with the world, including its foundational role in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations
(ASEAN). More recently, Indonesia's strategic calculation embraced membership in the
BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, along with newly invited
members) amid its pursuit of accession to the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), as well as the US’s negative sentiment towards members of
the BRICS (Martin, 2025; Takahashi, 2024). Previously, Abbondanza (2022) and Juned
& Setiono (2024) argue that Indonesia incorporates pragmatism in its contemporary
application of Bebas Aktif, nuanced in an inclusive approach that allows it to actively
engage with diverse economic cooperation with diverse actors, which is well reflected in
its approach to the US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific as well as the recently agreed
EUI-CEPA agreement with the EU.
With further development by 2025, Indonesia was officially accepted as a member of
BRICS on 6th January 2025 (Shofa, 2025). This milestone marks a new chapter in the
nation's approach to navigating the complexities of the Indo-Pacific region, particularly
in the context of its long-standing Bebas Aktif doctrine to ‘dance with the giants’ in the
Indo-Pacific region. His new affiliation does not signify a shift away from Indonesia's non-
aligned principles but rather an evolution of its strategy to actively engage with influential
global actors to promote its interests and contribute to regional stability in the dynamic
Indo-Pacific landscape. In this regard, Indonesia translates the doctrine of ‘Bebas Aktif’
into active engagement with two distinct global economic governance structures rather
than being passive by not joining any economic regimes as a form of its strategic
evolution of the non-alignment doctrine (Juned & Sutiono, 2024).
Indonesia is also pursuing permanent membership in the OECD, which is perceived as a
Euro-American economic regime that promotes its economic standards (Maulana & Azis,
2025; Strangio, 2024). We perceive that it will generate further challenges for Indonesia
in the coming years to strategically leverage its BRICS membership in its proposal to join
the OECD and strengthen its position and inclusive approach in the region. In this regard,
while BRICS membership opens opportunities for trade expansion and alternative
funding, it will also attract opposition from the US and its allies towards Indonesia. In a
recent case, Indonesia’s BRICS membership has generated extra tariffs from the Trump
administration-led US protectionist policy (Martin, 2025). On the other hand, the
finalisation of the long-postponed EUI-CEPA shortly after Indonesia joined BRICS displays
the opposing effect of how BRICS membership became its leverage to overcome the
deadlock in the EUI-CEPA negotiation (Juned & Sutiono, 2024; Kementerian Luar Negeri
Republik Indonesia, 2025). These two examples represent the challenges Indonesia faces
in managing uncertainty amid the different interests and calculations of the related
actors.
In this regard, we perceive that the discussion on how Indonesia utilises the BRICS
membership as leverage for the OECD membership proposal, as well as navigating the
Indo-Pacific’s dynamics, cannot be separated from the Association of Southeast Asia
Nations (ASEAN)’s position in the region. In this regard, Indonesia, as a founder and
dominant power in ASEAN, has powerful influences on regional organisations due to its
population, GDP, and pivotal roles in shaping the official regional perspective of the Indo-
Pacific region with the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) (Anwar, 2020). Recently,
Indonesia became the first ASEAN country to be accepted into BRICS and was also