OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

157

TOWARDS A MEASURABLE AND INCLUSIVE THEORY OF STATE FRAGILITY:

CROSS‑REGIONAL INSIGHTS FROM CHINA, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, AND

BOTSWANA

QI ZIZHENG

mc45860@um.edu.mo

She holds a Bachelor’s degree from the EHL Hospitality Business School in Lausanne,

Switzerland. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in International Relations and Public

Policy at the University of Macau (China). Her research interests include Chinese foreign

policy, the renewable energy sector, Global South development, and Sino‑European relations.

https://orcid.org/0009-0007-8098-1601

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

fleandro@um.edu.mo

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Catholic

University of Portugal in 2010. From 2014 to 2018, he served as the Program Coordinator at

the Institute of Social and Legal Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Saint Joseph in

Macau, China. From 2018 to 2023, he was the Associate Dean of the Institute for Research

on Portuguese-Speaking Countries at the City University of Macau, China. Currently, he is an

Associate Professor with Habilitation in International Relations at the Faculty of Social

Sciences, University of Macau (China), and Deputy Director of the Institute for Global and

Public Affairs. His recent publications include: Is China a Global Power? (2025), Palgrave

Macmillan and The Palgrave Handbook on Geopolitics of Brazil and South Atlantic (2025),

Palgrave Macmillan. Francisco Leandro is a member of OBSERVARE (Observatory of Foreign

Relations), established in 1996 as a centre for studies on International Relations at the

Autonomous University of Lisbon, Portugal. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1443-5828

Abstract

This study advances a more contextually grounded understanding of state fragility by

integrating a wide range of institutional indicators within a neoclassical realist framework,

while deliberately moving beyond the narrow epistemic assumptions that have traditionally

guided dominant assessments of state performance. Rather than drawing on uniform models

derived primarily from Euro‑Atlantic institutional experiences, the analysis adopts a

cross‑regional comparative approach that is sensitive to diverse political cultures, historical

trajectories, and governance practices. The selected cases - China, Portugal, Brazil, and

Botswana - constitute a deliberately heterogeneous set of political regimes and developmental

trajectories. Methodologically, the study conceptualizes, operationalizes, and measures state

fragility through a multidimensional indicator framework that captures variations in

institutional capacity, societal resilience, and policy adaptability. The analysis specifies the

scoring rules, weighting schemes, and aggregation procedures applied to each indicator, and

addresses issues of construct validity and cross‑case comparability in the context of

cross‑regional analysis. By reframing state fragility as a condition that cannot be meaningfully

assessed through universalized or externally imposed benchmarks, this study contributes to

a more inclusive and context-sensitive theoretical framework. It advances scholarly debates

on state performance and international relations while also offering policy-relevant insights

for decision‑making processes that require attentiveness to regional specificities, historical

trajectories, and locally articulated governance priorities within a changing global order. The

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

158

study nonetheless acknowledges important methodological limitations. Meaningful

comparison across the selected cases remains challenging due to their fundamentally different

historical contexts and developmental starting points. In addition, several indicators are

necessarily calibrated based on analytical judgment in order to capture variation across

dimensions, which introduces a degree of subjectivity into the evaluative process. Within this

framework, a strong state is defined as one characterized by institutional robustness and a

demonstrated capacity to respond effectively to domestic challenges. Conversely, a weak

state is conceptualized as a political system marked by systemic failure and institutional

incapacity across multiple dimensions of the analytical framework.

Keywords

State Fragility, Brazil, Portugal, China and Botswana.

Resumo

Este estudo promove uma compreensão da fragilidade do Estado, integrando um conjunto de

indicadores institucionais num enquadramento neo‑realista, ao mesmo tempo que se afasta

deliberadamente das pressuposições epistemológicas que tradicionalmente orientam as

avaliações dominantes sobre o desempenho do Estado. Em vez de recorrer a modelos

uniformes derivados sobretudo de experiências institucionais euro‑atlânticas, a análise adota

uma abordagem comparativa trans‑regional sensível a diferentes culturas políticas, trajetórias

históricas e práticas de governação. Os casos selecionados - China, Portugal, Brasil e

Botswana - constituem um conjunto heterogéneo de regimes políticos e trajetórias de

desenvolvimento. Metodologicamente, o estudo conceptualiza, operacionaliza e mede a

fragilidade do Estado através de um quadro multidimensional de indicadores que capta

variações na capacidade institucional, resiliência da sociedade e adaptabilidade das políticas

públicas. A análise especifica as regras de pontuação, os esquemas de ponderação e os

procedimentos de agregação aplicados a cada indicador, abordando igualmente questões de

validade de construto e de comparabilidade entre casos no contexto de uma análise

trans‑regional. Ao redefinir a fragilidade estatal como uma condição que não pode ser avaliada

de forma significativa por intermédio de padrões universalizados ou de referenciais externos

impostos, este estudo contribui para um quadro teórico mais inclusivo e sensível ao contexto.

Avança o debate académico sobre desempenho estatal, oferecendo simultaneamente

contributos relevantes para políticas públicas, particularmente em processos de decisão que

exigem atenção às especificidades regionais, às trajetórias históricas e às prioridades de

governação articuladas localmente num sistema internacional em transformação. O estudo

reconhece, no entanto, limitações metodológicas importantes. A comparação substantiva

entre os casos permanece desafiante devido às diferenças profundas nos seus contextos

históricos e pontos de partida de desenvolvimento. Além disso, vários indicadores necessitam

de ser calibrados com base em juízo analítico para captar variações entre dimensões, o que

introduz um grau de subjetividade no processo avaliativo. Neste enquadramento, um Estado

forte é definido como aquele que apresenta robustez institucional e capacidade demonstrada

de responder de forma eficaz a desafios internos. Em contrapartida, um Estado fraco é

conceptualizado como um sistema político marcado por falhas sistémicas e incapacidade

institucional em múltiplas dimensões do quadro analítico.

Palavras-chave

Fragilidade do Estado, Brasil, Portugal, China, Botswana.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

159

How to cite this article

Zizheng, Qi & Leandro, Francisco José B. S. (2026). Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of

State Fragility: Cross‑Regional Insights from China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 157-

190. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.7

Article submitted on 3rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th January

2026.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

160

TOWARDS A MEASURABLE AND INCLUSIVE THEORY OF STATE

FRAGILITY: CROSS‑REGIONAL INSIGHTS FROM CHINA,

PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, AND BOTSWANA

QI ZIZHENG

FRANCISCO JOSÉ B. S. LEANDRO

Introduction

Among the key challenges in global governance, fragile states emerge as a critical

concern worldwide, as Kofi Annan stated in his speech on peacebuilding, one of the

significant difficulties today is the problem of unstable nations. Later as he emphasised

more for the shared duty to reinforce and restore this broken fabric for global peace and

stability (Annan, 2009). This concern is also echoed in media and policy discourse. For

instance, Xinhua News highlights the importance of understanding fragile states by citing

real-world examples, such as the large-scale instability in South Africa and ethnic clashes

in Ethiopia. These incidents have repeatedly highlighted the vulnerability of certain

nations, rendering them fragile and inadequate in their ability to address and mitigate

geopolitical risks. This can often lead to a state prone to political and economic disruption

in severe cases and chaos (Xinhua News, 2021).

In scholarly literature, the concept of state fragility is widely used but remains contested

and multidimensional (Ferreira, 2016). Currently, scholarly discourse frequently engages

with concepts such as state collapse, stagnation, regression, and the fragility of political-

administrative structures (Ficek, 2022). Despite its presentence of the term in academic

articles, there is still no universally accepted definition of it. Some approaches focus on

the inability of the state to maintain territorial control and deliver basic services from the

government, while others put more emphasis on the deeper institutional weaknesses,

such as poor governance and a lack of legitimacy (Ferreira, 2016). Moreover, fragility

can be quantified by numbers using different models that are conducted by organisations.

The most commonly used empirical tools, like the Fragile States Index (FSI), attempt to

quantify fragility through comprehensive indicators such as the security apparatus,

economic decline and state legitimacy (THE FUND FOR PEACE, 2025). To further highlight

the ongoing debate is the measurement of the fragile state, scholars such as Baliamoune-

Acknowledgement: This project was generously supported by the University of Macau under Project

SGR2023‑00026‑FSS, Geopolitics of Brazil and the South Atlantic. The authors also acknowledge the use of

Microsoft Copilot in supporting the preparation of visual data presentations and in enhancing the clarity and

academic style of the manuscript; Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of

interest associated with this study.

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and Contemporary Dynamics

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Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

161

Lutz and McGillivray critiqued the existing measurement frameworks for lacking

theoretical coherence, normative biases and geopolitical interest, and they proposed the

fuzzy set theory to improve the evaluation of the fragility (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008).

Ferreira also uses the articles to compare with different evaluation systems to conclude

the lack of solid theoretical foundations, which provides a gap that leads to the

widespread confusion between causes, symptoms and the quantitative outcome.

Meanwhile, the international organisations such as the IMF also contribute to the

categories of fragility with the need for a policy response, with the emphasis on the lack

of a theoretical approach for this concept (Cebotari et al., 2025). Recent scholarship

proposes a rethinking of fragility not only as a developmental issue but as a relational

and dynamic consideration which can be shaped by global power structures, historical

legacies, and transnational pressures (Ficek, 2022). This broader understanding calls for

a more refined analytical approach with a diverse portfolio of case studies that can

capture the institutional dimensions of fragility, beyond conventional metrics of territorial

control or service delivery.

This research conducts a comparative analysis of four countries, which include China,

Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana. In the field of international relations, the scholarship

widely recognises China as the 21st century’s most transformative development,

solidifying its status as a defining rising power (Jalil, 2019). Its rapid economic

development and global interactions have drawn attention not only to its external

influence but also to the internal governance challenges, including issues of policy

coherence and institutional legitimacy. Another rising power in the global south group or

the regional power is Brazil, and its global positioning blends foreign policy ambition with

domestic tension. However, this external engagement also reveals Brazil’s internal

conflicting conditions, such as the nation selling high-value goods like advanced aircraft.

Meanwhile, tens of millions struggle in poverty (Burges, 2013). In contrast, Portugal is a

democratic state within the European Union, and it offers a case of institutional fragility

shaped by economic dependency, bureaucratic inertia, and the constraints of

supranational governance (Magalhães, 2005 & De Sousa, 2001). Most importantly, as

McNamara states, the Eurozone crisis stripped policy autonomy from governments across

the state, and the lack of a unified European solution, Portugal faced intense pressure to

adopt investor and agency to ensure debt repayment (Matthijs & McNamara, 2015).

Finally, Botswana is often described as an African success story because it demonstrates

relative institutional resilience despite structural vulnerabilities from the government, and

it also achieves a relatively high ranking for the stable state among different indices from

organisations (Good, 1999). However, this internal governmental system tends to have

deeper structural vulnerabilities rooted in governance practices and economic

dependency. The 2024 general election, in which the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

lost power for the first time in nearly six decades. It revealed underlying fragilities in

public dissatisfaction with corruption, nepotism, and inequality, as well as the economic

stagnation linked to the declining diamond sector (Bello et al., 2024). This political shift

challenges the conventional narrative of Botswana’s stability, which guides us to bring

this state together with other cases to conceptualise and reconsider the term state

fragility.

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

162

Our study proposes the research question of how state fragility can be defined and

evaluated? As each state embodies distinct governance systems, development pathways

are displayed with the display of internal fragility. By systematically examining how these

states confront challenges related to policy coherence, institutional legitimacy, and

resilience, this study seeks to illuminate the differentiated expressions of state fragility

across varied sovereignty to form a common applicable model. The significance of this

research lies in the theoretical innovation and empirical breadth. Early studies often relied

on institutionalist frameworks, emphasising the erosion of state capacity, authority, and

legitimacy (Carment et al., 2009). By building on this theoretical foundation, political

legitimacy theory also added to the research on the fragility of the state to highlight the

role of citizen trust and regime credibility in sustaining state resilience (Rosvadoski-Da-

Silva et al., 2021). Meanwhile, Ware also argues that the trajectories of colonial legacies

and global inequalities should also be considered in the institutional weakness in the long-

term development patterns (Ware & Ware, 2014). Moreover, discourse analysis and

critical theories have been used in analysing the term of state fragility on international

intervention and governance reforms for a specific region (Grimm et al., 2014). We

believe that the neoclassical realism offers a compelling theoretical framework for

analysing state fragility. Unlike classical realism, which puts more emphasis on the power

and structural politics, it focuses on the systemic and domestic variables, which can help

us to evaluate the resilience and fragility of the state. Empirically, this study challenges

the conventional assumptions of the case selection. The selection of China, Portugal,

Brazil and Botswana enables a comparative analysis across region-specific or

performance-based studies. A case study approach is particularly appropriate for this

research, as it facilitates an in-depth examination of the institutional configurations,

policy dynamics, and legitimacy mechanisms in each state within the context. These

cases, selected for their contrasting political systems, developmental trajectories, and

unstable geopolitical environment, can uncover patterns and divergences that challenge

dominant narratives and contribute to a more differentiated understanding of fragility.

Literature Review

The term of great power competition firstly used as description on the Cold War rivalry

between the United States and the Soviet Union (Brands, 2022), and the great power

politics are fundamentally determined by relative power (Gilpin, 1981). While power is

typically conceptualized as a state's ability to shape global politics in accordance with its

interests, systematic measurement. However, there is a lack of unified method of

quantifying it as this comprehensive assessment would entail delineating a country's

specific interests and its exact influence across a virtually infinite number of international

occurrences (Nye, 1990). However, this research would like to shift the focus from the

understanding and evaluation of the traditional power of the influential outside to the

power inside of the state for the concept of state fragility.

This is a core concept in the study of state governance and international development,

the concept of State Fragility has undergone dynamic evolution in its definition and scope

throughout these past decades. The late 20th century marked a critical foundational

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February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

163

period for related concepts. In 1982, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg took the lead in

focusing on the phenomenon of weak states in Africa. They argue that such states only

possessed a legal status as sovereign entities but lacked the capacity to effectively

exercise territorial control and governance functions (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). This

diverged sharply from Max Weber’s definition of a modern state as an actor with a

monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1948). This also leads to the current

research on state fragility from the perspective of governance capacity deficiency.

Aligned with the critique, Brock also argues that it overly equates fragility with a

breakdown in the state’s capacity to enforce control. Instead, it can be contended that

the core issue is systemic weakness in policy planning and implementation. It is rooted

in factors such as insufficient political will, bureaucratic inefficiency, weak institutions, or

conflict (Brock et al., 2013). In 1992, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner further proposed

the concept of the failed nation-state, which is a phrase that defines a state that can no

longer exist as a member of the international community, such as Somalia and Bosnia.

Furthermore, they also argue to advocate such states to be placed under UN trusteeship

(Helman & Ratner, 1992). Later, scholars like Robert Rotberg refined this framework,

and he argued that a nation-state fails when it is plagued by internal violence and ceases

to provide positive political goods to its citizens as a vacuum authority (Rotberg, 2002).

However, the connotation of fragile states itself was fragile in different contexts, and it

was subject to shifting interpretations across academic and policy contexts (Wang &

Chen, 2025). Nevertheless, the issue of state fragility gradually became a key focus of

foreign policy for developed countries and emerged as a critical topic in academic and

policy research (Kaplan, 2014). Scholars have sought to delineate the core traits of failed

states to clarify this contested concept, with Rotberg, Zartman, and other scholars

together summarising key characteristics of the loss of control of the state. It means the

state can no longer effectively assert authority over its geographic political boundaries.

Besides, the erosion of collective decision-making authority lacks the capacity to

formulate and implement comprehensive policies for the state. In addition, the state is

unable to provide basic public services such as healthcare, education, infrastructure and

security, and these elements are essential to sustain citizens’ livelihoods and well-being.

Crucially, it also represents a failure to fully participate in international affairs, which

includes an inability to uphold international obligations and acts as a recognised member

of the international community (Rotberg, 2002 & Zartman, 1995; Milliken & Krause,

2002). However, the failed state concept has been discussed in different opinions. As

Terry Call noted, it is overly broad and difficult to define precisely the failed state, which

can lead to a Conceptual muddle of different criteria in research and policy discourse

(Call, 2008). This conceptual ambiguity also leads to different evaluation systems.

Current researchers and institutions have developed a wide range of fragmented

frameworks to measure state fragility, and there is also a lack of standardisation,

resulting in significant discrepancies in empirical findings and frequent inaccuracies in

predictions (Zhu & Hao, 2017). As a result, the consensus on defining state fragility

remained elusive, with the term often used interchangeably with expressions like weak

performers, failing states, or failed states (Ferreira, 2016). Later, the concept of fragile

states gained international recognition in 2005, when the OECD Development Aid

Committee convened two high-level meetings, and it stated that the definition of a fragile

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February 2026, pp. 157-190

Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

164

state is a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement

policies (PPAIF, 2007).

Table 1 – What is state fragility?

Failed State

 Factors influencing state fragility as an internal and dynamic condition →

Strong State

Internal

External

Political Decision Making

Identity and

Participation

Needs

(Public Service)

Ability to

exercise

political

control and

commitment

Level of

internal

securitization

Efficiency of

the

institutional

decision-

making

process

Ability to

exercise the

monopoly of

the use of

force

Conflictual

social and

political

identities

Instable

social and

political

elites

Openness to

societal

participation

Level of

human

security

Ability to

address

the

evolution

societal

needs

Ability to

implement

a line of

political

and

economic

evolution

Ability to

provide

essential

public

services

Ability to

fully

participate in

foreign

affairs and

to be

perceived as

a security

threat

Diaspora’s

identification

and national

engagement

State is Non-Existent (Score=0)

Minimum Fragility (Sc

ore =240)

Source: Authors, based

on Appendix 1

After defining the fragile state, contemporary scholarship mainly focuses on identifying

the key correlates and drivers of fragility and finding a suitable measurement of the

fragile states. Carment and Samy argue that there is no direct association between

fragility and worse outcomes in conflict, human rights, democracy, or aid levels. Instead,

they assert that their analysis identified low human development through the UNDP’s

Human Development Index as the strongest correlate of fragility (Carment & Samy,

2009). This conclusion is also agreed by Patrick, who emphasised that the most severe

negative impacts of fragile contexts ultimately befall the states’ own populations (Patrick,

2006). Other scholars’ work has explored the structural and institutional drivers of

fragility. Migdal framed that the power of the state has to be concentrated in social

control. Capable states emerge as societies need to become relatively dependent on

state-provided services (Migdal, 1989). Building on this, Robinson and Acemoglu

highlighted elite capture as a critical driver. When power and wealth are dominant among

the elite, they neglect investments in basic public services. This can trigger a cycle of

civil war that erodes state capacity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). By contrast, Dutta and

Roy identified a mitigating factor for the fragile states. The higher transparency reduces

fragility by enabling free information flow. This empowers citizens to build trust in

government and political participation, which can address the legitimacy deficits that

often underpin vulnerability (Dutta & Roy, 2016). Chauvet and Collier anchored fragility

in the economic function system. They classify fragile or failed states as low-income

countries where poor economic policies, weak institutions, and deficient governance

make growth nearly impossible. The combination of poverty and stagnation significantly

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Towards a Measurable and Inclusive Theory of State Fragility: Cross

‑

Regional Insights from

China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana

Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

165

increases a country’s propensity for civil war, and this can be an influential factor in the

state's fragility (Chauvet & Collier, 2004). Despite the drivers of fragile state, scholars

also find particularity across regional scholarly traditions. Through the North American

literature, it has relied on the terms state failure and state collapse to describe severe

political crises in 1990s contexts like Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and

Afghanistan (Christensen, 2007). For the European and institutional literature, by

contrast, it eschews the failed state label, and it favours more nuanced terminology that

can avoid implying collapse. Sørensen argued that the term disrupted states refers to

entities that emphasise fragility as a dynamic, rather than a static condition. This

terminological shift also reflects deeper differences in how scholars conceptualise state

vulnerability. North American frameworks often focus on crisis severity, while European

and institutional work prioritises the potential for recovery and incremental improvement

(Sørensen, 1999). With the increasing importance of the multidimensional nature of

fragility, regional differences in how fragility is conceptualised further reflect the broader

scholarship to move beyond static, one-dimensional definitions. Currently, it has a shift

driven by growing recognition of fragility’s multidimensional nature, including drivers that

often lie beyond a state’s internal boundaries or control (Ware & Ware, 2014).

Meanwhile, fragile states are frequently framed as among the world’s security threats,

and this foundational assumption is highly contentious, as it lacks robust empirical

support (Brock et al., 2012; Carment & Samy, 2009; Nay, 2013; Patrick, 2006). The

challenge of this is the absence of a universal framework for measuring state fragility.

Scholars and international organisations have relied on a diverse array of assessment

tools, and each of them emphasises distinct dimensions of vulnerability. To address this

variability, this study draws on the combination of global and regional institutions’

measurement that balances comprehensiveness of the state’s portfolio. These include

the Fragile States Index (FSI), which was developed by the Fund for Peace, which

evaluates 178 countries across 12 social, economic, and political indicators (Fragile

States Index | the Fund for Peace, 2025). The Global Peace Index (GPI), which is

published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, quantifies peacefulness

based on measures of violence and militarisation (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2025).

Moreover, the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a tool

focused on low and middle-income countries that rates policy effectiveness and

institutional quality across 16 criteria (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment |

DataBank, 2025). In the context of African states, we also consider the African

Governance Index (AGI). As it is the regional indicator that assesses various aspects of

governance in Africa, it can provide a comprehensive evaluation of the state's governance

capabilities. We consider this to have great significance for measuring state fragility at

the regional level based on the regional context. Overall, by grouping analysis in these

widely recognised frameworks, our study seeks to mitigate the biases of a single

measurement tool and reflect the diverse dimensions of state fragility.

With the focus on empirical study, we complement realism’s analytical lens with insights

from widely recognised fragility measurement tools, each designed to quantify different

facets of state vulnerability. In this paper, we used neoclassical realism as the theoretical

framework with clear relevance to study state fragility. Neoclassical Realism (NCR)

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Qi Zizheng, Francisco José B. S. Leandro

166

emerged in the mid-1990s to address post-Cold War gaps in structural realism with the

strict focus on power distribution to integrate domestic factors (Dyson, 2008; Wivel,

2005). This theoretical adjustment makes NCR uniquely suited to studying state fragility.

Unlike frameworks that attribute fragility to either focusing purely on systemic pressures

or isolated domestic failures. NCR captures the interplay between these two spheres, and

we believe this lies at the core of fragility. As Gideon Rose first framed it over two decades

ago, NCR posits that systemic power shifts set the stage for strategic change, which

depends on the domestic situation (Rose, 1998). As scholars further elaborated, the

state behaviour is shaped not solely by the anarchic nature of the international order,

but also by factors such as a state’s domestic institutional capacity, the perceptions of

its leaders, and its strategic culture (Lobell et al., 2009). This contextual focus avoids

reducing fragile states to simply labelling failed states, and instead takes into

consideration their vulnerability in unique historical, regional, and domestic dynamics.

Take the NCR as our research framework; it can fill a fragility research gap because it

avoids overemphasising systemic determinism and reducing fragility to domestic failures.

Meanwhile, it can provide theoretical tools to explain the different vulnerabilities exhibited

by different countries in the face of international pressure and internal political factors.

This model asserts more on vulnerability to the interplay of global structures, domestic

institutions, and contextual history consideration (Kitchen, 2010; Lobell et al., 2009).

As Acharya and Buzan argue, mainstream international relations theory remains largely

an abstraction derived from Western historical experience and political thought (Acharya

& Buzan, 2019). This Western‑centric orientation has important implications for research

on state fragility, which has traditionally relied on analytical frameworks, case studies,

and measurement tools grounded in Western models of state‑building, governance, and

security. Such approaches often understate the significance of factors central to many

Global South contexts, including colonial legacies, post‑independence economic

structures, and external intervention in domestic governance.

By moving beyond Western‑derived abstractions, this study addresses key limitations in

the existing literature. First, it demonstrates how state fragility manifests differently

across diverse historical and institutional contexts, including African, Asian, Latin

American, and European states. Second, through comparative analysis, it develops a

more comprehensive evaluative model that integrates multiple indicators across different

types of states. In doing so, the study contributes to a more inclusive and globally

grounded approach to theorising state fragility.

The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The methodology section outlines the

research design, including the construction of the evaluative framework, indicator

selection, data sources, and comparative techniques. The case analysis section examines

state fragility in China, Portugal, Brazil, and Botswana across the dimensions of the

proposed model. The conclusion synthesises the theoretical and empirical findings and

reflects on their broader implications for the conceptualisation of state fragility.

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Methodology

Comparative research methodology is a pivotal methodological approach for

interrogating the dynamics of state fragility. By systematically examining the institutional

indicators across a diverse set of states, we argue that the mechanisms through

institutional configurations can shape a state model’s fragility. Notably, as the cases that

we study have distinct political regimes, levels of economic development, and geopolitical

positions, we can form a more balanced model to consider the variation between states.

For instance, as a member state of the European Union, Portugal’s institutional

development has been subject to the EU frameworks, and thereby it can demonstrate a

relatively high degree of institutional resilience. By contrast, Botswana, despite its

resource-dependent economic structure, has sustained a comparatively low level of

fragility through the establishment of institutionalised fiscal governance mechanisms.

China, alternatively, has fostered institutional concentration via its political system. It

confronts challenges about regime legitimacy and administrative transparency. As

Ferreira states in the article, comparative studies should be built on the foundation of a

theoretical framework in order to avoid just comparing different indicators from the index

(Ferreira, 2016). We also argue against the idea of considering the state’s history and

the process of institutional evolution rather than static analysis (Ware & Ware, 2014). By

analysing multiple cases with diverse indices, we can validate findings across different

contexts to minimise the risk of overinterpreting data from a single case.

Our evaluation model is structured around six dimensions of state internal management,

with the evaluation criteria detailed in Appendixes 1 and 2. Drawing on neoclassical realist

theory, six indicators are used to assess state performance: the external regional and

global environment; economic resilience and vulnerability; social control and legitimacy;

monopoly of violence and territorial control; governance and institutional strength; and

foreign policy and international agency.

The external regional and global environment refers to the state’s capacity to respond to

potential risks arising both domestically and externally. Economic resilience and

vulnerability capture the degree of economic diversification, which is critical for mitigating

risks associated with dependence on a single market. Social control and legitimacy relate

to the state’s ability to ensure everyday public safety and reflect the capacity of public

service provision. The dimension of monopoly of violence and territorial control assesses

the extent of governmental authority over coercive instruments, such as military and

security forces, and is closely linked to governance and institutional strength. Finally,

foreign policy and international agency evaluate the state’s external engagement and its

capacity to influence international norms and values.

This study employs a comparative framework to assess state resilience and institutional

capacity across six equally weighted dimensions: (1) the external regional and global

environment; (2) economic resilience and vulnerability; (3) social control and legitimacy;

(4) monopoly of violence and territorial control; (5) governance and institutional

strength; and (6) foreign policy and international agency. Each dimension is

operationalized through specific indicators (Appendixes 1 and 2) evaluated on a

standardized 1–10 scale. Scores of 0–2 indicate critical weakness and instability; 2–5

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reflect below‑average performance; 5–7 denote average performance relative to other

states; 7–9 signify strong state resilience; and 9–10 represent excellent institutional

capacity and stability.

The scoring process follows a relative, context‑oriented approach tailored to cross‑state

comparison among the selected cases. While the framework aims to ensure analytical

rigor and transparency, it acknowledges inherent limitations, including the partial

subjectivity associated with qualitative indicators. The primary objective of this

methodology is therefore not to generate definitive rankings, but to facilitate systematic

comparison by highlighting relative strengths and vulnerabilities across diverse states.

Case Analysis

External Regional and Global Environment (ERGE)

Geopolitical Pressures

From our perspective, a state’s stability is determined by the resilience of its domestic

institutions for converting the external pressures into cohesion rather than

fragmentation. Based on our perception, we give the score of 9 to Portugal as its

organisational embeddedness within the EU and NATO framework. These institutions

guarantee Portugal's external security for ensuring the internal stability. China (6.5) is

positioned in the relatively stable range, which shows the pressures from territorial

disputes and the strategic rivalry of major powers, such as the United States. We argue

that China has substantial state capacity, especially for naval power and strategic

infrastructure investments such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which can manage well

in the competition and territorial disputes. Botswana (6) achieves a score in the relatively

stable section. Its domestic politics are quite stable, with the recent movement for

changing the ruling regime. This rating reflects the resistance to the uncertainties in the

near future in its regional environment. Brazil (5.5), as the regional power, receives its

score due to the non-traditional security issues and fluctuating regional influence. For

instance, Brazil's policy shifts on the Amazon conservation issue fluctuated with the

resources and priorities. It has fundamentally undermined the state's credibility and

efficacy in geopolitics.

Trade Barriers

It is derived from the International Trade Barrier Index (TBI) from THOLOS Foundation

(ITBI, 2025). Within this dimension, Singapore (2.79) represents the benchmark of

lowest and Indonesia (5.84) the highest. In order to standardise the comparison across

different dimensions within the framework, the original scores are linearly converted to

a 0-10 scale which is presented by the lower trade barrier with the high score on this

dimension. Portugal (7.4) is rated as a stable category of stable, which is the beneficiary

of the EU's highly open and commercial policy. Botswana (6.5) remains within a relatively

stable band, and it reflects its overall openness as a customs union member. However,

it also faces developmental constraints such as digital trade facilitation and services

trade. Both Brazil (2.8) and China (2.2) are categorised as less stable in our evaluation,

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and the reasons are distinct. Brazil's score is primarily influenced by its high tariff

protections, such as the Mercosur common external tariff framework. Brazil imposes a

35% high tariff on imported vehicles (Blenkinsop, 2025). Conversely, China's primary

constraints are not on the traditional tariffs but in market access barriers within service

sectors. For financial services, foreign ownership in securities and insurance companies

was capped at 51% in 2017 and 100% in 2020 (Qu, 2020). Although China has gradually

reduced its limitations in this area, significant barriers persist across other key service

industries, such as the value-added services that require operating under a joint venture

with a Chinese partner for telecommunication.

Regional Integration

The original data from the Asia-Pacific Regional Integration Index was linearly

transformed to our evaluation model by using the highest performer (Poland, 0.728) and

weakest performer (Sudan, 0.218) as benchmarks (Huh & Park, 2018). The results are:

Portugal 9.51, China 5.20, Botswana 3.10, and Brazil 2.43. However, we find significant

limitations as the index primarily measures the degree of socio-economic integration,

such as trade, investment, and infrastructure. In contrast, the scoring criteria of this

study emphasise access to the market, security mechanisms and decision-making for the

regionality. Consequently, we have calibrated the data by integrating with our perception.

China (6.5) is constructing its substantive capture to shape the influence. This influence

is demonstrated through its role in shaping regional trade rules via RCEP and financial

connectivity, the Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB. Most importantly, it also

participates in security coordination like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Secondly, Brazil (5.5) and Botswana (6.0) achieve relatively stable progress in their

regional integration action. As the dominant power in Mercosur, Brazil possesses

institutional privilege to core market access and decision-making power. However, it also

faces immense challenges of internal issues with policy volatility and implementation

failures. Conversely, Botswana primarily derives stable leading positions in African states.

It shares benefits from goods market access within the Southern African Customs Union

(SACU). Compared to Portugal's deep and institutionalised integration and China's

strategic, shaping engagement, both Botswana and Brazil have a limited profile in this

dimension.

Global Shocks Vulnerability

Our data comes from the ND-GAIN Index, which quantifies states' vulnerability to global

shocks with readiness and resilience (ND-GAIN Index, 2025). Portugal (6.2)

demonstrates the highest readiness and lowest vulnerability among the selection states.

It is consistent with its developed economy and membership in the EU's support

mechanisms. China (5.8) reflects the significant adaptive capacity due to its economic

size and institutional strength. Especially for COVID-19, it also faces the challenges of

both initial disruptions and subsequent external demand shocks. Brazil (4.7) and

Botswana (4.9) score within the "Less Stable" range, and they reveal higher vulnerability

due to factors such as economic structure and developmental constraints.

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Based on the complete scoring data (Tables 2 and 2A), Portugal emerges as the strongest

performer in managing the external regional and global environment, achieving the

highest total score (32). Botswana (24) and China (22) demonstrate moderate resilience,

while Brazil (20) appears relatively more vulnerable in this dimension. The scores indicate

significant variation in national capacities to navigate external pressures, with Portugal

showing notable strength in regional integration (10) and managing geopolitical

pressures (9).

Table 2 – Numerical Evaluation of the External Regional and Global Environment

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Geopolitical Pressures

Trade Barriers

Regional Integration

Global Shocks Vulnerability

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 2A – Visual Evaluation of the External Regional and Global Environment (ERGE)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Economic Resilience and Vulnerability (ERV)

Economic Diversification

The next indicator of economic diversification is an important factor in the sustainable

development for state’s economy. Meanwhile, it is also important for analysing the

stability of the state performance. Diversification of the markets and industries can

minimise the strategic dependence on a single industry and foreign markets. The raw

data we use is from the Global Economic Diversification Index as follows: China 8.6,

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Portugal 3.6, Brazil 3.2, and Botswana 1.8 (Global Economic Diversification Index, 2025).

We convert it according to our criteria. However, we think that Portugal’s economy is

specialised in interconnected, value-added services and manufacturing niches, which are

deeply embedded in complex European supply chains. This structure provides inherent

buffers of diversification to mitigate the vulnerability of economic crisis more than Brazil

or Botswana. Therefore, we adjust its score to 5.0 for its performance. China receives a

score of 8.6 because of its strategic industrial plan from the government and sustained

upgrading within global value chains. However, Botswana's low score (1.8) shows the

structural vulnerability due to its persistent dependence on diamond extraction.

Debt Sustainability

The following indicator is the Debt sustainability, and we agree that it can reflect a state's

capacity to deal with the balance between the public debt and fiscal flexibility. We choose

the index of debt-to-GDP ratios from the World Population Review (World Population

Review, 2025), and we use the Brunei (2.3%) and Sudan (272%) represent the extreme

numbers to convert our selection state’s performance from the scale of 0-10. Botswana’s

(9.1) score signifies its good fiscal management. Brazil and Portugal have a similar ratio

of 76.5% with a score of 7.3. These governments consider fiscal flexibility relatively less.

Specifically, Portugal is a member of the Eurozone, which can operate within a common

monetary framework. This system can further limit its own independent currency and

interest rate policies. Brazil also has the issue of high borrowing costs and economic

volatility. China has a high ratio of 88.3% (6.8), which shows the role as a major global

economy, where such debt levels could have broader systemic implications, with the

opportunities to respond to market demand.

Informal Economy Size

Informal economy size is an indicator of illegal economic activity within the control of

governance. If the government cannot control well, then it has the possibility of leading

to the fragility of the state due to poor management skills. Based on the raw data we

find on the Informal Economy Sizes from World Economics, we convert the score from 0-

10 for our framework (World Economics, 2025). China has the lowest level among the

four states at (12.1%, 9.1). It reveals a formalised economic system with relatively strict

rules from the government. It is related to the stronger institutional capacity. Especially

for the extensive digital governance systems in China, to ensure a high rate of

compliance. Portugal follows at (17.6%, 8), and this indicates a developed formal

economy. As it has a mature regulatory framework within the EU economy framework.

However, Botswana (28.7%, 6.6) and Brazil (33.4%, 5.8) reveal the large informal

sectors, which have problems in areas such as tax collection and labour market

regulation.

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Unemployment Rate

The next indicator is the unemployment rate from the World Population Review (World

Population Review, 2025). Within the selected mid-range economies of these four states,

there are significant structural divergences. Botswana's exceptionally high rate of

(23.1%, 3.3) contrasts with the other three states, and it has profound structural

challenges within its labour market, which can be linked to the economic diversification

efforts and demographic pressures. Brazil (7.6%, 7.8) and Portugal (6.4%, 8.2) exhibit

moderately elevated rates. Brazil currently has a labour market that reflects prevailing

economic slack. This consistency can indicate challenges rooted in structural factors, such

as a large informal sector. This informality creates a dual labour market, with the formal

sector having insufficient job creation, and a large, low-productivity informal sector that

acts as a buffer but does not generate good employment and social security. However,

following the Eurozone debt crisis and COVID-19, Portugal implemented a series of labour

market policies aimed at enhancing flexibility and job creation, especially for tourism and

services. By contrast, China's notably lower rate of 4.6% (8.7) demonstrates relative

labour market resilience. The Chinese labour market benefits from a large manufacturing

industry with a dynamic service sector, which can gather a significant portion of the

workforce. Additionally, state-led initiatives, such as vocational training programs to

support the key employment groups.

Based on the complete data (Tables 3 and 3A), China demonstrates the strongest overall

economic resilience with a total score of 34, excelling particularly in economic

diversification (9) and maintaining a low unemployment rate (9). Portugal follows with a

total score of 28, showing balanced performance across debt sustainability (7), informal

economy size (8), and unemployment (8), though it reflects moderate diversification (5).

Brazil ranks third with a score of 24, which performs well in unemployment (8) but

exhibiting limited economic diversification (3). Botswana scores lowest (21), and it

reveals a high reliance on narrow economic sectors (2) despite strong debt sustainability

(9). The results highlight varied structural economic profiles, and China showing the most

diversified and stable labour market. However, Botswana's economy appears most

vulnerable due to its lack of diversification.

Table 3 – Numerical Evaluation of Economic Resilience and Vulnerability

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Economic Diversification

Debt Sustainability

Informal Economy Size

Unemployment Rate

Total Score

Source: Authors

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Table 3A – Visual Evaluation of Economic Resilience and Vulnerability (ERV)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Social Control and Legitimacy (SCL)

Trust in Institutions

The indicator of trust in institutions, it demonstrates the level of trust from the public in

the governmental sectors. However, there is no unified standard measurement to

evaluate the state’s performance. Thus, we employ a combination of several

measurements with our perception. The data mainly from the Edelman Trust Barometer

for China (77%, score 7.7) and Brazil (51%, score 5.1) (2025 Edelman Trust Barometer,

2025), and OECD data for Portugal (51.8%, score 5.2). (Trust in Government, 2025)

Botswana is currently absent from the major indexes and surveys. Therefore, according

to our evaluation, we give a score of 4.0 for this state. As the state is in a conditional

trust paradigm for sustained democratic stability, with a strong anti-corruption policy.

However, this indicator is closely related to the corruption and unemployment index, as

this can lose the trust of the public. China (7.7) receives many trusts from the public,

and it is because of the stable governance. Brazil (5.1) shows moderate but fragile trust,

and it is constrained by informality and polarisation. Portugal (5.2) reflects cautious trust

from the citizens, especially due to the distrust from the post-Eurozone crisis within the

EU framework.

Social Progress

The next indicator within this dimension is the social progress, and we put it here as it

demonstrates the development of the society, which is crucial for citizens. We argue that

the failure of the state is based on the perceptions of people. AlTi Global Social Progress

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Index (SPI) focuses on the non-economic aspects of society's well-being (Global Social

Progress Index, 2025). We convert the raw scores to a 0-10 scale by using Sweden

(90.75) and South Sudan (26.5) as the upper and lower benchmarks. Portugal has the

highest score among the four states of 9.1 (SPI 84.63), and this aligns with the top-tier

society atmosphere. Meanwhile, it also provides high-quality education, medical care and

access to information. The other three states of Brazil (7.2), China (6.7), and Botswana

(5.7) together to generate the cluster for their similar scores. All of them have met with

the basic needs, but there is still room for improvement. Specifically, we assert that

Brazil’s score reflects the huge inequity in opportunity, such as educational accessibility

and formal employment across different regions. China's position indicates considerable

success in meeting material basics like food and shelter. However, it has shortcomings

in environmental quality and aspects of personal freedom. Botswana’s lower score

highlights the gaps between the social status, particularly in advanced education and

health management.

Civil Society Vibrancy

The next indicator for our evaluation is the index of Civil Society Participation. Then we

convert the raw data, the highest score of Norway and the lowest score of North Korea

as benchmarks (Civil Society Participation Index, 2025). We transform the results of the

group for Brazil (9.1), Botswana (8.9), and Portugal (8.2). We argue that their scores

align with the vibrant civil society atmosphere. This high-level performance is ensured

by the comprehensive legal protections. It can lead these organisations to act as a critical

agency between the state and the citizens. However, China's score (2.1) places it in a

different category compared with other states. This score is related to China's single-

party system. Under the framework of the Communist Party's comprehensive leadership,

it is constrained by the system of institutional guidance and legal regulation.

Freedom of Speech

Upon the last indicator that we have just analysed, the next indicator we measure is the

freedom of expression. (The Global Expression Report, 2025). We use North Korea (0)

and Denmark (94) as the lower and upper benchmarks to give the score of our selection

portfolio. Both Brazil (9.36) and Portugal (9.04) achieve nearly maximum scores out of

10 on the scale, and this indicates relatively complete legal protections in the public

sphere. We found out that Brazil’s high score benefits from the federal structure and

political polarisation of the system of autonomy. Portugal’s position aligns with the EU

norms, which give attention to human rights and freedom. Botswana (8.19) also achieved

the high score, and it reflects its relatively free media environment within the African

context. This performance is consistent with its reputation for democratic stability.

However, China's score (0.21) is exceptionally low. This is closely related to the

geopolitical system, where there are some restrictions on the media and public discourse.

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Quality of Life

In order to draw a comprehensive analysis picture for the social development progress

to link with the state fragility, we identify the original data from the quality-of-life index

(NUMBEO, 2025). We later quantify the original figure framework from 0 to 10, and the

number from Luxembourg serves as the top and Nigeria’s score at the bottom of our

grading. Portugal (7.6) stands in the upper position of the selection of states due to its

location and membership in the EU. It shows that this state has a well-established system

for welfare, which can further demonstrate the strong causal relationship between

institutional development and system stability with the well-being. Then, China (5.5) is

placed at the average position among all the states, and the score reveals its substantial

progress in poverty, basic education, and healthcare access issues through the effort of

the governmental strategic plan for each year. Although Botswana (5.1) and Brazil

(5.0) have similar scores, they do not share similar regional contexts. We identify that

the performance of Botswana is relatively good, especially in the Sub-Saharan African

region, due to its effective management of diamond revenues and political stability.

However, Brazil encounters the social issue of the middle-income trap. This is where

inequality and institutional weakness constrain the improvements in living standards.

Table 4 – Numerical Evaluation of Social Control and Legitimacy

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Trust in Institutions

Social Progress

Civil Society Vibrancy

Freedom of Speech

Quality of Life

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 4A – Visual Evaluation of Social Control and Legitimacy (SCL)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

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Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control (MVTC)

Presence of Non-State Armed Actors

We argue that the presence of non-state armed actors serves as a critical indicator of

internal security and state monopoly of violence, but there is no index to present the

result. Regarding this indicator, we create our own evaluation based on the non-state

armed groups and legitimacy from the state. Portugal (9) falls within the highest stability

section. The state maintains an unchallenged monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

The law enforcement and military institutions are robust, professional, and fully capable

of maintaining internal order without contestation. China (9) is also positioned in the

most stable category as the central government retains the power to control over

territory through a comprehensive and unified security system, so the state

demonstrates a high capacity to encounter any emergent armed challenges swiftly.

Botswana (8) ranks within the stable range. It demonstrates good performance,

especially in the African context of stability and controlling the territory with the state

security forces. It faces the challenges of conventional crime rather than these organised

armed actors. Brazil (5) is categorised as relatively stable, as there are several regions,

particularly in remote areas, that have experienced significant influence from powerful

drug cartels and organised crime factions. This shows a partial erosion of the state’s

monopoly on violence, and it positions Brazil in a distinctively more vulnerable position

compared to the other three states.

Crime Rate

If we look inside the society, it is important to evaluate the safety of the environment.

The safety of the environment includes two parts: one is the crime rate, and the other is

the police effectiveness rate, which we will demonstrate later. This crime rate analysis

reveals a significant divergence among the four states for their internal governance

efficiency and social cohesion (Crime Index by Country, 2025). China's (8.7) and

Portugal's (7.3) scores are situated within the stable category, and it shows the relatively

high living standards and the effective system for police to prevent people commit the

crime. Especially for China, the high score is linked with its comprehensive and

technological system to record and prevent the occurrence of crime. Conversely,

Botswana (4.6) and Brazil (2.5) fall into the less stable category within our table.

Botswana's score presents its high daily conventional crime that can damage the quality

of living for people. Brazil's low score highlights systemic failure, especially for the state's

fundamental inability to address violence with the ineffective rule of law in rural

territories. In such regions, organised crime not only dominates security but also

infiltrates local governance and economic activities.

Border Control and Mobility

Based on our perceptual assessment with the fragility grading framework, the Openness

Score (Openness Index, 2025) reveals the management efficacy among the four states.

Portugal (9) is perceived as the most stable, as its effective control within a trusted

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regional bloc within the EU, where borders facilitate safe movement. For instance, its

borders benefit from the EU's integrated border management system, and it includes the

coordinated operations under the Schengen framework. Besides, China (9) is also

assigned a high score due to its demonstrated capacity for stringent sovereign control.

This is evidenced by extensive technological surveillance infrastructure and highly

regulated ports of entry. We argue that this score captures strong physical control for its

visa policy, and meanwhile, we should also separate the score from the view of diplomatic

openness. Botswana achieves a score of 6.5, as we think the official borders are managed

effectively with standardised procedures and authority, which is a model for other states

in Southern Africa. However, the 6.5 score critically accounts for persistent vulnerabilities

such as the country's long border monitoring issue, and it leads to challenges such as

informal cross-border trade, small-scale smuggling, and illegal migration. Brazil (4)

highlights the significant gap between policy and actual border control. The vast

Amazonian borders are notoriously permeable, and it provides opportunities for

organised crime. State authority is selectively applied, with remote regions effectively

outside full governmental control.

Military and Law Enforcers Effectiveness

The military and law enforcement capacity scores for China, Portugal, Brazil, and

Botswana are based on a normalized evaluation aligned with global defence rankings for

2026, such as the Global Firepower Index (GFP, 2026). We use the United States as the

upper benchmark (10 points) and Bhutan as the lower baseline (0 points), and then we

convert the score to the selection state. China (10) demonstrates a leading global military

posture, and it characterized by substantial defence expenditure, advanced technological

modernization, and extensive strategic resources to ensure the significant power

projection and territorial defence capabilities. Brazil (9) reflects a strong regional military

presence in South America, with considerable personnel and conventional assets though

its overall capacity. Portugal (8) represents a capable and professional defence force

integrated within NATO structures. Although its relatively small in scale, its military

benefits from high training standards, interoperability with allies. Botswana (4) illustrates

a limited but functional military framework designed primarily for border security and

domestic stability and it is constrained by its resource priorities.

Based on the comparative evaluation (Tables 5 and 5A), China exhibits the strongest

overall monopoly of violence and territorial control, reflected in uniformly high scores

across all indicators, particularly in suppressing non-state armed actors and maintaining

secure borders. Portugal also demonstrates a robust and effective system, characterized

by strong law enforcement and border management. Botswana shows a moderate level

of state authority but faces challenges in reducing crime and enhancing police

effectiveness. In contrast, Brazil presents the most significant vulnerabilities, with

notably low scores in crime rate and border control, indicating substantial challenges to

its territorial authority and internal security despite a relatively higher institutional

capacity score.

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Table 5 – Numerical Evaluation of Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Presence of Non-state Armed Actors

Crime Rate

Boarder Control and Mobility

Military and Police Effectiveness

Boarder Control and Mobility

Source: Authors

Table 5A – Visual Evaluation of Monopoly of Violence and Territorial Control (MVTC)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Governance and Institutional Strength (GIS)

Public Service Delivery

Service delivery is an important form of action from the government to the citizens, and

the service includes many kinds of them, such as the administrative registration, law

enforcement and so on. Based on the Public Service Index data by the organisation of

the Global Economy, we convert their data with the best score from Iceland (0.6) to 10,

while the Central African Republic's 10 represents 0 in our evaluation grading (The Global

Economy, 2025). Portugal’s high score (8.1) reflects that the system is widely accessible,

and it generally meets the requests from the citizens. China (5.5) in the band of relatively

stable indicates the gap of the system between service quality and accessibility.

Especially in the urban and coastal regions, they benefit from the relatively developed

infrastructure and system. However, the rural areas experience gaps which make the

system more complicated. Botswana’s score (4) points to poor quality in basic service

infrastructure and quality, despite its relative political stability. We argue that the public

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dissatisfaction here is very obvious with services such as healthcare, water, and

education’s limitations. Brazil’s score (3.3) draws our attention to the severe territorial

and social inequalities, especially in public service access. In a major urban centre, it

provides adequate services. However, in the rural regions with poor infrastructure, it

cannot meet the basic needs of people.

Bureaucratic Capacity

The next indicator is the Bureaucratic capacity, and we assert that it is a critical factor

when evaluating the state’s performance and resilience. However, there is a lack of a

unified existing framework to evaluate the states’ performance. Therefore, we create this

grading based on our understanding of professionalism, procedural efficiency and the

civil service system from the state. Portugal (8.5) shows a relatively strong system in

the civil service in terms of competence and effective operations. This can be exemplified

by its efficient platforms, such as the “Empresa na Hora” [speedy corporation] system,

which enables company registration to be completed within a short period. China (7.0)

‘s bureaucratic capacity presents the top-down policy implementation process with the

ability to execute the national projects efficiently. However, it has challenges

with complex administrative procedures that depend on regions in terms of local

governance. As Botswana’s score of 5.5 indicates a system that its civil service maintains

with basic operations, but it is struggled by procedural complexities such as the slow

implementation and transparency. Moreover, Brazil's score of 4.5 reveals a gap that is

affected by corruption and complex functionality. This systemic corruption frequently

happens, and it cannot be managed well by civil servants.

Corruption Levels

The assessment of corruption’s impact on the state economy must address its political

dimensions (Philp, 1997) because we believe that corruption in the governmental system

can affect the state’s stability. According to the corruption perceptions index from the

transparency international (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2025), we conclude the

scoring as Denmark’s 90, with the maximum score of 10, and South Sudan’s 8 as 0 in

our framework. Portugal and Botswana achieve the same corruption index of 57, which

corresponds to the score of 6 in our analysis. This score positions both states in the

relatively stable category. It indicates that corruption is perceived as a common

phenomenon in society. Although anti-corruption institutions and policies exist, their

effectiveness is limited and insufficient. China achieves a corruption index of 43, and it

converts the score of 4.3. It is positioned in the less stable section. This signifies that

corruption has become a pervasive phenomenon and may act as a required approach to

accessing public services. The score reflects that despite ongoing anti-corruption

promotion from the government, the possibility of corruption persists across multiple

sectors. Brazil receives the index of 34 with a score of 3.2 out of 10, which represents

the lowest score among the four states. It clearly points to a deeper, institutionalised

corruption. This indicates not only that corruption permeates all levels but also that public

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resources are often used as instruments for corruption. From a historical perspective,

there were several political corruption scandals makes the low trust from the public.

Decentralisation and Local Governance

Decentralisation presents the potential to strengthen the state’s cohesion to further

enhance the state’s stability. However, it also has the possibility of disintegration. We

find this indicator is based on the figure from the rule of law and judicial independence

of the World Justice Project (WJP Rule of Law Index, 2025). We convert the score with

Denmark (0.9) sets as 10 and Venezuela (0.26) as the minimum number of 0. Portugal

(6.4) represents the category of relatively stable states. This indicates the effective rule

within the law framework of the judicial institutions. However, the score also suggests

the difficulties, such as procedural delays and the gap between different places in the

state. Botswana receives the score of 5.3, which represents a quite significant state in

the Sub-Saharan African region. It reflects a basic legal system that maintains some

degree of judicial independence. The limitations are in the judicial capacity, accessibility,

and consistency in terms of service quality across regions. Brazil has a score of 3.8, and

it highlights the widespread problems such as judicial inefficiency and corruption in the

legal institutions, which can affect institutional trust. Although China (3.4) gets a similar

score to Brazil, it reflects another issue with the central authority of the limited judicial

independence among cities. Legal institutions in China are effective, but it does not have

full autonomy at the regional level.

Based on the comparative assessment of governance and institutional strength (Tables

6 and 6A), Portugal demonstrates the strongest overall performance with a total score of

29, which reflects high-capacity public service delivery and bureaucratic effectiveness.

China follows with a score of 20, characterized by substantial bureaucratic competence

yet constrained by lower decentralization and corruption control. Botswana achieves a

balanced profile with a score of 21, performing adequately in corruption control but

showing limitations in service delivery. In contrast, Brazil records the lowest score of 15,

indicating systemic institutional weaknesses, particularly in public service provision and

integrity mechanisms. These results highlight distinct governance models, ranging from

Portugal’s service-oriented and institutionally robust system to Brazil’s more vulnerable

and uneven administrative framework.

Table 6 – Numerical Evaluation of Governance and Institutional Strength

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Public Service Delivery

Bureaucratic Capacity

Corruption Levels

Decentralisation and Local

Governance

Total Score

Source: Authors

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Table 6A – Visual Evaluation of Governance and

Institutional Strength (GIS)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

Foreign Policy and International Agency (FPIA)

Diplomatic Presence and Alliances

The combination of analysis on diplomatic presence and alliance is an indicator to show

the linkage between the state and the world to ensure political legitimacy. This indicator

is based on two quantifiable data from diplomatic networks and the multilateral

engagement. The raw figure is from global diplomacy index from Lowy Institute (Lowy

Institute Global Diplomacy Index, 2024). Based on the data, China receives a score of

10 out of the full score, which indicates a stable diplomatic network with a well-connected

network in each region globally. In key arenas like climate change and global

development agendas, it actively engages in comprehensive cooperation partnerships for

its national interests and governance models. Although we argue that Portugal has the

original score of 4.4, we have adjusted it to 9 in the most stable category. However, the

European Union membership influences geopolitics. As Portugal's foreign policy is deeply

embedded within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and it uses this rotating

presidency and NATO membership to prioritise its critical influence, such as the EU-Africa

strategic partnership. Both Brazil (7.5) and Botswana (2.5) have relatively less influence

compared with China and Portugal, but it has demonstrated quite different patterns for

the differences in the scores. As a regional leader, Brazil maintains a diplomatic network

with a focus on Latin America and major global powers. Although it is a leading power

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within Mercosur and BRICS, it lacks influence on other parts of the world, such as Asian

and European states. Botswana concentrates on the key neighbouring states, such as

South Africa, for resource allocation.

Soft Power and Diaspora Engagement

Based on the definition of the soft power is defined as the cultivation of good relationships

and attention between states through favourable policies, qualities, and actions

(Gallarotti, 2011). We argue that soft power can play an important role in the stability of

states, as soft power helps to secure a peaceful external environment for domestic

development. Our evaluation of the score is based on the data from global soft power

index of Brand Finance in 2025 (Global Soft Power Index, 2025). Portugal (5.3) shows

its limitation on global influence, but it has influence in the European region because of

its presidency of the European Union. Meanwhile, it gives a good example of culture and

education within the Lusophone area and Southern Europe because of its rich heritage.

China (8.9) ranks as the second state in the world for its soft power, and it shows major

strengths in the sectors of business, education and cultural influence. Dominant

platforms like TikTok that can reshape global media consumption, and companies like

BYD in electric vehicles and Shein in fast fashion, demonstrate their competitive

advantage in the global consumer market for China. Brazil (4.9) has a distinct and

influential cultural influence in the region, especially for its culture. However, it also

encounters challenges in governance, such as the issues with political instability,

corruption scandals, and urban security problems, and these can also damage its

international reputation. Botswana (1.8) has a positive reputation for governance within

its region in Africa, which also shows the limitation for the other parts of the world.

Basically, due to the limitation of the geopolitical influence, the state does not have major

global brands and a large engaged diaspora. This results in a vague international image

without the relative soft power leverage.

Ability to Shape and Respond to International Norms

There is tremendous power in a settled norm (Axelrod, 1986), and we believe that norm

is crucial for a state to legitimise its authority for stability. Therefore, we create an

evaluation criterion for indicating the stability and norm performance. China (9)'s score

reflects its position as a global leading player in the contemporary international order. As

a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it demonstrates a high

capacity in formulating international rules and norms, such as the Belt and Road Initiative

and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Furthermore, it strategically uses the

international forums to protect and expand its own interests, especially in the domains

of digital governance, cybersecurity, and climate diplomacy. These engagements make

it a stable agenda-setting power globally. Brazil (7) is classified as a proactive and

influential participant of the multilateral system. It is good at leveraging the existing

institutions to secure its own state interests, such as the agricultural trade in the World

Trade Organisation. We argue this score is recognised for the role of the constructive

regional leader with limited influence, the norms and regulations in a specific context,

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such as the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the climate change

agenda meeting. Portugal (6) signifies its status as a relatively stable actor within a rules-

based order shaped primarily by others, especially the European Union. As a member of

the European Union and NATO, Portugal's foreign policy is deeply embedded in its

framework, so we usually treat Portugal as an EU member state. We argue that Portugal

participates actively in international organisations, but its influence is selective as it

possesses limited discourse power compared with the other EU states. Its normative

contribution is mainly within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries due to

its colonial history. We argue that Botswana (4) is a rule-taker rather than a regional

power to shape the rules and norms in the region of Africa. The diplomacy of the state is

concentrated on core interests, especially for its resources. Based on the evaluation of

foreign policy and international agency (Tables 7 and 7A), China exhibits the most

substantial global influence with the highest total score of (28) across all indicators.

Portugal and Brazil are tied in total score (20) Portugal demonstrates strong diplomatic

alliances (9) but more moderate soft power (5). While Brazil shows a balanced capacity

with notable strength in shaping international norms (7). Botswana, with the lowest

aggregate score (9), reflects limited international agency, especially in soft power and

diaspora engagement (2).

Table 7 – Numerical Evaluation of Foreign Policy and International Agency

States

Botswana

Brazil

China

Portugal

Diplomatic Presence and Alliances

Soft Power and Diaspora

Engagement

Ability to Shape and Respond to

International Norms

Total Score

Source: Authors

Table 7A – Visual Evaluation of Foreign Policy and International Agency (FPIA)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

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Conclusion

This study employs a comparative case analysis using a multidimensional analytical

framework to examine and assess the concept of state fragility across four cases:

Botswana, Brazil, China, and Portugal. These states were selected due to their distinct

political systems and differing geopolitical positions, which together provide a valuable

basis for illustrating variations in state stability. By comparing cases with diverse

institutional arrangements and international roles, the analysis seeks to demonstrate how

fragility and stability manifest across different state contexts.

The framework is constructed around six interrelated dimensions: external adaptability;

economic and social resilience; social control and legitimacy; monopoly of violence;

governance efficacy; and international agency. Based on this comparative assessment,

we define a “strong state” as one that scores the maximum value (10) across all

indicators, while a “weak state” is defined as one that scores the minimum value (0).

State fragility is conceptualized as a condition situated between these two ideal types,

reflecting varying degrees of institutional capacity and vulnerability.

Within this analytical framework, a strong or stable state is characterized by high levels

of resilience, adaptability, and effectiveness in the operation of its domestic institutions.

In a rapidly changing international environment, states are increasingly exposed to

external shocks and pressures. The capacity to anticipate, manage, and respond to such

pressures is therefore central to maintaining systemic stability and avoiding institutional

breakdown. This adaptive capacity is closely linked to state fragility: the more effectively

a state manages internal and external challenges, the lower its level of fragility.

Among the four cases examined, Portugal emerges as the closest approximation to a

stable state (Table 9). Its membership in the European Union and NATO provides

institutional safeguards against geopolitical shocks, as well as access to broader markets

and security guarantees. EU membership has also contributed to a diversified and

relatively balanced economy, a sustainable debt profile, high employment levels, and an

overall high quality of life. While instances of corruption exist, they do not appear to be

systemic within the civil service, indicating relatively effective rule of law and institutional

enforcement. In terms of international agency, Portugal maintains an extensive

diplomatic network, representing both national interests and those of the European

Union. Although its global influence remains limited, Portugal acts as a constructive

participant within the international normative framework and plays an active regional

role, particularly within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, especially in

areas related to economic cooperation and educational exchange.

By contrast, the concept of a weak state refers to a political system that experiences

severe failure and incapacity across multiple dimensions of the analytical framework.

Such states are typically unable to perform basic sovereign functions, often as a result

of sustained domestic pressures and loss of territorial control. However, none of the four

selected cases fully corresponds to this ideal-type category. In general terms, a weak

state is characterized by chronic instability, frequent territorial disputes, and an economy

dominated by monopolistic actors closely linked to political elites. Corruption within

governmental institutions undermines service provision, leading to dysfunction in basic

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public sectors. Furthermore, the state lacks effective control over violence, with non-

state armed actors playing a significant role and international intervention - often through

organizations such as the United Nations - becoming necessary. Diplomatic isolation and

the absence of stable alliances further reduce international agency, rendering such states

largely passive recipients of externally driven negotiations.

Building on these conceptual benchmarks, this study defines state fragility as a condition

in which a state lacks the legitimacy and capacity required to function effectively while

withstanding both external pressures and internal challenges. Fragility should be

understood as an evaluative indicator of potential risk to overall systemic stability rather

than as evidence of state failure per se. Importantly, fragility does not imply the imminent

collapse of the state; rather, it signals an increased probability of crisis arising from

limited institutional capacity to respond effectively to shocks and stresses.

Table 9 – Comparative Visual Representation (All Scores)

Source: Authors using Microsoft Co-pilot for data display.

Legend: Minimum = 0 (failed) – Maximum= 10 (strong)

As this study conceptualizes fragility and stability as phenomena grounded in societal

perceptions, we developed an evaluative framework to illustrate variations in state

performance across selected dimensions. This framework, however, is subject to

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important limitations inherent in multidimensional measurement approaches. In

particular, the choice of indicators reflects our analytical understanding of state

functionality and may insufficiently capture the historical trajectories through which

states have evolved.

Moreover, it is important to emphasize that no state can be classified as either entirely

strong or entirely weak. State development is a dynamic and ongoing process, and any

assessment of fragility represents a temporally situated snapshot rather than a definitive

or permanent outcome. Each state’s fragility profile is closely shaped by its specific

historical, political, and social context, underscoring the fact that states do not begin

from a common baseline nor follow identical developmental paths.

By examining four analytically diverse cases, our objective is not to rank states along a

single continuum of fragility, but rather to generate a broader understanding of how

fragility manifests across different contexts. The selected dimensions and indicators

function as heuristic tools intended to clarify the concept, rather than as exhaustive or

deterministic measures. Consequently, underperformance in any single indicator or

dimension should not be interpreted as rendering a state wholly fragile, but rather as

highlighting specific areas of vulnerability within an otherwise complex and evolving state

structure.

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