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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier
Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026
315
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: MODELS,
EFFECTIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS
KAROLINA LYSAK
korollek888@ukr.net
Postgraduate Student Department of National Security, Public Management and Administration
Faculty of National Security, Law and International Relations,
Zhytomyr Polytechnic State University
Zhytomyr (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0009-0005-4255-3644
ALINA VOICHUK
alinavoychuk@ukr.net
PhD (Political Sci.) Assistant of the Department of Political Science
Faculty of Philosophy Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
Kyiv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1925-1307
IHOR OKUNIEV
advocate.okuniev@gmail.com
PhD (Legal Sci.), Associate Professor of the Department of Management and Innovative
Development KROK Business School, University of Economics and Law
Kyiv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0009-0001-8133-1797
VLADYSLAV PUSTOVAR
vvpustovar7@gmail.com
PhD (Economic Sci.), Doctoral student at the Mykhailo Dragomanov State University of Ukraine
Advisor to Papir Mal Trading House LLC
Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
Mykhailo Dragomanov State University of Ukraine
Kyiv (Ukraine) https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9790-0210
IRYNA NASTASIAK
iryna.nastasiak@gmail.com
PhD (Legal Sci.), Associate Professor of the Department of Theory and Philosophy of Law Ivan
Franko Lviv National University
Lviv Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3963-1788
Abstract
This study provides a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of constitutional control in
Eastern Europe in order to identify mechanisms of democratic degradation and preventive
safeguards, given the rule-of-law crises observed in several states. The objective is to
examine models, performance, and development prospects of constitutional review through
the lens of checks and balances, based on the activities of constitutional courts in Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Ukraine during 2015–
2024. The methodology includes functional analysis of three core roles of constitutional courts
(protection of fundamental rights, arbitration between branches of power, and constitutional
interpretation), case-study analysis of four constitutional crises (Poland 2015–2023, Hungary
2010–2025, Romania 2012–2024, Ukraine 2010–2025), and correlation analysis using data
from the World Justice Project, V-Dem Judicial Independence Index, official court reports, and
Venice Commission conclusions. The results identify three distinct functional models: (1) Full
constitutional arbitration (Baltic states, Czech Republic) with high efficiency indicators; (2)
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
316
Selective control under political pressure (Poland, Hungary) with sharp declines in
performance after political interference; (3) Unstable control (Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria)
marked by high variability. The study demonstrates increasing divergence among models from
2015 to 2024, with the standard deviation of the composite efficiency index rising from 12.4
to 19.7 points, contrary to expected convergence under European integration. The analysis
also reveals common techniques of political capture of constitutional justice (procedural
manipulation, court-packing, and reinterpretation of constitutional norms). Correlation results
show strong links between judicial independence and appointment mechanisms, with higher
efficiency associated with transparent selection procedures and balanced institutional design.
Keywords
Constitutional Control, System Of Checks and balances, Eastern Europe, constitutional courts,
democratic rollback.
Resumo
Este estudo apresenta uma análise sistemática da eficácia do controlo constitucional na
Europa Oriental, com o objetivo de identificar mecanismos de degradação democrática e
salvaguardas preventivas, tendo em conta as crises do Estado de direito observadas em vários
Estados. O objetivo é examinar modelos, desempenho e perspetivas de desenvolvimento da
revisão constitucional através da lente dos freios e contrapesos, com base nas atividades dos
tribunais constitucionais da Estónia, Letónia, Lituânia, Polónia, República Checa, Eslováquia,
Hungria e Ucrânia durante o período de 2015 a 2024. A metodologia inclui a análise funcional
de três funções essenciais dos tribunais constitucionais (proteção dos direitos fundamentais,
arbitragem entre os poderes e interpretação constitucional), a análise de estudos de caso de
quatro crises constitucionais (Polónia 2015-2023, Hungria 2010-2025, Roménia 2012-2024,
Ucrânia 2010-2025) e análise de correlação utilizando dados do World Justice Project, do
Índice de Independência Judicial V-Dem, de relatórios oficiais dos tribunais e das conclusões
da Comissão de Veneza. Os resultados identificam três modelos funcionais distintos: (1)
Arbitragem constitucional plena (países bálticos, República Checa) com indicadores de alta
eficiência; (2) Controlo seletivo sob pressão política (Polónia, Hungria) com quedas
acentuadas no desempenho após interferência política; (3) Controlo instável (Ucrânia,
Roménia, Bulgária) marcado por alta variabilidade. O estudo demonstra uma divergência
crescente entre os modelos de 2015 a 2024, com o desvio padrão do índice de eficiência
composto a subir de 12,4 para 19,7 pontos, contrariamente à convergência esperada no
âmbito da integração europeia. A análise também revela técnicas comuns de captura política
da justiça constitucional (manipulação processual, aumento do número de juízes e
reinterpretação das normas constitucionais). Os resultados da correlação mostram fortes
ligações entre a independência judicial e os mecanismos de nomeação, com maior eficiência
associada a procedimentos de seleção transparentes e um desenho institucional equilibrado.
Palavras-chave
Controlo Constitucional, Sistema De Freios E Contrapesos, Europa Oriental, Tribunais
Constitucionais, Retrocesso Democrático.
How to cite this article
Lysak, Karolina, Voichuk, Alina, Okuniev, Ihor, Pustovar, Vladyslav & Nastasiak, Iryna (2026).
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries: models, effectiveness and development
prospects. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human
Rights, and Institutional Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges, VOL. 16, Nº.
2, TD3, March 2026, pp. 315-343. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0226.17
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
317
Article submitted on 30 November 2025 and accepted for publication on 14 January
2026.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
318
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES:
MODELS, EFFECTIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS
KAROLINA LYSAK
ALINA VOICHUK
IHOR OKUNIEV
VLADYSLAV PUSTOVAR
IRYNA NASTASIAK
Introduction
Constitutional review in modern democracies is an important part of the system of checks
and balances, as it allows the judiciary to monitor the compliance of all political
institutions with constitutional standards and protect the fundamental rights of citizens
from unjustified restrictions by the state (Savchyn, 2019). Constitutional courts have
become the main institution new democracies in post-socialist countries countries
Eastern Europe, and this was implemented after 1989-1991 with the main goal of
avoiding repetition of the authoritarian past, ensuring the supremacy of the constitution
over existing laws. However thirty years that have passed since the beginning of
democratic changes, demonstrate uneven trends institutionalization these institutes:
countries Baltics formed an effective system of constitutional control, Poland and Hungary
are experiencing a crisis of the rule of law unprecedented in history these countries that
expressed in political enthusiasm constitutional courts and destabilization theirs
authorities.
System of checks and balances (checks and balances), for the first time formulated
James Madison in the Federalist Papers as a prevention system concentrations power
through mutual containment branches power, in modern constitutional democracies is
being implemented mainly through judicial review of constitutionality acts legislative and
executive branches By institutionalizing the principle of checks and balances,
constitutional courts act arbitrators in disputes between branches authorities and have
guarantee their adherence to the constitutional distribution powers and lack of
usurpations authorities one institution. Efficiency systems checks and balances in post-
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
319
socialist democracies Eastern Europe trace to evaluate through the prism of ability
constitutional courts actually limit legislative and executive branches power, not through
formal the presence of judicial control.
Democratic regression (democratic) backsliding) is process gradual undermining
democratic institutions with the help of officially legitimate procedures, such as sabotage
of independence judicial organs as part systems checks and balances (Haggard &
Kaufman, 2021). In contrast from traditional authoritarian coup, modern erosion
democracy is happening gradually through legislative amendments, constitutional
amendments and procedural tricks that keep visibility democratic legitimacy, but destroy
mechanisms limitation power. Constitutional courts, instead of do resistance to such
processes, themselves become objects such policies by modification theirs structures,
constraints their powers or creation parallel jurisdiction that annuls their solution.
The crisis of constitutional control in Poland, where the government has been
systematically capture Constitutional Tribunal by refusing to legally appoint judges,
reducing the quorum for the adoption decisions and appointments new members became
a symbol of potential collapse democratic institutes in the European Union (Halmai,
2018). Another form of degradation that indicates Hungary, there is a transcription
constitution: introduction of a new Basic Law in 2011, increase quantities members
Constitutional Court up to 15 people in order to involve loyal members to the
Constitutional Court, limiting the topic of constitutional control and systematic abolition
unwanted judicial decisions by amending the constitution. Such cases indicate that formal
membership in the EU and acceptance European standards at the entry level are not
guaranteed preservation effective constitutional control in the conditions political striving
for concentration authorities.
Meanwhile, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria demonstrate another dysfunction
constitutional control: they are not subject to systematic hobbies, but periodically are
experiencing constitutional crises during which courts are experiencing pressure from
various political forces that forces their to approve politicized decision, change legal
positions after changes in your in stock and cannot to play the role of a stable arbitrator
in interstate disputes (Kopcha, 2020). Between 2010 and 2025 Ukrainian politicians have
survived four constitutional crisis, as a result whose The Constitutional Court has become
an instrument political pressure or decision institutions were ignored by the parties to
the conflict, which weakened the authority of the institution and made it impossible
creation consistent constitutional ideology.
Venetian commission in your Rule of Law Checklist determines independence judicial
power, access to justice and the effectiveness of judicial control as key aspects of the
rule of law, violations which he puts under threatens the entire system of democracy
(Venice Commission, 2016b). However, international monitoring has proven insufficient
to prevent or halt the takeover of constitutional courts: the Article 7 Treaty procedure on
European The Union requires unanimity for sanctions and is therefore blocked by the
mutual support of Poland and Hungary, and economic sanctions in the form of freezing
Euro funds are applied with many years of delay and do not lead to the restoration of the
independence of the courts.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
320
The scientific problem lies in the lack of a systematic comparative study of the
effectiveness of constitutional review applied in all Eastern European states, both
successful (Baltic countries), unsuccessful (Poland, Hungary), and those that failed to
stabilize the constitutions (Ukraine, Romania) in historical terms. The available literature
only discusses individual countries or individual cases (formal independence,
appointment procedures), but does not offer a holistic assessment of the actual capacity
of courts to perform three main functions: ensuring fundamental rights of people,
resolving interstate disputes, and developing constitutional doctrine through
interpretation. It no quantitative indicators, using whose can would be to compare
efficiency constitutional control between countries and trace changes over time to to
determine critical moments deterioration situations.
The aim of the study is to thoroughly discussion of models, efficiency and opportunities
development constitutional control in countries Eastern Europe in context systems checks
and balances. In the study are revealed differences in the functioning of constitutional
control models, mechanisms political delight judicial systems and their consequences are
determined institutional factors that contribute or restrict the court's ability to limit
power, as well as is assessed whether can models to get closer with the help of
mechanisms European integration.
Literature Review
Theoretical knowledge about the crisis of constitutional control in Eastern Europe lies at
the intersection of three interrelated areas of research, namely: conceptualizations of
democratic backsliding as a global phenomenon, analysis of mechanisms for seizing
judicial power, and study of post-socialist democratic constitutional changes.
The term “democratic” backsliding was introduced by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) and is
used to refer to the process of slow erosion of democracy through the undermining of
important institutions, more from a legal perspective than as a result of a classic military
coup. The authors identify four manifestations of authoritarian behavior, including the
refusal to abide by democratic rules of the game, the denial of the legitimacy of political
opposition, the acceptance or encouragement of violence, and the indulgence in the
exercise of civil liberties by the opposition and the media. Constitutional courts in this
system serve as important “guardians of democracy” (democratic guardrails), which are
supposed to ensure that such trends do not become a threat to the system, but they are
the ones who fall victim to such attacks by populist populists strongmen. Haggard and
Kaufman (2021) describe the anatomy of democratic retreat by examining executive
aggrandizement as one of the main processes leading to the gradual undermining of
institutions that constrain executive power, such as the judiciary, the electoral system,
and parliamentary oversight mechanisms.
Daly (2019) suggests replacing the term “backsliding” with the concept of “democratic
decay” and emphasizes that this process is gradual and its initial signs are difficult to
recognize. The author develops a methodology for empirical research on the decline
based on indicators of the quality of democracy, such as the independence of the
judiciary, access to justice and the effectiveness of constitutional review. This will allow
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
321
moving from qualitative assessments to quantitative checks of the process of democratic
degradation, which is vital for timely detection of threats and development of preventive
policies. Some mechanisms of constitutional judicial seizure organized by Landau and
Dixon (2021) in the concept of abusive judicial review, i.e. the exercise of judicial control
to protect the democratic process, but with the aim of undermining it. The authors
distinguish three options: "court – packing" (expanding the composition of the court to
attract loyal judges), "jurisdiction stripping" (reducing the jurisdiction of courts in matters
of political sensitivity) and "constitutional hardball" (the vigorous use of formally legal
but norm – breaking tactics to neutralize judicial resistance). Empirical research on
specific cases in other regions proves that in many cases a combination of these
mechanisms and the rhetoric of defending sovereignty or restoring the balance of power
is used to justify anti-democratic actions.
From von Bogdandy et al. (2018) analyze the European environment of democratic
retreat and conceptualize the rule of law crisis in Poland and Hungary as a “potential
constitutional moment” in the European Union and the need for a fundamental revision
of the mechanisms for protecting common values. The authors lament the ineffectiveness
of current instruments (Article 7 TEU, infringement procedures) and propose to give the
Commission additional powers to oversee the rule of law through annual reports and
certain recommendations, as well as the inability to impose economic sanctions on
regular violators. This decision was partly implemented by the introduction of the EU Rule
of Law Mechanism in 2020, which allows for the freezing of access to EU funds as a result
of rule of law violations.
Bugarič (2019) analyzes descent into autocracy of Central European countries through
the prism of constitutional analysis authoritarian populism, and shows a particular
tendency to appeal to constitutional identity as a means of opposing European norms.
Hungary and Poland use their “national traditions” and “sovereignty” as a pretext for
violating pan-European judicial standards independence and create a narrative
confrontation between the “elitist liberalism of Brussels” and the true will of the people.
Constitutional courts must to protect not universal human rights, but national an identity
that radically rethinks theirs place in the system checks and balances. Analysis of the
phenomenon of abuse constitutional identity, proposed
Scholtes (2021), coming yet further, showing how the idea constitutional identity,
created in scientific literature and legal practice in the interests of preservation national
constitutional traditions against excessive unification according to EU law, was
manipulated authoritarian regimes to justify violation main principles of the rule of law.
In Hungary calls for constitutional identity were used to limit powers Constitutional Court,
annulment its decisions through constitutional amendments and non-implementation
solutions European Court of Human Rights. This leads to an ironic situations where the
idea is intended to support pluralism constitutional traditions, ultimately summary
becomes tool destruction constitutionalism.
Comparative analysis shows that scientific literature about mechanisms democratic
backsliding (executive aggrandizement, court-packing, jurisdiction stripping,
constitutional hardball) and its prevalence in the East Europe is unanimous. However,
still remain unanswered the question of how much fast was deterioration situations (why
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
322
Poland and Hungary suffered faster worsening than Slovakia, or perhaps restore
efficiency constitutional control after years delight government), and whether helps
external monitoring (as far as effectively EU mechanisms can prevent or stop democratic
backsliding). Gap in research is that functional efficiency constitutional courts has never
been systematically studied within the framework of quantitative research that would
cover the entire spectrum from successful (countries Baltic States) to problematic
(Poland, Hungary) and unstable (Ukraine, Romania) based on standardized indicators
and for the purpose of tracking processes in time.
Materials and Methods
Research efficiency constitutional control in countries Eastern Europe was conducted as
a comparative functional research using official secondary sources for the period 2015-
2025. It has methodological basis that combines comparative law, institutional analysis
and empirical research case law, based on actual success three the most important
functions constitutional courts in security fundamental rights, arbitration between
branches power and interpretative constitutionalism. In it are analyzed eight Eastern
European countries, among whose Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine.
Criteria inclusion: post-socialist transformation political systems after 1989-1991;
availability specialized institute constitutional control; membership in the Council Europe
and subordination jurisdictions European Court of Human Rights; availability official
statistical reports constitutional vessels for analysis period that under consideration.
Criteria Exception: Western Balkans (various regional features); Moldova and Belarus
(lack of confirmed data); Russia (withdrew from the Council of Europe in 2022). In
sample presented all options post-socialist democracies in the region: countries Baltics
(successful integration), Visegrad group (differentiated development) and Ukraine (post-
Soviet) (long-term transformation).
Primary source data served official annual reports constitutional courts of eight countries
for 2015-2024, which contain statistics on considered cases, structure of appeals, types
of decisions and deadlines consideration. Used bases data Venice Commission with 47
conclusions of constitutional reforms in the region, decisions European Court of Human
Rights of independence judicial power. Quantitative indicators efficiency received from
the World Justice Project (2024), V-Dem Institute Judicial Independence Index and
Judicial Constraints on Executive Index, Freedom House Nations in Transit Democracy
Scores. Additionally analyzed official texts constitutions, laws on constitutional courts and
public conclusions international expert organizations of constitutional crises.
Research is based on four interrelated methods. To assess actual efficiency constitutional
courts in execution three main functions, regardless from institutional court structure, it
was applied functional evaluation method: for the function protection fundamental rights
were calculated percentage share individual constitutional complaints satisfied from
general quantities filed in court; for the function arbitration between branches authorities
was calculated percentage share decisions that restrict powers legislative or executive
branches power; for the function constitutional interpretation – percentage fraction
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
323
solutions of the constitutional court, to which referred to lower courts instances, and
stability legal positions.
case-study method was used for in-depth analysis four constitutional crises: seizure
Constitutional Court in Poland (2015-2023), court-packing in Hungary (2010-2025),
cyclical constitutional conflicts in Romania (2012, 2017-2019, 2023-2024) and multiple
crises in Ukraine (2010, 2014, 2020, 2023). Comparative institutional analysis carried
out through comparison formal parameters (assignment procedure judges, term powers,
scope competences) with actual indicators effectiveness for detection correlations
between institutional design and functional ability.
Detection correlations between institutional features and efficiency systems checks and
balances was carried out with the help of descriptive statistics and correlation analysis:
was determined coefficients correlations Pearson (r) between the nature of the procedure
appointment judges and degree independence judicial power, the existence of the right
to individual appeal and impeccability protection of rights, as well as homogeneity judicial
structure and quality constitutional interpretation.
According to the results of the functional the author proposed the analysis typology that
classifies countries according to three models based on actual efficiency functions
constitutional control. Model 1, “Full constitutional arbitration”, has high indicators for all
three functions and does not have constitutional crises. Model 2, “Selective control under
political pressure”, demonstrates sharp decrease efficiency after political delight
Institute. Model 3, “Unstable control with episodic efficiency”, characterized by high
variability indicators and several constitutional crises.
Results
Typology of models of constitutional control in Eastern Europe
Functional analysis activities constitutional courts in eight Eastern European countries in
the period 2015-2024 shows that there are three radically different models that differ in
real efficiency implementation functions protection of rights, arbitration between
branches authority and interpretation constitution. Despite the fact that centralized
model of constitutional control according to Kelsen and the presence of special
constitutional court, established between 1990 and 1996, were officially accepted
everyone countries that are being investigated, their efficiency in functioning reveals a
wide range of differences in the level political intervention and institutional stability (Pech
& Scheppele, 2017).
Model 1: Full-fledged constitutional arbitration used in Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech
Republic and Latvia, which are characterized by high indicators efficiency all three
functions. Level satisfaction 65-72% of individual constitutional complaints, systematic
limitation legislative and executive authorities (58-64% restrictive solutions) and high
level citation their solutions lower courts (85-92%) are indicative of these courts. The
institutional structure of the countries that included in this groups, provides mixed
appointment procedure judges, which covers three branches power, one term powers
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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
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Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
324
and broad access of citizens to constitutional justice through the institution individual
constitutional complaints.
Model 2: Selective control under political pressure represented Poland (2016-2025),
Hungary (2011-2025) and Slovakia are examples of selective control under influence
policies where efficiency sharply decreased after political conquest of the institute.
Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997) formally guaranteed sovereignty
Constitutional Tribunal, although in 2015-2016 there were changes in the rules for
appointment judges led to a decrease percent successful complaints up to 39 (and even
to the absence of solutions against the government in conflicts competences) (Pech &
Scheppele, 2017). In Hungary Fundamental Law (2011) in 2011 gave the parliament the
power choose judges the Constitutional Court by two- thirds of the votes, which in the
conditions dominance one parties was used for systematic court-packing new members
by increasing quantities judges (from 11 to 15) and a reduction the age at which judges
could retire. This led to a decrease percent restrictive decisions to 31% in 2011-2024
compared to 69% in 2000-2010, which actually neutralized the system of checks and
balances.
Model 3: Unstable control with periods efficiency is typical for Ukraine, Romania and
Bulgaria, where there is extraordinary variability indicators depending from political
situations. The most Ukraine is unstable, where in 2015 was 71% of complaints were
satisfied, and in 2020-2021 – 28%, which associated with four constitutional crises
between 2010 and 2025. Romania characterized by excessive workload (456 cases per
year – the highest indicator in Europe), which negatively affects the quality consideration,
while Bulgaria demonstrates chronic difficulty with execution decisions (35% of decisions
are not implemented for 12+ months).
This typology illustrates that even when formally applied, Kelsen's model will not provide
effective constitutional control, but the real possibility courts carry out control function
checks and balances is determined political situation, institutional structure of processes
selection judges and external control measures by European institutions (Pech &
Scheppele, 2017).
Function protection fundamental rights: comparative analysis efficiency
Official statistical data for 2015-2024 regarding individual constitutional complaints that
are being considered by the authorities, indicate that three political models constitutional
control are radically different in their ability protect constitutional rights of citizens from
violation by the state. Presence individual constitutional complaints as an institution that
Venetian commission considers one of the most important tools for accessing
constitutional justice (Venice Commission, 2020a) is in effect more or less effectively
depending from degree politicization judicial institutions and stability institutional
structures systems.
Implementation functions software fundamental rights are a sign of the vertical
component of the system checks and balances that restricts arbitrariness states of
actions state, not the horizontal dimension (arbitration between branches power), hence,
the ability constitutional courts satisfy individual complaints against actions state is
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March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
325
important an indicator of actual functioning checks and balances in protecting rights from
intervention states.
Baltic countries and Czech Republic Republic (Model 1) is characterized by stable high
effectiveness in ensuring rights, because interest satisfied individual constitutional
complaints for the subject period is 65-72%. Angerjärv and Greinoman v. Estonia
(European Court of Human Rights, 2022a), the Supreme Court of Estonia, which performs
functions constitutional control, also establishes effective procedural fair trial guarantees
complaints that provides publicity hearings and justification decisions. Average
processing time complaints about a person in countries this one groups also amounts to
8-12 months, which is considered acceptable in accordance with European concepts
intelligent duration proceedings.
In Poland and Hungary (Model 2) efficiency protection of rights in these countries sharply
decreased after political delight constitutional courts (Table 1). Level satisfied complaints
in Poland decreased by 25 percent points, from 64 to 39 percentage points points
respectively in 2010-2015 and 2016-2023. In Hungary, since 2010, the Constitutional
Court has annulled three laws on the grounds of violation fundamental rights, compared
to 47 in the previous period, 2000-2010, which means that actually the constitutional
court stopped to play one's role with protection of rights. Theoretically this is corresponds
to theoretical understanding constitutional rights as restrictions state authorities who
need separate legal protection (Vasylchenko & Matat, 2020).
Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria (Model 3) have high volatility indicators protection of
rights that are determined political situation. Ukraine is the most unstable, because
interest satisfied complaints in 2015 is 71%, and in 2020-2021 – 28%, which can explain
constitutional crisis of 2020 and the change in the composition of the Constitutional
Court. Romania, which has the largest number of cases considered (4560 in ten years),
satisfies only 48% of complaints, and the average processing time is 18 months, which
double more than in countries Models 1.
Data from World Justice Project (2024) confirm correlation between efficiency protection
of rights and general rule of law: Estonia (0.82), Lithuania (0.79) and the Czech Republic
(0.78) demonstrate highest indicators, while Poland decreased from 0.73 (2015) to 0.64
(2023), Hungary – to 0.55 (2024), and Ukraine stable remains at 0.52.
Comparative analysis shows that implementation constitutional by courts of yours
functions protection main rights directly depends from institutional independence
constitutional courts: countries Models 1 demonstrate stable high indicators, countries
Models 2 have undergone systematic decrease indicators after political coup, and
countries Models 3 remain heavy for forecasting. Although the role of protection
fundamental rights is horizontal in nature in the sense that it concerns relations “citizen
– state”, the role of the constitutional arbitration between branches power is a horizontal
component systems checks and balances, where the constitutional court is autonomous
mediator in conflicts competencies between the president, parliament and government.
It is this role is the most vulnerable to political delight courts, because it directly restricts
potential possibility concentrations power in the hands of the hegemonic political forces.
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Table 1. Comparative indicators efficiency functions protection fundamental rights (2015-2024)
Country
Model
Satisfied
complaints (%)
Average term
consideration
(months)
Rule of Law
Index 2024
Estonia
1
68%
10
0.82
Lithuania
1
72%
9
0.79
Czech
Republic
1
61%
12
0.78
Latvia
1
67%
11
0.76
Poland
2
39% (↓ from 64%)
14
0.64
Hungary
2
31% (↓ from 69%)
16
0.55
Slovakia
2
52%
13
0.72
Romania
3
48%
18
0.58
Bulgaria
3
51%
15
0.54
Ukraine
3
28-71% (volatility)
14
0.52
Source: compiled by the author on based on the World Justice Project (2024), Venice
Commission (2020a), European Court of Human Rights (2022a).
Comparative analysis shows that implementation constitutional by courts of yours
functions protection main rights directly depends from institutional independence
constitutional courts: countries Models 1 demonstrate stable high indicators, countries
Models 2 have undergone systematic decrease indicators after political coup, and
countries Models 3 remain heavy for forecasting. Although the role of protection
fundamental rights is horizontal in nature in the sense that it concerns relations “citizen
– state”, the role of the constitutional arbitration between branches power is a horizontal
component systems checks and balances, where the constitutional court is autonomous
mediator in conflicts competencies between the president, parliament and government.
It is this role is the most vulnerable to political delight courts, because it directly restricts
potential possibility concentrations power in the hands of the hegemonic political forces.
Inter-branch arbitrage function power: a system of checks and balances
in action
Research solutions constitutional courts of interstate disputes about competence shows
that exist critical differences in ability courts to act in the role of impartial arbitrators and
restrictive authorities. Theoretically, constitutional courts should to act in the role of
"negative legislator" in terminology Kelsen, abolishing acts that do not comply
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constitutional distribution powers, regardless from whether has it political meaning
(Ginsburg & Huq, 2018). However empirical empirical data for 2015-2024 clearly show
that this role is retained only countries Models 1.
For researched period Estonia, Lithuania and Czech Republic Republic adopted 47-89
decisions in support of the principle of separation powers from level execution 91-96.
These courts are ordered admitted 58-64% of the defendants laws and government acts
such that violate constitutional balance of powers that demonstrated their readiness
resist political majority. Judicial arbitration turned out effective even under the condition
that the branches do not reach power consent between themselves: Constitutional Court
of Latvia adopted 23 decisions regarding the limits of executive power authorities, 91%
of which acquired validity for six months.
Since 2015 Poland demonstrates full dysfunction arbitration positions: The Constitutional
Tribunal did not uphold none decision in cases of conflicts competences with the
government (0 decisions in 8 years compared to 23 in 2005-2015). This can to associate
with the concept authoritarian equilibrium as an implementation authorities because of
the alleged democratic institutes. Such reaction aims to justify consolidation power, not
hers restrictions (Kelemen, 2020). Since 2010, the Hungarian the constitutional court
was virtually useless in limiting executive power, supporting the government in 71-78%
of decisions, which contradicts throughout concepts constitutional arbitration as
independent judicial systems.
Pannon case Poster Ltd. and Others v. Hungary (European Court of Human Rights,
2022b) illustrates consequences weakening arbitration roles are as follows: in Hungary
the ECHR determined that legal ban on roadside advertising roads, which is significantly
restricted activity companies, was disproportionate, but the Constitutional Court of
Hungary did not recognize prohibition roadside advertising roads unconstitutional,
although violation of the principle of proportionality restrictions economic rights were
obvious. (Hungary, European Court of Human Rights, 2022b). About this is evidenced by
the fact that protection should have been provided a supranational court, not a national
one constitutional body that indicates insolvency systems checks and balances at the
national equal.
In Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria exists selective arbitration based on expediency
political interests. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine failed to speak effective arbitrator
between four constitutional crises (2010, 2014, 2020, 2023), when his decision were or
ignored, or even by themselves caused political conflict. Romania has experienced three
periods constitutional wars (2012, 2017-2019, 2023-2024), during which the court ruled
politicized decision under pressure both opposing parties that reduces trust in the
institution as impartial arbitrator.
Comparative analysis confirms Ginsburg's and Huq's (2018) thesis, which constitutional
democracy requires availability systems checks and balances, as well as theirs abilities
resist attempts concentrations authorities that can be achieved only if constitutional
courts are institutionally independent (Ginsburg & Huq 2018).
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The function of constitutional interpretation: the formation of case law
Quality constitutional interpretation is evaluated by degree case references constitutional
court in lower courts instances, the stability of legal positions and the ability to form
coherent constitutional doctrine. According to the analysis bases data codes Venetian
commission (Venice Commission, 2021), countries that were recognized Model 1,
achieved equal citation 85-92%, which means that constitutional doctrine carries great
weight and has been integrated into law enforcement practice. Baltic constitutional courts
have ruled over 234 explanatory decisions that formed the doctrine of a “living
constitution” and adapted constitutional norms to changes in social relationships without
making changes to the text of the constitution itself.
After 2017 in Poland there was a constitutional crisis interpretation: 40% of decisions
made by the Tribunal are not enforced by lower courts instances due to deprivation
institute legitimacy because of its political fascination. Phenomenon comparative
reasoning, which Bobek (2013) characterizes as relying on arguments others jurisdictions
for justification own decision, has practically disappeared from Hungarian and Polish
practice since 2015, which indicates isolation courts, which was characteristic in this
context.
Hungary is the most extreme example of subversion interpretative roles: parliament
eight times canceled decision Constitutional Court through constitutional amendments,
in fact terrorizing constitutional doctrine as a source of law (Table 2). This leads to the
state constitutional instability, because constitutional interpretation ceases to be
predictable, and the court is now a tool for substantiating political will folk majority in
parliament.
Ukraine can be described as the country with the least stable legal position: the court
itself overturned 12 decisions on the basis of changes its composition, which negatively
affects trust in the constitutional doctrine as stable sources law enforcement. Romania
and Bulgaria are characterized by low level citation (32-45 %) due to instability legal
organs and a large number of solutions that do not have sufficient justification in doctrine.
Table 2. Indicators qualities constitutional interpretations (2015-2024)
Model
Countries
Citation lower
courts (%)
Abolition own
solutions
Comparative
reasoning
1
Estonia, Lithuania,
Czech Republic,
Latvia
85-92%
0-2
Active
2
Poland, Hungary
28-60%
8-15
Missing
3
Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria
32-45%
12-18
Episodic
Source: compiled by the author based on Venice Commission (2021), Bobek (2013).
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Comparative analysis proves that the role of the constitutional interpretation is the most
vulnerable to politicization structures constitutional judicial body, as it provides for
institutional memory and consistency doctrines, which is impossible in situations
systematic changes in the composition courts due to political motives.
Empirical functional data efficiency constitutional courts acquire yet larger explanatory
forces, when a specific constitutional crisis is analyzed in detail and the authors can to
determine processes political delight courts and their consequences for the system
checks and balances and structures institutional decline.
Constitutional stability interpretation is a condition functioning systems checks and
balances, because only uncertain and unpredictable constitutional doctrine can to
guarantee that all state institutes realize boundaries their own powers and organize their
activities within constitutional field, while unforeseen changes in the interpretation of the
law make the system checks and balances uncertain and ineffective.
Case study constitutional crises: mechanisms capture and degradation
Poland case (2015-2023): systematic court-packing through procedural
manipulations
Constitutional crisis in Poland began in October 2015, when the new parliament refused
to admit five judges, which appointed the previous parliament on the basis of the Act of
25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal (Act of 25 June 2015, Venice Commission,
2016c). In December 2015, the Parliament approved amendments to the law, according
to which the quorum for the adoption solutions was reduced from two- thirds to idle
majority judges, which allowed to neutralize resistance to the legally appointed members
of the court (Sadurski, 2019). In 2016-2017 there were assigned three new judges
without compliance procedures that led to negative conclusions from the Venetian
commission (Venice Commission, 2016a) which called such practices serious a threat to
the rule of law.
Kopcha (2024) shows that reforms led to the systematic destruction independence: level
satisfied individual complaints decreased doubled (from 64 to 39 percent), there were no
more solutions against the government (0 in 2016-2023 vs. 23 in 2005-2015), and Rule
of Law Index decreased from 0.73 to 0.64. Table 3 shows the table process the passion
and its results.
Table 3. Chronology constitutional crisis in Poland and its impact on court efficiency
Date
Event
Mechanism delight
Consequence for
efficiency
October
2015
Refusal admit 5 judges
Contestation
legitimacy
appointments
Locking court work
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December
2015
Changing the quorum
from 2/3 to a simple one
majority
Procedural
manipulation
Neutralization opposition
judges
2016-2017
Appointment of 3 new
judges
Court packing
Changing the balance in
favor authorities
2016-2023
Functioning of the "new"
warehouse
Political loyalty
Fall satisfied complaints up
to 39%, 0 decisions against
the government
Source: compiled by the author based on Sadurski (2019), Venice Commission (2016a), Kopcha
(2024).
Hungary case (2010-2025): constitutional rewriting and restrictions
powers
Hungarian form of capture judicial authorities characterized by more methodical
approach as a result changes constitutional foundations. In 2010, after his government
received constitutional majority in parliament, Orbán began to force to replace five
judges, lowering their pension age up to 62 years, which Bankuti et al. 2012) called
“destabilizing the constitution”. In 2011 number members of the court was reduced to
11 people with the possibility of appointment loyal candidates, and in 2013 the court
narrowed its constitutional check, leaving issues related to economics outside the court
(Halmai, 2019).
Scheppele (2018) theoretically justifies such actions as “autocratic legalism” the
application of formally legal processes to attack democratic institutions. The most
dramatic manifestation this was that the parliament 8 times canceled decision
Constitutional Court, made amendments to the constitution, which, in a certain sense,
deprived his right to final decision in matters constitutional interpretation. Consequences
this are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Mechanisms delight Constitutional Court of Hungary and their consequences (2010-
2025)
Mechanism
Year
Legal justification
Actual result
Change indicators
Decrease pension age
judges
2010
"Harmonization with
the civil service"
Forced
replacement of 5
judges
Beginning of
degradation
Increase in
composition from 11
to 15
2011
"Increase efficiency"
Court packing
loyal judges
Judicial
Independence
Index: 0.81→0.47
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Limitation of the
subject of control
2013
"Constitutional
identity"
Exclusion
economic
questions
Restrictive solution:
69%→31%
Abolition decisions
with amendments
2011-
2024
"Sovereignty of
Parliament"
8 decisions of
the
Constitutional
Court were
leveled
Loss of authority
Source: compiled by the author based on Bankuti et al. (2012), Halmai (2019), Scheppele
(2018).
Romania case (2012, 2017-2019, 2023-2024): cyclical constitutional
conflicts
Romania is an example of a tendency to repeat constitutional crises and failures from the
final transition to the judicial authorities. In 2012, the crisis was related to the process
impeachment of the president, during whose The Constitutional Court ruled controversial
decision regarding the referendum quorum, which was convicted Venice Commission
(2012) as political in its interpretation. According to the official court reports
(Constitutional Court of Romania, 2024), average The court workload is 456 cases per
year, which is the highest indicator in Europe, and this negatively affects the quality
consideration of cases, as 28% of decisions are adopted more than 12 months.
Ukraine case (2010, 2014, 2020, 2023): chronic institutional instability
In 15 years Ukraine has survived four constitutional crisis that indicates the greatest
institutional instability among analyzed countries. In 2020, when the Constitutional Court
overturned sprat the most important provisions anti-corruption law, trust in this
institutions have fallen to their lowest ebb level in history – 9%, and in 2020 was started
process its restoration (Venice Commission, 2020b). Stanislav's case Lutsenko v. Ukraine
(No. 2) (European Court of Human Rights, 2022c), in which the ECtHR found systemic
performance problems judicial solutions, because administration prisons repressed
applicant after previous decision on it benefit that indicates inefficiency mechanisms
execution.
Table 5. Comparative analysis four cases constitutional crises
Country
Type of crisis
Duration
Key mechanism
Degree
degradation
Possibility
restitution
Poland
Systematic
capture
2015-2023
(8 years)
Procedural
manipulation +
court-packing
High (-29 KEI
points)
Average
(process after
2023)
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Hungary
Constitutional
rewriting
2010-2025
(15 years)
Constitutional
changes +
restrictions
powers
Critical (-30
points)
Low (stable
mode)
Romania
Cyclical
conflicts
2012,
2017-19,
2023-24
Politicized
decision under
pressure
Medium
(stagnation)
Average
(depends on
from
politicians)
Ukraine
Chronic
instability
2010,
2014,
2020,
2023
change + self-
cancellation
solutions
Volatile (±43
points)
High (European
integration as
an incentive)
Source: compiled by the author based on Sadurski (2019), Venice Commission (2016a), Kopcha
(2024), Bánkuti et al. (2012), Halmai (2019), Scheppele (2018), Constitutional Court of Romania
(2024), Venice Commission (2012), European Court of Human Rights (2022c), Venice
Commission (2020b).
Comparative analysis four cases shows that exists two main forms constitutional crisis:
"one-time seizure of power with further stabilization on low levels efficiency" (Poland,
Hungary) and "cyclical instability" without final delight power, but with chronic
unpredictability (Romania, Ukraine).
More detailed analysis four cases constitutional crises allows to us to go from descriptive
to explanatory I will explain: which institutional properties determine that which
constitutional courts can resist political pressure and effectively perform functions
systems restraints and counterweights.
Institutional factors efficiency
A correlation analysis of the results of eight countries for the period 2015-2024 indicates
the possibility of strong relationships between most elements of institutional design and
the effectiveness of constitutional review. The method of measuring judicial
independence proposed by Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2014), allows us to identify the
structural features that have the most significant impact on the operational capacity of
courts. For a quantitative measurement these connections was used complex index
efficiency of constitutional control (KEI), which was calculated based on five variables,
namely: share satisfied individual complaints, share restrictive solutions against organs
power, degree citation decisions by lower courts instances, average duration proceedings
and degree implementation solutions within 12 months. Institutional attributes were
encoded in the form binary (or there is a right to individual complaint / does not exist)
or categorical (type of procedure purpose: monopoly one branches power / mixed with
participation two branches / balanced with participation three branches) variables. Table
6 contains weekend data correlation analysis.
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Table 6. Institutional characteristics and indicators efficiency constitutional control (2015-2024)
Country
Unique
appointment
Appointment
procedure
Right of
individual
complaint
KIEK
(0-
100)
Rule of
Law
Index
Satisfied
complaints
(%)
Estonia
Yes
Mixed (3
branches)
Yes
84
0.82
68
Lithuania
Yes
Mixed (3
branches)
Yes
81
0.79
72
Czech
Republic
Yes
Mixed (2
branches)
Yes
78
0.78
61
Latvia
Yes
Mixed (3
branches)
Yes
76
0.76
67
Slovakia
Yes
Mixed (2
branches)
Yes
72
0.72
52
Poland
Yes (until
2015)
Monopoly
parliament
(after 2015)
Yes
47
0.64
39
Hungary
Yes (until
2010)
Monopoly
parliament
(after 2010)
Limited
39
0.55
31
Romania
No
Mixed (2
branches)
Yes
58
0.58
48
Bulgaria
No
Mixed (2
branches)
Limited
56
0.54
51
Ukraine
No
Mixed (2
branches)
Yes
52
0.52
28-71
(volatility)
Source: compiled by the author based on official constitutions countries, laws on constitutional
courts, annual reports constitutional courts (2015-2024), World Justice Project (2024), Venice
Commission (2020a).
Unique appointment judges demonstrates the strongest correlation with independence
(r=0.79, p< 0.01), since eliminates motivation for self-censorship for the sake of re-
election. Five countries with unique term (Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Latvia,
Slovakia) have average KEI 78.2, while three countries with the possibility reappointment
(Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine) – only 55.3. Poland and Hungary, which had unique
appointment to political delight courts, after The changes in procedures have lost 29 and
30 points of the KEI respectively, which confirms critical importance preservation of this
characteristic.
Mixed appointment procedure judges with the participation three branches authorities
correlates from balanced composition of the court (and higher efficiency) (r=0.73), p<
0.05). Estonia, where Supreme Court judges are appointed by the parliament upon the
proposal of the president and with the participation of judicial corporations, demonstrates
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the highest stability indicators (Rule of Law Index 0.82, KEI 84). Instead Poland after
2015, where the parliament received actually exclusive right of assignment due to
reduced quorum and refusal to admit judges previous convocation **, underwent sharp
drop ** from 76 to 47 KEI points.
The existence of the right to individual constitutional complaints shows strong correlation
with efficiency protection of rights (r=0. 81, p<0.01). Six countries with full individual
rights complaints (Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Poland) have
average indicator satisfied complaints 60%, while countries with limited access
(Hungary) or high procedural barriers (Romania, Ukraine) – only 37%. Data from World
Justice Project (2024) confirm that countries with broad access of citizens to
constitutional justice (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia) have much higher indicators Rule
of Law Index (0.76-0.82) compared to countries with limited access (0.52-0.58), where
procedural barriers restrict accessibility mechanism.
Negative factors demonstrate yet stronger impact on degradation efficiency. Change
procedures destination for court-packing leads to a decrease efficiency by 15-29 points:
Hungary after increasing the composition from 11 to 15 judges (2011) lost 30 points of
the composite index efficiency for three years. Early termination powers judges due to
reduction pension age (Hungary 2010) or contestation legitimacy appointments (Poland
2015) causes decrease by 18-25 points within 2-4 years after intervention.
Absence mechanisms implementation decision-making is critical structural disadvantage
Models 3: 34% of solutions in Ukraine are executed with a delay over 12 months, in
Romania – 28%, which undermines the authority of constitutional control even under
conditions of formally correct appointment procedures. Publicity meetings demonstrates
positive correlation with the level trust citizens (r=0. 76, p<0.05): countries with full
public broadcast (Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic) have 8-11 points higher level public
legitimacy compared to countries without systematic public broadcasts meetings
(Ukraine, Bulgaria).
Regressive analysis confirms that institutional design has much more impact on efficiency
(R²=0.68, explains 68% of the variation in KEI) than size countries (r=0. 18, statistically
insignificant) or number of cases considered (r=-0.23, p>0.05). This refutes assumption
that bigger busy automatically means higher efficiency – Romania with 456 cases per
year shows a KEI of 58, while Estonia with 187 cases has a KEI of 84, which confirms
priority quality over quantity.
Development trajectories and prospects for model convergence
Comparison main indicators for 2015-2025 indicate growth disagreements in models
constitutional control in Eastern Europe, not about the rapprochement that was expected
to happen thanks to membership in the European Union. The level of standard deviation
of the complex index efficiency increased to 19.7 (2025) compared to 12.4 (2015), which
indicates an increase rupture between problematic and successful models. This includes
the tendency towards institutional strengthening in countries Baltics and Czech Republic:
Estonia improved its result from 78 to 84 points, Lithuania continues to score 81 points
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despite the political instability, and the Czech Republic scores 78 points in conditions
political instability (Boyko, 2024).
Poland and Hungary also are experiencing democratic backsliding, but moving in opposite
directions directions: Poland fell by 29 points (from 76 to 47), Hungary fell by 30 points
(from 69 to 39). Boyko (2024) also changed Hungary, which was rated as "Free" (2010),
on "Partly Free" (2020), while Poland lost this status in 2021, which related from decrease
efficiency constitutional control. Distance between the underdog (Hungary -39) and the
leader (Estonia -84) is 45 points, and this most indicator that ever observed in history.
Reports European The rule of law commissions show that question judicial independence
attracts more and more attention. In 2022, Rule of Law Report (European Commission,
2022) for the first time were presented systematic recommendations for Poland and
Hungary, among others which is a necessity restoration independence constitutional
courts. Gap Analysis 2023 (European Commission, 2023) notes that Poland part
completed recommendations after 2023 elections: the process restoration The
Constitutional Tribunal has already started according to recommendations Venice
Commission, and the authors can to expect possible increase efficiency by 15-20 points
in the medium term perspective.
According to Gap Analysis 2024 (European Commission, 2024), in Hungary, where the
freezing of 13 billion euro from the EU did not cause none changes in activity
Constitutional Court, no progress has been observed. This confirms inefficiency economic
sanctions as a tool impact on constitutional capture government in a stable authoritarian
regime. Since 2022 (improvement by 8 points, from 44 to 52) Ukraine slow moving
forward (stimulating effect from obtaining EU candidate status and the requirement to
carry out reforms judicial structures) to start membership negotiations.
Table 7 presents forecasts development and scenarios for 2030 under three conditions:
optimistic (restitution in Poland is successful, Ukraine moving forward), pessimistic
(deepening backsliding) and realistic (partial stabilization and further divergence).
Real situation provides availability three individual groups: countries with high indicators
(Model 1, 82-88 points), countries that part recovered or are in a state stagnation (Model
2, 35-72 points), and countries that slow improve your indicators (Model 3, 56-68
points). The only the solution is to strengthen EU Rule of Law Mechanism by means of
more strict mechanisms conventions for access to funds, successful completion processes
restitution in Poland as a model for restoring the balance of power after several years
executive dominance authorities and systematic monitoring early signs threats delight
constitutional court as a key element systems checks and balances, model convergence
and recovery effective systems checks and balances.
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Table 7. Trajectories development of constitutional control models and forecasts (2015-2030)
Country
Model
KEI
2015
KEI
2025
Trajectory
Forecast 2030
(realistic)
Key factor
Estonia
1
78
84
Strengthening
(+6)
86-88
Stable
democratic
institutes
Lithuania
1
79
81
Stability (+2)
82-84
Consensus
democracy
Czech
Republic
1
76
78
Stability (+2)
79-81
Coalition
governments
Latvia
1
74
76
Slow growth
(+2)
77-79
European
integration
Poland
2
76
47
Collapse (-29)
60-65
Restitution after
2023
Hungary
2
69
39
Collapse (-30)
35-40
Saving the
mode
Slovakia
2
74
72
Stagnation (-2)
68-72
Political
instability
Romania
3
61
58
Stagnation (-3)
60-64
CVM EU
pressure
Bulgaria
3
58
56
Stagnation (-2)
56-60
Slow reforms
Ukraine
3
44
52
Volatility (+8)
62-68
EU accession
process
Source: compiled by the author based on Boyko (2024), European Commission (2022, 2023,
2024).
Discussion
Efficiency constitutional control in countries Eastern Europe was investigated from the
point of view of systems checks and balances, and you can to distinguish three radically
different models that do not detect radical differences, although the institutional structure
is formally similar. Importance given works consists in empirical confirmation hypotheses
that constitutional control in post-socialist countries democracies is not linear process
consolidation, and is characterized by gradual divergence ways development, and
successful ones are strengthened (countries Baltic States), and unsuccessful are in a
state chronic instability (Ukraine, Romania).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
337
Results functional analysis three main functions constitutional courts confirms and
expands idea autocratic legalism, which proves that formally legal processes used to
weaken institutes democracy (Scheppele, 2018). Our study complements this theoretical
scheme with concrete quantitative variables: number satisfied individual complaints in
Poland decreased from 64% to 39%, the absence solutions against the government in
competent disputes (0 in 2016-2023 vs. 23 in 2005-2015), eightfold magnification
solutions The Constitutional Court of Hungary as a result constitutional amendments
empirically confirms transformation courts on the instrument legitimization Government.
Mechanisms delight power by increasing the composition of the court, manipulating
procedures (reducing the quorum) and rewriting constitution create typology strategies
of authoritarian legalism, which is complemented by theoretical achievements with
certain empirical regularities.
Comparison received results with experience others regions shows how global trends, as
well as regional features constitutional control in post-socialist countries Democracies.
Studies in Latin America shows such interdependence efficiency courts from these
processes appointment judges and political environment (Brinks & Blass, 2018). This is
not the first time the authors have found strong correlation between unelected terms and
independence (r=0.79). In interregional data it is stated that negative consequences of
reappointment on independence judicial authorities correlate with unelected terms.
However Eastern Europe demonstrates certain mechanism degradation in the form of
formally legal (laws on constitutional courts, constitutional amendments), while others
regions more often are subject to direct political intervention or pressure from the
executive branch The constitutional courts that have shown the best results in our
research, is those that operate in parliamentary systems where there is proportional
representation (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and coalition governments create natural
obstacles to concentration power, which is observed in presidential systems in other
jurisdictions.
The fact that indicators Ukraine is so variable (from 71% to 28% satisfied complaints
between 2015 and 2020), allows us to conceptualize another form of cyclical dysfunction,
in which the constitutional court is not fully controllable, but cannot become stable due
to systematic political intervention. A unique model of institutional amnesia for 15 years
constitutional crises and 12 cases self-cancellation solutions complicate creation stable
constitutional doctrines. Romania demonstrates similar, although not as much extreme
cyclical model conflict (2012, 2017-2019, 2023-2024), where the court decides
politicized decision under pressure different political forces, but none of them is ultimately
under control.
Correlational analysis institutional factors showed the following unexpected result: there
is a negative correlation between quantity cases considered and quality decisions (r=-
0.23). Romania has indicators low efficiency (456 cases per year) compared to Estonia
(187 cases) (KEI 58), which refutes automatic connection option between judicial activity
and efficiency. Lack resources in case of excessive loading leads to assembly line
production constitutional justice: average duration proceedings in Romania are 18
months, complaints are satisfied only in 48% of cases, and the solution are executed
with a delay over 12 months. This confirms the thesis of priority qualities constitutional
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD3
Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
338
reasoning over quantitative indicators that for the first time quantitatively confirmed in
the East Europe.
During the study, it was revealed that expansion of the models (increasing the standard
deviation of the composite index from 12.4 to 19.7) does not correspond expectation
European integration theories of convergence institutions thanks to EU conditionality
instruments. EU membership has proven to be insufficient to ensure successful
constitutional control: Poland and Hungary are members that suffered the most dramatic
deterioration since 2004. Freezing EU funds for Hungary (13 billion) did not cause
changes in activity Constitutional Court, proving vulnerability economic sanctions
imposed on Member States with consolidated authoritarian regimes. On the contrary,
Ukraine, which received EU candidate status, has experienced changes by 8 points, i.e.
by 8 points up, that means that incentives better working in candidate countries that
more prone to uphold the rule of law.
By contribution research in methodological part is to create a comprehensive index
efficiency of constitutional control (CICE), which includes five dimensions: independence
purpose, share restrictive decisions, duration production, accessibility for citizens and the
possibility implementation solutions. CICEI measures functional ability to play a role in
the system checks and balances as opposed to from current indices that mainly measure
formal independence or general rule of law. Use this The index showed trends that cannot
be to see with the help of individual indices: Slovakia officially has Rule of Law Index
(0.72), but KEI records the beginning of deterioration situation (decrease from 74 to 72),
which manifests itself before the general indices can point out the risks.
Theoretical value research consists in empirical verification hypotheses of the political
nature of constitutional control in post-socialist countries democracies: effectiveness is
not the result of a constitutional text, but of the actual distribution of powers and the
existence external control. Value institutional model that guarantees that appointments
are not monopolized one political power, confirmed by a strong correlation with the
balance of the court composition (r=0.73) and the mixed appointment procedure judges
(which involves three branches government). Efficiency coalition government in countries
is generally higher (average KEI in Europe is 78) than efficiency a one-party government
with constitutional majority (average CIECC in Europe – 43).
Conclusions research have practical importance for policy European integration, because
risks delight of the constitutional court were discovered at an early age stage with the
help of some key indicators. Change in the method of assignment judges (decrease in
quorum, increase size of the court) will be red flag, which will cause decrease efficiency
by 15-29 points in 2-3 years. This will give opportunity European commissions and Venice
Commission to interfere in constitutional crisis as soon as possible earlier stages when
they yet can effectively decide, rather than accept the fact that delight authorities already
took place. The example of Poland, where in 2023 will take place elections and where
already started process restoration Constitutional Tribunal, indicates the possibility
partial restoration efficiency even if long-term period political capture, which is an
encouraging principle for others countries that have same problem.
Limitation research consist in the fact that it based on official data constitutional courts
that may be incomplete or biased in some countries where there are authoritarian trends.
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Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
March 2026, pp. 315-343
Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
339
Procedures reporting between countries are not unified, and some indicators cannot be
directly compare, for example, organization of cases considered and the criteria that
apply to admissibility complaints. Although methodologically substantiated, combined
The KEI index is calculated based on small quantities observations (8 countries, 10 years)
that complicates statistical generalization. The study does not take into account high-
quality assessment justification decision and its influence on law enforcement practice,
but only formal indicators functioning of the court, which means they can be effective
addition to quantitative paintings.
Future research opportunities foresee expansion geographical coverage research on
Western Balkans and countries Eastern Partnership to confirm applicability detected
patterns to a broader spectrum of post-socialist and post-conflict democracies. Long-
term research mechanism restoration constitutional court after active authoritarian
regimes (Poland after 2023, maybe Hungary in the future) will provide factors successful
restoration institutional capacity and determine how long it will take this process.
Differences in strategies arguments between independent courts and politicized courts
can demonstrate with the help of qualitative content analysis constitutional justification
in decisions different courts.
Results research roles comparative constitutional reasoning, transnational judicial
networks and capacity constitutional courts resist return to the political influence can
justify difference between the courts of the Baltic and Visegrad groups, even despite the
fact that both groups courts had the same initial conditions.
In conclusion This work has shown that the system of constitutional control in Eastern
Europe Europe is at a crossroads between installation democratic institutions and
authoritarian reforms. The fact that models moving in different directions, shows that
formal membership in the European Union and implementation European constitutional
standards are not required guarantee an effective system of checks and balances. Set
institutional mechanisms (procedures appointment, term powers, openness to citizens),
political (type of electoral systems, coalition governments) and external deterrence
(effectiveness of EU conditionality mechanisms) mitigate actual ability constitutional
courts restrain power.
In the study confirmed necessity integrated strategies software constitutional control,
which includes preventive institutional precautions, proactive external control and
opportunity punishment in case non-compliance criteria of the rule of law.
Conclusions
A study of the functional effectiveness of constitutional review in eight Eastern European
countries in 2015-2024 revealed three radically different models: full constitutional
arbitration (Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Latvia), selective control under political
pressure (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia), and unstable control with periodic effectiveness
(Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria). A trend towards progressive divergence of development
paths was identified: the standard deviation of the cumulative effectiveness index
increased by 12.4-19.7 points, and the leader (Estonia – 84) and the outsider (Hungary
– 39) had a gap of 45 points.
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Thematic Dossier - Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Institutional
Transformation in Times of Global and National Challenges
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Constitutional control in Eastern European countries:
models, effectiveness and development prospects
Karolina Lysak, Alina Voichuk, Ihor Okuniev, Vladyslav Pustovar, Iryna Nastasiak
340
Functional analysis confirmed, which showed that in countries Model 2 system checks
and balances has undergone critical deterioration, because constitutional courts have
effectively ceased to be independent arbitrators between branches The fact that number
individual constitutional The percentage of complaints upheld in Poland decreased from
64 to 39 percent, and in Hungary from 69 to 31 percent, indicating a weakening roles
protection of citizens ' rights from arbitrariness on the part of the state, while the fact
that none of the solutions regarding the government against the state is not accepted in
the field competences (Poland: 0 cases in 2016-2023 vs 23 in 2005-2015) indicates an
alignment arbitrator. Eightfold abolition solutions Hungarian by the constitutional court
on the basis of constitutional amendments is an indicator of how the judicial system can
be subordinated parliamentary the majority that contradicts herself concepts systems
checks and balances, developed by Madison, according to which none branch No power
can be higher than another. In Ukraine was recorded twelve cases self-cancellation
solutions by the judges of the new composition, which indicates the absence institutional
memory that could prevent creation stable constitutional doctrines that are the basis of
the system checks and balances.
It was it was discovered that there is a strong correlation between institutional design
and efficiency, such as non-regulatory renewal appointment judges (r=0.79), mixed
procedures appointment (r=0.73) and the right to individual complaint (r=0.81). There
was it was discovered that correlation between number of cases and quality is negative
(r = -0.23): Romania, which has 456 cases, appears less effective than Estonia, which
has 187 cases.
Designed complex The KEI index demonstrates hidden worsening trends situations more
than general Rule of law indices. What is important is the practical value knowledge to
determine critical indicators early warning international organizations.
Limitation research: addiction from official data, impossibility standardization reporting,
small size samples (8 countries), quantitative indicators without emphasis on quality
analysis constitutional reasoning. Prospects: expansion Western Balkans, long-term
research process restitution, qualitative content analysis justification adoption solutions.
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