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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

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NON-ARAB MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TURKISH AND MALAYSIAN STATE APPROACHES

ENGIN KOÇ

engin.koc@btu.edu.tr

He has been serving as the Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations in

the Bursa Technical University (Turkey). He specializes in Middle East Politics, Turkey’s foreign

policy, and China’s foreign policy in the Gulf. Engin Koc holds both Master's and Ph.D. studies at

the Department of International Relations at Uludag University. His Ph.D. thesis is “Analysis of

Iran and Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Policies in the Context of State Identity” he also

studied at the American University of Cairo for six mounts as a visiting scholar. He knows

Turkish, English, and Arabic language. His research has been featured in the news and academic

outlets, including Politics Today and TRT World. He interviews at some international news

channels and tweets at @KocEngin16

Abstract

This research conducts a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of Turkiye and Malaysia

regarding the Palestinian issue and Israel, highlighting both their convergences and

divergences in approaches within the broader context of Jewish-Muslim relations. Ankara and

Kuala Lumpur maintain extensive and multifaceted connections in various spheres, such as

religion, politics, economy, culture, and social issues in the Middle East. The political stances

of Turkiye and Malaysia serve as an insightful comparative case study to understand the

engagement of Muslim-majority non-Arab countries with the Palestinian cause and the state

of Israel. Their diplomatic initiatives consistently advocate for a two-state solution to the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Additionally, both countries provide humanitarian and

developmental aid to Palestinians residing in occupied territories and refugee camps. This

study argues that Turkiye's direct support for Palestine is in contrast to Malaysia's indirect

approach, with Turkiye's historical ties and formal diplomatic relations with Israel, as opposed

to Malaysia's policy of avoiding direct engagement in most-similar case study approach.

However, this paper sheds light on how their policies reflect broader trends and tensions in

Jewish-Muslim relations in international relations.

Keywords

Turkiye, Malaysia, Palestine Issue, Middle East, Israel.

Resumo

Esta investigação realiza uma análise comparativa das políticas externas da Turquia e da

Malásia relativamente à questão palestiniana e a Israel, destacando tanto as suas

convergências como as suas divergências nas abordagens, no contexto mais amplo das

relações entre judeus e muçulmanos. Ancara e Kuala Lumpur mantêm ligações extensas e

multifacetadas em várias esferas, tais como a religião, a política, a economia, a cultura e as

questões sociais no Médio Oriente. As posições políticas da Turquia e da Malásia constituem

um estudo de caso comparativo esclarecedor para compreender o envolvimento dos países

não árabes de maioria muçulmana com a causa palestiniana e o Estado de Israel. As suas

iniciativas diplomáticas defendem consistentemente uma solução de dois Estados para o

conflito israelo-palestiniano. Além disso, ambos os países prestam ajuda humanitária e ao

desenvolvimento aos palestinianos que residem em territórios ocupados e campos de

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

430

refugiados. Este estudo argumenta que o apoio direto da Turquia à Palestina contrasta com a

abordagem indireta da Malásia, com os laços históricos e as relações diplomáticas formais da

Turquia com Israel, em oposição à política da Malásia de evitar o envolvimento direto numa

abordagem de estudo de caso mais semelhante. No entanto, este artigo esclarece como as

suas políticas refletem tendências e tensões mais amplas nas relações entre judeus e

muçulmanos nas relações internacionais.

Palavras-chave

Turquia, Malásia, Questão da Palestina, Médio Oriente, Israel.

How to cite this article

Koç, Engin (2026). Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of

Turkish and Malaysian State Approaches. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations, VOL. 17,

Nº. 1, May 2026, pp. 429-448. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.17.1.22

Article submitted on 31 March 2025 and accepted on21 January 2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

431

NON-ARAB MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES ON PALESTINE AND ISRAEL:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TURKISH AND MALAYSIAN STATE

APPROACHES

ENGIN KOÇ

Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the most persistent and complicated issue in

modern international relations. International actors, including countries with a majority

of Muslims, have strong approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the beginning

of the problem has been principally regarded as an Arab issue, non-Arab Muslim states

have usually remained passive observers due to geopolitical distance and ideological

alignments during the Cold War. However, the 1969 Al-Aqsa fire spurred non-Arab

Muslim states' involvement in Palestine via the newly formed Organization of Islamic

Cooperation (OIC) (Hossain, 2012). Although these states primarily deal with the issue

through the OIC, they became increasingly sidelined after the 1990s (Rubin and Laquer,

2008) due to the Oslo Accords, predominant by Arab states, diminished the role of non-

Arab Muslim nations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During this time, Malaysia also

presented symbolic support for Palestine, while Turkiye, driven by regime security,

shifted towards Israel. However, Turkiye and Malaysia, as two non-Arab modern Muslim-

Sunni states have historical, geopolitical, ideological, and cultural deep ties with

Palestine. On the other side, they have divergent diplomatic strategies towards the

Palestine issue and Israel.

This study argues that Turkiye adopts a pragmatic and direct approach, balancing its

diplomatic and economic ties with Israel while strongly supporting Palestine. In contrast,

Malaysia maintains an uncompromising stance against Israel, providing indirect support

to Palestine through ideological and humanitarian advocacy, primarily leveraging soft

power and international platforms like the OIC. By examining these disparate

approaches, the research offers a sophisticated understanding of how non-Arab Muslim

nations navigate the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study did not

select Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran because Turkiye and Malaysia offer more distinctive

perspectives on the Palestinian issue.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a significant foreign policy challenge for

many nations due to the following three factors: its religious background, entanglement

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

432

with regional geopolitical rivalries, and the social and humanitarian repercussions of the

conflict, such as displacement and persistent violence. (Bayraktar, 2019). Khalidi (1985)

and Disntein (1994) examine the Arabs' views of the Arab-Israeli tension, while Mansab

(2024) and Nonneman (2003) explore European approaches to the disputed issues

between hostile sides. Slater (2002) focuses on American perspectives in the ongoing

conflict. Pipes (1987), Kazziha (1985) and Brown (2003) analyzed Arab approaches to

conflict. However, this study aims to investigate the two non-Arab Muslim nations

regarding the Palestine-Israel conflict over time.

This article is divided into four sections: Navigating Complexities explores their broader

Middle East policies; Turkiye’s Policy examines its balance between ties with Israel and

support for Palestine; Malaysia’s Policy analyzes its firm opposition to Israel and

consistent pro-Palestinian stance; and Diverging Paths, Common Ground compares their

approaches, highlighting both differences and shared commitments. This paper allows

for a comprehensive comparison of the convergences and divergences of how these two

non-Arab Muslim countries navigate the complexities of the Palestinian question.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This study aims to analyze the Palestine policies of these two (Turkiye and Malaysia) non-

Arab Muslim nations, examining the political commonalities rooted in their historical

connections and the distinct priorities shaping their roles on the issue. Specifically, the

analysis will explore how each country’s interpretation of the Palestinian struggle and its

perspective on Israel’s presence in the region influence their respective policies. Using a

most similar systems design (MSSD) (Lijphart, 1971), this study considers Malaysia and

Turkiye as two non-Arab, middle-power, Muslim-majority nations with similar normative

identities, major pro-Palestinian stances, and membership in Islamic international

organizations. Despite these similarities, they differ in their approaches to Israel, which

makes them suitable for systematic comparison.

This study employs Role Theory (Holsti, 1970) as its main analytical tool to look at

Malaysia's and Turkiye's foreign policies regarding Israel and the Palestinian conflict. The

growing field of Foreign Policy Analysis gave rise to Role Theory, which highlights how

state self-perceptions, identity constructions, and socially grounded assumptions impact

their foreign policy (Hudson, 2005; Hermann, 1980; Breuning, 2007). Role Theory

emphasizes the importance of national role conceptions in influencing decision-makers'

opinions, policies, and diplomatic behavior rather than considering foreign policy only as

a response to material interests or systemic restrictions (Harnisch, 2012). Role theory,

which facilitates our understanding and interpretation of states' foreign policies, focuses

on the thoughts of elites who determine national policies, their understanding of the

international system, and other states' perceptions of their own state's role (Aggestam,

2004, 82). Within the framework of role theory, the identities that states possess are

assumed to be a component of politicians' beliefs and domestic politics, rather than a

result of their interactions with other states. (Wendt, 1999, 280)

This analytical perspective is particularly important when considering Malaysia's and

Turkiye 's approaches to the Palestinian issue and Israel. Both countries are non-Arab,

predominantly Muslim countries that actively engage in Islamic multilateral organizations

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

433

like the OIC and constantly express their support for Palestinian rights. Despite these

similarities, their diplomatic strategies toward Israel and the Palestinian issue are quite

distinct. Role theory, which highlights how each state develops and carries out its

international role, provides a suitable framework for understanding this divergence.

Navigating Complexities: Turkiye and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy to the

Middle East

During World War II, Turkiye adopted a policy of non-intervention in Middle Eastern

affairs and focused instead on domestic modernization and forged new foreign

alignments, primarily with Western nations (Khan, 2015). Following the war, Turkish

foreign policy pivoted towards containing Soviet influence. The ideological and territorial

ambitions of the USSR posed a significant threat to Turkiye’s independence. To counter

this, Ankara sought alliances with Western powers. Western anti-communist initiatives,

such as the Truman Doctrine (1947) and the Marshall Plan (1948), profoundly impacted

Turkish foreign policy. Confronted with Soviet demands regarding the Turkish Straits and

the northeastern provinces of Ardahan and Kars (Shamir, 2008), Turkiye sought security

guarantees from Western powers. This shift made Ankara the first Muslim-majority

country to recognize Israel’s independence in 1949 (Smith, 2000). Motivated primarily

by concerns over Soviet expansionism, Turkish policymakers also recognized the

potential advantages of fostering relations with the American Jewish community to lobby

for Turkish interests within the Western power structure. However, this realpolitik

decision, which prioritized national security over regional solidarity, alienated Arab states

and strained Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East for decades.

Throughout the Cold War, Turkiye, as a secular state, viewed the Palestinian cause

primarily through a humanitarian lens, eschewing radical political involvement in the

Middle East (Aykan, 1993). This stance was further shaped by its participation in the

1955 Baghdad Pact with Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan to counter Soviet influence. However,

the pact’s fragmentation with Iraq’s withdrawal in 1959 and its subsequent

transformation into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) headquartered in Ankara

strained relations with Arab states like Egypt and Syria, who viewed Turkiye with

suspicion as the West’s gendarme in the region (Dinc and Yetim, 2012). For instance,

during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Turkiye navigated the competing interests of the United

States and Britain regarding Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of

the Suez Canal (Sever, 1998). Rather, Turkiye’s approach to the Arab-Israel conflict

prioritized maintaining a balancing act between both the West and the Arab world.

In contrast, events like the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Johnson Letter (1964), and

the Cyprus Issue all played a role in reshaping Turkiye’s Cold War policies and its

approach to the Palestinian question. To comprehend Turkish foreign policy toward the

Middle East and the Palestinian issue, it is essential to consider both domestic and

international factors. Historically, Turkish-Arab relations have been influenced by

external factors. Notably, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Turkish-Western disputed views

over the Cyprus issue in 1965 have served, at times, to bring these regional actors closer

together in pursuit of their respective interests. Arguably, a decline in trust towards

Western powers coincided with a gradual improvement in Turkiye’s relations with the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

434

Arab world. As Volk (2013, 27) observes, “Whenever Israel was in direct confrontation

with Arab states and whenever Israel was directly humiliating Palestinians, Turkiye was

on the side of the Palestinians. Likewise, whenever Arab countries were intimidating

Turkish concerns, Turkiye returned to Israel's side”. So, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli

War, Turkiye began to diverge from the U.S. Middle East position. It refused Western

requests to use the Incirlik airbase for military aid to Israel and instead supported UN

resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories (Abadi, 1995). This

shift continued during the 1973 Arab-Israel War, as Turkiye extended support to Palestine

and other Arab states.

The domestic politics of Turkiye have played a crucial role in shaping Ankara’s foreign

policy towards the Middle East and Palestine in particular. Two significant factors in this

regard are securitization and the ideology of political elites (Tür and Han, 2011). For

instance, the 1980s saw further development under Turgut Özal’s economic liberalization

policies. Moving beyond the isolationist Kemalist approach, Turkiye adopted a

conservative perspective, fostering closer economic ties with the Arab world (Dal, 2012).

However, the post-Cold War era introduced new challenges. Turkiye’s domestic politics,

including securitization and the strategic relationship with Israel, formalized in the 1997

Security Pact, strained relations with some Arab states, particularly Syria (Şafak, 2024).

The rise of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2002 initially promised a new era

of cooperation with its multi-pronged diplomacy and focus on the East. While this period

did see increased cooperation, it was also marked by complex dynamics of competition,

particularly evident during the Arab Spring uprisings and the 2017 Qatar crisis.

Malaysia’s foreign policy prioritizes autonomy and national interest, guided by principles

of peace, justice, and equality. The main objective of Malaysia’s foreign policy is to carry

out the country’s mandate, which serves as an important capacity to protect the country’s

sovereignty and interests as well as make significant contributions to a just world

community through professional diplomatic relations (Dollah, 2020).

Historically, Malaysia’s foreign policy has undergone significant transformations. In the

aftermath of World War II and the onset of the Cold War (1947-1991), the complex

geopolitical environment, particularly the rivalry between the United States and the

Soviet Union, significantly influenced Malaysia's political and diplomatic stance

(Iannone, 2023). During this period, Malaysia adopted a pro-Western

alignment, integrating itself into the US-led anti-communist strategy. However, a shift

towards greater neutrality emerged with the establishment of diplomatic relations with

China in 1974.

Within the Islamic world, as one of the founders of the OIC, Malaysia, since 1969, has

played an important role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Its first Prime

Minister, the late Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970), was the first Secretary General of

the OIC (OIC, 2023a). One of the major steps taken by Malaysia was the signing of the

OIC Islamic Charter in 1972. This strategy aimed to project Kuala Lumpur's image on the

international stage and indirectly place Malaysia as one of the main and important

countries in the third world (Dollah, 2020). Through the formation of the OIC, Malaysia

began to collaborate closely and intensely with countries in the Middle East. The OIC is

considered an important instrument for increasing multilateral cooperation, which can

have a positive impact on the development of Malaysia's foreign policy towards the Middle

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

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East. Malaysia became one of the mediator countries in resolving the Iran-Iraq war

(Pertahanan, 2020). In addition, Malaysia also provides full support to the Palestinian

people in their struggle to regain their land, which was occupied by Israel.

Malaysia’s involvement in world diplomacy, especially in the Middle East region, is

evidence that Malaysia takes an important role and participates in resolving problems

and conflicts that often occur in the Middle East region. Malaysia is one of the countries

in Southeast Asia that has been vocal in calling for Palestinian independence and

condemning the brutal Israeli attacks. In this case, OIC has been an important platform

for Malaysia since its founding. Through OIC, Malaysia uses its foreign policy to

strengthen relations with countries in the Middle East. Furthermore, Malaysia also took

part in several important things, such as hosting the OIC Conference in 1974 and 2003

(OIC b) and hosting the Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign

Ministers on Terrorism in Muslim countries in 2002 (Moktal, 2022).

Under the leadership of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) as Prime Minister,

Malaysia underwent several dynamic changes in its international relations. Recognizing

the importance of an active role in fostering closer ties with Islamic nations, particularly

those in the Middle East, Mahathir pursued policies to enhance these connections. He

notably implemented the Look East Policy, aimed at strengthening economic cooperation

with East Asian nations (Hua, 1984). Serving the longest term in Malaysian history

(1981–2003), Mahathir capitalized on this tenure to further improve Malaysia’s relations

with various countries, including those in the Middle East (Jaafar, 2022). Abdullah Ahmad

Bedevi (2003-2009) developed the Kuala Lumpur image and initiatives in the Middle East.

Malaysia's economic success and image as a modern Muslim nation have fostered closer

ties with Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. While religion and history play a role,

Malaysia's well-defined foreign policy and shared interests across the region are key

drivers of these strong relationships (Harun, 2009). During the tenure of Najib Razak

(2009-2018), in contrast to the foreign policy trends observed during Dr. Mahathir's era,

he pursued a more moderate stance, emphasizing the importance of improving relations

with all countries in the Middle East. This can be evidenced by the implementation of a

number of policies with other GCC countries to combat extremism, radicalism, and

terrorism over politics and economic relations (Castlereagh Associates, 2019). 24

November 2022, Political Islamist and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Anwar Ibrahim

ascended to office as prime minister in Malaysia. It is important to acknowledge that,

alongside the religiously oriented diplomacy, there is a strategic venture to refrain

aligning with or being categorized within any certain political or ideological bloc in the

Middle East. Despite his past association with the Muslim Brotherhood, there is no

indication that Prime Minister Anwar has faced significant obstacles with the influential

regional states in the Middle East (Togoo, 2024).

Turkiye’s Policy on the Palestinian Question and Relationship with Israel

Turkiye’s engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was far more closely tied to its

relations with Western nations and the Arab world. In 1947, the United Nations Partition

Plan for Palestine was rejected by Turkiye together with Arab states (Aykan, 1993).

Turkiye recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in June 1975 as the only

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

436

authorized representation of the Palestinian people. Turkiye was also backing the UN

General Assembly resolution in November of the same year, which denounced Zionism

as a form of racism and the "fruit" of "this era of power" (Shamir 2008). Moreover, the

Turkish government did not accept Israel’s annexation plan of Jerusalem in 1980 and

criticized and condemned it very seriously (Hale, 2013). Following 1980, the Turkish

public's interest in Palestine began to grow. One of the major causes for this is the

National Vision Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) in Turkiye, which was led by Necmettin

Erbakan and takes a political Islamist stance on the regional issues (Uzer, 2017). Turkiye

was the fifth country in the world and the first NATO member nation to recognize

Palestinians’ right to exist on November 15, 1988, when the PLO declared an independent

state in exile and adopted all UN resolutions mentioning Palestinians’ right to exist

(Bayraktar, 2019). On the other side, Turkiye and PLO relations were always reluctant

because the PLO sided with the Greek thesis in Cyprus and supported radical leftist

terrorists and revolutionary groups such as The Revolutionary People's Liberation

Party/Front (DHKP-C), Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the Palestine and Lebanon Camps (Makovsky,1999 and

Aras, 1997).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the U.S. had grown less willing to sell weaponry to Turkiye,

which led the latter to forge ties with Israel to get a new supply of weapons for its battle

against the PKK in southeast Turkiye. National security threats by neighboring countries

like Iraq, Syria and Iran shifted Turkish foreign policy to Tel Aviv. Ankara also considered

Israel a partner in allying against Syria, a nation that had become more hostile to support

terrorist groups toward Turkiye (Walker, 2006). Turkiye also attached importance to her

relationship with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was established in 1996

within the framework of the Oslo-I (1993) and Oslo-II Agreements (1995), as well as the

cooperation that was focused on improving the living conditions of the Palestinian people.

Turkiye supports the efforts of the State of Palestine to be recognized as a state in

international forums (MFA, 2023).

When Pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (JDP) under the Erdogan leadership

ascended to power in Turkiye in 2002, Ankara paid attention to the developments in

Palestine. Erdogan responded strongly against the assassination of Ahmad Yasin, who

was the leader of Hamas (the US, Canada, the EU, and Japan classified it as a terrorist

organization, while Iran, Russia, Turkiye, and Malaysia do not) in 2004. His speeches

were appreciated by the Muslim world (Atrissi, 2017). In 2008, in Israel’s Operation Cast

Lead in Gazza, thousands of innocents were killed by Israel's army, and it caused Turkiye

and Israel’s relations to deteriorate. Turkiye was one of the leading pro-supporters of

Palestinians in Gazza and an anti-Israel figure in the international community. Turkish

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan consistently used harsh language against his Israeli

counterpart, accusing Israel of killing civilians. The Gaza War marked a watershed

moment in Turkish-Israeli relations in 2008 (Bayraktar, 2019). Turkiye supported Hamas

politically and tried to convince Fatah to cooperate with all functions against Israel's

pressure in Palestine. Two significant events dramatically changed Ankara’s foreign policy

toward Palestine. Firstly, on 29 January 2009, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan fought during a panel debate about Gaza at the World

Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (Hale, 2013). The second is Israeli soldiers

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 17, Nº. 1

May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

Engin Koç

437

attacking and killing nine Turkish citizens on the Mavi Marmara flotilla sailing to break

the Gaza blockade in the international waterways (Cagaptay, 2009).

These tragic events increased Turkiye’s credibility with the Palestinians because of how

costly its strong anti-Israeli position was—bloodshed occurred during the fleet raid, and

its strategic partnership with Israel was strained, leading to negative military and

economic effects (Bakir and Abu Amer, 2012). Turkiye canceled the joint military training

and projects with Israel. In this context, Turkiye actively backed the State of Palestine in

its bid for membership in UNESCO in 2011. Moreover, Palestine's upgrade of status to a

“non-member observer state” at the UN on 29 November 2012 by the overwhelming

support of the members of the UN, including Turkiye, constituted a landmark in the

recognition of Palestine as a state (MFA, 2023). Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated

Muhammed Mursi came to power in 2012 in Egypt; Turkiye considered it as a possible

friend related to their shared common history and Sunni identity. This new alliance

affected Turkiye’s aggressive diplomatic position in the 2012 Israeli-Gaza war, in which

it collaborated with Egypt and Qatar. However, Turkiye's position altered once the Muslim

Brotherhood was deposed in Egypt in 2013. During the 2014 Gaza conflict, Erdogan

chastised both Israel and Egyptian President al-Sisi, undermining Turkiye's influence. The

Rabia sign, which represents sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood, became an

important aspect of the JDP's rhetoric, firmly embedded in Erdogan’s speeches and

eventually becoming the party’s motto (Sultan, 2020).

For Turkiye, the Palestinian issue is more than just a historical, religious, or emotional

one. Due to its sensitivity, Trump’s declaration on December 6, 2017, to transfer the US

Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Turkish government criticized the US’s president

decision to any form of agreement concerning Palestinian areas, will not be oblivious to

changes in the Palestinian problem (Bayraktar, 2019). Turkiye opposed the normalization

between Israel and Arab states, citing concerns about neglecting Palestinian interests.

The Abraham Accords in 2020 were perceived as weaknesses, including hasty timing,

contradiction with the international community, notably the UN, and a disregard for the

two-state solution (Bayrak, 2021). Turkiye's discourses changed at the beginning of the

October War in 2023. Turkiye’s Foreign Minister, Fidan, said, “There should be a

guaranteed mechanism for monitoring, verifying, (and) when needed, enforcing the

obligations of the parties in a just peace," and “We must be unequivocal in condemning

and resisting the loss of any single innocent life” (Calli, 2023)

Regarding the post-7th October Israeli war in Gaza, Turkiye has engaged in the conflict

crisis in all formal and informal ways. President Erdoğan, speaking at the 5th Conference

of the League of Parliamentarians for Al-Quds in Istanbul, saluted the brave Palestinian

children stand out against oppression and criticized those who have massacred thousands

of Palestinians, comparing them to modern-day pharaohs and Nazis. He specifically

condemned Netanyahu as the "Butcher of Gaza," stating that this dark stain will never

be removed. Erdoğan emphasized that Turkiye will not label Palestinian resisters as

terrorists and will continue to support Hamas as defenders of their homeland. He

reaffirmed Turkiye's commitment to the Palestinian cause and the establishment of an

independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Highlighting Turkiye's humanitarian efforts, he noted the delivery of nearly 50,000 tons

of aid to Gaza and the transfer of 900 Gazans to Turkiye for treatment since October 7

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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May 2026, pp. 429-448

Non-Arab Muslim Perspectives on Palestine and Israel: A Comparative Study of Turkish

and Malaysian State Approaches

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(TCCB, 2024). On the other side, Turkiye has disapproved claims of defense-based

cooperation with Tel Aviv, affirming that it will not operate in any activity that harms

Palestinians. The Defense Ministry stated on April that it is not possible for the Republic

of Turkiye, which has always supported Palestine, to conduct any activities with Israel,

including military training, exercises, or defense industry cooperation (TRT World, 2024).

On 20 April, 2024, Turkish President, following hours-long talks with Hamas chief Ismail

Haniyeh in Istanbul, encouraged Palestinians to unite amid Israel’s war in Gaza

(Aljazeera, 2024). In wake of Israel's increased attacks in Gaza, universities, NGOs, and

social-political groups in Turkiye organized mass protests to condemn Israel's military

intervention in Gaza and to support the Palestinian people (Gungor, 2024; Daily Sabah,

2024). Turkiye also supported Palestinian victims and condemned Israeli attacks in Gaza

on international organizations' platforms.

Malaysia’s Policy on the Palestinian Question and Approach to Israel

Malaysia has consistently supported the Palestinian struggle and opposed the Israeli

occupation of Palestinian land post-1948. The Malaysian government has never

established diplomatic relations with Israel but supports a peace plan based on Israel's

return to the 1967 borders as per the 1949 Armistice Agreements, with East Jerusalem

as the capital of a future Palestinian state (Parliament of Malaysia). Malaysia’s support

for Palestine is consistently voiced in international forums, regardless of political factions.

Both Hamas and Fatah are treated fairly by the Malaysian Government, even though the

official Palestinian diplomatic mission in Kuala Lumpur is under Fatah's authority in

Ramallah (Abdulrahmana, 2015). Malaysia’s endorsement of the Palestinian people and

issue is deeply embedded in its foreign policy, which emphasizes the right to self-

determination, as outlined in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter and Common Article 1 of both

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). These international legal

provisions underpin Malaysia’s steadfast support for Palestinians in their quest for their

rights (Yusoff, 2019). Since achieving independence in 1957, Malaysia has prioritized

support for Palestinians in its foreign policy, with heightened awareness following the

Six-Day War in 1967 (Saidin, 2016).

For decades, Malaysia’s support for Palestine has remained unwavering, viewing it as a

nation oppressed by Israeli violations of human rights. In 2003, Mahathir addressed the

UN General Assembly, attributing many global issues to the expropriation of land in

Palestine for the creation of Israel. He reiterated this stance in 2018, identifying this issue

as a fundamental cause of regional terrorism (Strait Times, 2018). At the international

level, Malaysia has actively supported Palestine from a human rights perspective and has

vehemently condemned the egregious violations of international law committed by Israel.

In response to accusations of anti-Semitism against Malaysia and particularly against

Mahathir, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized diplomatic values and

adherence to international law in its public diplomacy messages (Chooi, 2012). Despite

the geographical distance from Palestine, Malaysia has maintained its steadfast support

by refusing to recognize Israel as a sovereign state. Notably, Malaysia is among the few

countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel (AP News, 2019). On multiple

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occasions, Malaysia has barred entry to Israeli athletes intending to participate in

international sports competitions in Kuala Lumpur (Strait Times, 2021).

Another significant motivation for Malaysia’s vocal support of Palestine is the

humanitarian issue, central to the critique of Israel’s indiscriminate actions. Malaysia

consistently condemns Israel and highlights the humanitarian violations against

Palestinians in international forums. A notable example of this advocacy is the formation

of Viva Palestina Malaysia (VPM), a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) dedicated to

raising support for the Palestinian people, focusing specifically on humanitarian issues

(Koss, 2019). Malaysia-Israel relations are a particularly sensitive issue for Muslims in

Malaysia. Malaysia, along with most Muslim-majority countries, has never recognized

Israel as a sovereign state and maintains no diplomatic relations with it. Reflecting this

stance, former Malaysian Foreign Minister Dato’ Sri Saifuddin bin Abdullah, during the

74th anniversary of Nakbah Day (May 14, 1948) in Putrajaya, stated, “Malaysia will

continue to express unwavering support and solidarity with our Palestinian brothers and

will not even establish relations with Israel.” (Ahmad, 2022).

At the 15th East Asia Summit in Hanoi in Vietnam in 2020, Malaysia’s role in advocating

a two-state solution was evident. The summit included participation from the United

States, represented by National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien. Former Malaysian

Prime Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin addressed the forum, where he affirmed

Malaysia’s solidarity with Palestine (East Asia Summit Document Series, 2020).

Additionally, the Malaysian government, alongside Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam,

issued a Joint Statement condemning the escalation of violence by Israelis in the

Occupied Palestinian Territory. They emphasized their support for establishing an

independent and sovereign Palestinian state and reiterated their solidarity with the

Palestinian people (United Nations General Assembly, 2021). Malaysia, along with these

countries, demanded an end to Israel’s attacks on Palestinians.

Similarly, on December 6, 2017, when the United States under President Donald Trump

recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, significant protests occurred at the US

embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Demonstrators called for the US to rescind its statement and

urged the Malaysian government to take immediate action to support Palestine (Razif,

2018). During these protests, notable Malaysian politicians such as former Prime

Ministers Najib Razak and Mahathir Mohamad participated, condemned Trump’s decision

and expressed their support for Palestine. These leaders, along with various Malaysian

NGOs supporting Palestinian independence, have built a strong transnational network

aimed at promoting Palestinian independence and assisting relevant actors in realizing

this goal (Ridzuan and Majid, 2023). In coordination with Turkiye, on 27 July 2019,

former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad emphasized the need for Malaysia and

Turkiye to collaborate to keep the Palestinian issue prominent despite efforts to downplay

it (D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, 2019). Similarly, on 12 May 2021, the

President of Turkiye discussed the Palestinian issue with the King of Malaysia and the

Emir of Qatar, highlighting the need for unity against the oppression faced by Palestinians

due to Israeli attacks on the al-Aqsa Mosque (Mulia, 2021).

Malaysia's longstanding anti-Israel stance has intensified in the context of the 7 October

Gaza War. Kuala Lumpur's hostility toward Tel Aviv is impacted by both international and

domestic reasons. Internationally, the Malaysia supports Palestinian rights in to assist

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Islamic values. Domestically, it uses anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian rhetoric to strengthen

its influence and position among the Muslim-majority population (Redlich, 2024). On 17

October 2023, the Malaysian Government called on the international community to

prevent massacres and ethnic cleansing by Israel against the Palestinian people. During

the Ministerial Question Time (MQT) in Parliament, Prime Minister Ibrahim reiterated

Malaysia’s firm stance on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, demanding an immediate

cessation of hostilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). He condemned all forms of violence

against women, children, and civilians by any party and expressed his dismay at the

global silence and inaction in the face of Palestinian suffering in Gaza.

On 22 October 2023, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim met with Turkish President

Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul to discuss various issues, including the Palestinian

situation. Malaysia, along with other Islamic countries, pledged to support Turkiye’s

significant decisions and policies to establish a sovereign Palestinian state (Harian

Bernama Malaysia, 2023). On 24 October Ibrahim also participated Malaysia Islamic

Youth Organization’s protest with his 16.000 citizens to solidarity with Palestine and

condemn to Israel (Reuters, 2023). He said "It's a level of insanity …it's the height of

barbarism in this world’’.

On 31 October 2023, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim addressed in the parliament that

“Malaysia strongly rejects all forms of terrorism and categorically condemns the actions

of killing innocent lives and taking women and children as hostages in Palestine.”. On

March 2023 Anwar Ibrahim, during the Germany and Malaysia diplomatic meeting, told

that “"What I reject strongly is this narrative, this obsession, as if the entire problem

begins and ends with the 7th of October. It did not begin on the 7th October and did not

end with the 7th of October. It began four decades before that and continues daily"

(Lagardien, 2024). Additionally, he condemned Western countries, including the United

States, for failing to act against Israeli oppressors in a television program aired on Arab

News (2024). As of 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has received complaints

from the Palestinian Authority and several international human rights groups alleging

Israel of war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. Following the intensification of the

confrontation between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2023, this judicial process gained

quickness (ICC, 2024). Turkiye and Malaysia have closely monitored the ICC proceedings

and expressed their support for Palestinian rights under international law. Turkiye

supports legal applications to the ICC for Palestine, and Turkish President Erdoğan urged

for international action, citing proof of Israeli war crimes (Hürriyet Daily News, 2024).

Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia's prime minister, supported the ICC's probe into Gaza and called

for sanctions and a quicker legal procedure (Anadolu Agency, 2024). On 8 June 2024,

Malaysia and Turkiye together with other six members of D-8 Organization for Economic

Cooperation Organization in Istanbul issued a joint declaration to call an immediate

ceasefire and lift US veto to full membership of Palestine in at the UN, and enforce

international pressure on Israel’s violation in Gaza (D-8 Organization for Economic

Cooperation, 2024).

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Different Ways and Common Ground: Turkiye and Malaysia’s Policies on

the Palestinian and Israel

Two prominent non-Arab Muslim nations, Malaysia and Turkiye, have different but similar

stances on the Palestinian problem. Although both nations strongly support Palestinian

rights, their strategies for responding to diplomacy are very different. Turkiye’s approach

is defined by direct engagement and pragmatic diplomacy. Historically, Turkiye continued

diplomatic relations with Israel. However, Turkiye has also stood up as a key supporter

for Palestinian statehood, supporting international recognition initiatives and providing

significant humanitarian aid. Under the President Erdogan’s leadership, Turkiye's pro-

Palestinian stance has enhanced, particularly following the Gaza wars in 2008. By striking

a balance between ideological commitments and strategic goals, Turkiye chose to

maintain commerce ties with Israel despite its outspoken criticism.

Malaysia has a strong anti-Israel stance, refusing to recognize Israel or build diplomatic

relations. Based on Islamic sympathy and humanitarian campaigns, its foreign policy

places significant value on its unwavering support for Palestine. Malaysia employs its

position in the UN and OIC to object to Israeli policies and advocate for Palestinian

statehood. Global action is encouraged by leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir

Mohamad, who argue against Western backing for Israel. Unlike Turkiye, Malaysia uses

soft power rather than direct engagement to impose economic restrictions on Israel and

organize pro-Palestinian protests. However, with a focus on using international justice

systems like the ICC to hold Israel responsible, both nations have increased their

diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. The main differences between Turkiye and Malaysia

are based on their approaches to engagement. Turkiye's strategy combines pragmatic

diplomacy and active engagement, keeping relations with both Israel and Palestinian

groups while promoting Palestinian sovereignty. Malaysia's approach is more rigorous

and ideological, preferring a total boycott of Israel and prioritizing moral and

humanitarian advocacy before direct political action. While both states support the

Palestinian cause, Turkiye pursues a more sophisticated, strategic approach, whilst

Malaysia pursues a consistent, steadfast pro-Palestinian posture in its foreign diplomacy.

Conclusion

Turkiye and Malaysia, two non-Arab developed countries in the Islamic world, presented

both similarities and differences in their approaches to the Palestinian issue and relations

with Israel in this study. Malaysia usually is a more vocal stance frequently criticizing

Israeli policies towards Palestine, but is more practical than Turkiye, at least does not

recognize Israel or have formal relations with it. While Turkiye plays a more active role

for instance, in mediation, hosting Hamas and PLO leaders and providing humanitarian

assistance. However, Turkiye recognized Israel diplomatically in 1949 to safeguard

national interests during the Cold War and largely avoided involvement in Arab world

issues until the 1960s.

Turkiye also advocates for a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based

on UNSC Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, and 1515, the principle of land for peace, the Arab

Peace Initiative, and the Road Map, promoting two states living side by side within secure

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and recognized borders. Malaysia also endorses these UNSC Resolutions in international

forums but refrains from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel to firmly oppose

Zionist policies in Palestine. Malaysia’s foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is

straightforward, emphasizing the ummah, humanitarian concerns, strong leadership, and

criticism of the superpowers' handling of the conflict and human rights issues. Both

Turkiye and Malaysia, as members of the United Nations, D8, and OIC, vocally support

Palestinian independence in various international forums. While Turkiye takes a more

confrontational and implement pro-Islamist strategy, Malaysia emphasizes peaceful

advocacy through international organizations such as the OIC and ASEAN.

Both countries passionately support Palestinian independence, but their methods reflect

varying degrees of participation and ideological objectives. Turkish foreign policy towards

the Middle East, particularly Palestine, is shaped by its own governments and varies with

the ideological orientation of its ruling parties, being more proactive during conservative

administrations and more reserved during secular ones. In contrast, Malaysia’s position

on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has remained steadfast and consistent across various

administrations, from the tenure of Tunku Abdul Rahman to Anwar Ibrahim. Malaysia

actively advocates for a just resolution to the conflict, consistently articulating its stance

in domestic and international forums. Additionally, Malaysia supports Turkiye’s pro-

Palestinian position while upholding non-interference principles in other nations' internal

policies. It also engages in bilateral cooperation with countries like Turkiye to address

international crises, including the Palestinian issue. Turkiye and Malaysia maintain strong

relationships with the PLO and Hamas concerning the Palestinian cause. Both countries'

conservative policymakers utilize the Palestinian issue to bolster their positions against

secular opposition parties in local political competition. For political Islamist leaders like

Erdogan and Anwar Ibrahim, the Gaza conflict is also a significant event for enhancing

their stature within the Islamic world. Substantially, Malaysia focuses on strong

discursive but keeps a distance, while Turkiye actively and closely engages in the

situation.

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