OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023

EDITORIAL

EU RELATIONS WITH CHINA: SEEKING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AMID

GROWING SUPERPOWERS COMPETITION | AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

DANIEL CARDOSO

dcardoso@autonoma.pt

Assistant Professor at the Autónoma University of Lisbon (Portugal), where he coordinates the BA

program on International Relations. He is an Integrated researcher at the Portuguese Institute of

International Relations at the NOVA University of Lisbon (IPRI-NOVA) and an OBSERVARE-UAL

researcher.

CÁTIA MIRIAM COSTA

catia.miriam.costa@iscte-iul.pt

Researcher at the Centre for International Studies (ISCTE-IUL, Portugal) and invited professor at

the same university. She is also Director of the Global Iberoamerica Chair of the European

Institute of International Studies (Stockholm, Salamanca). She coordinates two international

Erasmus+ projects and is ISCTE’s alternate representative in UNESCO’s Academy programme.

She has numerous publications in English, Portuguese, Spanish, and French. Her main areas of

research are Chinese Foreign Policy, Macau, Sea and Globalisation, International Communication,

and Discourse Analysis. She was an advisor to the Secretary of State of Internationalization of

the Portuguese Republic until April 2022.

YICHAO LI

A18092105144@cityu.mo

Ph.D. from the Institute for Research on Portuguese-speaking Countries, City University of

Macau. She also received a master’s degree in comparative civil law (in Chinese) from the

University of Macau, and a Bachelor of Laws from Nanjing University of Information Science &

Technology, China. From 2021 to 2022, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for

International Studies (ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon, Portugal). Her current research interests are the Belt

and Road Initiative and Portuguese-speaking countries.

How to cite this editorial / Como citar este editorial

Cardoso, Daniel, Costa, Cátia Miriam, Li, Yichao (2022). Editorial. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. VOL14 N1, TD1 - Thematic dossier “European Union-China Relations”,

September 2023. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0123ED

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 1-9

Editorial

Daniel Cardoso, Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li

EDITORIAL

DANIEL CARDOSO

CÁTIA MIRIAM COSTA

YICHAO LI

Since China lifted its anti-COVID 19 restrictions and reopened its doors to the world

towards the beginning of 2023, leaders of more than 20 countries and international

organizations have visited, issued joint statements and/or deepened partnerships with

the Asian country in the first half of the year. The most high-profile was French President

Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s joint visit.

The results of this joint visit to China are still to be seen, but two things are worth noting.

First, even though EU-Chinese relations — which Von der Leyen calls “one of the most

intricate and important anywhere in the world” (DW, 2023) — has experienced months

of tensions, it seems that there remains room for dialogue, and the Chinese government

welcomes the EU’s “positive desire to…grow relations” (MFA, 2023). Second, the EU is

clearly still calibrating its position vis-à-vis China, as evidenced by von der Leyen and

Macron’s somewhat differing positions: von der Leyen focused on the importance of de-

risking commercial relations with China and the need to tie economic prospects to

security considerations. Macron, on the other hand, while showing desires for continuing

a robust economic relationship with China, downplayed security concerns. On his return

from China, he further hinted that Europe should strive for strategic autonomy and

minimize its dependence on external actors. In particular, Europe must reduce its

dependency on the United States and at the same time avoid getting dragged into a

tussle between China and the U.S. over Taiwan (Anderlini and Caulcutt, 2023). A month

later, the French president reaffirmed this position by stating that “being allies does not

mean being a vassal […] doesn’t mean that we don’t have the right to think for ourselves”

(Ridgwell, 2023).

As differing as von der Leyen and Macron’s positions may be, they both point to

something integral to current EU strategic consideration — what role should the EU play

amidst a Sino-U.S. competition (i.e., a bipolar world) (Biscop, 2023)? It is in this context

We would like to convey our gratitude to the individual authors for their invaluable contribution, and to all

reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.

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Editorial

Daniel Cardoso, Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li

that the idea of a European “strategic autonomy” gains traction. The idea itself is not

new. The debate emerged in the late 2010s after Macron called for a conscious “European

sovereignty”, before former German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that Europe should

take its destiny into its own hands, as it could no longer rely on protection from the U.S.

(European Parliament, 2021). By “strategic autonomy” or “European sovereignty”,

decision-makers refer to the capacity of the EU to act independently from other countries

in strategically essential policy areas, which can range from defence policies to economic

concerns and the capacity to uphold democratic values (European Parliament, 2022).

This rationale applies with respect to not only China but also the U.S. One of the lessons

that European authorities have drawn from the Trump administration is that American

domestic politics can strain bilateral relations with the EU. Between 2016 and 2020, it

became apparent that in a number of areas the U.S. was no longer a reliable partner —

trade, the environment, security, and health. Such dubious tendency of the U.S.

administration was exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic, as it assumed a solid

nationalistic and un-scientific position, departing from the World Health Organization

(WHO) and adopting an ambiguous stance regarding the role of vaccination. At the same

time, the pandemic also spotlighted the EU’s own over-reliance on medical supplies such

as masks and gowns produced in China (Bradsher and Alderman, 2020), therefore

accelerating the EU’s awakening of the need to become more autonomous.

Despite being impacted heavily by the pandemic, the EU remains an economic

powerhouse today: it continues to be the third-largest economy in the world and accounts

for one-sixth of global trade. However, despite having this economic might, it will require

a great deal of work on the European authorities’ part to achieve strategic autonomy vis-

à-vis China and the U.S. For China, the fact is that, after 20 years of strategic partnership,

European Union–China relations have grown into a multifaceted and complex

relationship. They are interdependent in various areas, especially in the economic sector.

In 2022, China was the third largest partner for EU exports (9%), and the most significant

partner for EU imports (20.8%) (Eurostat, 2023). The EU is also highly dependent on

China’s metals. Of the 30 raw materials classified by the EU as critical, 19 are

predominantly imported from China. These include magnesium, rare earth and bismuth,

of which China has a de facto monopoly (European Commission, 2020); these resources

are crucial to developing wind turbines, electric vehicles, solar cells and semiconductors,

and are fundamental to success in the energy transition and digitization drive (Wrede,

2022). Primarily (but not exclusively) in response to this situation, in March 2023, the

European Commission proposed a new Critical Raw Materials Act whose goal is to

diversify and enhance the resilience of EU critical raw material supply chains (European

Commission, 2023). While the details of the (implementation of the) act is still being laid

out, the proposal itself has already shown a concerted effort by the European countries

to respond to structural vulnerabilities.

Moreover, even though Chinese investments in Europe have been steadily declining since

2017, with a 77% drop between 2021 and 2016’s peak figures (Kratz et al., 2022), China

remains one of Europe’s largest investors. For instance, under the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI), Chinese companies and authorities have invested significantly in ports and

railways, two of the most important investments being the Piraeus port in Greece and

the more recent port in Hamburg, Germany (Kijewski, 2022). On the back of this flow of

investments, the EU and China signed in 2020 a Comprehensive Agreement on

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Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 1-9

Editorial

Daniel Cardoso, Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li

Investment (CAI) which aimed to overcome the hurdles in investment from the two sides.

However, the EU froze the ratification of the CAI on the grounds of human rights violations

in Xinjiang arising from China’s repression of the ethnic Uyghurs there (which the

international community accused the Chinese government of but the Chinese vehemently

denied), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s crackdown on the dissident pan-

democracy camp in Hong Kong (Mathias, 2022). Once the EU had adopted the Global

Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR), a tool to “address serious human rights

violations and abuses worldwide”, it imposed several sanctions on Chinese officials. These

sanctions prompted the CCP to retaliate with sanctions on members of the European

Parliament (MEPs) (European External Action Service, 2021).

This shows that, despite strong economic ties, the two sides do not see eye to eye on

several political issues, namely, human rights, democratic rule, and the rule of law.

Moreover, China’s growing economic relevance under President Xi has given the country

the desire for a bigger say on international matters (Rudd, 2022), and the BRI is proof

of it. As one of the largest trade powers in the world, China expects to consolidate that

position. At the same time, China regards global governance institutions as having

disproportionally served European and American interests, and therefore makes no secret

of its intention to reform them. On this China is joined by other revisionist states such as

Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa, who together created the BRICS forum in 2009 to

build alternative and/or complementary global governance structures to the post–Second

World War ones developed by the U.S. and Europe. Indeed, China has grown more

suspicious of Europe and the U.S. under Xi. In a recent speech (6 March 2023), Xi stated

that “Western countries headed by the United States have implemented containment

from all directions, encirclement and suppression against us, which has brought

unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development” (Xinhua, 2023). This

followed U.S. President Joe Biden’s State of the Union address on 7 February 2023, in

which he posited that “winning the competition [against China] should unite all of us!”

(White House, 2023).

Even in strictly economic terms, it has been difficult to keep up relations; the EU, for

example, has been expressing concerns and even complaints about China’s state

subsidies, industrial policies, and lack of reciprocity in market access, particularly in

security-sensitive sectors. For this reason, in 2019 the EU put in place a Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI) screening mechanism. While not exclusively directed at Chinese

companies, the significant growth of Chinese investment in Europe was one of the main

reasons to develop the instrument (Mathias, 2022). According to French President

Macron, this move also showed that the EU was not naïve regarding China and was

working towards building a “united front” against the Asian country (Gill, 2019).

In March 2019, the EU adopted a twofold definition of its relations with China —

comprising both competition and cooperation — in acknowledgment of the fact that there

were both strong economic relations as well as political tensions. This new definition

stemmed from a 2019 document entitled “EU-China Strategic Outlook: Commission and

HR/VP Contribution to the European Council”, in which China was presented in different

policy areas simultaneously as a cooperation partner (with whom the EU shares closely

aligned objectives), a negotiating partner (with whom the EU needs to find a balance of

interests), an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, as well as

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 1-9

Editorial

Daniel Cardoso, Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li

a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance (European Commission,

2019).

This stance is reinforced by another EU document in 2022 called “A Strategic Compass

for Security and Defence”, which aimed to improve the bloc’s common defence and

security policy by 2030. The document highlighted China as one of two critical actors of

concern after Russia (China was referenced nine times in the document, compared to 19

mentions of Russia), and while reiterating the EU’s multi-faceted approach towards

China, it presented China as a revisionist actor challenging the rules-based international

order, albeit shying away from adopting decisive language. The document also pointed

out that EU-China relations were souring, and that the trust gap between them was

widening. This mistrust grew particularly in 2020 and 2021 as a result of several events,

including the pandemic and ensuing disruptions in production and logistics chains, the

aforementioned situations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The more recent war in Ukraine

has exacerbated the rift: while China has publicly expressed its neutrality over the war,

it has also been strengthening relationships with Russia. In fact, even before the war, in

2021, Chinese politicians had embraced a new formula for cooperation with Russia, which

they characterized as having “no limit, no forbidden zone and no ceiling to how far [it

could] go” (Xinhua, 2021). In February 2022, the Joint Statement of the Russian

Federation and the People’s Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New

Era and Global Sustainable Development reaffirmed the no-limit friendship between the

two states, stating that the strengthening of their bilateral strategic cooperation was

neither “aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international

environment and circumstantial changes in third countries” (Kremlin, 2022) thereby

serving to justify the maintenance of good relations between the two countries despite

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, despite tensions and evolving rhetoric, diplomatic relations between the

EU and China have seemed slightly more stable in recent months. Efforts have been

made from both sides to resume high-level exchanges. In late 2022, German Chancellor

Olaf Scholz visited Beijing, as did European Council President Charles Michel. China’s new

ambassador to the EU Fu Cong has also been busy with meeting key European

stakeholders in recent months (Houtari and Stec, 2023).

The recent years have therefore shown that the EU is still calibrating its China strategy.

While European authorities want to assume a more defensive yet assertive position

towards Beijing, they do not expect to compromise bilateral relations, nor to become

dependent on the U.S. What in fact will be prudent is to find a balance between

cooperation and confrontation, and to identify when and where China should be treated

as a partner, a rival, or as a threat. Portugal’s recent decision to exclude non-OECD, non-

EU and non-NATO companies from being involved in the development of its 5G network

(Almeida & Mayger, 2023), and Germany’s approval of a COSCO investment in one of its

largest ports are both signs of splintering within the EU, showing that individual EU

countries treat Chinese investment differently. What this also shows is that the definition

of what should be considered critical areas to be protected from Chinese investments is

still open for debate.

The next years will determine the future of EU-China relations. First, given the

interdependence between the two sides and significant world challenges ranging from

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 1-9

Editorial

Daniel Cardoso, Cátia Miriam Costa, Yichao Li

climate change to economic development and peace, it is unlikely that bilateral relations

will be driven exclusively by rivalry, even though a certain level of systematic rivalry will

remain. In addition, under the EU’s goal of achieving more strategic autonomy vis-à-vis

the world and China’s intention to focus on domestic development and innovation, it is

unlikely that economic and political relations between the two sides will be nearly as

productive as they had been until 2019. Nevertheless, how it will all impact globalization,

multilateralism and global governance remains to be seen.

This special issue is a result of the challenging times that we live in and the possibility of

a transformation of the global order, in which the EU and China will both play determinant

roles. The researchers participating in this special issue reflect on the topics mentioned

above and problematize the impact of this conjuncture on the present and future of EU-

China relations.

The inception of this special issue was the 6th edition of the International Conference

“Europe as a Global Actor”, hosted by ISCTE-IUL and OBSERVARE-UAL in May 2022,

particularly its Panel 2 — The EU and China, but we also extended our invitation to

scholars and experts from other countries and regions in the world. Therefore, as an

international special issue, the present volume consists of five articles, offering valuable

insights on China-EU relations from multiple perspectives. Since the beginning of the 21st

century, China has gradually begun to establish different types of partnerships with the

EU as a whole and with individual European countries to strengthen bilateral relations

and promote cooperation in various fields (on the premise of the one-China policy);

indeed, the year 2023 marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the

comprehensive strategic partnership between the EU and China. As of 2022, among the

27 EU countries, 19 have established different types of partnerships with China, and 18

have signed MoUs with China under the BRI.

The first article in this special issue was written by Cátia Miriam Costa and Yichao Li,

who were inspired by the interesting observation that seven of the eight countries

(Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Luxembourg, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) that have not yet

established partnerships with China have however signed BRI MoUs, while some

countries that have long established partnerships with China (and have even

deepened/strengthened those partnerships) have not signed BRI MoUs for the time being

(e.g., Germany, France). Based on different types of Chinese partnerships, the authors

divided all EU member states into four groups. They gather data on the outcome of the

cooperations on trade and investment between China and EU member states, and find

that there is no immediate positive impact or definite correlation between the type of

partnership and trade in goods, the total value of trade in services and FDI. They

therefore conclude that Chinese partnerships contribute to boosting cooperation results,

but it has a political framework beyond economics.

In the past few years, China-EU relations have deteriorated due to bilateral and

international issues. In the second article, using the theory of cognitive dissonance

proposed by the psychologist Leon Festinger, Carlos Rodrigues evaluates possible

attributes of China-EU relations’ current state of affairs. Rodrigues concludes that the

manner in which dissonance is being reduced does not fit with the theoretical predictions

— rather than being based on changing dynamics in terms of behaviour, value and belief

systems, and environmental conditions, the reduction seems to rely on a strategy of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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September 2023, pp. 1-9

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hedging: the EU has seen China simultaneously as a partner, competitor, and rival, which

is the precise notion of hedging — to separate the economic and political dimensions.

The first round of negotiations of EU-China investment agreement was initiated in

January 2014, and after 35 negotiations in seven years, in December 2020, the two sides

announced that the negotiations had in principle concluded in a Comprehensive

Agreement on Investment (CAI) (European Commission, n.d.). Soon after, however, in

May 2021, the European Parliament passed a motion to formally freeze the CAI. Seeing

the CAI as a relevant international event affecting international relations, the third

article — penned by Carmen Mendes, analyzes China’s reaction to this unexpected

cessation and whether or not the EU Parliament’s vote could have foreshadowed the

debacle. Moreover, Mendes expects little chance of the CAI to be brought back to the

table in 2023, as, for the EU, it is impossible to separate trade and investments from

other policy areas and fundamental values, and the reality of Chinese assertiveness will

remain a matter of urgent concern both for the present and the future.

Moreover, recent U.S.-China competition and the Ukraine war are important factors

affecting EU-China relations. Emphasizing the concept of strategic autonomy, Pablo A.

Sánchez-Rodríguez argues in the fourth article that the EU should play the role of a

balancer and overcome internal and external barriers to pursue its global affairs agenda

amidst U.S.-China competition. Specifically, this means exercising cautious discretion

over its military, economic and political alliance with the U.S., and strengthening mutual

trust with China in areas beyond the economic domain.

The fifth article, written by Francisco José Leandro and Roopinder Oberoi, illuminates

how India and China’s involvement may impact the EU’s security in the context of the

Ukraine war. The authors see the war as having a real possibility of inducing a new

international order, and, through comparing how India and China approach the war and

impact their relations with the EU, they identify six major security challenges. They

suggest that the EU should not expect to rely on India as an extended partner, and, more

importantly, the EU, India, and China should come together and cooperate to engineer a

peaceful resolution to the conflict.

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