production chains came

to the fore. The weaponisation of trade and in particular the most beautiful word in the

vocabulary of President Trump, “tariffs”, moved trade policy back not only into the

limelight but also the stone age. This unravelling of past achievements, in particular the

WTO which had been set up to de-politicise trade policy and provide stability and

predictability, leads to unseen disturbances and welfare losses for all. Populists are not

aware, that in the long run, there is no protection in protectionism.

Like the Korean War which internationalised with the intervention of UN-forces under US

leadership, the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine demonstrates to everybody that

there is only one security: South Korea joined the group of countries condemning the

flagrant breach of the Charta of the United Nations by Russia and applies sanctions. It

also started to backfill arms for Ukraine through sales of weapons to Poland and the US.

South Korea also started to backfill arms for Ukraine through sales of weapons to Poland

and the US. Thus, on the Ukrainian battlefields South Korean weapons meet North Korean

soldiers and arms.

A continuation of past policies, more of the same, will neither preserve the status quo,

which is not desirable anyhow, nor bring the problem closer to a solution. Thus, while

denuclearisation remains the global long-term goal, it is unlikely that North Korea will

give up its nuclear arsenal any time soon as it guarantees regime survival. The recent

attack of Iran by Israel, supported by the US by attacks on Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan

with “bunker buster" bombs (GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator - MOP) will harden

this conviction: Ghaddafi in Libya, Hussein in Iraq and Ukraine renounced nuclear

weapons and paid a heavy price. In short, “Back to the Future” would mean more tension

and turmoil ahead.

And the winner is: North Korea

North Korea has improved its position in gaining more options: it has added Russia as a

balancer to the rocky relationship with its long-time-only supporter, China. The 2024

Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed by Putin and Kim Jong-un Un

provides for "military and other assistance" in case of an armed attack. This amounts to

an alliance and could turn what was often regarded as technicality or left-over from the

Korean War – there is only an armistice between the two Koreas and no peace treaty -

into a serious issue: According to Russian propaganda, Russia is under attack by NATO

and must defend itself. Therefore, North Korea is providing assistance in sending troops

and not only weapons. According to the same logic, North Korea could claim Russian

support against South Korea with which it is technically still at war!

North Korean soldiers on European soil are a serious escalation and could involve an

Asian state in a conflict with NATO, should Putin decide in the future to attack a NATO

member. This alliance will embolden North Korea’s Kim Jong-un as he finally gets out of

the unilateral dependence on China and now has Russia as a hedging partner vis-à-vis

China. At the same time and different from 2018, Kim Jong-un will also be less keen to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

restart his bromance with Donald Trump; he also refuses the persistent overtures of

President Lee Jae-myung to recalibrate the relationship after the hawkish President Yoon

and open lines of bilateral communication.

While Russia attempted extending this trilateral China-Russia-North Korea to Iran,

hostilities between Israel and Iran as well US attacks on Iran have devalued this

extension. The other supporters of Russia, who rejected in 2022 condemning the

aggression against Ukraine in the United Nations, namely Belarus, Eritrea and Syria, are

no material support.

Most importantly in the UN context, the veto of Russia to reconduct the UN Panel of

Experts e.g., the committee monitoring sanctions, takes off some pressure from the

North, as the replacement, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT)

carries less authority. The non-prolongation of the UN Panel, however, has NOT ended

the sanctions which remain in place and therefore need to be implemented. The first

report of the MSMT published on 29 May 2025, underscores this fact. It also calls for

active diplomacy to restore the UN Panel – which grants more legitimacy – and invites

the DPRK to engage diplomatically. The reporting focuses on the North Korea – Russia

cooperation.

Russia and North Korea are under heavy sanctions. In the case of North Korea, they

have not realised the main goal, to stop the development of nuclear weapons and inter-

ballistic missile systems. As a collateral damage, the North Korean people suffer from

malnutrition, a miserable standard of living while the family dictatorship shields itself and

its cronies from the effects of sanctions.

North Korea excels in making use of emerging technologies: cybercrime helps to fill the

otherwise empty state pockets, facilitated using crypto currencies/bitcoins

which are

difficult to track. Chinese knowhow allows to maintain the Korean version of the Great

Cyber Wall; Russian oil lubricates some industry and food deliveries prevent a large-scale

famine. While the argument, without sanctions the situation would be worse holds some

truth, a rethink of policies is necessary.

Geopolitically, all eyes are on Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan, India-Pakistan, the South China

Sea and the erratic policies of the Trump II administration. Trump’s admiration for strong

leaders, irrespective of their moral standards, opens even the perspective to tie in the

old love affair and rekindle the Kim-Trump bromance, potentially with Putin as the Third

Man. Old love does not rust, but the bromance Trump-Putin is deteriorating as the latter

clearly plays the former. Recall the melt down between Donald Trump and Elon Musk!

President Trump will soon realise that the price for engaging with Kim Jun-un has gone

up compared to seven years ago. Standing between Xi and Putin gives Kim re-assurance,

Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the

United Kingdom, United States of America

US Department of State (2025). Joint Statement of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) on

the First Report Covering DPRK-Russia Military Cooperation. 29 May 2025; at https://www.state.gov/joint-

statement-of-the-multilateral-sanctions-monitoring-team-msmt-on-the-first-report-covering-dprk-russia-

military-cooperation/

Dan Goodin (2025). How North Korea pulled off a $1.5 billion crypto heist—the biggest in history. Ars technica,

25 February 2025; at https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/02/how-north-korea-pulled-off-a-1-5-billion-

crypto-heist-the-biggest-in-history/

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

the urge to talk with and be recognised by the US has diminished. Russian pays for

deliveries either in cash or technological support for the nuclear and missiles programs;

evidently cooperation is not tied to international law and any moral standards. North

Korea did not respond positively to being left off the US travel ban list if the omission

was meant to encourage future engagement

The 2025 National Security Strategy was strong in criticising Europe but short of even

mentioning North Korea. The role assigned to Seoul is primarily to contribute to reducing

US trade deficit and burden sharing in military and infrastructure investments. The 2026

US National Defence Strategy assigns South Korea the task to keep North Korea at bay

and to invest correspondingly under the US ‘extended deterrence’.

The European Union's robust partnership with the Republic of Korea is founded upon a

shared acknowledgement of the strategic significance of the Democratic People's Republic

of Korea, as well as sustained support for South Korean policies through a unique array

of agreements and a strategic partnership. The European Union has persistently

encouraged successive Korean administrations to advance diplomatic engagement,

constructive dialogue, the peaceful resolution of disputes, non-proliferation initiatives,

and the pursuit of denuclearization.

As for the South Korean governments’ policy towards the North, whether progressive or

conservative, Sheena Greitens concludes:

“Korean progressives emphasize economic and social rights in their stance

toward the North and focus on improving the welfare of North Koreans

through intergovernmental rapprochement with Pyongyang — a process that

has often led them to constrain the role of civil society organizations and

activists to keep political dialogue going. Conservatives treat consideration of

civil and political rights as a precondition for discussions of unification. They

are sceptical of the compromises necessary to achieve rapprochement with

Pyongyang, and elevate the role of North Korean defectors, including those

who openly call for political change to the Kim regime, rather than prioritizing

intergovernmental contact”

President Lee’s challenges

The new government of President Lee Jae-myung is expected to be more inclined to

engage with the North than the Yoon Suk Yeol administration which advocated unification

on South Korean terms as laid out in his last liberation day speech on 15 August 2024

Thus, a rethink of the traditional fixtures of South Korean policy, preventing war,

achieving denuclearization, and laying the foundation for unification will be necessary.

Yonhap (2025). N. Korea says U.S. entry ban not a matter of interest over its omission from list. 10 June

2025; at https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250610002100315?section=nk/nk

Sheena Chestnut Greitens (2025). How South Korea’s Next Leader Should Handle Kim Jong-un. The Journal

of Democracy, May 2025; at https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/how-south-koreas-next-

leader-should-handle-kim-jong-un/

Yonhap (2024). Full text of Yoon's Liberation Day speech. 15 August 2024; at

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240815002500315

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

Kim Jong-un has abandoned the long-standing pet project of unification in a rather radical

change of policy. He deviated from the policy lines of his father, Kim Jong-il, and -even

more striking, his venerated grandfather, Kim Il-sung.

While it needs two to tango, to maintain the prospect for unification, the South will have

to shoulder the brunt of the project to maintain the prospect of unification. While still

official policy, there is a clear generational split in the South Korean society. The younger

generation has no emotional attachment any longer and is therefore not willing to bear

the heavy costs of what they perceive to be ‘another’ people. This is certainly an area

where provincial governments, like Gyeonggi Province, which are prone to foster the

people-to-people dimension can play an important supportive role.

Limited options for the incumbent president

President Lee Jae-myung intends to follow a “pragmatic diplomacy grounded in national

interests", maintaining South Korea's alliance with the U.S. as the "foundation" of his

envisioned foreign policy”. This realpolitik will include “future-oriented relations with

Japan”

In his inaugural address which marked the transition from campaigner to

president and therefore was more sensible than campaign speeches, he hinted at a

balanced policy without giving any specifics: “With a defence budget twice that of North

Korea, the world’s fifth-ranked military, and the Korea-U.S. alliance, we will deter nuclear

threats and military provocations while keeping open channels of dialogue to establish

peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

This is an interesting nuance, deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea, not China, unlike the US.

President Lee moved quickly to improve atmospherics in reducing cross border irritations

like blaring loudspeakers and exchange of balloons. While the latter make sense

politically, this might infringe on the right of free speech and demonstration according to

the Constitutional Court. Based on experience, trust and confidence building measures

are welcome to reduce tensions, However, a policy based on reciprocity and snap-back

measures if commitments are not honoured, will be more effective than one-sided open

offers which can be interpreted as weakness.

President Lee put Japan into the trilateral context, “We will reinforce the Korea-U.S.

alliance, strengthen trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan and approach relations

with neighboring countries through the lens of practicality and national interest.”

China

was not mentioned specifically but is covered by “neighboring” countries – a classic

hedging approach to bridge the gap between the largest trading partner, China, and the

main security provider, the US, with which South Korea is locked into an alliance. The

first personal encounter in the margins of the G7 of both leaders built a base. In pursuing

pragmatically wants to pursue a ‘two track’ approach, e.g., separating historical disputes

from forward looking cooperation

, President Lee made a historic stop-over in Tokyo on

Yonhap (2025). Lee's 'pragmatic diplomacy' vision put to test in U.S. alliance, regional power ties .4 June

2025; at https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250602009900315?section=national/diplomacy

The Korea Times (2025). Lee Jae-myung's inaugural speech. 4 June 2025; at

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/politics/20250604/full-text-lee-jae-myungs-inaugural-speech

Yonhap (2025). So close, yet so far: S. Korea-Japan ties at pivotal moment 60 yrs after normalization. 15

June 2025; at https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250613006900315

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

his way to the first summit with President Trump in Washington. Prime Minister Takaishi

responded by inviting President Lee to visit her hometown, Nara, a city known for its

historic connections to Korea. Together, the leaders pioneered an innovative diplomatic

approach, "drum diplomacy," where they played drums along with K-Pop music rhythms.

Should the EU play the China card?

Because of the deteriorating situation between the US and China, China is starting a timid

charm offensive, reaching out to the EU, Japan and South Korea while continuing to grant

India a favourable treatment. President Xi needs to rekindle growth, needs alternative

market access opportunities in the battle with President Trump; strategically Xi continues

pursuing a goal he shares with Putin, to split the West, or whatever is left from this

notion.

Utilising China's strong position as a market, raw material and technology provider as

leverage is not the most effective strategy for the European Union. Nevertheless, given

that the United States under President Trump has shifted from a stabilising influence to

a potentially destabilising one by questioning established alliances, shared interests, and

values, it is essential to acknowledge the geo-economic and political significance of China

and incorporate this consideration into future policy development.

At the G7 President von der Leyen delivered a rather hawkish speech on the Global

economic outlook, either as a warning when setting the scene for the July summit in

Beijing or to renounce playing the China card: ”China has largely shown that it

unwillingness to live within the constraints of the rules based international system. While

other opened their market China focused undercutting intellectual property protections,

massive subsidies with the aim to dominate global manufacturing and supply chains. This

is not market competition – it is distortion with intent. And it undermines our

manufacturing sectors.”

She also identified China’s insistence on its status as a

developing country in the WTO as the “biggest collective problem”. In September 2025

responded to this criticism. While it did not renounce its status, China announced it would

no longer invoke special and differential treatment (S&DT) as a developing country in

future WTO negotiations.

Given the economic interdependence with China, the EU has already ruled out decoupling

from or isolating China. Without being blue-eyed the EU follows a policy of derisking

which does not exclude sectoral cooperation, politically and economically. China has lifted

bans on some members of the European Parliament which at the time caused the collapse

of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA). While this Agreement is not re-

instated immediately, there is clearly a Chinese interest for cooperation, not least to

stabilise its own economy. President Xi will go to great lengths to prevent economic issues

at home from causing discontent or political unrest. The negative repercussions of the

trade and tariff war with the US are an incentive for China to work more closely with the

EU. Therefore, trade negotiations are ongoing, China has also hinted to be forthcoming

Ursula von der Leyen (2025). Statement Session I of G7, Global economic outlook; 16 June 2025; at

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1521

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

on a deal to secure the supply of essential raw materials like rare earth

; measures to

improve market access for goods, services and investment to provide the famous level

playing field and reduce the ballooning trade deficit need to follow. However, the

profound differences concerning Chinese support for Russia including North Korean

troops in Ukraine pose serious problems for cooperation which were not addressed at the

EU-China Summit on July 24-25, 2025.

Among the key outcomes of this short summit in Brussels without President Xi was the

extension of climate collaboration with China, encompassing initiatives such as clean

energy development, methane emission reduction, and carbon market mechanisms. The

relaxation of rare earth export restrictions represented a significant positive development

for European businesses and is considered a strategic geopolitical decision by China,

distinguishing its approach to the EU from that to the United States.

On other issues, neither side is wearing rose-tinted glasses. Commission President von

der Leyen emphasized that bilateral ties were at an “inflection point” and called on both

sides to “come forward with real solutions.” Meanwhile, according to the official Chinese

readout, President Xi Jinping (習近平) urged the EU to avoid “restrictive economic and

trade measures” and to keep its markets open. He also called for joint support of

multilateralism and opposition to “unilateralism”, a thinly veiled reference to the United

States. Notably, the Chinese brief made no mention of the war in Ukraine, a key issue

raised by the EU side. Thus, the situation remains volatile as the EU must also to pursue

its interests through reciprocity: member states voted 2 June 2025 to restrict access to

the vast procurement markets for Chinese medical device manufacturers in response to

Beijing’s refusal to open its own tenders to EU firms.

Dealing with North Korea

Restraining North Korea could well be a common interest of the EU and China.

Thus, the EU inviting China to restrain North Korea in its support for Russia, especially

concerning further nuclearization with Russian support and know-how. Allegedly, North

Korea is pursuing the project of a nuclear submarine - a rather difficult task, remember

the AUKUS discussion and fall-out. Non-proliferation has been a common denominator

between the EU-China and the US; President Trump, however, is using loose language

in referring to North Korea as a ‘nuclear state’, opening the door to a path to the nuclear

club like in the case of India and Pakistan. Adding another two, South Korea and Japan,

to the already existing three nuclear powers in Northeast Asia - China, Russia and North

Korea - would hardly be a contribution to stability with South Asia already suffering from

the tensions between nuclear India and Pakistan.

In general, the EU pursues a policy of critical engagement towards the DPRK. “Its goals

are to support a lasting diminution of tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the region,

to uphold the international non-proliferation regime and to improve the situation of

New York Times (2025). China Hints at Rare Earths Progress With E.U. Before Talks With U.S. 6 June 2025;

at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/06/business/china-rare-earth-licensing.html

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17 Nº. 1, TD 1

Thematic Dossier – The Korean Peninsula in a Global Context: Security, Culture, and

Transnational Perspectives

June 2026, pp. 5-23

North Korea: Back to the Future is no Solution

Michael Reiterer

human rights in the DPRK.”

The EEAS website has been updated last time 18 January

2022 – in these rapidly changing times this negligence is a message.

This EU policy started in 1995 with varying phases of engagement or critique. At the end

of the 1990s during a more engaging phase, the EU participated in KEDO, the Korea

Energy Development Organisation. The project failed in the end; the EU had only played

a secondary role – invited to pay but not to act politically.

The last years have been characterised by pressure and sanctions in implementing the

UN sanctions to which the EU added autonomous sanctions. This caused in 2015 the

termination of the political and human rights dialogue between the EU and North Korea

while some humanitarian aid through NGOs was continued.

Although some member states have embassies in Pyongyang and are striving to get back

post-COVID to pre-COVID level, the EU could not prevent the diplomatic failure, that for

a long time the Chinese had the only solid line of communication with the Kim regime.

The brief interlude Trump – Kim was only a bracket. The forceful engagement of Russia,

however, is a game changer.

As President Putin is not interested in terminating hostilities anytime soon and strives to

keep up tensions at the border with NATO (Baltic states, Poland), the above mentioned

2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea

has become more than a ‘one-nightstand’ and produces all the risks of an alliance which

the EU has to factor in when finally re-examining its policy.

The future role for the EU

Based on a successful free trade agreement, South Korea is the EU's eighth-largest trade

partner in goods, while the EU is Korea's third-largest trade partner, a digital trade

agreement was added giving life to the Digital and Connectivity partnerships. European

companies are the largest source of investment. The EU’s trade deficit is compensated

by a structural surplus in services (2023).

In the various Asia, Asia Pacific or Indo Pacific strategies, as well as the 2016 Global

Strategy and the 2022 Global Compass, the EU has developed the concept of

comprehensive security in substance and geography. As there is only one security,

neglecting the part of the world, which is most dynamic, technologically at the edge, with

an overall growing population and a remarkable number of hotspots, is no political option.

Having the capacity to respond to multiple crises at the same time, even with war in

Europe (Ukraine), is essential for a major power. While the EU has learned that economic

and soft power need also to translate not only into smart but also into hard power,

responding to these challenges is particularly difficult when the decade-long reliable ally

and partner, turns unreliable calling out the EU as an institution set-up to screw the US.

EEAS. EU and DPRK; at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/dprk-and-eu_en (accessed 5 February 2026).

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This total reversal of politics necessitates a fundamental rethink of the EU’s foreign and

defence policies and actually acting upon the ‘Zeitenwende’ the then German chancellor

Olaf Scholz rightfully proclaimed.

Politicians and the general publics in Europe must recognise urgently that there is no

more space for nostalgia for good old times: Striving for more resilience, more

engagement, shouldering more responsibility politically and exercising leadership are

challenges the EU shares with its Northeast Asian partners, South Korea and Japan

This should and could lead to a closer trilateral (EU, ROK, Japan) policy coordination for

mutual reassurance and solidification vis-à-vis North Korea, China, Russia and the United

States – the latter a new, unusual and disquieting addition to challenges to meet. This

situation is at the same time a strong call on South Korea and Japan to overcome the

legacies of the past in a sustainable manner. A steady policy outliving changes of

governments is necessary to cooperate in the overriding interest, to stabilise the situation

thereby strengthening the bargaining power of the three. Cooperation between South

Korea and Japan is an essential element in the security equation of Northeast Asia. This

cooperation could become even stronger if the principles established at the Camp David

trilateral summit convened by President Biden in 2024 continue to endure.

As HRVP Kallas pointed out at the2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore:

“North Korea directly contributes to the illegal aggression with soldiers, arms

and ammunition. And China says it’s neutral, but its dual-use exports are

fuelling Russia’s war. When China and Russia speak of leading together

changes not seen in a hundred years and of revisions to the global security

order, we should all be extremely worried.” She also recalled: “Back in 2022,

former Japanese Prime Minister Kishida warned from this stage that Ukraine

today may be East Asia tomorrow. We are over three years into this war

now”

Acknowledging geopolitical difficulties, the EU needs to revise its approach by rethinking

its traditional and favoured role as a peace project, ensuring this is supported by robust

defence measures. The EU plans to allocate up to €800 billion for joint defence

investments; without this, it cannot achieve its aim of being a credible global security

partner.

The EU has concluded security and defence partnerships with Japan and the Republic

of Korea. In addition, the Strategic Compass and the Indo-Pacific Strategy foresee a

Michael Reiterer (2020). The European Union and Security Cooperation: Bringing Northeast Asia into Focus.

Global Asia, The East Asia Institute (Seoul, 10 November 2020); at

https://www.globalnk.org/commentary/view?cd=COM000044

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea (2024). Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United

States. 18 November 2024; at https://overseas.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=321087

EEAS (2025). Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue; at

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/speech-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-iiss-shangri-la-

dialogue_en

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deepening of security relations with India and Australia, New Zealand. At the beginning

of 2026, the partnership with Vietnam was elevated to the “comprehensive” level.

More attention needs also to be paid to the Pacific Island states because of their strategic

importance and not only because of their essential threats of rising sea levels because of

climate change.

The same applies to the regional trade agreements, in particular the CPTPP which

South Korea is set to join. Regional trade governance are important stepping stones

for revitalising the rules-based trading system and the WTO, an idea this author had

already voiced in 2022, and finally taken up by President von der Leyen in her 2025 State

of the Union address in response to President Trump’s erratic trade policy. In November

2025 at a meeting in Australia closer cooperation between the EU and CPTPP participants

was agreed. Joining the Partnership like the United Kingdom appears to be too

cumbersome and time consuming when quicker action is required. A quarter of a century

negotiations of the MERCOSUR free trade agreement, finally signed but sent to the

European Court of Justice by the European Parliament, is a serious weakening of the EU

in the sole area where it is strong On the other hand, the signing of the “mother of all

deals”, a free trade agreement with India

as well as a landmark EU-India Security and

Defence Partnership is a strong contribution to governance and shared resilience. These

pacts strengthen the autonomy of both partners as well as the rules-based approach;

swift implementation is of course necessary to increase leverage. President Trump

reducing reciprocal tariffs from imports from India

right after India’s agreement with

the EU is a strong indication of the effectiveness of this policy.

Despite Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, North Africa, the Balkans and many more challenges,

Europe must cultivate a long-term, strategic commitment to Northeast Asia and therefore

aim at contributing to find solutions to the specific regional hotspots, North Korea,

Taiwan, South and East China Sea, India-Pakistan to name a few.

North Korea

Experience with NAPCI, the Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation Initiative under the

presidency of Park Geun-hye

, and the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue shows that it needs more

than functional cooperation to solve high stakes political and security problems,

although functional cooperation can become an important stepping stone. The so-called

Zermatt Dialogue managed by the Swiss think tank Geneva Centre for Security Policy

(GSCP) provides a platform to meet but lacks the element of power of persuasion

necessary r for talks to produce results.

Joint statement on upgrading relations between the European Union and Viet Nam to a Comprehensive

Strategic Partnership, 29 January 2026; at

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_26_255

European Commission (2026) EU and India conclude negotiations for largest trade deal in their history. 28

January 2026; at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_26_253

BBC (2026) US and India reach trade deal, Trump says after Modi call. 2 February 2026; at

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yve1x9zv0o

Michael Reiterer (2015). The NAPCI in the Volatile Security Environment of North-East Asia: Which Role for

the European Union? European Foreign Affairs Review 20, no.4, 2015; pp. 573-590.

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North Korea’s alliance with Russia renders every effort more difficult – the ‘my enemy’s

friend is my enemy ‘logic cements a relationship instead of weakening it. The EU can

either encourage member states to provide track 2 or 1.5 platforms or do it itself with a

broader basis.

Nominating a special representative for Northeast Asia who has the time and

infrastructure to work in and with the various stakeholders in the region would manifest

the EU’s engagement in this important region, add an element of stability and

sustainability, and translate the EU’s narrative into action. In times of budgetary

constraints drawing on defence spending could be a solution, as this would only be a tiny

fraction of the envisaged € 800 bn. As a policy axiom, prevention is always cheaper than

warfare and reconstruction.

Supporting South Korea’s policy towards North Korea has been a trademark of the

EU’s policy. The political consultations upgraded to the ministerial level provide the

platform for policy coordination. Given the geopolitical situation, the EU should continue

stressing the need to cooperate with Japan, both countries are concerned and threatened

by a hostile North Korea supported by aggressive Russia. The EU seeking better relations

and an understanding to prevent proliferation of nuclear devices and weapons of mass

destruction with China would impact on North Korea. Achieving stability and nuclear

restraint on the Korean Peninsula strikes a chord in the region, as expressed by the 27

May 2024 Joint Declaration of the 9th Republic of Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Summit

Due to Russia’s support and its recent inroads in missiles and weapons technology, albeit

with setbacks as the disastrous launch of a new 5,000-ton destroyer showed, North Korea

has become an international and no longer only regional problem. While denuclearisation

remains the global goal, it is unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear arsenal

which guarantees regime survival.

The recent attack of Iran by Israel, supported by the US by attacks on Fordo, Natanz and

Isfahan with bunker buster" bombs (GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator - MOP) will

harden this conviction: Ghaddafi in Libya, Hussein in Iraq and Ukraine renounced nuclear

weapons and paid a heavy price.

Consequently, striving for ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization’

is no longer a realistic short-term goal while remaining an idealistic long-term one. The

discussion whether South Korea can continue relying on the US nuclear shield and US

boots on the ground under Trump, or whether it should go nuclear itself with

consequences for proliferation, has already arrived in South Korea. Switching to arms

reduction talks, coping with the nuclear threat in the region through deterrence will need

an international response.

“Prime Minister Kishida expressed serious concern over North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities and

development of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, and reconfirmed that the

denuclearization of North Korea and the stability of the Korean Peninsula is the common interest of the three

countries. Prime Minister Kishida stated that the three countries should urge North Korea to completely abandon

its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council

resolutions. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued support of the leaders of the ROK and China for

the immediate resolution of the abductions issue and gained their understanding.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Japan (2024). The Ninth Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit. 27 May 2024; at

https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/pageite_000001_00376.html

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Michael Reiterer

To render the EU policy with North Korea more dynamic, all member states have to be

on board, including France which does not maintain regular diplomatic relations but

operated only a cooperation office for humanitarian and cultural matters from 2011 until

its COVID induced closure in 2020. As a permanent member of the UNSC France bears

special responsibility within the UN as well as for EU foreign policy making.

Multilateral engagement

Invitations to the G7 and NATO summits are a recognition of South Korea’s strategic

position in the region and a contribution to stabilise the country after the internal turmoil

in pulling it back into the community of responsible international actors. This will help

President Lee to “expand Korea’s diplomatic reach, raise [Korea’s] international stature

and enlarge our economic territory.”

However, in the context of NATO as a AP4 country

, it will not only be honour and

participation but also shouldering of additional costs: the 5% GDP target for defence

spending will also be applied to Asian partners and allies according to US sources

. This

would translate into a doubling of South Korea’s already considerable defence spending

and support for stationing of US troops. (In 2025 South Korea's defence budget stands

at around 61.2 trillion won (US$44.6 billion), about 2.32 % of its GDP.

) Turning down

the invitation to the 2025 summit because of burning domestic issues allows various

interpretations: stepping back from NATO as a transatlantic military alliance as criticised

previously by the opposition leader Lee; renouncing to avoid further irritating China and

Russia; or pragmatically, in recognition that the much wanted meeting with President

Trump was difficult to secure (Trump had left the G7 before the arranged meeting could

take place.)

Hosting the 2025 APEC summit in South Korea offered the occasion for the long-sought

for summit with President Xi. Preventing a further emboldening of North Korea because

of its alliance with Putin’s Russia is a common goal where joining hands of China, South

Korea, Japan and the EU could lead to common diplomatic efforts.

This EU-South Korea cooperation should also include ASEAN. Like the EU, South Korea

has traditionally supported ASEAN. Economic security upgraded the geoeconomic

importance of the ASEAN market for diversification, supply and production chains. In

terms of security policy countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia are part of

the island chain parameters.

South Korea reaching out to partners who share the interest to counter the insecurity

created by the transactional policies of President Trump, like the EU, Canada, Australia,

New Zealand, ASEAN and - at least partly India would enlarge the room of manoeuvre

and increase autonomy. Thereby strengthening trade governance could play a pivotal

The Korea Times (2025).

Michael Reiterer (2024). NATO and the Republic of Korea: The AP4 in the Indo-Pacific”. 38 North, 9 April

2024; at https://bit.ly/43UAhyr

Yonhap (2025). S. Korea says share of its defense spending against GDP 'very high' compared with key U.S.

allies. 20 June 2025; at https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250620003552315?section=search

Yonhap (2025). Trump repeats NATO members should spend 5 pct of GDP on defense. 20 June 2025; at

https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250621000351315?section=national/diplomacy

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role: The necessity to provide economic security, secure and stable supply and production

lines as well as sea lanes for transport, or more generally the need to get back to a stable

rules-based international order, provide a sound interest-based foundation for enhancing

cooperation for middle powers. In the aftermath of COVID-19, China’s

instrumentalization of rare earth exports and Trump’s transactional tariff and economic

policies made it abundantly clear that a more organised response was needed.

As pointed out already in 2022, the regional trade agreements, RCEP and CPTPP merit

more attention by the EU

. In view of President Trump’s unruly trade policy, President

von der Leyen has taken up this issue, recognising that closer cooperation with the

interested countries in this economically and technically prone region could serve as a

stepping stone to revitalise rules based free trade and the WTO

. In the more immediate

future, demonstrating that rules-based policies produce better results in the interests of

participating countries is the necessary enabler giving agency to such an approach.

Conclusions

Considering North Korea's significant advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities,

Kim Jong-un's increasingly aggressive stance which now includes the possible first use

of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances (read: threat to the survival of the

regime), the ending of its longstanding special relationship with South Korea and the

rejection of unification with what it now sees as an enemy, as well as the backing of two

permanent UN Security Council members, China and Russia, and an alliance like

strengthened strategic partnership with Russia, and finally a US president who pursues

transactional policies without values, it is evident that simply relying on traditional

diplomatic approaches is no longer feasible for South Korea or the European Union. Both

must recognise that past strategies, ‘Back to the Future’, will not suffice in this

dramatically altered geopolitical landscape.

"Forward to the Past", learning from history but adapting those lessons to new realities

rather than simply repeating old patterns, must be the new policy direction. This will

need more than just a pragmatic diplomacy or the continuation or only slight update of

critical engagement

The new geopolitical situation e.g., power politics in a multipolar world where

international law and guardrails are weakened, the direct involvement of North Korea in

Ukraine and the constraints to placate President Trump in pursuing his China policy and

yet unclear North Korea policy, will constrain the room of manoeuvre outside the US-

China-Russia triangle, including for the incumbent South Korean President, considerably.

The worst-case scenario would be Korea-passing after a successful deal Trump-Putin on

Michael Reiterer (2022). Regional Trade Agreements in the Indo-Pacific: Does the EU Risk Losing Sight of

Their Importance? CSDS Policy Brief 01/2022; at https://csds.vub.be/publication/regional-trade-agreements-

in-the-indo-pacific-does-the-eu-risk-losing-sight-of-their-importance/

Reuters (2025). EU's Pacific alliance would not replace WTO, EU officials say. 27 June 2025; at

https://www.reuters.com/en/eu-alliance-with-pacific-rim-could-lead-wto-redesign-von-der-leyen-says-2025-

06-27/

Michael Reiterer (2026) The Puzzle of South Korea’s Foreign Policy: Can You Have It All? Global Policy 2026

https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70131 (forthcoming)

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Ukraine: Putin could take on the role as facilitator for a renewal of the Trump-Kim Jong-

un contacts, a role previously played by President Moon Jae-in during the first bromance.

As for the EU to preserve some influence, it must strengthen its engagement with

East Asia, the Korean Peninsula and North Korea to pursue its security interests in

updating and adapting the principles laid out in the Strategic Compass and its Indo-Pacific

Strategy

to the new situation created by Trump II as well as the technological progress

reached by North Korea. Security is interconnected; only deeper involvement will lend

the EU credibility as a political and security actor in the region and avoid EU-passing in

policy making. As a sizable economic power with a track record of promoting rules-based

policies, the EU has credibility to act as the defender and promotor of a rules-based

order, rule of law to prevent further progress by ‘might is right’.

Revitalising the rules-based trading order through cooperation with partners in the

region, such as those participating or considering doing (South Korea) in the

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), could

be at the same time a stepping stone for redesigning the WTO. To recall, TPP was the

economic pillar of President Obama’s pivot to Asia which Trump I abandoned.

The current policy of ‘critical engagement’ needs a rethink, a stronger commitment to

engagement, diplomacy to solve the nuclear crisis and prevent further proliferation. The

EU has gained considerable experience in this field when leading the negotiations with

Iran which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the exclusively

peaceful use of nuclear energy. An EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Northeast

Asia could help implementing an innovative approach visibly and signal unity and

presence, important features for being effective. While ‘flying the flag’ is always

important in diplomacy, this applies in particular to Asia where personal contacts are

crucial.

North Korea’s nuclear threat needs to be countered by firm diplomacy and deterrence

seeking dialogue on arms reduction with the ultimate goal of denuclearisation and

avoiding proliferation.

Applying the Korean Peninsula recipe to Ukraine e.g., a frozen conflict with an

armistice but no peace agreement, could be a short term means to stop fighting but

would at the same time add another unstable, unresolved situation but not a sustainable

solution although provisional agreements can develop quite some staying power.

In extending its Connectivity Strategy

the EU could foster an arrangement between

South and North Korea, for instance reconnecting the railway systems, would connect

the Korean Peninsula to Europe via the Eurasian landmass. This could have a double

function: adding to the security of communication lines of the South while being part of

an incentive bargaining package, in case talks with North Korea restart in earnest.

Michael Reiterer (2023), The European Union in Asia and the Indo-Pacific: international cooperation in the

era of great transformation and mounting security challenges. Lausanne, Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe,

Debates and Documents Collection, issue 31, December 2023; at https://jean-monnet.ch/wp-

content/uploads/2023/12/23-12-eu-asia-indopacific-m-reiterer-cdd-31.pdf (open access).

See Shiong Kim, Michael Reiterer (eds). Connecting Europe and Asia: Security, Economy and Mobility. Huine

HUFS University Press, Seoul, 2023.

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To end this analysis on a positive note: Autocratic powers tried to bend the global

order to their will, started the Second World War and lost. 80 years ago, freedom

prevailed because defenders of the order joined hands and arms. Citizens were at the

forefront, and this has not changed. This puts a special obligation and responsibility on

provincial and local authorities which are close to the people. Today’s call is to repeat the

positive experience of the previous generations to rebuild and maintain a rules-based

order where might is not right.

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