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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between

Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025

434

BALANCING AN EMERGING POWER’S INFLUENCE: CAMBODIA’S FOREIGN

POLICY CHOICES WITHIN ASEAN UNDER CHINESE ECONOMIC LEVERAGE

YELIZAVETA YURCHENKO

yelizaveta.yurcenko@gmail.com

Post-Graduate, Karadeniz Technical University

ÖZGÜR TÜFEKÇI

ozgurtufekci@ktu.edu.tr

Associate Professor, Karadeniz Technical University (Turkey). Director-General of CESRAN

International. ORCID: 0000-0002-4335-2909

Abstract

The essay aims to explore Cambodia's behaviour and decisions in the international arena,

which emerged from its close economic cooperation with China. This paper uses the ASEAN

ministerial meeting in 2012, the Ream Naval Base dispute, and the Belt and Road Initiative

infrastructure project as case studies. In this way, we obtained detailed information about the

specific mechanisms of influence of the above-mentioned events on Cambodia's further

decisions in foreign policy. This paper reveals that the long-term multidimensional cooperation

between China and Cambodia has had a direct impact on Cambodia's diplomatic activities

within ASEAN, ensuring the protection of China's geopolitical interests at the cost of

destabilising a crucial regional bloc. It follows that in order to preserve the unity of ASEAN

and take the maximum strategic benefit from partners, Cambodia needs to apply a balance

mechanism between cooperation with China and the Southeast Alliance.

Keywords

ASEAN; Economic cooperation; The Belt and Road Initiative; Chinese investment; Cambodia’s

foreign policy.

Resumo

O ensaio tem como objetivo explorar o comportamento e as decisões do Camboja na arena

internacional, que surgiram da sua estreita cooperação económica com a China. Este artigo

utiliza a reunião ministerial da ASEAN em 2012, a disputa da Base Naval de Ream e o projeto

de infraestrutura da Iniciativa Belt and Road como estudos de caso. Desta forma, obtivemos

informações detalhadas sobre os mecanismos específicos de influência dos eventos acima

mencionados nas decisões futuras do Camboja em matéria de política externa. Este artigo

revela que a cooperação multidimensional de longo prazo entre a China e o Camboja teve um

impacto direto nas atividades diplomáticas do Camboja dentro da ASEAN, garantindo a

proteção dos interesses geopolíticos da China à custa da desestabilização de um bloco regional

crucial. Conclui-se que, para preservar a unidade da ASEAN e obter o máximo benefício

estratégico dos parceiros, o Camboja precisa aplicar um mecanismo de equilíbrio entre a

cooperação com a China e a Aliança do Sudeste Asiático.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

435

Palavras-chave

ASEAN; Cooperação económica; Iniciativa Belt and Road; Investimento chinês; Política

externa do Camboja.

How to cite this article

Yurchenko, Yelizaveta & Tüfekçi, Özgür (2025). Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence:

Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean under Chinese Economic Leverage. Janus.net, e-

journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and

Regional Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 434-451.

https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0525.23

Article submitted on 09th July 2025 and accepted for publication on 08th October 2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

436

BALANCING AN EMERGING POWER’S INFLUENCE: CAMBODIA’S

FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES WITHIN ASEAN UNDER CHINESE

ECONOMIC LEVERAGE

YELIZAVETA YURCHENKO

ÖZGÜR TÜFEKÇI

Introduction

Cambodia's foreign policy has been noticeably leaning towards China since the 1950s,

owing to its facilitation and aid in the desperate struggle against Western influence. A

closer chapter in relations between Cambodia and China began after the Khmer Rouge

came to power in 1975, led by Pol Pot. Since then, Cambodia has been provided with

financial aid, funding for infrastructure development projects, military equipment, and

even the use of a partnership with China as a trump card in relations with great powers

and potentially concerning neighbours. In the current period of rivalry between the great

powers, Cambodia finds itself balancing between ASEAN and its long-standing and solid

alliance with China.

Such close economic ties definitely influence Cambodia's decisions in terms of foreign

policy. Cambodia prioritises the direct interests of China over the interests of ASEAN

countries. In this sense, this study addresses the following research questions: 1) How

have Cambodia’s relations with China influenced its foreign policy decisions? 2) What

specific actions linked to this alignment have disrupted ASEAN’s cohesion? The central

hypothesis is that Cambodia’s deepening economic interdependence with China has

encouraged policy choices that prioritise Beijing’s strategic interests, often at the expense

of ASEAN consensus.

This research adopts a qualitative case study approach to analyse the influence of Sino-

Cambodian economic ties on Phnom Penh’s foreign policy. Three cases were selected

based on their relevance to ASEAN unity and their demonstrated linkage to Chinese

interests: the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the Ream Naval Base developments, and

Cambodia’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. Data sources include peer-

reviewed journal articles, ASEAN official documents, policy reports, and news outlets.

Content analysis is applied to trace patterns of diplomatic alignment and identify causal

mechanisms between economic dependence and political positioning.

It is hypothesised that strong ties between Cambodia and China have led to strained

relations with the countries of Southeast Asia through their foreign policy choices.

Assumptions can be made based on recent research materials. According to Khath

Bunthorn (2022), even though membership in ASEAN has security, economic, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

437

diplomatic advantages, Cambodia still prioritises China's interests, thereby sowing

discord and weakening the centralisation of such an important regional organisation as

ASEAN.

To a greater extent, Samath (2020) supports this point of view and asserts that

Cambodia's decisions in foreign policy are primarily pragmatic economic calculations in

order to obtain the greatest possible benefit. It is noted that Cambodia should adopt this

pragmatism with the BRI to achieve its economic development goals. Another aspect is

that Cambodia should balance relations with ASEAN and China to avoid the risks of full-

scale bandwagoning.

Validating the position of Samath (2020), Sothirak (2021) asserts that Cambodia should

avoid the risk of economic dependence and isolation in the region due to the alliance with

China, and also learn to balance the competition of great powers in the regional context.

Another study conducted by Charadine (2020) affirms that Cambodia aims to apply a

varied and balanced foreign policy, even though it is involved in security disputes with

Thailand and the South China Sea disputes, which are bound to deep ties with China.

Po and Primiano (2020) reinforce the opinion and expand on this by revealing that, except

for economic benefit and prompt development, Cambodia advocates Chinese interests in

its foreign affairs and also for keeping Hun Sen’s regime in power, as well as securing

protection from Vietnamese threats and assessing ASEAN's effectiveness. Williamson

(2023) agrees that linkages with China help Hun Sen to maintain the regime through

domestic policies and supportive behaviour in the international arena. In return,

Cambodia has been generously endowed with investment, funding, diplomatic friendship,

and political endorsement.

Challenging the common consensus among experts, who claim that economic bonds with

China negatively affect relations with neighbouring countries, Chheang (2022) argues

that Cambodia does not prioritise China in its foreign policy decision-making but uses a

hedging strategy and a multilateral approach. In particular, Chheang claims that ASEAN

has been asserted as a crucial element of Cambodia’s foreign policy, acting as a ‘reliable

security shield’ and as an important element in promoting the economic integration of

countries and development in the South Asian region.

Recent research on the topic reveals that the multifaceted relationship between China

and Cambodia not only provides significant economic development to the latter but also

leads to geopolitical repercussions, primarily strained relations with neighbouring

countries and ASEAN partners. As an illustration, China's support in the South China Sea

has led to doubts about whether Cambodia follows the principles of common security and

cooperation or sows security uncertainty in the region. In general, we can see that there

is agreement in this fieldwork, and most researchers believe that Cambodia does take a

pro-China position in its foreign policy, which hurts regional stability and security.

However, at the same time, some studies examine Cambodia's efforts to mitigate the

negative consequences of economic cooperation with China and balance multilateral

relations with neighbouring countries.

Following this brief outline of China's influence on Cambodia's foreign policy, this essay

will delve deeper into the particular means through which the Sino-Cambodian economic

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

438

relationships affect the decisions that Cambodia makes in the international context, as

well as what impact it has on the geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia.

Even though a large number of studies (e.g. Samath, 2020; Сharadine, 2020; Po and

Primiano, 2020; Sothirak, 2021; Williamson, 2023) have been conducted on the subject

of economic Sino-Cambodian bonds and their outcomes for the Southeast region, there

is a gap in evaluating how Cambodia's Chinese orientation in foreign policy affects unity

within ASEAN and its ability to speak with one voice on issues of regional security,

infrastructure development, and economic integration. According to current research, it

is clear that Cambodia's pro-China policy is negatively impacting ASEAN internal

relations. Still, the literature has largely overlooked the exact mechanisms and specific

decisions on Cambodia's part that have led to this phenomenon.

Historical perspective of the Sino-Cambodian alliance

Historically, Sino-Cambodian relations have gone through various phases of closeness

and cooperation. The coming to power of the Khmer Rouge was a turning point in bilateral

relations because China provided considerable military and political support to the Pol

Pot regime. Allegedly, the four-year genocide was partly financed by China, along with

other radical and violent policies of the Khmer Rouge. The next stage was a significant

drop in the strong ties between China and Cambodia due to Vietnamese influence, and

fueling the civil war in Cambodia to fulfil its strategic interests.

The mediation of relations between Cambodia and China took place in 1997, which

accompanied the internal conflict between key influential leaders - Prince Norodom

Ranariddh of FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Western

countries refused to provide any support to Cambodia due to human rights violations and

accusations of authoritarianism, demanding a peaceful and democratic suspension of the

affair. Taking advantage of Cambodia's isolation from its Western partners, China

provided extensive diplomatic mediation and financial backing, and in response, Hun Sen

supported the One-China policy (Chen, 2018).

Hun Sen's authoritarian rule increased tensions with the Western powers, which allowed

a significant deepening of diplomatic, financial, and cultural relations with China in the

early 2000s. Over the next few years, China became Cambodia's most influential

strategic partner. This was manifested in the fact that Beijing provided the largest

financial aid compared to any other state in the world. In addition, Cambodia was

completely exempted from debt payments to China. The cultural ties between Cambodia

and China have acquired an unprecedented dimension in terms of the spread of the

Chinese language and the aspirations of Cambodian youth to study in Chinese

metropolises instead of universities in leading European countries, as was the case

before. Cultural solidarity was also manifested in the widespread distribution of Chinese

mass media and the increase in tourists and migrants (Kurlantzick, 2006). In addition,

Cambodia could count on solid support for sovereignty and diplomatic cooperation, which

was followed by mutual visits of high-ranking officials.

Bilateral relations between Cambodia and China reached their peak in the 2010s when

Cambodia became a key partner of China in the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

439

China has expanded its sphere of influence due to the rapid development of

infrastructure, economic integration, and international cooperation, which has certainly

become beneficial for Cambodia; nevertheless, it is a considerable financial risk that calls

into question the sovereignty of the latter (Heng & Po, 2017). Cambodia is one of the

countries that benefited the most from participating in the initiative; therefore, in return,

it provided full backing and support to China in political matters. Based on such proficient

cooperation, the trade partnership of the countries has also significantly deepened. Thus,

China has become a central figure in Cambodia's foreign policy, providing developmental

financing, trading partnerships, and political assistance.

Strategic tools of China's alignment with Cambodia

The alignment of Cambodia and China was brought to life thanks to a number of strategic

instruments that allowed the development of strong bilateral relations. To these, we can

include financial and investment aids in the form of infrastructure development and the

BRI project

1

, numerous trade agreements, cultural and ideological support, and an

unconditional diplomatic pillar. Undoubtedly, such a close connection between Phnom

Penh and Beijing allowed Cambodia to develop economically very quickly, and the

country's leader consolidated his position and increased the significance of the state's

voice in the regional context, owing to Chinese backing. This chapter will describe three

dimensions of the mechanisms by which China was able to secure comprehensive

assistance to Cambodia and obtain the most ardent partner in ASEAN and Southeast

Asia.

The basis of infrastructure development and investment in Cambodia is project lending

from China. This process is mutually beneficial for both sides. In this way, China receives

all the advantages inherent in the investor. Still, at the same time, it allows the

strengthening of economic and financial relations with Cambodia by meeting its critical

needs at the state level. These include agriculture, electrical infrastructure, transport

links, and bridge networks. Chinese investment in Cambodia was concentrated in these

areas; after all, Cambodia received $125 million in loans for the development of national

roads, the construction of eight dams worth $1 billion was financed, as well as $436

million in investments in agriculture between 2009 and 2011, and others (Ciorciari,

2013). This investment trend is expected to continue gaining momentum in the future,

and even excluding the billions of dollars that Cambodia received under the Belt and Road

initiative, China continues to provide financial support in the form of $588 million for the

development of the textile industry from 2019 to 2021. Which, in turn, plays almost the

biggest role in Cambodia's export of products (Reuters, 2019).

Alongside this, FDI statistics indicate that Cambodia is one of the leading countries in

Southeast Asia, which is confirmed by Chea Vuthy, Secretary General of the Cambodia

Investment Board of the CDC and Member of TPAB, who declares that despite a 40%

investment decline in the region experienced in 2020, Cambodia has maintained a solid

annual level of $3.6 billion. As reported by the Council for the Development of Cambodia

1

“One Belt One Road” (OBOR) was officially renamed to “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) in 2016 to emphasize

inclusiveness and avoid misunderstanding concerning the project’s goals.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

440

(CDC), in the first half of 2023, China became the leading investor, accounting for 42.1%

of Cambodia's total FDI (Kunmakara, 2023).

As of 2020, Cambodia has become the second largest recipient of China's FDI stock after

Singapore among Southeast Asian countries, accounting for 14.9%, surpassing

Thailand's 11.1%, Indonesia's 11.0%, and Myanmar's 9.8% (Mingey et al., 2023).

Accordingly, this demonstrates that no ASEAN country has such a high share of Chinese

investment to achieve parity with Cambodia. Unlike Singapore, which held the leading

position in 2020 but has a highly diversified economy, Chinese investment in Cambodia

has a fundamentally different and systemic nature, encompassing infrastructure, energy,

and defence development.

Trade is another important dimension that we need to consider in order to understand

the specific mechanisms on which strong ties between China and Cambodia are built. In

2010, a trade agreement was concluded between China and ASEAN, which in turn made

China not only the largest trading partner for the member countries but also the first

country to export to them. Despite this, Cambodia became the first country to engage in

bilateral trade with China among all ASEAN countries that were also included in the

agreement. According to the agreement, the volume of trade between the two countries

in 2017 should have reached 5 billion dollars (Pheakdey, 2012). Additionally, the

formation of the CCTFA in 2020 and Cambodia's ratification of the RCEP in 2021 allowed

the total trade in 2023 to increase to $12.26 billion, with the prospect of further growth

(The Phnom Penh Post, 2024). Such cooperation in the field of trade opens wide economic

opportunities for Cambodia, having China as a market for export goods, while deepening

the strategic partnership and the importance of China in shaping its policy at various

levels.

In addition, current statistics demonstrate a significant ongoing expansion of Sino-

Cambodian cooperation in the field of trade. According to data released by the General

Department of Customs and Excise of Cambodia (GDCE), trade volume reached $4.48B

in 2024, which is more than 15% higher compared to 2023. Taking this into account,

China ranks first as a trading ally, outperforming the US, Vietnam, Japan, and Thailand.

In addition, according to GDCE bilateral trade data, Cambodia's exports to China

increased by 22.3% in 2024 compared to the previous year and amounted to $1.6B,

while Cambodian imports from China increased by 24.5% year-on-year. Both sides gain

substantially from this long-term trade cooperation, with Cambodia enjoying access to

the extensive Chinese market and Chinese enterprises investing in Cambodia making the

most of Cambodia's preferential tariffs on exports to the United States (Sgueglia, 2025).

Along with the mechanisms described above, another key framework was China's soft

diplomacy towards Cambodia. While the world community grew concerned about human

rights abuses, rising levels of corruption, and misrule in the highest echelons of

government in Cambodia, China has not raised any questions on these grounds and has

continued to be a reliable and generous partner with continued absolute backing. This

was seen in the fact that China's diplomatic mission is the largest in Phnom Penh, and

financial investment in development has never stopped since then. In response to such

warm regard, Cambodia provided China with unlimited access to its own economy,

fulfilling any whims of its partner, for example, the repatriation of the Uyghurs. Such a

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

441

soft alliance-oriented policy of China has always allowed Cambodia to seek assistance

without facing condemnation (Burgos & Ear, 2010).

Therefore, these factors, in the guise of investments in development, numerous trade

agreements, and favourable, friendly diplomacy, have become key in achieving such

deep bilateral cooperation between Cambodia and China, which is characterised by even

greater economic dependence.

The role of Cambodia in the South China Sea dispute

Cambodia has emerged as a divisive member of the South China Sea dispute by

cooperating closely with China and not adopting a conventional position, unlike other

ASEAN countries. This was manifested in multiple blockages of multilateral negotiations,

especially in 2012 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which led to the impossibility of

issuing a joint communique. These actions on the part of Cambodia once again

highlighted the level of economic and diplomatic dependence on China and the

undeniable readiness to protect their interests both on the world stage and across the

region in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.

The ministerial meeting in 2012 became the most prominent symbol of disunity in ASEAN,

while Cambodia held the chair and was in the process of deepening economic, financial,

and ideological cooperation with China. The first failure in the organisation's history to

sign a joint communique revealed ASEAN's vulnerability to external interference. A

critical point was the intention of Vietnam and the Philippines to include the Scarborough

Shoal disputes and exclusive economic zones. Still, the representative of Cambodia, after

speaking with non-participating advisers, rejected this intention as an irrelevant issue.

Reportedly, drafts of the meeting were shared with the Chinese side, which confirmed

foreign interference and external influence on Cambodia's actions. Failure to sign the

joint communique lowered the image of the organisation's influence, highlighted

organisational gaps and disunity among the members, and revealed China's desire to

weaken the unity of the regional bloc through the Cambodian agency (Bower, 2012).

Based on this information and reports of the meeting, a reasonable question arises: Did

any events precede Cambodia's decision and the subsequent blocking of the signing of

the joint communique? An assumption can be made on the fact that just a few days

before the meeting in July 2012, Hun Sen met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of

China, where once again they announced the principles of their comprehensive

cooperation, which consists of economic and political support for the sovereignty of

Cambodia, and in return, China was provided with protection of their key political

interests. Financial aid and large investments helped China finally win the favour and

help of Cambodia in the South China Sea issues and become a major diplomatic partner.

In addition, the volume of Chinese investments in Cambodia by 2011 amounted to more

than 8.8 billion dollars, which cements the title of China as the first and largest investor,

but only in 2011 the amount of investment amounted to more than 1.9 billion dollars,

which emphasises the scale of China's financial influence on Cambodia preceding the

Ministerial meeting (Ciorciari, 2013).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

442

Cambodia's unquestioning and absolute commitment to China has shown the inability of

ASEAN as a bloc to share a common position on the South China Sea dispute. The

blocking of arguments that were objectionable to China at the ministerial meeting in 2012

revealed that the organisation lacked ideological unity and shared no common opinion.

In addition, under a secret agreement, Cambodia granted China access to twenty per

cent of its coastline and the use of the Ream Naval base, which further increased the

insecurity of the region in connection with possible hostilities (Florick, 2021). The inability

of the Southeast bloc to come to a common ground in resolving the issue has called into

question ASEAN's overall ability to support regional security and stabilisation issues.

Ream Naval Base tensions

After the impossibility of reaching a common agreement in 2012, uncertainty about

Cambodia's position grew and caused numerous disputes among ASEAN countries. The

next development that attracted the attention of the world community was allowing China

to use a naval military base on the southern coast of Cambodia. While reports said that

the naval base had come under Chinese control and Phnom Penh denied any secret deals,

the security issue became more compelling on the agenda of countries in the regional

bloc, especially for Thailand and Vietnam, due to direct geopolitical and economic threats.

The motivations for the concerns of these countries were different. Still, they agreed that

China replaced the United States of America, led the way in the development, and

allegedly invested in the construction of a naval base in the Gulf of Thailand.

Although China justified the large financial investment in the construction of the military

base for diplomatic and peaceful logistical reasons, Thailand remained edgy that the

naval base would later be used for purposes other than those previously defined.

Thailand's lack of confidence in security, as expressed by Cambodia, which assures that

the port is in no way used for military purposes, is supported by satellite imagery, which

confirms the presence of Chinese warships in the port. This has become clear proof that,

in addition to all areas of bilateral cooperation between Cambodia and China, including

diplomatic and economic ties, relations have acquired a new vector and developed

militarily as well, bringing even more regional insecurity and allowing China's influence

in the sea to grow. Thus, such a Cambodia-friendly country as Thailand will not be able

to maintain neutrality regarding the situation in Ream Base in the future because it

carries unreserved economic and security perturbations (Spadaccini & Makornwattana,

2024).

Concerns about the Ream Naval Base have also not gone unnoticed by Vietnam because

the military port is territorially located in close proximity to Vietnam, and the build-up of

Chinese naval forces could mean a worsening of the situation in strategic trade routes,

as well as security uncertainty due to existing disputes between Hanoi and Beijing about

the situation in the South China Sea. Vietnam found itself in a critically unfavourable

situation, as it faced Chinese military facilities in the South China Sea on its northern and

eastern borders, but after allowing China to use Ream, also in the west and south (Hutt,

2022). Figure 1 depicts a map of the Ream Naval Base within the context of Southeast

Asia (Yaacob, 2024) and illustrates how Vietnam found itself strategically surrounded by

China after China's involvement in the development of the Ream Naval Base.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

443

Figure 1

Source: Lowy Institute

Despite deep concerns and the risk of worsening relations with neighbouring countries

and ASEAN allies, the new military dimension of Cambodia-China cooperation has had

significant benefits for both parties. The choice of the Ream naval base to concentrate

Chinese investment for development is not an accident but a deliberate strategic move.

In this way, the core partners, Beijing and Phnom Penh, achieve their fundamental

geopolitical and security targets regarding external threats: China is expanding its

regional political influence, and Cambodia, in return, receives military support to resist

possible aggression (Yaacob, 2024).

In addition to the apparent gains that Cambodia made from the cooperation and

unconditional support of China, this entailed a number of systemic damages suffered by

ASEAN in connection with Cambodia's suspected permission to use a military naval base.

This is manifested in the fact that China's regional political strengthening leads to the

undermining of the internal unity of the organisation and imbalance, because Vietnam

and Thailand find this cooperation threatening to the security of their states.

BRI’s impact on Cambodian foreign policy

The cases described in the previous chapters are evidence of the growing influence of

China on Cambodia, which has a direct connection with the geopolitical situation of the

entire region and the foreign policy framework of Phnom Penh. Speaking of levers of

influence, we cannot ignore the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become a vital stage

in the strengthening of economic and diplomatic ties between China and Cambodia.

The scale of the Belt and Road Initiative, due to its tremendous impact on the

development of infrastructure and the economy, could not help but influence the foreign

policy of the receiving country, Cambodia. As illustrated in Figure 2, before the launch of

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

444

the initiative in 2013, Cambodia was not a country marked by significant economic

development or a successful infrastructure network; on the contrary, it was recognised

as one of the weakest economies in the Southeast region (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014).

The Chinese project made corrections to the existing deplorable situation and significantly

changed the economic situation of Cambodia. Important points to note are the Phnom

Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, which strategically links Phnom Penh with the country's

essential seaport, as well as the reconstruction of the Siem Reap Angkor International

Airport, which became a determining component in attracting the attention of

international tourists and expanding the network of foreign flights. Thus, Cambodia's

participation in the BRI has gained critical importance through the implementation of

large-scale national initiatives (Manghout, 2021). At the same time, involvement in large-

scale Chinese investment designs has reduced the independence of Cambodia's decisions

at the international level, including the ASEAN framework.

Figure 2

Source: ASEAN Community in figures

Cambodia's gains from Chinese investments is reflected in the rise of GDP from $19.81B

in 2013 to $42.34B in 2023, an indicator that is steadily increasing, coinciding with the

time period when China became the top investor in Cambodia and simultaneously the

main trading partner, starting cooperation within the framework of the BRI in 2013 and

RCEP and CCFTA later in 2022 (Macrotrends, 2023). However, Chinese investment in

Cambodia continues to grow, reaching US$1.378B in 2023, far surpassing the average

annual Chinese investment from 2003 to 2023, which was US$466.75M. The share of

Chinese investment in total foreign investment in Cambodia in 2024 was 49.82%, making

China the absolute leader in foreign capital in Cambodia, as well as securing the role of

a major partner in trade, security, cultural, and political spheres (Sgueglia, 2025).

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Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

445

In 2024, Cambodia ranked first as the fastest-growing economy in Southeast Asia,

overtaking the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as the third fastest-growing economy in

Asia. (Khmer Times, 2024). This growth can be attributed, among other factors, to the

kingdom's participation in the BRI, which has enabled the development of infrastructure,

industrial zones, and production chains.

As already stated previously, Cambodia's enthusiastic acceptance of participation in the

BRI initiative, in addition to all the obvious and direct advantages, provided an

opportunity to deepen the already amiable and cooperative relations with China.

Therefore, as an expression of regard and gratitude, Cambodia began to actively spread

Chinese narratives, including defending Beijing's strategic interests in ASEAN. The

successful application of the BRI project for China has led to growing, alarming concerns

in ASEAN, which believes that such deep economic cooperation with China can lead to

the fact that small ASEAN member countries can become subtle satellites of Beijing's

interests, losing their voice. Another alarming cause for concern was the understanding

that the value of ASEAN as a regional organisation lay precisely in unity and effective

multilateral diplomatic cooperation, which is in direct danger if some ASEAN member

countries ultimately fall under the dictates of China's interests. Thus, ASEAN could

potentially lose its leading role in regional security and economic cooperation

(Cheunboran, 2021).

In addition to the political destabilisation of the region and growing insecurity, the

negative consequences of participation in the Belt and Road Initiative include devastating

environmental damage and increasing Cambodia's foreign debt, but our main focus

remains on how this infrastructure project forces Cambodia to follow geopolitical

strategies and diplomatic interests of China, which is the largest investor and

developmental partner. The ruling body of the government of Cambodia could not avoid

criticism in connection with unconditional service to the political objectives of China's

international policy and advocacy of their diplomatic goals in ASEAN and cooperation with

other states. It can be concluded that Cambodia is ultimately moving into the sphere of

Chinese domination, based on recent developments in the field of foreign policy, such as

the official ban on raising the flag of Taiwan, constant and stable support in the South

China Sea issues, as well as withdrawal from multiple programs based on cooperation

with America, including military exercises (Heng & Po, 2017).

Thus, this chapter reveals that in addition to the indisputable benefits for Cambodia's

economic situation, the BRI project resulted in significant security and ideological

concerns of ASEAN due to the growing influence of China in the region and the

strengthening of unequal cooperative relations with Cambodia. Such a statement has a

number of consequences, namely loss of unity, reduction of independent collective

decision-making, and regional significance of the organisation.

Balancing challenges and contributions within ASEAN

Cambodia is an ASEAN member country that can boast of its exceptionally important

strategic geographical location in Southeast Asia. This is what makes the state a key

player in the international arena, as well as an extremely important member of the

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

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ASEAN organisation: Cambodia acts as a crucial link for ensuring the security,

integration, and trade of other states of the regional bloc. The other side of the coin is

Cambodia's foreign policy, which is characterised by close cooperation with China on

multiple levels, including economic, diplomatic, and even military campaigns. As

discussed in previous chapters, Cambodia's foreign policy decisions often prioritise

Chinese strategic interests in Southeast Asia, and China's growing influence does not go

unnoticed, shifting the balance of power and undermining ASEAN unity, which in turn

excludes the adoption of collective security decisions.

The repeated situation with the promotion of Chinese narratives led to the fact that

Cambodia's ASEAN partner countries were critical because such policies had a direct

impact on the division of the unity of the organisation. Some of the countries, for

example, Vietnam and Thailand, considered such close cooperation as a hostile gesture

and a security threat. Thus, in 2020, the former permanent secretary of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Singapore, Bilahari Kausikan, expressed his opinion that Cambodia's

history in ASEAN may come to an end and the state may be excluded from the regional

bloc, referring to the fact that such intensive interaction between China and Cambodia

threatens the unity of the organisation and contributes to the lack of common direction

in decision-making, for instance, as at the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial meeting (Strangio,

2020).

Phnom Penh rejects these objections and highlights that ASEAN membership is declared

key to the kingdom's strategic development plan and emphasises the benefits that ASEAN

receives from Cambodia's membership. A substantial contribution of Cambodia is the way

its location and connecting potential have made the kingdom a key element of the East-

West ASEAN Economic Corridor, contributing to the economic development and

integration of the bloc's partner countries. Cambodia emphasises that to prioritise

ASEAN, considerable efforts and resources have been devoted to the development of the

economic corridor for the common benefit of ASEAN (Pich & Murg, 2020).

Although Cambodia was the last country to join ASEAN in 1991, it is argued that its

contribution to the development of cooperation and the strengthening of relations

between the countries was successful. It is known that in 2022, Cambodia held the

ASEAN chairmanship, and it was during this period that it actively developed all spheres

of activity of the block: trade and economic partnerships, investment, and political and

diplomatic relations with other countries. During the one-year presidency of Cambodia in

ASEAN, a number of designs aimed at the development of diplomatic and economic

relations with countries worldwide were initiated, and special attention was paid to China

and the United States of America. As stated, Cambodia has not openly declared allegiance

to any of the named countries and seeks constructive and fruitful cooperation with both

(Boros, 2022).

Despite the desired neutrality declared by Cambodia, it is obvious that the state is in

need of multifaceted support from China. The support that Phnom Penh received from

Beijing could not help but leave a mark on relations with the Western world and ASEAN

partner countries. Mostly, this political and economic cooperation had negative

consequences on the internal relations within the organisation, the unity of opinion of the

members, and the ability to make common negotiated decisions. At the same time,

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December 2025, pp. 434-451

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under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

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ASEAN has been declared the main direction of development for Cambodia, and activity

in the organisation has its own valuable advantages. In fact, Phnom Penh is at the

crossroads of open and transparent cooperation with China and productive activity in the

regional organisation (Bunthorn, 2022).

Summing up the challenges and achievements of Cambodia as a member of ASEAN, it

should be noted that the importance of the state as a geopolitical player is constantly

growing due to the development and deepening of multidimensional economic

cooperation with China and the concerns that it brings to the agenda of the regional

organisation. The choice of the main directions of Cambodia's development has a direct

impact on the geopolitical situation of Southeast Asia because the prioritisation and

promotion of China's strategic interests in the region will lead to a shift of power and

control, as well as to a change in the trajectory of development of other ASEAN countries,

which they will be forced to follow as a result of Sino – Cambodian cooperation.

Conclusion

The paper's main goal is to analyse how the economic ties between China and Cambodia

affect Cambodia's international political decisions. It can be concluded that the two

countries' economic alliance directly influenced Cambodia's foreign policy, especially the

settlement of regional issues such as the South China Sea and the failure to adopt a joint

communique at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2012. Understanding the historical

context of the development of bilateral Sino-Cambodian relations provides a

comprehension of the dimensions in which the relationship acquired such a volume and

importance that enabled China to increase its influence in the region.

The historical perspective sheds light on Chinese support dating back to the Khmer Rouge

period, when Western assistance declined significantly for several reasons. At that time,

China adopted a supportive position of the regime and acquired a loyal ally for the next

decades until the deepening of bonds after the launch of the BRI project in 2013. The

multidimensional cooperation between China and Cambodia is a complex web of strategic

tools that China uses to enlist the support of its partners. This includes economic,

investment, cultural, and diplomatic instruments that Cambodia welcomes to strengthen

its regional position and security. Substantial investment-based funding has enabled

China to have an ASEAN member ally that supports the One China Policy and a stance

on the South China Sea issue and actively promotes this position on the organisation's

agenda, which has a polarly opposite setting.

Another important indicator of the economic closeness of relations between China and

Cambodia is the reconstruction and permission to use the Ream naval base, which is

mutually beneficial for both sides and helps achieve security goals at the cost of

unsecured relations with Vietnam and Thailand. Analysis of the BRI project as the case

study did not reveal a direct impact on Cambodia's foreign policy decisions. However, it

was a vivid example of a mechanism that led Cambodia to a more dependent economic

position and the threat of a debt trap. It allowed Beijing to actively promote its narratives

and state interests, using the advantageous status of the biggest economic partner.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 434-451

Balancing an Emerging Power’s Influence: Cambodia’s Foreign Policy Choices within Asean

under Chinese Economic Leverage

Yelizaveta Yurchenko, Özgür Tüfekçi

448

In the context of the broader implications of the Sino-Cambodian economic coalition, it

should be noted that Cambodia risks its sovereignty, state interests, and priorities by

having a more limited ability to make independent decisions in the regional and global

contexts. Undeniably, prioritising cooperation with China affected Cambodia's role in

ASEAN. Despite the previously announced course of development along with ASEAN,

cooperation with China, on the flip side, contradicts this statement and makes effective

membership in the regional organisation impossible by undermining unity among

member states, creating internal tensions, and fueling security conflicts.

Thus, the analysis of the historical perspective and the examination of the cases allowed

us to closely inquire into the international politics of Cambodia, namely the activities in

ASEAN, which coincide with the dynamic strengthening of cooperation with China in many

spheres of political activity. Analysis of cases revealed that Cambodia's political decisions

in the international arena often have a background that confirms that these decisions

were made based on compliance with China's strategic interests. For example, blocking

the adoption of a joint communique within the South China Sea dispute framework.

Having the understanding of the specific mechanisms and instruments that influence the

direction of Cambodia's foreign policy, in order to get a holistic overview of the

consequences of Phnom Penh's deep economic cooperation with Beijing, one should focus

on the long-term perspective and consequences of these bonds, as well as their global

and regional effects, the domestic situation in Cambodia together with potential benefits

and drawbacks.

Summing up, it is important to note that the long-term multidimensional and mainly

economic cooperation between China and Cambodia has led to the reshaping of

Cambodia's foreign policy strategy. The importance of this alliance lies not only in the

prospects it brings for Cambodia's domestic politics but also in the stability of the regional

political environment and ASEAN. The regional organisation and neighbouring countries

of the Kingdom of Cambodia have growing security concerns, leading to the deterioration

of relations and increasing pressure. Therefore, in order to achieve the maximum benefit

from membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and bilateral relations

with Beijing, Cambodia should develop balancing strategies between the two strategic

directions of development without harming the activities of ASEAN as a unified bloc,

besides not worsening relations with China as its leading investment partner.

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