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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

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469

THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF ISLAMIC UNITY IN THE AGE OF NATION-

STATES: THE MUSLIM WORLD, THE CALIPHATE, AND THE

ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

ERDAL KURĞAN

erdal.kurgan@marmara.edu.tr

Assistant Professor at Marmara University, Institute of Middle East and Islamic Countries

(Turkey). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6668-2804

Abstract

The global expansion of Western hegemony in the 19th century and thereafter engendered

profound crises in the Muslim World, as it did in every region that established relations with

the West. This article evaluates the political, economic, and cultural unity efforts in the post-

colonial Muslim World, focusing on the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). It analyses

the structural and external factors characterising the contemporary situation of the Muslim

World within the context of civilisational interaction. The central argument of this analysis is

that an interconnected Muslim World has always existed, but that its efforts towards Ittihad-

i Islam (Islamic Unity) through the OIC in the post-Caliphate era and the age of nation-states

have been constrained by local and global limitations. However, it further suggests that these

constraints do not constitute a historical block and that overcoming them remains possible

within the context of Muslim populations.

Keywords

Muslim World, Caliph, OIC, Islamic Unity.

Resumo

A expansão global da hegemonia ocidental no século XIX e posteriormente gerou crises

profundas no mundo muçulmano, assim como em todas as regiões que estabeleceram

relações com o Ocidente. Este artigo avalia os esforços de unidade política, económica e

cultural no mundo muçulmano pós-colonial, com foco na Organização da Cooperação Islâmica

(OCI). Analisa os fatores estruturais e externos que caracterizam a situação contemporânea

do mundo muçulmano no contexto da interação civilizacional. O argumento central desta

análise é que sempre existiu um mundo muçulmano interligado, mas que os seus esforços

em direção à Ittihad-i Islam (Unidade Islâmica) através da OIC na era pós-califado e na era

dos Estados-nação foram limitados por restrições locais e globais. No entanto, sugere ainda

que estas limitações não constituem um obstáculo histórico e que é possível superá-las no

contexto das populações muçulmanas.

Palavras-chave

Mundo Muçulmano, Califa, OIC, Unidade Islâmica.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 469-491

The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The Muslim World, the

Caliphate, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Erdal Kurğan

470

How to cite this article

Kurğan, Erdal (2025). The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The

Muslim World, the Caliphate, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional

Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 469-491. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0525.25

Article submitted on 02nd July 2025 and accepted for publication on 21st October 2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 469-491

The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The Muslim World, the

Caliphate, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Erdal Kurğan

471

THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF ISLAMIC UNITY IN THE AGE OF

NATION-STATES: THE MUSLIM WORLD, THE CALIPHATE, AND

THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION

ERDAL KURĞAN

Introduction

The forms of social togetherness are subject to change and transformation throughout

historical processes. This togetherness, which does not occur in absolute fixity, is shaped

in relation to geography, history, and the socio-cultural context emerging from historical

experience. Furthermore, the relationships that societies establish with those who are

different contribute to and shape the social reality. While some influences can be

evaluated as directly positive contributions, situations that push one towards a negative

stance or position also represent contributions in the long run, albeit as a ‘negative

effect’. People, cultures, or, on a larger scale, civilisations constantly influence each

other, contributing to the human experience. These mutual interactions and contributions

become much more intensive and rapid during periods of increased transportation and

communication. However, these effects do not yield the same outcome for all parties

involved in the relationship. In some cases, one party tends to establish dominance over

the other, imposing its influence as a unidirectional relationship, as exemplified by the

global spread of Western hegemony in the 19th century and beyond (Wallerstein 1974).

This article evaluates the political, economic, and cultural unity efforts in the post-colonial

Muslim World, centring on the OIC. It analyses the structural and external factors

characterising the contemporary situation of the Muslim World within the context of

civilisational interaction. The core assertion of this analysis is that the efforts

towards Ittihad-i Islam realised through the OIC in the post-Caliphate era and the age of

nation-states are limited due to local and global constraints. Nevertheless, it proposes

that these constraints are not a historical block and that it is plausible for Muslim peoples

to overcome them.

In this context, in light of the foregoing, I will first problematise the notion of the ‘Muslim

World’ and discuss its feasibility. This discussion is anchored in Cemil Aydın’s work, The

Idea of the Muslim World, which explores whether an ‘Idea of the Muslim World’ existed

in the 119th-centurycontext. The debate over the Muslim World is important because it

implies a political, economic, military, and cultural body beyond a mere geographical

designation. I follow the trajectory of The Idea of the Muslim World in making this

implication, but with one distinction: I argue that Aydın’s fundamental claim occasionally

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December 2025, pp. 469-491

The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The Muslim World, the

Caliphate, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Erdal Kurğan

472

contains anachronistic and retrospective assumptions and that certain points he expected

to exist but did not find, or claimed were non-existent but overlooked, should be

interpreted differently. I contend that the reading I propose will render the 19th and

20th-century Muslim World more intelligible, thus making it easier to perceive the

historical conditions and conceptualisations under which the expectation of a Caliphate

became possible.

Following the examination of the conceptualisation of the Muslim World, I will address

the Caliphate and its manifestations in historical experience during the early modern

period. In doing so, I will attempt to distinguish the conceptualisation of the Caliphate in

the post-Caliphate period from the practical experiences and the meaning ascribed to it.

This will facilitate an easier analytical comprehension of the relationship between the

late-colonial-era understanding of the Muslim World and its practical notion of the

Caliphate.

After addressing the conceptualisation of the Muslim World and the issue of the Caliphate,

I will examine the establishment of the contemporary global order in the absence of the

Caliphate and the OIC as an outcome of the Muslim World-Caliphate conceptualisation

within that order. In the conclusion, I will critically assess the effectiveness and strength

of the OIC in its efforts to resolve both the internal problems and the external challenges

of the Muslim World in the absence of the Caliphate, thus concluding the article.

The Muslim World

Approximately one-fifth of the world’s population today is Muslim (Aydın 2017, p. 1).

Muslims can be encountered in many parts of the world, from the Siberian deserts to the

canyons of North America, from the Amazon in South America to the depths of Africa.

When asked about their thoughts regarding other people who define themselves as

Muslim, you may witness them expressing that they do not see them as separate from

themselves and that they share a common bond. It is even possible to observe some

discussing this perception of commonality with an ideal of universal and monolithic unity.

In this context, it suffices to cite the examples of transnational aid

associations/foundations and the many Muslims of different nationalities working as

volunteers there, or Muslims who travel to conflict zones despite the danger of death to

assist Muslims in those areas. However, can one speak of a unified entity encompassing

the political, military, and cultural unity of all Muslims in historical experience? Or can

one speak of a Muslim World—a shared destiny—bound by the collective past and future

perceptions of Muslims? Cemil Aydın answers this question with a ‘no’ in his work, The

Idea of the Muslim World, a product of intensely focused intellectual and historical effort

(Aydın 2017).

Aydın, seeking an answer to the question ‘What is the Muslim World?’, offers a negative

reply regarding the existence of such a world, citing the late-19th-century political

choices motivated by anti-Westernism. However, upon careful examination of the

arguments for this answer, it is evident that Aydın’s readily given response fails in some

respects to escape being anachronistic and retrospective. The arguments in question,

which we will analyse in detail below, can be grouped under the following headings: i-

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The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The Muslim World, the

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Erdal Kurğan

473

Muslims do not represent a homogeneous sociality, ii- Muslims do not have a monolithic

political unity, iii- the notion of the Muslim World was born out of the assumption of a

monolithic Western image, iv- in the pre-modern era, the belief in unity and the concept

of Ummah were practically absent among Muslim societies, v- the idea of the Muslim

World emerged as a prescription for salvation under colonial domination, and finally vi-

the pluralistic administrations of cosmopolitan rulers in Islamic history differed from the

conceptualisation of the Muslim World. Each of these arguments represents assumptions

that are addressed in different debates, especially by Islamist political or intellectual

actors. These argumentative questions directed at actors who propose and demand

transnational movements or ideals of political unity significantly influence the search for

unity and the ability of Muslims to act collectively in the post-Caliphate era.

Aydın argues that Muslim societies do not represent a homogeneous sociality but rather

a structure containing intense (ethnic, sectarian, dispositional, political, cultural)

differences among themselves (pp. 9–10, pp. 24–25). He suggests that the term Muslim

World is recent and that this changed with the ‘new’ meaning ascribed to the notion of

the Ummah (pp. 12–13). Thus, according to him, the perception arose that homogeneity

was desired among Muslims, or that a homogeneity had existed in the past; however, he

states that such a homogeneity was absent historically, and therefore, the absence of

homogeneity should be accepted as proof that the conceptualisation of unity was also

non-existent. However, the judgment here is the manifestation of an anachronistic

expectation. It is unrealistic to expect homogeneity from people living in pre-modern

societies—that is, in traditional empires or dynastic states; rather, it is more reasonable

to state that differences were central due to historical conditions and geographical and

cultural structures. The matter of homogeneity among societies that emerged in the

modern era—or the expectation thereof—has been made possible only up to a certain

point, even with the nation-state’s apparatuses for creating citizens, such as compulsory

education, mandatory military service, and the state’s monopoly over social and cultural

epistemology. Given this, expecting social homogeneity or uniformity from people who

lived in the early modern or pre-modern period means projecting the characteristic

features of modern societies onto pre-modern societies, which makes it difficult to fully

understand social formations that have not yet experienced modernity and have not

reached the capacity to control societies with the apparatuses of the nation-state.

Furthermore, we must recall that the diversity Aydın mentions is tied to ethnic, historical,

and geographical constraints. This diversity, conceptualised by the notion of ‘Urf’

(customary law), implies different experiences at different times in the same geography,

just as it allows for different interpretations in different geographies at the same historical

moment. However, these differences pertaining to Urf are not valid in situations clearly

stipulated by the explicit legal texts (nass) of the Sharia, which we can call the

paradigmatic centre. In many critical matters, such as general public law, family law,

inheritance law, and the law of war, commonality/similarity, not difference, is the case.

The differences represented by the schools of jurisprudence (madhhabs) do not alter the

relationships among Muslims or their responsibilities towards each other.

Aydın contends that Muslims lacked monolithic political unity in the pre-modern period,

but that this ideal emerged after the 19th century with the conceptualisation of the

‘Muslim World’ (2017, p. 24). We stated above that Muslims are not homogeneous in the

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context of social traditions and cultural practices. The assertion that Muslims lacked

political unity before the 19th century is used alongside cultural heterogeneity, and the

lack of political unity is cited as an argument supporting it. However, the expectation that

all Muslims should live under a single political structure is the result of a conceptualisation

that emerged in the modern era. As we discuss below, the Caliphate did not signify a

‘Muslim United State’. Technical possibilities, geographical constraints, and the minimum

conditions necessary for the practical application of law structurally preclude all Muslims

worldwide from living under a monolithic state roof. However, this does not mean that

the idea of the Ummah did not refer to the unity of Muslims worldwide, detached from

one another (Aydın 2017, p. 2). The concepts and responsibilities

of Walā and Barā (loyalty and disavowal) define mutual rights and obligations among

Muslims, even if there is not a monolithic and homogeneous Muslim World (Toorawa

2013, pp. 178–179; Rustow 2013, pp. 318–319). These rights that Muslims have over

one another form a notion of common interest and common enemy, advising that all

Muslims be viewed as a single body and that organs in need of help be supported by the

others. For this reason, in the case of acts of worship such as Jihad or mutual aid among

Muslims, the vibrant parts of the Ummah are mobilised. That is, the rights of Muslims

over one another command them to help each other in times of crisis, and this is fulfilled

as a religious obligation. And the fulfilment of this obligation occurred at different times

long before the modern era (such as during the wars against the Crusades). The fact that

Buddhists, Confucians, or adherents of different pagan religions did not require such

brotherhood and mutual responsibility should not lead to the conclusion that the desire

of the Muslim World to mobilise using technical capabilities in the 19th century was

derivative or ‘invented later’. This relationally emergent practice persists in most acts of

worship (with an emphasis on being a congregation). The difference lies only in its greater

visibility in discourse and practice with the advancement of instrumental capacity and

communication/transportation capabilities.

Therefore, arguing that the belief in the unity of all Muslims before the nationalistic

ideology and European colonialism racialised and separated them is a misconception

(Aydın 2017, p. 16) fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the following question: If

Muslims were already practically separate where unity did not exist, why would

racialisation or categorisation into races generate a need for the ideal of unity among

them? By what argument did the ideal of unity acquire a religious dimension? We can

take this question to a more world-historical dimension and ask: Considering the

conditions of the pre-modern era, which cultural basins or civilisation (s) put forward the

ideal of unity? If these ideals exist, in what ways do they differ from modern practices of

unity, or do they share similarities with modern ideals of unity? All these questions

necessitate considering the historical and cultural context. When considering the

historical and cultural context, we can state that the ideal of unity (being one) already

existed among Muslims, but that political, geographical, technical, and factual conditions

did not permit the practical realisation of unity as we assume today. There has never

been a country whose borders encompassed all Muslims, neither in the pre-modern nor

the modern era. However, with the designation Daru’l-Islam (the abode of Islam),

Muslims could live as individuals with the same legal rights in every region where

the Sharia was in force. Since the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim was

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determined by the law of dhimma (protected non-Muslim subjects), non-Muslims paid

the jizya (poll tax) and were deprived of some rights in the lands of Daru’l-Islam, while

being Muslim represented having superior legal rights. The relations established with the

status of Muslims living in other regions were determined by the actions of the actors in

governing positions, while for ordinary Muslims, the attitude of the rulers towards other

Muslims determined their legitimacy. If a ruler, despite having the power and authority,

refused to help Muslims in other regions in need, it meant jeopardising their social

legitimacy. Or, in other words, it meant jeopardising their political power over their

subjects. This is because they would have created an opportunity for different actors

aiming to share power to attack them with the accusation of ‘not helping Muslims’. The

argument of ‘not helping Muslims’ in the fatwas of deposition or in certain uprisings in

the Ottoman Empire is supportive of this.

The notion of a monolithic West is considered necessary for the perception of a monolithic

Muslim World. Indeed, according to Aydın, the perception of the Muslim World gained a

different dimension in the context of the external threat of Western colonial activities,

and therefore, this perception constructed a monolithic image of the West (2017, pp. 5–

7). However, the point overlooked by this argument is that the definition of the Western

World is not new. The Crusades in the pre-modern era, the religious motivation in the

exploitation of the non-Western world during the early colonial period, the systematic

genocide of Muslims and Jews in Andalusia, and similar actions created a Christian-based

image of the West, and the West itself does not deny this. This approach, which

transcended the Middle Ages and extended into the modern era, was also relevant when

determining the fate of the ‘Sick Man’ Ottoman Empire during the time of the Concert of

Europe, despite all its internal differences. The Question Orientale was the attempt to

define this unity according to its internal balance. Therefore, to understand the military-

political unity practices of the West before the 19th century—for example, the motivation

(apart from some elites with economic aims) in the Crusades—we must accept the reality

of a common Christian-Western identity and motivation. However, this is not the ‘unity’

that precedes the homogeneity understood today. Furthermore, it should also be stated

that the people living in the lands targeted by this unity (Muslims or the Muslim World)

constituted a different kind of unity in the eyes of the Crusaders.

The argument that the belief in unity and the concept of Ummah among Muslim societies

emerged with modern technological developments like the train, telegraph, steamship,

and printing press, and was practically absent before that, also contains a generalisation

like the one above. Yes, of course, the speed and scale of social mobilisation increased

greatly in the modern era; but when it comes to the Muslim World, factors such as

relations among the ulama (scholars), long Rihlas (journeys for seeking knowledge) for

education, the mobilisation of Sufi orders (tariqas) and dervishes, and the high-scale and

rapid practice of trade have never interrupted relations among Muslims. Considering the

geographical reach of the Halvetiyya, Tijaniyya, Naqshbandiyya, or Qadiriyya, we are

taking the entire Muslim World into account. The diffusion of common knowledge and the

shared conceptualisation of unity (which we mentioned above is implicit in mutual

responsibilities) throughout the entire Darulislam, merely through the education received

in politically and intellectually central cities such as Istanbul, Damascus, Cairo, or

the Haramayn, and the subsequent spread of this knowledge via students, indicates that

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476

unity is an epistemological rather than a technological outcome. The influence of effective

scholars, ascetics, and other actors in the central cities, through their students and

followers, carried the conceptualisation of the Ummah/Muslim World to Muslims far from

the centre (Kaya 2011, pp. 29–30). For example, the influence and capacity for

mobilisation produced by a scholar who lived in the second half of the 1600s, throughout

various regions of the Muslim World before the 19th century, was made possible through

the ‘ulama network’ (Voll 1975, p. 36; Voll 1987, p. 69).

The character of unity among Muslim societies in the pre-modern era was predominantly

epistemological, not political. The practical results of this unity are also rooted in

the Rihla—the scholarly journey undertaken by the ulama—and the ease with which they

could socialise and integrate into the ruling elites when travelling to different regions.

Ibn Khaldun, a scholar born in Andalusia who moved to North Africa, could become

a Qadi (judge) in Cairo, occupy a similar position in Damascus, and even be invited to be

patronised by Timur (Ibn Khaldun 2007). The epistemological unity is what made Ibn

Khaldun feel at home in these vastly distant regions, but because this unity was also

accepted by the political elites, the Ummah conceptualisation constructed by

epistemological unity had to be accepted by the political elites—willingly or under duress.

In light of the above, it can be argued that the term Muslim World and the idea of Muslim

solidarity it encouraged, along with practical outcomes such as collective struggle against

colonialism, were present even before the 19th century. However, the colonial experience

after the 19th century caused the idea of solidarity to become widespread and impose

more urgent results. For this reason, the ideal of Muslim unity (Ittihad-i Islam) was

debated, and attempts were made to formulate political positions among Ottoman

scholars and intellectuals before the Muslims of Egypt or India who lived under colonial

exploitation (Özcan 1997). The idea that the term Muslim World originated from Muslims

living under the domination of England, Holland, France, and Russia (Aydın 2017, p. 7)

is historically a weak claim. Defining the demand for equal treatment from the

aforementioned colonialists as a path to salvation against their colonial arrogance—which

viewed Muslims as racialised, second-class, and backward people—disregards the

sensitivities of what we call epistemological unity; nevertheless, it is an undeniable truth

that the racist approaches of colonial arrogance encouraged the idea of the salvation of

the Ummah. The Muslim perception of unity, their feeling of responsibility towards other

Muslims, and their feeling of shared destiny with Muslims living in other parts of the

world—in times of crisis—existed long before the 19th century. However, the exploitation

that occurred in the 19th century and the political-military-economic weakness of the

current Caliphate gave rise to new discourses. So, what kind of political practice did the

Caliphate perform before the late 19th century? Why did colonial powers, despite

extensive field research, fear the institution of the Caliphate and its potential to mobilise

all Muslims during the debates concerning the Caliphate at the end of the 19th century?

These and similar questions necessitate that we re-evaluate the Caliphate and briefly

address the practical reality it constructed in the Muslim World on the eve of the modern

era.

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The Caliphate on the Eve of the Modern Era: What It Was, What It Should

Have Been

The new political structures that emerged in Europe with modernisation, or rather, the

new forms taken by the powers in Europe, changed the previous regimes’ understanding

of the political (Ertman 1997, 90–154). The French Revolution, which brought about this

change institutionally and violently, invented the term ancien régime to designate the

previous regime(s). Subsequently, as European hegemony spread to the non-Western

world, the theoretical assumptions, practical outcomes, and institutions of the Western

political understanding also permeated the non-Western world. Undoubtedly, the political

transformation experience of the Muslim World was not exempt from this. While the

political was being redefined in the modern era, the institutionalism and institutional

relations of the past also changed, causing profound epistemological ruptures. In this

context, the issue of the Caliphate/Khilāfah and the political unity of Muslims in Islamic

political thought took on a new character. At the very least, the manner of its discussion

changed, evolving into debates that emphasised different dimensions of the Caliph’s

personal qualities, legitimacy, or minimal necessity. While earlier discussions centered

on the qualifications of the Caliph, the manner(s) of accession to power, and the mode

of politics, the modern era saw new topics of discussion—such as the poor conditions of

all Muslims, the reasons for the Muslim World’s decline, prescriptions for salvation, the

status of a structure binding all Muslims, and effective methods for combating

colonialism—come to the fore in connection with the Caliphate.

The emergence of new discussion topics regarding the Caliphate did not sideline the

fundamental necessities of its legitimacy. However, new solutions were proposed in the

context of urgent needs and the political manoeuvres required to meet them. In fact,

Muslims had previously experienced a similar difference in dimension during the debates

on the legitimacy of the Caliphate. The issue of the conditions and status of the legitimate

Caliph, as discussed in the classics of Islamic political thought such as al-Mawardi (1994),

al-Juwayni (2016), and al-Ghazali, began to be discussed with a different dimension by

Muslims who were experiencing a socio-political crisis due to the Mongol aggression. Ibn

Taymiyyah’s work, especially al-Siyasatu’sh-shar’iyya (Public Policy in Islamic

Jurisprudence), focused on the fundamental purpose for which the political was

constructed, in order to find practical and Islamic solutions to the practical problems of

Muslims in a time of crisis: the implementation of the Sharia, the establishment of justice,

and the entrustment of the political authority (amana) to those qualified (1999).

Since the Caliphate resided with the Ottomans at the time of the encounter with modern

Europe in the late 19th century, it was essential to evaluate the unity of the Muslim World

within the context of the Ottoman Caliphate. The recognition of the Ottoman Sultans’

Caliphate by non-Muslim states occurred with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, signed after

the 1768-1774 Ottoman-Russian War. This treaty marked the official registration and

recognition of the Ottoman Caliphate by a non-Muslim state in international law. The

Ottomans, who were forced to yield Crimea to the Russian sphere of influence (Shaw

2002, p. 65), had the clause emphasising that the Ottoman Sultan was the Caliph of all

Muslims included in the treaty text in order to monitor the situation of Muslims in Crimea

and to prevent the Crimean Khanate from causing a problem for the Caliphate center in

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the future. This was because, according to the agreement, the Crimean Khanate was to

remain politically free, albeit as a formality. However, it was not difficult to predict what

this freedom would entail. For this reason, the words of the Ottoman delegate Yenişehirli

Osman Efendi during the agreement are telling: “The Sultan is the Caliph of all Sunni

Muslims. If he does not exercise this [his Caliphate] over India, Bukhara, and Fez, whose

rulers are Sunni, this is a deficiency arising from the great distance between them.

Recognising the freedom of the Tatars will mean a severe blow to the office of the

Caliphate” (Buzpınar 2016, p. 50). The emphasis here is important; for it both reminds

that the Caliph is the Caliph of all Muslims and stresses that there is only one Caliph. This

emphasis continued to increase from the 17th century onward. As Buzpınar also states,

the emphasis placed by the Ottoman political elites and ulama on the singularity of the

Caliphate from the 18th century until the beginning of the 20th century—and even until

the abolition of the Caliphate—indicates a state of vigilance against the danger of more

than one person claiming the Caliphate (Buzpınar 2016, p. 60). In this context, the

critique of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Sultanate of Fez in the 16th century—which

argued that the Caliph should be from the Quraysh tribe—evolved by the 18th century,

forced by practical consequences, into accepting the Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of all

Muslims and encouraging aid to him (Buzpınar 2016, p. 61).

As an example of the Ottoman Sultans acting as the Caliph of all Muslims, one can look

at the text of the friendship and trade agreement made with Spain in 1782, which

emerged after three years of negotiations. Spain requested that the agreement contain

a promise from the Ottoman Empire not to aid Spain’s enemies, in return for Spain’s

promise not to aid Ottoman enemies (Beydilli 2001, pp. 166–167). However, this request

was not accepted because some of Spain’s potential enemies might be Muslim, i.e.,

Muslim corsairs from the Barbary States might be at war with Spain and ask for Ottoman

aid. Furthermore, the Sultans of Fez might also be at war with Spain. In this situation,

because the Ottoman Empire was both the center of the Caliphate and because it is an

obligation (fard) for other Muslims to help any Muslim asking for help (the relationship

of Walā and Barā), the Ottoman aid to the Sultan of Fez or the corsairs of the Barbary

States would be a religious necessity (Ahmed Cevdet Pasha 1309, p. 193). For this

reason, this request was not included in the agreement. Moreover, the agreement text

stressed that aid would be given to a Muslim state in case of war with Spain. It might be

argued that this positioning was self-assumed by the Ottoman Empire to protect its own

influence. However, conversely, the fact that Muslims living in regions very far from the

centre saw the Ottoman Empire in a similar position because of the Caliphate shows that

the issue was not one-sided. For example, the Sultanates of Malabar and Mysore in India

sending envoys to the capital in the second half of the 1770s to ask for help from the

Sultan-Caliph can be cited as an example (Aydın 2017, pp. 14–15). However, some

requests for help, unfortunately, could not be met due to the weakening of the Ottoman

Sultan’s practical power. Yet, the inability to meet these requests due to practical

inadequacies cannot lead to the conclusion that the Ottoman Caliphate was disregarded

by Muslims or that the Ottomans only considered their own strategic interests and did

not care much about other Muslims (Aydın 2017, p. 15). For it was not only the Ottomans

and the Muslims in distant lands in need of help who deemed the Caliphate connection

important; England also sought help from the Caliph to stop the Indian Muslims who were

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obstructing their colonial activities in India, planning to use the office of the Caliphate to

invite Muslims to obedience to the British (Özcan 1997, p. 17). However, when these

demands were not met, they would start producing discourses questioning the legitimacy

of the Ottoman Caliphate. The discourse emphasising that the Caliphate should be

reserved for those from the Quraysh lineage in the Arab world was circulated in public

discourse by the British.

Against the British discourses questioning the Ottoman Caliphate and asserting that the

Caliphate should belong to the Arabs, the treatise written by Redhouse in 1877 is

important because it summarises how the Caliphate was perceived and accepted in

historical practice: “...gradually, but generally, has been acknowledged, accepted, and

adopted by the whole Sunni Muslim world, from China to Algeria, from the frozen plains

of Siberia to the tropical islands of Sumatra and Java, and the British colony of the Cape

of Good Hope” (2002, p. 98). Redhouse’s argumentation is a manifestation of factual

reality. The Caliphate, after the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, partially evolved into a

sultanate, weakened historically, and became completely symbolic during the Mongol

invasions. This symbolisation had little effect beyond granting legitimacy to those holding

practical power, while Ibn Taymiyyah shifted political legitimacy away from the existence

or non-existence of a Caliph to whether Islamic Sharia was practically implemented and

justice was established, as a solution. This is because the political crisis in the era he

lived in was shaped by the absence of a strong Caliph, alongside the lack of any authority

capable of managing most, if not all, Muslims in the Islamic world. In this situation, local

sultanates and emirates emerged; Ibn Taymiyyah’s action was to keep these emirates

within the boundaries that protected the public interest (maslahah) of Muslims and to

ensure they created a social reality where the Islamic faith could be practised. However,

he did not discount the fact that actors whose power could exceed local boundaries would

practically aspire to the Caliphate. Indeed, practical reality confirms this: actors (states)

with the political and military power to protect the Muslim populace are favoured in the

ordinary course of life and are naturally accepted as the Caliph. This is precisely how the

Caliphate passed to the Ottomans. Yavuz Sultan Selim’s conquest of Egypt and the

subsequent bringing of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil—who was symbolically under

the protection of the Mamluks—to Istanbul was not for the transfer of the Caliphate to

the Ottomans. Furthermore, al-Mutawakkil did not leave the Caliphate to the Ottomans

in a ‘handover’ ceremony (Buzpınar 2004, 113–127). The Ottomans, who did not protect

al-Mutawakkil after he lost the Mamluks’ protection, kept him in the capital for a period

and then allowed him to go to Cairo, and after his death, the Caliphate claims of those

descending from the Abbasid lineage were not taken seriously. However, the fact that

Muslims cannot live without a Caliph, or rather, the warning hadiths that those who die

without obeying the Imam of the time will die a Jahiliyyah (Ignorance) death, necessitate

a Caliph. This practical need, along with the Ottoman Sultans defining themselves as

Caliphs starting with Suleiman the Magnificent, and other Muslims seeing the Ottomans

as their protectors due to their power and protection, practically meant the transfer of

the Caliphate to the Ottomans. However, the Caliph, being the leader of all Muslims,

should not be taken to mean that he possesses the capacity to provide a solution to every

problem at all times. The limits of the Caliph’s practical power also define the limits of

the internal unity and strength of the Muslim World. If the Caliph has sufficient political

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and military power, he is considered obligated to protect the rights of Muslims in any

region; if he fails to fulfil this obligation, it is emphasised that he will be held accountable

for neglecting his responsibilities both in this world and the hereafter. However, the

Caliph’s inability to assist a Muslim in situations where his political and military power is

insufficient does not imply that the institution of the Caliphate is non-functional or merely

symbolic.

The 20th Century: New World Order Debates

1

and Unity in the Muslim

World

Understanding the global system that established the current political, economic, and

cultural world is equivalent to grasping where and how the Muslim World is positioned

within this system. The period between the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and World

War II was an era during which the war-weary world sought to reconstruct its fractured

orders, and populations grappled with the economic and agricultural crises of

1929. Following Europe’s second initiation of a major power war and the creation of

unimaginable catastrophic crises on its own soil, the year 1945 marked the re-

establishment of peace. At this juncture, unlike the First World War, an idea of a global

order began to be voiced by the victors. It is known that the post-war’ World Order’

discussions were tied to Pax Americana. However, where the issue crystallises in public

academic debates indicates the presence of different approaches, modes of reading, and

preferences. In this context, the political positions to which each evaluation is committed

implicitly express their visions for the future while attempting to understand the

present. So, in this regard, what is meant by the ‘New World Order’ designation in public

academic debates? Moreover, can a genuine order, beyond what is actually meant, be

spoken of in reality? If so, how should it be defined for us to know what kind of world

awaits us in the future? In this context, we must first state that Socialist, Liberal, and

Islamist public discourses have sometimes common and sometimes differing definitions

of the New World Order due to their political preferences.

The New World Order for Socialists or Liberals

By Socialists or Liberals, I do not mean all socialist/liberal structures or individuals, but

the ideal type of the socialist/liberal discourse that is dominant in public academic

debates.

The alliance of the Western coalition led by the United States and the Soviets to defeat

the Germans against Nazi expansionism necessitated the establishment of a balanced

structure after 1945. Especially Europe’s failure to re-establish the balance it had created

within itself a century earlier (the Concert of Europe) after World War I, and the United

1

For a more extensive discussion on the dimension of the new world order concerning Muslims, see Kurğan,

Erdal. 2025. ‘Kolonyalizmden Postkolonyalizme: Orta Doğu, Göç ve Küresel Düzenin Yeni Hali’ [From

Colonialism to Postcolonialism: The Middle East, Migration, and the New State of the Global Order], in Küresel

Göç ve Türkiye [Global Migration and Turkey], eds. Ersoy, İmre S., Aysan, Mehmet Fatih & Kurğan, Erdal,

İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları. The conceptual discussion presented here follows the same trajectory

as the conceptual discussion in that article

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States’ inability to collect the loan aid it had provided to the continent, paved the way for

the process leading up to and after 1945. At the peace talks concluding World War I in

1918, France’s stance and the price it sought to exact from Germany seemed to suggest

a forthcoming rematch even at that time. J. M. Keynes, a member of the British

delegation at the talks, emphasised that these were not peace talks but preparations for

a new war. According to Keynes, the war reparations demanded by the French were an

amount the Germans could not pay, and the peace terms were conditions they could not

accept. Ultimately, Keynes’s prediction proved correct, and World War II occurred.

After World War II, the US did not repeat the mistake it made in 1918: it did not leave

the continent to its own devices; politically, militarily, and economically, it integrated the

Western powers into the system it constructed. Symbolically, the Dollar-centric’

International Monetary Agreement’ was signed in 1944 based on the decision reached in

Bretton Woods, a small town in New Hampshire, USA. Subsequently, the World Bank and

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established. This was not merely economic

cooperation but also a global political organisation that did not include the Soviets (and

countries close to them). And in the newly constructed post-war economic order, modern

liberal economic policies, which allowed for state regulation—the theoretical framework

of which was provided by Keynes—became prevalent. In this post-war economic

order, states prevented unemployment by creating jobs through massive public

investments while also stimulating the market by encouraging consumption. At the same

time, states provided essential social needs such as education, healthcare, and pensions

through welfare state practices. In fact, these economic policies were implemented by

Nazi Germany before 1945, but let us be content with this for now.

The crisis of the Bretton Woods system established in the post-1945 era, along with

economic downturns such as the 1973 oil crisis, led to the economic policies first

implemented by the coup administration in Chile in 1973, and subsequently by Margaret

Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US in the late 70s and early 80s, which are

generally referred to as the Neo-liberal order. This era, in which welfare state policies

were abandoned, labour organisations were restricted, and public services such as

education and healthcare were marketised, also reflects the period when the discourse

of ‘Globalisation’ began to emerge and spread. It is an era characterised by the rise of

identity politics, consequently bringing multiple identity issues to the

agenda, questioning the boundaries and conventional policies of the nation-state, and

the proliferation of cultural pluralism (Fülberth, 2018: 265–291). In this period, where

organised structures—regardless of whether they are socialist or right-wing/nationalist—

are defined as tools of domination, sociality and social organisations are changing, and

processes are centred on identity politics.

In this ‘New World Order’ (Harvey, 2010; Hardt & Negri, 2023), which Socialists evaluate

from a critical perspective and Liberals from an affirmative one, the homo economicus is

unrestrained by any legal bond. The preceding legal and public benefit-centric restrictions

of the homo juridicus are abandoned in the neo-liberal era, and the homo juridicus is

translated into the language of the homo economicus. In other words, the law is

constructed to serve the interests of capital; the state creates the market.

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To summarise, this order, which permitted the abandonment of the post-war order and

the spread of globalisation and neo-liberal policies, is characterised by Socialists and

Liberals as the New World Order.

The New World Order in Islamist Discourse

Unlike the Socialist or Liberal discourse, Islamist discourse differentiates itself by not

seeking the New World Order in the language of political economy. In Islamist

discourse, the New World Order begins in the early 90s when NATO positioned Islam in

its new enemy concept (Albayrak, 2007: 45). Following the end of the Cold War, since

the Soviets were dissolved, the destabilising power/actor needed for Pax Americana’s

legitimacy was now represented by Muslims.

The ‘green belt’ project, which centred on the Muslim world serving as a buffer against

Soviet ‘red’ expansionism in the 1980s, began to be abandoned in the 90s. The Green

Belt project actually did not operate with the efficiency expected by the US. The

project, which presupposed an identity of ‘Moderate Islam/Muslim’ that was compatible

with the liberal-capitalist values of modern Western civilisation, also included mass

mobilisation to be leveraged against the socialist threat. However, the project failed to

account for one thing: the procedural premises of Islam. That is, the epistemic sources

of the monotheistic worldview not only rejected the liberal-capitalist values promoted by

the US but also viewed them as falsehoods on the same scale as the socialist

worldview. For this reason, for Islamists, the capitalist expansionism of the US was at

least as dangerous as the communist expansionism of the

Soviets. Consequently, mainstream Islamist structures remained distant from the green

belt project, apart from narrow-framed, individual, or local involvements.

The collapse of the Soviets and the Green Belt project opened the door to a new world

for Islamist discourse: the New World Order. The critical threshold of this order was

NATO’s declaration, in its ‘New Strategic Concept’, that it viewed Islamist

fundamentalists as its existential enemy. In this context, the statement made by former

NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes in February 1995 is very clear: ‘…in the five years

since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Islamic militancy has emerged as

perhaps the gravest threat to the alliance and Western security.’

2

The notion that

Islamism was the new enemy concept after the Soviets was articulated much earlier than

Claes, in 1990 and also in the context of NATO, by Margaret Thatcher, the architect of

neoliberal policies. As the 2000s approached, the rising discourse of ‘Islamist terror’

became a dominant rhetoric in the conventional press, and military interventions in

different geographies of the Islamic world did not meet with sufficient reaction because

they could find a legitimate basis in world public opinion.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the strategic concept surpassed the Atlantic and Continental

Europe and spread globally. Every government, strong or weak, from the US to

France, from Russia to China, from Uzbekistan to Angola or Niger, was able to proceed

with the liquidation of Muslim opposition by labelling it with the rhetoric of

2

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/02/09/nato-seeks-talks-with-n-african-mideast-

states-on-islamic-militants/cf728b91-d57d-4126-9e40-b77c9aa38763/ retrieved: 25.10.2025

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terror. Therefore, the definition of the New World Order in Islamist discourse can be read

as the globalisation of anti-Islamism led by the West.

The Nature of the New Order

In fact, both the Socialist and Islamist definitions of the New World Order have justifiable

aspects. However, my personal conviction is that the New Order has been in existence

for a very long time and has created the entire international public sphere.

The point missed by the conventional understandings of the world order is its pro-Zionist

structure—which supports Zionist interests under all circumstances—that remains

unchanged, unlike the changing sides of the order, and gives the order its

character. Bringing the philosophical and academic premises of this system to the fore is

one of the indispensable prerequisites for understanding its nature. I claim that the

influence of Zionism in the establishment of the UN, the declaration of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, and so forth, cannot be denied.

The post-1945 order, Pax Americana, where the institutions known internationally today

were built, never saw the Soviets as an existential other, contrary to Cold War

rhetoric. They were already allies in pushing back the Nazis. The US-Soviet conflict

experienced in the first years of the order until its institutions were established began to

soften with détente , not long after—10-15 years later—and the order was consolidated

with a mutually agreed-upon, controlled tension. The price for the US was the acceptance

of the Soviets as a superpower. For this reason, the New World Order was consolidated

on a global scale by including Soviet Russia and China, with absolute veto power, in the

United Nations (UN), the symbolic institution of the post-’45 order.

The pro-Zionist character of the order is not solely the exclusion of the Germans as an

atonement for their Nazi sins; it was also the recognition of Jews as a separate nation by

the Allies (US, UK, France, USSR, and China). Our point is not that a Jewish identity or

Judaism does not exist; of course, there is a reality called Jews and

Judaism. However, the recognition of this entity as a ‘nation’ in the age of nation-states

also presupposes a state and a homeland for that nation; if the state and homeland do

not exist, it makes them necessary and legitimate.

The pro-Zionist character of the New World Order both legitimised and accelerated the

process leading up to 1948. The realisation of a homeland for the stateless Jewish

population would only be possible by evacuating the non-Jewish population from the

region we define as Palestine, with Al-Haram Al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) at its

centre. The ‘Transfer’ discussions in the early 1940s, which envisioned moving the

surplus population in Europe as colonisers to sparsely populated areas, were also on the

agenda of US President Roosevelt (Mazower 2013, p. 108). The secret M-Project, or

‘Migration Project,’ prepared during the war, did not only aim to give the Jews a

homeland. It also aimed to coordinate international agreements between European

countries with a population surplus—the countries that would export population—and the

countries where the population was projected to be settled (Mazower 2013, pp. 105–

106). However, Roosevelt’s project failed. Yet, the Jewish export part of the project

continued in a complex manner. Demographers, geographers, and other cademics, such

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as Eugene Kulischer, Joseph Schechtman, and Vladimir Jabotinsky, each of whom was a

Zionist or even an active Zionist, constructed the discourse in the post-’45 order that

viewed the existence of Zionism as a state as the unique legitimacy of the order (Mazower

2013).

In addition to the pro-Zionist character of the New World Order, we must also remember

that it is Eurocentric and colonialist. Among the things that remained unchanged on the

path from colonialism to post-colonialism is the circulation of

political, economic, military, and epistemic discourses—which recreate the domination of

the system’s hegemonic powers—in public debate spheres. This discursive struggle gave

rise to its opponents; while the hegemonic discourse stood on one side, critical

approaches emerged opposite it. Nevertheless, the Muslim World, in the post-Caliphate

era, has been coded as the absolute other of the new order. The pro-Zionist nature of

the order not only disregards the systematic genocide of the Israeli occupation regime

but also tolerates movements of ‘history-cide’ that attack the historical past of

Muslims. In this context, an arson attack was carried out against the Al-Aqsa Mosque in

1969 as one of the Zionist terror activities ongoing in the Palestinian territories since the

1890s. The unintended consequence of this action gained a new dimension with the

construction of an institutional body by the Caliphate-less Muslim World, which they

hoped would fulfil the Caliph’s duties in practice.

OIC: Replacement of the Caliphate, Power Struggle, or Effort for

Existence?

Al-Aqsa Mosque, one of the three holy sanctuaries of Muslims, was set on fire by a Jew

on August 22, 1969. These ‘civilian’ attacks, seen as militia activities of the Zionist

occupation regime and directed at the history of Jerusalem and the sacred sites of

Muslims, were met with outrage across the entire Muslim World. The most significant and

institutionally permanent of these reactions was the establishment of ‘The Organisation

of Islamic Cooperation’ (OIC). With a decision taken at the Summit convened in Rabat

on September 25, 1969 (12th Rajab 1389 Hijra), under the leadership of the then Saudi

King Faisal and Moroccan King Hassan, it was decided to establish an international

institution to which all Muslim countries would be members. Subsequently, at the first

Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) held in Jeddah in 1970, agreement was

reached on giving the organisation permanent status, making Jeddah the headquarters

of the secretariat until Jerusalem was liberated, and appointing the former Prime Minister

of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, as the founding Secretary-General.

3

At

the 3rd ICFM Session held in March 1972, the Charter of the Islamic Conference was

adopted, giving the organisation legal personality.

According to the organisation’s founding Charter, the organs of the OIC are listed under

11 separate headings. These 11 headings express both the names of the core organs and

the types of organs. Accordingly, the institutional structure of the OIC consists

3

The current Secretary-General, serving as the 12th in the post, is Hissein Brahim Taha, and the Organization

has 57 member states. This number grants the OIC the distinction of being the international organization with

the largest number of member states after the UN.

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of: 1. Islamic Summit, 2. Council of Foreign Ministers, 3. Standing

Committees, 4. Executive Committee, 5. International Islamic Court of

Justice, 6. Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, 7. Committee of

Permanent Representatives, 8. General Secretariat, 9. Subsidiary

Organs, 10. Specialised Institutions, and 11. Affiliated Institutions. Among these

organs, the Islamic Summit, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the General Secretariat

are the most effective (Ataman & Gökşen 2014, p. 12). The Islamic Summit, the main

decision-making body, is composed of heads of government/state and kings. Meeting

routinely every three years unless an extraordinary meeting is necessary, the Islamic

Summit determines the basic policies to be followed by the organisation. Accepting the

principle of discussing every issue related to the Muslim World, the organisation presents

solutions to these issues and adopts resolutions regarding the organisation’s common

stance on these matters. A term president is elected at every ordinary meeting of the

Islamic Summit held every three years; thus, the term presidencies are for three

years. The arrangements required for the Islamic Summit meetings are carried out by

the Council of Foreign Ministers and the General Secretariat.

The second-highest and effective decision-making body of the organisation is the Council

of Foreign Ministers, which consists of the foreign ministers of the member states or their

official representatives. Meeting once a year normally, the Council of Foreign Ministers

can also hold extraordinary meetings upon the request of the General Secretariat or any

member. It holds coordination meetings during the UN General Assembly to develop a

common stance among member states; it determines the policies to be pursued and

establishes common positions. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which meets in a

different member state each year, ensures the implementation of decisions that

determine the organisation’s general policy and the review and monitoring of decisions

taken at previous meetings of the Islamic Summit and the Council of Foreign

Ministers. Key duties, such as the appointment of the Secretary-General and his

assistants, the adoption of the organisation’s budget, and the proposal of new organs or

committees, are also under its purview.

The General Secretariat, the executive organ of the organisation, is responsible for

ensuring dialogue among member states; controlling and reporting the implementation

of the decisions and recommendations of the Islamic Summit and the Council of Foreign

Ministers; and supporting the subsidiary or auxiliary organs and specialised institutions

by guiding and coordinating their programs. The Secretary-General, the most effective

executive of the organisation, can be elected by the Council of Foreign Ministers for a

term of five years, for a maximum of two terms. The Secretary-General submits his

assistants for the approval of the Council of Foreign Ministers and appoints the staff of

the organisation. Employees of the General Secretariat do not receive orders or

instructions from any government or authority outside the organisation while performing

their duties. The subsidiary organs specified in the OIC Charter are: the

Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries

(SESRIC); the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA); the Islamic

University of Technology (IUT); the Islamic Centre for Development of Trade (ICDT); the

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International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA); and the Islamic Solidarity Fund and its Waqf

(ISF).

4

Within the OIC, there are four permanent committees, each operating under the

patronage of the head of state of a different country. The relevant ministers of the

member states attend the meetings of these committees. These committees are the Al-

Quds Committee, the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs

(COMIAC), the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation

(COMCEC), and the Standing Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation

(COMSTECH).

Among these committees, the one with the closest relationship to the organisation’s

founding motivation is the Al-Quds Committee. Established in Rabat in 1975, the main

purpose of the Al-Quds Committee is to coordinate economic aid provided to Muslims in

various cities of Palestine, especially Jerusalem. In addition, the committee determines

the necessary measures to be taken for the protection of the sacred sites of Muslims in

and around Jerusalem, particularly Al-Aqsa Mosque, and monitors the implementation of

the required actions. The other committees were established with the intention of

promoting the economic and social development of member countries and increasing

their mutual relations in these areas. These committees are tasked with monitoring the

implementation of OIC decisions concerning economic and commercial

cooperation, enhancing the capacity of member states in these matters, and presenting

recommendations. COMCEC has developed significant cooperation programs, working to

foster collaboration among Muslim countries in almost all economic sectors, such as

trade, industry, agriculture, food, transportation, communication, energy, finance, healt

h, demography, and technical cooperation (Ataman 2006, p. 600).

In addition to the committees, there are also Specialised Institutions, each with its own

independent budget, determined by independent legislative bodies. The specialised

institutions established to date in this context are: the Islamic Development Bank (IDB);

the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO); the Islamic

Broadcasting Union (IBU); the International Islamic News Agency (IINA); the Islamic

International Committee of the Red Crescent (ICIC); and the Centre for

Science, Technology and Innovation (STIC).

5

The OIC also has other organs and

institutions outside of these different categories. Among these, the Executive

Committee, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the International Court of

Justice, the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission, and the Islamic

Universities should not be forgotten.

The main objective of the organisation is to achieve solidarity and cooperation among

member states, and its other important goals can be listed as follows: i- To increase

cooperation among member states in economic, social, cultural, scientific, and other vital

fields, ii- To prevent and end colonial activities applied in Muslim countries, iii- To combat

hunger, eradicate poverty, and ensure access to basic nutrition in every country, iv- To

4

“Subsidiary Organs,” https://new.oic-

oci.org/SitePages/OrganisationsEn.aspx?Item=9&OrgType=Subsidiary%20Organs retrieved 25.10.2025

5

“Specialized Institutions” https://new.oic-

oci.org/SitePages/OrganisationsEn.aspx?Item=11&OrgType=Specialized%20Institutions retrieved 25.10.2025

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establish peace by ending ethnic and religious conflicts existing in member states, and

v- To ensure the protection of cities and structures considered sacred from a religious

perspective (Kayaoğlu, 2015).

Considering all this and the successes or failures of the OIC in the Muslim World since its

establishment, the resulting picture is as follows: the OIC is an Islamic Union attempted

in the post-Caliphate era and the age of nation-states. It is even possible to suggest that

the OIC is an endeavour for a contemporary Caliphate practice, considering the

committees, auxiliary organs, etc., that we mentioned above. However, the purpose of

establishing this union, the domestic political situations of the actors within the union,

their positions in the international public sphere, the economic relationship networks of

the member countries, and whether ordinary Muslims in the countries have a say in the

administration—many such points determine both the capacity and the practical power

of the union.

The Arab Cold War (Cleveland 2015, p. 360; Kerr 1971) that occurred during the OIC’s

establishment period—namely, some Arab countries being satellites of the capitalist

Western world while others were pro-Soviet—significantly affected the founding process

as a major handicap. Despite the heinous attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque being the trigger

for the establishment, the division among the Arab political elites made the liberation of

Jerusalem a secondary issue. Furthermore, the Kemalist Islamophobia experienced in

Turkey, the most influential power and the remnant of the Caliphate in the Muslim World,

prevented the organisation from acquiring the experience necessary to draw a real

institutional identity and roadmap. Turkey’s decisive influence within the OIC and its

ability to overcome its internal secularism syndrome only became possible in the early

2000s. Not only Turkey’s but also the activities of other Muslim countries within the

organisation could not (or cannot) perform at the same level, often turning into an arena

for hegemonic struggle where some countries attempt to dominate. For instance, Saudi

Arabia’s desire to be decisive during the establishment phase was rooted in its rivalry

with Egypt in the Arab world and its anxiety about losing leadership to Egypt. However,

Egypt’s distancing itself from the Soviets, its brief war with the Israeli occupation regime,

and Iran’s sectarian-motivated efforts to export the revolution after the Islamic

Revolution compelled Saudi Arabia to approach Egypt again. Nevertheless, this approach

did not significantly change the practical results.

Despite the OIC being established with the purpose of liberating Jerusalem, the political

interests of the political elites of the member countries do not align with the OIC’s

agenda. The primary factor in this is undoubtedly the fact that we live in the age of

nation-states. The concepts of Ummah and the Muslim World, as we discussed in the

introduction, although they existed in the pre-modern era, the new circumstances

created by the modern era provided technical possibilities that could make

the Ummah and the Muslim World more dynamic and more monolithic. Paradoxically,

however, a politically much weaker unity is practised in the Muslim World today than in

the pre-modern era. This is primarily because national identities, national borders, and

national interests are prioritised over the Muslim World. However, this prioritisation is

not done by the Muslim populations but predominantly by the political elites. A regime-

populace dichotomy exists in many states prevalent in the Muslim World. While the

populations are mostly inclined to favour the Muslim World, the regimes—the political

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Erdal Kurğan

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elites—adopt a position in the opposite direction. In addition to national division,

sectarian differences can also be read as an obstacle to the ideal of unity. However, even

though sectarian differences were present in the pre-modern era, they did not lead to a

violent separation that would create a crisis within the Ummah. Even today, there are

actors who fuel separation; however, these actors remain marginal, and the majority

within the Ummah does not prioritise sectarian differences in times of crisis.

The OIC’s performance in practically fulfilling the function of the Caliphate is weakened

by the existence of other institutional unions and rival organisations. For example, the

Arab League, established before the OIC (excluding Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran), was

founded in 1945 by largely the same effective states in the OIC, with a similar objective

of liberating Jerusalem. The oil-exporting countries among the 22 members of the

organisation also influence the organisation’s decisions. Furthermore, the D-8 union, the

unions formed among African countries, the unions formed among Asian countries, etc.,

all restrict the practical power of the OIC and reduce its capacity to act.

Although the economic committees of the OIC work more efficiently compared to its

political committees, they fail to produce the expected practical results. Since most OIC

member countries produce almost nothing except natural resources and agriculture,

achieving an autarkic economy does not seem possible for now. Both the poor quality of

human capital and their dependence on the outside world in many areas compel the

countries to act in their own interests. Consequently, these countries are often forced to

accept the impositions of other non-member countries (Dabour, 2001). In addition to the

political problems within the OIC, economic problems also hinder cooperation. The

development gap among OIC member states prevents economic integration. Although

the number of OIC member countries is 57, a total of 77.7% of exports are carried out

by only 10 countries. This situation differentiates the economic priorities of the countries

and thus prevents a common course of action. At the same time, this situation causes

not all countries within the OIC to have an equal say (Sey 2020, p. 70).

In the recent period, especially after 9/11, the OIC has made efforts to generate public

discourse in combating Islamophobia. In this context, it reports on rising anti-Islam

sentiment in the Western world and combats Islamophobia under the rhetoric of human

rights. Culturally, it can be argued that its recent work on minority rights (Sharqieh 2012)

attempts to fulfil a duty similar to the Caliph’s role of protecting all Muslims. Just as they

raise the rights of the Thai Muslim minority, the Filipino Muslim minority, and the

Rohingya Muslims, they also generate public awareness by raising the rights of Muslim

minorities in the West. On the other hand, cultural activities such as supporting the

restoration of historical artefacts that are the common heritage of the Muslim World

(Mosques, Madrasas, Libraries, Palaces, bazaars, bridges, etc.), the preservation of

manuscript collections, and studies on the history of Islamic science are prominent.

We argued above that a Caliph naturally emerged and gained acceptance among Muslims

with social consent when political-military power could practically protect Muslims. A

similar situation could have occurred after the establishment of the OIC. The existence

of a military and political power capable of taking practical political decisions and putting

them into effect could have produced a Caliph from within the OIC. However, it is evident

that the committees established by the OIC, despite concerning many political, economic,

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The Conceptualisation of Islamic Unity in the Age of Nation-States: The Muslim World, the

Caliphate, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Erdal Kurğan

489

and cultural issues, were not formed militarily. Yet, the stabilisation of the Muslim World

and its capacity to produce a Caliph are primarily dependent on military power. The

realisation of Ittihad-i Islam necessitates a coordinated military power, even if not

monolithic and unitary. Unfortunately, the practical experience of the OIC has been far

from this. As the occupation of Jerusalem deepened day by day, it failed to constitute a

practical obstacle, could not prevent the occupation of Afghanistan (by the Soviets and

the US), could not stop the occupation of Iraq during the First and Second Gulf Wars,

turned into a phantom during the Arab Spring, and remained overly silent on the path to

the Syrian revolution, projecting an image of a cumbersome institutional structure. For

this reason, as the former Secretary-General of the OIC stated, the Organisation has

unfortunately failed to realise its own potential (İhsanoğlu 2012).

The characteristic structure of the post-Caliphate era constructed a political atmosphere

that shaped the 20th century and determined the actors within the OIC’s internal body:

‘Unity in discourse, rivalry in action.’ This atmosphere has always been decisive in the

Arab League and the practical United Arab Republic (Cleveland 2015, pp. 348–350). This

environment, defined by unity in discourse and rivalry in action, persisted within the OIC

until the early decades of the 2000s.

Conclusion

The Muslim World represents a widely dispersed society on a global scale, accompanied

by local diversities. In the 19th century, the development of transportation and

communication technology and the colonial aggression directed against the Muslim World

compelled Muslims to engage in an organised struggle against the colonial West. This

compulsory struggle foregrounded the issue of Walā and Barā’ (loyalty and disavowal),

shaping relations and mutual responsibilities among Muslims.

In contrast to modern approaches that advocate for all Muslims to live as a monolithic

whole under a single state umbrella, the conception of unity among Muslims also existed

in the Muslim World during the pre-modern era. However, this unity was not a

homogeneous uniformity constructed among the citizens of modern states; rather, it was

an epistemological solidarity that was implicit in the differences centred

on Urf (customary law). Political unity under the Caliph’s symbolic and practical

leadership could be constrained by limitations such as military capacity, economic power,

or vast geographical distance. Nevertheless, after the 19th century, the political, military,

and economic weakness of the Caliph left the Muslim World vulnerable to colonial

aggression, and following the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the Muslim World was

left Caliphate-less in the New World Order. In other words, it practically lost its unity and

became confined within the national borders of nation-states. The OIC, constructed under

these historical circumstances, embarked with the ideal of fulfilling the duties performed

by the Caliph during the post-Caliphate era and establishing the unity of Muslims.

However, the distance between the regimes—the political elites—and the populace in the

Muslim World, the struggle for hegemony within the OIC’s internal structure, and the

prioritisation of members’ national interests over the Muslim World all invalidate the

Organisation’s intention to substitute the Caliphate.

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Based on the experience practised by the OIC, we can assert that, despite the personal

or national preferences of the political elites, the ideal of unity among Muslim populations

still remains fresh. The emergence of quickly mobilised actors in the Muslim World during

times of crisis is indicative of this. While nation-states prioritise their national and regional

strategies, actors demonstrating a strong will—while being aware of this

strategic realpolitik but also transcending it—can enact the practical outcomes of the

Caliphate. This power and will are inherent in the socio-political structure of the Muslim

populations, the Muslim World, or the Ummah.

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