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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
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VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023
10
CHINA AND EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES: DO CHINESE PARTNERSHIPS
BOOST COOPERATION RESULTS?
CÁTIA MIRIAM COSTA
catia.miriam.costa@iscte-iul.pt
Researcher at the Centre for International Studies (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal) and invited professor at
the same university. She is also Director of the Global Iberoamerica Chair of the European
Institute of International Studies, Stockholm, Salamanca. She coordinates two international
Erasmus+ projects and is ISCTE’s alternate representative in UNESCO’s Academy programme.
She has numerous publications in English, Portuguese, Spanish, and French. Her main areas of
research are Chinese Foreign Policy, Macau, Sea and Globalisation, International Communication,
and Discourse Analysis. She was an advisor to the Secretary of State of Internationalization of
the Portuguese Republic until April 2022.
YICHAO LI
A18092105144@cityu.mo
Ph.D. from the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University of
Macau. She also received a master’s degree in comparative civil law (in Chinese) from the
University of Macau, and a Bachelor of Laws from Nanjing University of Information Science &
Technology, China. From 2021 to 2022, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for
International Studies (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal). Her current research interests are the Belt and Road
Initiative and Portuguese-speaking countries.
Abstract
The People’s Republic of China and countries of the European Union (EU) have signed multiple
diplomatic documents for cooperation under different types of conception. France was the first
EU country to start a comprehensive partnership with China in 1997, and, by 2021, among
the 27 EU member countries, 19 had already established partnerships with China (the
exceptions were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Sweden). Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced in 2013, 18 EU member
states (except Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, and
Sweden) have signed MoUs with China. What this study investigates, however, is why some
of the countries have opted to sign a BRI MoU but not establish partnerships with China. On
the other hand, some countries that have long had partnerships with China have deepened or
strengthened those partnerships, yet have not signed a BRI MoU. The current study is
therefore motivated to pose this main research question: To what extent does the Chinese
partnership framework facilitate practical cooperation between EU countries and China? The
study also poses these secondary questions: What are the main differences between these
cooperation documents? Do such differences in documentation result in discrepancies in the
nature of cooperation? From a bilateral state-to-state perspective, the study compares joint
statements pertaining to Chinese partnerships with different EU countries, analyzing how
closely they are tailored to each European country’s specificity. Through reviewing the
literature, the authors gather data concerning the outcomes of cooperations on trade and
investment between China and EU member states, and analyze any official diplomatic
documents available.
Keywords
Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese Partnerships, EU, FDI, Trade, Investment.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
11
Resumo
A República Popular da China e os países da União Europeia (UE) assinaram vários acordos
diplomáticos para cooperação sob diferentes tipos de concepção. A França foi o primeiro país
da UE a iniciar uma parceria abrangente com a China em 1997 e, até 2021, entre os 27 países
membros da UE, 19 haviam estabelecido parcerias com a China (as exceções foram Estónia,
Letónia, Lituânia, Luxemburgo, Malta, Eslováquia , Eslovénia e Suécia). Desde que a Nova
Rota da Seda (NRS) foi anunciada em 2013, 18 estados membros da UE (exceto Bélgica,
Dinamarca, Finlândia, França, Alemanha, Irlanda, Holanda, Espanha e Suécia) assinaram
Memorandos de Entedimento (MdE) com a China. Este estudo investiga, no entanto, porque
razão alguns dos pses optaram por assinar um MdE da NRS, mas não estabelecer parcerias
com a China. Por outro lado, alguns países que muito mantêm parcerias com a China
aprofundaram ou fortaleceram essas parcerias, mas ainda não assinaram um MdE da NRS. O
presente estudo coloca como principal questão de investigação: até que ponto o quadro de
parceria chinês facilita a cooperação prática entre os países da UE e a China? O estudo também
coloca as seguintes questões secundárias: Quais são as principais diferenças entre estes
documentos de cooperação? Essas diferenças na documentação resultam em discrepâncias
na natureza da cooperação? Numa perspetiva bilateral entre estados, o artigo compara
declarações conjuntas relativas a parcerias chinesas com diferentes países da UE, analisando
até que ponto estão adaptadas à especificidade de cada país europeu. Através da revisão da
literatura, as autoras coletam dados sobre os resultados da cooperação nas áreas do comércio
e do investimento entre a China e os estados membros da UE e analisam os documentos
diplomáticos oficiais disponíveis.
Palavras-chave
Nova Rota da Seda, Parcerias Chinesas, União Europeia, Investimento Direto Estrangeiro,
Comércio, Investimento
How to cite this article
Costa, Cátia Miriam, Li, Yichao (2023). China and European Union countries: Do Chinese
partnerships boost cooperation results?. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL14
N1, TD1 Thematic dossier European Union-China relations, September 2023. Consulted
[online] in date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0123.1
Article received on November 26, 2022 and accepted for publication on January 16, 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
12
CHINA AND EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES: DO CHINESE
PARTNERSHIPS BOOST COOPERATION RESULTS?
CÁTIA MIRIAM COSTA
YICHAO LI
1. Introduction
In post-1990s international relations, as the international order underwent gradual
reconfiguration, partnerships, especially strategic partnerships, became a fashionable
means for states to seek dialogue and cooperation with other states and/or with
regional/international organizations (Tyushka & Czechowska, 2019: 8 & 11). China
established its first strategic partnership in 1993 with Brazil
1
, and the European Union
(EU) established its first strategic partnership with Russia in 1998 (Pałłasz, 2015: 4).
Being two of the most important economies in the world, the EU and China held their
first summit in April 1998 during which they issued a joint statement
2
, declaring that
both sides hope to build and develop a 21st centuryoriented long-term and stable
constructive partnership
3
. This description of the partnership between China and the EU
was expressed in the 4th summit in 2001 as “a comprehensive partnership”
4
and in the
6th summit in 2003 as “an overall [comprehensive] strategic partnership”
5
. As of 2022,
the China-EU Summit has been held 23 times, mostly annually, but with some
exceptions
6
. In addition, in December 2003, the EU adopted the European Security
1
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697
843.html
2
In March 1998, according to a communication from the Commission of European Communities, Brussels
expressed wishes to build a comprehensive partnership with China. Retrieved on 13 July 2022, from
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0181:FIN:EN:PDF
3
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697
888.html
4
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from
https://www.google.com.hk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwie58bnlt34AhV
FxYUKHV3RCf8QFnoECBAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fcommission%2Fpresscorner%2Fa
pi%2Ffiles%2Fdocument%2Fprint%2Fen%2Fpres_01_312%2FPRES_01_312_EN.pdf&usg=AOvVaw08ACC
33L7c6Msr_-VBPyrt
5
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/77802.pdf
6
China-EU summits were held in neither the 2008 nor 2011, but took place in both in 2009 and 2012. In
2014, although the China-EU summit was not held, President Xi Jinping visited the EU’s headquarters in
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
13
Strategy, in which particular emphasis was placed on developing a strategic partnership
with China (European Council, 2003: 16).
Till now, China has established various types (e.g., strategic) of partnerships with more
than 100 countries in the world (Li & Vicente, 2020: 207), while the EU has formed only
strategic partnerships with merely ten countries
7
. China and the EU also differ in their
choices of strategic partners and definitions of partnership. As explained by Stumbaum
and Xiong (2012: 163), China and the EU’s conceptual gap regarding signing a
partnership lies within their difference in the timeline and pace of implementing a
partnership: China pays more attention to keeping the flow of the partnership over the
long term, a point which is often reflected through positive, promotional language in the
partnership’s joint statement, in a view to achieving better cooperation and development
in the future (Brown, 2021: 14). For the EU, the immediacy of its strategic thinking
prompts it to place more emphasis on solving bilateral challenges that they face both
presently and in the short term (Stumbaum & Xiong, 2012: 164).
One aspect, however, is consistent between China and the EU’s understanding of a
partnership: whether in terms of quality or quantity, a partnership has to be (further)
developed through a dynamic and variable process. A partnership should therefore be
regarded as a soft law” (i.e., it is not legally binding) (Li, 2021: 46; Cihelková, et al.,
2020: 1729 & 1737). This, however, to some extent, causes concern for the effectiveness
of partnerships. For example, this has led to the term “strategic partner(ship)” being
viewed as “ill-defined in EU usage”8. China does not have a clear, standardized way to
classify partnerships either. When assessing China-EU strategic partnerships, many
scholars find the concept of partnership either unclear (Sautenet, 2008: 11), imperfect
(Pałłasz, 2015: 7), or elusive (Maher, 2016), such that people may doubt whether the
two sides in fact regard each other as a strategic partner9. In regard to areas of
cooperation, indeed, the coverage has been widening, but no real strategy has formed
(Wouters & Burnay, 2012: 330). Yue (2018: 5) also believes that the Chinese partnership
network “is still an aspiration rather than a realistic blueprint. Nevertheless, it is
undeniable that a partnership provides a platform for dialogue between the two sides. It
is therefore considered a diplomatic and relational approach, and, has, to a certain
extent, led to positive results (Hu & Pelkmans, 2020: 2–3).
The foremost premise of establishing a partnership with China is adherence to the “one-
China” policy and respect for Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such is always
reiterated in the joint statement every time a Chinese partnership is established,
deepened, or upgraded. Generally speaking, a partnership is reached through dialogue
and provides a framework for bilateral cooperation, covering various cooperation areas,
such as politics, economy, culture, people-to-people exchanges, health, sustainability,
Brussels, and the two issued a joint statement to deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership for
attaining further mutual benefits. A China-EU summit did not take place in 2021 either.
7
The EU’s strategic partners are, namely, the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada, China, India, Brazil, South Africa,
Mexico, and South Korea. Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://www.etiasvisa.com/etias-news/eu-
strategic-partnerships
8
Retrieved on 15 June 2022, from https://euobserver.com/eu-political/30828
9
Retrieved on 15 June 2022, from https://euobserver.com/eu-political/30828
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
14
and other regional or global affairs (Men & Jiang, 2020: 394). In 1997, France became
the first EU country to establish a comprehensive partnership with China
10
, and by 2021,
19 of the 27 EU member countries had established partnerships with China (except
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden).
Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach (2019: 73) argue that the fact that China has
established separate bilateral partnerships with some EU countries affects coordination
between the EU and its member states and weakens the EU’s overall solidarity as it
engages China. Although this situation may happen to some extent, it needs to be
emphasized that all joint statements on the establishment of partnerships between China
and any EU countries reinforce that the two sides should continue to deepen bilateral
relations within the framework of comprehensive China-EU strategic partnership
complemented by partnerships between China and individual EU countries. This two-tier
framework shows that China is interested in using partnerships with each EU country to
advance its overall relations with the EU. There certainly is no direct, specific intention
of weakening Europe’s integration on the Chinese part.
As of March 2022, 146 countries in the world have signed memoranda of understanding
(MoUs) with China to become part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
11
. Among them
are 18 EU member states (EU countries that have not signed BRI MoUs with China are:
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, and
Sweden). Overall, the expansive network comprising these partnerships is an important
foothold for China to advance the BRI (Men & Jiang, 2020: 390).
Interestingly, however, it is notable that some EU countries that have not yet established
partnerships with China have instead signed BRI MoUs (e.g., Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta,
Luxembourg, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). On the contrary, some countries that have long
established partnerships with China (and have even deepened or strengthened those
partnerships) have not signed BRI MoUs for the time being (e.g., Germany, France).
Furthermore, Garcia-Herrero and Xu (2019: 18) searched a global database of media
articles to quantitatively analyze the perceptions of BRI in different countries and regions.
Among the EU countries, the results are rather extreme: the Netherlands, which ranks
first in the tone of coverage related to BRI, has not signed an MoU, while Poland, who
ranks last in the tone of coverage related to BRI, was the second EU country to sign an
MoU (after Hungary) in 2015. Such paradoxical statuses motivate this main research
question of the paper: To what extent does the Chinese partnership framework facilitate
practical cooperation between EU countries and China? Further secondary questions have
also been proposed: What are the main differences between these cooperation
documents? Do such differences in documentation result in discrepancies in the nature
of cooperation? To offer answers to these questions, we gather data concerning
cooperations between China and EU member states on trade and investment, analyzing
them based on the timeline of the partnerships concerned when they were established,
deepened/strengthened, and specific circumstances of the various countries involved.
10
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1997/gwyb199717.pdf
11
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/
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China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
15
2. Grouping EU Countries by Types of Chinese Partnerships
Though all Chinese partnerships may be established on an equal basis, they likely differ
in terms of depth and breadth of cooperation. This is reflected through prepending
various descriptors “strategic,” “comprehensive,” “all-round,” “reciprocal,” “friendly,”
and “innovative” to the word “partnership.” The different descriptors express the
variability in the partnerships’ conceptualizations and characteristics, as well as show
that “China’s relations with different countries are developing at varying speeds” (Men &
Jiang, 2020: 392).
Generally speaking, a strategic partnership is of a higher level than a non-strategic
partnership (Li & Vicente, 2020: 210). As cooperation between two countries deepens,
their partnership agreement can be strengthened or upgraded, and the partnership may
therefore be re-described accordingly to reflect such change in the nature of cooperation.
Accordingly, we classify the 27 EU member states into four groups based on the type of
their current partnerships with China (with particular focus on whether the descriptor
“strategic” is present) (Table 1).
Table 1. Chinese Partnerships and BRI MoUs with EU Countries
Country
Current Types of Chinese Partnerships
(E year of establishment, U year of update)
BRI MoU Signing
Date
Group 1
Germany
All-round strategic partnership (U - 2014)12
Not signed
France
Comprehensive strategic partnership (U - 2004)13
Not signed
Italy
Comprehensive strategic partnership (E - 2004)
2019.03.23
Spain
Comprehensive strategic partnership (E - 2005)
Not signed
Poland
Comprehensive strategic partnership (U - 2016)14
2015.11.26
Hungary
Comprehensive strategic partnership (U - 2017)15
2015.06.06
Denmark
Comprehensive strategic partnership (E - 2008)
Not signed
Greece
Comprehensive strategic partnership (E - 2006)
2018.08.28
Portugal
Comprehensive strategic partnership (E - 2005)
2018.12.05
Group 2
Friendly strategic partnership (E - 2018)
2018.04.08
Reciprocal strategic partnership (E - 2012)
Not signed
Strategic partnership (E - 2016)
2015.11.26
Strategic partnership (U - 2019)16
2015.11.26
Strategic partnership (E - 2021)
2019.04.25
Group 3
Belgium
All-round partnership of friendship and cooperation (E - 2014)
Not signed
Finland
Future-oriented new-type cooperative partnership (E - 2017)
Not signed
Netherlands
Comprehensive cooperative partnership (E - 2014)
Not signed
Croatia
Comprehensive cooperative partnership (E - 2005)
2017.05.16
Romania
Comprehensive friendly partnership of cooperation (E - 2004)
2017.05.13
12
China and Germany established a partnership with global responsibility within the framework of the China-
EU comprehensive strategic partnership in 2004.
13
China and France established a comprehensive partnership in 1997.
14
China and Poland established a friendly partnership of cooperation in 2004.
15
China and Hungary established a friendly partnership of cooperation in 2004.
16
China and Bulgaria established a comprehensive friendly partnership of cooperation in 2014.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
16
Table 1. Chinese Partnerships and BRI MoUs with EU Countries
Country
Current Types of Chinese Partnerships
(E year of establishment, U year of update)
BRI MoU Signing
Date
Group 4
Sweden
Non-partnerships
Not signed
Slovakia
2015.11.26
Slovenia
2017.11.29
Malta
2018.11.05
Luxembourg
2019.03.23
Estonia
2017.11.29
Lithuania
2017.11.29
Latvia
2016.11
Source: Authors’ compilation. Retrieved on 13 April 2022,
from https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/roll/77298.htm and
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/oz_678770/
All of the countries in Group 1 except Germany have established with China
comprehensive strategic partnerships that cover many cooperation areas, including
horizontal areas such as politics (e.g., bilateral dialogue, frequent reciprocal visits
between leaders, rule of law and human rights, security and military issues), economics
(e.g., reform global economic governance, investment and trade, technological
cooperation, development of small and medium-sized enterprises, intellectual property
protection), culture (e.g., establishment of cultural centres, Chinese year of cultural
activities, promotion of cultural diversity), people-to-people exchanges (e.g., tourism,
education, media, youth exchanges), health (e.g., agriculture and food security,
infectious disease prevention), environment (e.g., climate change, sustainability,
biodiversity). There are also vertical (i.e., in terms of the geographical scope of
cooperation) areas of cooperation: in addition to bilateral cooperation, regional and global
cooperations are also addressed, for example international issues including conflict
resolutions, counter-terrorism, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
refugees and illegal immigrants. Views on such international issues of mutual interest are
exchanged bilaterally. China and Germany have established an all-round strategic
partnership an “all-round” partnership has one more dimension than a
“comprehensive” one, which is consultation between the governments of the two
partners. The Sino-German government consultations were established in 2010, six
rounds of which have been held so far.
The countries in Group 2 have strategic but non-comprehensive partnerships with China.
Compared with the countries in Group 1, those in Group 2 have narrower scopes of
cooperation, both horizontally and vertically. For instance, the frequency of bilateral
dialogue in the political field has reduced, discussions on reforming global economic
governance have not taken place, and focus on global affairs has also decreased. The
Chinese partnerships pertaining to Group 3 countries have been developing relatively
slowly, with little deepening or upgrading since being established. The countries in Group
4 have yet to formally establish partnerships with China.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
17
Promoting economic development has always been the focus of both China and the EU
countries as they develop bilateral relations. The establishment, deepening and
upgrading of Chinese partnerships often happen during meetings between Chinese and
EU leaders
17
, with a view to not only building mutual trust and reaching political
consensus but also facilitating more practice in areas with potential for further or future
cooperation, especially if there is political support. In the following sections, we present
data on cooperations in trade and investment between China and EU member states. We
divide the EU countries into four groups for analysis.
3. Bilateral Trade in Goods
Since becoming a member of the WTO, China’s continuous expansion of export in the
21st century has had an impact on the EU. Of particular note is China’s capability to
maintain a trade surplus with the EU (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2020: 1213). In 2021,
China was the EU’s biggest trading partner (total), ranking first as the EU’s import partner
and third as EU’s export partner
18
. Garcia-Herrero et al. (2020: 1) conclude that “China
is, and will continue to be, a major trade and investment partner for EU countries.” In
early 2022, the EU overtook the ASEAN to become China’s top trade partner.
19
In other
words, as Chen et al. (2021: 582) quantitatively demonstrate, the EU’s share of trade
with China rose, while the share of trade with EU partners declined,” suggesting that “the
trade links with China weakened trade links among EU countries”. The chronic trade
imbalance between China and the EU has also raised questions about the notion of mutual
interests emphasized in Chinese partnerships. In this regard, the EU will work toward
obtaining greater reciprocity and balance, while from China’s standpoint, a “win-win”
outcome means that both sides will work hard together to periodically achieve their
respective goals, but not necessarily at a 50-50 split (Brown, 2021: 17).
The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) provides comprehensive data on the
import and export between China and EU member states from 2000 to 2020 (Annex I).
Figure 1 is obtained by adding up and averaging the volumes of import and export of
17
For example, the first China-EU Summit was held in 1998, hosted by Zhu Rongji, then Premier of China,
Tony Blair, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and EU President, and Jacques Santer, President of
the European Commission. They issued a Joint Statement on China-EU Summit and reached a consensus
on their readiness to build and develop a 21st centuryoriented long-term and stable constructive
partnership between them. Retrieved on 31 July 2022, from
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697
888.html
The Sixth China-EU Summit was held in 2003 in Beijing, hosted by Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao
of the People’s Republic of China. The EU was represented by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in his
capacity as President of the European Council, as well as President of the European Commission Romano
Prodi and High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. Chinese
President Hu Jintao met with the visiting European leaders. The leaders expressed satisfaction on the
positive outcome of this Sixth Summit meeting, particularly for promoting the development of an overall
strategic partnership between China and the EU. Retrieved on 31 July 2022, from
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/77802.pdf
18
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.pdf
19
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from
https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202203/18/WS6233da5ba310fd2b29e51a69.html
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
18
goods over 21 years. The following analysis is presented in conjunction with Annex I and
Figure 1:
(1) Generally speaking, the closer the partnership that an EU country has developed with
China, the larger and more frequent its trade with China will be. Figure 1 clearly
shows the difference in volume of bilateral trade in goods between countries that
have established a comprehensive strategic partnership with China (Group 1) and
Source: Authors’ compilation. Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from https://oec.world/en/rankings/eci/hs6/hs96
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL14 N1, TD1
Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations
September 2023, pp. 10-43
China and European Union countries: Do Chinese partnerships boost cooperation results?
Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
19
those in the other three groups, especially countries that have not established
partnerships (Group 4). The comparison is, however, not absolute: for example,
Sweden in Group 4, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland in Group 3, and Czechia,
Ireland, and Austria in Group 2 all have more bilateral trade in goods with China than
Portugal and Greece in Group 1.
(2) As seen from Annex I, indeed, the bilateral trade volume between China and all EU
member states has grown considerably over the past 21 years, but fluctuations and
trade imbalances have remained. In Annex, I, the volume of trade export from most
EU member states to China (red line) has lagged behind import (blue line) for a long
time. There are two exceptions here: Germany and Ireland. From 2000 to 2012,
bilateral trade between China and Germany increased rapidly. Although China has
always had a trade surplus with Germany, the gap began to narrow significantly in
2010 (this was the onset of the Sino-German government consultation mechanism).
After that, China had several trade deficits with Germany, even though the gap, while
present, was very small. In other words, the development of bilateral trade between
China and Germany has been relatively balanced, mutually beneficial, and positive.
For Ireland, it is the only member of the EU that maintains a continuous trade surplus
with China over the recent several years, and the gap will likely continue to widen.
China and Ireland established a reciprocal strategic partnership in 2012. Integrated
circuits has always been a category accounting for a large proportion of Ireland’s
export to China. In 2020, Ireland exported in total $11.2B worth of integrated
circuits, $6.91B of which to China
20
. In the same year, integrated circuits made up
Ireland’s fourth largest export, and Ireland was the second largest exporter of
integrated circuits in Europe, after Germany.
21
(3) Another noteworthy point is that although China has always had a trade surplus with
the majority of EU countries, the larger surpluses mainly belong to Group 1 countries
(e.g., France, Italy, Poland and Spain). Czechia (Group 2) and the Netherlands
(Group 3) also have relatively large surpluses, with the Netherlands having the
largest gap among all EU countries. Conversely, for those countries in Group 4 that
are not in partnership with China, though they have trade deficits with China, the
gap is not large. Butter and Hayat (2008) did an empirical analysis and showed that
the main determinant of the Netherlands’ import growth from China was in-house
offshoring to China. Another factor has been the “Rotterdam effect,” as the port of
Rotterdam is an important entry point for products to enter into the EU (Garcia-
Herrero et al., 2020: 1314). Suyker and Wagteveld (2019: 6) also believe that due
to its “gateway function,” the Netherlands has been accumulating deficits with China
since 2000. This means that products from China will arrive in the Netherlands first,
before being re-exported to their final destinations in the rest of Europe.
20
Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/integrated-
circuits/reporter/irl?yearExportSelector=exportYear1
21
Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/integrated-circuits
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Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li
20
Table 2 contains data collected from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and
lists the top three import and export trading partners of each EU member state in 2019.
In terms of major trading partners of individual EU member states, China has ranked as
Germany’s main partner in both import and export. China is also one of the main import
partners of France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Czechia, and the Netherlands, while these
countries have had relatively large trade deficits with China. These results shown in Table
2 are consistent with our previous point. Interestingly, for Group 4 countries (those that
have not established partnerships with China), China has little influence over their import
or export trade.
Table 2. Top 3 Trading Partners for EU Countries in 2019
Groups
EU
Countries
Top 3 Export Destination
Countries/Regions
Top 3 Import Origin
Countries/Regions
1st
2nd
3rd
1st
2nd
3rd
Group
1
Germany
USA
France
China
China
Netherlands
USA
France
Germany
USA
Italy
Germany
China
Italy
Italy
Germany
France
USA
Germany
France
China
Spain
France
Germany
Italy
Germany
France
China
Poland
Germany
Czechia
UK
Germany
China
Russia
Hungary
Germany
Slovakia
Italy
Germany
Austria
China
Denmark
Special
categories
Germany
Sweden
Germany
Sweden
Netherlands
Greece
Italy
Germany
Turkey
Germany
Iraq
Italy
Portugal
Spain
France
Germany
Spain
Germany
France
Group
2
Austria
Germany
USA
Italy
Germany
Italy
China
Ireland
USA
UK
Belgium
UK
USA
France
Czechia
Germany
Slovakia
Poland
Germany
China
Poland
Bulgaria
Germany
Romania
Italy
Germany
Russia
Italy
Cyprus
Netherlands
Bunkers
Libya
Greece
Italy
UK
Group
3
Belgium
Germany
France
Netherlands
Netherlands
Germany
France
Finland
Germany
Sweden
USA
Germany
Russia
Sweden
Netherlands
Germany
Belgium
France
Germany
Belgium
China
Croatia
Italy
Germany
Slovenia
Germany
Italy
Slovenia
Romania
Germany
Italy
France
Germany
Italy
Hungary
Group
4
Sweden
Norway
Germany
USA
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Slovakia
Germany
Czechia
Poland
Germany
Czechia
Unspecified
Slovenia
Germany
Italy
Croatia
Germany
Italy
Switzerland
Malta
Bunkers
Germany
Italy
UK
Italy
Germany
Luxembourg
Germany
France
Belgium
Belgium
Germany
France
Estonia
Finland
Sweden
Latvia
Germany
Russia
Finland
Lithuania
Russia
Latvia
Poland
Russia
Poland
Germany
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Russia
Lithuania
Germany
Poland
Source: Authors’ compilation. Retrieved on 10 July 2022, from https://wits.worldbank.org
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21
In short, from the data of bilateral trade in goods between China and EU countries from
2000 to 2020, it can be shown that, generally speaking, the closer the partnership that
a country has established with China, the greater the trade volume between the two
sides will be, and the more influence China will have. For instance, countries in Group 1
(e.g., Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Hungary), which have established all-
round/comprehensive strategic partnerships with China, have relatively high trade
volumes in both directions. There are, however, exceptions: Czechia in Group 2 and the
Netherlands in Group 3 also perform well in bilateral trade in goods. If we look at each
time that a partnership was established, deepened, or upgraded (including the times
when a BRI MoU was signed) in conjunction with Annex I, we find no evidence that the
aim was to bring immediate positive impact to both parties on trade in goods. In other
words, every time a partnership is established, deepened or upgraded, it may not be
immediately reflected in bilateral trade in goods in the following year. Instead, trade in
goods is a long-term process that involves other factors as well.
4. Bilateral Trade in Services and Foreign Direct Investment
Compared with trade in goods, the scale of trade in services and foreign direct investment
(FDI) between China and the EU is relatively small. The EU is the world’s largest trader
in services. Trade in services accounts for 25% of the EU’s GDP, and 60% of all of EU’s
FDI to the rest of the world is in services (European Commission, 2021: 18). Unlike the
trade in goods situation, in which the EU has a deficit with China, in trade in services the
EU has a surplus with China
22
. Although China’s ranking among EU’s trading partners in
services is not far behind, it trails by some distance both the UK and the U.S. (top two)
in terms of volume
23
.
Table 3. Balance of Trade in Services between EU Countries and China: 2013-2020 (Million €)
Groups
EU
Countries
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Group
1
Germany
1,625.0
2,914.0
5,216.0
5,509.0
6,288.0
8,873.0
7,934.0
7,364.0
France
458.0
986.0
2,487.0
1,063.0
3,550.0
4,248.0
5,045.0
3,303.0
Italy
-457.4
-338.7
-492.6
-705.2
-729.5
-399.4
-114.9
418.9
Spain
-356.0
-493.0
-549.0
-286.0
-391.0
81.0
42.0
-526.0
Poland
-27.2
0.7
36.8
13.5
-23.5
-28.2
-88.2
-250.3
Hungary
-56.9
-25.7
-46.3
25.7
19.6
257.7
305.0
-39.9
Denmark
1,360.8
1,060.4
466.8
134.9
499.3
476.4
511.1
626.5
Greece
-177.7
-133.1
769.8
647.9
944.4
1,045.5
1,083.3
933.9
Portugal
-53.0
-107.0
-144.0
-105.0
-71.0
-46.0
-58.0
-267.0
Group
2
Austria
20.0
235.0
160.0
185.0
123.0
217.0
197.0
61.0
Ireland
1,077.0
1,061.0
3,029.0
c
1,128.0
c
2,405.0
1,978.0
Czechia
-414.2
-303.3
-498.9
-405.3
-416.2
-513.6
-586.1
-886.9
Bulgaria
-8.6
-31.6
-17.0
-26.4
-16.8
3.1
2.6
-6.7
22
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-
region/countries-and-regions/china_en
23
Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_services#General_overview
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22
Cyprus
8.0
34.0
42.0
12.0
3.0
-17.0
-40.0
-17.0
Group
3
Belgium
230.0
263.0
181.0
183.0
244.0
156.0
395.0
445.0
Finland
-155.0
-314.0
-110.0
375.0
476.0
487.0
739.0
468.0
Netherlands
-103.0
-565.4
-451.9
-1,661.7
-1,211.9
-857.5
575.2
1,204.3
Croatia
4.4
3.7
11.6
24.2
24.4
23.7
11.6
6.8
Romania
-16.7
-8.3
-22.5
-17.6
-33.9
-35.5
-48.7
-46.5
Group
4
Sweden
103.7
-158.5
434.3
801.0
801.3
207.6
573.3
309.0
Slovakia
-14.7
-45.8
-60.3
-61.5
-41.4
-11.1
-8.1
-53.0
Slovenia
2.5
2.3
-1.4
12.4
15.3
23.2
22.4
-11.0
Malta
-11.0
-13.0
c
c
-6.0
c
13.0
-14.3
Luxembourg
281.0
617.0
1,122.0
1,239.0
779.0
913.0
880.0
958.0
Estonia
-36.6
-32.4
-33.7
-37.1
-41.4
-32.3
15.7
-9.6
Lithuania
-10.8
18.7
c
2.7
1.5
1.8
12.1
-22.2
Latvia
-31.0
-46.0
-53.0
-49.0
-55.0
-56.0
-32.0
-49.0
Note: “c” means data is confidential.
Source: Authors’ compilation. Retrieved on 13 April 2022,
from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop_its6_tot/default/table?lang=en
According to data from Eurostat, from 2013 to 2020, in terms of trade in services, seven
EU countries were always in surplus, and five always in deficit with China. The other 15
countries fluctuated between surplus and deficit during those eight years. Sweden and
Greece turned from deficit to surplus with China in 2015, while Finland did so in 2016
(Table 3). Although the countries in Group 1 had more eye-catching performances, no
correlation between the types of partnership and balance in trade in services could be
identified. Taking Luxembourg in Group 4 as an example, according to data from the
OECD, in 2018, among Luxembourg’s exported services to China, transportation,
financial services, and other business services had the highest values.
24
At the same
time, among countries that were always in surplus with China in trade in services, the
largest proportions pertained to these categories: royalties and licence fees, other
business services,
25
transportation, and travel.
Table 4. Czechia Trade in Services Import to China 2013-2020 (Million €)
Year
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
TOTAL TRADE IN
SERVICES
558
627
820
770
856
1076
1210
1260
Transport
491
558
732
691
770
958
1097
1157
Sea Transport
8
7
10
11
12
12
11
11
Air Transport
42
43
47
40
42
78
91
85
24
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/lux
25
According to EBOPS 2010 services components, other business services mainly included: (1) Provision of
customized and non-customized research, sale of proprietary rights arising from research and development,
other research and development services; (2) Legal services, accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax
consulting services, business and management consulting and public relations services, advertising, market
research, and public opinion polling; (3) Architectural services, engineering services, scientific and other
technical services, waste treatment and de-pollution, services incidental to agriculture, forestry and fishing,
operating leasing services, trade-related services, other business services. Retrieved on 13 July 2022, from
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradeserv/tfsits/msits2010/ebops2cpc_detailed.htm#ebops10
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23
Other Modes of
Transport26
441
508
674
635
716
867
995
1061
……
Transport/Total Trade in
Services
87.99%
88.99%
89.27%
89.74%
89.95%
89.03%
90.66%
91.83%
Source: Authors’ compilation. Retrieved on 13 July 2022, from
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TISP_EBOPS2010#
Another outlier is Group 2’s Czechia, who has always had a deficit with China in trade in
services that seems to be expanding. The OECD provides detailed statistics on specific
categories of Czechia’s trade in services. The same can be observed from Eurostat’s
records: from 2013 to 2020, Czechia had a deficit in trade in services with China
throughout. An interesting finding is that transportation accounts for about 90% of
Czechia’s total exported services to China. Within the transportation category, railway
and road transport had the main shares, while air and sea transport accounted for only
a small proportion (Table 4). Among the EU countries, Czechia and Cyprus were the only
two that had signed a BRI MoU before formally establishing a strategic partnership with
China. In November 2015, China and Czechia signed a BRI MoU, and the two established
in March 2016 a strategic partnership. Their joint statement assured that they will
strengthen cooperation in connectivity, tapping the enormous of potential within such
fields as infrastructure construction, direct flights, logistics, and transportation.
27
In
September 2017, China Railway Express from Yiwu to Prague commenced. In addition,
China supports Czechia to become a financial centre of Central and Eastern Europe and
is willing to further strengthen financial cooperation with Czechia. In April 2016, the Bank
of China planned to officially open a branch in Prague
28
. In 2017 and 2019, the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
29
and Bank of Communications
30
also established
Prague branches to provide account services, corporate financing services, international
settlement and trade financing services, and treasury services.
In the 1990s, FDI from the EU to China grew rapidly, but has declined since the beginning
of the 21st century. The decline worsened due to the impact of the economic crisis, but
then in 2018 rose back to preeconomic crisis levels. Due to COVID-19, however, FDI
fell back to US$5.7 billion (a year-on-year decrease of 11.8%), accounting for 3.8% of
total trade (Figure 2). Kratz, Barkin and Dudley (2022) reviewed trends in European FDI
to China from 2000 to 2021 and found that European FDI in China in terms of countries
of origin are relatively concentrated, mainly including Germany (Group 1), Netherlands
26
According to EBOPS 2010 services components, other modes of transport mainly included: (1) Space
transport; (2) Rail transport; (3) Road transport; (4) Inland waterway transport; (5) Pipeline transport; (6)
Electricity transmission; (7) Other supporting and auxiliary services. Retrieved on 13 July 2022, from
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradeserv/tfsits/msits2010/ebops2cpc_detailed.htm#ebops10
27
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cecz/chn/zjgx/zywx/t1621576.htm
28
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-
03/31/content_24214014.htm
29
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-
09/13/content_31933680.htm
30
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from http://www.china-
ceec.org/eng/hzjl_1/glyhz/jm1/201905/t20190521_6830385.htm
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24
(Group 3), the UK and France (Group 1). These four countries accounted for an average
of 87% of total investment value in 2018-2021 and 69% in the last decade (2012-2021).
So far, Germany is the largest investor, with German firms accounting for more than half
of all European investment in China in 2018. The auto sector stands out in terms of
sectors, which consistently represents about a third of all European direct investment in
China. As a matter of fact, in 2020, 83% of FDI in China came from ten Asian
countries/regions
31
far exceeding FDI coming from the EU (MOFCOM, 2021: 89).
Meanwhile, Chinese FDI in the EU amounted to a similar amount. One research shows
that China’s OFDI focuses on less technologically advanced countries that are rich in
natural resources (Liu et al., 2022: 21). Brown (2012: 8384) also believes that in terms
of factors affecting China’s overseas investment, indeed, the EU and China are major
trading partners of one another, with a broad market and an open economic environment.
However, not only does the EU not have advantages in resources, its distance from China
and small number of ethnic Chinese makes it a challenge to compete with many Asian
countries. In the EY Europe Attractiveness Survey 2022 (4849), among the top 20
European countries that receive FDI, China is the second largest investor in Germany;
31
The ten Asian countries/regions are: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Macau, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan.
Note: Statistics of EU’s investment in China from 1987 to 2019 include investment from UK investors, which
is no longer included since 2020.
Source: MOFCOM, 2021: 28.
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25
for the rest of the countries, the top three investors are almost always either the U.S. or
other European countries.
With data from the Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,
Annex II presents the growth of China’s outward FDI stock in EU countries, showing large
increases from 2007 to 2020. Similar to trade in services (above), the types of
partnership between China and the EU countries do not correlate definitely to the size of
China’s outward FDI stock. Figure 4 presents an overview of China’s outward FDI stock
to EU countries in 2020: nearly half of the stock went to EU countries in Group 1, with
FDI exceeding US$1,000 million, with the Netherlands in Group 3 and Sweden and
Luxembourg in Group 4 being other notable receivers. Similar observations can also be
made from examining the cumulative values of transactions involving Chinese investment
in Europe from 2000 to 2021, according to data from a report by Rhodium Group &
MERICS: Overall, Group 1 EU countries have the highest cumulative value of Chinese
investment, with the Netherlands and Finland in Group 3, and Sweden and Luxembourg
in Group 4 forming a prominent part of that tally (Figure 3).
Source: Rhodium Group & MERICS, 2022: 7.
Source: 2020 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment, p. 168. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-
09/29/5639984/files/a3015be4dc1f45458513ab39691d37dd.pdf
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In 2021, the financial sector accounted for 5% of the total FDI in Europe, 20% of which
pertained to Luxembourg. Although this percentage of Luxembourg was lower than
2020’s (i.e., the figure has been decreasing), Luxembourg remains the largest
investment centre in Europe, and, globally, second only to the United States (Wintgens,
2022). At the same time, Luxembourg is the largest investment fund centre in Europe,
and is seen as a gateway between China and the EU and even other countries
32
. Six large
Chinese banks have chosen Luxembourg as a hub for their European operations,
establishing their European headquarters there (Deloitte, 2015: 3). More than 40% of
Chinese investment in Europe has passed through Luxembourg. This is mainly due to
Luxembourg’s tax policies, stable regulatory environment, and ecosystem, which mainly
means easy access to experts in relevant areas for solutions to their problems
33
. In fact,
Ireland and Luxembourg have a lot in common, not least for having the reputation for
being fund domiciles for a wide array of investment funds (Nadaud, 2022). Moreover,
Chinese greenfield investment in Europe has grown rapidly over the past two years,
reaching 3.3 billion euros in 2021, up 51% from 2020’s level, which mainly benefited
from several large deals in the automotive and information and communication
technology (ICT) sectors, including ByteDance’s data centre in Ireland (Rhodium Group
& MERICS, 2022: 1011).
The Nordic countries of Sweden and Finland have not shown a strong interest in the BRI.
However, though their bilateral trade in goods and services as well as FDI with China are
not at the very top among EU countries, they are not far behind either. Forsby (2019: X)
believes that “Nordic expertise, technology and innovation skills are in high demand in
China, especially with respect to green growth and sustainable development solutions
that are critical to China’s overall modernization objectives.” This is clearly reflected in
the future-oriented new-type cooperative partnership that Finland established with China
in 2017. The joint statement emphasized that the two countries will expand and deepen
practical cooperation in trade and investment, innovation, environmental protection,
urbanization and other fields, including (1) developing a circular economy, improving
resource utilization efficiency, and promoting sustainable development; (2) developing
new-type urbanization and green ecological smart city construction; (3) exploring the
potential for cooperation in the fields of transport and ICT; (4) exchanging and sharing
experience related to welfare solutions; (5) cooperating in relevant Arctic areas
34
.
Overall, there is still a lot of room for improvement in cooperation between China and EU
countries in terms of bilateral trade in services and FDI. Combining the data on trade in
services and FDI from both sides shows no definite correlation between the type of
partnership and the total value of trade in services and FDI; more appears to depend on
the countries’ own development conditions, resources, and abilities to attract investment,
as well as the whole international environment. However, the establishment of Chinese
32
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-11/30/c_139553724.htm
33
Retrieved on 13 June 2022, from https://www.bdo.lu/en-gb/insights/business-services-outsourcing-
en/new-china-eu-investment-deal-possible-implications-for-luxembourg
34
Retrieved on 13 April 2022, from
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/oz_678770/1206_679210/1207_679222/201704
/t20170405_9339825.shtml
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27
partnerships has indeed played a positive role in promoting the development of trade in
services and FDI with certain EU countries (e.g., Czechia).
5. Conclusion
Considering which EU countries have established partnerships and which ones have
signed BRI MoUs with China, we have proposed this main research question: To what
extent does the Chinese partnership framework facilitate practical cooperation between
EU countries and China? We have also put forth these secondary questions: What are
the main differences between these cooperation documents? Do such differences in
documentation result in discrepancies in the nature of cooperation?
After analyzing and comparing data on bilateral trade in goods, trade in services, and
FDI between China and EU countries over the years (economic cooperation), we believe
that Chinese partnerships contribute to boosting cooperation results, but it has a political
framework that goes beyond economic results. Meanwhile, the different types and
specificities of partnerships between China and the EU countries add complexity and
difficulty to a comparative study of all partnerships, as each nation’s economy and market
have individual specificities. This process demonstrates the creativity on China’s part in
adapting models to specific situations, which we have demonstrated in a previous study
concerning the development of different types of special economic zones (SEZs) in China
(Li & Costa, 2021). Trade in goods, services and FDI between China and all EU countries
have been growing over the years, whether or not those EU countries have established
Chinese partnerships. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the growth of
economic relations with China can be achieved immediately after a Chinese partnership
has been established, upgraded, or deepened. Nevertheless, economic development
requires stable political relations, and Chinese partnerships have been playing precisely
that role, paving the way for stable, long-term development and cooperation of economic
and trade relations between China and EU countries.
All Chinese partnerships have a similar building process. Each partnership’s joint
statement signifies a consensus reached by both partners after their heads of states have
met and expressed satisfaction (on behalf of the countries) with the establishment,
deepening, or upgrading of their partnership. However, the joint statement, though
reached, is not legally binding, but its core principle and premise adhere to the “One-
China” policy. The joint statements of Chinese partnerships usually include three main
parts: (1) an affirmation of current bilateral relations and reaffirmation of historical ties
or prior relations (if any); (2) a discussion on potential areas of cooperation and
development; (3) an exchange of regional or international situations and affairs.
Within the flexible and political framework provided by Chinese partnerships, the areas
of cooperation between the two parties cover many aspects such as politics, economy,
culture, environment, and public health. These areas are not limited to bilateral
cooperation; they can also be regional or global. Therefore, the main difference in the
documentations of these cooperations is that, according to China’s interests and the
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characteristics of each EU country, the areas of bilateral cooperation can be diverse.
Furthermore, the agreements result in different kinds of cooperation that are sector-
specific. For example, in maritime cooperation, China and Portugal have developed a blue
partnership and are prepared to build a STARLab to promote new aerospace cooperation
and develop a blue economy from both sides. In terms of third-party markets, China and
Austria, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands believe that there is potential
to continue seeking development in cooperation with such markets. Africa and Latin
America are in particular drawing more attention for third-market cooperation between
China and Portugal, and China and Spain.
Last but not least, countries that have established partnerships but not signed BRI MoUs
have much more frequent economic exchanges than those that have signed BRI MoUs.
In fact, half of the EU countries that have not established partnerships but signed BRI
MoUs are members of the China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-
CEEC, the “16+1”) Cooperation. The “16+1” initiative can be regarded as part of the BRI,
and these Central and Eastern European countries provide a strategic link between Asia
and Western Europe, which can greatly impact the success of the BRI (Jakl& Svetličič,
2019: 84). China has devised a strategic approach by adapting the BRI discourse to
diverse circumstances and audiences, thereby paving the way for cooperating with
European countries even before establishing partnerships with them (Costa, 2020: 41).
Economic relations are complex due to asymmetries and interdependence between
countries. “A fruitful and balanced co-existence should be the aim of EU-China economic
relations” (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2020: 69). Ultimately, although Chinese partnerships
are affected by the whole international environment and may be long and changeable,
they can provide a platform for bilateral dialogue, build a political framework for
cooperation, and positively impact the process towards achieving the goal.
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Annex I. Bilateral Trade in Goods 20002020 between China and EU Countries
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Annex II
Groups
EU
Countries
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Germany 845.41 845.5 1082.24 1502.29 2401.44 3104.35 3979.38 5785.50 5881.76 7841.75 12163.20 13688.61 14233.99 14549.58
France 126.81 167.13 221.03 243.62 3723.89 3 950.77 4 447.94 8 444.88 5 723.55 5 116.17 5 702.71 6 598.79 5 954.34 4 860.95
Italy 127.13 133.6 191.68 223.8 449.09 573.93 607.75 719.69 931.97 1 554.84 1 903.79 2 145.35 2 570.17 2 847.81
Spain 142.85 145.01 205.23 247.76 389.31 437.25 315.71 424.53 608.01 736.47 692.63 1 060.14 1 110.57 1 109.50
Poland 98.93 109.93 120.3 140.31 201.26 208.11 257.04 329.35 352.11 321.32 405.52 523.73 555.59 682.31
Hungary 78.17 88.75 97.41 465.7 475.35 507.41 532.35 556.35 571.11 313.70 327.86 320.69 427.36 341.87
Denmark 36.75 38.08 40.79 42.47 49.13 53.24 84.37 208.15 82.17 226.11 228.83 246.53 294.85 353.54
Greece 0.38 1.68 1.68 4.23 4.63 5.98 119.79 120.85 119.48 48.08 182.22 242.47 231.02 126.29
Portugal 1.71 1.71 5.02 21.37 33.13 40.38 55.32 60.69 71.42 87.74 110.23 105.93 58.57 45.78
Austria 4.04 4.04 1.55 2.01 24.54 79.46 76.66 201.70 327.99 530.51 851.49 461.63 492.18 675.23
Ireland 29.23 107.77 106.82 139.91 156.83 193.77 323.25 249.72 248.32 573.77 882.63 972.77 1 074.01 1 517.94
Czechia 19.64 32.43 49.34 52.33 66.83 202.45 204.68 242.69 224.31 227.77 164.90 279.23 287.49 1 198.43
Bulgaria 4.74 4.74 2.31 18.6 72.56 126.74 149.85 170.27 235.97 166.07 250.46 171.09 156.81 155.84
Cyprus 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 90.9 94.95 171.26 107.17 109.15 110.05 718.69 845.43 1 061.47 202.74
Belgium 33.98 33.3 56.91 101.01 140.5 230.69 315.01 493.47 519.53 544.03 479.23 326.41 470.95 500.63
Finland 0.94 3.59 9.04 27.25 31 34.03 42.55 58.99 95.07 211.70 213.07 327.54 340.38 306.62
Netherlands 138.76 234.42 335.87 486.71 664.68 1107.92 3193.09 4194.08 20067.13 20587.74 18529.00 19428.99 23854.82 26041.29
Croatia - - - - - 8.63 8.31 11.87 11.82 11.99 39.08 69.08 98.40 252.64
Romania 72.88 85.66 93.34 124.95 125.83 161.09 145.13 191.37 364.80 391.50 310.07 304.62 428.27 313.16
Sweden 146.93 157.59 111.89 1479.12 1531.22 2408.17 2737.71 3012.92 3381.96 3553.68 7307.42 6896.81 8578.69 10601.49
Slovakia 5.1 5.1 9.36 9.82 25.78 86.01 82.77 127.79 127.79 82.77 83.45 99.29 82.74 82.87
Slovenia 1.4 1.4 5 5 5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 26.86 27.25 40. 09 189.60 46.80
Malta 1.87 4.81 5.03 0.2 3.37 3.37 3.49 5.42 10.45 163.64 164.98 230.49 229.32 172.53
Luxembourg 67.02 122.83 2484.38 5786.75 7081.97 8977.89 10423.76 15666.77 7739.88 8776.60 13936.15 15388.70 13902.21 15995.45
Estonia 1.26 1.26 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.62 56.84 63.33 5.32
Lithuania 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 3.93 6.97 12.48 12.48 12.48 15.29 17.13 12.89 9.81 12.23
Latvia 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.94 0.94 1.02 11.70 11.63 16.81
Group 4
Note: Croatia joined the EU in 2013.
Source: 2011 & 2020 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
http://aaa.ccpit.org/Category7/Asset/2014/Apr/22/onlineeditimages/file71398159735273.pdf & https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-
09/29/5639984/files/a3015be4dc1f45458513ab39691d37dd.pdf
China’s Outward FDI Stock in EU Countries: 2007-2020 (Millions of USD)
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3