OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between

Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025

389

THE ORGANISATION OF TURKIC STATES: AN EMERGING ACTOR IN THE

CONTEXT OF GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS?

YUSUF ZIYA BÖLÜKBAŞI

yzb@anadolu.edu.tr

Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration,

Anadolu University, 26470, Eskişehir (Türkiye). https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4723-5977

İLHAN BİLİCİ

ilhan.bilici@erdogan.edu.tr

Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration,

Recep Tayyip Erdogan University, Rize (Türkiye). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4085-7274

GÖKBERK YÜCEL

gokberk.yucel@amasya.edu.tr

Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Amasya University, Amasya (Türkiye). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0292-1722

Abstract

The Organisations of Turkic States (OTS), which aims to strengthen the Turkic world’s

historical and cultural linkages, appears as a key regional actor candidate in the context of

globalisation and regionalisation dynamics of the international system. Formed in 1991 by the

Turkic-speaking states that gained their independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union,

this organisation plays a prominent role in cooperation, defence and economic integration

(such as free trade, common currency and visa liberalisation), especially in the Eurasian

region. In an environment where young states in the region face security and economic risks,

the OTS has a major role in providing its members with the opportunity to develop a common

policy against these risks. The OTS, which is built on the axis of the common historical, socio-

cultural and linguistic ties of its members and can be read as a reflection of the idea of

Turkism, claims to lead the establishment of a strong solidarity platform on a regional scale.

In this context, the main purpose of the present study is to investigate the role and potential

of the OTS in the international system with its historical foundations and current function.

Although it is seen that the integration between the OTS countries is getting better day by

day in the economic field, this is not the case in the field of political cooperation and security.

As a result, the pressures of other global actors in the region and the fact that the OTS

countries prioritise their own national interests indicate that the Turkic world integration is

still far from being a regional actor.

Keywords

The Organisations of Turkic States (OTS), Caucasus and Central Asian (CCA), Turkic World,

Rising Powers, Regional Actors.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

390

Resumo

A Organização dos Estados Turcos (OTS), que visa fortalecer os laços históricos e culturais do

mundo turco, surge como um importante candidato a ator regional no contexto da

globalização e da dinâmica de regionalização do sistema internacional. Formada em 1991

pelos Estados de língua turca que conquistaram a sua independência com a dissolução da

União Soviética, esta organização desempenha um papel proeminente na cooperação, defesa

e integração económica (como o comércio livre, a moeda comum e a liberalização de vistos),

especialmente na região eurasiática. Num ambiente em que os jovens Estados da região

enfrentam riscos económicos e de segurança, a OTS tem um papel importante ao proporcionar

aos seus membros a oportunidade de desenvolver uma política comum contra esses riscos. A

OTS, que se baseia nos laços históricos, socioculturais e linguísticos comuns dos seus

membros e pode ser interpretada como um reflexo da ideia do turquismo, afirma liderar o

estabelecimento de uma forte plataforma de solidariedade à escala regional. Neste contexto,

o principal objetivo do presente estudo é investigar o papel e o potencial da OTS no sistema

internacional, com as suas bases históricas e função atual. Embora se observe que a

integração entre os países da OTS está a melhorar dia a dia no campo económico, o mesmo

não se verifica no campo da cooperação política e da segurança. Como resultado, as pressões

de outros atores globais na região e o facto de os países da OTS priorizarem os seus próprios

interesses nacionais indicam que a integração do mundo turco ainda está longe de ser um

ator regional.

Palavras-chave

Organizações dos Estados Turcos (OTS), Cáucaso e Ásia Central (CCA), Mundo Turco,

Potências Emergentes, Atores Regionais.

How to cite this article

Bölükbaşı, Yusuf Ziya, Bilici, İlhan & Yücel, Gökberk (2025). The Organisation of Turkic States: An

Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical Opportunities and Limitations?. Janus.net, e-journal

of international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional

Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 389-410. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0525.21

Article submitted on 16th May 2025 and accepted for publication on 06th September

2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

391

THE ORGANISATION OF TURKIC STATES: AN EMERGING ACTOR

IN THE CONTEXT OF GEOPOLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND

LIMITATIONS?

YUSUF ZİYA BÖLÜKBAŞI

İLHAN BİLİCİ

GÖKBERK YÜCEL

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Türkiye, believing it

had eliminated its primary security threat, soon encountered even more complex and

multifaceted security challenges, including ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle

East, and the Caucasus; the rise of PKK terrorism; tensions with neighbouring countries;

setbacks in the European Union (EU) accession process; economic crises; and political

instability. Amid these difficulties, the newly independent Turkic states of the Caucasus

and Central Asia (CCA), emerging from the Soviet collapse, represented a strategic and

cultural opportunity for Türkiye. Seeking to recalibrate its foreign policy and reduce

dependence on the Western alliance—particularly the United States and the EU—Türkiye

moved swiftly to establish diplomatic and economic ties with these nascent states.

Likewise, the Turkic republics, burdened by the Soviet legacy and lacking prior experience

in modern state- and nation-building, were able to assert themselves in the international

system with Türkiye’s support and guidance. These early interactions laid the historical

foundations of the Organisation of Turkic States.

The institutional foundations of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) can be traced

back to the Summit of Heads of State of Turkic Speaking Countries, initiated by Turkish

President Turgut Özal in 1992. Initially involving Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, these summits laid the groundwork for the

institutionalisation of cooperation, culminating in the establishment of the Turkic Council

through the Nakhchivan Agreement in 2009. This body was rebranded as the

Organisation of Turkic States in 2021, marking a shift from informal cultural and linguistic

ties to structured political and economic collaboration. This development is widely

regarded as the emergence of a potential regional actor in Eurasian geopolitics. However,

the question remains whether the OTS can truly evolve into a significant regional power

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

392

capable of influencing its geopolitical environment amidst global actors. The underlying

assumption of this study is that the OTS has not yet accomplished its objective of evolving

into an organisation that facilitates collaboration between Turkish communities and global

and regional actors in Eurasian geopolitics, with the aim of promoting political stability

and economic cooperation. This study seeks to explore this question through the lens of

neo-realism, a theory in international relations that emphasises systemic dynamics, state

interests, and the distribution of power (Waltz, 1979), and which argues that identity-

based policies may gain traction during periods of systemic transition. Concurrently, the

present theory is regarded as conducive to delineating the approaches to be adopted in

this study for the concepts of regional actors and integration. The process of political,

economic and cultural rapprochement between states in the CCA is expressed by the

concept of integration. According to neo-realists, the process of integration is only

possible if it is compatible with the balance of power. Waltz (1979) contests the notion

of international organisations or integration processes as autonomous centres of power,

proposing instead that they are instruments reflecting the interests of the major powers.

Indeed, this theory posits that states function as the principal agents in this process.

Therefore, regional actors are congruent with the emergence of powerful states at the

lower levels of the international system. Although not explicitly mentioned in Waltz’s

approach, this scenario, in accordance with the power distribution approach, suggests

the emergence of medium-sized regional hegemonies alongside the global poles within

the system. The integration process is a means to facilitate the harmonisation of interests

between major powers.

The following discussion will address the OTS’s efforts to achieve such harmonisation

between the U.S., Russia, China and the EU in the CCA region. However, the primary

concern pertains to the OTS’s regional agency. The concept of a regional agency thus

offers a microcosmic reflection of the systemic polarisation (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). The

issue of whether regional multipolarity, which has been debated since the early 2000s,

is represented by the OTS in the CCA geography will be examined on the basis of the

organisation’s political and economic integration issues. In order to establish whether the

OTS can be considered a regional actor in the context of its political and economic

integration within Turkish geography, it is necessary to include in the analysis the

national interests of the states that constitute the OTS, the effects of the international

system, and the competition between the global powers active in the region.

In this regard, the current study aims to explore the role and potential of the OTS in the

international system with its historical foundations and current function, and in

connection with this aim, the study was designed by adopting the single case study

design (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2014). Within a single case study design, researchers focus on

a single phenomenon, individual, group, or event, and perform a multidimensional in-

depth investigation for the specified case. In this study, the OTS has been determined as

the single case, and the examination and discussion were developed within the

framework of it. The study also employs the historical analysis method, which seeks to

uncover meaning through the systematic interrogation of ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’

questions concerning historical events and ideas (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Sources

include international academic literature, OTS summit proceedings, and regional news

and analyses. The analysis first examines the historical evolution and institutional

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

393

structure of the OTS, followed by a discussion of the economic and strategic dimensions

of Turkic integration, and concludes with an interpretation of the findings.

Organisation of the Turkic States: Historical background

Throughout history, political unity among the Turks—who spread from the Eastern

Eurasian steppes to Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Anatolia—has rarely been

achieved, with the notable exceptions of the Hun and Gök-Türk Empires (Taşağıl, 2018).

Attempts during the final phase of the Ottoman Empire, such as the Basmachi Movement,

ultimately failed. Following these developments, the Republic of Türkiye emerged as the

only independent Turkic state, while most other Turkic communities remained under

Soviet, Chinese, or Iranian rule. Due to the Soviet threat, identity-based foreign policy

constraints, and internal weaknesses, Türkiye was compelled to limit its engagement with

the broader Turkic world. However, the independence of the Turkic republics following

the Soviet collapse was seen as a historic opportunity. President Turgut Özal declared

that Türkiye could regain its global influence after 400 years, emphasising the strategic

importance of Turkic independence (Aydın, 2010). Several factors contributed to

Türkiye’s proactive engagement with the newly independent Caucasus and Central Asian

(CCA) states, including the crisis in Turkish foreign policy, the rising use of identity as a

diplomatic tool, the regional power vacuum, and Türkiye’s aspiration to serve as a model

state (Bölükbaşı, 2023; Ayata, 2010; Sander, 2006). Accordingly, Türkiye was among

the first to recognise the independence of these states and swiftly established diplomatic

relations. High-level visits by President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel resulted in the

signing of 140 bilateral agreements (Yalçınkaya, 2013), and Demirel’s slogan “From the

Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” came to symbolise the foreign policy vision of the

era. During his time as Prime Minister and subsequently as President, Demirel did not

merely produce chauvinistic rhetoric; he also pursued a rational strategy. The basis of

this strategy was the maintenance of Türkiye’s position, whilst also ensuring the

continued provision of aid to Azerbaijan. This was achieved by engaging in shuttle

diplomacy between Moscow and Washington during the First Karabakh War (Kürkçü,

2019). Meanwhile, the newly independent CCA countries—characterised by fragmented

ethnic structures, weak economies, limited state traditions, landlocked geographies, and

rigid bureaucracies—faced significant internal and external pressures. In need of support

to ensure their security, build state institutions, and maintain sovereignty, these

countries turned to international cooperation. In this context, the foundations of a

regional organisation to serve the mutual interests of Türkiye and the CCA states were

laid in 1992.

Prior to deliberating on the establishment of an organisation among the countries of the

Turkic world and the process of its formation, it would be beneficial to examine Türkiye’s

initial hegemonic approach and the consequences it engendered. The relations that began

between Türkiye and the Turkic states that gained independence after the collapse of the

Soviet Union essentially represented a unilateral process. Within the framework of the

aforementioned reasons, Türkiye initiated the establishment of relations with regional

countries and laid the foundations for institutional structures. It is evident that during

this process, relations between Türkiye and the states in the CCA manifested a

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

394

hegemonic-hierarchical character. However, it should be noted that this situation may be

misleading. The absence of modern state experience in these societies, coupled with

Türkiye’s inherent need for greater openness towards the region, naturally resulted in

relations commencing under Türkiye’s patronage. The fundamental reason for the failure

of the CCA policy was our attempt to adopt a big brother role in the region and our

condescending attitude towards other countries (Aydın, 2010). The CCA countries would

react to this situation in a short time and, in subsequent processes, begin to pursue

independent policies, influenced both by their relations with global powers and their own

local nationalism.

The First Summit of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States, held in Ankara on 30–31

October 1992, marked the initial step toward the integration of the Turkic world. These

summits, later formalised under the title “Heads of State of Turkic Speaking Countries”

in 1998, evolved into a structured organisation with the signing of the Nakhchivan

Agreement in 2009, leading to the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic

Speaking Countries, commonly known as the Turkic Council. Since 2010, summits have

been conducted under this framework. Uzbekistan officially joined the Council—

comprising Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan—at the Bishkek Summit in

2019. At the 8th Summit held in Istanbul, the organisation was renamed the Organisation

of Turkic States (OTS), and its institutional structure was significantly revised.

Turkmenistan and Hungary participated in this Summit as observer members

(turkicstates.org, 25.04.2025). The declaration issued after the Istanbul Summit

emphasised preserving the principles of the Nakhchivan Agreement, expanding and

institutionalising the OTS, advancing the Turkic World 2040 Vision, congratulating

Azerbaijan on its Karabakh victory, and expressing support for both Azerbaijan and

Kyrgyzstan in their respective regional conflicts. It also highlighted the revival of

economic ties, increased diplomatic engagement, and coordinated responses to shared

challenges (turkicstates.org, 26.05.2025). The Istanbul Summit produced three key

outcomes: (1) the Turkic Council was restructured into the OTS, (2) the unification of

Turkic states under a single organisational framework was effectively completed, and (3)

a long-term development strategy was formalised through the “2040 Turkic World Vision”

document (Mustofaev, 2022, pp. 107–109). This strategic document outlines four

primary areas of cooperation: political-security, economic-sectoral, public, and external

relations. More importantly, it aims to enhance the OTS’s regional and international

influence through concrete projects and policies responsive to geopolitical dynamics

(Baki, 2022). Notably, the vision foresees deeper engagement with the European Union

via Hungary’s observer status and proposes strengthening the OTS’s representation in

Budapest as a hub for multi-layered cooperation with European institutions, including the

Visegrád Group (Mustofaev, 2022).

The new institutional structure of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) comprises the

Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Committee of Senior

Officials, the Committee of Elders, and the General Secretariat. Member states include

Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, while Hungary,

Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status. The

Council of Heads of State, chaired by the rotating Chairmanship-in-Office, serves as the

primary decision-making body. The General Secretariat, based in Istanbul, coordinates

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

395

and supports OTS activities. Subsidiary bodies include the International Organisation of

Turkic Culture (TURKSOY), the International Turkic Academy, the Parliamentary

Assembly of Turkic Speaking States (TURKPA), the Turkic Culture and Heritage

Foundation, the Turkic Business Council (established in 2011), and the Joint Chamber of

Commerce and Industry (established in 2019 at the Astana Economic Forum). Among

these, TURKSOY is headquartered in Ankara, the International Turkic Academy in Nur-

Sultan, and both TURKPA and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation in Baku

(turkicstates.org; Sarıkaya, 2021). Consolidating these bodies under the OTS framework

enhances institutional integration and cooperation within the Turkic world, especially

given that not all OTS members participate in every sub-organisation (Mustofaev, 2022).

While institutional integration has been achieved, its political and economic implications

raise ongoing debates about the OTS’s potential as a regional actor.

The ‘Big Game’ again: The OTS in the face of the clash of power

between global and regional actors

Turkestan and the Caucasus have long been arenas of great power rivalry, a pattern that

continues today. In the Caucasus, the struggle for dominance between the Ottoman

Empire and the Safavid–Qajar dynasties was joined by Tsarist Russia in the early 19th

century, which, within a century, established control over the region—an extension of

the broader power struggle in Turkestan. Located between British-controlled India and

Russia, Turkestan was politically fragmented and governed by weak dynasties, making it

vulnerable to colonisation. The Anglo-Afghan Wars and Russia’s occupation of Turkestan

exemplified this rivalry, famously termed the “Great Game” by Hopkirk (2021). Although

Central Asian societies briefly gained independence following the fall of the Tsarist

regime, they were soon absorbed into the Soviet Union and subsequently became a

“forgotten region” (Zabortseva, 2012) until the USSR’s collapse. With the end of the Cold

War, the region once again drew the attention of global powers due to its strategic

location, abundant natural resources, and market potential. While Russia’s post-Soviet

dominance initially prevented the kind of violent rivalries seen in Eastern Europe and the

Caucasus, recent developments—such as intensified global economic competition,

China’s expanding influence, the Taliban’s full control of Afghanistan, and the erosion of

Russian power—have re-positioned the region at the centre of international geopolitical

competition (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022).

The main global and regional actors competing for influence in the Caucasus and Central

Asia (CCA) region are Russia, China, the United States, the European Union, and Türkiye.

The dynamics of competition and distribution of power among these actors exert a

significant influence on the policies of the countries within the CCA, as well as on the role

of the OTS as a regional actor. Among these, Russia stands as the most dominant power,

having historically ruled the region during both the Tsarist and Soviet eras. Post-Cold

War, Russia has sought to reassert its influence through institutional and socio-cultural

channels, particularly in shaping identity. The Eurasianist perspective advanced by Dugin

(2014) underpins the “Near Periphery Doctrine,” asserting that control over the Eurasian

heartland is essential for Russia to remain a great power. Politically and militarily, Russia

has leveraged the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, 1991), the Collective

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

396

Security Treaty (1994), and its successor, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation

(CSTO, 2002); economically, it has utilised platforms such as the Central Asian

Cooperation Organisation (joined in 2004) and the Eurasian Economic Community (2000)

(Arı, 2010). Russia’s position with respect to the OTS can, on occasion, be said to

manifest a paradoxical structure, while at other times this can be considered

complementary, in regard to its historical foundations and strategic orientations.

Historically, the propensity of Turkish communities to unite has invariably provoked

concern on the part of Russia, compelling it to adopt an assertive stance. The stance

adopted by Tsarist Russia towards the rising Turkish nationalist movement in the

Ottoman Empire and the uprisings beginning in Turkestan became even more severe

after the Bolshevik Revolution. During the Soviet era, Turkic communities were kept

distant from Ankara. At the time, Türkiye adopted a policy of maintaining the status quo

in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union regarding this issue. Following the

termination of the Cold War, the Russian Federation initially adopted a reserved stance

with regard to the process of rapprochement that commenced among the Turkic states.

Indeed, the failure to achieve the desired integration over time and the resulting

weakness led to the OTS being seen in the region as a complementary element rather

than a formation against Russia (Ongun, 2022). Nevertheless, Russia continues to adopt

a cautious and controlled stance towards the OTS. Alongside Russia, China has emerged

as a rising regional actor with a strategy built on three pillars: security, energy, and

trade. From a security standpoint, China is sensitive about East Turkestan and is cautious

not to encourage pan-Turkic sentiments among Central Asian states due to their ethnic

ties with the Uighurs. On energy, China’s agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

are vital to meeting the resource demands of its growing economy. In trade, the region

is central to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which envisions a continuous trade route

from China to Europe. To realise its goals, China utilises the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation (SCO), in which Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan hold full

membership, to secure and expand its interests across the region (Clarke, 2013; Yujin,

2019; Swanström, 2011). A close examination of China’s comprehensive strategy

concerning the OTS reveals a transition in its approach, initially marked by caution but

subsequently evolving into a security-centric and ideological stance, particularly following

its institutionalisation in 2021. Despite the emergence of pan-Turkism in the region and

the enhancement of collaboration among Turkic states being perceived as potential

challenges, it can be posited that China is strategically leveraging the economic prospects

engendered by the OTS (Aghjeh, 2022; Mai, 2021).

As in other regions, the United States and the European Union have pursued distinct

strategies in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region to counterbalance Russian and

Chinese influence. The U.S. approach revolves around two core objectives: securing

control over energy resources and their transportation routes to Western markets, and

reducing the strategic influence of Russia and China (Kireçci, 2011). In essence, American

foreign policy in the region seeks to curb Russian and Chinese dominance by leveraging

control over energy (İşeri, 2009). This emphasis on energy became a central pillar of

U.S. strategy after the Cold War, particularly as the country’s share in global energy

production dropped from nearly 50% in 1945 to around 20% today, intensifying the need

to access alternative sources (Faulkner, 2021). Similarly, the EU’s policy towards the CCA

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 389-410

The Organisation of Turkic States: An Emerging Actor in the Context of Geopolitical

Opportunities and Limitations?

Yusuf Ziya Bölükbaşı, İlhan Bilici, Gökberk Yücel

397

region highlights energy security as a strategic priority, particularly in ensuring diversified

supply routes to Western markets. While promoting democratic governance and universal

norms is a stated aim of EU foreign policy, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes and

weak human rights standards in the region creates a normative dilemma. In practice,

the EU tends to prioritise its political and economic interests, with energy considerations

taking precedence (Asma & Koca, 2021).

The CCA policies of global powers have been briefly reviewed; however, to assess the

economic, political, and military strategies of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) in

response, it is essential to examine the role of Türkiye—arguably the most influential

actor shaping the OTS. As previously noted, the OTS has developed largely under

Türkiye’s patronage and reflects Ankara’s broader regional vision. Following the Syrian

conflict and the war in Ukraine, a growing body of analysis identifies Türkiye as a pivotal

actor in five key geopolitical regions, with the CCA standing out through the OTS, whose

institutional architecture Türkiye has helped to establish. Economically, Türkiye’s

strategic partnerships in the region pose a potential challenge to Russian dominance

(Furlong et al., 2025), while Duran (2023) argues that the West should support Türkiye

as a balancing force against China’s expanding influence. In reality, however, Türkiye

faces considerable structural limitations that hinder its capacity to rival Russian and

Chinese hegemony in the region, particularly in three areas: security, trade, and political

leadership. As a NATO member, Türkiye is constrained in its ability to confront Russia on

security matters, curbing its strategic reach. In trade, the lack of a robust transportation

and logistics network across the CCA region, coupled with China’s infrastructural

dominance and commercial connectivity via Iran, exposes Türkiye’s limited economic

leverage. Politically, authoritarian governance and strong centralised leadership in CCA

states diminish the potential for deep, institutionalised cooperation. Despite Türkiye’s

favourable bilateral ties with regional leaders, their entrenched alignment with Russia

often takes precedence over relations with Ankara (Alaranta & Silvan, 2022).

The OTS, regarded as an emerging actor in the wake of the Ukraine War, becomes

attractive primarily through the realisation of its members’ common interests. Therefore,

it is essential to analyse the economic and political dimensions of the organisation.

Economic Integration: Energy, New Trade Routes and Cooperation

among Member States

The Turkic world holds a significant position in the global economy due to its geopolitical

location and natural resources. The combined population of OTS member and observer

states reaches approximately 170 million, covering 4.5 million square kilometres with an

economic output exceeding 1.5 trillion dollars—ranking them as the 13th largest

economic bloc globally (Kocaman, 2022; Baghırov, 2022). In terms of Gross Domestic

Product (GDP), these countries collectively account for around 2 per cent of the global

economy, with a total GDP of 2 trillion dollars. Although Russia and China maintain

economic dominance in the region, the strategic importance of the Turkic states has

created a landscape where global and regional powers, particularly the U.S. and the EU,

experience both overlapping interests and economic competition. Following the

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institutionalisation of the OTS, issues such as joint investments, trade development, and

economic integration among member states have gained increasing prominence (Koçak,

2023).

Economic opportunities in the Turkic world centre on three main areas: hydrocarbon

resources, trade routes, and economic cooperation within the Organisation of Turkic

States (OTS). On energy, strategic infrastructure projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan,

Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, the Southern Gas Corridor, and its components TANAP and TAP

have aimed to transport the region’s hydrocarbon wealth to Western markets while

prioritising cooperation among OTS members. These initiatives have enhanced the

region’s geostrategic importance for the West. The “OTS Energy Cooperation Programme

for 2023–2027” and the “OTS Energy Coordination Committee,” both launched in Almaty,

further reflect a coordinated strategy to utilise energy as a tool for regional peace and

stability. Trade connectivity is another key dimension, particularly through the Central

Corridor, a component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that has gained prominence

amid the Ukraine-Russia War. Complementing this, the Zangezur Corridor—under

construction after the Karabakh victory—offers further integration potential. TRACECA

(Transit Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia), headquartered in Baku, provides land, rail, and

sea connections between the EU and Kyrgyzstan and supports economic integration

among OTS states (Yalçınkaya & Güzel, 2021). Regarding intra-OTS trade, Türkiye is the

largest economy among members, followed by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan,

Turkmenistan, Hungary, and Kyrgyzstan. While the share of intra-group exports rose

from 13.9% in 2016 to 25.9% in 2021, this accounts for only 3% of the members’ total

trade volume, which stands at approximately 700 billion dollars. Moreover, the share of

these countries in Türkiye’s foreign trade remains low at 1.94%, highlighting the

underdeveloped nature of economic integration (Baghirov, 2022; Kocaman, 2022;

Sarıkaya, 2021; İstikbal, 2021). Türkiye has supported the region through investments,

loans, and aid since its independence, notably via the Turkish Cooperation and

Coordination Agency (TIKA), which has led numerous initiatives (TIKA, 2025). Economic

coordination has been prioritised in OTS summits: the 2013 Gabala Summit focused on

transport networks, the 2014 Bodrum Summit on tourism, and the 2019 establishment

of the Union of Turkic Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TCCI) marked a step toward

institutional economic cooperation. The “Turkic World Vision-2040” sets a long-term

agenda for governance, digitalisation, and investment diversification (Koçak, 2023, p.

122). Most recently, the Samarkand Summit saw the establishment of the Turkic

Investment Fund—the first joint financial institution of the Turkic world—based on equal

capital contributions by member states (turkicstates.org, 2022). These developments

signal a growing emphasis on deepening economic integration in the coming period.

The economic structures of the OTS member states are shaped significantly by their

hydrocarbon resources. Central Asia is among the world’s richest regions in this regard:

Kazakhstan holds 30 billion barrels of oil and 2.4 trillion cubic metres of gas;

Turkmenistan has 7.5 trillion cubic metres of gas (Kireçci, 2011); Azerbaijan possesses

7 billion barrels of oil and 2.5 trillion cubic metres of gas (worldometers.info; iea.org);

and Uzbekistan has 1.8 trillion cubic metres of gas and 594 million barrels of oil

(deik.org). In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Türkiye lack significant energy resources, with

Türkiye meeting 92.8% of its energy demand through imports (Yalçın & Doğan, 2023).

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This dependency is a key driver of Türkiye’s CCA policy, as it seeks both to meet its

energy needs and enhance its geopolitical role by becoming a key transit route for energy

exports to Western markets. Kazakhstan effectively leverages its energy wealth in foreign

policy, pursuing a multi-vector strategy aimed at balancing the interests of China, Russia,

the U.S., and the EU to curb Russian dominance and bolster its regional influence

(Zabortseva, 2012; Omelicheva & Du, 2018; Nurgaliyeva, 2015). Its diversified foreign

partnerships have attracted substantial infrastructure and pipeline investments from

countries such as the U.S., Italy, the UK, and China. Kazakhstan’s expectations from the

OTS include securing alternative energy export routes, diversifying its economic base,

and expanding access to global markets (Aydın & Liui, 2024). These aims align closely

with the interests of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. For Kyrgyzstan,

whose economy is relatively weak and resource-poor, economic cooperation within the

OTS is of vital importance. Uzbekistan, sharing similar economic partners with Türkiye

and Kazakhstan, also emphasises economic collaboration as a core element of its

multidimensional foreign policy under President Mirziyoyev (Aydın & Liui, 2024).

Azerbaijan likewise places economic relations at the centre of its engagement with the

OTS, particularly through its focus on the Central Corridor, which aims to link Central

Asia and Europe while mitigating Russian influence via cooperation with China.

Azerbaijan’s strategic motivations include energy and logistics, reinforced by its victory

in the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent construction of the Zangezur Corridor.

This corridor not only elevates Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance but also promises to

enhance trade connectivity, with an estimated 10 million tonnes of cargo expected to be

transported over 13 years, benefiting all OTS members, especially Türkiye and Azerbaijan

(Rickleton, 2024a; Anadolu Agency, 2022).

In addition to the economic potential of the OTS and the economic capacities and

approaches of its member states, it is essential to examine the policies of global and

regional powers in Central Asia. Since the independence of the CCA countries, the United

States has provided over $9 billion in direct aid for security, democracy, and economic

development, alongside more than $50 billion in loans and technical assistance from

American financial institutions, which reportedly generated $31 billion in local

employment. These efforts have been viewed as tools to counterbalance Russian and

Chinese influence. A significant recent event provides another important clue regarding

the U.S.’s CCA policy. This is the declaration signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia

with Trump’s mediation. While the political ramifications of the declaration between the

two countries will be assessed at a later date, it is imperative to address its economic

implications in the present context. The route, formerly known as Zengezur and now

called TRIPP, has been referred to as the Trump corridor. It has been leased by the U.S.

for 99 years. It is evident that this strategic manoeuvre will have a dual impact. Firstly,

it will serve to diminish Russia’s influence within the given region, thereby increasing

pressure on Iran. Conversely, it will elevate the United States to a position of prominence

with respect to trade relations and the transfer of energy resources among the EU, the

OTS, and China. The advantages of this route are manifold, including a 10-15 per cent

reduction in energy transport costs, an increase in freight volume to 15 million tonnes,

the creation of a $100 billion trade volume, an increase in the national income of

Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Türkiye’s rising power and influence in the region, which

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will enable it to act as an agent for the renewal of Armenia’s infrastructure. It has been

argued that the primary benefit of economic integration among countries in the region is

that it can lead to lasting peace, as evidenced by the example of the relationship between

Turks and Armenians (Ryzhko & Sabirova, 2025). The European Union, meanwhile, has

focused primarily on energy policy, aiming to double the capacity of the Southern Gas

Corridor and signing a Memorandum of Understanding to secure the flow of 20 billion

cubic metres of gas from the region by 2027. Economically, the EU remains Türkiye’s

main partner and has made significant investments in the region. Russia, however,

continues to hold the greatest economic sway over the CCA countries, accounting for

85% of the value generated through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Following the

Ukraine War, many CCA states aligned with EU sanctions, which in turn boosted intra-

regional trade (Koçak, 2023). There has also been a growing trend to reduce Russian

economic dominance by diversifying partnerships. The decision by Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan to decline invitations to BRICS’ 16th anniversary event reflects their intent to

assert economic autonomy amid shifting geopolitical dynamics (Rickleton, 2024b).

Nevertheless, Russia maintains a strong presence through its energy companies, with

Gazprom and Rosatom securing agreements to construct nuclear power plants in

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (rfe/rl, 27.12.2024). Alongside Russia, China represents the

other major economic actor in the region. Since the independence of the Turkic republics,

China’s trade turnover in the region has increased 60-fold. Through the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), China has funded infrastructure projects, including transportation

corridors, energy pipelines, and trade agreements to strengthen connectivity and

economic integration across the Caucasus and Central Asia (Koçak, 2023). Key initiatives

such as the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-China railway and energy transfer deals with

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan further highlight China’s growing regional influence

(Rickleton, 2024c).

Security and Politics

Security issues and political relations are at least as vital as economic considerations for

the CCA countries, if not more so. Following independence, these states faced significant

security challenges, including border and ethnic tensions inherited from the Soviet era,

the rise of radical religious groups, and disputes over water resources—all contributing

to strained inter-state relations in the Turkestan region. The border and ethnic disputes

originated from administrative arrangements imposed during Tsarist and Soviet rule.

Notable examples include the Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes in Osh, repeated changes in the

status of the Karakalpak Autonomous Region, ongoing border disputes between

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and situations where states must traverse neighbouring

territories to access their own capitals (Arı, 2010). Among these, the Karabakh conflict

between Azerbaijan and Armenia has had particularly profound regional and international

implications. The roots of this conflict date back to the early 19th century, when Russia

expanded into the Caucasus, defeating the Qajars and occupying the region. Although

Turks were the majority in Karabakh, Russian authorities began settling Armenians—

viewed as politically aligned—in the region to create a strategic buffer against the

Ottomans and Qajars. This policy continued during the Soviet era, and by the 1980s, the

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region’s demography had shifted dramatically from 90% Turkish to 78% Armenian.

Following the USSR’s dissolution, Armenian separatist demands led to violent clashes,

and with Russian military support, Armenians occupied Karabakh and carried out ethnic

cleansing (Bölükbaşı, 2023). Beyond territorial disputes, the water-sharing issues among

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and the threat of radical religious groups—

exacerbated by the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan—pose ongoing challenges. While

partial agreements have addressed water concerns, radicalisation persists, fueled by the

presence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Fergana Valley and East Turkestan, as well

as Iranian influence. In response, CCA states have adopted legal and policy measures

aimed at reinforcing secularism and social resilience (Cumhuriyet, 2025). Lastly, the

long-standing dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea among Russia, Iran,

Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan—whether it should be classified as a sea or

lake—was settled in 2018 through a multilateral agreement (Euronews, 2018).

In addition to persistent regional security challenges, the strategic rivalry among global

and regional powers significantly shapes the geopolitical landscape of the CCA countries.

The United States has prioritised diplomatic engagement in the region to curtail Russian

and Chinese influence, while also expressing concern over Iran and the spread of radical

Islam. However, energy security remains its primary focus. Following Donald Trump’s re-

election, U.S. strategy appears to be shifting, as reflected in Vice President Vance’s

statement that Russia should not remain China’s junior partner (WSJ, 2025) and ongoing

diplomatic efforts to end the Ukraine War. Analysts suggest that Trump’s CCA policy will

largely hinge on his relations with Russia, China, and Türkiye (Painner, 2024). Current

U.S. actions—such as new sanctions on Iran and warm overtures toward Russia against

China—underscore the priority given to strategic and geopolitical interests. Meanwhile,

China emphasises East Turkestan as a key security concern in its relations with the

region. Fearing that the OTS might support Uyghur independence and thus threaten its

territorial integrity, China exerts political pressure through the SCO. However, the CCA

countries consistently reassure China that the OTS has no such agenda and does not

intervene in the affairs of Turkic groups abroad. China has also deepened its influence by

selling an air defence system to Uzbekistan (Standish, 2025), thus extending its reach

beyond the economic sphere. Despite this, Russia remains the dominant political and

security actor in the region, largely through mechanisms like the CIS and CSTO. Yet,

since the Ukraine War, there has been a growing effort by CCA states to reduce Russian

dominance. For example, while Türkiye voted at the UN General Assembly on 1st March

2022 to demand Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine, CCA countries abstained—mainly due

to their entanglement with Russian-led organisations and Türkiye’s NATO membership

(Mustofaev, 2022). As Brzezinski (2021) notes, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have taken

specific steps to foster national identity and curb Russian influence in Turkestan. This

trend continues under Tokayev, who emphasises economic integration and a new security

architecture for the Turkic world (Kazakh MFA, 2024). Similarly, Uzbek Foreign Minister

Kamilov’s (2024) remarks on a pragmatic, multilateral foreign policy signal a strategic

distancing from Moscow. The approaches adopted by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are

influenced by systemic factors, namely their relations with global powers and their

national interests. Furthermore, the presence of rising nationalism in the region is

another factor that is relevant in this context. Additionally, the objectives of the two

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countries differ from those of the international organisations to which they belong.

However, Russian analysts view these moves as attempts to undermine CSTO

dominance. Commentator Kirsanov claims that a Central Asian security architecture

without Russia is unrealistic and accuses Tokayev of being backed by British intelligence

(Asia24.media, 2024). Russian warnings, citing Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s pro-

NATO tilt as a costly mistake during the Karabakh conflict, serve as veiled threats to CCA

states. These pressures limit the manoeuvring capacity of smaller countries like

Kyrgyzstan, which has postponed implementation of the common Turkic alphabet,

fearing a backlash from Moscow (RFE/rl, 03.10.2024). Ultimately, it is yet to be

determined how Russia will respond to the declaration that was signed between

Azerbaijan and Armenia under the leadership of the United States. Despite maintaining

an official silence on the matter, the ongoing challenges in Russia’s relationship with the

U.S., compounded by the ongoing costs of the Ukraine War, have led to concerns

regarding the potential loss of a pivotal region such as the Caucasus. Concurrently,

President Trump is endeavouring to emulate the Abraham Accords between Arab states

and Israel during his inaugural term, this time between Armenia and the Turkic world

(Holland, 2025). In addition to its economic benefits, TRIPP is regarded as having the

potential to provide the U.S. with significant power in the Caucasus from a political and

strategic perspective, and could also potentially undermine Russia’s hegemony in

Turkestan.

The deep-rooted problems in the CCA region and the impact of global power competition

have significantly shaped the dynamics among Turkic states and their engagement with

the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), revealing the political meaning attributed to the

organisation by its members. From an external perspective, Aneschi & Grigoryan (2022)

argue that despite the post-Ukraine War environment enabling more autonomous

behaviour by Turkic states, their integration efforts remain vague and rhetorically hollow.

This view gains clarity through an analysis of inter-CCA relations since 1992, when the

foundations of the OTS were laid with the Summits of Turkic Speaking Heads of State—

initiated under Türkiye’s patronage to navigate its foreign policy challenges. CCA

countries joined to integrate into the international system and benefit from Türkiye’s

support, yet during the First Karabakh War, the organisation proved ineffective as

members, except Türkiye, failed to support Azerbaijan. Political integration remained

limited due to Türkiye’s missteps and the internal and external agendas of the CCA

states; notably, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan long refrained from summit participation

(Bölükbaşı, 2020). The 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement marked a turning point by initiating

institutionalisation and transforming the Turkic Council into the OTS, prioritising political

and security cooperation. Since then, the OTS has faced three major tests. First, during

the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the OTS supported Azerbaijan’s military operations

to reclaim its occupied territories, a campaign bolstered by Turkish-made UAVs. Second,

during the Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border clashes, the OTS expressed support for

Kyrgyzstan. Third, following the unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022, OTS foreign

ministers convened an emergency meeting and backed the Kazakh government.

However, as the situation escalated, Kazakhstan turned to the CSTO for military

assistance, exposing the OTS’s limited crisis-response capacity. Member states’ divergent

expectations from the OTS further complicate integration: Türkiye and Kazakhstan seek

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regional and global influence; Azerbaijan aims to consolidate support against Armenia;

Uzbekistan aspires to regional leadership; and Kyrgyzstan prioritises political and

economic stability (Aydın & Liui, 2024). These differing priorities underscore the absence

of a unified vision. A recent incident exemplifies this fragmentation: at the Samarkand

Summit, the EU offered a €12 billion aid package in exchange for the CCA states’

recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration and endorsement of UN resolutions on

Cyprus. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan initiated diplomatic engagement with

the Greek Cypriot side, refraining from siding with Türkiye on what it considers a national

cause—unlike the past solidarity shown by Islamic countries (Güller, 2025). This stance

sparked disappointment in Turkish public opinion and raised questions about the OTS’s

credibility. Although the TRNC’s admission as an observer had initially generated

optimism, its exclusion from the 2023 Astana meeting signalled growing disillusionment

(Karaveli, 2024). Ultimately, the OTS has fallen short of meeting political and security

expectations, revealing the fragile unity among its members.

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) emerged as an

identity-based international organisation initiated by Türkiye, shaped by its efforts to

address the challenges faced by both itself and the CCA countries in response to evolving

geopolitical dynamics. The OTS represents a significant attempt to foster political,

economic, and cultural integration among Turkic-speaking societies that have been

fragmented under separate political entities for centuries. However, the question

remains: is the OTS becoming a rising actor in the CCA region in the face of competing

international organisations and global powers? To address this, it is essential to assess

the extent of political and economic integration within the organisation and to analyse its

relations with other actors in the context of regional and global developments.

In economic terms, the OTS has gained positive momentum with the deepening of its

institutionalisation following the Nakhchivan Agreement. The primary motivation of

member states appears to be economic cooperation, supported by Türkiye’s status as

one of the world’s twenty largest economies and the CCA countries’ rich natural

resources. However, significant challenges remain. First, for meaningful integration, OTS

member states should rank among each other’s top ten trading partners; for instance,

Türkiye, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan—as well as observer members like the

TRNC, Hungary, and Turkmenistan—should feature prominently in Kazakhstan’s foreign

trade statistics. Currently, intra-OTS trade constitutes only 3% of the members’ total

trade volume, a notably low figure. Moreover, the combination of vast geography, low

population density, and abundant underground resources contrasts starkly with the low

GNP rates across the region, highlighting structural economic deficiencies. Under current

conditions, the OTS lacks the economic capacity to rival global actors such as the U.S.,

EU, Russia, or China. Indeed, the protocol signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia,

leasing TRIPP to the U.S. for 99 years, exemplifies the inability of OTS countries to

compete economically with global powers. Nevertheless, the primary objective of the

present endeavour does not lie in the pursuit of competition with the USA. Rather, it is

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an attempt to diversify the country’s foreign policy. In contrast, Türkiye has recently

adopted a more pro-American stance in its own foreign policy.

Political and security relations within the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) are

considerably more complex than its economic integration. The emphasis on economic

cooperation stems from the underdeveloped state of political collaboration. In a global

order shaped by neoliberalism, economic integration cannot be sustained without

corresponding political alignment. Since its inception in 1992, the OTS has struggled to

establish a coherent political framework. Türkiye’s leadership role and its developmental

advantage over Central Asian counterparts have fostered a “big brother” perception,

undermining mutual trust. The lack of support for Azerbaijan following the First Karabakh

War, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s prolonged absence from summits, and declining

diplomatic engagement reflect this fragility. Contributing factors include Türkiye’s

economic and security challenges, as well as the authoritarian tendencies of regional

regimes. Militarily, the OTS remains ineffective; Kazakhstan’s appeal to the CSTO during

the 2022 unrest highlighted the organisation’s inability to act as a security alliance. Even

prior to military integration, the desired political unity had not materialised. A striking

example is the recent adoption of an EU-aligned declaration by some CCA countries,

recognising the Greek Cypriot Administration while sidelining the Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus and implicitly portraying Türkiye as an occupier. Although institutional

progress and Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War represent positive

developments, the latter resulted largely from Azerbaijan’s bilateral alliance with Türkiye,

with minimal support from other OTS members. The indifference of certain CCA states to

the Cyprus issue—central to Türkiye’s security concerns for decades—further illustrates

the weakness of political integration. This disillusionment, however, is not solely the fault

of other member states; Türkiye must also reconsider its policies. For instance, in the

case of East Turkestan, neither Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, nor any other OTS

member has dared to openly confront China’s repressive policies. Despite their ethnic

ties with the Uyghurs, these states remain silent in the face of China’s coercive diplomacy

and human rights violations.

Ultimately, the OTS requires further economic integration and has yet to develop a true

political union. The differing objectives of its member states, the perception of the OTS

as a secondary organisation compared to others, and the focus on short-term national

interests rather than the long-term stability and interests of Turkic societies hinder the

OTS from becoming a regional actor. In accordance with the precepts of neo-realist

theory, this scenario is indicative of regional hegemonies in the face of global powers. In

the case of the OTS, this was Türkiye during its founding process in the early 1990s, and

today it is Türkiye to the west of the Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan to the east. This

situation is analogous to the classical division of Eastern and Western Khanates in

historical Turkish states. Indeed, rather than considering the OTS in its totality, it is more

logical to divide it into two distinct regions: Turkestan and the Caucasus-Black Sea area.

Additionally, economic unity alone is insufficient; political and security cooperation must

complement the economic framework, which the OTS has not yet achieved. While the

Ukraine War temporarily positioned the OTS as an emerging actor, the Cyprus issue

exposed its limitations. The states of the Turkic world demonstrate this through their own

national interests and the relationships they have established with global powers.

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Russia’s diminishing influence, Türkiye’s transition towards a policy aligned with that of

the United States, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel, and the desire of Kazakhstan and

other states east of the Caspian Sea to benefit from EU assistance are all significant

factors that must be taken into consideration. It can be posited that the CCA states

prioritise their own interests over those of the OTS in their dealings with global actors,

and that the OTS is regarded as a mechanism for regulating relations among themselves.

The OTS’s ability to navigate the challenges posed by Trump’s policies towards China will

be a crucial test, determining whether it can establish itself as a regional actor.

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