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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier

Portugal and China in International Relations:

Historical Legacies and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026

IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN CHINA: PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE POLICY

AT THE INTERSECTION OF STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

LUÍS FILIPE PESTANA

luis.pestana@ipor.org.mo

He completed his bachelor’s degree (2010) and master’s degree (2013) in International Relations

at the Catholic University of Portugal. Since 2021, he has been enrolled in a Ph.D. program in

Political Science at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas. His research focuses

primarily on ideology and the Chinese education system, with additional interests in language

policy and China’s foreign policy. He has resided in China since 2014, having taught Portuguese

at Harbin Normal University (2014–2016) and Beijing Normal University (2016–2023). He

currently works for the Instituto Português do Oriente (IPOR, Portugal), serving as the institute’s

delegate for Mainland China at its Beijing office. He also holds the position of Education and

Culture Attaché at the Embassy of Portugal in Beijing. In addition to teaching Portuguese, he

supports the organization of cultural activities, facilitates connections between IPOR and other

Camões Institute focal points across Asia, and assists the Embassy in various education- and

culture-related functions.

LUÍS PIRES

luispires@um.edu.mo

He is a Senior Instructor in the Department of Portuguese at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities,

University of Macau (China). He holds a degree in Classical Languages and Literatures from the

University of Lisbon and a Master’s in Portuguese as a Non-Native Language from the Open

University of Portugal. His academic and professional trajectory includes five years as a

Portuguese language lecturer at Tianjin Foreign Studies University, following an invitation from

the University of Lisbon. Subsequently, he was appointed by the Camões Institute to Shanghai

International Studies University, where he lectured for four years. He later served as Attaché for

Education and Culture at the Portuguese Embassy in Beijing, concurrently coordinating the local

delegation of the Portuguese Institute of the Orient (IPOR). Luís Pires earned his Ph.D. in

Portuguese Studies, with a specialization in Language Policy, from the Open University of

Portugal. His research interests focus on language planning, linguistic diplomacy, and the role of

Portuguese in multilingual contexts, particularly within the framework of Sino-Lusophone

relations.

Abstract

This study examines the ideological foundations of foreign language education in the People’s

Republic of China, arguing that language planning is inseparable from the state’s ideological

strategies and international engagement. Drawing from a historical perspective that traces

the evolution of Chinese education from the late imperial period to the present, it

demonstrates how educational policy has consistently subordinated intercultural exchange to

national interests. Foreign language instruction, rather than reflecting openness or pluralism,

is deployed as a strategic instrument, valued for its developmental utility while subject to

strict ideological boundaries. The analysis focuses on the political role of education as a means

of regulating access to foreign knowledge and maintaining internal cohesion. In this context,

foreign languages are approached not as cultural bridges, but as managed resources:

imported for diplomatic and economic advantage yet carefully contained to avoid ideological

disruption. This dynamic is exemplified by the case of Portuguese, whose rise in China’s

academic landscape reflects wider geopolitical and economic shifts rather than cultural

demand or educational reform. Its institutional expansion aligns closely with China’s foreign

policy interests, especially in relation to Lusophone countries and the symbolic role of Macau.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

By situating language policy within the ideological architecture of the Chinese state, the article

contributes to the study of international education as a form of statecraft. It also underscores

the importance of aligning language promotion strategies - such as those pursued by Portugal

- with the internal logics and constraints of partner countries. In doing so, it responds to the

goals of this special issue by offering a critical, historically grounded account of Sino-

Portuguese engagement through the lens of ideology, education, and global positioning.

Keywords

Ideology and Education, Language Policy, Portuguese as a Foreign Language, China.

Resumo

Este estudo examina os fundamentos ideológicos do ensino de línguas estrangeiras na

República Popular da China, argumentando que o planeamento linguístico é inseparável das

estratégias ideológicas do Estado e do seu posicionamento internacional. A partir de uma

perspetiva histórica que acompanha a evolução da educação chinesa desde o final do período

imperial até à atualidade, demonstra-se que a política educativa tem, de forma consistente,

subordinado o intercâmbio intercultural aos interesses nacionais. O ensino de línguas

estrangeiras, longe de refletir abertura ou pluralismo, é mobilizado como instrumento

estratégico, valorizado pela sua utilidade para o desenvolvimento, mas confinado a limites

ideológicos estritos. A análise centra-se no papel político da educação enquanto mecanismo

de regulação do acesso ao conhecimento estrangeiro e de preservação da coesão interna.

Neste enquadramento, as línguas estrangeiras não são concebidas como pontes culturais,

mas como recursos geridos: importados por razões diplomáticas e económicas, porém

cuidadosamente controlados para evitar potenciais perturbações ideológicas. Esta dinâmica é

exemplificada pelo caso da língua portuguesa, cujo crescimento no panorama académico

chinês reflete transformações geopolíticas e económicas mais amplas, e não uma procura

cultural intrínseca ou uma reforma educativa. A sua expansão institucional alinha-se

fortemente com os interesses da política externa chinesa, particularmente nas relações com

os países lusófonos e no papel simbólico de Macau. Ao situar a política linguística na

arquitetura ideológica do Estado chinês, esta investigação contribui para o estudo da educação

internacional como forma de “construção do estado”. Sublinha, igualmente, a importância de

alinhar estratégias de promoção linguística - como as desenvolvidas por Portugal - com as

lógicas internas e as restrições dos países parceiros. Deste modo, responde aos objetivos

deste número temático ao oferecer uma leitura crítica e historicamente fundamentada do

envolvimento sino‑português através das lentes da ideologia, da educação e do

posicionamento global.

Palavras-chave

Ideologia e Educação, Política Linguística, Português Língua Estrangeira, China.

How to cite this article

Pestana, Luís Filipe & Pires, Luís (2026). Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language

Policy at the Intersection of Statecraft and Strategy. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies and

Contemporary Dynamics, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2, February 2026, pp. 55-79.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0126.3

Article submitted on 13rd November 2025 and accepted for publication on 22nd January

2026.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN CHINA: PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE

POLICY AT THE INTERSECTION OF STATECRAFT AND STRATEGY

LUÍS FILIPE PESTANA

LUÍS PIRES

Introduction

Foreign language education in China has long mirrored the state’s evolving engagement

with the outside world. While English has remained dominant, other languages have

gained traction according to shifting political and economic interests. Among these,

Portuguese presents a compelling case, due not only to its unique historical entry into

China’s linguistic landscape but also because of its association with strategic partnerships

across the Lusophone world.

This comes at a time when the Chinese leadership has embarked on a decidedly more

ideological approach to education. Drawing lessons from classical Chinese philosophy and

incorporating elements of Marxism-Leninism, Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics for a New Era attempts to produce a form of harmonious society,

by which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the sole unifier of the Chinese people.

Portuguese as a foreign language, which is directed at foreign nationals who are not from

the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), thus faces new challenges.

The present paper offers a broad evolution of the concept of harmony and how it has

been used during different stages of Chinese history. Furthermore, the CCP’s ideology

has been increasingly pushed into the education system since 2012, as a way of creating

a harmonious society Under-Heaven, starting with the Chinese youths. This, conversely,

leads to a new evaluation of different possibilities for PLE to adapt to the current

ideological education environment in a time of great uncertainty.

Building Social Harmony in the Era of Xi Jinping: The Role of Education

Philosophical Origins of Harmony

The concept of harmony (he 和) is ever-present in Chinese history. During the pre-Qin

dynasty period, Chen (2018, p. 43) states that social and political upheaval was the norm.

Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest associated with this study..

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

Pines (2023) describes how the decline of the Zhou dynasty (1046 to 256 BC) resulted

in a power struggle to achieve unity under a new leadership. The 4th century BCE

furthered this status quo during the Warring States period (Zhanguo 战国, 453–221 BC).

Pines (2023) indicates that:

“As wars became bloodier and more devastating, and with no adequate

diplomatic means to settle the conflicts in sight, most thinkers and statesmen

came to an understanding that unity of “All-Under-Heaven” (tianxia

天下

) was

the only means to attain peace and stability” (Pines, 2000).

This greatly influenced philosophers of the time who searched for the ideal form of

harmony. Li (2008, pp. 423 & 424) further confirms this statement, elaborating that

harmony pre-dates Confucius. Citing Shi Bo, a scholar-minister of the Western Zhou

(1046–771 BCE), harmony is achieved by means of the five flavours and six measures

of sound. Yan, Li & Fu (2021, p. 57) further illustrate how Shi Bo viewed this concept as

a way of congregating different perspectives to formulate new ones. This “harmony

without uniformity”, which focuses on achieving an equilibrium between different

perspectives, is also promoted by the Chinese government (China Keywords, 2024), as

this article will later illustrate.

The Warring States period thus produced a series of schools of thought, each with their

epistemology and solutions to create greater harmony. Of the One Hundred Schools, four

are of particular interest to this study and are considered among the most influential of

Chinese philosophies: Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism and Mohism. The first of these,

Confucianism, has generally garnered more attention as still contributing to the guiding

principles the CCP follows to this day. In the Confucian Classic Shi Jing (诗经), harmony

is an ideal that encapsulates a balanced relationship with other people and nature. In the

Yue Ji (乐记), following up on Shi Bo’s statements, music plays an integral role in

promoting morals. Li (2008, p. 425) further states:

“Confucius considered harmony fundamentally necessary. In the Confucian

view, music more than anything else captures the essence of harmony. Music

is the process of bringing a plurality of sounds into concord. (…) In the

Confucian view, music has this powerful positive effect on people because it

is intrinsically harmonizing".

Harmony is not exclusive to Confucian thought, on the contrary. In Daoism it plays a

central role, as Chen (2018, p. 42) clarifies. For Daoists, there are three main forms of

harmony: natural harmony (tian he 天和), human harmony (ren he 人和), and the

harmony of the heart-mind (xin he心和). They are all integrated to form their own

philosophy, one that is centred on humans’ relation to the spirit and not merely attached

to societal and political affairs (Chen, 2018, p. 43).

Legalism, another philosophy of the “Hundred Schools”, also concerns itself with this

concept. In the Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang reminds the reader that change is part

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

of society and that coercion is the only force capable of leading a knowledgeable people

(Pines, 2023). To construct harmony, therefore, morals are not enough, as Confucianists

would believe. Han Fei who, alongside Shang Yang, is one of the main Legalists, claimed

that morality guided human interaction in the past because it was an era of abundance.

As resources became more limited due to population growth, Han contended, just like

Shang, that coercion was necessary to create harmony Under Heaven. The essence of

this thought led Qin Shihuang’s

approach to governance: a highly centralized

government which resulted in brutal takedown of those that deviated from the laws of

the land (Pines, 2000; Pines, 2023)

. The argument can also be made that the PRC has

used legalism as a means to achieve harmony. Mao Zedong and his followers believed

that legalists could contribute to the construction of a new nation. The Great Leap

Forward, as Tanrikut (2024) explains, was characterized by a combination of Marxism-

Leninism and legalism.

Finally, Mohism promotes harmony through a combination of impartial concern for those

All Under Heaven and the existence of an authoritarian centralized government backed

up by a bureaucratic system. The leader, as Fraser (2024) indicates, should be

enlightened and guided by virtue. In the eyes of Mohists, education promotes a social

conformity based on ethical principles that everyone will follow. Furthermore, political

issues can be resolved through debate, as dialogue leads to objective solutions (Fraser,

2024).

The Fall of the Qing and the Republican Era (1911-1949)

Different solutions to establish some sort of socio-political order were tried and tested

throughout Chinese history and well into the last years of the Qing dynasty and the

Republican era. Liang Qichao, one of the key modernizers of Chinese sociology, sought

out to prepare the nation for a new era. As such, Liang envisioned a social harmony that

incorporated elements of Western and Chinese thought. As Liu (2020, pp. 65-66) states,

Liang was profoundly influenced by Kang Youwei, his mentor and a great critic of classic

Chinese philosophy, studied Western thinkers including during his academic years in

Japan and followed his mentor in attempting to reform Confucianism. As Jin (2023) points

out, the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) propelled a young Liang to a path of

modernizing China. Crucially, in 1898, Liang and Kang launched the Hundred Day’s

Reform period, an attempt to save the imperial rule, that ended being suppressed by

conservative forces (Jin, 2023). Nonetheless, this did not mean rejecting the past, on the

contrary. Kang Youwei’s New Text Confucianism proposed to preserve the essence of

Confucius and Mencius while adapting it to a new political environment. Fairbank (2006,

p. 229) further indicates that Kang wished for Confucianism to become the national

religion of China, a firm commitment to the “new nation’s” connection to its past.

Liang, however, would stray away from his mentor, thanks to his interaction with Yan Fu,

abandoning the idea that Confucianism should be protected at all costs (Liu, 2020: 81-

First emperor of the Qin dynasty, Qin Shihuang ruled from 259 to 210 BC.

Legalism fell out of favor from the Han dynasty onward

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Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

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February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

83). For Liang, in the end, Chinese philosophy, and Western thought should give way to

a new form of balance and harmony. The end of the imperial era, however, brought

significant changes to the Chinese political sphere.

The fall of the Qing, a dynasty long in decline as evident from the Opium Wars and the

Taiping rebellion (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 201-206) gave way to the rise of

republicanism. For Sun Yat-sen it was an opportunity to

“(…) dismantle the Manchu rule that had governed China for more than two

and a half centuries and had become, particularly in the nineteenth century,

an object of scorn and frustration to much of the Chinese citizenry” (Chang

& Gordon, 1991, pp. 21-22).

This was a particularly novel concept in China at the time, considering how industrial

development was at the center of republican policies. As Barrington Moore (1966, pp.

177-178) explains, the urbanization efforts of the early 20th century resulted from the

disintegration of the social order of the countryside and the emergence of commerce in

the coastal areas

. For Sun Yat-sen, this served as a basis to create a new form of

nationalism, one that repudiated cosmopolitanism or universalism (Sun, 1924, pp. 26-

28) while drawing inspiration from a distant past. Sun Yat-sen famously repurposed

Tianxia 天下 or All Under Heaven, the Zhou dynasty’s sinocentric cosmos (Zhao, 2019),

calling it Tianxia weigong 天下为公. For Sun, the concept of Great Harmony was relevant,

as Chen (2011) illustrates. A key part of the Book of Rites (Liji 礼记), the Datong 大同

was essential to the socio-political harmony of the past. The Tianxia weigong, as Sun

proposed, was a rebranded version intended to make All Under Heaven serve the people

(Chang & Gordon, 1991, p. 129; Chen, 2011)

The following decades were marked by constant inner turmoil. Yuan Shikai’s rule during

the Beiyang government period was characterized by ever-lasting disputes among

different cliques and warlords (Fairbank & Goldman, 2006, pp. 249-251). By the time

China had finally established itself as a somewhat unified country, the initial pressure and

later invasion by the Japanese Empire meant that the Kuomintang (KMT) leaders would

be incapable of asserting their form of harmony. The situation became even more dire

with the ascension of the CCP as the main rival to the KMT. Once the former defeated the

nationalists, Mao Zedong set his sights to guide the nation to socialism. While the first

few years were distinctively not socialist (Blecher, 2019, p. 155)

, similarly to the New

Economy of the Soviet Union, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution

repudiated China’s philosophical heritage, Confucianism being particularly targeted as an

enemy of progress. However, a strong argument can be made that legalism did exert

some influence on Mao’s policies, for two main reasons. Firstly, both legalism and Maoism

required strong, centralized and authoritarian leadership. Secondly, the law was

Yet, the country was clearly lacking in machinery: of around 20 000 factories, China only possessed 363 with

machines.

Up until the Great Leap Forward the Chinese economy retained some elements of capitalism as it was still not

ready to embrace socialism, given its lack of development.

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

supposed to be the main guiding principle, even if it drove to major injustices committed

against the people (Tanrikut, 2025).

The CCP and the Birth of a New State Ideology

Mao Zedong had, thus, formulated his own version of Marxism while retaining a

connection to China’s philosophical past. According to Paul (2021, p. 265), the CCP’s

ideology combines elements of the Communist Manifesto, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism

and traditional Chinese philosophy. From Leninism, the paramount leader extracted the

party vanguard and violent revolution concepts. However, the lack of an industrial base,

led Mao in search of supporters among peasants. At the time, 89.36% of the Chinese

population lived in the countryside, and only recently this trend has flipped in the opposite

direction (Xinhua, 2019

). With the peasantry behind him, Mao embarked on his fight

against oppressive foreign forces. Ideologically, in conclusion, the CCP formed its own

basis fully adapted to the country’s context. Lenin asserted that the Marxist class struggle

was key to achieving a communist society (Touchard, 1961, p. 476 & 495-501), believing

that the proletariat’s power would lead to the fall of the bourgeoisie and, eventually, to a

classless society (Lenin, 1977, pp. 8-9).

For Mao Zedong, it was this combination that allowed to create a sense of unity, both

against the Japanese and the KMT. As such, ideology may have a congregating effect,

and it evolves through time. Arendt (1953, p. 316) defines ideology as the logic of an

idea in constant motion and transformation. This is precisely how it is possible to define

China’s state ideology, that is, a process that has developed through decades with every

leader adding new elements to it, as a response to the specific circumstances of their

time.

Crucially, Mao understood the importance of education as a means of imposing the will

of the CCP. As such, ideological and political education has, since Maoist times, become

a mainstay of the PRC’s education system. Post-1949, the state narrative centered on

the Century of Humiliation (百年国耻 bǎinián guóchǐ), not only as way of reminding the

Chinese people of the oppression at the hands of foreign powers, but also of how classical

thought and old ideas were culprits of the country’s downfall (Wang, 2008, p. 789).

Afterwards, the discourse shifted towards the class struggle. According to Wang (2008,

p.789), the Communist leadership wished to direct the youth’s rage towards the

bourgeoisie and landlords that still dominated and held part of the country’s wealth. And

yet there were concerns that thought would become overly stifled by the CCP’s ideological

guidance. Nikita Kruschev’s attack on Josef Stalin let the Soviet Union to loosen its grip

on the population. Taking note on these developments Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai

launched the Hundred Flowers Movement (1956-1957) intending to encourage

intellectuals to criticize the government and help implement reformed policies. However,

the Campaign ended as soon as criticism became perilous to the Party and its legitimacy

as leading force of the nation. King (2012) accurately states that the subsequent Anti-

The rural population in 2018 was 40,42% of the total.

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

Rightist Campaign of 1957 resulted in the re-education or execution of thousands of

critics.

The CCP in this context portrayed itself as the vanguard of the people against the

perceived oppressive forces. The triumph of the Chinese people was tied to the success

of the Party, even when Mao was publicly criticized after his death in 1976. The victorious

CCP was continuously supported by state-led media. The People’s Daily, for instance,

remarked it was crucial to firmly embrace ideological education (抓紧思想教育). Chen

(2021) also explains that this was understood as a necessary effort to find scapegoats

for the country’s backwardness. The traditional targets were, as the author exemplifies,

violent attacks perpetrated by the enemy, Chiang Kai-shek or to stimulate the unity of

the peasantry, the core of the CCP’s class struggle and united front.

The Cultural Revolution further exemplifies how the Mao period pushed for greater

ideological strength in the education system. According to Wang (1975, p. 760), the

education reforms of the time sought to ensure greater “political conscious” of students,

as well as provide training that could be useful to China’s industrial and agricultural

output. For this to be achieved, decision-makers understood that education had to spread

nationwide. However, the re-education of intellectuals placed a massive strain on college

education, as its greatest thinkers were under constant threat of public criticism or of

being sent to villages and factories to work (Chandra, 1987, p. 130). Ideologically, the

regime intended to create a uniform critical mass supported by the lowest strata of

society. When the new enrolment policy was rolled out in 1972, as Leff singles out (2019,

p.12), access to higher education depended on ideological knowledge and not academic

achievements, thus making education subservient to politics. Other reforms were

introduced to enhance the ideological presence in education:

“Along with appointing Communist Party cadres to high ranking

administrative positions in the universities, political ideology dominated the

higher education curriculum. Textbooks used during the Cultural Revolution

were entirely rewritten in accordance to the new political doctrine in place.

The students and faculty members were required to visit the factories and

communes to learn from the laboring class and peasants” (Leff, 2019, p.13).

As mentioned before, ideological education is not a novelty in present-day China. The

Republican authorities, after the fall of the Qing, focused their attention on the Century

of Humiliation. Starting with the first Opium War, this period was marked by the steep

decline of the last imperial dynasty. For about 100 years, foreign powers were responsible

for carving up the Chinese territory under the threat of warfare or imposed via unequal

treaties, the first of which being the treaty of Nanjing (1842) (Lesaffer, 2025). This

discourse continued in Taiwan after the expulsion of the KMT from the mainland (Wang,

2008, p. 789). In search of new targets, the CCP identified the class struggle against

oppressive forces as key to settling the Party as the vanguard. (Wang, 2008, p. 789). In

Beijing, as Peng (2023, pp. 1033-1035) clarifies, there was the perception that there

were certain segments of society still “contaminated” by bourgeois education. The

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

and Contemporary Dynamics

February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

resulting policies that the Cultural Revolution heightened the desire to rid the country of

such interference, particularly in urban areas.

Post-1989: Reforming Ideological and Political Education

The year 1989 was a turning point. Deng Xiaoping acknowledged the investment in

ideological education had not sufficed (Zeng, 2016, p. 115). Furthermore, the leading

class of the Party were also fearful of losing legitimacy. After decades of building a

unifying image of themselves, Zhang (2008, p. 788) alludes, the Mandate of Heaven was

on the verge of being led astray.

Chen (2021) broadens this analysis, as the PRC prioritized the implementation of

ideological and political education in the entire teaching process (把思想政治教育贯彻在全

部教育过程中). Deng Xiaoping and the proponents of the Reform and Opening policies paid

little attention to political and ideological education. From the beginning this was

understood as a way of distancing the CCP from the excesses of the past. Now that the

nation was surging because of economic prosperity and non-isolationism, ideology took

the backseat. Callahan (2006, p. 85) determined that between 1947 and 1990 national

humiliation related books were not published. However, the opening of the PRC brought

along a few unintended consequences. Prior to 1989, the lack of focus on the ideological

education was conducive to potential internal instability. This compounded in 1989 with

the events at Tiananmen Square, leaving Deng Xiaoping to conclude that

“one of the greatest failures of the CCP leadership during the Reform and

Opening up period was not considering political-ideological education as a

priority”.

As such, the crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 resulted in a

renewed ideological fervour with particular focus on the education system. In 1992,

Deng’s Southern Tour was not only devised to relaunch the country’s economy, but also

to assert the CCP’s position as sole representative of the Chinese people. The State

Education Commission published the “Reform and Development of Education in China

Program”. At its core, it highlighted that patriotism should be the most important value

for the PRC. In 1994, 95% of Beijing’s primary and high school students had already

watched patriotic movies recommended by the State Education Commission, as part of

the “Circular on Carrying Out Education of Patriotism for Primary and Secondary Schools

Through Out the Country via Good Films and TV Series” (Zhao, 1998).

Ideological work was, as such, well underway with further contributions from the Ministry

of Education and the Communist Youth League’s Central Committee. New courses were

created, for example, “Marxism Basic Principles” or “Introduction to Maoism and

Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (Chen, 2021). Books and

teaching materials were also targeted. Published in April 1990, The Indignation of

National Humiliation served as a remembrance of the events of the First Opium War,

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD2

Thematic Dossier - Portugal and China in International Relations: Historical Legacies

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February 2026, pp. 55-79

Ideology and Education in China: Portuguese Language Policy at the Intersection

of Statecraft and Strategy

Luís Filipe Pestana, Luís Pires

reinstating the Century of Humiliation as central to the CCP’s ideological discourse against

domestic and foreign threats (Callahan, 2006, pp. 186-187).

During Hu Jintao’s time as the Secretary General of the CCP, in October 2004 the CCP

Central Committee and the State Council published Opinion on Further Strengthening

and Improvement of Ideological and Political Education for College Students (关于进一步

加强和改进大学生思想政治教育的意见). As Chen (2021) elaborates

“That document stated that “strengthening and improving the ideological and

political education of college students is an extremely urgent and important

task,” and that “raising their ideological and political character” was

necessary in order to “cultivate them into the builders and successors of the

socialist cause with Chinese characteristics”.

Nonetheless, ideological education was perceived to have become stagnant. Chen (2021)

confirms this hypothesis by analysing the number of occurrences of the term sizheng 思

政

, from 1994 to 2021, in the People’s Daily, the CCP’s main media mouthpiece. Of the

766 occurrences, 700 correspond to the time since Xi’s takeover in 2012. Obedience to

the Party, while crucial, was no longer enough to form harmony and ensure a cohesive,

unified popular front. During Xi Jinping’s stewardship, though, circumstances have

shifted.

Current Ideological Trend Under Xi Jinping

Presently, Xi’s Thought is the last iteration of the PRC’s ideology. Introduced in the CCP

Constitution in 2017, it highlights the historical role of the Party in unifying the people.

As an extension of the path created by Mao Zedong, it encompasses the armed forces,

technological innovation, ecology or the improvement of Chinese people’s livelihood. Its

presence is crucial for Xi and the country’s leadership which, in turn, makes it

fundamentally necessary to be taught at every level of the education system (Xinhua,

2024). In other words, Xi’s thought must be studied and interiorized from an early age

as to ensure that harmony is produced with the Party at the center of the Tianxia.

The CCP, therefore, acted when the new government took power in 2012. One of Xi

Jinping’s main objectives as the Paramount Leader of the People’s Republic of China is to

further the efforts of establishing a form of social harmony under the helm of the CCP.

As discussed, the concept of harmony is not foreign or a novelty in the realm of political-

philosophical Chinese thought. However, the Communist rule has presently a clear view

on what that harmony should look like, and it should be at the centre of the order Under

Heaven. As Tatlow suggests (2018), the CCP views itself as the inheritor of the

tianchao 天朝, “heavenly empire,” the actual ruling force that governed all matters

Tianxia. President Xi Jinping has embraced his role as the “emperor”. During the

celebration of Confucius’ 2565th anniversary, Xi highlighted that the current ruling class

Shortened version of sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu (思想政治教育) or ideological and political education.

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is a successor to those responsible for actively promoting Chinese tradition (Tatlow, 2018:

p.6). However, this does not simply mean that China is attempting to replicate the

harmonious society of imperial times. As aforementioned, the ideological fingerprint of

the CCP is ever-present as it promotes a kind of social order with little to no trace of

foreign influence. The Document 9, a communiqué that spread among Party members

in April 2013, offers a deeper glance into the perceived perils exposure to Western ideals.

Broadly speaking, Document 9 outlines seven political threats to the CCP-led harmony,

namely, promoting Western-style constitutional democracy, universal values that weaken

the Party, civil society unrest, neoliberalism, Western-style media, historical nihilism and

negative views on the CCP and New China and putting into question the Reform and

Opening process (ChinaFile, 2013). As such, it called for Party leaders all over the country

to pay close attention to these perceived threats and enhance ideological work through

education. These set of guidelines have, therefore, garnered attention by the Chinese

leadership. Education, as Xi (2014, p. 93) himself declares is an important means to

ensure a harmonious society (Stanzel et al., 2017, pp. 4-7). Teaching materials play a

key role. In August 2021, Han Zhen, head of the Textbook National Committee,

concluded that Xi Jinping’s Thought about Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the

New Era would become part of basic, vocational and higher education. This statement

came after new guidelines from the Ministry of Education that expected Marxist beliefs

to become stronger among Chinese youth, as well as strengthening the path, theory,

system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Global Times, 2024).

National unity is crucial for the CCP’s national interests and education is at its core, as

the Patriotic Education Law determines (CLT, 2023b).

From a discourse perspective, the ruling party has pushed this concrete narrative as a

means of ensuring not only that the Communist leadership is necessary, but also that

there should be no foreign interference when it comes to domestic issues. Back in 2014,

the General Office of the Party Central Committee and the State Council advocated for

stronger control over the education system (Fu, 2024). Xi clarified, in 2019, during a

speech to professors and educators of political ideology and theory, that political-

ideological education is irreplaceable and bestowed responsibility on educators to

enlighten students in the relevance of socialism with Chinese Characteristics, party

theories, institutions and culture. Fu (2024) clarifies that higher education particularly

targeted

“Specific measures included strengthening political training sessions for

faculty and standardizing textbooks across disciplines, particularly in the

social sciences”.

In 2021, a nationwide inspection was conducted at 31 universities to assess the

effectiveness of ideological teaching. Two top-tier institutions, Tsinghua University and

Peking University, were criticized for their inefficiencies in promoting the CCP’s thought

(Liu, 2021).

Language teaching has also been repeatedly targeted, particularly relating to the

English’s weight in the gaokao, the annual university entry exam. Since 2012 the National

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People’s Congress (NPC) and the China People’s Political Consultative Conference

(CPPCC) have received proposals to reduce the importance of English when it comes to

evaluating the gaokao (Leung, 2023). While these proposals and opinions have not, for

the most part, translated into actual changes in the college admissions process (Fu, 2024;

Leung, 2023

), it signals a growing desire from policymakers to diminish the status of a

foreign subject, while highlighting greater ideological work.

From a legal standpoint, the Chinese government has also set forth a series of laws that

aim to promote national unity. The Patriotic Education Law (CLT, 2023b), approved in

October 2023 and rolled out on January 1st, 2024, is part of broader legislation that

includes the Counter-espionage Law (CLT, 2023a), the revised National Security Law (CLT

2015) and the Hong Kong National Security Law (Lam, 2020). To the Chinese authorities,

these documents intend to create a CCP-led social harmony that isolates society from

external influence.

Of particular relevance to this study, the 2024 Patriotic Education Law (CLT, 2023b)

represents a renewed effort to recentre the role of political and ideological instruction.

Through this legislation, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to cultivate an educational

environment in which students—from kindergarten through university—are

systematically exposed to, and expected to develop proficiency in, Xi Jinping Thought.

As mentioned before, Xi’s presidency has been marked by a thought isolationism as it

pushes away Western liberal democracy values and norms. The rejection of these

elements also extends to democracy in its liberal form. The whole-process people’s

democracy, as showcased in its eponymous white paper (SCIO, 2021), is, from the

Chinese perspective, a more inclusive and direct form of democracy. In short, the election

process in China starts at the local level. From there, elected officials are able to select

members of parliament at municipal level and so forth, up the National People’s Congress,

China’s top legislative body (SCIO, 2021). Candidates are not exclusively members of

the CCP and there have been elected officials from the other nine political parties that

form the United Front.

The Patriotic Education Law derives from government documents, such as the 2016

Ministry of Education directive or the CCP Central Committee and State Council’s 2019

patriotic education directive (Department of Education, 2024), instructing all education

departments of every teaching level at the Provincial tier to implement the patriotic

education. Article 6 of the law explains what patriotic education is:

- CCP’s, New China’s, Reform and Opening, socialism development and Chinese

people’s history;

- socialism with Chinese characteristics system, CCP’s accomplishments and the lived

experience of the people’s unity;

- the Chinese people’s culture, as well as the revolutionary and advanced socialist

cultures;

The Beijing government has downgraded English in the gaokao.

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- basic knowledge of the constitution, national and ethnic unit, national security and

defence;

- martyrs, heroes and model citizen as symbols of the spirit of the people and the spirit

of the times;

- other content rich in patriotic sentiment (CLT, 2023b).

Ideologically, the PRC is invested in ensuring a certain level of uniformity of thought. Yet

the expectations of the Chinese population may be distinctive to what the government

desires, in part, because there is difficulty to change deeply engrained believes. Focusing

on access to higher education, Chinese parents greatly invest in guaranteeing that their

children have a better chance of reaching of the top universities of the country. Besides

extra classes, even during weekends, guardians enroll students in extra-curricular

activities from music to sports, in an attempt to give an edge to these students.

Conversely, some policies go against the parents’ interests. The double reduction (双减政

策shuāng jiǎn zhèng cè) which sought to alleviate the number of extracurricular classes

and the amount of homework given to school students, ended up with several private

tutoring institutions ceasing operations (Zhao, Shi & Wang, 2024). This, in turn, led

parents to seek alternatives in the black market.

Furthermore, the State Council has tried to condition what career path the Chinese youth

may choose which, in turn, only leads to more panic among parents. The high school

entry exams, zhongkao (中考), have become increasingly subject of attention. In July

2023, 15,4 million students took part in this examination and only 50% of the examinees

were allowed to move on to “regular” high schools that lead to university. The bottom

half either entered the job market or chose vocational training (Li, 2023). However, fear

of failure is a systemic issue in Chinese society, as Liu (2020) explains, given that there

is a focus on the “science of success” (chenggong cue 成功学) as a counterpoint to the

“science of failure” (shibai xue 失败学).

For the CCP, adapting to the market conditions does not seem to eliminate the necessity

of promoting stronger unity through ideology. Major developments in AI, digital literacy

and STEM (Global Times, 2024) are examples of such a statement. The STEM Education

Action Plan 2029, launched in 2018, promotes better training of educators to use STEM

tools in their teaching and train future teachers (Hu, 2024: 77 e 78), while integrating

moral values in their practice (Global Times, 2024).

Yet this does not eliminate a series of challenges that any society is facing with the advent

of Artificial Intelligence. According to Yang (2021), 70% of what is taught in college can

be learned more efficiently by AI. The author considers that this technology has forced

Chinese leaders and society, described as a stable and static status quo, to revolutionize

its education system. In essence, social harmony is now facing new trials.

As a response, the CCO Central Committee and the State Council have already begun to

act. In January 2025, the new 2035 education action plan was presented and includes

strong political and ideological leadership, talent competitiveness, scientific and

technological basis, welfare assurances, social synergy and international influence.

Education Vice-minister Wu Yuan stated that in September 2024 that 1673 new

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bachelor’s degrees were established, while 1670 were suppressed for not being in tune

with the PRC’s strategic goals and the country’s social and economic development. Since

2012, 21000 bachelor’s degrees have been created, as opposed to 12000 that were

suspended or cancelled in the same period (Xinhua, 2025). In this year’s Two Sessions,

the discourse focused on innovation and talent attraction capable of producing native

technology, while reducing foreign dependency and incorporating Xi’s Thought in the

education system.

The generation that reached adulthood during XI’s time in power (post-1990) has

experienced the brunt of China’s social issues that are now widespread. The CCP, in its

effort to create a social harmony firmly distinct from the West, has used ideology to fuel

the fight against child obesity, effeminate masculinity, LGBT movements and feminism.

However, the real-world problems that young college graduates tackle daily, from

dwindling wages to high unemployment rates, has at times driven the citizens meant to

be the future of the country to certain behaviours contrary to what the CCP expects.

Cultural and social phenomena, such as “lay flat” or “let it rot” (Lu, 2024), encapsulate

the youth’s state of desperation and willingness to embrace indifference regarding their

future.

Language Policy and Foreign Language Education in China

Language, Ideology, and the Chinese State

Within the ideological apparatus that has long underpinned Chinese education, foreign

language instruction occupies a highly strategic position. Rather than representing

intercultural openness, it has been governed by the political logics of state-building and

ideological regulation, the evolving and shifting priorities of the state, that consistently

subordinate linguistic and cultural exchange to national interest, that is, as a means of

acquiring useful knowledge to support developmental objectives. (Mao & Min, 2004; Gil,

2016) Ultimately, foreign language education in China is functionally open but

ideologically bounded. As Ricento (2006) argues, language policy always reflects

underlying power structures.

This relationship is articulated through the concept of ‘language import and export’ (Pires,

2024), which situates language education within the broader framework of the political

economy of language (Grin, 2006) and foreign language planning (Payne, 2007). In this

view, foreign languages are imported as strategic resources (Ruíz, 1984) that serve

national goals in diplomacy, trade, and technological advancement, yet are carefully

managed to prevent ideological disruption. Conversely, exporting national languages

functions as a means of projecting soft power and enhancing international status.

Through such linguistic exchanges, states seek to accumulate both material and symbolic

capital, positioning language not merely as a medium of communication but as an

instrument of political influence and global prestige.

As we will see in more detail below, the case of Portuguese language education (PLE) in

China exemplifies this dynamic. Introduced in the early 1960s, its institutionalization was

driven not by organic academic interest or cultural proximity, but by geopolitical needs

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and ideological alignment. Its expansion has tracked closely with China’s global

positioning and state priorities, from its engagement with Lusophone liberation

movements in the Cold War era to its pursuit of new strategic partnerships in the 21st

century.

Historical Trajectories: From the 19th Century to 1949

The emergence of foreign language education in China was not the result of voluntary

openness but of external pressure (Feng & Adamson, 2019). It began in the 19th century,

following a series of military defeats that underscored the need for urgent modernization.

Western languages, especially English, became strategic tools for accessing scientific and

technical knowledge from abroad. Yet this engagement was deeply ambivalent. While

foreign expertise was needed, the threat of ideological subversion loomed large.

The Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing period embodied this tension. As

Adamson (2002, p. 234) explains, its guiding slogan - “study China for morality, the West

for utility” - reflected a model of selective appropriation: foreign languages were

embraced only to the extent that they served national development. Language was

treated as a neutral medium, stripped of cultural depth, and valued purely for its

functional utility. This instrumental logic persisted into the Republican era. According to

Feng & Adamson (2019), while government policies encouraged foreign language

learning to support scientific and technical advancement, they also coexisted with waves

of cultural protectionism and antiforeignism. Throughout this period, language policy

privileged strategic benefit over intercultural dialogue, a framework that would carry

through the foundational decades of the PRC.

Portuguese Language Education Under the People’s Republic

The early decades of the People’s Republic saw the consolidation of foreign language

education as a state-directed and ideologically mediated endeavour. Portuguese, in

particular, entered the curriculum not through linguistic diversity initiatives, but through

Cold War-era foreign policy recalibrations, where Russian was initially the privileged

language (Ning, 2021). Following the Sino-Soviet split, China intensified engagement

with Africa and Latin America, many of whose liberation movements operated in

Portuguese. This led to a targeted need for specialists who could serve state objectives

abroad.

In 1960, the first formal Portuguese language program was launched at the Beijing

Broadcasting Institute, selected for its role in external propaganda rather than linguistic

prestige. That same year, the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages initiated a short-

term intensive course in Portuguese, later expanded to a full degree. These programs

were designed to produce translators, journalists, and diplomats for use in state media

and foreign service, often tied directly to ideological dissemination (Li, 2012). Training

was also carried out in Macao under the auspices of the Nam Kwong Commercial

Company, illustrating the strategic use of external sites for politically aligned language

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instruction (Choi, 2012). These efforts culminated in the 1964 “3000 Talents Plan”, a

seven-year initiative to build diplomatic translation capacity in key foreign languages.

However, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought a dramatic reversal. Foreign

languages were recast as vehicles of ideological contamination, and institutions where

foreign languages were taught were denounced as counter-revolutionary (Li, 2012).

Language programs were suspended, foreign materials banned, and trained professionals

side-lined. As Mao & Min (2004) note, this period exemplifies the cyclical, even pendular,

nature of Chinese language policy, where moments of pragmatic openness give way to

ideological retrenchment.

Rehabilitation of foreign language teaching began cautiously in the 1970s, in tandem with

China’s re-entry into global diplomacy. Portuguese programs resumed in Beijing and

Shanghai, though their expansion remained limited and ideologically constrained. By the

1990s, Portuguese remained marginal, confined to a few institutions and serving

narrowly defined state purposes. As Li (2015) observes, this long stagnation would be

abruptly broken in the 2000s by a ‘volcanic eruption’, that is, an explosive growth of the

number of students and courses of Portuguese in China’s higher education.

Contemporary Developments and Enduring Structures

The 21st century witnessed a sharp turn in Portuguese language education. Between

2000 and 2020, the number of universities offering Portuguese in Mainland China rose

from three to over forty (André, 2019; Pires, 2022; Jatobá, 2020). This shift was

catalysed by several overlapping factors: China’s accession to the WTO; the emergence

of Brazil and Angola as strategic partners; the founding of Forum Macao in 2003; and

new educational policies encouraging universities to diversify their degree offerings (Ye,

2014; Castelo & Ye, 2020). Portuguese suddenly became attractive due to its perceived

market value and low initial institutional cost. Yet this growth occurred without a formal

guiding policy. As Jatobá (2020, p. 184) argues, it amounted to a “tacit policy”, shaped

more by political and economic signals than by educational planning. This flexibility

allowed rapid expansion, but also introduced problems of quality control, faculty training,

and curricular fragmentation (Ye, 2014; Liu, 2017).

Even as market responsiveness increased, the ideological framing of language education

remained intact. Policy documents continued to stress alignment with national priorities.

Portuguese was promoted not for its cultural richness, but for its strategic usefulness.

Decisions like the 2011 withdrawal of preferential exam policies reinforced the message

that language programs would be supported only as long as they served state-defined

goals (Liu, 2017). This expansion also revealed structural asymmetries. As of 2023, over

half hundred institutions in Mainland China and its SARs offered Portuguese courses

(Pires, 2024), with estimates of student enrolment range between 5,100 and 6,400, and

about 300 teachers nationwide. (Pires, 2022; Castelo & Ye, 2020). Yet staffing levels,

academic qualifications, and postgraduate opportunities vary widely. As of 2020, only 6%

of Mainland teachers held doctorates, compared to a more qualified and experienced

teaching corps in Macao (Castelo & Ye, 2020).

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Macao occupies a pivotal position as both a geopolitical bridge and an academic centre

within China’s Portuguese language education system. Yet, until 1999, Portuguese was

the language of the ruling class, public services and Law (Teixeira e Silva & Lima-

Hernandes, 2014, pp. 63 & 64). Cheng (2020, p. 186) states that there was no defined

language policy in Macao during Portuguese rule. More than four centuries of rule had

only led to the creation of two separate societies. As Cheng (2020, p. 187) further points

out:

“(…), the influence of the Portuguese language hardly spread beyond the

public domain. In other fields, such as commerce, education and cultural life,

Portuguese was not commonly used in Macao society, either because the

Portuguese administration deliberately refrained from making Portuguese the

official language outside government business, or because governmental

inefficiency impeded the expansion of the official language policy beyond the

public domain”.

However, the local government did make significant advances during the 1990’s that

greatly impacted Portuguese language teaching to this day. The creation of the University

of Macau and the Polytechnic Institute of Macao (now Polytechnic University of Macao) is

still seen as having an impact in the competitiveness of those that learn Portuguese

(Teixeira e Silva & Lima-Hernandes, 2014, pp. 70). Furthermore, the Macao Special

Administrative Region’s is based on the Portuguese one. Cheng (2020, p. 197) further

states it is necessary for the legal system to remain bilingual, as a way of not only

remembering the territory’s history but also of protecting the Portuguese language.

Its institutions provide structured professional development for Mainland instructors

through master’s and doctoral programs, intensive summer training, interpretation

courses, and scholarly conferences. These institutions also act as instruments of cultural

diplomacy, operationalizing Macao’s formal role as China’s designated platform for

Lusophone cooperation. In this dual capacity, Macao integrates educational leadership

with strategic function, aligning language education initiatives with Beijing’s broader soft

power objectives, particularly within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

From Language Policy to Ideological Control

Despite quantitative gains, significant challenges remain. The absence of standardized

curricula, the uneven distribution of faculty expertise, and reliance on Macao all point to

the fragility of the system. As in earlier decades, foreign language education remains a

tool of statecraft: flexible in form, but rigid in function. Locals identify more closely with

the PRC (Geddes, 2020), an element that is present even among younger generations.

Li, Ieong, Wong et. al. (2025, pp. 566 & 567) found that University of Macau students

have an easier time accepting the official ideology of the CCP, as well as balancing the

existence of a national identity that does not eliminate the presence of a local identity.

The authors also signal to the fact the current circumstances are not static:

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“Notably, as the Hong Kong and Macao governments actively promote

patriotic education, which has been significantly shaped by the official

ideology in Mainland China in recent years, this spectrum pattern is better

treated as dynamic rather than static, as it may change over time. This

spectrum pattern could provide insights for school stakeholders to rethink

how to better equip youths for the complex world through patriotic education”

(Li Ieong, Wong et. al., 2025, pp. 567 & 568).

Patriotic education, therefore, is viewed as key element to promoting national unity

through the Xi Jinping thought. In 2024 the local government announced that new

courses would be offered at Macao schools to foster a strong national with China, as well

as promote “excellent Chinese culture” (Pereira, 2024; The Macao News, 2024). Then

chief executive Ho Iat Seng stated that the Patriotic Education Law would ensure national

security and the without it, Macao would not continue in its path of development and

solidity (Pereira, 2023). His words have been closely replicated, through calls to use

patriotic materials in strengthen Macao’s integration with the Greater Bay Area region

(Ho, 2025) and to increase education investment as a way of not only spearheading

technological development, but also construction of a stable national identity.

Other institutions have responded to the government’s push to embrace patriotic

education as a crucial part in solidifying Macanese society and integrating into the CCP’s

tianxia. The Women’s General Association of Macao, for instance, called the local

government to commit to promoting patriotic education among young people (Marques,

2025), as a way a solidifying the patriotic spirit the Macanese people with the framework

of the “One Country, Two Systems” (Newsdesk, 2024).

History has been at the core of the discussion. Beijing’s intent revolves around creating

a narrative that not only reminds Macao and Hong Kong youths of the country’s past

under foreign oppression but also attempts to generate a stronger sense of belonging to

China under the help of the CCP. Production of teaching materials, for instance, was a

point of contention. Macao SAR DSEDJ, since 2019, has encouraged schools to adopt

history manuals produced by the People’s Education Press, a Mainland China publisher.

Several academics questioned whether this would limit a more pluralistic comprehension

of history (JTM, 2016).

Conclusion

Stemming from centuries of tradition, the CCP has attempted to create a new form of

social harmony. Based on Xi’s Thought, the PRC intends to create a space where the

Communist leadership is placed at the centre. These efforts are not new since 1949 and

yet Xi’s presidency has pushed ideological and political education further than previous

generations of Communist rulers. Universities have been particularly targeted leading to

greater insularity from the outside world. Nonetheless, there is still a disconnect between

the ideological objectives of the state and the needs and concerns of Chinese youth. High

unemployment and a lack of willingness to engage in the “rat race” that is required to

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reach a high-status position in society counteract the CCP’s intention of having a cohesive

force moving in the same direction. Furthermore, greater investment in fields like STEM

and AI places greater pressure on language courses to become attractive to young college

students.

The case of Portuguese in China exemplifies the intersection between foreign language

education and geopolitical strategy. From its marginal beginnings as a tool of diplomatic

necessity to its current status as a language of opportunity and employability, Portuguese

has found a distinct space within China’s linguistic landscape. Its continued success will

depend on sustained investment, institutional collaboration, and the evolving priorities of

China’s engagement with the Lusophone world.

At the same time, this trajectory highlights a critical insight for international language

policy: the promotion of a foreign language, whether for cultural outreach, soft power, or

commercial gain, cannot be disentangled from the ideological and institutional structures

of the host country. In China, where language planning is tightly coupled with political

priorities, foreign language education remains a carefully managed enterprise. The

development of Portuguese has advanced not through cultural affinity, but through

strategic calibration - serving diplomatic, commercial, and ideological functions within

China’s state-led educational framework. For Portugal, this underscores the need for

foreign policy and language promotion strategies that are attuned to the recipient

country’s political economy and ideological parameters.

In this regard, Macao holds particular relevance. As both a symbolic link and an

operational platform, Macao facilitates the linguistic and institutional bridge between

China and the Lusophone world. Its comparative academic strength, cultural familiarity,

and geopolitical positioning make it a critical node for expanding Portuguese language

education in East Asia. More broadly, the case of Portuguese in China offers a window

into the complex interplay between language, ideology, and international relations, an

interplay that defines, and will continue to shape, the evolving dynamic between Portugal,

China, and the wider Lusophone sphere.

References

Adamson, B. (2002). Barbarian as a foreign language: English in China’s schools. World

Englishes, 21(2), 231–243. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-971x.00244

Adamson, B. (2004). China’s English: A history of English in Chinese education. Hong

Kong University Press.

André, C. A. (2019). Ensino do Português na China: Um Breve Balanço. In Y. Zhang, S.

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