OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2
Thematic Dossier
Portugal and China in International Relations:
Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics
February 2026
191
BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ACROSS
GLOBAL POWERS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH
XIAN ZHANG
ac40317@um.edu.mo
She is an undergraduate student majoring Portuguese studies at University of Macau (China),
with a deep interest in geopolitics and regional studies. Her academic journey was first sparked
through coursework examining the political and cultural dynamics of Portuguese-speaking
nations. It was further solidified by the participation in summer research program on Geopolitics
of Brazil and the South Atlantic. Xian's research interests lie at the intersection of international
relations and geopolitics. She seeks to understand how the world operates through geopolitical
analysis. This drives her focus on the evolving dynamics between China and the Lusophone
world. Her natural curiosity about Portuguese-speaking countries, combined with her linguistic
background, fuels her exploration to these cross-regional relationships. It is her goal to
contribute meaningful insights into China-Lusophone geopolitical dynamics and to inform policy-
making processes in this region. https://orcid.org/0009-0009-8308-584X
FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO
fleandro@um.edu.mo
He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic University
of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program Coordinator at the Institute of
Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint Joseph in Macau, China. From
2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking
Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he is an Associate Professor with
Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Macau
(China), and Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and Public Affairs. His recent publications
include: Is China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave Macmillan and The Palgrave Handbook on
Geopolitics of Brazil and South Atlantic (2025), Palgrave Macmillan. Francisco Leandro is a
member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign Relations), established in 1996 as a centre for
studies on International Relations at the Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828
ARTHUR DE DIEGO GARRIDO VIEIRA
arthurdediegorodrigues@gmail.com
He is an aspiring scholar with a keen interest in geopolitics and strategic studies. He embarked
on his academic journey with a sponsorship from the Rotary Club's Youth Exchange program in
Denmark during 2019-2020. This experience broadened his horizons and ignited his passion for
international affairs. From 2023 to 2025, Arthur received an International Scholarship to pursue a
Bachelor of Social Sciences in Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau.
Specializing in International Public Affairs, he has immersed himself in the study of global political
dynamics and governance structures. His academic pursuits are complemented by his active
participation in various research projects and academic forums. Arthur's research interests lie at
the intersection of geopolitics and strategic studies. He is particularly fascinated by the strategic
interactions between nations and the geopolitical implications of global events. His work aims to
contribute to a deeper understanding of international relations and to inform policy-making
processes. With a solid foundation in social sciences and a passion for strategic analysis, Arthur
de Diego Garrido Vieira is poised to become a significant contributor to the field of geopolitics and
strategic studies. https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5541-5587
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2
Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies
and Contemporary Dynamics
February 2026, pp. 191-215
Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
192
Abstract
As the world’s tenth-largest economy, Brazil has witnessed a marked and sustained decline
in its economic complexity over the past three decades. This downward trajectory presents
significant challenges to the country’s ambition of assuming a more influential role in global
economic governance. Despite Brazil’s structural potential and geopolitical relevance, it
continues to face considerable obstacles in its transition towards high-income status. This
study addresses the following research question: How has Brazil’s economic complexity
evolved in relation to major global powers and the Global South? What factors have led to
the continuous decline in Brazil’s economic complexity? To explore this, we adopt a
comparative methodology that examines Brazil’s economic trajectory alongside both leading
global economies and prominent actors within the Global South. Using the Economic
Complexity Index (ECI) as the principal analytical framework, the research identifies critical
development gaps and strategic opportunities. Through case studies and cross-national
comparisons, our findings demonstrate that, despite notable political efforts to enhance
Brazil’s economic complexity, the country has yet to establish the necessary conditions to
reverse its long-standing decline. Brazil remains in an intermediate position, lacking the
technological sophistication and export diversification that typify high-complexity economies.
These insights underscore the urgent need for targeted industrial policies, innovation-led
strategies, and institution reforms, providing policy guidance for Brazil to reposition itself
within the global economic hierarchy and advance its development agenda.
Keywords
Economic Complexity, Brazil, Economic diversification, Global south, Economic Complexity
Index (ECI).
Resumo
Sendo a décima maior economia do mundo, o Brasil tem registado, ao longo das últimas três
décadas, um declínio marcado e sustentado na sua complexidade económica. Esta trajetória
descendente coloca desafios significativos à ambição do país de assumir um papel mais
influente na governação económica global. Apesar do seu potencial estrutural e da sua
relevância geopolítica, o Brasil continua a enfrentar obstáculos substanciais na sua transição
para o estatuto de país de alto rendimento. Este estudo responde às seguintes questões de
investigação: Como tem evoluído a complexidade económica do Brasil em relação às grandes
potências globais e ao Sul Global? E quais os fatores que explicam o declínio contínuo da
complexidade económica brasileira? Para tal, adotamos uma metodologia comparativa que
examina a trajetória económica do Brasil paralelamente às economias globais líderes e a
atores proeminentes do Sul Global. Recorrendo ao Índice de Complexidade Económica (ECI)
como principal enquadramento analítico, a investigação identifica lacunas críticas de
desenvolvimento e oportunidades estratégicas. Por meio de estudos de caso e comparações
transnacionais, os resultados demonstram que, apesar de esforços políticos significativos para
aumentar a complexidade económica do Brasil, o país ainda não estabeleceu as condições
necessárias para reverter o seu declínio persistente. O Brasil permanece numa posição
intermédia, sem a sofisticação tecnológica e a diversificação exportadora que caracterizam
economias de elevada complexidade. Estas conclusões sublinham a necessidade urgente de
políticas industriais direcionadas, estratégias baseadas na inovação e reformas institucionais,
oferecendo orientações de política pública que permitam ao Brasil reposicionar-se na
hierarquia económica global e avançar a sua agenda de desenvolvimento.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2
Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies
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February 2026, pp. 191-215
Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
193
Palavras-chave
Complexidade Económica, Brasil, Diversificação Económica, Sul Global, Índice de
Complexidade Económica (ECI).
How to cite this article
Zhang, Xian Leandro, Francisco José B. S. & Vieira, Arthur de Diego Garrido (2026). Brazil’s
Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers and the Global South.
Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in
International Relations: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2,
February 2026, pp. 191-215. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.8
Article submitted on 3rd October 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th January 2026.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2
Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies
and Contemporary Dynamics
February 2026, pp. 191-215
Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
194
BRAZIL’S ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
ACROSS GLOBAL POWERS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH
1
XIAN ZHANG
FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO
ARTHUR DE DIEGO GARRIDO VIEIRA
Introduction
The Federative Republic of Brazil is widely recognized as a regional power and a
foundational member of the BRICS+ coalition (Esteves & Coelho, 2025). It maintains a
robust and strategic engagement with the Global South, positioning itself not only as an
integral actor within this geopolitical bloc but also as a regional leader with aspirations
for greater influence in the global economic system (Heine, 2025). In both contexts -
regional leadership and global ambition - Brazil’s status as an economic powerhouse is a
critical determinant of its international standing (Bernal‑Meza, 2019). Therefore, in order
to anticipate Brazil’s potential trajectory within the global economic arena, it is essential
to analyze its development through the lens of comparative economic complexity, which
offers valuable insights into the sophistication, diversity, and resilience of its productive
capabilities.
Economic complexity captures the depth of productive knowledge embedded within a
nation's economy, as evidenced by the diversity and sophistication of its export portfolio
- an indicator considered a strong predictor of long-term economic growth (Romero et
al., 2022). This type of embedded knowledge is tacit, context-specific, and difficult to
transfer across borders, making economic complexity a key driver of sustained
development and structural transformation (Teixeira, Missio & Dathein, 2022).
The Economic complexity index(ECI) has demonstrated considerable predictive power in
forecasting future GDP growth. Mealy et al. (2019) observe that “countries that increase
their economic complexity tend to experience higher future income growth,”
underscoring the ECI’s strategic relevance for policymakers. Similarly, Hidalgo and
Hausmann (2009) argue that “economic complexity is a better predictor of income levels
than many other commonly used indicators.” This correlation stems from the inherent
1
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest related to the research,
authorship, or publication of this study.
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
195
adaptability and resilience of complex economies, which are better equipped to absorb
global shocks, reallocate production, and foster innovation.
Moreover, economic complexity acts as a catalyst for technological advancement and
industrial diversification. As Hidalgo (2021) emphasizes, “the accumulation of capabilities
enables countries to move into more sophisticated industries.” This process enhances
productivity, generates higher-value employment, and contributes to inclusive and
sustainable economic development.
As of 2023, the world’s ten largest economies by gross domestic product - namely, the
United States of America (USA), China, Germany, Japan, India, the United Kingdom (UK),
France, Italy, Canada, and Brazil - exhibit considerable variation in economic complexity,
as measured by the ECI. Japan ranks highest with an ECI of 2.43, reflecting its advanced
manufacturing base and technological sophistication (Hausmann et al., 2014). Germany
follows with an ECI of 2.01, underscoring its global leadership in engineering and
industrial exports. The UK (1.81), USA (1.51), and China (1.47) also demonstrate high
levels of complexity, driven by diversified and technologically advanced export
structures. France (1.26) and Italy (1.40) maintain moderate economic complexity,
benefiting from strong industrial sectors and globally competitive luxury goods industries.
In contrast, Canada (0.29) and India (0.45) exhibit lower complexity, indicative of a
greater reliance on natural resource exports and less diversified production capabilities.
Brazil, with an ECI of -0.16, ranks lowest among the top ten economies, highlighting its
dependence on commodity exports and limited industrial diversification. These disparities
in economic complexity have significant implications for long-term growth trajectories
and resilience to global economic shifts.
The ECI, developed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), measures the diversity and
sophistication of a country’s productive capabilities by analyzing the range and
complexity of its export products. Countries with higher ECI scores tend to possess more
advanced knowledge systems and institutional capacities, enabling them to innovate,
adapt to shifting global market dynamics, and sustain inclusive economic development.
The most effective institutional capacities are (Vu, 2022; Araujo, Azevedo & Ferreira,
2025): 1) Robust research and development (R&D) infrastructure, supported by
universities and public research institutions; 2) Efficient regulatory frameworks that
facilitate entrepreneurship and protect intellectual property; 3) Strategic industrial
policies that promote high-value sectors and incentivize technological adoption; 4) Skilled
labor force development, through vocational training and higher education aligned with
industry needs; 5) Public-private partnerships that foster collaboration in innovation and
export promotion; 6) Strong governance and coordination mechanisms, ensuring policy
coherence across ministries and agencies.
Empirical studies have demonstrated that economic complexity is strongly correlated with
future GDP growth. For instance, Albeaik et al. (2017) found that a one standard
deviation increase in an improved version of the index (ECI+) is associated with a 4–5%
increase in annualized economic growth, even when controlling for physical capital,
human capital, and institutional quality. Similarly, Yıldırım (2021) shows that productivity
estimates derived from complexity metrics align closely with country-level indicators such
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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies
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February 2026, pp. 191-215
Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
196
as GDP per capita, human capital, and governance quality, reinforcing the predictive
power of ECI for long-term development trajectories. Moreover, the multidimensional
approach to economic complexity - incorporating trade, research, and technological
outputs - provides a more comprehensive framework for forecasting growth. According
to the Observatory of Economic Complexity(2025), countries with higher ECI scores are
expected to outperform their peers in terms of GDP per capita growth over the next
decade, with Brazil, for example, projected to grow at an annual rate of 2.97% due to its
increasing complexity.
This study adopts a comparative approach to examine Brazil’s economic trajectory,
positioning it relative to major global powers and leading economies within the Global
South. Using the framework of economic complexity, it identifies key gaps and
opportunities in Brazil’s development strategy, with implications for its future role in the
global economic order.
Economic complexity offers a valuable lens for assessing a country’s developmental
potential, capturing both its current production structure and the underlying capabilities
needed for diversification and innovation. As Hausmann et al. (2014) note, “economic
complexity reflects the amount of productive knowledge in a society” while Mealy et al.
(2019) find that increases in complexity are strongly associated with future income
growth. The central aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence that can support
low-ECI countries in formulating targeted industrial policies. By highlighting the link
between productive capabilities and long-term growth, the research underlines the
importance of strategic investment in education, infrastructure, and innovation systems
to foster structural transformation and inclusive development.
Literature Review
The influential contribution of Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) introduced a novel analytical
framework for assessing national economic development through the composition of
export baskets. Rather than evaluating exports solely by volume, their approach
emphasizes the diversity and sophistication of exported products, encapsulated in the
ECI. This index quantifies the embedded productive knowledge within an economy,
offering a robust metric for what development economists have traditionally recognized
qualitatively: sustainable economic growth necessitates the accumulation of layered
productive capabilities and institutional competencies (Felipe et al., 2012).
Central to this framework is the "product space" concept (Hidalgo et al., 2007), which
represents a global network where complex products occupy densely connected core
positions, while simpler goods remain in sparsely connected peripheral areas. This
structural configuration reflects path dependence in industrial upgrading: countries find
it easier to move into products that are closely related to their existing capabilities. The
ECI aggregates the complexity of a country's export portfolio, and nations with higher
scores are better positioned to diversify into more sophisticated products, creating a self-
reinforcing cycle of development. (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). This dynamic underscore
the strategic importance of fostering complexity in national production systems, as it
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
197
facilitates entry into the dense core of the product space and promotes long-term
economic resilience and growth.
Brazil serves as a salient example of the constraints imposed by capability traps within
the framework of the product space. Empirical evidence suggests that economic
complexity exerts a significant positive influence on micro-regional economic growth
(Morais et al., 2021; Teixeira et al., 2022; Mewes & Broekel, 2022). Brazil’s Economic
Complexity Index (ECI) has shown no significant progress between 1995 and 2020,
accompanied by a relative decline in its global ranking. This stagnation and relative
setback in complexity evolution reflect the structural obstacles Brazil faces in industrial
upgrading and technological deepening. Andreoni & Tregenna (2020) further argue that
Brazil has experienced premature deindustrialization and has failed to achieve sustained
technological upgrading through effective industrial policy, making it a typical case of
being caught in a “middle-income technology trap.”Closer examination reveals that the
manifestation of Brazil’s complexity trap is not uniform across its territory. Recent studies
indicate that increases in economic complexity do not uniformly translate into regional
economic growth, thereby exposing limitations in the applicability of complexity theory
at the sub-national level (Cardoso et al., 2024; Morais et al., 2021). These findings
underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of how productive capabilities
are distributed and mobilized within a country, particularly in large, diverse economies
such as Brazil. They also highlight the importance of incorporating spatial and sectoral
heterogeneity into analyses of economic complexity, as national-level metrics may
obscure critical regional disparities in development potential.
This study addresses key gaps in the literature on economic complexity, particularly in
the context of Brazil. While the relevance of economic complexity for national
development and industrial upgrading is well established, three critical gaps remain.
First, there is a methodological comparative gap. Much of the foundational work on
economic complexity - such as the ECI and product space framework - has been applied
primarily to industrialized or export-oriented Asian economies. As a result, large,
resource-rich emerging economies like Brazil remain underexplored in comparative
analyses.
Second, a spatial and regional heterogeneity gap persists. Although Brazil is often cited
as a case of the middle-income trap, existing studies rarely account for internal disparities
across its diverse regions. National-level metrics may obscure significant sub-national
variations in industrial structure, institutional capacity, and innovation ecosystems.
Third, a data gap is manifest. Much of the literature relies on datasets predating 2014,
which may not reflect Brazil’s current economic structure or recent shifts in trade,
technology, and regional development policy. Updated empirical analysis is needed to
capture these changes and assess their implications for economic complexity.
This study focuses on addressing the first and third gaps by offering a comparative
analysis of Brazil’s economic complexity and incorporating more recent data to better
understand its evolving industrial capabilities.
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
198
Methodology
This study adopts a mixed-method design to examine the dynamic complexity of the
Brazilian economy through a two-stage analytical integration. The first stage employs a
quantitative approach to map macro-level trends, while the second stage incorporates
qualitative analysis to contextualize and explain these patterns.
The initial quantitative phase analyzes Brazil’s ECI rankings, trade volumes, and
structural indicators alongside major global powers and selected Global South economies
for the period 2018–2023. This stage systematically identifies Brazil’s relative position
and trade performance trajectories. However, quantitative data alone cannot uncover the
underlying mechanisms driving these trends. Therefore, specific findings - such as
episodes of declining complexity, increased reliance on primary commodities, or export
performance gaps relative to comparator economies - inform the second, qualitative
stage. These findings shape guiding questions for the collection and interpretation of
academic literature, historical accounts, and Brazilian policy documents. This approach
enables the qualitative analysis to explain how observed trends emerged and to explore
associated policy frameworks, structural constraints, and historical pathways.
By integrating macro-level statistical evidence with in-depth contextual interpretation,
the study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding that transcends the
limitations of single-method approaches. This dual strategy ensures that conclusions are
both empirically grounded and enriched by historical and policy insights, offering a
nuanced explanation of the factors behind Brazil’s declining economic complexity.
Furthermore, comparative analysis is consistently employed throughout. Given Brazil’s
aspirations for greater influence in the global economic system, its trajectory is most
meaningful when assessed relative to major powers and other Global South economies.
Comparative inquiry also facilitates the identification of lessons from countries that have
successfully diversified their economic structures. While each nation exhibits unique
characteristics, examining their strategies and outcomes provides a valuable framework
for understanding the challenges and opportunities inherent in Brazil’s pursuit of a more
sophisticated and diversified economic model.
Brazil and the Global Economies
Despite its status as one of the world’s ten largest economies by nominal GDP (IMF,
2025), - behind Canada and ahead of Russia Federation - Brazil has experienced the
steepest ECI drop among its peer nations over the past three decades, revealing a
paradox of high gross domestic product coexisting with low productive sophistication.
This trend reflects Brazil’s overreliance on commodity exports and its limited capacity to
internalize and build upon high-complexity imports. The stagnation and subsequent
decline in export sophistication signal a weakening of the country’s underlying productive
capabilities.
Figure 1 presents a comparative analysis of Brazil and ten major global economies -
namely, the USA, China, Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, and
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
199
Australia - in terms of their ECI between 1995 and 2023. The figure illustrates Brazil’s
relative position in product complexity rankings over time, highlighting its persistent
underperformance within this group. Since 1995, Brazil has consistently ranked third
from the bottom among these economies, initially occupying the 29th position globally.
Between 1995 and 2000, it was overtaken by China, and between 2010 and 2015, by
India - both countries that have significantly improved their economic complexity through
targeted industrial and innovation policies. The decline in Brazil’s relative complexity
became more pronounced from 2015 to 2023, with the gap between Brazil and its peers
widening substantially. Notably, Brazil has remained only marginally ahead of Australia,
a country traditionally characterized by its agricultural export base and relatively low
complexity. However, the gap between the two has steadily narrowed, underscoring
Brazil’s stagnation in productive knowledge accumulation.
Brazil’s deterioration in ECI rankings can be largely attributed to its overreliance on
primary commodities, which imposes structural constraints on the development of more
sophisticated productive capabilities. As shown in Table 1, Brazil’s export profile remains
heavily concentrated in low-complexity goods. Energy minerals, including crude
petroleum, are primarily exported to the US, India, and China. Soybeans - Brazil’s largest
export by volume - are predominantly shipped to China, while metallic ores are traded
with China, Japan, France, and Germany.
These commodities are consistently classified among the bottom five products in terms
of complexity (Hausmann et al., 2014), as they require a relatively narrow base of
productive knowledge and involve limited inter-sectoral linkages. This export structure
reflects a limited diversification of Brazil’s industrial capabilities and contributes to its
stagnation in economic complexity. The dominance of low-complexity exports not only
constrains innovation and value-added production but also limits Brazil’s ability to
transition toward a more knowledge-intensive and resilient economic model.
Figure 1. Comparison Between Brazil and the Major Global Economies (ECI)
Source: Authors, based on Harvard Kennedy School, atlas of Economic Complexity Rankings.
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
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Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
200
We also notice Brazil has formed a three-level industrial chain externalization through
exports of soybeans (raw materials), soybean oil (edible oil), and soybean meal (feed
protein). Among them, soybeans dominate trade with China, while soybean meal enjoys
a competitive edge in the European market. These three products are in the high
proximity area within the product space and a typical case of path-dependent
upgrade. However, this industrial chain is still located in the sparse peripheral area of the
product space (agricultural cluster), far away from highly complex industries. While the
total export volume to these nine countries shows a fluctuating increase, this growth is
overwhelmingly driven by raw materials and agricultural products that need minimal
productive knowledge and little intricate interaction, makes its economic complexity
difficult to evolve. In contrast to Brazil’s declining export sophistication, the country’s
import profile is increasingly dominated by high-complexity goods from advanced
economies.
Table 1. Brazil's Exports by Top Economies by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)
Trading
Partner
Total Trade Volume
Major exported products
2019
2021
2023
2018
2023
USA
29.80
31.90
35.10
Gas turbines (1.93),
Semi-finished iron
(2.08),
Aircraft/spacecraft
(2.06)
Crude petroleum (4.78),
Semi-finished iron (1.68),
Aircraft/spacecraft (1.67)
China
63.60
88.20
105.00
Soybeans (27.20), Iron
ore (11.00), Crude
petroleum (14.40)
Soybeans (38.90), crude
petroleum (19.80),
iron ore (19.70)
Germany
5.21
5.62
6.40
Coffee (0.75), Soybean
meal (0.49), Gas
turbines (0.35)
Coffee (1.07), Soybean
meal (0.97), Copper Ore
(0.90)
Japan
7.14
6.51
9.32
Iron ore (2.90), Poultry
meat (0.71), Coffee
(0.33)
Iron ore (3.31), Poultry
meat (0.94), Corn (1.49)
India
2.96
4.93
4.91
Crude petroleum (1.16),
Raw sugar (0.54),
Soybean oil (0.54)
Soybean oil (1.30), Raw
sugar (1.23), Crude
Petroleum (0.67)
UK
3.14
3.20
3.68
Gold (0.76), Soybeans
(0.16), hydrogen (0.16)
Gold (0.45), Soybeans
(0.34), Other prepared
meat (0.25)
France
2.92
2.62
3.06
Soybean meal (0.58),
Iron ore (0.43), Sulfate
chemical woodpulp
(0.31)
Soybean meal (0.82),
Crude petroleum (0.29),
iron ore (0.21)
Italy
3.41
4.16
4.57
Sulfate chemical wood
pulp (0.81), Coffee
(0.47), Iron ore (0.37)
Sulfate chemical woodpulp
(0.64), Coffee (0.70),
Soybeans (0. 63)
Canada
3.60
5.12
6.00
Aluminum Oxide (1.14),
Gold (0.34), Raw sugar
(0.31)
Aluminum Oxide (1.22),
Gold (1.61),
Aircraft/spacecraft (0.73)
Australia
0.50
0.60
0.81
Large construction
vehicles (0.09), Coffee
(0.05), Fruit juice (0.03)
Large construction
vehicles (0.17), Coffee
(0.10), Sulfate chemical
woodpulp (0.06)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database
(OEC World, 2025).
Table 2 illustrates that the USA exports value-added industrial products to Brazil, while
China has significantly increased its exports of semiconductors. The share of automotive
components from Germany, Japan, and Italy has remained stable, and pharmaceuticals
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Brazil’s Economic Complexity: A Comparative Analysis Across Global Powers
and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
201
constitute major exports from Germany, India, and the UK. These products rank among
the top five in terms of complexity (Hausmann et al., 2014), requiring advanced
technological capabilities and specialized skills that are not closely aligned with Brazil’s
existing production structure.
Table 2 - Brazil's Imports by Top Economies by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)
Trading
partner
Total Trade Volume
Major imported products
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2018
2023
USA
33.80
36.30
28.90
41.40
51.60
39.90
Refined petroleum
(7.08), Gas turbines
(1.85), Coal briquettes
(1.23)
Refined petroleum (4.70),
Gas turbines (4.10), Coal
briquettes (1.68)
China
36.50
37.90
37.40
53.80
64.20
57.80
Special purpose ships
(3.36), Telephones
(2.31), Broadcasting
accessories (1.18)
Semiconductor devices
(4.09), Telephones
(3.35), Pesticides (1.61)
Germanyy
11.30
11.30
9.64
12.40
13.40
13.60
Motor vehicles (0.88),
Packaged
medicaments (0.65),
Nitrogen heterocyclic
compounds (0.50)
Nitrogen heterocyclic
compounds (0.73), Motor
vehicles (0.73), Packaged
medicaments (0.62)
Japan
4.79
4.63
4.08
5.19
5.46
5.19
Motor vehicles (0.84),
Cars (0.26), Engine
parts (0.17)
Motor vehicles (1.00),
Papermaking machines
(0.15), Engine parts
(0.12)
India
3.89
4.54
4.15
6.96
9.64
7.07
Non-retail synthetic
filament yarn (0.29),
Pesticides (0.38),
Motor vehicles (0.24)
Refined petroleum
(1.19B), Pesticides
(0.53), Nitrogen
heterocyclic (0.47)
UK
2.72
2.72
2.40
2.69
3.20
3.34
Gas turbines (0.37),
Packaged
medicaments (0.16),
Refined petroleum
(0.14)
Gas turbines (0.41),
Packaged medicaments
(0.22), Cars (0.17)
France
5.45
4.43
4.09
4.46
4.78
5.41
Aircraft/spacecraft
(0.57), Gas turbines
(0.28), Motor vehicles
(0.32)
Gas turbines (0.69),
Aircraft/spacecraft (0.54),
Motor vehicles (0.24)
Italy
4.78
4.59
4.13
5.46
5.52
5.76
Motor vehicles (0.33),
Refined petroleum
(0.31), Combustion
engines (0.26)
Motor vehicles (0.40),
Vaccines (0.22),
Transmissions (0.15)
Canada
2.07
2.01
1.76
2.29
3.37
3.31
Potassic fertilizers
(0.81), Coal briquettes
(0.17), Gas turbines
(0.09)
Potassic fertilizers(1.95),
Aircraft/spacecraft(0.14),
gas turbines(0.13)
Australia
1.13
0.98
0.58
1.21
2.81
2.00
Coal Briquettes
(0.85), Raw aluminum
(0.05), Pesticides
(0.02)
Coal Briquettes (1.52),
Coke (0.22), Therapeutic
appliances (0.03)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database
(OEC World, 2025).
Applying the product space framework (Hidalgo et al., 2007) to Brazil’s trade data reveals
a structural disconnect: Brazil’s agricultural and mineral exports occupy peripheral
positions in the global product network, far removed from the central nodes represented
by high-complexity imports such as semiconductors. This spatial and technological
distance results in a mismatch of skills, fragmentation of supply chains, and divergence
in innovation trajectories. Consequently, Brazil struggles to absorb and integrate external
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technologies into its domestic economy. If this pattern persists, Brazil risks long-term
disadvantages - paying premium prices for essential high-tech goods while exporting
low-value commodities and thereby limiting its prospects for income growth and
sustained economic prosperity.
Brazil and the Global South
Despite being the Global South's third-largest economy, Brazil exemplifies the complexity
trap facing middle-income countries, with its ECI ranking plummeting from regional
leader to bottom position over three decades. While Global South markets provide
important export destinations and revenues, Brazil remains trapped in its low complexity
export yet high complexity import pattern. The country has not leveraged these
partnerships to climb the complexity ladder yet, but there are emerging opportunities for
industrial diversification and economic complexity upgrading.
Figure 2 illustrates Brazil’s relative position in terms of product complexity rankings
compared to six major countries in Global South. This section narrows its focus to the
comparison with Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Turkiye,
excluding China and India due to listed data in section 3. Although Brazil was ranked
second among the countries of the global south in 1995 (below Mexico), it was surpassed
by rising Thailand during the period from 1995 to 2000. Subsequently, the decline in its
ECI continued to accelerate, and it was overtaken by Turkey after five years. The gap
then widened even further. From 2015 to 2023, the dropping was even more significant,
and it was successively surpassed by the fluctuating Indonesia and Argentina. At this
point, its economic complexity ranked 93rd, being the last position among these
countries. The continuous decline in the ECI ranking indicates that Brazil has not only
has failed to acquire new capabilities, but may also be losing its existing manufacturing
capabilities.
Looking closer to its trade profile, the trade pattern of the Global South strengthens
Brazil's export structure instead of diversifying it. Still, Brazil’s exports remain heavily
concentrated in low-complexity products. Table 3 shows raw materials account for a
significant proportion in Brazil’s export: raw sugar, raw cotton, iron ore, poultry meat
and soybeans emerged as key export commodities. Namely, soybeans appear in 5 out of
6 export destination countries. These products were also previously exported by Brazil
to the global economies. Rather than using Global South partnerships to diversify into
higher-complexity manufacturing, Brazil has simply replicated its commodity export
model across different markets, making limited progress in addressing the ECI decline.
Beyond trade patterns, the productive capacity hierarchy of Brazil exhibits systematic
deficiencies that explain its complexity decline. While the country possesses strong
natural endowments and basic extraction capabilities, its primary processing remains
incomplete, and intermediate manufacturing capabilities suffers from severe deficiencies
- particularly in automotive, machinery, electronics, and chemical production. This
creates a "missing middle" in Brazil's capability structure. However, isolated successes
like aircraft production represents a “leap away” from existing product clusters in Brazil,
but without the support of sequential capability building, may not be sustainable.
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Figure 2 – Comparison Between Brazil and Selected Countries of Global South (ECI)
Source: Data adapted from Harvard Kennedy School, atlas of Economic Complexity Rankings
Table 3 - Brazil's Exports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions
USD)
Trading
Partner
Total Trade Volume
Major imported products
(typical annual value range)
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2018
2023
Argentina
14.9
9.81
8.51
11.9
15.3
16.8
Cars (3.84), Motor
vehicles; Parts &
accessories (1.03),
Delivery trucks
(1.09)
Soybeans (2.04B),
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(1.70), Cars(1.40)
Indonesia
1.65
2.10
2.49
2.13
3.20
4.33
Soybean meal
(0.66), Raw tobacco
(0.13), Raw cotton
(0.26)
Soybean meal
(0.53), Raw sugar
(0.82), Iron ore
(0.21)
Mexico
4.50
4.90
3.83
5.67
7.11
8.59
Delivery
trucks(0.26),
Spark-ignition
engines (0.35),
Poultry meat (0.20)
Cars(1.1),
Soybeans(0.82),
Poultry meat(0.43)
Saudi
Arabia
2.10
2.03
1.89
2.74
3.98
4.42
Poultry meat (0.81),
Raw sugar (0.43),
Soybeans (0.12)
Raw sugar(1.76),
Poultry Meat(0.85),
Corn(0.36)
Turkiye
2.66
2.46
3.13
3.51
3.8
3.52
Soybeans (0.52),
Bovine (0.39), Semi-
finished iron (0.29)
Soybeans(0.97),
Iron ore(0.42),
Bovine(0.30)
Thailand
1.96
1.79
2.08
2.8
3.61
3.93
Soybeans (0.47),
Soybean meal
(0.90), Motor
vehicles; Parts &
accessories (0.05)
Soybean
meal(1.56),
Soybeans(1.40),
Crude
petroleum(0.50)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database (OEC World, 2025).
29
37 43
54 59
78
93
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1995 RANK 2000 RANK 2005 RANK 2010 RANK 2015 RANK 2020 RANK 2023 RANK
Brazil Argentina Indonesia Mexico
Saudi Arabia Thailand Turkiye
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Brazil's import patterns from Global South countries reveal both structural vulnerabilities
and emerging industrial integration opportunities. The composition of these imports
confirms Brazil's continued dependence on higher-complexity manufactured goods, even
within South-South trade relationships. Table 4 shows that Brazil imports manufactured
goods from all listed countries except Saudi Arabia, which primarily supplies energy
products. The country imports motor vehicles and parts from Mexico, Turkey, and
Thailand, computers from Mexico, and delivery trucks from Argentina. Brazil is importing
finished products rather than intermediate goods such as garments, textiles and food
processing that could be further processed domestically then re-exported. This approach
would create value-added production chains that connected to many product categories.
By failing to do so, Brazil misses opportunities for using specific capabilities relevant
within communities and therefore industrial upgrading through South-South cooperation.
Looking at the positive aspects: Firstly, Brazil maintains a positive trade balance with
most Global South partners, with total import volumes consistently lower than export
volumes; Secondly, Argentina stands out as Brazil's most significant Global South trading
partner, representing a complexity-enhancing bilateral relationship that demonstrates
Brazil's untapped upgrading potential. With Brazilian exports growing from $14.9 billion
in 2018 to $16.8 billion in 2023, and imports of $11.9 billion in 2023, this partnership
achieves the near-balanced trade flows that complexity theory associates with successful
industrial integration. Most significantly, Argentina absorbs $1.28-3.84 billion annually in
Brazilian automotive products alone - proving that Brazil possesses manufacturing
capabilities sophisticated enough to compete in regional markets when proper industrial
complementarity exists.
Brazil’s automotive trade with Argentina and Mexico illustrates successful intra-industry
specialization, which contributes to economic complexity and growth. Brazil exports cars,
motor vehicles, and parts to both countries, while importing delivery trucks, cars, and
accessories. These exchanges involve differentiated yet functionally related products,
allowing each country to specialize in distinct segments of the industry. The growing
export volume from Brazil to Argentina and Mexico reflects the benefits of deepening
industrial specialization.
Table 4 - Brazil's Imports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)
Trading
partner
Total Trade Volume
Major imported products
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2018
2023
Argentina
11.30
10.50
7.71
11.60
12.90
11.90
Delivery trucks
(2.50), Cars (1.87),
Wheat (1.31)
Delivery trucks
(2.48), Cars (2.24),
Wheat (0.82)
Indonesia
1.39
1.35
1.19
1.79
1.96
1.54
Coconut oil (0.18),
Rubber (0.16),
Motor vehicles;
parts & accessories
(0.13)
Coconut (0.22),
Palm oil (0.13),
Telephones (0.11)
Mexico
5.45
5.26
4.00
4.71
5.53
5.74
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.73), Cars (1.09),
Computers (016)
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.73), Cars (0.70),
Delivery trucks
(0.34)
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Table 4 - Brazil's Imports by Countries in Global South by GDP (2018–2023, Billions USD)
Trading
partner
Total Trade Volume
Major imported products
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2018
2023
Saudi
Arabia
2.39
2.40
1.63
3.22
5.49
3.70
Crude petroleum
(1.68), Mixed
mineral or chemical
fertilizers (0.30),
Propylene polymers
(0.14)
Crude petroleum
(3.26), Mixed
mineral or chemical
fertilizers (0.52),
Refined petroleum
(0.60)
Turkiye
0.63
0.69
0.73
1.25
1.24
1.00
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.05), Raw iron
bars (0.03),
Carbonates (0.05)
Carbonates (0.10),
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.05), Synthetic
rubber (0.05)
Thailand
1.76
1.72
1.51
2.25
2.37
2.05
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.25), Rubber
(0.20), Engine parts
(0.10)
Motor vehicles;
Parts & accessories
(0.30), Rubber
(0.09), Engine parts
(0.09)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from OEC World Trade Database (OEC World,
2025).
Analysis and Discussion
The fact that Brazil ranks among the world’s ten largest economies stands in stark
contrast to its declining performance in the ECI. Over the past three decades, Brazil’s
pronounced loss of ground in the ECI rankings among major economies highlights a
critical divergence: its high GDP coexists with a level of productive sophistication that
has failed to advance relative to global competitors. This downward trend reflects deep-
rooted structural weaknesses in Brazil’s industrial base and a persistent reliance on
import-intensive, low-complexity exports.
Figure 1 illustrates Brazil’s position relative to ten other large economies - namely, the
USA, China, Germany, Japan, India, the UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Australia - since
1995. Brazil has consistently ranked near the bottom of this group. Despite maintaining
a trade surplus with China since 2019, which reached US$12 billion in 2024 and
accounted for 41% of Brazil’s total trade surplus (BCB, 2025), Brazil was overtaken by
China between 1995 and 2000, and later by India between 2010 and 2015. From 2015
to 2023, Brazil’s complexity gap widened further, approaching that of Australia - a
country similarly characterized by a commodity-dependent export structure (Mesquita,
Merlo, & Gremaud, 2021). This trajectory underlines the urgent need to address Brazil’s
limitations in productive knowledge accumulation and industrial upgrading. Without
strategic interventions to diversify its export base and strengthen innovation ecosystems,
Brazil risks remaining trapped in a cycle of low complexity and constrained development.
Table 1 indicates that Brazil's export report remains dominated by primary commodities.
Crude petroleum is exported mainly to the USA, India, and China, while soybeans -
Brazil's top export product - rose from $27.2 billion in 2018 to $38.9 billion in 2023,
mainly to China. Metallic ores are exported to China, Japan, France, and Germany. These
products are the simplest, with minimal productive information and minimal technological
contact (Hausmann et al., 2014). Brazil's three-step soybean value chain for exports -
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raw soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal - is an example of path-dependent
upgrading, with incremental innovation in a narrow technological niche (Araujo & Lima,
2006). Although soybean meal has gained competitiveness in the EU market, such a
chain remains embedded in the agriculture cluster of the product space outside central
nodes pertaining to high-complexity industries (Hidalgo et al., 2007). Overall export
volume growth is driven by low-complexity products, which limits Brazil's evolution
toward increasingly complex production.
On the other hand, the import composition of Brazil is increasingly comprised of high-
income economies' high-complexity goods. Aircraft and gas turbines are exported by the
USA, semiconductors by China, and motor vehicles' parts by Germany, Japan, and Italy
with regular shipments. Germany, India, and the UK also have prominent
pharmaceuticals. These are part of the top five highest in complexity (Hausmann et al.,
2014), requiring high-tech capabilities and special skills.
Despite being the third-largest economy in the Global South, Brazil has experienced a
pronounced decline in its ECI, falling from a regional leader to the lowest-ranked among
key Global South economies over the past three decades. In 1995, Brazil trailed only
Mexico in ECI, but was subsequently surpassed by Thailand by 2000, Turkiye by 2005,
and more recently by Indonesia and Argentina between 2015 and 2023. By 2023, Brazil
ranked 93rd globally, a position that reflects not only stagnation but also a potential
deterioration of existing productive capabilities (Britto, Romero, Freitas, & Coelho, 2015).
As illustrated in Figure 2, this trajectory underscores Brazil’s failure to capitalize on
South-South cooperation as a mechanism for industrial upgrading. Table 3 further
demonstrates that Brazil’s export structure remains heavily concentrated in low-
complexity products - such as soybeans, iron ore, poultry meat, raw sugar, and cotton.
The fact that soybeans appear as a major export to five of the six key Global South
partners exemplifies the replication of Brazil’s traditional commodity-based model, rather
than a strategic shift toward higher-complexity manufacturing (World Bank, 2015).
Brazil’s import patterns from Global South countries also reveal structural weaknesses.
Although Brazil maintains a trade surplus with most of its regional partners (Table 4), it
continues to import high-complexity finished goods - including motor vehicles,
computers, and delivery trucks - from Mexico, Turkiye, Thailand, and Argentina. Saudi
Arabia, by contrast, primarily exports energy commodities. Notably, Brazil’s import
basket lacks intermediate goods such as textiles and processed foods, which could
otherwise support domestic value-added production and re-exporting. This absence
suggests limited integration into regional value chains and reflects Brazil’s
underdeveloped productive linkages. As Moreira (2022) argues, Brazil’s industrial
structure lacks the coordination and capability-building mechanisms necessary for deeper
insertion into global value chains.
Brazil’s bilateral trade with Argentina stands out as a complexity-enhancing relationship.
Between 2018 and 2023, Brazilian exports to Argentina increased from $14.9 billion to
$16.8 billion, while imports reached $11.9 billion (Table 4). Argentina absorbs $1.28–
$3.84 billion annually in Brazilian automotive products, demonstrating Brazil’s capacity
to compete in regional manufacturing when industrial complementarity is present.
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Crucially, Argentina has recently surpassed Brazil in ECI rankings, underscoring the
urgency for Brazil to revise its industrial policy (Sert, 2017). Brazil’s automotive trade
with Argentina and Mexico exemplifies successful intra-industry specialization: Brazil
exports cars and motor vehicle components while importing differentiated products such
as delivery trucks and high-value parts. This division of labor enables each country to
specialize in distinct segments of the automotive sector, achieving economies of scale
and fostering innovation. As Fullerton, Sawyer, and Sprinkle (2011) note, intra-industry
trade yields greater benefits than inter-industry trade by stimulating innovation and
exploiting scale efficiencies. Despite isolated successes such as aircraft production,
Brazil’s broader productive structure suffers from a “missing middle.” While the country
demonstrates strength in natural resource extraction and basic processing, it lacks robust
intermediate manufacturing capabilities in sectors such as electronics, chemicals, and
machinery. Without sustained capability development, these successes remain
exceptions rather than indicators of systemic transformation (Hamaguchi, 2020). There
are three leading reasons to be considered and one additional aspect:
Firstly, Brazil's steady fall in the ECI is directly related to its own long-standing process
of deindustrialization. Since the 1980s, Brazil has suffered from what scholars have
described as "premature deindustrialization," where the manufacturing sector falls
behind before the economy has achieved high-income status. The experience has been
worsened by structural issues such as low productivity growth, fragile innovation
systems, and Dutch disease effects, most importantly caused by the real overvaluation
during commodity booms (Bresser-Pereira, 2018). Disorganization of Brazil's
manufacturing structure has limited it from diversifying its exports to more advanced,
knowledge-based industries, which directly affected its ECI performance (Kupfer, Ferraz
& Marques, 1995; Cano, 2011).
A critical factor in this trajectory has been the absence of a consistent and strategic
industrial policy. Brazil's shift toward market liberalization in the late 20th century,
particularly during the 1990s, marked a turning point in its development model. During
this period, many state-led industrial initiatives were dismantled, and no coherent
strategy was put in place to foster technological upgrading or strengthen domestic
production chains. This policy vacuum contributed to the erosion of productive
capabilities, limiting the country’s ability to move into more complex and knowledge-
intensive sectors - a key requirement for improving its position in the Economic
Complexity Index (Stemmler, 2019).
Compounding this institutional void, trade liberalization and financial openness
introduced additional structural challenges. The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and
1990s prioritized openness over strategic development, weakening Brazil’s industrial
structure. Iasco-Pereira and Morceiro (2024) show that these reforms led to a decline in
total factor productivity and manufacturing labor productivity, as liberalization was not
accompanied by policies to support domestic industry. Their empirical analysis reveals
that Brazil’s industrial sector lost its capacity to generate structural change, with the
country increasingly specializing in low-complexity activities. The lack of coordination
between liberalization and industrial development resulted in a national-level
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deindustrialization, constraining Brazil’s ability to sustain diversified and technologically
advanced economic activities - and ultimately, to climb the Economic Complexity Index.
In response to this scenario, recent efforts such as the Nova Indústria Brasil [The New
Industry of Brazil] policy represent a strategic attempt to reverse premature
deindustrialization and reinsert Brazil into more complex global value chains. The policy,
launched in 2024, emphasizes innovation, sustainability, and technological upgrading,
with BRL 300 billion allocated to support industrial transformation until 2026. It aims to
stimulate sectors with high value-added potential, such as health technologies,
electromobility, and digital infrastructure, while also promoting local content and green
industrialization. However, as Belloc (2014) cautions, the effectiveness of such policies
depends on the design of subsidy mechanisms and the ability to foster productivity-
enhancing firm entry. Without a firm commitment to rebuilding domestic industry and
aligning incentives with long-term development goals, Brazil risks establishing itself as a
commodity-dependent economy, deepening its structural vulnerabilities and limiting its
capacity to climb the economic complexity ladder.
Secondly, the privatization wave that commenced in the late 1980s and escalated in the
1990s under Collor and Cardoso governments was a revolutionary shift in the economic
trend of Brazil. Privatization was originally being justified on the basis of the reduction of
the external debt and efficiency, but it was exposed to disassembling major state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) without an appropriate industrial policy to cultivate national
champions (Silva, 2019). This was done in the 2000s and gained a new life in the 2010s
and 2020s, particularly under the financially tight agendas. This resulted in the industrial
climate of Brazil, especially in sectors like energy, telecommunications, and
infrastructure, which are all columns of economic complexity (Fagundes & Caciatori,
2020). The absence of a well-coordinated industrial strategy at the time of, and after,
privatization further entrenched the country's vulnerability to foreign shocks as well as
technological dependence.
Contrary to the expectations of traditional privatization advocates, the reforms failed to
generate the anticipated industrial dynamism. Rocha and Ruiz (2008) show that Brazilian
industries remained heavily reliant on production-intensive knowledge and lacked
integration with scientific and technological institutions, which are essential for
innovation. The privatized sectors did not reinvest sufficiently in R&D or technological
upgrading, and innovation was often limited to meeting regulatory standards rather than
pursuing breakthroughs. Guimarães (2004) further argues that Brazil’s state lacked the
institutional capacity and strategic coherence to replicate the success of developmental
states like Japan and Korea, which used privatization selectively and always within a
broader industrial policy framework. In Brazil, the absence of such coordination led to
fragmented innovation ecosystems and technological dependence on foreign actors.
Nolan (2018) adds that privatization, when not aligned with social and economic rights
frameworks, can erode the state’s ability to fulfill long-term development goals.
Moreover, the lack of mechanisms to ensure that privatization proceeds were reinvested
into productive sectors further entrenched Brazil’s vulnerability to foreign shocks and
reinforced its specialization in low-complexity exports. A telling example is Petrobras,
which, despite remaining partially state-owned, saw its strategic role diluted during
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liberalization, limiting its capacity to act as a sovereign agent of industrial transformation
and innovation (Zanotelli & Ferreira, 2021). These dynamics collectively undermined
Brazil’s ability to build the productive capabilities necessary for climbing the Economic
Complexity Index.
Finally, Brazil’s declining performance in the ECI can be attributed to a combination of
structural and institutional factors. The country’s export structure remains heavily
concentrated in primary commodities such as soybeans, crude petroleum, and iron ore.
These products rank among the lowest in complexity because they require limited
productive knowledge and minimal inter-sectoral linkages (Hausmann et al., 2014). This
overreliance on low-complexity exports restricts the development of more sophisticated
industries and limits opportunities for technological spillovers and innovation-driven
growth (Cardoso et al., 2024). Furthermore, Brazil has struggled to diversify its industrial
base beyond traditional sectors. Unlike countries that have successfully transitioned into
high-tech manufacturing or knowledge-intensive services, Brazil’s industrial upgrading
has been slow and uneven. This stagnation is partly due to weak innovation ecosystems,
limited investment in research and development (R&D), and insufficient integration into
global value chains (Mazzucato, 2023; Suzigan et al., 2020). In addition, there is
significant regional heterogeneity in economic complexity across Brazil. While some
states - such as São Paulo - possess relatively advanced industrial structures, others
remain dependent on agriculture and extractive industries. National-level ECI metrics
often mask these disparities, yet they contribute to the overall stagnation in complexity
when aggregated (Cardoso et al., 2024; Bandeira Morais, Swart, & Jordaan, 2021).
Additionally, Brazil’s economic complexity is further hindered by institutional and policy
constraints. These include inconsistent industrial policy, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and
limited support for innovation and entrepreneurship. Such barriers reduce the country’s
ability to accumulate productive knowledge and transition into more complex sectors
(Suzigan et al., 2020; Baer, 2020).
Brazil’s industrial landscape, though marked by structural challenges, includes several
niche sectors that have achieved notable global competitiveness through sustained
innovation and strategic policy support. The aeronautical industry, led by Embraer,
exemplifies this trajectory. Emerging from mid-20th-century state-led initiatives and
bolstered by institutions like ITA and CTA, Embraer has positioned Brazil as the third-
largest commercial aircraft manufacturer globally, integrating advanced engineering,
global partnerships, and a robust innovation ecosystem (Fonseca, 2010). In the electrical
machinery and automation sector, WEG S.A. stands out as a globally competitive firm,
with operations in over 135 countries and a strong focus on R&D, energy efficiency, and
industrial automation. Its ability to innovate and scale production has made it a key
player in the global market for electric motors and industrial solutions (Ministério de
Minas e Energia, n.d.). Additionally, EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research
Corporation) has played a transformative role in agricultural innovation, particularly in
tropical agriculture. Through cutting-edge research in biotechnology, precision
agriculture, and sustainable practices, EMBRAPA has significantly increased productivity
and enabled Brazil to become a global leader in agribusiness. Its international
partnerships and technology transfer initiatives further underscore its role as a driver of
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Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
210
economic complexity and global competitiveness (IPEA, 2022). These cases illustrate that
Brazil possesses the institutional and technological foundations necessary for broader
industrial upgrading. By leveraging these successful models, the country can foster
innovation-driven growth across other strategic sectors of its economy.
In addition to these three reasons, stands the recent (2026) MERCOSUR–EU partnership
is expected to raise Brazil–EU trade by BRL 94.2 billion and add roughly BRL 37 billion to
GDP by 2044, while fostering regulatory cooperation and integration into European value
chains (Agência Brasil, 2024; Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2024). Translating
these gains into durable upgrading requires progress in human capital (skilled labor).
Brazil’s 2022 PISA scores - 379 (mathematics), 410 (reading), and 403 (science) -
remain below OECD averages, with fewer than half of students reaching baseline
proficiency in maths and science (Agência Brasil, 2023; Statista, 2025). These skill gaps
constrain the diffusion of tacit, production-specific knowledge that supports
diversification into higher value activities - knowledge captured by the ECI (Teixeira,
Missio, & Dathein, 2022). Empirical evidence from Brazil indicates that higher levels of
economic complexity are positively correlated with sustained growth and structural
transformation at subnational scales, particularly when industrial policies promote
strategic diversification toward technologically proximate and more sophisticated sectors
(Romero et al., 2022; Teixeira, Missio, & Dathein, 2022). Nevertheless, human capital
remains a decisive enabling factor for this transformation, as the accumulation of tacit
knowledge and advanced skills is essential for upgrading production capabilities and
sustaining complexity-driven development.
Accordingly, the MERCOSUR–EU framework should be coupled with targeted education
and training reforms - STEM curriculum strengthening, teacher professional
development, and vocational pathways aligned with EU standards - to build the
capabilities needed for complex manufacturing and services (Agência Brasil, 2023;
Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 2024). By linking market access to human capital
upgrading, Brazil can move into products closer to the core of the product space, raise
its ECI, and convert trade liberalization into sustained competitiveness and inclusive
growth (Romero et al., 2022; Teixeira et al., 2022).
Conclusion
This study set out to examine how Brazil’s economic complexity has evolved in relation
to major global powers and leading economies within the Global South, and to assess
Brazil’s relative position in the global economic. The findings reveal a concerning
trajectory: despite rising trade volumes, Brazil has experienced a steady decline in
economic complexity, losing competitive ground both globally and regionally.
Although Brazil remains a major exporter, its trade profile has become increasingly
concentrated in low value-added goods, underscoring limited progress in integrating
productive knowledge into its industrial base. Structural and institutional barriers - such
as fragmented innovation ecosystems, inadequate logistics infrastructure, and
inconsistent industrial policies - have constrained the transformative potential of trade
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and the Global South
Xian Zhang, Francisco José B. S. Leandro, Arthur de Diego Garrido Vieira
211
expansion. Consequently, Brazil has faced challenges in sustaining its leadership role
within the Global South and in ascending global value chains. However, it is necessary to
point out that this analysis has some limitations. This study mainly relies on the ECI,
which is a single measurement criterion. Although it is powerful, it cannot fully cover the
various determinants of trade patterns. Factors such as bilateral agreements, geopolitical
relations, logistics frameworks, and specific national demand structures - all of which are
key elements shaping a country's trade content and trading partners - are beyond the
scope of ECI's research. Moreover, although the comparison method has explanatory
value, it cannot encompass all the differences in scale, history, and resource endowments
of the studied economies. These limitations indicate that although the ECI effectively
diagnoses the trend of declining trade complexity, it is still necessary to combine more
in-depth and context-specific analyses to provide targeted policy recommendations.
Nevertheless, despite these enduring constraints, the country continues to host several
domestically developed niche industries that are both globally competitive and
technologically advanced. The success of Brazil’s globally competitive and technologically
advanced niche sectors demonstrates the country’s latent capacity for broader industrial
transformation. These sectors - such as aerospace, electrical machinery, and agricultural
innovation - not only exemplify the potential of targeted industrial policy and institutional
coordination but also serve as catalysts for upgrading other segments of the economy.
Their technological spillovers, supply chain linkages, and innovation ecosystems can
foster productivity gains and knowledge diffusion across less developed industries,
promoting a more diversified and resilient industrial base. By leveraging these strategic
sectors as models and anchors, Brazil can accelerate its structural transformation,
enhance its position in global value chains, and climb the ECI. This approach aligns with
recent calls for a renewed industrial strategy that integrates long-term innovation and
sustainability goals, aiming to reverse premature deindustrialization and restore the
country’s capacity for robust, inclusive growth (Feijó, 2025).
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