1927 and its final draft in 1932, namely in the matrix pillar of this conjecture. Concretely,
we are talking about his definition of the state.
Nowadays, the state may appear consensual and as José Fontes describes it, “a territory,
a people and a political power” (Fontes, p.22, 2009); for Schmitt, in 1927, it was based
predominantly on the people, as a unit, defining policies of paradigmatic principles and
values consistent with the almost Aquinian precept of “civil friendship” (Schmitt, pp. 41-
42, 2020). His evolution to 1932 allocates to political power the interpretative discretion
of the “mystical” foundations associated with the unity and political protection of the
state’s identity (Schmitt, pp. 161-162, 2020). This decision-making infallibility that
Schmitt conditions to the sovereign only parallels with the dogmatism of the Roman
Catholic infallibility of His Holiness the Pope, whomever he may be (Schmitt, 2013).
This absolutist idea is reinforced by the democratic inaction of the Weimar Republic in
the face of what Schmitt and some German elites considered the denigration resulting
from Versailles. In fact, the representative and federal semi-presidentialism of the
Weimar Republic always contained moderating rituals of a certain vindictive popular
drive—a counterweight, if you like, that still exists in the constitutional spectrum of
Western democracies.
Weimar, like the modern state, weakened in the polarization of “common things”,
neglecting the essential—or, better said, the existential—and bringing it closer to what
Schmitt calls the “Total State”, colonized by current party interests and without regard
for the metapolitical. Now, his anti-parliamentarism became more manifest, since
circumstances were considered exceptional and relevant. It required an effective
discernment that the ubiquity of treatment given by the parties to all issues did not place
the prominent ones at the top of the agenda (Schmitt, p.18, 2020).
This is the motto that Agamben (2018) later classifies as a “State of Exception”, clarifying
a concept addressed by interpretations of the jurist Schmitt, who in The Guardian of the
Constitution argues that legal-constitutional normativism is insufficient to construe the
best interests of the state in circumstances of absolute tension; instead, this domain
should be attached to political power. This line of reasoning was based on the recovery
of the prestige of the state and would be verified in Weimar with Hitler’s to power.
We have, then, two more ideas of Schmittian thought to add to the two previously stated:
3- The “friend/enemy” concept, as a passive identity reserved for the defeated people of
the First World War, as a reaction to the moral superiority imposed by the winners that
limited the mutual and balanced recognition of nations (Schmitt, p. 14, 2020).
4- The state, genealogically based on the idea of a people, can only defend its interests
through reinforced political powers of an anti-parliamentary nature, due to the ubiquitous
weaknesses of the “total party state”—in other words, a concentrationist state of power
must emerge (Schmitt, p. 17, 2020).
Here, as a product of what has already been described in German history and the
subsequent rise to power of the Nazi Party (which Schmitt joins), comes his last
argument: Decisionism.
This formulation results from the idea that, for the state to establish public order, legal
normativism is insufficient when we are faced with abnormal situations. In other words,