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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between

Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025

302

OVERLAPPING ORGANISATIONS AND EMERGING POWERS: INDIA’S

SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF FORUM SHOPPING

FATMA SEVER

fatma.sever@dest.smk.lt

Researcher, SMK College of Applied Sciences, Vilnius (Lithuania).

https://orcid.org/0009-0000-8003-4996

MEHMET RECAI UYGUR

mehmetrecai.uygur@smk.lt

Senior Researcher, SMK College of Applied Sciences, Vilnius (Lithuania).

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1872-0885

Abstract

The post-WWII era gave rise to not only an expansion in international organisations but also

in regional organisations, resulting in the proliferation of overlapping organisations at both

the global and regional levels (Panke and Stapel, 2018; Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023).

This overlapping phenomenon also opens a room for forum shopping that leads states to

navigate themselves among different organisations according to their interest (Busch, 2007;

Hofmann, 2018). India, as an emerging power, has a dual approach with committing to global

organisations, while actively engaging with regional organisations. Hence, India actively

participates in international organisations such as the UN and WTO, while simultaneously

taking an active role in shaping regional institutions such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, and RCEP.

Thus, the study contributes to overlapping organisations literature focusing on the forum

shopping strategy to understand how India, as an emerging power, navigates itself between

overlapping organisations to contribute to regional and global efforts while maximising its

national interests. This paper argues that India’s foreign policy behaviour reflects a strategic

manoeuvre of forum shopping that selectively engages with overlapping organisations based

on institutional design, membership, and issue-specific utility. The study employs process

tracing since the early 1990s to map India’s historical and strategic shifts in organisational

engagement, such as the move from SAARC to BIMSTEC or its withdrawal from RCEP, to

uncover the causal mechanisms and motivations behind India’s institutional strategies. The

findings demonstrate that India’s foreign policy rationality is neither a retreat solely from

multilateralism nor a simple alignment with major powers, but rather an adaptive strategy to

advance national interests through institutional diversity and regional substitution.

Keywords

Overlapping regionalism, forum shopping, institutional balancing, regionalism, India.

Resumo

O período pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial deu origem não só a uma expansão das organizações

internacionais, mas também das organizações regionais, resultando na proliferação de

organizações sobrepostas, tanto a nível global como regional (Panke e Stapel, 2018;

Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023). Este fenómeno de sobreposição também abre espaço para

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

303

a escolha do foro mais favorável, levando os Estados a navegar entre diferentes organizações

de acordo com os seus interesses (Busch, 2007; Hofmann, 2018). A Índia, como potência

emergente, tem uma abordagem dupla, comprometendo-se com organizações globais e, ao

mesmo tempo, envolvendo-se ativamente com organizações regionais. Assim, a Índia

participa ativamente em organizações internacionais como a ONU e a OMC, ao mesmo tempo

que desempenha um papel ativo na formação de instituições regionais como a SAARC, a

BIMSTEC e a RCEP. Assim, o estudo contribui para a literatura sobre organizações

sobrepostas, com foco na estratégia de forum shopping, para compreender como a Índia,

como potência emergente, navega entre organizações sobrepostas para contribuir para os

esforços regionais e globais, maximizando os seus interesses nacionais. Este artigo argumenta

que o comportamento da política externa da Índia reflete uma manobra estratégica de forum

shopping que se envolve seletivamente com organizações sobrepostas com base no desenho

institucional, na adesão e na utilidade específica da questão. O estudo emprega o

rastreamento de processos desde o início da década de 1990 para mapear as mudanças

históricas e estratégicas da Índia no envolvimento organizacional, como a mudança da SAARC

para a BIMSTEC ou a sua retirada da RCEP, para descobrir os mecanismos causais e as

motivações por trás das estratégias institucionais da Índia. As conclusões demonstram que a

racionalidade da política externa da Índia não é nem um recuo exclusivo do multilateralismo

nem um simples alinhamento com as grandes potências, mas sim uma estratégia adaptativa

para promover os interesses nacionais através da diversidade institucional e da substituição

regional.

Palavras-chave

Regionalismo sobreposto, forum shopping, equilíbrio institucional, regionalismo, Índia.

How to cite this article

Sever, Fatma & Uygur, Mehmet Recai (2025). Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers:

India’s Selective Engagement Through the Lens of Forum Shopping. Janus.net, e-journal of

international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional

Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 302-319. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-

7251.DT0525.16

Article submitted on 01st June 2025 and accepted for publication on 07th October 2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

304

OVERLAPPING ORGANISATIONS AND EMERGING POWERS:

INDIA’S FORUM SHOPPING STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA

FATMA SEVER

MEHMET RECAI UYGUR

Introduction

India’s international policy post-1990s is characterised by strategic multi-alignment with

several overlapping global networks instead of a rigid alignment to one bloc (Hall, 2021;

Kumar, 2024; Majumdar, 2024). This entails that India actively alternates among forums

in what is colloquially termed as forum shopping in order to further boost national

interests. International relations scholars define forum shopping as the strategic choice

of one institution, or arena, over another based on that forum’s membership, mandate,

decision rules, and enforcement capacity (Murphy & Kellow, 2013; O’Donnell & Papa,

2021, p. 802). As outlined by Murphy and Kellow (2013), the actors consider these

characteristics in the arena’s design, and a system of overlapping institutions can

enhance policy results by providing multiple options for achieving objectives. Rüland

(2012) explains this as a type of ‘diminished multilateralism,’ in which an emerging power

like India initiates or accentuates other regional or transregional forums to work around

the limits of global structures.

Amongst such shifting governance frameworks, scholars show that states have started

increasingly engaging in what is termed forum shopping, the movement through

institutional settings in pursuit of an advantage to serve national interests (Busch, 2007;

Hofmann, 2018). In the case of emerging powers like India, such practices go beyond

mere reactions to external forces and become an essential facet of its multi-layered

international policy. Most literature centres on dissatisfaction emerging powers have with

Western institutions and their bid for status through new forums (Rüland, 2012;

O’Donnell & Papa, 2021). India’s balancing participation in the WTO with SAARC,

BIMSTEC, RCEP, and even Quad reflects a careful measurement of inclusion, autonomy,

and influence.

India’s behaviour indicates a far more blended approach, including a more flexible version

of institutionalism and pragmatic multialignment, at both the regional and international

level. For clarity, this study treats “multialignment” as a comprehensive concept while

also recognising that India’s regional foreign policy often manifests itself as flexible and

pragmatic institutional forms. Hence, this multialignment approach is, in India’s case,

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

305

certainly pragmatic, driven by national interests, but also not a rejection of globalisation

since India remains active in the UN, WTO and G20 while engaging with numerous other

groupings. As External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has noted, India’s “multi-alignment or

multi-vector” policy allows it to collaborate with different partners on different issues in

what optimises India’s position (Garg, 2024). Simply put, Upadhyay (2022) notes India’s

perspective is to “weigh their own side” rather than succumb to either U.S. or China

hegemony. This standpoint also serves as a pivotal indicator that motivates us to trace

forum shopping within these overlapping organisations. In doing so, India exemplifies

how emerging powers strategically engage overlapping regionalism to assert agency,

mitigate constraints, and shape the evolving architecture of international order.

Therefore, the question of “how does India strategically navigate itself within the

increasingly overlapping regional and global organisations” lies at the heart of this study.

Accordingly, this study aims to map and explain India’s forum shopping using process

tracing and contribute to overlapping regionalism, institutional balancing, and the

adaptive responses of emerging powers to a fragmented global order. Thus, this paper

analyses how India has implemented this strategy in the context of economic and security

priorities within the overlapping phenomenon. In this vein, the study uses a qualitative

process tracing method to analyse India’s forum shopping strategy within overlapping

regional and global contexts. The rationale is to uncover motivations, mechanisms,

critical turning points, and India’s strategic shifts in relation to institutional engagement

since forum shopping entails a complex decision-making process that involves multi-

layered international and domestic competing factors. Indian forum selection behaviour

and explanatory frameworks can be best captured through process tracing.

Within this scope, this paper advances the existing literature by linking forum shopping

to institutional balancing and overlapping regionalism in different mechanisms based on

mandate, membership, enforcement, and decision rules. The study does this by applying

process tracing to India’s institutional alignment since 1991. We analyse, accordingly,

India’s participation within overlapping regional frameworks such as SAARC vs BIMSTEC,

and supra-regional-global ones, particularly BRICS, RIC, SCO, RCEP, UN, and WTO from

1991 to present. We present some instances, like India’s pivot from SAARC to BIMSTEC

and its subsequent withdrawal from RCEP and study the underlying motivations in terms

of forum shopping, considering membership composition, mandate, decision rules, and

enforcement. India’s approach, we argue, exemplifies an interest-maximising approach

to spatial institutional diversity, and it shifts between fora to pursue preferable results

achieved through engagement, albeit limited multilateralism.

Theoretical Framework: Overlapping Organisations, Institutional

Balancing and Forum Shopping

The post-World War II period saw the emergence of a growing number of regional

organisations, which spearheaded academic research on the drivers of regionalism and

institutional integration, particularly in Europe (Haas, 1958; Deutsch et al., 1957).

Studies of regionalism subsequently expanded theoretically and conceptually,

emphasising globalised and multidimensional processes that extend beyond geographical

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

306

boundaries (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003; Katzenstein, 2005). For

example, Acharya (2012) referred to regionalism as a “global heritage” with diverse

trajectories in different regions of the world, transcending Eurocentric models (Acharya,

2012, p. 3; Söderbaum, 2015). This pluralistic understanding of regionalism and the

rapid proliferation of regional organisations have also paved the way for overlapping

regionalism discussions (Panke & Stapel, 2018; Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023).

The expansion of global and regional organisations has not been strictly progressive or

singularly focused. This has led to overlapping memberships, mandates, functions, and

boundaries, which are described as overlapping regionalism (Panke & Stapel, 2018). This

is closely related to the complexity of governmental systems where multiple institutions

with similar objectives exist, resulting in redundant abundance and functional rivalry

(Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023). As stated by Panke and Stapel (2018, p. 239),

overlapping regional organisations occur when states join more than one organisation

under a similar mandate or enforcement that provides both opportunities and constraints

for states. This gives states the opportunity to use multifaceted strategies to strengthen

and protect their interests, primarily when centralised global institutions such as the UN

or WTO are in political deadlocks or unresponsive. These overlapping dyads also echo

this reasoning and explain that “institutional balancing”, often known as the creation or

sponsorship of new forums, is a response to the dominance of stubborn, outdated

multilateral frameworks. Institutional balancing, as He (2015) argued, relies on the use

of international institutions to counter a relationship of more than one power and

constrain their influence.

Reinsberg and Westerwinter (2023) further suggest that the design of frameworks and

institutions with overlapping functions is intentional and the product of powerful countries

aiming to prevent the diminishing of their influence in existing forums. These overlapping

organisational forms provide less powerful or emerging states with a greater range of

institutional options, which is particularly useful in Asia, where there are many competing

institutions vying for the same policy spaces. Hence, Panke and Stapel (2023, p. 10)

found that Asia stands out as a form of “comprehensive overlap” that is rarely nested

based on the percentage of overlapping dyads within the region. Hofmann (2018) states

that these overlapping associations permit states many tactical options, especially

hostage-taking, forum-shopping, and brokering, that have been designed to change the

result of some process. Consequently, forum shopping takes place when a state, facing

opposition in one organisation, seeks out another organisation to which it can present

the same issue, expecting a warmer welcome. By all means, forum shopping is a useful

approach for emerging powers who are attempting to escape structural dependency in

the global hierarchy (Stephen, 2017).

Forum shopping is particularly relevant for emerging powers that try to sidestep

structural dependency in the global order so as to reproduce their preferences across

multiple institutional venues, remould existing coalitions, or abandon unproductive fora.

While forum shopping concentrates on the micro-level tactical behaviour of states,

broader strategic frameworks such as institutional balancing and multi-alignment capture

the rationale behind such decisions. India, for example, can shift between global and

regional forums to reproduce or restructure existing alliances, reproduce their

preferences across institutional venues, or exit unproductive forums. Such behaviour is

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

307

rational and adaptive (Hofmann, 2018), especially in areas with high institutional density.

Studies of India’s foreign policy confirm this pattern. O’Donnell and Papa (2021) argue

that India deliberately overlaps its policy agenda across the RIC, BRICS, and SCO

alignments, selectively reinforcing one while the others stagnate in advancing its security

objectives. In this case, India’s forum shopping is a calculated strategy that allows

policymakers to change the venue of an issue to a different space when progress is

terminating in a given forum (Murphy & Kellow, 2013; Garg, 2024; O’Donnell & Papa,

2021).

Jamali & Liu (2024) build on this framework in the context of India, claiming India

employs institutional balancing to achieve its diplomatic objectives concerning China

while sidestepping rising power conundrums like overcommitting to the U.S. or getting

mired in bloc politics. It demonstrates how India attempts to sway contested regional

forums in a bid to retain strategic autonomy, a concept rooted in Indian foreign policy

since Nehru’s nonalignment (Kaura, 2021). Rather than global institutions, it is India’s

turn to approach them that comes off as instrumental. This strategic flexibility stems also

from Jaishankar’s words, “India is determined to ‘practice strategic autonomy’” refraining

from aligning exclusively with any single power and instead cultivating a plethora of

partnerships (Garg, 2024; Upadhyay, 2022). Hence, rational multi-alignment described

India’s behaviour, as the state participates in and interacts with varying rival powers

contingent on non-loyalty, issue-driven interests, instead of on ideological fidelity.

O’Donnell and Papa (2021) reinforce this perspective in their examination of India’s

participation in RIC, BRICS, and SCO, wherein India is shown to selectively mimic its

counterterrorism policies as forum shopping for burgeoning BRICS and after the SCO.

International relations and political economy scholars have studied overlapping

organisations and institutional balancing, focusing on global institutions and regional

organisations (Busch, 2007; Hofmann, 2018; Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023). There is

a gap, however, in research exploring how emerging powers such as India navigate

overlapping regional and global institutions through forum shopping. Even though there

are some analyses of India’s institutional balancing (Jamali & Liu, 2024) and its multi-

alignment diplomacy in BRICS, RIC, and SCO (O’Donnell & Papa, 2021), most of these

studies are disconnected and lack an interwoven storyline of India’s strategic oscillations

across numerous institutions. This study aims to address that gap by conducting a meso-

level comparison of India’s forum shopping behaviour in South and Southeast Asia,

examining the mechanisms of cross-participation among overlapping institutions at both

the regional and international level.

Mapping India’s Overlapping Membership and Engagement

The study mapped India’s institutional relations with regional and international bodies

from 1991 to 2024. The timeline is divided into three phases to capture the most relevant

changes in the country’s political leadership, foreign policy doctrines, and the global

environment. The first phase (1991-2004) is marked by India’s economic liberalisation

and late engagement into global structures with multilateral enthusiasm, such as the

WTO and early regionalism, epitomised by SAARC.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

308

Table 1. The map of India’s Engagement with Overlapping Regional International Organisations

(RIOs)

RIO

Name

Year

Mandate

Scope

SAARC

South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation

1985

Regional

South Asia- 8 States

(including Pakistan)

BIMSTEC

Bay of Bengal Initiative for

Multi-Sectoral Technical and

Economic Cooperation

1997

Regional

Bay of Bengal- 7

states

RCEP

Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership

2012/

2019

Economic

Asia Pacific-16

Countries

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation

2005

Security

Eurasia- 10

members

Quad

Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue

2007

Security/Strat

egic

Asia-Pacific-4 states

BRICS

Brazil, Russia, India, China,

and South Africa

2009

Economic

Mini-lateral

RIC

Russia-India-China Strategic

Trilateral

2001

Strategic

Mini-lateral

ASEAN Dialogue

Association of Southeast

Asian Nations-India Dialogue

1992

Regional

ASEAN-India

IORA

Indian Ocean Rim

Association

1997

Maritime

Indian Ocean/ 23

members

ASEAN-India FTA

Association of Southeast

Asian Nations-India Free

Trade Agreement

2010

RTA

ASEAN/India

India-Japan CEPA

India-Japan Comprehensive

Economic Partnership

Agreement

2011

RTA

Bilateral

India-Korea CEPA

India-Korea Comprehensive

Economic Partnership

Agreement

2010

RTA

Bilateral

India-UAE CEPA

India-UAE Comprehensive

Economic Partnership

Agreement

2022

RTA

Bilateral

India-Australia

ECTA

India-Australia Economic

Cooperation and Trade

Agreement

2022

RTA

Bilateral

Sources: The table has been created by authors considering the Regional Organisations Project

(CROP) and the OVREG database from Panke and Stapel (2023).

The second phase (2005-2014) portrays, to some extent, an era of ‘dismantlement’ of

institutional limits with India’s deeper participation in the RCEP, BRICS, and ASEAN-

centred trade frameworks, along with the growing discontent with SAARC. The post-2014

as the third phase formally begins with Prime Minister Modi where strategic divergence

and forum shopping prevail, withdrawing from RCEP, shifting from SAARC to BIMSTEC,

increased participation in the Quad, and selective revival of RIC indicating a move away

from normative multilateralism towards interest-based institutional maneuvering (Gupta

et al., 2019; Hall, 2021; Kumar, 2024; O’Donnell & Papa, 2021). In the realm of India’s

foreign policy, the forum shopping approach makes it possible to link the outcome of key

events like the shift from SAARC to BIMSTEC, the withdrawal from RCEP, or attending

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

309

the SCO and Quad simultaneously, with strategic choices, institutional frameworks, and

global geopolitical pressure. In this vein, the following table presents Indian’s institutional

presence across overlapping regional, bilateral, and global platforms. It shows that not

only multialignment, but also mini-lateral and issue-based platforms, gain importance in

India’s engagement strategy, which opens a room to forum shopping strategies through

overlapping organisations.

Forum-shopping in Regional Deadlocks: SAARC vs. BIMSTEC

In South Asia, the SAARC (1985) historically included all eight countries of the region:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

SAARC’s mandate covers broad socio-economic cooperation that includes the South Asian

Free Trade Area (SAFTA) but operates on strict consensus rules. Over time, India grew

frustrated by the perennial India-Pakistan frictions that repeatedly blocked SAARC

progress. For instance, the disputes over Kashmir and terrorism, as well as other bilateral

grievances, have repeatedly derailed SAARC meetings or common initiatives (Gurjar,

2017; Bishwakarma & Hu, 2022; O’Donnell & Papa, 2021).

In the 2010s, Pakistan notoriously withdrew from SAARC infrastructure projects and

staged a military parade in 2016 on the eve of a summit, which led to a subsequent

boycott of the 2016 SAARC Summit in Pakistan by India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and

Bhutan (Anwar, 2022, p. 17). India’s government and media branded Pakistan as the

biggest “deadlock” to South Asian cooperation (Waggy & Hassan, 2023; Gurjar, 2017).

Consequently, SAARC activity virtually came to a standstill, and there were no summits

from 2014 to 2022. In response to this deadlock, India turned to alternate regional

bodies, implementing “forum shopping” strategies. These regional economic bodies are

highlighted in the Table above alongside India’s engagement, reflecting India’s strategic

participation.

Both SAARC and BIMSTEC share the characteristics of weak enforcement and lack of

treaty obligations, but the modified membership of BIMSTEC stands out as an important

structural feature. In practice, India uses BIMSTEC for connectivity, power projects, and

security dialogues while SAARC remains moribund (Anwar, 2022). BIMSTEC (1997)

captures parts of the SAARC geography but leaves out Pakistan. Its members include

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and later Myanmar and Thailand (ASEAN

members) (Gurjar, 2017). India has found a more flexible framework to pursue its

objectives of South Asian and Southeast Asian integration without Pakistan. Modi’s India

has convened BIMSTEC heads of government summits, the first one in Goa in 2016,

chaired meetings of the security chiefs, and sparked new projects under BIMSTEC like

connecting the power grid of Bangladesh and India and counterterrorism dialogues

regionally (O’Donnell & Papa, 2021).

Indian policy pronouncements make clear the reasoning. India pointed out Pakistan as

opposed to the possible regional integrations under SAARC that also show a strategic

shift toward BIMSTEC, which offers India a chance to engage with its South and

Southeast Asian neighbours without being weighed down by Pakistan (Gupta et al., 2019;

Gurjar, 2017). To summarise, India swapped forums: it pursued its South Asian agenda

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

310

through BIMSTEC instead of SAARC. Pakistan’s veto power in SAARC turned the region

into a forum of unwanted competition in the eyes of other members, classic forum

shopping, while BIMSTEC’s composition without Pakistan and comparatively looser

enforcement welcomed progress on trade, connectivity, and security, which are

fundamental to India (Murphy & Kellow, 2013).

Economic Forum Shopping: WTO, RCEP and Trade Agreements

India additionally utilises the forums of the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. For

example, IORA promotes India-ASEAN connections for trade and maritime security free

from South Asian political encumbrances. India also engages bilaterally, like with “Act

East” ties with ASEAN, when regional collectives fall short. These patterns also

demonstrate forum shopping: India seeks integration in the Bay of Bengal, East Asia

Summit or Indian Ocean initiatives, unencumbered by South Asian logjam politics.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was one of the more

prominent Asia-Pacific FTAs with 16 member nations: ASEAN-China, Japan, Korea,

Australia, New Zealand, and India. India entered the negotiations in 2012 but withdrew

in 2019 during the summit. This illustrates India’s options among economic forums.

India’s domestic interests clashed with RCEP’s strict free-trade commitments and large

membership, including China. Modi stated that the present form of the RCEP agreement

does not fully reflect the basic spirit and the agreed guiding principles of RCEP and further

stated that it did not satisfactorily address India’s outstanding issues and concerns

(Gupta et al., 2019; Gupta & Ganguly, 2020). Indian experts argue that India would have

been compelled to drastically reduce tariffs on a wide range of goods, including mobile

phones and agricultural products, to 2014 levels, endangering the ‘Make in India’

initiative (Kadekodi, 2018). More importantly, the massive trade deficits India faced with

the RCEP countries, especially China, coupled with the surge of low-cost goods,

influenced the decision (Rawat et al., 2020). This also highlights India’s attempts at

forum shopping with regional institutions.

Instead of locking itself into a rigid Asia-Pacific FTA that India deemed unfavourable, they

sought to trade through different avenues. These include existing bilateral agreements,

the ASEAN plus agreements, and the WTO approach. In withdrawing, India anticipated

self-relegating to RCEP‐15 and missing out on the chance to integrate its economy, but

Indian leaders determined that adopting “strategic withdrawal” to protect domestic

producers and strategic sectors was more advantageous (Gaur, 2022; Siew, 2019).

Domestically, India measured access to the market vis-à-vis protection of the market

and opted for the latter, ultimately deciding to participate in the RCEP forum. India’s

post-2014 trade policy was heavily reliant on protectionist measures fueled by the

perception that previous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) permitted an unrestrained flow

of Chinese imports without adequate protective measures (Gupta & Ganguly, 2020).

Consequently, shifting focus to India’s economic relations, there is evidence of forum

shopping wherein India rejects one set of venues (RCEP) in favour of others (bilateral

FTAs, WTO) that more closely align with its decision criteria and mandate preferences,

as shown in the Table above. India’s multilateral engagement with global issues has been

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 302-319

Overlapping Organisations and Emerging Powers: India’s Selective Engagement Through the

Lens of Forum Shopping

Fatma Sever, Mehmet Recai Uygur

311

active and steadfast where its interests intersect, as in the case of the WTO, where India

has been an outspoken advocate of the developing countries’ special and differential

treatment, food security, and flexibility concerning intellectual property rights. There are

times also when Indian negotiators have chosen to boycott WTO packages when Modi

threatened to derail the WTO 2013 Bali package due to its potential impact on India’s

public food distribution system (Erixon, 2014, p. 4).

India has allied with some other countries of the Global South in demanding deeper

reform as well. India stays primarily committed to the WTO as a forum, even with the

understanding that leaving would entirely sacrifice negotiating ground, and despite

protectionist rhetoric at home. In effect, India maximises the use of the WTO

enforcement as dispute settlement in cases where benefits are clear while exercising

caution on fully liberalising trade (Chakraborty, 2023). There are two distinguishing

characteristics of important economic trade forums. RCEP had a strict free-trade

mandate, whereas the WTO is broad-based with an enforceable dispute system. India

opted out of RCEP because its decision rules and content clashed with national interests,

but remained committed to the WTO (Chakraborty, 2023; Hopewell, 2022).

Forum Shopping in the Security Realm: RIC, BRICS, SCO, QUAD

India’s strategic forum shopping is also pronounced in the overlapping security domains.

Within the context of Eurasia, the trilateral RIC (Russia-India-China) grouping was

created in 2001 as a response to unilateralism and an early step toward what eventually

became BRICS. India was a co-founder of RIC, but for a long time, it considered it merely

a diplomatic talk shop. From the mid-2000s, both Modi and Putin appeared to agree that

with the addition of Brazil and South Africa, BRICS was a more useful multilateral

platform (Cecchi, 2025; Upadhyay, 2022). India also focused on bilateral relations, such

as with the U.S., because of tensions with China. After the 2020 Galwan border clash

with China, India controversially reactivated RIC meetings in 2018 and 2020, including

unprecedented meetings between defence ministers (Cecchi, 2025; O’Donnell & Papa,

2021).

This sequence is also explained by O’Donnell & Papa (2021) as classic forum-shopping.

It is shown that India deprioritised counterterrorism and security matters to stagnate

within BRICS and SCO, which has been an important incentive to revive RIC and impose

the same agenda there. To put it differently, India aims for overlapping convergences in

policy goals among RIC, BRICS and SCO, and when discontented with one place, shifts

focus to another. As noted in the article, India’s example illustrates that policymakers,

when facing challenges in their preferred policy space, often look for alternative locations

to implement policies.

As in the Table, the SCO with 8 members, including China, Russia, Pakistan, and now

India, is largely focused on counterterrorism and political-security cooperation. India

became a member of the SCO in 2017 in order to have a say in Central Asian security

issues and work on cross-border terrorism. However, the overlap of China and Pakistan

in the SCO means India faces quite difficult dynamics. While India has sustained a

selective engagement in the SCO, the border clashes with China have also pushed it to

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enhance its involvement in the Quad as a balancing mechanism (Ali, 2023). Hence, the

Quad’s informal shape as an Indo-Pacific forum (U.S., Japan, Australia, India) is a

minilateral counterbalance to China, although lacking formal rules to make decisions or

a secretariat, is far more flexible (Kumar, 2024; Thakur, 2024). Thus, India adopted the

revived Quad to strengthen its naval and technological partnership with the Western

democracies, counter China’s belligerence, and advance the vision of an “open and

inclusive” Indo-Pacific region.

India also continues to actively participate in broader global frameworks. In the United

Nations, India pursues its security-development strategies and aims to receive a

permanent seat on the Security Council, which China and Russia oppose. Doing so, they

actively engage with South Africa and Brazil, both of which are also pursuing permanent

seats on the Security Council, through the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the G4 coalition

(Stuenkel, 2019; Touthang, 2024). India’s engagement with the IBSA Dialogue Forum

demonstrates a further example of forum shopping, which enables these rising powers

to coordinate their positions on Security Council reform and global governance (Alden &

Le Pere, 2023). India’s engagement with IBSA further underscores its selective

engagement that supports the country’s ambition to gain legitimacy and recognition in

the global order.

Beyond the regional manoeuvres, India also hosts one of the world’s largest UN

peacekeeping operations to strengthen its legitimacy and claim as a global leader.

Moreover, India is a member of the G20, which it chaired in 2023, as well as the

Commonwealth, and uses these fora to advocate for infrastructure financing and climate-

and-health initiatives (Touthang, 2024). More importantly, India compartmentalises

issues by forum that can bring up counterterrorism at the UN because it needs to consider

Pakistan’s votes at the UNGA, or at ASEAN+ meetings, but then use BRICS or RIC for

different emphases on multilateral reform (Chandra, 2020). This too can be viewed as a

form of forum shopping, not only to hedge against regional powers, but also to pursue

legitimacy and project status in the changing global order.

Overlapping Institutions and India’s Forum Shopping Patterns

Based on these cases, India seems to have a systematic way of dealing with changing

institutional elements in relation to a region’s forum shopping behaviour. To begin with,

India tends to select forums that either include important partners and/or exclude critical

foes based on membership compositions. India is explicitly sidelining SAARC for BIMSTEC

to exclude Pakistan. On the other hand, India partially joined the SCO because of its

Central Asian and Russian members, who are important for their security purposes, even

if China and Pakistan are also members. India also turned its face to the Quad, which is

without China or Russia when it seeks China-free maritime dialogues (Waggy & Hassan,

2023). Thus, Membership formulations dramatically determine the forum preferred by

India.

Second of all, India has pushed its agenda in forums where the charter does best fit the

agenda. Emphasis on terrorism in the SCO and RIC is clearly defined within the charter

and has an explicit focus of sorts on the SCO (Kumar, 2024). Also, India focuses on

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economic development in BRICS and trade liberalisation in the WTO/FTAs. India may

change venues if the mandate of the forum is overly broad or too narrow. India did not

fulfil development goals with RCEP’s limited trade scope. However, India does prefer the

multi-sectoral BIMSTEC that allows security and trade discussions, which far better aligns

with India’s regional agenda (Gaur, 2022; O’Donnell & Papa, 2021; Roy, 2022).

Thirdly, India devises a meeting room with the structures. India often resorts to SAARC,

BIMSTEC, or forums that permit unilateral and bilateral coalitions when consensus groups

are stagnant. The BIMSTEC is also consensus-based, but it is easier for India to get

approval there since Pakistan is absent and the other members have aligned priorities.

The Quad and RIC have no formal voting regulations at all, which gives India leeway

(Anwar, 2022; Gurjar, 2017; Waggy & Hassan, 2023). India usually invokes binding

dispute resolution, but also blocks results if the group is deadlocked. India’s exit from

RCEP shows that even in consensus-based systems, a single member can effectively veto

membership by withdrawing.

Finally, the organisational enforcement mechanisms and resource capacity are other

things that impact forum shopping related to India. With India, stronger forums are

utilised when binding outcomes are needed and weaker ones when more flexibility is

needed. India opts for WTO litigation for winning disputes like on cotton subsidies

because once won, they can enforce trade rules (Chakraborty, 2023; Erixon, 2014;

Waggy & Hassan, 2023). On the contrary, SAARC and BIMSTEC declarations are mostly

unenforceable, which is why India moves things there that do not require strict

adherence. The SCO has some institutional heft, but little to no actual enforcement. Since

the Quad is completely informal in structure, India has no obligations to participate but

serves as a minilateral counterbalance to China (Thakur, 2024). This is why India’s forum

selection often coincides with whether it prefers formal commitments, such as the WTO,

or informal dialogue like the Quad, RIC (Kumar, 2024).

To summarise, these identified patterns indicate that forum shopping sheds light on

India’s stance in the geopolitical theatre. It evaluates the character of each institution

and shifts locations to exploit the most favourable arrangement. As Murphy & Kellow

(2013) point out, overlapping arenas provide multiple redundant chances to increase

flexibility or marginalise opposition, which is exactly what India does. After the BRICS

consensus failed (e.g., not reaching minimum agreements on basic measures and

designating certain figures as terrorists) or stalled due to SCO-gatekeeping, India sought

alternative gatherings (e.g., RIC ministerial sideline meetings (Cecchi, 2025; Cooper,

2021). When the terms of RCEP posed a threat to domestic producers, India withdrew

and strategically opted for bilateral agreements along with pathways through the WTO.

After progress stagnated within SAARC, India formed BIMSTEC and “ignored SAARC”

even during the 2016 BRICS outreach summit (O’Donnell & Papa, 2021; Burakowski,

2025). Such actions are not ideologically motivated but calculated moves to optimise

interests.

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Discussion and Conclusion

The case of India after the Cold War illustrates how India pragmatically and selectively

blends together different institutions with a pragmatic touch. It mirrors India’s aspiration

of being a shaper of global rules rather than a mere follower, alongside its carefully

crafted geopolitical manoeuvres within overlapping multilateral frameworks. This study

illustrates with a process-traced timeline, along with the comparative institutional

analysis, that India’s global engagement is not linear or uniform. Instead, it reflects a

forum shopping reasoning where India participates in or opts out of global or regional

institutions based on issue alignment, strategic autonomy, and power asymmetries.

Forum shopping as a concept used theories on how states decide on certain institutional

venues to achieve maximum gains in policies (Busch, 2007; Hofmann, 2018). It is

observable in India’s conduct, especially with respect to its exit from RCEP and shift

towards bilateral and mini-lateral agreements like the India-CEPA and the Quad (Hall,

2021; Kapoor, 2023). Instead of rejecting global governance systems entirely, India has

filled many interdependent institutions, which often function as systems of cross-

framework governance, and adeptly navigates within and between them. From time to

time, India’s leaders tend to invoke some form of forum shopping logic that looks for or

designs ways to advance proposals in Indian-dominated ecosystems. India’s external

affairs officials, for instance, have stated that they encourage the use of the multilateral

system to improve the governance of inter-institutional relations so that all operate in

support of the system. This is celebrated in India as a form of ‘internationalism’ which

enables India greater autonomy to (Chatterjee & Maitra, 2024; Roy, 2022). Unlike the

classical approach to forum shopping that focuses on the existence of overlapping venues

in a trade framework, India’s model integrates strategy, economics, and geopolitics,

blurring the domains of polity and security, thus also broadening the rationale of forum

shopping.

Simultaneously, the literature on overlapping regionalism is also helpful for

understanding the context of India’s forum shopping around multiple memberships

(Panke & Stapel, 2018; Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023). While SAARC has stagnated

due to structural veto problems stemming from the Indo-Pakistani conflict, India has

vigorously supported BIMSTEC in order to circumvent such deadlocks (Haokip, 2014;

Pant & Passi, 2017). This form of selective regional prioritisation illustrates India’s

geopolitical pragmatism and a tendency shared with other rising powers, preferring low-

constraint, high-flexibility environments. Geopolitically, this is how India has managed to

obtain collaboration on important matters while hedging against tensions. Hence, India

has shifted the regional framework by preferring BIMSTEC to SAARC and transformed

India’s position regarding global frameworks by placing itself outside of RCEP but active

in WTO, BRICS, and UN.

The interplay between the RIC, the SCO, and the Quad also highlights the layered nature

of India’s forum shopping strategy. Complementing this, the IBSA Dialogue Forum

highlights another coalition of India, Brazil, and South Africa seeking legitimacy and

reform in global governance, particularly the expansion of the UN Security Council. The

findings remind us that India is not rejecting international frameworks, but it takes

advantage of strategic overlap to advance its objectives. In this way, India utilises and

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also contributes to the regime complexity of contemporary global governance. As

scholars warn, many overlapping organisations increase the complexity of governance,

which Indian policymakers have used to their advantage to maximise their interest and

power (Hofmann, 2018; Panke & Stapel, 2018; Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2023).

To sum up, India has executed a hybrid approach, scratching out merging forum

shopping, institutional balancing, and overlapping regionalism into one core design. The

study advances the debate of this literature by illustrating that emerging powers,

particularly India, practice strategic forum shopping not only to preserve autonomy,

norms, and mitigate risks, but also to hedge against uncontrolled results. Further

research could be directed at exploring the impact of India’s forum shopping on

organisational change, norm diffusion, and the overarching structure of global

governance.

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