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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026

477

CHINA’S IDEATIONAL INFLUENCE ON IRAN: THE 25-YEAR COMPREHENSIVE

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP THROUGH ROLE THEORY AND POLITICAL

NARRATIVES

ANDRÉ MATOS

andre.matos@uab.pt

PhD in International Relations. Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Humanities Universidade

Aberta (Portugal), Senior Researcher at Centre for Global Studies

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1259-1915

EDUARDO RIBEIRO

eduardolucaribeiro@gmail.com

MA in International Relations, specialisation in Political Diplomacy from Universidade Portucalense

(Portugal) and a degree in International Relations. He undertook a PECMNE work placement at

the Portuguese Embassy in Athens and is a co-founder of the Diztopia

Project.https://orcid.org/0009-0004-8755-052X

Abstract

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Iran in 2021

represented a significant milestone in the evolution of their bilateral relations. Framed within

the Belt and Road Initiative, this agreement became both a vehicle for cooperation and a

shared institutional arrangement. Based on Wendt’s Constructivism and on role theory, the

analysis contends that China articulates a particular international identity and seeks to shape

the ideational environment of its partners, fostering alignment with Chinese norms and policy

orientations. To assess the extent to which such influence is reflected in Iran, the study

examines the narratives of political leaders and key opinion makers through discourse

analysis, focusing on their interpretations of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Keywords

Belt and Road Initiative; Comprehensive Strategic Partnership; China; Iran.

Resumo

A assinatura da Parceria Estratégica Abrangente entre a China e o Irão em 2021 representou

um marco significativo na evolução das suas relações bilaterais. Enquadrado na Iniciativa da

Rota da Seda, este acordo tornou-se simultaneamente um veículo de cooperação e um acordo

institucional partilhado. Com base no construtivismo de Wendt e na teoria dos papéis, a

análise defende que a China articula uma identidade internacional específica e procura moldar

o ambiente ideacional dos seus parceiros, promovendo o alinhamento com as normas e

orientações políticas chinesas. Para avaliar em que medida essa influência se reflete no Irão,

o estudo examina as narrativas de líderes políticos e formadores de opinião importantes

através da análise do discurso, centrando-se nas suas interpretações da Parceria Estratégica

Abrangente.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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Palavras-chave

Iniciativa «Belt and Road»; Parceria Estratégica Abrangente; China; Irão.

How to cite this article

Matos, André & Ribeiro, Eduardo (2026). China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Through Role Theory and Political Narratives. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations, VOL. 17, Nº. 1, May 2026, pp. 477-501.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.17.1.24.

Article submitted on 4 April 2025 and accepted on 5 January 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

479

CHINA’S IDEATIONAL INFLUENCE ON IRAN: THE 25-YEAR

COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP THROUGH ROLE

THEORY AND POLITICAL NARRATIVES

ANDRÉ MATOS

EDUARDO RIBEIRO

Introduction

Historically peripheral to China, the Middle East became strategically significant in the

21st century. Early Ming Dynasty interactions waned due to domestic priorities, and

Beijing’s modern engagement only began in 1949. China’s role grew notably in the 1990s

and 2000s as an emerging economic power (Kemp, 2012; Elnaggar, 2020).

Since the early years of the twenty-first century - and particularly throughout its second

decade - China has advanced three main vectors of interest, stimulated by the

opportunities created both by the Arab Spring and by the launch of the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI). The first would assure a secure energy supply, driven by China’s

sustained dependence on energy imports to support economic growth, particularly

oil.(Qian, 2016). The second vector concerns the expansion of trade, the safeguarding of

strategic transport corridors, and the development of infrastructures capable of ensuring

their security and functionality. Finally, a third, secondary vector concerns security

cooperation with the region’s States, with the primary goal of combating what Beijing

calls the “Three Evils” - terrorism, extremism, and separatism (Castilla, 2016; Kamel,

2018; Hoh, 2019).

Alongside economic and security goals, Beijing developed political ties, establishing the

China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (2004) and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council

Strategic Dialogue. Guided by non-interference, China’s “business-first” approach since

2011 fostered efficient ties with rival regional states, offering an alternative model amid

the Arab Spring’s turmoil and U.S. disengagement (Kemp, 2012; Sidlo, 2020; Hoh,

2019).

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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Over the last decade, China’s growing presence in the Middle East has been most visibly

expressed through trade, energy interdependence, infrastructure connectivity, and the

expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this context, Iran occupies a

particularly relevant position due to its geostrategic location, energy resources, and the

political constraints imposed by sanctions and regional rivalry. The 25-year

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), formally signed in 2021, marked a turning

point in the institutionalisation of Sino-Iranian relations, consolidating a long-term

framework for cooperation in economic, infrastructural, and political terms.

Most analyses of China-Iran relations have understandably emphasised material drivers:

energy security, sanctions evasion, trade diversification, and geopolitical balancing.

These factors are essential and cannot be dismissed. However, if the CSP is treated only

as an economic arrangement, an important part of the relationship remains

underexplored: the extent to which China also shapes the ideational environment in

which Iranian elites interpret, justify, and publicly frame this partnership.

China’s “Pivot to the West” strategy strengthened perceptions of its political influence in

the Middle East. Through the BRI, Beijing pursued a soft-power approach, in clear

contrast to U.S. tactics. In his speech at the Arab League on 21 January 2016, President

Xi Jinping stressed peace, cooperation, and mutual benefit, calling on regional states to

join the BRI (Sharma, 2019; Lin, 2017). On that occasion, Xi highlighted the distinctive

traits of China’s engagement in the Middle East, presenting the country as a promoter of

peace talks rather than a seeker of power or “any sphere of influence” in the region. He

described China instead as a builder of “a cooperative network for mutual benefits and

win-win results” and a “circle of friends”. However, Xi also called on Middle Eastern

countries to join the BRI, presenting it as the main framework for regional cooperation.

(China Daily, 2017)

Of China’s $770 billion BRI investment since 2013, 14% has gone to the Middle East,

making it the fourth-largest regional recipient (Wang, 2021). Initially excluded, states

like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq gradually joined by signing Memoranda of

Understanding, with Iran playing a pivotal role due to its strategic oil resources and

location (Shariatinia and Azizi, 2017; Githaiga et al. 2019; Cordesman, 2007)

. The

strengthening of China-Iran ties within the framework of the Initiative comes largely from

both states’ perception of the objective benefits derived from their engagement. While

these material considerations help explain the dynamics of the relationship and,

consequently, China’s expanding influence over the Tehran regime, they are not sufficient

to capture the full scope and depth of that influence. “Influence” as a concept must be

Within the framework of what has been termed the “Asian Energy Security Grid,” Iran’s geographical position

renders it a pivotal actor in ensuring the connectivity of the global energy network China seeks to establish—

particularly in West Asia—since it is the only country in the region “with the ability to meet part of China’s oil

and gas needs through both land and sea.” Iran’s involvement in a series of pipeline projects, including the

Iran-Pakistan pipeline and the interconnection with Turkmenistan, would not only secure China’s overland

energy supply but also enable Iran to export energy to the Chinese market via land routes. This would provide

an alternative to traditional and more volatile maritime corridors. For further details, see Selmier, Travis. “The

Belt and Road Initiative and the influence of Islamic economies.” Economic and Political Studies 6, no. 3 (2018):

255-277.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

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understood not only in terms of its material impact - particularly in the economic sphere

- but also as the capacity to shape and guide perceptions about oneself, about the other,

and about the functioning of the international system.

This article contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it examines the China-

Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership not only through its material drivers, but also

through its ideational dimension, while recognising that sanctions, trade, and geopolitical

pressures remain central to the relationship. Second, it makes “ideational influence”

analytically explicit by assessing whether Iranian political authorities and influential

opinion makers reproduce and normalise discursive frames associated with China’s

projected international role. Third, it combines thematic categorisation and qualitative

discourse analysis in a focused corpus, offering an empirically grounded approach to the

study of ideational alignment in elite narratives.

Theoretical framework and methodology

This article starts from the assumption that influence in international politics is not

exhausted by material dependence or transactional gains. In addition to economic

leverage, states may exercise influence by shaping the categories, narratives, and role

expectations through which other actors understand bilateral cooperation and the

international order. In this sense, China’s influence may be observed not only in the

practical expansion of cooperation with Iran, but also in the discursive normalisation of

specific principles and frames associated with Beijing’s international role, such as

sovereignty-centered order, non-interference, “win-win” cooperation, civilisational

rhetoric, and opposition to Western unilateralism.

Existing literature on China-Iran relations and on China’s broader engagement in the

Middle East has predominantly emphasised material and strategic drivers, especially

energy security, trade expansion, sanctions, and connectivity under the Belt and Road

Initiative (Kemp, 2012; Wuthnow, 2016; Conduit and Akbarzadeh, 2018; Hoh, 2019;

Shariatinia and Azizi, 2017; 2019). This literature is indispensable for explaining why

Sino-Iranian cooperation has deepened over time, particularly under conditions of U.S.

pressure and Iran’s search for economic alternatives. However, its main focus remains

on interests, constraints, and strategic calculations, leaving comparatively less room for

a systematic analysis of how influence is also produced through discourse, identity, and

role-related meanings.

A second group of academic contributions provides a more suitable basis for that

analytical move. Studies on China’s international projection increasingly stress that

Chinese influence cannot be reduced to material capability alone, and that it must be

understood as socially mediated and context-dependent (Fung et al., 2022). In parallel,

works on the ideational dimension of China’s rise emphasise the role of narratives,

symbols, and normative language in shaping perceptions of China and in structuring the

political meaning of cooperation, such as Wilson, 2021 and Elmalı, 2022. These texts

were especially relevant for the present article because they clarify how discourse may

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

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function not merely as rhetoric, but as a mechanism through which international roles,

expectations, and forms of legitimacy are negotiated.

This perspective has also been applied in regional studies. Garlick and Qin (2022) show,

in the Central and Eastern European context, that Chinese influence is partly exercised

through ideational and interpretive channels, and that these can be traced through

comparative analysis of elite and scholarly narratives. Although the geopolitical context

differs from the Iranian case, the analytical implication is highly relevant, as Chinese-led

cooperation frameworks generate not only material expectations but also discursive

contestation and alignment around political meaning.

In the specific case of Iran, the ideational dimension has received more limited and

uneven treatment. Forough (2020) offers a particularly important contribution by

highlighting the ideational nexus linking Iran and China within the BRI, including

civilisational discourse and alternative geopolitical imaginaries. His later work on the 25-

year deal (Forough, 2021) also reinforces the need to read the Partnership beyond its

economic provisions. At the same time, broader analyses of Iran-China relations and

regional alignments remind us that convergence should not be overstated: structural

incentives remain central (Shariatinia, 2011), and overlapping anti-Western positions do

not automatically produce a fully institutionalised strategic bloc (Grajewski, 2022).

Bearing this in mind, the present article addresses a specific gap: the lack of a systematic

analysis of how Chinese ideational influence is reflected in Iranian elite narratives on the

25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, by combining constructivism and role

theory with a structured discourse analysis of statements by political authorities and

opinion makers.

As said, this study uses Wendt’s Social Constructivism and role theory to explore how

the BRI deepens Iran-China ties through shared ideational factors, including identity-

related. Civilisational rhetoric, mutual enmity toward the U.S., and shared foreign policy

principles underpin this partnership, drawing on historical and civilisational narratives

that both sides mobilise in contemporary political discourse. Moreover, this common

perception is reflected in the narratives articulated by Iran’s political leadership and

prominent opinion makers concerning the 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

For the purposes of this investigation, “ideational influence” refers to the capacity of one

state’s projected identity, normative language, and role conceptions to shape the

interpretive frames through which political elites in another state publicly describe

bilateral cooperation and the international order. This definition does not assume passive

imitation or ideological dependence. Instead, it captures a process of selective

appropriation, in which domestic actors adopt and rearticulate external narratives in ways

that remain compatible with their own political priorities. This distinction is important in

the Iran-China case. The existence of strong material incentives (sanctions pressure,

trade opportunities, and geopolitical balancing) does not preclude ideational influence;

rather, it may create favorable conditions for discursive convergence. The empirical task,

therefore, is not to deny material causality, but to assess whether elite narratives about

the CSP also reveal a patterned alignment with Chinese strategic and normative frames.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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Additionally, role theory helps define China’s self-perceived role in the BRI and its

influence on Middle Eastern relationships, particularly with Iran. It highlights Beijing’s

ambitions to expand globally and assert its position in the international system (Harnisch,

2012; Michalski and Pan, 2017). Wendt’s constructivism explains how roles in the

international system emerge from socially constructed interactions. States’ positions are

shaped by their perceptions of themselves and others, formed through processes of

socialisation in “collective structures” (Wendt, 1992; Knoblauch, 2013). Although the

China-Iran bilateral relationship has developed as a collective structure in which both

states have gradually constructed convergent identities, for the purposes of this study

the BRI and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, most notably the 25-year

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in 2021, will be considered the relevant

“collective structures.” In recent years, these instruments have formed the central basis

of bilateral interaction, serving as the channels through which China has projected its

own identity and exerted influence on Iran by shaping the latter’s self-perception.

The central analytical question is therefore the following: to what extent is China’s

ideational influence visible in the narratives produced by Iranian political authorities and

influential opinion makers regarding the 25-year CSP? By focusing on elite narratives,

this article does not seek to measure public opinion in Iran. Rather, it examines how

politically relevant actors frame the Partnership and whether their discourse reflects

convergent role conceptions and normative assumptions compatible with China’s

strategic narratives.

The Iranian case is particularly important for assessing ideational influence because

Iran’s foreign policy combines a strong ideological tradition with a long record of strategic

adaptation. Since the 1979 Revolution, the principle often summarised as “Neither East

nor West” has occupied a central place in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy doctrine.

At the same time, changing international pressures, such as sanctions, regional

insecurity, and tensions with the United States, have encouraged a more pragmatic

reconfiguration of external partnerships, including a stronger turn to the East.

This tension between doctrinal autonomy and strategic realignment makes Iran a critical

case. If Chinese ideational influence is visible in Iranian elite narratives, it is likely to

emerge not as simple rhetorical imitation, but as a selective process of appropriation,

reinterpretation, and alignment shaped by Iran’s own political priorities. For this reason,

attention to elite discourse is essential: political leaders, state-affiliated media, and

influential commentators play a central role in constructing the public meaning of the

CSP and in signaling the terms through which the relationship with China is legitimised

domestically and internationally.

This article adopts a theory-led mixed-method design that combines structured

qualitative content analysis with interpretive discourse analysis. The methodological

choice follows directly from the article’s theoretical framework: if ideational influence is

understood as the capacity to shape meanings, roles, and expectations, then the

empirical strategy must capture both the frequency of recurring argumentative patterns

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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and the way these patterns are articulated linguistically in elite discourse (Wendt, 1992;

Onuf, 2012; Krippendorff, 2018; Schreier, 2012).

The empirical corpus is composed of ten public texts (speeches, interviews, official

statements, and opinion pieces) produced by Iranian political authorities and politically

relevant opinion makers between April 2020 and April 2021. This period was selected

because it corresponds to the final negotiation and formalisation phase of the 25-year

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), and therefore captures the moment in which

elite narratives sought to frame the meaning, legitimacy, and expected effects of the

agreement. The sample is purposive rather than representative: documents were

included when they (1) explicitly referred to the CSP and/or Sino-Iranian strategic

cooperation under the BRI framework, and (2) were attributable to actors with agenda-

setting relevance in Iran’s political or para-political sphere. This also means that the

article analyses a bounded discursive moment, primarily the late Rouhani period, rather

than all phases of Iranian foreign policy.

The analysis proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, all ten texts were coded through

a deductive coding frame derived from the literature and the theoretical argument of the

article. Two dimensions were coded: tone (positive, skeptical, negative) and

argumentative frames (economic; cultural/identity; democracy or human rights;

security-related; international system/global order; nuclear deal; military cooperation;

anti-American). The unit of analysis was the document, but coding decisions were based

on explicit textual markers (keywords, expressions, and argumentative passages). A

frame was coded as present when it appeared at least once in a substantively meaningful

way. To improve procedural consistency, the coding frame and category definitions were

fixed before the full coding round, and the corpus was re-read after the initial coding to

verify category stability and resolve borderline cases (Bowen, 2009).

In the second stage, the coded material was subjected to discourse analysis in order to

interpret how elite actors constructed the CSP as a meaningful political object. This

qualitative step focused not only on recurrent themes but also on rhetorical strategies,

legitimising narratives, silences, and implicit contrasts. This stage is essential because

ideational influence is not exhausted by thematic frequency: it also depends on how

language normalises certain role expectations, identities, and geopolitical hierarchies

(Fairclough, 2003; Wodak and Meyer, 2015). Methodologically, the article does not claim

to measure public opinion in Iran; rather, it examines elite discourse as a politically

consequential layer of meaning production, while acknowledging that future research

should compare elite narratives across different Iranian political periods and with non-

elite or foreign sources.

The BRI as a reflection of Chinese identity

Wendt describes identity as stable role-specific understandings shaped by shared

meanings (Wendt, 1992). Chinese identity reflects both Sinocentric superiority, rooted in

its historical view as the world’s center, and insecurity stemming from the “century of

humiliation” (Weissmann, 2015; Gaddis, 2017). Tensions within Chinese identity

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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complicate defining its role in the international system (Holsti, 1970). By the 1990s, Deng

Xiaoping shaped China as a “responsible power,” and the 2000 “Going Global” strategy

promoted foreign investment and market interconnection, boosting China’s status as an

“emerging power” (Goldstein, 1998; Ikenberry, 2008).

In recent decades, Chinese foreign policy shifted toward a revisionist stance, challenging

the liberal order. The 2008 financial crisis exposed global systemic weaknesses and

inspired Beijing to pursue an alternative economic and political order to counter U.S.

dominance (Deng, 2014; Etzioni, 2011; Zhang, 2009). Hu Jintao introduced the vision of

a harmonious global order, which Xi Jinping later expanded after assuming leadership

(especially from 2012–2013 onward), aspiring to lead an alternative system based on

sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and inclusivity. This order contrasts with Western

models, promoting fairness and shared prosperity (Ding, 2008; Breslin, 2009; Michalski

and Pan, 2017). This reconceptualisation of China’s role in international affairs - and, by

extension, of its identity - would be accompanied by new expectations associated with

that evolving role. In that sense, Chinese Foreign Policy would reflect those expectations

and materialise this role and identity (Thies, 2010; Harnisch, 2012; Michalski and Pan,

2017; Shala, 2021).

Launched in 2013, the BRI exemplifies China’s global ambitions. As the centerpiece of

Beijing’s “Going Global” strategy, it became a legal priority in 2017, aiming to create a

trade and investment network that fosters prosperity while cementing China’s leadership

(Taylor and Zajontz, 2020). In his 2013 speech in Kazakhstan introducing the Initiative,

Xi Jinping emphasised its significance, presenting it as inspired by the Ancient Silk Road

and aimed at opening a “new chapter of friendship” founded on “solidarity, mutual trust,

equality, inclusivity, mutual learning, and win-win cooperation”. The Initiative, he

argued, would foster the joint pursuit of development and peace among its members. At

its core, China was to assume a pivotal leadership role - one not only grounded in the

contemporary resonance of a celebrated past, but also regarded as necessary and

accepted by the participating states as integral to the Initiative. The justification for this

acceptance comes from the fact that this leadership was promoted and seen as a form

of connective leadership presented as fair and mutually beneficial (Wang, 2016;

Andornino, 2017).

In this sense, the way that this role is conceived and understood is both a result of its

promotion by China and of the understanding and expectations created around it by the

States participating in the Initiative, being, in that sense, a role born of the sharing and

intersubjective meanings of actors in interaction (Wendt, 1992; Harnisch, 2012).

China and Iran’s interaction on the BRI: historical ideational factors and

revived material needs

Iran’s foreign policy cannot be reduced to a purely economic logic, nor can it be read as

a fixed ideological posture. Since 1979, it has been shaped by a persistent tension

between revolutionary principles and pragmatic state interests, a duality that has long

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China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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been identified in the literature on the Islamic Republic’s external behaviour (Ramazani,

2004; Rakel, 2007; Khelghat-Doost, 2022). This tension is also embedded in the

constitutional and normative foundations of the regime: the post-revolutionary state

formally articulated a foreign policy anchored in independence, anti-domination, and the

rejection of subordination to great powers, often summarised in the principle of “Neither

East nor West” (Papan-Matin, 2014). In practice, however, this principle has not implied

strategic equidistance, but rather a recurring effort to preserve regime autonomy while

selectively engaging external powers according to shifting pressures and opportunities

(Barzegar and Divsallar, 2017; Ramazani, 2004).

A second point that is essential for this article is that Iranian foreign policy is not produced

by a single actor, but through a layered and contested elite structure. The Supreme

Leader, the presidency, the foreign ministry, security institutions, and semi-official

intellectual networks all shape policy narratives, though not with equal weight across

periods (Bazoobandi, Heibach and Richter, 2024). This helps explain why Iran’s external

discourse has combined continuity with adaptation across different presidencies:

pragmatic openings and diplomatic diversification under Rafsanjani and Khatami, a

stronger anti-Western rhetorical line under Ahmadinejad, selective re-engagement with

Europe during Rouhani’s presidency, and a more explicit consolidation of the “Look East”

orientation under Raisi (Azizi, 2023; Khelghat-Doost, 2022). Rather than a sudden

rupture, the contemporary strategic turn to Asia should therefore be read as the

intensification of an existing tendency, made more durable by sanctions, regional

competition, and declining expectations regarding the West (Azizi, 2023).

Within this broader trajectory, China occupies a distinctive place in Iranian strategic

thinking. The literature shows that Tehran has viewed China simultaneously as an

economic partner, a diplomatic hedge, and a symbolically useful pole in a less Western-

centered order, especially since the mid-2000s (Shariatinia, 2011; Fan, 2022). Yet this

relationship has also been marked by asymmetry and constraint. Even when Iranian

elites promoted a “Look to the East” policy, Beijing’s approach remained cautious and

interest-driven, particularly under the pressure of U.S. sanctions and China’s wider global

priorities (Shariatinia, 2011; Chaziza, 2020). This is precisely why an ideational approach

is useful here: material cooperation alone does not explain why Iranian official and semi-

official narratives repeatedly frame China not just as a partner of necessity, but as a

legitimate and even civilisationally resonant strategic interlocutor (Fan, 2022).

This context is particularly relevant for interpreting the discourse surrounding the 25-

year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Existing scholarship on Iran and the BRI

highlights a dual pattern of expectation and caution (“hope and fear”), in which Iranian

actors recognise both the opportunities of Chinese connectivity and the risks of

dependency or unequal gains (Shariatinia and Azizi, 2019; Chaziza, 2020). At the same

time, more ideationally oriented analyses show that Iranian elite discourse often presents

Iran as a civilisational crossroads in an emerging Afro-Eurasian space, a framing that

converges with key symbolic elements of China’s BRI narrative (Forough, 2020; Fan,

2022). By situating the Iranian case within this doctrinal and elite-political background,

the article can better demonstrate that the narratives examined in the empirical section

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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are not isolated statements, but part of a longer process in which strategic necessity,

elite mediation, and ideational alignment intersect (Saleh and Yazdanshenas, 2023;

Bazoobandi, Heibach and Richter, 2024).

The BRI reflects China’s “interconnected leadership” by advancing shared principles and

tangible benefits (Selmier, 2018; Andornino, 2017). Iran and China, whose ties date back

to the Ancient Silk Road, find their modern partnership driven by material needs and

historical-cultural commonalities (Shariatinia and Azizi, 2017; 2019).

Both countries’ revival of formal relationships, since 1971, and especially since 1979,

when the Iranian Revolution took place and when Deng Xiaoping’s Open-Door Policy was

presented and began to be implemented, had in its core the need to correspond to each

country’s material needs (Scott, 2016). Since the 1980s, China China has become a

major purchaser of Iranian energy supplies. Iran became one of China’s major purchasers

of defense-related goods, military equipment, and nuclear-related technology,

particularly since the 1980s due to the Iran-Iraq War, where China became a supplier of

conventional weapons (Davis et al. 2012). During the 1990s, energy emerged as the

central axis of China-Iran relations, with Beijing increasingly viewing Tehran as a key

partner for ensuring its energy security. This partnership continued to evolve in

subsequent decades to address those needs. However, its expansion and consolidation

also came from shared identity elements and convergent perceptions of common threats.

The collective memory of both nations’ humiliation at the hands of imperial and foreign

powers, their historical opposition to colonialism, and their mutual concern over losing

autonomy and sovereignty rooted in common past experiences, together with a

determination to preserve internal cohesion and resist external hegemonism, whether

regional or global, “color each country’s historical narrative” in strikingly similar ways

(Ibid). In the same way, after “centuries of humiliation,” both states have shaped their

foreign policy, at least rhetorically, by presenting themselves as champions of the non-

aligned movement and as committed partners of other developing nations, seeking to

reclaim the international influence they believe was taken from them by Western powers

since the sixteenth century. The long-standing networks forged through centuries of

interaction, communication, trade, and cultural as well as economic exchange are

reinforced by a “rhetoric of civilisational solidarity” that “seemed to lubricate the process

of Sino-Iranian cooperation” (Garver, 2006).

Given the identity affinities between the two countries, it suggests that they tend to

perceive threats in markedly similar ways. These convergent perceptions have, in turn,

contributed to bringing Tehran and Beijing closer together over the past few decades.

First and foremost, the United States is perceived as a hegemonic and historical threat

to both countries (Conduit and Akbarzadeh, 2018; Fulton, 2019). In the 2013 and 2015

Defense White Papers, China states the danger of hegemonism to the country’s rise and

overall regional stability (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2013; The

State Council of The People’s Republic of China, 2015). Similarly, since the 1979

Revolution, the Iranian regime has depicted the United States as its principal adversary,

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the “Great Satan”, consistently framing its intentions and actions in the Middle Eastern

context in a negative and adversarial light.

Secondly, this perception of a shared enemy has been essential for reinforcing both

countries’ relationship materially and cultivating a benevolent perception of each other.

In the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s Defense needs were answered by China, being Beijing the

country’s leading arms supplier in this conflict, accounting for 40 to 70 percent of all arms

supplied (Conduit and Akbarzadeh, 2018). During the conflict, Iran employed Chinese

missiles, including the Silkworm, and in 1987 used one to strike a U.S.-reflagged tanker.

As tensions escalated and the international community condemned China for contributing

to arms proliferation by supporting Iran, Beijing encouraged Tehran to accept a ceasefire

in July 1988, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 598. China’s alignment with

Iran during this war contributed to the perception among Iranian officials of Beijing as a

dependable partner in safeguarding their interests and, consequently, “a key

interlocutor” for Iran in the international arena.

Likewise, Iran’s imperative to export energy and China’s need to secure energy imports

formed part of a broader regional environment in which China expanded strategic

coordination frameworks, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the early

2000s: high-level platforms designed to counterbalance U.S. influence in the Middle East

while addressing both regional and Chinese strategic needs in more concrete terms.

China and Iran’s perception of America’s enmity was “reinforced,” especially after the

crisis surrounding Iran’s Nuclear Program and its consequences, namely the international

sanctions imposed, the constant pressure applied by Washington to limit Beijing and

Tehran’s interaction and the subsequent agreement on the nuclear program, called the

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (Shariatania and Azizi, 2017). Iran’s isolation

did not diminish its strategic significance in Beijing’s eyes; rather, it created a window of

opportunity for China. Although generally reluctant to support the imposition of sanctions

on Iran - and even as pressures accumulated for stricter measures - Beijing “balanced

its relations with Iran at points respecting the U.S. led sanctions on Iran while also

making the most of the opportunities arising out of Iran’s isolation” (Roy-Chaudhury,

2021). The 2015 nuclear agreement subsequently opened the way for greater Chinese

engagement in the Iranian economy and facilitated access to its energy market, despite

the decline, since 2013, in China’s dependence on and prioritisation of Iranian energy

supplies.

This reduction came from the sanctions regime implemented by the Obama

Administration, which forced Beijing to choose between maintaining access to U.S.

financial markets by cooperating with the sanctions and “solely relying on the global

energy market,” or defying the regime and facing U.S. hostility (Wuthnow, 2016; Harold,

2015). Even so, the resulting status quo offered Beijing renewed opportunities to

strengthen its ties with Tehran. Moreover, shifts in Iran’s foreign policy behavior,

combined with the broader framework of the BRI, created favorable conditions for

Chinese influence to expand further.

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The BRI as the framework for a new relationship

In 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Iran and he was the first Chinese head of State to

do so for almost 15 years. Together with the establishment of a broader comprehensive

strategic partnership framework in 2016, the visit marked a significant step in

consolidating Beijing’s intentions and long-term objectives with Iran, later deepened

through the 25-year CSP in 2021. The visit was interpreted as indicating a “new chapter

of high-level exchanges between the two states.” During his meeting with President

Rouhani, Xi underlined that there were no “fundamental conflicts” between China and

Iran, two countries with “no wars or disputes” and a history of “time-honored friendly

exchanges and sincere cooperation” that had “stood the vicissitudes of the international

landscape” (China Daily, 2016). These acknowledged and valued identity affinities

between the two countries set the stage for the positive outcomes of the visit.

Seventeen agreements were concluded during the visit, covering a broad spectrum of

areas. These included the strengthening of political relations through the establishment

of an annual meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers aimed at deepening

“mutual strategic trust”; the promotion of cultural exchanges, notably through tourism;

and a joint commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes and opposition to the use

of force in international relations. Nonetheless, the majority of the agreements focused

on enhancing economic cooperation. Those included a 600-billion-dollar trade deal to be

fulfilled until 2026 and the recognition of Iran’s participation in the BRI that would allow

the development of several areas within that framework, namely infrastructure

construction, finance, and energy cooperation (Butch, 2021).

An Iran seeking to create favorable international conditions for economic growth and

seeking to have a more cautious and cooperative regional approach after an

unprecedented Nuclear Deal promoted by President Rouhani’s pragmatic and more

rationalist approach to Foreign Policy, one that sought to improve the country’s

international reputation and dilute, in some sense, its pariah and isolated status, the BRI

was presented as a golden opportunity for those goals to be fulfilled (Golmohammadi,

2019; Shariatinia and Azizi, 2017). That is illustrated by Supreme Leader Ayatollah

Khamenei’s statements in a meeting with President Xi Jinping in 2016 when he called the

Initiative “very appropriate and wise,” welcoming it as a new outline in the relationship

of “two ancient civilisations” and as an opportunity for Iran to reach its goals (Sinaiee,

2021). In the same vein, Iran’s Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Ali Tayyebnia

said in the Belt and Road Initiative Forum in 2017 that Iran’s position in the Initiative

was “spectacular and ideal,” showing enthusiasm for the Iran’s participation in the

Initiative (Financial Tribune, 2017). Moreover, the aspiration to strengthen ties with a

like-minded partner, combined with the prospect of economic gains, thus encompassing

both identity-based and material considerations, can be identified as key drivers behind

the deepening of bilateral cooperation under the BRI and the broader strategic

partnership. In this context, China’s foreign policy and rhetoric have played an

“increasing role in shaping Iran’s international behavior”.

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This trajectory of closer ties was reinforced by President Trump’s announcement on 8

May 2018 of the United States’ withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal. Consequently, on 5

November of that year, all U.S. sanctions on Iran that had been suspended under the

Agreement were reinstated as part of the “maximum pressure policy”. The impact on

Iran’s economy was severe, with oil production, the cornerstone of its economic system,

declining sharply.

Despite the U.S. Administration’s reimposition of sanctions, the Chinese Government

remained firmly committed to the nuclear deal, consistently defending what it terms

Iran’s right to the peaceful use of atomic energy

. Furthermore, in an effort to mitigate

the effects of the sanctions on Iran and on the BRI, Beijing worked closely with the Tehran

regime to implement multiple Memoranda of Understanding signed in 2014. Through this

continued engagement, China positioned itself as a dependable partner for Iran, capable

of facilitating efforts to renegotiate the Nuclear Deal with the United States

. This

perception of reliability was further consolidated with the signing of the 25-year

Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

The 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Although reportedly negotiated during President Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to Tehran, in July

2020 several documents were leaked concerning the expansion and upgrade of the

already established Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Subsequently, on 27 March

2021, this enlarged and deepened partnership entered public debate after the

circulation/leak of draft documents by Saeed Khatibzadeh, spokesperson for the Iranian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The leak did not disclose specific details (such as the “financial

and monetary resources” or the existence of binding contracts), but suggested a loosely

defined framework of Chinese investment in Iran, amounting allegedly to 400 billion

dollars over 25 years, in exchange for the supply of Iranian oil to China for the same

period. Symbolically, the deal was signed on the 50th anniversary of the establishment

of diplomatic relations between the two states. Iran refers to it as a “strategic cooperation

deal,” yet both sides have publicly clarified that it does not constitute an alliance, a pact,

or a legally binding agreement. Reza Zabib, a member of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, described the arrangement on Twitter as a “non-binding document”. In a press

conference on 29 March, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated that

the agreement “(…) neither includes any quantitative, specific contracts and goals nor

Indeed, Beijing and Tehran continued to advance a number of nuclear-energy-related initiatives, many of

which had been discussed during President Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit. These included contracts for the construction

of two 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plants, the development of an Arak heavy water reactor, and joint

scientific research in the nuclear field (Butch, 2021).

In addition, Beijing has contributed to the financing of several research and development parks and innovation

hubs in Iran. For further details, see: Sheikhi, Marjohn. “Science VP in China for promotion of tech. coop.”

MEHR News Agency, October 24, 2016. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/120769/Science-VP-in-China-for-

promotion-of-tech-coop; Sheikhi, Marjohn. “Iran’s MERC signs scientific MoU with China.” MEHR News Agency,

December 10, 2016. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/121904/Iran-s-MERC-signs-scientific-MoU-with-China.

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targets any third party, and will provide a general framework for China-Iran cooperation

going forward” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2021).

According to the leaked document, Beijing was expected to allocate 280 billion dollars to

the development of Iran’s petrochemical, gas, and oil industries, and a further 120 billion

dollars to the modernisation and upgrading of the country’s manufacturing and

communications infrastructure connected to the BRI. Encompassing both public and

private actors from each side, the deal purportedly envisaged close to 100 projects across

a broad range of sectors beyond those already mentioned, including vaccine provision,

pharmaceuticals, banking, consumer goods, and trade, with Chinese companies with

Chinese companies expected to play a central role in implementing these projects. Tehran

would primarily offset the costs of these large-scale investments through guaranteed oil

exports to China at discounted prices (Dudgeon, 2021; DW, 2021).

With regard to nuclear issues, the document states that it “contributes towards

guaranteeing the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear activities” and affirms Iran’s legitimate

right to the “peaceful use of nuclear energy according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT)”. It also specifies that the JCPOA should be implemented in “good faith and in an

inclusive and balanced manner,” reinforcing both countries’ commitment to the

agreement. Consequently, if the United States were to rejoin the JCPOA, it would have

to accept the Agreement’s “existing scopes and parameters.” This framing underscores

a perceived decline in U.S. influence in the region and a loss of leverage in any potential

future nuclear deal negotiations (Islamic Republic News Agency, 2021).

Although Iran’s official news agency refers only to the “economic and cultural” dimensions

of the cooperation, the leaked plan allegedly includes provisions for military collaboration.

One reported element is the possible deployment of Chinese military personnel to Iran

for training purposes and to enhance the interoperability of the two armed forces. This

aspect, along with the JCPOA-related provisions, could serve as a deterrent to potential

hostile military actions or threats against Iran in the region (Vatanka, 2021).

Despite the nature of the Partnership and what both countries publicly admit of it, this

reflects the gradual intensification of Tehran and Beijing’s relationship not only materially

but also in ideational terms, being a result of their constant interaction on specific

“collective structures,” while demonstrating at the same time both countries’ detachment

and friction with the United States, and thus a “common” definition and perception of the

structure of the International System and the roles played by certain States in it—

functioning of the International System (Harnisch, 2012).

Data Analysis and Results

The strengthening of Sino-Iranian ties through the CSP illustrates China’s influence on

the narratives articulated by the Iranian elite. Although public opinion data remain scarce,

an analysis of elite discourse sheds light on how their framing shapes collective

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perceptions of the partnership. For this purpose, ten speeches and written statements

from political leaders and opinion makers, delivered between April 2020 and April 2021,

were examined. These were coded under two analytical dimensions: tone (positive,

skeptical, or negative) and arguments used at least once (economic; related to the

international system; security-related; concerning democracy or human rights; cultural

or identity-based; anti-American; related to the nuclear deal; or enhancing military

cooperation).

Beyond the uniformly positive tone identified across all ten documents, the corpus reveals

a more structured pattern of discursive alignment. The convergence is not limited to

official statements by the presidency or the foreign ministry (Docs. 1–4), but also extends

to diplomats, university professors, media figures, and para-official opinion makers

(Docs. 5–10). This distribution is analytically relevant because it suggests that support

for the CSP is not expressed only as a formal state position, but as a broader elite

narrative reproduced across different sites of meaning production. In this sense, the

positive tone should be read less as a merely descriptive feature and more as an indicator

of discursive stabilisation around the legitimacy of the Partnership (Table 1).

A first interpretive pattern is the close articulation between anti-American rhetoric and

references to international order. In most documents, criticism of U.S. “unilateralism”

and “interventionism” is not presented only as a bilateral grievance, but as evidence of

a wider disorder affecting “security, peace, and stability” in the region (Docs. 1 and 10).

Likewise, documents that emphasise the CSP as a response to sanctions (Docs. 2 and 3)

do more than describe economic pressure: they frame the Partnership as part of a

broader political strategy to resist external domination. This helps explain why anti-

American references frequently overlap with “global order” arguments. The CSP is thus

narrated not simply as a contract, but as a politically meaningful alignment within an

alternative reading of international order.

A second pattern concerns the economic dimension, which remains central but performs

an ideational function as well. As the coding table shows, economic arguments appear in

almost all documents (with the exception of Doc. 8), and they consistently emphasise

mutual gains, connectivity, and long-term development expectations. However, these

references are not purely technical. In several cases, economic cooperation is linked to

China’s perceived status and role, including the expectation that China is a reliable and

exceptionally capable partner within the BRI framework, even described as “the most

powerful state economically and militarily” (Doc. 9). This suggests that material

cooperation is discursively embedded in a hierarchy of international roles in which China

is represented not only as useful, but as a legitimate anchor of Iran’s strategic future.

A third pattern is the selective use of cultural and identity-based arguments. These are

less frequent than economic and anti-American frames, but they play a disproportionate

legitimising role. Expressions such as “common cultural grounds,” “long-term historical

relations,” “Asian identity,” and “two founders of great civilisations” (Docs. 2, 7, and 9)

do not merely praise bilateral ties; they help naturalise the Partnership by presenting it

The speeches’ sources (Docs.) are identified in the Bibliographic References.

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as historically grounded and civilisationally coherent. This is particularly important for the

article’s argument on ideational influence, because it shows that the CSP is framed not

only as expedient, but as symbolically appropriate. In other words, identity references

work to transform strategic cooperation into a narrative of belonging and continuity.

Finally, the silences and asymmetries in the corpus are as revealing as the recurrent

themes. Nuclear issues are mentioned only in a limited number of documents (Docs. 4,

8, and 10), despite their clear relevance to the broader strategic context, and military

cooperation appears only once—and there in the form of denial (Doc. 7). The complete

absence of democracy or human rights language across all ten documents is especially

significant. Rather than a neutral omission, this silence suggests a discursive boundary:

the CSP is consistently articulated through sovereignty, order, development, and anti-

intervention, while normative vocabularies associated with liberal internationalism are

excluded. Taken together, these patterns indicate that ideational convergence in the

corpus is expressed not only through what is repeatedly said, but also through what is

systematically left unsaid.

Overall, the empirical findings point to more than rhetorical support for a bilateral

agreement. They reveal a structured discursive alignment in which economic

cooperation, anti-American positioning, global-order narratives, and civilisational framing

reinforce each other. This combination is what allows the CSP to function, in Iranian elite

discourse, as both a material strategy and an ideationally meaningful partnership.

Conclusion

Regarding the research question posed in the introduction—whether Chinese ideational

influence can be identified in the narratives of Iranian political authorities and opinion

makers concerning the CSP—the findings suggest a consistent pattern of discursive

convergence. Within the selected corpus, Chinese influence is visible not only in the

positive valuation of the Partnership, but also in the recurrence of specific interpretive

frames that align with Beijing’s strategic narratives, particularly those related to

sovereignty, anti-unilateralism, international order, and “win-win” cooperation.

At the same time, the findings should be interpreted with analytical caution. The corpus

is limited to ten texts produced within a specific political moment (2020–2021), and it

primarily reflects elite and para-official voices rather than broader public attitudes. For

that reason, the article does not claim to demonstrate a generalised societal alignment,

nor does it seek to isolate ideational factors from the material and geopolitical incentives

that also structure Sino-Iranian cooperation. Instead, the evidence indicates that the CSP

functions as a discursive and institutional setting in which material cooperation and

ideational alignment reinforce one another.

The article’s theoretical framework contributes to this interpretation by combining

constructivism and role theory to analyse how shared meanings, role conceptions, and

political expectations are articulated in elite discourse. Methodologically, the combined

use of structured thematic categorisation and qualitative discourse analysis proved useful

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for identifying both recurring argumentative patterns and strategic silences, including the

selective marginalisation of nuclear and military themes and the complete absence of

democracy or human-rights language. These omissions are analytically significant

because they help define the normative boundaries within which the Partnership is

publicly legitimised.

This study also contributes to the literature by examining the 25-year Comprehensive

Strategic Partnership not only as a materially driven arrangement, but as an ideationally

meaningful platform. While economic and geopolitical factors remain central, the findings

indicate that the Partnership also supports the circulation of convergent narratives about

order, cooperation, and the role of non-Western powers. Future research may build on

this framework by expanding the corpus across different Iranian political periods,

comparing elite and non-elite narratives, and assessing whether similar patterns of

discursive alignment can be identified in other regional contexts shaped by China’s

strategic partnerships.

Looking ahead, comparative studies involving foreign journalists, academics, and political

actors could help determine whether the observed discursive patterns are uniquely

Iranian or part of a broader international echo of China’s strategic narratives. Such an

approach could further refine our understanding of how ideational influence travels and

adapts across different political and cultural contexts.

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VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 477-501

China’s Ideational Influence on Iran: The 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Through Role Theory and Political Narratives

André Matos, Eduardo Ribeiro

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Table 1. Visual distribution of tones and arguments

The content analysis and the corresponding results table stem from research conducted for the preparation

of a Master’s thesis in International Relations. This material is original and has not been published or

disseminated elsewhere.

Doc

Author/Origin

Tone

Arguments

Pos

Skep

Neg

Eco

Global

Orde/

I.S

Sec.

Demo/

H.R

Cultural/

Identity

Anti-

Americanism

Nuclear

deal

Military

coop.

President

Rouhani

President

Rouhani

President

Rouhani

Spokesperson

of Ministry of

Foreign

Affairs

Diplomat

Opinion

maker

(University

Professor)

Opinion

maker

(University

Professor)

Opinion

makers

(speakers in

the

international

webinar)

Opinion

maker

(Managing

Director of

the Islamic

Republic

News

Agency)

Opinion

maker

(journalist)