Russia-Ukraine conflict or shifting Sino-Indian realities, on the future of BRICS. Despite
these limitations, the study makes a significant contribution to understanding India’s
evolving foreign policy and its ambitions in an increasingly complex, multipolar, and
culturally diverse world order.
Evolving Non-Western International Relations
There is nothing new about scholars of international relations criticising Western centrism
in the field of IR theory; it is a theme that keeps resurfacing. Dependency School and
World Systems theorists have questioned the Western-centric approach to international
relations since the 1960s and 1970s, particularly during decolonisation (Wallerstein,
2004). The development of non-Western international relations theories within peripheral
states has recently gained prominence. The most significant and striking factor in the
transformation of the world is that non-Western civilisational states are playing an
increasingly important role (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). What we mean by this concept is
that we think of states that weigh their legitimacy not on a nation but on their
civilisational heritage. In the West, the primary condition for a state’s legitimacy is its
democratic functioning. Nevertheless, in a civilisational state, the presence or absence of
democracy holds minimal significance. Henry Kissinger (2014) expressed concern that
competing conceptions of civilisation could lead to conflicts that could be even more
dangerous than the conventional conflicts between states. He contended that the
fundamental conflict in the modern world is not merely a struggle for political power or
economic influence; instead, it is a struggle for deeply ingrained cultural and civilisational
values. As a result, states often use historical and cultural narratives to legitimise their
power, making the significance of culture in this context frequently surpass that of
political calculations. This concept is presented in the “civilisational state,” which,
according to the assertions of some Asian academics, is defined not only by political
authority but also by an extraordinary moral authority that distinguishes it from the
Western state model (Mahbubani,2023). Huntington opines that the major civilisations
of the world, Western, Islamic, Confucian, and Hindu civilisations, among others, will be
the dominant sources of conflict in the post-Cold War period. In his argument, Huntington
asserts that civilisational identity, based on religion, culture and historical experience, is
an enduring force that influences global politics. This argument was reawakened in “The
Great Convergence,” as referred to by Mahbubani (2013), who claims that the world is
currently shifting from a Western-dominated international order to a multipolar world,
where, especially in Asia, non-Western civilisations assert their values and models of
governance. The ideological hegemony of the West, including liberal democracy, is now
increasingly challenged by civilisations with different historical narratives, values, and
ways to govern. Non-Western powers, such as China, India, and Russia, are asserting
their civilisational identities in an increasingly purposeful manner and promoting
alternative governance approaches based on historical legitimacy, cultural continuity,
and moral authority within institutions. These nation-states no longer assert their political
influence alone; they also offer political legitimacy based on their civilisational identity.
Mahbubani (2013) argues that the world is transitioning from an international order
dominated by the Western world to a more multipolar world in which non-Western
civilisations, particularly those in Asia, assert their values and models of governance.