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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier
European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026
93
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PROJECTION AS A GLOBAL ACTOR THROUGH ITS
ACTIONS IN THE SAHEL: THE CASE STUDY OF MALI
MIGUEL AFONSO FIGUEIRA CERDEIRA DE FREITAS
mafcfreitas@outlook.pt
Master of Science in Military Aeronautics from the Air Force Academy (Portugal). Pilot Officer in
the Portuguese Air Force ORCID: 0009-0006-1134-4222
Abstract
This article examines the European Union’s (EU) role as a global actor through its engagement
in Mali. Drawing on a Politics, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure
(PMESII) spectrum analysis of Mali’s multidimensional crisis, it assesses the EU’s response via
its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, strategic frameworks, and financial
instruments. The study argues that the EU demonstrates significant capacity in comprehensive
crisis management and multilateral coordination, thereby reinforcing its external identity.
However, limitations related to political cohesion, local ownership, and structural instability
constrain its overall effectiveness. The case of Mali illustrates both the potential and the
challenges of the EU’s projection as a security actor in the international system.
Keywords
European Union, Mali, CSDP, Sahel, PMESII, SWOT.
Resumo
O presente artigo analisa o papel da União Europeia (UE) enquanto ator global através do seu
envolvimento no Mali. Com base numa análise do espectro Político, Militar, Económico, Social,
de Informação e Infraestrutura (PMESII) e da natureza multidimensional da crise maliana,
avalia-se a resposta europeia por meio das missões no âmbito da Política Comum de
Segurança e Defesa (PCSD), dos enquadramentos estratégicos e dos instrumentos financeiros
mobilizados. Argumenta-se que a UE revela capacidade relevante na gestão abrangente de
crises e na coordenação multilateral, reforçando a sua identidade externa. Contudo, limitações
associadas à coesão política, à apropriação local e à instabilidade estrutural condicionam a
eficácia global da sua intervenção. O caso do Mali evidencia, simultaneamente, as
potencialidades e os desafios da projeção da UE enquanto ator de segurança no sistema
internacional.
Palavras-chave
European Union, Mali, CSDP, Sahel, PMESII, SWOT.
How to cite this article
Freitas, Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de (2026). The European Union's Projection as a Global
Actor Through its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance: from Integration to Strategic
Autonomy, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4, April 2026, pp. 93-109. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT03226.6
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
94
Article received on February 10, 2025 and accepted for publication on February 13, 2026.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
95
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PROJECTION AS A GLOBAL ACTOR
THROUGH ITS ACTIONS IN THE SAHEL: THE CASE STUDY OF MALI
MIGUEL AFONSO FIGUEIRA CERDEIRA DE FREITAS
Introduction
The role of the European Union (EU) and its relevance in the international system
continue to be topics of debate in academia. In an increasingly complex world with
multidimensional threats, recently exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU seeks
to achieve autonomy that allows it to act independently in defending its interests.
This article aims to demonstrate that the EU can position itself in the international system
as a relevant actor in crisis management, through the application of existing foreign
policy instruments and its commitment to multilateralism.
In the first phase of this investigation, the EU's crisis management capacity is explored
within the complex and multidimensional context of Mali. The Malian geopolitical context
is analysed through a Politics, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure
(PMESII) spectrum analysis, thus achieving a holistic understanding of the reality facing
the EU in Mali. Knowledge of the Malian context allows us to understand the main factors
weakening the country, which will serve as a starting point for investigating the EU's
actions in Mali.
Secondly, the main elements of European foreign policy used in its presence in Mali are
analysed. This allows for an understanding of the EU's mode of operation, its main
strengths and weaknesses, and what distinguishes it from other actors in the
international system.
The article culminates in a SWOT analysis of European action in Mali, thus outlining the
political perspectives in terms of potential and constraints that a presence in the country
may present to the EU.
The crisis scenario in Mali
Mali is located in the arid Sahel region. Considering the EU definition of a region, the
Sahel is understood as a strip of territory that extends along the African continent, with
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
96
the Sahara Desert as its northern limit and the humid savannas as its southern limit,
Senegal to the west and Eritrea to the east (Pichon, 2020).
The security context in which Mali finds itself is quite complex, not only regionally but
also nationally. Communities in the country have faced numerous armed rebellions,
terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and a proliferation of weapons (Galito, 2013).
Together, all these factors contribute to significant instability in the region and the
country.
The history of Mali, like that of any other country in the world, is full of conflicts and
wars. Despite the deep temporal and social roots of Malian conflicts, they are currently
the result of pressure exerted by various armed groups that have established themselves
in the Sahel region (UN, 2020).
At the end of 2011, after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Tuareg fighters returned
from Libya to Mali. Together with the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation
of Azawad (MNLA), and with some Islamist armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and
some deserters from the Malian Armed Forces (FAM), they began, in January 2012, a
series of attacks against government forces in the north of the country (UN, 2020b).
From the EU side, two missions were sent within the framework of the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP): the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and
the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali). The first, sent
at the request of the Malian government in 2013, had as its main objective the training
and advising of the Malian Armed Forces in the fight against terrorism in the north of the
country (EEAS, 2020), while the second, sent in 2014, was sent with the purpose of
supporting the Malian police and security forces in reaffirming governmental authority
throughout the territory (EEAS, 2016).
Modern crises are characterized by complex interdependence, resulting from a
combination of historical, political, military, social, cultural, and economic factors.
Therefore, to understand the complex scenario of insecurity and instability in Mali, the
PMESII spectrum analysis model – political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
information factors – was used. This model is employed by NATO in complex operations
(NATO, 2019) to understand the nature of conflicts, human and organizational behaviour,
both of local populations and insurgents (Angelelli & Maymir-Ducharme, 2015). However,
one of the main difficulties observed during this analysis was the lack of official data,
partly due to the complexity of the country's current paradigm and, on the other hand,
due to the lack of current documentation on the factors under study.
PMESII Analysis
Political Factor
Mali, once considered a model of democracy on the African continent, has seen its
democratic system decline in recent decades. The events of 2012 were the most recent
illustration of the enduring tensions between the North and South of the country.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
97
Following its independence, various tensions arose between the rulers, who resided in
the South, and those in the North, leading to the political and economic marginalization
of the North. This state "withdrawal" from the once prosperous and valuable region has
made Northern Mali a risk and a threat to the security of the entire country (Chauzal &
van Damme, 2015).
The deteriorating situation, with the collapse of the army in the North and the protests
in Bamako against poor living conditions, ultimately led to the overthrow of President
Amadou Toumani Touré on March 21, 2012. He was replaced by a transitional
government headed by Diocounda Traoré.
Currently, Mali is governed by a transitional government led by Bah N'Daw, which is "fully
dedicated to its primary duty of providing services to its citizens throughout the territory."
However, this task is hampered by the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, as well as economic
difficulties, persistent security problems, and all kinds of social pressures for better living
conditions (Cisse, 2021).
Military Factor
The Malian Armed Forces (MAFs) are primarily focused on combating Islamist and rebel
groups in the country. A defence reform process is underway, with assistance from
external partners. Mali is supported by neighbouring G5 Sahel countries and receives
support from the EU, France, and the US in assisting with the training of military and
security forces. EUTM Mali, whose mandate has been extended until 2024, continues to
train the Malian army and has also conducted some training for the Air Force. The MAFs
participate in multinational exercises, particularly those focused on counter-terrorism
capabilities. Equipment and maintenance capabilities are quite limited, and the suitability
of some vehicles for service is questionable (ISS, 2020).
Economic Factor
Agriculture is the largest source of income and employment for Malians. With
approximately 80% of Mali's population working in agricultural activities, the sector is
the main driver of the country's economy and holds great potential for generating
economic growth (USAID, 2021a; European Parliament, 2014). Another important
element for the Malian economy is gold mining. In fact, Mali is the third largest gold
producer on the African continent, behind South Africa and Ghana, and it is the country's
most exported product (WTO, 2020).
Within its territory, there is a wide spectrum of regions with very different climatic and
environmental conditions: from the arid Sahara Desert in the North, where the dry season
can extend for more than nine months, to the semi-arid Sahel region which is interrupted
by the Niger River delta area – usually quite affected by floods – and, finally, to the
tropical savannas with a dry climate in the south (Nagarajan, 2020, pp. 13-14).
In general, in Mali, climate change and conflict together reduce the area of natural
resources that can be used by communities for their subsistence. At the same time,
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
98
population growth, migration resulting from conflict and climate, and the impacts of
climate change increase the pressure on competition for natural resources (Nagarajan,
2020, p. 19, our translation).
Both agriculture and livestock farming, the main drivers of the Malian economy, are
highly dependent on climatic factors. According to the Ministere de l'Environnement et
de l'Assainissement (2011), climate change, expressed in the decline and irregularity of
rainfall, the increase in average annual temperatures and soil aridity, contributes to the
decrease in agricultural and livestock yields. Furthermore, these factors contribute to
increased inter-communal tensions and transhumance in the country.
Lastly, but no less importantly, the increase in drug trafficking and other illicit goods, as
well as the rise in kidnappings, represents one of the main sources of income for some
groups based in northern Mali. According to the 2019 World Drug Report, the West African
region continues to play a significant role in drug trafficking, and Mali in particular plays
an important role as both a transit and destination country (UNODC, 2019).
Sociocultural Factor
Mali is a remarkable example of ethno-linguistic coexistence, where diverse ethnic groups
coexist and twenty languages are spoken throughout the country. The population of Mali
can be divided into two large groups: sub-Saharan populations (90%) and Arab-Berber
populations (10%), half of whom are Tuareg. The latter are mainly concentrated – about
95% – along 800 kilometres in the Niger River valley, between Niafounké and Gao, where
they live as sedentary farmers (OECD/SWAC, 2014).
There are also several ethnic groups, including the Fulani, mostly nomadic and Muslim
pastoralists, and the Dogon, generally polytheistic and sedentary. Since 2015, relations
between these two ethnic groups have become significantly more antagonistic following
accusations that the Fulani have been grazing their livestock on Dogon lands, as well as
disputes over natural resources, partly due to disturbances caused by climate change,
discussed later in this dissertation (Global Security, 2021).
Infrastructure Factor
Malian infrastructure is generally weak and unable to provide society with the necessary
infrastructure for its development. However, there is little recent data on the condition
of the various sectors of Malian infrastructure.
Nevertheless, it was possible to deepen the analysis in several sectors: most roads in the
country are in acceptable condition for vehicle traffic; there is potential in linking the
railways between Mali and Senegal; civil aviation and airports are at risk due to terrorist
attacks in their vicinity; access to drinking water and basic sanitation is significantly
deteriorated in the North.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
99
Information Factor
The advent of information media in Mali dates back to colonial times, when French
colonizers used the press as a propaganda tool to send messages in order to support
their rule. Currently, the landscape is dominated by radio – which covers 75% of the
territory – and the press, although it only exists in Bamako and some regional capitals
(Konaté, 2021).
The entire sector, in general, has evolved precariously, even with the advent of
democracy and information technologies that have revolutionized audiovisual media. At
the same time, Malian media outlets experience difficulties stemming from a lack of
professionalism and financial insecurity, which threatens their independence: they
survive thanks to annual state subsidies. Furthermore, the 2021 crisis and economic
instability are making the media increasingly susceptible to political influence (Konaté,
2021).
European Foreign Policy: Building an Identity
EU Global Strategy
In 2016, HR/VP Frederica Mogherini presented the European Union Global Strategy
(EUGS), which reinforced the idea of a united and cohesive Europe, but which,
nevertheless, “did not enjoy its full potential” (Mogherini, 2016). In response to a world
in disarray, the EU's external action revolved around the vision of “principled
pragmatism,” combining a realistic assessment of the strategic environment with an
idealistic aspiration to make the world a better place (SEAE, 2016a). Moving away from
aspirations to become a normative power that could export liberal values, the EU proved
more modest in its objectives and more cooperative in its methods (Barbé & Morillas,
2019).
However, in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic triggered several dangerous dynamics in
international relations that hampered the progress of the EU, such as the upward spiral
of rivalry between the US and China, the increase in economic and social inequalities, or
the disruption of societies affected by conflict with Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine,
and Yemen (Bargués, 2020; Biscop, 2020).
The Common Security and Defence Policy
The European Community Security Programme (ECSP) has become a crucial tool among
the various mechanisms of European foreign policy, and its operations are the most
visible manifestations of EU activity in fragile states (Cojocaru & Bursuc, 2020). However,
EU efforts regarding its crisis management operations and support mechanisms have
faced five main challenges that limit the action of the EU and its Member States (MS):
the time lag between events and European responses (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018);
cooperation with international partners in conflict prevention and peacebuilding
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
100
operations (EEAS, 2017); civil-military coordination (EEAS, 2018); ensuring local
ownership (Christie, et al., 2018); and conflict sensitivity
1
(Bøås, et al., 2018).
Despite all these challenges, the CSDP's operations and missions have enabled the EU to
develop its capabilities in a number of crucial areas, such as Security Sector Reform
(SSR), the rule of law, civilian and military training, maritime security, and border
management. From Missiroli's (2017) perspective, these activities are fundamental to
crisis management and will likely become increasingly prominent in the coming years.
European action in Mali
Overview of international interventions in Mali
France was the driving force behind the Western and European commitment in Mali
(Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019a). Despite all indications that the crisis in Mali in 2012
could develop into a conflict with significant implications for all of Europe, France found
itself alone among the European powers in the military intervention in the country
(Skierka, 2013), and even “at the international level there were many reservations about
military intervention in Mali” (Ribeiro, et al., 2014). Nevertheless, France ended up
intervening unilaterally in Mali through Operation Serval in 2013. Operation Serval ended
in July 2014 and was followed by its successor, Operation Barkhane (Ministère des
Armées, 2021).
Besides France, there were other actors on the ground such as the UN, ECOWAS, the AU,
the USA, among others. With this wide range of actors operating in Mali, Debuysere and
Blockmans (2019a) identified three challenges that this multilateralism could bring to the
EU. Primarily, the lack of coherence in the response between institutional actors has
hindered effective conflict management. Secondly, the lack of coherence between the EU
and the Member States has affected the effectiveness of the EU's response, particularly
in terms of budgets, commitment, and the definition of strategic priorities. Finally, the
unilateralist tendencies of some actors, which end up limiting the EU's impact, such as
France, which quickly launched a unilateral mission in Mali (Operation Serval) shortly
after the 2012 coup d'état.
The European approach in Mali: Strategies and Operational Instruments
Over the past decade, the EU has been increasing its support for Mali through various
instruments. Within the context of the security-development nexus, the EU has two
missions under the CSDP – EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali – and multiple financial
instruments to support the country's development. Furthermore, as existing challenges
in the Sahel region merged with other emerging security threats, several EU foreign
policy mechanisms were activated to formulate a political response to the problem
1
In this article, the sensitivity of the conflict encompasses both spaces between implementation and local
reception/perception.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
101
(Gstohl & Lannon, 2014, p. 50). The result emerged at the Foreign Affairs Council in
March 2011 with the adoption of the Strategy for the Sahel (ESDS).
Later, the migration issue also became a priority amidst the so-called “migration crisis”
that developed in 2015 in European territory, immediately following the significant
increase in the number of refugees arriving on European shores (Lucia, 2019). According
to Lucia (2019), this was one of the main events that led to a change in Brussels'
approach to the Sahel, leading to the creation of the Regional Action Plan (RAP) 2015-
2020.
The European Joint Program (JCP) 2020-2024 is the EU's latest strategy for Mali. Joint
programming is a process through which the European Commission, the European
External Action Service (EEAS), and the Member States jointly determine and develop a
strategic response for a particular country, in this case Mali, and draft a document
containing the strategic guidelines for European action, ideally replacing the bilateral
strategies of European countries (Galeazzi et al., 2013). Therefore, the JCP Mali should
be understood as a framework for the common objectives that the Member States and
European institutions have established as priorities for their development programs in
Mali for the period 2020-2024.
Finally, there are the two missions within the framework of the CSDP, already mentioned.
One military, EUTM Mali, and the other civilian, EUCAP Sahel Mali. Despite the
comprehensive approach, the two CSDP missions operate through different logics and,
according to interviews conducted by Eickhoff (2020), there were different interpretations
of their work environment and organizational responses.
Respondents to the EUCAP Sahel Mali mission expressed doubts about the Malian
government's commitment to the SSR. At the same time, they emphasized that there
was significant pressure for the mission to focus on the priorities of the European Member
States in the areas of migration and border control and counter-terrorism operations.
This follows the same line as Lopez (2017) argued: the Sahel Strategy tended to prioritize
the strategic interests of the EU, with potentially negative consequences for the ability of
CSDP missions and other European actors to take into account the priorities of the Sahel
countries, thus having negative effects on the sense of domestic ownership.
On the EUTM side, respondents emphasized the importance of fulfilling the mandate and
only supporting processes that favoured or promoted the Malian parties. “Adherence to
Malian priorities” was identified as the main guide for EUTM interactions with the Malian
parties, while also enabling them to exercise control over important factors in shared
activities such as, for example, the selection of trainees (Eickhoff, 2020).
EU financial assistance to Mali
The EU's financial instruments, established in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)
2014-2020, have faced some difficulties regarding coherence and flexibility in responding
to the constantly changing international context (Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019b). In an
effort to address these difficulties, the EC developed a proposal for a new MFF
corresponding to the period 2021-2027, thus establishing the priorities and the overall
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
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budgetary framework for European external action through the Neighbourhood,
Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). The proposal aims to
bring together nine instruments and funds from the 2014-2020 MFF, as well as the EDF,
which is currently outside the MFF (Immenkamp, 2020).
The proposed simplification of the financing architecture for European external action is
designed to help the EU respond as effectively as possible to the growing number of
increasingly complex, multidimensional and rapidly evolving global challenges
(Immenkamp, 2020).
In the context of security and defence, the EU faces a paradoxical situation in its efforts
for peace and stabilization abroad. Despite being the largest provider of humanitarian
and development aid in the world and a major provider of military training missions
(currently with three missions that together mobilize more than 1,000 people), there is
a gap in the provision of military aid and equipment directly to third countries so that
they can take ownership of their own security (Morcos & Ruy, 2021).
This gap may be filled by the recent adoption of the European Peace Support Facility
(EPF), on which Member States reached an agreement at the end of 2020. Initially
proposed by former HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2018, the facility aims to expand the
“toolbox” of European external action, allowing the EU to supply military equipment and
infrastructure directly to partner countries and to have “more responsibility as a security
provider in our region and beyond” (Mogherini, 2018). At the same time, it aims, in a
way, to guarantee the permanent availability of funds in order to allow for the rapid and
flexible mobilization of European resources (European Commission, 2018b).
In order to carry out a more in-depth analysis of the development of EU financial support,
data from 157 funding actions in the period 2011-2019 were compiled, divided among
the sectors of the PMESII analysis. From this analysis, it became evident that the priority
support sectors for the EU are the military, infrastructure and political sectors – which
together represent an allocation of 88.8% of EU funding in this period.
Prospects for European continued presence in Mali – SWOT Analysis
Strengths
The complex nature of the threats facing the EU necessitates a sober response that must
itself be complex and comprehensive. This may arguably have been the purpose of the
EU Strategic Policy launched in 2016.
Furthermore, as can be seen, since the beginning of the crisis in 2012, the EU has placed
the Sahel region, and consequently Mali, in an increasingly prominent position on its
foreign policy agenda. The European presence in Mali, notably through CSDP missions
and financial and humanitarian support, demonstrates the high degree of commitment
of the EU to the stabilization of the Sahel region. Reaching a common strategy for the
Sahel region, which identifies the main areas of interest for the entire EU, was a crucial
step in projecting European identity in the region.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
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The new European Joint Program has renewed the European commitment to the
stabilization of Mali. Furthermore, the financial instruments available to the EU have
enabled continuous and consistent funding to support Mali since the beginning of the
crisis in 2012, both in terms of development and security.
In this sense, the EU demonstrates unity and a sense of convergence regarding its actions
in Mali. The presence of 11 Member States on the ground, the unprecedented investment,
and the fact that the EU faces a significantly complex scenario in several dimensions,
make Mali a "good training ground" (European Council, 2016) for European foreign policy.
Weaknesses
The various EU initiatives seem to tend, in a way, towards Brussels' priorities such as
terrorism, illicit trafficking, and refugees in particular. In this sense, several authors
(Peters, 2018; Cissé, et al., 2017) suggest that there seems to be a lack of clear
sensitivity to the conflict, resulting from the development of policies in Brussels with
limited consultation with local partners in Mali and government entities. Furthermore, the
conflict hinders accurate monitoring of developments in the country.
However, the EU must also recognize that its priorities – notably the fight against
terrorism and the increasing migration to European territory – may not necessarily be
aligned with the interests of the Malian state and the various segments of the local
population. This fact was demonstrated by the investigation carried out by Eickhoff
(2020) on missions within the framework of the CSDP, in which the divergences between
those that are the priorities for the EU and those of the Malian counterpart hinder the
development of the missions.
In this sense, as Bøås et al. (2018) investigated, there is a perspective that Mali is seen
as a laboratory for EU crisis response policies. This may suggest that there is limited
interest on the part of Member States in developing policies tailored to the Malian context.
However, if the intention is to promote a sense of local ownership, the EU should actively
seek to work with the ideas and viewpoints of Malians, “despite the different cultures and
divergence of values”.
Some members do not demonstrate the necessary political will or even deny the use of
military means (Simon et al., 2011). From a realistic point of view, it can be argued that
this lack of political will arises, on the one hand, from the fact that military missions are
very expensive and, on the other hand, from the self-interests of each of the EU Member
States, which may be divergent.
Opportunities
The EU's presence in Mali has resulted in a new impetus for European foreign policy.
Furthermore, there are other actors operating in the country, so it is important for the
EU to strategically position itself as a key partner in Mali's development, as Borrel (2020)
points out.
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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD4
Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
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April 2026, pp. 93-109
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The focus of European action should be on those areas where the EU can make a greater
contribution, those where the EU can make a difference. For example, when it comes to
renewable energies, the EU possesses the expertise, the technology, and the financing
capabilities. Sustainable development is the next great economic development (Borrell,
2020), and therefore, not only should the EU seek to share its experience and know-how
with Mali so that the country develops sustainably, but this will also be an investment
that could yield a significant return.
Thus, the European presence in Mali represents an opportunity for the EU to position
itself on the international stage as an important and distinct actor in its mode of action.
In this sense, the new multiannual framework 2021-2027, which includes the NDCIC and
the EPF, reinforces the idea of an EU with greater capacity and flexibility. At the same
time, the new EPF can represent a new role for the EU in the international system, since
it allows the supply of military equipment directly to third countries, something more in
line with what other powers such as the US and Russia, recognized for their hard power
capabilities, have done to date.
Threats
Some of the constraints on European action arise from factors external to the EU. Mali's
internal governance is weakened. On the one hand, it is a country with porous and large
borders. On the other hand, the current political crisis hinders dialogue between the EU
and the Malian government. Furthermore, the desert to the northwest has created a
porous border with Mauritania, the desert to the northeast a porous border with Niger
and Burkina Faso, and the mountainous terrain to the north a porous border with Algeria.
These porous borders have allowed drug trafficking to proliferate (Raineri & Strazzari,
2015; Rousseau, 2017).
As previously mentioned, armed groups in northern and central Mali resort to drug
trafficking to finance their rebellions and, more specifically, the costs of recruitment and
armament. Given that the European continent is the largest market for illicit drugs
originating from South America, the proximity of northern Mali's borders to southern
Europe makes the country an important transit point for narcotics (Rousseau, 2017).
Just as the porous borders of the North allow drug trafficking to flourish into the European
continent, they also encourage human trafficking and migration flows. Around 400,000
people have been displaced due to conflict and climate change in Mali. As a result, these
people seek refuge anywhere, including Europe.
At the military level, despite efforts to coordinate action through its CSDP, the EU largely
assumed a supporting role for France in Mali. Attempts to Europeanize the intervention
were compromised by local perceptions of neocolonialism and institutional constraints.
The inability to transfer security responsibilities to Malian authorities or regional actors
created a vacuum that was progressively filled by non-Western powers, particularly
Russia, whose growing presence signals an intensification of geopolitical competition in
the Sahel, in a context of growing distrust towards traditional Western actors (Campo,
2025).
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Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
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The European Union's Projection as a Global Actor Through
its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
105
At the same time, some tensions between the ruling military junta and the EU, the
deteriorating security situation, and suspicions of ongoing human rights violations led to
the suspension of EUTM Mali in May 2024 by the EU. Furthermore, the type of actions
carried out by European forces raised internal doubts in the Member States (Lebovich,
2021).
Conclusion
As we can see, the EU's presence in Mali has been intensifying over the last decade,
emerging as one of the country's main partners in the fight against terrorism,
development, the promotion of human rights, and border control management.
Mali faces a complex conflict, where several factors exacerbate its effects. The PMESII
analysis carried out, although limited by the lack of current literature on some of the
sectors under analysis, allowed us to identify, within those factors, the structuring points
of the current conflict in Mali.
The EU then emerged as one of Mali's main partners in managing the crisis in the country.
We witnessed an attempt to streamline the European foreign policy process, revealing a
sense of unity and coherence among the Member States, a factor strictly necessary for
the success of European operations.
Through SWOT analysis, it was possible to observe that the EU, in its strengths, has
multiple instruments and strategies for its action in Mali, revealing a united and
convergent bloc in supporting Mali in crisis management and the country's development.
Regarding the prospects for opportunities for European involvement in Mali, the creation
of new instruments for foreign policy has revealed a renewed impetus for conflict
resolution. Thus, the EU intends to establish itself as a relevant actor in crisis
management. Finally, the European intervention can serve as a trial run for future
European interventions in other crisis scenarios.
There are several constraints to the EU's continued presence in Malian territory. The
persistent threats to European security posed by terrorism and mass migration put some
pressure on European action. At the same time, European action is limited by the local
perception of neocolonialism and institutional constraints that lead to a security vacuum
that is progressively filled by non-Western powers, whose presence is synonymous with
an intensification of geopolitical competition in the Sahel.
Nevertheless, the EU projects itself onto the international system as a relevant actor in
conflict management, through the application of its foreign policy instruments and its
commitment to multilateralism. The case of Mali has revealed the potential of its
instruments through their application in the highly complex scenario that the country
faces. Thus, through its presence in Mali, the EU aims to ensure the stability and security
of its immediate neighbourhood and European interests in an increasingly complex and
competitive world, while finding new impetus for the European project regarding its
common security and defence, towards a more autonomous and global EU. Global policy
is achieved through the political commitment of its Member States in participating in
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
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Thematic Dossier - European Union Security Governance:
from Integration to Strategic Autonomy
April 2026, pp. 93-109
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its Actions in the Sahel: The Case Study of Mali
Miguel Afonso Figueira Cerdeira de Freitas
106
missions and operations, notably Portugal's presence, over the last decade, in missions
within the framework of the EU, the UN and multilateral organizations, reflecting the
complementary efforts of various organizations to achieve international peace and
security.
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