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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier

Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026

452

CRISIS OF THE UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM AS A CRIMINAL LAW

COMPONENT OF ENCROACHMENTS ON THE PROTECTION OF PEACE AND

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY LEADING TO ARMED AGGRESSION

IGOR PARYZKYI

i.paryzkyi@gmail.com

PhD (Legal Sci.), Dr. Sci (Economics), Professor of the Department of Marketing, Economics,

Management and Administration National Academy of Management

Kyiv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6835-5930

OLEKSIY HUMIN

oleksii.m.humin@lpnu.ua

Doctor of Law, Professor of the Department of International and Criminal Law

Institute of Law, Psychology and Innovative Education Lviv Polytechnic National University

Lviv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8016-945X

IRYNA KHOMYSHYN

iryna.y.khomyshyn@lpnu.ua

Doctor of Law, Professor, Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs and Quality of Education

Lviv Polytechnic National University

Lviv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6180-3478

MYROSLAVA SIRANT

myroslava.m.sirant@lpnu.ua

Doctor of Law, Professor of the Institute of Law, Psychology and Innovative Education

Lviv Polytechnic National University

Lviv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9393-2397

YARYNA OLIINYK

yaryna.s.bohiv@lpnu.ua

Doctor of Law, Professor of the Department of International and Criminal Law Institute of Law,

Psychology and Innovative Education Lviv Polytechnic National University

Lviv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5906-4565

Abstract

The existing framework for collective security under the auspices of the United Nations is

experiencing a profound institutional crisis that significantly undermines the effectiveness of

the prohibition on the use or threat of force, a fundamental principle of the contemporary

international legal order. These deficiencies are most apparent in situations of armed

aggression involving permanent members of the UN Security Council, where response

mechanisms are paralysed by procedural obstacles, particularly the veto power. This results

in a persistent gap between binding international legal norms and the practical ability to

enforce them. Against this background, the study examines the criminal law dimensions of

the crisis affecting the UN collective security system, especially in cases where threats to

peace escalate into acts of armed aggression. The analysis focuses on the legal foundations

and institutional structure of collective security within the UN, alongside existing mechanisms

of international criminal accountability. The research is based on a doctrinal analysis of the

UN Charter, relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court, and contemporary scholarship in public

international law and international criminal law. The findings indicate that the prohibition on

the use of force fails to generate effective criminal sanctions when the Security Council is

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

453

blocked by veto. Moreover, the General Assembly’s instruments remain largely advisory and

procedural, insufficient to compensate for Security Council paralysis. The study also highlights

the political dependence of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, which

contributes to systemic impunity and weakens the collective security regime.

Keywords

International law, collective security, prohibition of force, UN Security Council, veto right.

Resumo

O quadro existente para a segurança coletiva sob os auspícios das Nações Unidas está a

passar por uma profunda crise institucional que compromete significativamente a eficácia da

proibição do uso ou ameaça do uso da força, um princípio fundamental da ordem jurídica

internacional contemporânea. Essas deficiências são mais evidentes em situações de agressão

armada envolvendo membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, onde os

mecanismos de resposta ficam paralisados por obstáculos processuais, particularmente o

poder de veto. Isto resulta numa lacuna persistente entre as normas jurídicas internacionais

vinculativas e a capacidade prática de as aplicar. Neste contexto, o estudo examina as

dimensões do direito penal da crise que afeta o sistema de segurança coletiva da ONU,

especialmente nos casos em que as ameaças à paz se transformam em atos de agressão

armada. A análise centra-se nos fundamentos jurídicos e na estrutura institucional da

segurança coletiva no âmbito da ONU, a par dos mecanismos existentes de responsabilização

penal internacional. A investigação baseia-se numa análise doutrinária da Carta das Nações

Unidas, das resoluções relevantes da Assembleia Geral e do Conselho de Segurança, do

Estatuto de Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional e dos estudos contemporâneos em direito

internacional público e direito penal internacional. As conclusões indicam que a proibição do

uso da força não gera sanções penais eficazes quando o Conselho de Segurança é bloqueado

pelo veto. Além disso, os instrumentos da Assembleia Geral continuam a ser em grande parte

consultivos e processuais, insuficientes para compensar a paralisia do Conselho de Segurança.

O estudo também destaca a dependência política da jurisdição do TPI sobre o crime de

agressão, o que contribui para a impunidade sistémica e enfraquece o regime de segurança

coletiva.

Palavras-chave

Direito Internacional, Segurança Coletiva, Proibição Do Uso Da Força, Conselho De Segurança

Da ONU, Direito De Veto.

How to cite this article

Paryzkyi, Igor, Humin, Oleksiy, Khomyshyn, Iryna, Sirant, Myroslava & Oliinyk, Yaryna (2026).

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments on the

Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression. Janus.net, e-journal

of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3, March 2026, pp.

452-476. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0226.24

Article submitted on 18 December 2025 and accepted for publication on 15 January

2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

454

CRISIS OF THE UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM AS A

CRIMINAL LAW COMPONENT OF ENCROACHMENTS ON THE

PROTECTION OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

LEADING TO ARMED AGGRESSION

IGOR PARYZKYI

OLEKSIY HUMIN

IRYNA KHOMYSHYN

MYROSLAVA SIRANT

YARYNA OLIINYK

Introduction

The global security framework established by the United Nations, designed as a

universally applicable system to avert conflicts and sustain worldly tranquility, is

demonstrating growing operational deficiencies in addressing instances of armed hostility

under current global realities. This incapacity is notably pronounced when the authority

of the Security Council is thwarted by the veto power exercised by permanent members

who are themselves participants in the dispute. This state of affairs transcends a mere

political impasse; the institutional deadlock directly erodes the efficacy of the ban on the

application of force and fosters an environment where international offenses, most

critically the crime of aggression, enjoy practical immunity. Consequently, the apparatus

meant to legally safeguard peace and global stability devolves into a locus of regulatory

ambiguity. Here, the failure to mount a collective rebuttal facilitates the systematic

erosion of fundamental principles of international law, throwing into doubt the capacity

of the international legal structure to execute its roles in both prevention and sanction.

Against this backdrop, Staunton (2025) posits that the emergence of novel international

standards, such as the doctrine of responsibility not to veto, signifies a gradual, albeit

slow, evolution in the operational conduct of the Security Council. The author

demonstrates that even without formal alterations to the UN Charter, a form of normative

constraint develops, incrementally modifying perceptions regarding the acceptability of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

455

employing the veto when widespread breaches of peace occur. This perspective holds

value because it shifts focus away from viewing reform as a discrete occurrence, framing

it instead as an ongoing sequence – one that is irregular and marked by friction, yet

nonetheless accumulates toward a substantive impact.

In their work, Stensrud et al. (2025) address comparable problems, approaching them

from a nearly inverse viewpoint, concentrating on twenty years of experience in putting

into practice the principle of the responsibility to protect. Their analysis underscores and

elaborates upon the obstruction of the Security Council by its permanent members,

simultaneously emphasizing the backing for R2P offered by smaller and mid-sized

nations. Crucially, a state of institutional disarray does not inherently signify total

collapse of the underlying norms; rather, and this is of greater significance, it signals a

transition away from what was once viewed as a narrowly defined duty incumbent solely

upon formal authorities, toward an obligation now shared by a wider array of international

law subjects. Crucially, a state of institutional disarray does not inherently signify total

collapse of the underlying norms; rather, and this is of greater significance, it signals a

transition away from what was once viewed as a narrowly defined duty incumbent solely

upon formal authorities, toward an obligation now shared by a wider array of international

law subjects.

Gomez-Robledo and Olabuenaga (2024) present a highly structured examination of

voluntary limitations on the use of the veto power, asserting that while these measures

are no substitute for formal legal amendments, they can serve effectively as a bridging

solution. Their paper dives deep into curtailing the veto in the context of present-day

global hazards. Notably, their research is the first in scholarly writing to investigate the

link between the established political behaviors surrounding veto usage (or abstention)

and the legal ramifications arising from the Security Council’s failure to act.

Trahan and Germeaux (2024) project a scenario where the dynamic shifts, leading to the

permanent members themselves being held accountable for violating international peace

and security. Their research exposes the inherent imbalance within the collective security

framework: the system proves incapable of functioning precisely when it is most needed

– when aggression from core participants renders the institution unable to even classify

the hostile acts as aggression – causing a collapse. The paper weighs proposals for

structural overhaul against arguments advocating for preserving the existing order,

underscoring the relevance of both perspectives when confronting genuine international

crises.

Hehir (2024) continually advances the critical discourse surrounding the Responsibility

to Protect (R2P), describing the doctrine as an international law "protracted black hole."

The author highlights the disparity between the appealing moral standing of R2P and the

concrete tools available for its application, attributing this failure largely to political

obstacles within the Security Council. This finding bolsters the contention that an inability

to act by collective bodies should be viewed not merely as a political failing, but as an

element that actively facilitates international crimes.

A recent current in academic writing involves scrutinizing the legal boundaries

surrounding the use of veto power, specifically when confronted with instances of armed

aggression. Peters (2023) examines what, according to his interpretation of general

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

456

international law and its non-derogable norms, could possibly legitimize the obstruction

of any Security Council resolution "in the face of blatant aggressive acts." This notion

itself contradicts the fundamental principle of collective security should such obstruction

materialize. From the vantage point of systemic patterns – the concepts underpinning

institutional impunity within the field of criminology – this becomes a matter of

considerable significance.

Notwithstanding the large volume of current scholarship dedicated to the breakdown of

the UN’s collective security arrangement, several conceptual voids remain in the

academic discourse, hindering a complete grasp of this issue. Primarily, the vast

preponderance of existing publications concentrate on the political-institutional or

normative examination of veto authority, proposed Security Council reforms, or the

development of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. This leaves the criminal law

ramifications stemming from institutional paralysis largely unaddressed by systematic

inquiry. Furthermore, the query of whether the stagnation of collective response

mechanisms qualifies as more than just a political flaw within the system – potentially

acting as an autonomous element fostering the commission or perpetuation of the crime

of aggression – remains insufficiently explored. Similarly, the nexus between personal

criminal culpability for aggression and the structural shortcomings of the collective

security framework, which effectively nullify the deterrent capacity of international

criminal law, has only received piecemeal investigation.

The objective of this investigation is to pinpoint and provide scientific backing for the

criminal law facet of the UN collective security system’s crisis, particularly concerning

intrusions upon the preservation of peace and international security that result in armed

aggression. To realize this aim, the research intends to definitively resolve a series of

interconnected scholarly objectives that naturally arise from the article’s subject matter.

Initially, the study centers on clarifying the scope and constraints of criminal law

protections afforded to peace and international security when the UN collective security

mechanisms exhibit systemic inability. Subsequently, the task involves assessing,

through the lens of international criminal law, how the exercise of the veto power within

the Security Council influences the efficacy of preventing and halting armed aggression.

A distinct mandate is to illuminate the relationship connecting individual criminal liability

for the crime of aggression with the institutional lapses of collective organs that generate

environments of impunity.

Literature Review

The dependence of the aggression crime on a close connection to the powers of the

Security Council occupies is an issue in classical international-law studies. Blokker (2007)

was among the first scholars systematically to show that structural vulnerability creeps

into the whole system of international justice when, at its base, there lies dependence

on a politico-criminal qualification of aggression by any organ–here specifically speaking

about the Security Council. Heller (2011) continues this line and brings out clearly how

legally uncertain arrangements concerning aggression are and how little they can operate

under conditions wherein politics block everything. This approach shall be complemented

by that analysis from state practice provided by Koh and Buchwald (2017), who

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

457

demonstrate different interpretations regarding real possibilities for responsibility. Hehir

(2013), using the example of the Libyan crisis, shows the persistence of institutional

inconsistency of the Security Council, which undermines trust in the responsibility to

protect concept. This line is continued by Hehir and Lang (2015), who emphasise that

the political selectivity of the Security Council directly affects the effectiveness of the

International Criminal Court, especially in cases related to the use of force.

More recent studies have considered the veto as a factor of institutional paralysis.

Illingworth (2020) discusses the voluntary restraint of the veto as a temporary measure

to support R2P, fully acknowledging both its very limited potential and its practical

feasibility. Similar arguments appear in works that emphasize the role of the General

Assembly. Barber (2022) makes arguments based on the collective action of the General

Assembly in times of serious violations of peremptory norms, against Arrocha

Olabuenaga (2023), who analyzes United Nations General Assembly (further – UNGA)

Resolution 76/262 as an instrument of institutional response to the use of the veto by

the Security Council. Anich Sfeir (2023) reinterprets the doctrine of unity for peace,

raising questions not only about whether it has found a second life in contemporary

conflicts, but also about how this has happened.

The practical aspect of these approaches can be best understood through works

specifically dedicated to particular crises. Melling (2023) discusses the relevance of the

Uniting for Peace resolution in armed aggression against Ukraine and responses by the

Security Council, thereby showing that institutional alternatives are formally existent but

hardly applied. In their earlier work on Syria, they confirm that even when mass crimes

take place, collective security mechanisms still depend on the political will of permanent

members. Cross (2013) introduces an additional critical perspective focusing more on

problems with legal regulation regarding use or force and its limited capacity in

preventing escalationof armed conflicts.

The generalisation of the cited works indicates a high level of development of the

institutional, political, and normative aspects of the crisis of UN collective security. At the

same time, most authors focus either on procedural reform or on the evolution of the

R2P and Uniting for Peace doctrines, leaving the criminal-law consequences of

institutional inaction outside systematic analysis. It is precisely the insufficient integration

of research on the crime of aggression with the analysis of structural failures of the

collective security system that forms the theoretical gap which this study seeks to fill.

Materials and Methods

The research was carried out during 2024–2025 within the framework of a doctrinal and

normative analysis of public international law and international criminal law, with the

objective of revealing the criminal-law aspects of the crisis affecting the United Nations

collective security system. The selected research design focused on examining the

manner in which the institutional dysfunction of the UN Security Council, resulting from

the exercise of the veto power by permanent members, influences the practical

implementation of the prohibition of the use of force and generates normative conditions

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

458

conducive to the impunity of armed aggression (Charter of the United Nations, 1945;

Akande & Tzanakopoulos, 2018).

The empirical and normative foundation of the study was formed by universal

international legal instruments governing the maintenance of international peace and

security. These included the Charter of the United Nations (Charter of the United Nations,

1945), resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in particular

Resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for Peace”, which provides an alternative procedural

framework in situations of Security Council paralysis (United Nations General Assembly,

1950), as well as General Assembly Resolution 76/262, adopted in response to the

recurrent use of the veto by permanent members of the Security Council (United Nations

General Assembly, 2022). The practical operation of these instruments was analysed on

the basis of official documentation and resolutions of the UN Security Council covering

the period from 1946 to 2024 (United Nations Security Council, n.d. a).

A distinct set of sources comprised the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court relating to the crime of aggression, including the Kampala Amendments

adopted in 2010 (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2021), as well as

resolutions of the Assembly of States Parties defining the scope and conditions of the

Court’s jurisdiction over this offence (Assembly of States Parties, 2010; Assembly of

States Parties, 2017). In order to clarify the procedural framework and institutional

competences of the Court, official materials issued by the International Criminal Court

were also examined (International Criminal Court, n.d.).

The analytical framework was further enriched by contemporary English-language

scholarly literature in the fields of international criminal law and international security,

addressing issues such as the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression, the

role of the UN Security Council in activating mechanisms of criminal responsibility, and

the phenomenon of structural impunity in cases of aggression (Akande & Tzanakopoulos,

2018; Kress, 2018; Salari & Hosseini, 2023). These works were employed not as

independent empirical data, but as a doctrinal reference base for the interpretation and

contextualisation of the relevant normative provisions.

From a methodological perspective, the research relied primarily on a doctrinal and

normative mode of analysis aimed at examining the substance, objectives, and practical

operation of norms of international law. Within this framework, a comparative

assessment was conducted between the principles and institutional mechanisms

established by the UN Charter and the actual practice of exercising the veto power, as

well as between these practices and the provisions governing the crime of aggression

under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This comparative inquiry

made it possible to identify normative discontinuities that impede the effective

implementation of criminal accountability for aggression (Kress, 2018; Brungger, 2023;

Klamberg, 2016). A problem-oriented analytical approach was further employed to

evaluate the impact of these discontinuities on the criminal-law protection of peace and

international security.

Alongside the doctrinal-normative analysis, the study incorporated a limited set of

descriptive institutional statistics in order to organise and illustrate recurring patterns of

decision-making paralysis within the UN Security Council. Aggregated data concerning

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

459

the use of the veto since 1946 were drawn from the official database of Security Council

vetoes maintained by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, which contains structured

information classified by year, permanent member, and agenda category (United Nations

Security Council, n.d. b). These data were supplemented by records from the UN Digital

Library of Security Council resolutions, enabling the identification of decisions related to

the use of force, sanctions, and enforcement measures, as well as by official explanatory

materials on the veto mechanism issued by the United Nations. In addition, archival

voting records compiled by the Harvard University Library were utilised as a

supplementary historical reference for tracing long-term institutional trends (Harvard

Library, n.d.).

Within this methodological design, the armed aggression of the Russian Federation

against Ukraine was employed as an analytical case study. This case was not used to

establish or reassess the factual elements of the aggression itself, but solely to examine

the institutional response of the UN collective security system and the resulting criminal-

law implications. The case thus functioned as an empirical testing ground for evaluating

the functional capacity of the Security Council and the associated mechanisms of

international criminal responsibility under conditions of decision-making obstruction

caused by the exercise of the veto power.

Results

Structural incapacity of the UN Security Council in the implementation

of the prohibition of the use of force

The doctrinal-normative analysis of the collective security system of the United Nations

indicates that the prohibition of the use of force is one of the fundamental principles of

the contemporary international legal order and constitutes the core of the post-war model

of peace maintenance. In accordance with the UN Charter, states are obliged to refrain

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence

of any state, as well as from any other actions incompatible with the purposes of the

Organization (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). This norm has an imperative

character and is regarded in international law as a basis of jus cogens that allows no

derogations.

At the same time, the implementation of this prohibition in the practical dimension was

institutionally entrusted to the UN Security Council, to which the Charter assigns primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is precisely the

Security Council that is empowered to determine the existence of a threat to the peace,

a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression and to adopt decisions on the application

of enforcement measures, including sanctions or the use of armed force on behalf of the

international community (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). In the theoretical model

of the Charter, such a construction was intended to ensure a centralised and effective

response to violations of the prohibition of the use of force.

However, the normative design of the Security Council contains an internal structural

contradiction that significantly limits its capacity to implement the said prohibition. This

concerns the voting mechanism, according to which the adoption of decisions on all

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

460

substantive matters requires the consent of all permanent members of the Security

Council. A negative vote of any one of them results in the blocking of a decision,

regardless of the position of the majority of non-permanent members (Charter of the

United Nations, 1945). As a result, the veto right is transformed from an instrument for

ensuring a balance of major powers into a factor of institutional paralysis, especially in

situations where a permanent member of the Security Council is directly or indirectly

interested in the outcome under consideration.

This structural contradiction is confirmed by quantitative institutional data. According to

the official database of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, from 1946 to 2024 the veto was

exercised more than 300 times by permanent members of the Security Council. A

substantial proportion of these vetoes concerned draft resolutions addressing armed

conflicts, enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the legal

qualification of situations as threats to international peace and security (United Nations

Security Council, n.d. b). Notably, in the period after 2011 the frequency of veto use

increased markedly in relation to ongoing armed conflicts. In the context of the Syrian

conflict alone, draft resolutions were vetoed over 15 times, resulting in the repeated

blocking of coercive measures and collective responses. These figures demonstrate that

veto-induced paralysis is not episodic but quantitatively recurrent, reflecting a persistent

pattern embedded in the decision-making architecture of the Security Council (see Figure

2).

According to official records and Security Council resolutions from 1946 to 2024, this

procedural design has been most visibly manifested in situations involving armed

conflicts or alleged acts of aggression, where the adoption of enforcement measures or

even the formal legal characterisation of the situation depended on the consent of all

permanent members (United Nations Security Council, n.d. a). As a consequence, the

prohibition of the use of force formally remains in effect, but its institutional

implementation acquires a selective character and becomes contingent upon the political

will of dominant states.

The quantitative data presented below make it possible to specify in which areas the

implementation of the powers of the UN Security Council is most often subject to

institutional blockage. In view of this, it is advisable not only to analyze the dynamics of

the use of the veto right in time, but also to distinguish its application by subject matter.

This approach allows us to identify which categories of issues most systematically fall

into the zone of procedural paralysis and how this affects the Security Council’s ability to

respond to threats to peace and international security. In this context, Figure 1 illustrates

the distribution of vetoes of permanent members of the Security Council by the main

thematic areas of resolutions during 1946–2024, which creates an empirical basis for

assessing the selectivity of the application of collective security mechanisms.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

461

Figure 1. Distribution of Security Council vetoes by subject matter (1946–2024)

Source: compiled by the author based on United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (n.d.)

The data shown in Figure 1 show that the vast majority of veto applications are

concentrated in areas directly related to the maintenance of international peace and

security, including armed conflicts, the use of force, sanctions and coercive measures.

This distribution confirms that the veto is used not sporadically or on minor procedural

issues, but primarily in situations where the exercise of the Security Council’s powers

could have legally significant consequences for states or individual political actors. As a

result, it is precisely those categories of decisions that are key to ensuring the effect of

the prohibition on the use of force that are most vulnerable to blocking, which reinforces

the selective nature of the functioning of the collective security system and reinforces

the conclusion about its structural, rather than accidental, failure.

Awareness of this problem is not new to the UN system. As early as 1950, the General

Assembly adopted Resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for Peace”, in which it explicitly recognised

that the Security Council may be unable to perform its functions due to the lack of

unanimity among permanent members (United Nations General Assembly, 1950). The

mechanism introduced by this resolution allowed the General Assembly to recommend

collective measures in cases of paralysis of the Security Council. However, such

recommendations do not have binding legal force and cannot replace the powers of the

Security Council to establish legally significant consequences for violators of the

prohibition of the use of force.

The year 2022 saw the development of an additional institutional response in the form

of General Assembly Resolution 76/262, which provides for the automatic convening of

the General Assembly whenever a permanent member casts a veto (United Nations

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Armed conflict / use of force

Sanctions / enforcement (Chapter VII)

Peacekeeping / mandates

International justice / accountability

Humanitarian access / protection

Other peace & security issues

Veto count (1946–2024)

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462

General Assembly, 2022). While this mechanism enhances transparency and political

accountability, it does not alter the structural conditions under which the veto operates.

Consequently, no procedural innovation of this kind is capable of neutralising the

institutional effect of the veto in situations where Security Council decisions on the use

of force are blocked.

Figure 2. Use of the veto in the UN Security Council in matters related to peace and security

(1946–2024)

Source: United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (n.d.)

Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative dynamics of the use of the veto by permanent

members of the UN Security Council in matters related to the maintenance of

international peace and security between 1946 and 2024. The data demonstrate a

pronounced concentration of vetoes during the Cold War period, with the highest

frequency recorded in the 1960s, followed by a gradual decline in the late twentieth

century, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, the post-2010

period is characterised by a renewed increase in the use of the veto, indicating a partial

return to patterns of decision-making blockage in situations involving armed conflicts and

enforcement measures. This temporal distribution confirms that the institutional capacity

of the Security Council to act collectively in response to violations of the prohibition of

the use of force has not evolved linearly towards greater effectiveness, but remains

structurally dependent on the political alignment of permanent members, with direct

implications for the consistency and predictability of the application of collective security

mechanisms.

The obtained results of the normative-institutional analysis indicate that the incapacity

of the UN Security Council in the implementation of the prohibition of the use of force

has a clearly fixed structural nature and derives from the combination of imperative

norms of the Charter with the procedural mechanisms of their application. Although the

100

1946–1959 1960–1969 1970–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 2000–2009 2010–2019 2020–2024

Number of vetoes

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prohibition of the threat or use of force is закреплена as a universal and unconditional

principle of international law (Charter of the United Nations, 1945), its practical

implementation is mediated by the exclusive competence of the Security Council and the

voting mechanism of the permanent members, which allows the blocking of any decisions

in the event of the use of the veto right. For the purpose of generalising these results

and visually demonstrating the gap between the normative model of collective security

and the actual institutional consequences of the functioning of the Security Council, the

key elements of such incapacity are systematised in Table 1, compiled on the basis of

the provisions of the UN Charter and the official practice of the organs of the

Organization.

Table 1. Structural elements of the incapacity of the UN Security Council in the implementation

of the prohibition of the use of force

Normative

element

Enshrinement in

the UN Charter

Prescribed function

Actual institutional result

Prohibition of the

threat or use of

force

Article 2(4) of the

UN Charter

Universal and imperative

limitation of state conduct;

foundation of the collective

security system

Formally preserved as a jus

cogens norm, but does not

guarantee an automatic

response in the event of

violation

Exclusive

competence of the

Security Council

Articles 24, 39 of

the UN Charter

Centralised determination of

the existence of a threat to

the peace, breach of the

peace, or act of aggression

Exercise of competence

depends on procedural

consent of permanent

members

Voting mechanism

of permanent

members

Article 27(3) of the

UN Charter

Ensuring a balance of

interests of major powers in

matters of peace and security

Transformation of the veto

right into an instrument for

blocking decisions in conflicts

involving permanent

members

Veto right

Institutional

practice of the

Security Council

Prevention of enforcement

decisions against key states

Systemic paralysis of the

Security Council in situations

involving the use of force

Alternative

responses of the

General Assembly

GA Resolution 377

(V); Resolution

76/262

Compensation for the

incapacity of the Security

Council

Recommendatory and

procedural character without

coercive legal force

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations (1945); United

Nations Security Council (n.d. a); United Nations General Assembly (1950); United Nations

General Assembly (2022), United Nations (n.d.)

The data presented in the table confirm that the key problem of implementing the

prohibition of the use of force lies not in the absence of normative certainty, but in the

procedural architecture of the collective security system. The imperative character of

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter retains its legal validity; however, it does not transform

into an automatic response mechanism due to the dependence of the entire enforcement

function on the Security Council. The veto right, enshrined as an element of balance

among major powers, in practice neutralises the universality of the prohibition of force

in situations where the violation is connected with the interests or actions of a permanent

member. Alternative mechanisms of the General Assembly only partially compensate for

this deficit, without creating binding legal consequences. As a result, a structural legal

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vacuum is formed between the norm prohibiting aggression and the institutional

possibility of its coercive enforcement, which directly affects the subsequent problem of

criminal-law responsibility for armed aggression. Thus, the results of the normative

analysis indicate that the structural incapacity of the UN Security Council is not

temporary, but systemic in nature. As a result, the prohibition of the use of force remains

legally binding, but institutionally unsecured in critical cases, which creates a legal

vacuum and lays the groundwork for further criminal-law problems related to

responsibility for armed aggression.

In order to generalize the obtained quantitative results and move from the description of

individual institutional manifestations to their systematic assessment, it is advisable to

integrate aggregated statistical indicators that reflect the real legal consequences of the

use of the veto right in the field of maintaining international peace and security. Unlike

previous graphic materials that illustrate the dynamics, thematic concentration and

institutional reactions to the blocking of Security Council decisions, generalized statistics

allow us to correlate the scale of procedural paralysis with the actual results of its

functioning in terms of the application of jus cogens norms and the formation of criminal

law consequences. In this context, Table 3 systematizes the key quantitative indicators

that characterize the institutional effectiveness and limitations of the UN collective

security in situations related to the use of force, and at the same time creates an

empirical basis for further analysis of the criminal law gap between the prohibition of

aggression and its practical implementation.

The summarized data presented in Table 3 convincingly confirm that the institutional

crisis of collective security is not accidental, but reproducible and systemic in nature. The

high number of vetoes in cases directly related to the use of force and coercive measures

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is combined with the limited and purely

recommendatory activity of the General Assembly and the complete absence of criminal

law consequences in the form of proceedings for the crime of aggression. This

configuration of indicators captures the structural gap between the imperative prohibition

of aggression as a jus cogens norm and the real institutional capabilities for its

implementation, which allows us to interpret the crisis of the collective security system

not only as a political dysfunction, but as a persistent criminal law gap in the modern

international legal order.

Table 2. Institutional consequences of Security Council vetoes in situations involving the use of

force (aggregated indicators, 1946–2024)

Indicator

Quantitative

value

Analytical relevance for the study

Total number of UNSC vetoes related to

the maintenance of peace and security

>300

Confirms the systemic and recurrent nature of

veto use in core security matters

Estimated number of vetoes concerning

armed conflict and use of force

~120

Demonstrates concentration of veto power in

situations triggering collective security

mechanisms

Draft resolutions under Chapter VII

blocked by veto

~45

Indicates obstruction of coercive enforcement

measures provided by the UN Charter

Situations where veto prevented formal

legal qualification of aggression

>30

Shows selective non-application of jus cogens

norms at the institutional level

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465

Instances of subsequent General

Assembly action under Res. 377 (V) or

76/262

<20

Illustrates limited compensatory capacity of

Assembly-based mechanisms

Cases resulting in criminal-law

proceedings for the crime of aggression

Empirical confirmation of the criminal-law gap

between collective security and international

justice

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library (n.d.),

United Nations General Assembly (2022, 1950), and official materials of the International

Criminal Court (n.d.), United Nations (n.d.)

Normative limitations of alternative response mechanisms of the UN

General Assembly

The obtained results of the doctrinal-normative analysis demonstrate that the UN General

Assembly indeed possesses alternative response instruments in situations where the

Security Council is paralysed due to the lack of unanimity among permanent members.

At the same time, these instruments have clearly fixed normative limits that do not allow

them to perform the function of a full replacement of the Security Council precisely in

the part concerning the coercive enforcement of the prohibition of the use of force and

the formation of legal preconditions for criminal-law responsibility for armed aggression

(Charter of the United Nations, 1945; United Nations General Assembly, 1950). This

conclusion is empirically supported by the fact that, despite the existence of alternative

General Assembly procedures, the overall number of vetoes cast in situations involving

armed conflicts and enforcement-related resolutions since 1946 exceeds several hundred

instances, with no corresponding transfer of binding decision-making authority from the

Security Council to the Assembly recorded in UN practice.

Within the system of the UN Charter, the General Assembly is not endowed with the

status of an organ of coercive security action, even when its activity is aimed at the

maintenance of international peace and security. Primary responsibility in this sphere is

institutionally assigned to the Security Council, and therefore the mechanism for adopting

binding decisions and applying enforcement measures is conceptually linked precisely to

this organ (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). Under such conditions, any alternative,

even one that is procedurally developed and politically significant, remains secondary in

its legal effect and is not capable of reproducing the sanctioning and binding nature of

Security Council decisions. Quantitative analysis of UN institutional practice confirms that

General Assembly resolutions adopted in response to Security Council paralysis have not

resulted in the adoption of legally binding enforcement measures comparable to those

authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter, regardless of the frequency of veto use in

the relevant period.

This secondary character has a clearly defined legal form. Even in cases of the application

of special response procedures, the outcome of the activity of the General Assembly

remains recommendations rather than decisions that have binding force for member

states in the same sense in which Security Council decisions function within the Charter

model of collective security (Charter of the United Nations, 1945; United Nations General

Assembly, 1950). As a result, the Assembly’s alternative mechanisms should be regarded

primarily as instruments of politico-legal pressure and mobilisation of an international

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466

position, but not as mechanisms of legal coercion. Statistical comparison of Security

Council veto records and subsequent General Assembly actions shows that increases in

the use of the veto, particularly in the post-2010 period, correlate with a rise in non-

binding Assembly debates and resolutions, without altering the formal distribution of

coercive powers within the UN system.

In order to further specify the institutional consequences of the use of the veto right, it

is advisable to move from the analysis of its distribution and concentration to comparing

this instrument with alternative forms of response within the UN system. Of particular

interest in this context is the relationship between periods of active blocking of decisions

in the Security Council and the subsequent institutional response of the General

Assembly, in particular through the mechanisms provided for in resolution 377 (V) “Unity

for Peace”, as well as modern procedural innovations. It is this comparative approach,

reflected in Figure 3, that allows us to clearly assess whether the increase in the number

of vetoes is accompanied by an increase in alternative institutional responses, or whether

the activity of the General Assembly performs a predominantly compensatory and

declarative function without changing the balance of powers in the collective security

system.

The data presented in Figure 3 demonstrate that the increase in the number of veto

applications in the UN Security Council is systematically accompanied by the activation

of alternative procedures of the General Assembly, but this reaction is predominantly

non-coercive in nature. A chronological comparison shows that peaks in blocking Security

Council decisions, in particular during periods of exacerbation of armed conflicts,

correlate with an increase in the number of debates, special sessions and General

Assembly resolutions adopted within the framework of the “Unity for Peace” mechanism

and related procedures. At the same time, the absence of further legally binding

consequences indicates that such institutional activity does not transform into a

replacement of the coercive powers of the Security Council, but rather performs the

function of political legitimization and articulation of a collective position, without

eliminating the structural limitations of the collective security system.

Of particular importance in this context is General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) of 1950.

The normative analysis of its construction indicates that the paralysis of the Security

Council due to the position of a permanent member was institutionally recognised at an

early stage of the development of the UN system as a recurring risk rather than as an

exceptional malfunction (United Nations General Assembly, 1950). This aspect is

significant not as a historical reference, but as a normative marker that the problem of

the veto has a structural character and, accordingly, that the crisis of collective security

manifests itself not only in the political, but also in the legal and institutional

dimension. The continued reliance on this resolution over several decades, despite

fluctuating but recurrent levels of veto usage documented in official UN datasets from

1946 to 2024, underscores the absence of any quantitative reduction in institutional

paralysis attributable to Assembly-based alternatives.

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467

Figure 3. Security Council vetoes and General Assembly alternative responses (1950–2024)

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of United Nations Security Council (n.d.a) and

United Nations General Assembly (1950, 2022), using data from United Nations Dag

Hammarskjöld Library (n.d.), United Nations (n.d.)

Normative analysis of Resolution 377 (V) makes it possible to clarify the limits of its

functional effectiveness. Under conditions of paralysis of the Security Council, the General

Assembly is indeed authorised to consider the relevant situation promptly and to issue

recommendations regarding collective measures, which in the political dimension may be

perceived as an active reaction of the international community (United Nations General

Assembly, 1950). At the same time, the legal form of such measures remains

recommendatory, which does not generate an automatic international legal obligation to

implement them and, accordingly, does not ensure a guaranteed coercive

effect. Empirical evidence from voting records and resolution databases confirms that,

notwithstanding repeated activation of Assembly procedures in veto-related contexts, no

statistically observable shift toward binding enforcement outcomes has occurred.

Of principled importance for the criminal-law dimension is the fact that Resolution 377

(V) does not transform the competence of the General Assembly into a jurisdictional one

and does not create a procedural link between the political response of the UN and the

mechanism of international criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. Even full-

scale application of the Uniting for Peace procedures does not remove the institutional

dependence of the activation of certain aspects of criminal prosecution on the functioning

of the Security Council (Akande & Tzanakopoulos, 2018; Kress, 2018). This conclusion is

supported by institutional statistics showing that, despite repeated invocations of

Assembly-based procedures in veto-related situations since 1950, the number of Security

Council vetoes in matters linked to armed conflicts and enforcement measures has

continued to grow in subsequent decades, without any recorded instance of jurisdictional

substitution in favour of the General Assembly.

100

1950–19591960–19691970–19791980–19891990–19992000–20092010–20192020–2024

Security Council vetoes GA alternative responses

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468

Similar limitations are inherent in the more recent Resolution 76/262 (2022), which

introduces mandatory public discussion in the General Assembly in the event of the use

of the veto. Its normative significance lies in increasing transparency and political

accountability of the permanent members of the Security Council; however, this

mechanism has a purely procedural character and does not change the distribution of

powers enshrined in the UN Charter (Charter of the United Nations, 1945; United Nations

General Assembly, 2022). As a result, even modernised response instruments of the

Assembly remain means of articulation of positions rather than of legal

coercion. Empirical data from 2022–2024 indicate that, notwithstanding the automatic

convening of General Assembly debates following vetoes, the overall frequency of veto

use has not decreased, and no binding enforcement measures have followed these

debates.

This procedural nature is insufficient precisely in the criminal-law context, since the

implementation of responsibility for the crime of aggression requires a clear normative

linkage to the jurisdictional conditions of the International Criminal Court. Resolution

76/262 does not create new legal grounds for overcoming the limitations arising from

the construction of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute and the Kampala

compromises (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2021; Assembly of

States Parties, 2010; Assembly of States Parties, 2017). Statistical comparison between

periods before and after the adoption of Resolution 76/262 confirms the absence of any

measurable institutional shift that would facilitate the activation of criminal-law

mechanisms in response to veto-induced paralysis.

The comparison of alternative mechanisms of the General Assembly with the body of

Security Council practice for the period 1946–2024 confirms the systemic character of

the problem. The veto right functions as a recurrent procedural barrier in matters relating

to the core security interests of permanent members, and the activation of Assembly

instruments does not eliminate the legal finality of such blocking (United Nations Security

Council, n.d.a). As a result, the Assembly’s alternatives perform a compensatory

legitimising function, but do not remove the normative gap that acquires decisive

significance for the criminal-law prosecution of aggression (United Nations General

Assembly, 1950; United Nations General Assembly, 2022). Longitudinal data on veto

usage demonstrate that peaks in veto activity are consistently followed by increased

Assembly engagement, yet without any corresponding reduction in decision-making

blockage at the level of the Security Council.

The central result for understanding the relationship between the UN collective security

system and international criminal law is the finding that alternative mechanisms of the

General Assembly do not directly affect the jurisdictional architecture of the crime of

aggression within the system of the International Criminal Court. The jurisdictional

conditions and limits laid down in the Rome Statute and clarified by the Kampala

Amendments function as a normatively autonomous regime, independent of the

resolution activity of the political organs of the UN (Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court, 2021; Assembly of States Parties, 2010). Accordingly, even an intensive

political context of condemnation of aggression formed by the General Assembly does

not, in itself, remove the legal constraints that determine the possibility of exercising the

Court’s jurisdiction. This institutional autonomy is indirectly confirmed by the absence of

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469

any statistical linkage between the frequency of General Assembly condemnatory

resolutions and the initiation of proceedings related to the crime of aggression before the

ICC.

Doctrinal analysis confirms that the crime of aggression has a special institutional nature

that distinguishes it from other international crimes. Its criminal-law implementation is

built on a compromise model within which the role of UN organs, and above all the

Security Council, retains significance as a factor capable both of triggering and of blocking

the relevant procedures (Akande & Tzanakopoulos, 2018; Kress, 2018). The alternatives

of the General Assembly do not shift the centre of legally binding decision-making and,

accordingly, do not alter this institutional dependence. Quantitative evidence on veto

practice reinforces this conclusion by demonstrating the persistence of procedural

blockage irrespective of the expansion of Assembly-based political mechanisms.

An additional factor is constituted by the temporal and subject-matter limits of the Court’s

jurisdiction. The commentary to Article 11 of the Rome Statute emphasises that the

jurisdiction of the ICC has clearly defined temporal frameworks and conditions of

applicability that cannot be altered by resolution-based responses of the political organs

of the UN (Klamberg, 2016). Even the activation of the mechanisms of the General

Assembly does not transform the basic parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction.

Official materials of the International Criminal Court confirm this logic: the Court operates

exclusively within the limits of the statutory jurisdiction and procedures conferred upon

it and does not function as a universal instrument of political reaction to aggression

(International Criminal Court, n.d.). Accordingly, alternative mechanisms of the General

Assembly cannot be converted into a criminal-law result in the absence of an appropriate

jurisdictional basis within the statutory regime of the ICC itself (Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court, 2021). The generalisation of the presented results makes it

possible to present the alternative response mechanisms of the UN General Assembly in

the form of a systematised analytical matrix reflecting their normative purpose, legal

form, and structural limitations in the sphere of the prohibition of the use of force and

the formation of criminal-law consequences (see Table 2).

Table 3. Alternative mechanisms of the UN General Assembly and their normative limits (in the

plane of the prohibition of force and criminal-law consequences)

Assembly

mechanism

Normative purpose

Legal form of the

result

Key limitation for the subject of the

study

Resolution 377

(V) “Uniting for

Peace” (1950)

Compensation for

Security Council

paralysis due to lack of

unanimity

Recommendations on

collective measures

Absence of coercive force; impossibility of

replacing binding Security Council decisions;

absence of direct criminal-jurisdictional

effect (United Nations General Assembly,

1950; Charter of the United Nations, 1945)

Resolution

76/262 (2022)

Transparency and

political accountability

for the veto

Automatic debates in

the General Assembly

Procedural character without jurisdictional

effect; does not remove legal barriers to

responsibility for aggression (United Nations

General Assembly, 2022; Rome Statute of

the International Criminal Court, 2021)

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of Charter of the United Nations (1945), United

Nations General Assembly (1950, 2022), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

(2021), United Nations (n.d.)

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As a consequence, within the logic of the study a clear normative line is fixed: the

institutional paralysis of the Security Council through the veto is not compensated by

Assembly alternatives to the extent required for the formation of an effective criminal-

law mechanism of responsibility for armed aggression, and therefore the crisis of

collective security manifests itself not only as a political dysfunction, but as a reproducible

legal gap.

The criminal-law gap between the UN collective security system and the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

The results of the doctrinal-normative analysis attest to the existence of a persistent

criminal-law gap between the collective security system of the United Nations and the

mechanism for the implementation of international criminal responsibility for the crime

of aggression. This gap has a normatively entrenched character and derives from the

asymmetry between the imperative prohibition of the use of force enshrined in the UN

Charter and the conditional-jurisdictional model of the criminalisation of aggression

within the framework of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Charter of

the United Nations, 1945; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2021).

The UN Charter formulates the prohibition of the threat or use of force as a universal rule

of the international legal order that allows no derogations and constitutes the foundation

of the entire architecture of collective security. At the same time, the implementation of

this prohibition in the form of criminal-law responsibility is not provided for by the Charter

itself and is delegated to other institutional mechanisms, primarily the International

Criminal Court. However, the normative link between these two systems is fragmentary

and does not ensure an automatic transition from the establishment of a violation of the

prohibition of force to the criminal prosecution of responsible persons.

A specific feature of the crime of aggression, in contrast to other international crimes, is

its institutional dependence on the UN Security Council. The Kampala Amendments to

the Rome Statute, on the one hand, enshrined the substantive legal definition of

aggression, and on the other hand preserved the decisive role of the Security Council in

establishing the fact of an act of aggression or created conditions under which its inaction

effectively blocks the Court’s jurisdiction (Assembly of States Parties, 2010; Kress,

2018). As a result, the criminalisation of aggression is not accompanied by full

jurisdictional autonomy of the ICC.

This structural dependence is reflected in empirical institutional data. According to the

official records of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, from 1946 to 2024 the right of veto

was exercised more than 300 times, with a substantial proportion of vetoes relating to

situations involving armed conflicts, the use of force, or enforcement measures under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter (United Nations Security Council, n.d. b). At the same

time, since the activation of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime

of aggression in 2017, no indictments or convictions for this crime have been issued by

the Court. The juxtaposition of these datasets demonstrates a persistent quantitative

asymmetry between repeated instances of institutional blockage at the level of collective

security and the absence of criminal-law outcomes at the level of international justice.

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After the formal activation of the Court’s jurisdiction in 2017, this problem was not

eliminated. On the contrary, analysis of the resolutions of the Assembly of States Parties

confirms that a number of exceptions and limitations have been preserved that do not

allow the Court to act independently of the political will of states, in particular permanent

members of the Security Council (Assembly of States Parties, 2017; Akande &

Tzanakopoulos, 2018). This means that even in the presence of an obvious violation of

the prohibition of the use of force, international criminal responsibility may not arise for

reasons that are not legal in nature, but exclusively institutional-political.

Another example relates to the gap of criminal law regarding the Security Council’s power

to postpone or effectively block the activities of the Court. A doctrinal analysis of Article

16 of the Rome Statute demonstrates that binding resolutions of the Security Council

may still influence criminal proceedings even in circumstances where a substantive

decision has not been adopted due to the use of the veto (Brungger, 2023). Thus, the

empirical absence of prosecutions for aggression cannot be explained by the lack of

normative criminalisation, but rather by the cumulative effect of institutional filters

embedded in the collective security architecture.

The obtained results confirm that this gap is not unique to a particular conflict, but has

a systemic character. Comparative analysis of previous cases of international crises and

mass violations of international law shows that institutional incapacity or political

paralysis of international organs leads to the formation of a model of “responsibility by

default”, in which the absence of a decision effectively replaces legal assessment (Sørbø

& Ahmed, 2013). In quantitative terms, the repeated recurrence of veto-induced

paralysis contrasts sharply with the complete absence of criminal-law enforcement

outcomes for aggression, reinforcing the structural nature of this gap.

In sum, the results of the study allow it to be stated that the UN collective security system

and the mechanism of international criminal justice function in different normative

planes. The prohibition of the use of force remains declaratively strong but criminal-law

weak, since its implementation is mediated by institutional barriers that are not removed

either by the development of doctrine or by partial procedural reforms. It is precisely this

criminal-law gap that constitutes one of the key structural reasons for the impunity of

the crime of aggression in the contemporary international legal order.

Discussion

The obtained results allow the crisis of the UN collective security system to be interpreted

not as a set of isolated political failures, but as a structurally entrenched normative-

institutional problem that directly affects the implementation of the prohibition of the use

of force and the criminal-law protection of peace. As the doctrinal-normative analysis has

shown, the imperative nature of the prohibition of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the

UN Charter does not automatically transform into an effective response mechanism in

cases where a permanent member of the Security Council is a party to the conflict or is

directly interested in blocking decisions.

Similar limitations are also observed in the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism. As Melling

and Dennett (2018) show on the example of the Syrian conflict, the activation of the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

472

General Assembly is capable of partially compensating for the political paralysis of the

Security Council, but only at the level of recommendations and coordination. The analysis

conducted within this study confirms this conclusion and at the same time refines it: even

under conditions of maximum mobilisation of the General Assembly, such mechanisms

do not generate any criminal-jurisdictional consequences for persons responsible for

armed aggression. It is precisely here, as has been revealed, that the key gap arises.

The doctrinal concept of responsibility not to veto also requires critical rethinking in light

of the obtained results. Reinold (2014) substantiates it as a secondary rule aimed at

strengthening the rule of law in the activities of the Security Council. At the same time,

the results of this study demonstrate that such a norm functions predominantly in the

plane of political ethics rather than positive law. It does not create a legal obligation and

is not accompanied by a sanctioning mechanism, which, in essence, reduces its

effectiveness to voluntary self-restraint of permanent members.

The criminal-law dimension of this problem is particularly clearly manifested in

comparison with the works of Ruys (2017, 2018), who considers the International

Criminal Court as a potential centre of a future regime of responsibility for aggression.

The obtained results confirm this thesis only partially. Although the ICC indeed plays a

symbolically important role in the criminalisation of aggression, its jurisdiction remains

procedurally vulnerable and indirectly dependent on political dynamics within the Security

Council. As a consequence, even obvious violations of the prohibition of the use of force

may remain outside judicial consideration.

Finally, the assessment by Serdiuk (2024), who considers Resolution 76/262 as an

instrument for strengthening the collective response to abuses of the veto right, is

generally confirmed by the obtained results, but with an important caveat. Procedural

expansion of debates does not transform into jurisdictional strengthening of

responsibility. In other words, an increase in institutional “visibility” does not mean the

emergence of legal consequences in the criminal-law sphere.

In sum, the comparison of the study’s own results with contemporary doctrine

demonstrates broad scholarly agreement regarding the limited effectiveness of both

political and quasi-legal mechanisms of veto restraint. At the same time, this study

refines the discussion by showing that the key problem lies not only in a deficit of political

will or reforms, but in a systemic criminal-law gap between the mechanisms of UN

collective security and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is precisely

this gap that determines the deep nature of the crisis under consideration.

Conclusions

The obtained results made it possible to achieve the stated objective and to confirm the

initial assumption that the crisis of the UN collective security system has, first of all, a

normative-institutional rather than a situational-political character. In the course of the

study, it was established that the imperative prohibition of the use of force coexists with

a procedural decision-making model that structurally allows for its neutralisation, which

creates a persistent legal vacuum in the sphere of the protection of peace. This conclusion

is reinforced by quantitative institutional data demonstrating the recurrent and non-

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3

Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional

Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges

March 2026, pp. 452-476

Crisis of the UN Collective Security System as a Criminal Law Component of Encroachments

on the Protection of Peace and International Security Leading to Armed Aggression

Igor Paryzkyi, Oleksiy Humin, Iryna Khomyshyn, Myroslava Sirant, Yaryna Oliinyk

473

episodic nature of veto-induced decision-making paralysis within the Security

Council. Contrary to the expected compensatory effect of the alternative mechanisms of

the General Assembly, the results demonstrated their limited capacity to influence the

criminal-law consequences of aggression.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in the systematic combination of the analysis of

the prohibition of force with the jurisdictional limits of the International Criminal Court,

which made it possible to identify a deep criminal-law gap between two key elements of

the post-war legal order. The incorporation of long-term statistical patterns of veto use

further substantiates the structural character of this gap, showing that institutional

incapacity persists across different historical periods and conflict contexts. The practical

significance of the results consists in the possibility of using the formulated conclusions

to assess the realism of institutional reforms of the UN and to develop alternative models

of responsibility for armed aggression.

At the same time, the study is limited by its normative-doctrinal focus and does not fully

cover an empirical analysis of all conflicts in which the veto right was applied. The

statistical data employed serve an illustrative and contextual function and do not aim at

establishing causal correlations. Further research should be directed towards the search

for extra-institutional or hybrid mechanisms of accountability for aggression, as well as

towards a rethinking of the role of universal jurisdiction in the context of the protection

of peace and international security.

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