OBSERVARE
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between
Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025
230
TÜRKİYE’S ROLE IN SHAPING REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC) AND
THE ASTANA PROCESS
YUSUF DİNÇEL
yusuf.dincel@pa.edu.tr
Assistant Professor at Turkish National Police Academy, Faculty of Homeland Security,
Department of International Relations (Turkey). ORCID: 0000-0002-2615-6025.
Abstract
Turkish foreign policy has repositioned itself at various times in response to global and regional
developments, particularly in the Middle East. This study argues that Türkiye’s diplomatic
behaviour reflects a dual orientation: while it employs normative, multilateral, and soft power
instruments within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), it adopts a more security-
driven and pragmatic approach in the Astana Process. The central hypothesis is that these
two cases, taken together, reveal Türkiye’s evolution toward a multidimensional and multi-
actor strategy that balances value-based diplomacy with hard power imperatives.
Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative and comparative approach, relying on
secondary sources, official documents, and statements by government officials to analyse
Türkiye’s roles, strategies, and limitations across both platforms. By linking the OIC and the
Astana Process, this article not only highlights the contrast between institutional
multilateralism and crisis diplomacy but also contributes to the Turkish foreign policy literature
by demonstrating how Türkiye simultaneously pursues normative legitimacy and security
imperatives in its regional engagements.
Keywords
Türkiye, Astana Process, Turkish Foreign Policy, OIC, Multidimensional Strategy.
Resumo
A política externa turca reposicionou-se em vários momentos em resposta aos
desenvolvimentos globais e regionais, particularmente no Médio Oriente. Este estudo
argumenta que o comportamento diplomático da Turquia reflete uma orientação dupla:
enquanto emprega instrumentos normativos, multilaterais e de soft power dentro da
Organização da Cooperação Islâmica (OCI), adota uma abordagem mais pragmática e
orientada para a segurança no Processo de Astana. A hipótese central é que estes dois casos,
considerados em conjunto, revelam a evolução da Turquia para uma estratégia
multidimensional e multilateral que equilibra a diplomacia baseada em valores com os
imperativos do hard power. Metodologicamente, o estudo adota uma abordagem qualitativa
e comparativa, baseando-se em fontes secundárias, documentos oficiais e declarações de
funcionários governamentais para analisar os papéis, estratégias e limitações da Turquia em
ambas as plataformas. Ao ligar a OIC e o Processo de Astana, este artigo não só destaca o
contraste entre o multilateralismo institucional e a diplomacia de crise, como também
contribui para a literatura sobre a política externa turca, demonstrando como a Turquia
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
231
persegue simultaneamente a legitimidade normativa e os imperativos de segurança nos seus
compromissos regionais.
Palavras-chave
Turquia, Processo de Astana, Política Externa Turca, OIC, Estratégia Multidimensional.
How to cite this article
Dinçel, Yusuf (2025). Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional
Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 230-247. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0525.12
Article submitted on 26th May 2025 and accepted for publication on 22nd September
2025.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
232
TÜRKİYE’S ROLE IN SHAPING REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC
COOPERATION (OIC) AND THE ASTANA PROCESS
YUSUF DİNÇEL
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, Türkiye’s foreign policy approach has begun to shift,
moving away from its traditional Western-oriented trajectory toward a more active,
multidimensional, and strategically grounded policy in the Middle East. Particularly in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring, the deepening political instability across the region has
compelled Türkiye to develop new policy instruments in the areas of security, economy,
and diplomacy. In this context, Türkiye has sought to increase its regional influence
through various institutional and political platforms, assuming a significant role in two
major diplomatic processes: the OIC and the Astana Process. Existing studies have
separately examined Türkiye’s Middle East policy (Khan, 2015; Cornell, 2012), its role in
multilateral Islamic institutions such as the OIC (İhsanoğlu, 1997; Koç, 2019;
Kulaklıkaya, 2025), and its engagement in the Astana Process as part of Syrian crisis
diplomacy (Abboud, 2021; Michiels & Kizilkaya, 2022). However, these analyses often
treat the two mechanisms in isolation. Building on this literature, this article chooses the
OIC and the Astana Process for in-depth examination not only because Türkiye has played
visible and active roles in both, but also because they embody two distinct logics of
diplomacy: while the OIC reflects institutionalised, multilateral, and norm-based
cooperation, the Astana Process represents crisis diplomacy shaped by military realities
on the ground. By bringing these two strands of scholarship together, the study
demonstrates how Türkiye balances soft power and normative legitimacy in a multilateral
framework with hard power and security imperatives in a conflict-driven process.
While the OIC is characterised by a structure grounded in religious, cultural, and
multilateral diplomacy, the Astana Process represents a form of crisis diplomacy shaped
by military and political realities on the ground. These two distinct frameworks embody
different dimensions of Türkiye’s multidirectional foreign policy vision. Accordingly, the
primary rationale for examining the OIC and the Astana Process together in this study is
to reveal how Türkiye simultaneously manages value-based approaches and security-
driven interests, and what kind of foreign policy model it adopts in this context. In line
with this, the central research question of this study is formulated as follows: “How has
Türkiye’s foreign policy approach differed between two distinct diplomatic platforms -the
OIC and the Astana Process- and what objectives has this comparative engagement
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
233
revealed about the evolution of its regional strategy?” The hypothesis developed based
on this question is that, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Türkiye’s foreign
policy demonstrates a dual orientation: while it emphasises normative, multilateral, and
soft power tools within the OIC, it adopts a more security-driven and pragmatic approach
in the Astana Process. Taken together, these cases reveal an evolution toward a
multidimensional, multi-actor strategy that balances value-based diplomacy with hard
power imperatives.
The study analyses Türkiye’s diplomatic role, interests, instruments, and limitations in
the aforementioned two processes from a qualitative perspective. Methodologically, it
employs a comparative case study design, examining the OIC and the Astana Process as
two distinct but complementary cases of Turkish foreign policy practice. The analysis is
based on secondary sources, official documents, statements by government officials,
academic literature, and international reports. Theoretically, the study draws on a
combination of constructivist and realist perspectives: while constructivism helps explain
Türkiye’s use of normative and identity-based elements within the OIC, realism sheds
light on the security-driven and interest-based calculations that shape its role in the
Astana Process. By integrating these perspectives, the article develops a balanced
framework that demonstrates how value-based and security-oriented logics coexist in
Türkiye’s foreign policy. This analysis aims to uncover the diplomatic, military, and
humanitarian strategies that Türkiye has adopted both in institutional frameworks (such
as multilateral organisations like the OIC) and in field-oriented crisis initiatives (such as
the Astana Process).
Türkiye’s Foreign Policy Approach in the Middle East
From a historical perspective, it is evident that Türkiye’s foreign policy has long placed
significant emphasis on its relations with the West. However, developments since the
beginning of the 21st century indicate that Turkish foreign policy has increasingly sought
to establish closer ties with Middle Eastern countries. The ongoing transformation within
the international system has led Türkiye to concentrate more intensively on regional
issues. In the past, Türkiye’s policy toward the Middle East was shaped predominantly
by security concerns and based on a principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs
of regional states. In recent years, however, Turkish foreign policy has adopted a more
proactive stance on Middle Eastern affairs (Khan, 2015: 31). Developments in the Middle
East have had a significant impact on Türkiye’s policies, extending from security to
economic spheres. The traditional non-interventionist approach that characterised
Türkiye’s foreign policy toward the Middle East became unsustainable in the early 2000s
due to changing regional dynamics. Within this framework, Türkiye began to shift its
focus toward regional issues and strengthen its relations with neighbouring countries as
a means of protecting its national interests and addressing both internal and external
challenges. The reflection of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East has thus been
shaped by objectives such as maintaining regional stability and enhancing economic
cooperation (Arı and Pirinççi, 2010: 3).
Following the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Türkiye’s
role in the Arab world underwent a significant transformation. In this context, Türkiye
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
234
launched numerous political initiatives with neighbouring Arab states and signed a series
of agreements aimed at enhancing mutual cultural engagement. During this period,
Türkiye began to pursue a more active policy within the OIC and gained permanent
observer status in the Arab League, allowing it to participate in various activities under
its framework (Ennis and Momani, 2013: 1128). As of January 2009, it became evident
that the AKP’s foreign policy orientation was no longer solely focused on strengthening
ties with Western countries or pursuing European Union (EU) membership. Instead,
increasing emphasis was placed on Türkiye’s policies toward the Middle East (Özdemir,
2010: 274). After the AKP’s success in the 2011 general election, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan said in his victory speech that cities such as Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut,
Amman, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, and Nicosia were all “friendly and brotherly” towards
Türkiye. He went on to emphasize that Türkiye would pursue an active foreign policy in
regions including, but not limited to, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus
(Cornell, 2012: 13). In this framework, it was clearly stated that Türkiye sought to
assume a more active role in foreign affairs and to strengthen cooperation with both its
immediate and more distant neighbors.
The United States (U.S.) activities in the Middle East in 2004 under the rhetoric of
freedom caused concern among the region’s populations. The U.S. interventions in Iraq
and Afghanistan revealed that the discourse of freedom did not align with the realities on
the ground. In this context, regimes in the Middle East adopted increasingly repressive
and authoritarian governance models in response to unfolding events. At the beginning
of 2011, uprisings that started in Tunisia and Egypt, driven by demands for
democratisation and reform, spread to other Arab countries and triggered developments
that would have long-term consequences. During this period, the U.S. asserted that Arab
states, in order to successfully implement reform and transformation processes, should
follow the practices of a “model” country. Tunisia’s opposition leader Rached Ghannouchi
emphasised that Türkiye could serve as a model state in terms of political transformation
and reform in the Arab world (Kirişçi, 2011: 33-34).
These uprisings in the Middle East came to be known as the “Arab Spring” and were
particularly notable for being internally driven movements. The widespread use of social
media during the uprisings enabled Arab youth and the disadvantaged middle classes to
adopt a political stance and take collective action. Factors such as the global economic
crisis, rising food prices, and unjust governance were key contributors to the emergence
of the Arab Spring. The fact that the uprisings began in Tunisia and were soon followed
by the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya generated a wave of
optimism across other Arab nations. In an environment characterised by profound
uncertainty surrounding the future direction of political developments in the region, the
question of Türkiye’s new foreign policy vision became critical, particularly given its
recent adoption of a “zero problems with neighbours” (Coşkun, 2015: 187) approach.
Notably, Turkish-Syrian relations, which had remained strained throughout the 1990s,
improved significantly in the early 2000s during the tenure of the AKP government. The
increasing trade volume between the two countries and the facilitation of visa procedures
significantly contributed to the development of positive bilateral relations. However, the
uprisings in Syria during the Arab Spring posed serious challenges to Turkish foreign
policy. In the initial phase, Türkiye emphasised that the Assad regime should undertake
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
235
reforms. During this period, Türkiye maintained open channels of communication with
Syria. Nevertheless, the Assad regime escalated its repressive and authoritarian practices
in an effort to suppress domestic opposition groups. Following this development, relations
between Türkiye and Syria deteriorated significantly (Öniş, 2012: 47-55; Dalacoura,
2012: 77). Before the Arab Spring, it was widely recognised that Türkiye had been trying
to develop closer ties with Arab countries. As a result of its active foreign policy in political
and economic spheres, Türkiye’s popularity in the region has increased considerably.
However, during the Arab Spring process, Türkiye faced significant difficulties in
maintaining its previously strong relations with neighbouring states.
Beginning in the 2000s, Türkiye developed a foreign policy approach grounded in soft
power, placing greater emphasis on diplomatic negotiations rather than military
instruments. Before the Arab Spring, Türkiye had good relations with countries like Syria,
Egypt and Libya. During this period, Türkiye aimed to strengthen its ties with Arab states
by leveraging mutual economic interdependence. Within this framework, Türkiye signed
free trade agreements with several Levant countries, including Syria. As can be observed,
the majority of these relations were based on bilateral trade, and Türkiye’s political
stance following the uprisings had the potential to endanger its economic interests in the
region. However, adopting a policy that ignored popular uprisings and supported existing
regimes would have significantly undermined Türkiye’s aspiration to play a regional
leadership role. Faced with such a dilemma, Türkiye ultimately chose to stand by the
protesting Arab populations. In doing so, the “Turkish model” emerged as an alternative
to the prevailing political authoritarianism and rent-based economic structures dominant
in the Middle East (Öniş, 2014: 207-208; Ennis and Momani, 2013: 1129-1130). Between
2002 and 2011, the AKP’s Middle East policy was shaped around Ahmet Davutoğlu’s
principle of “zero problems with neighbours,” with a strong emphasis on fostering
economic interdependence. During this period, Türkiye maintained close relations with
countries in the region. However, the country remained cautious regarding the idea of
presenting itself as a model for other states in the region. In this context, Davutoğlu
made a clear statement in 2004, declaring that Türkiye did not aspire to serve as a model
for anyone. Despite this, the term “Turkish model” continues to be employed in the
literature when analysing Türkiye’s Middle East policy (D’Alema, 2024: 815).
In the Turkish model, economic gains were prioritized over ideological motives (Göksel,
2018: 44). During the period of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Türkiye’s vibrant
economy was perceived by Arab societies as a model worthy of emulation (Bengio, 2012:
59). However, considering the structural rigidity of the state-centric economies prevalent
in Arab countries, it was argued that replicating Türkiye’s developmental trajectory would
be difficult for the Arab world (Dede, 2011: 30). Before the Arab Spring, Türkiye had
assumed the role of mediator in resolving regional conflicts such as those between Israel
and Syria, Israel and Hamas, Syria and Iraq, and even between the U.S. and Iran.
However, following the escalation of civil wars in Syria and Libya, Türkiye came to the
realisation that it was insufficient in terms of halting regional conflicts (Ehteshami and
Elik, 2011: 646-655). In the pre-Arab Spring period, Türkiye had established close ties
with Arab countries by prioritising economic cooperation and engaging in active mediation
efforts.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
236
However, following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the new
conjuncture that emerged brought about changes in Turkish foreign policy. While
struggling with this new reality, Türkiye adopted a security-oriented foreign policy
approach. Particularly after 2016, Türkiye’s national security came under threat due to
regional crises. In Libya, Türkiye supported the Government of National Accord against
Haftar’s forces, while during the developments following the economic embargo imposed
on Qatar, Türkiye sided with the Qatari government against Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the
ousting of the legitimately elected Mohamed Morsi government in Egypt through Sisi’s
coup in 2013, followed by Sisi’s rise to power, combined with Türkiye’s support for the
Muslim Brotherhood, led to the deterioration of relations between Türkiye and Egypt. In
this context, in November 2013, Egypt expelled Türkiye’s ambassador in Cairo, and, in
line with the principle of reciprocity, Türkiye declared the Egyptian ambassador persona
non grata. Following these developments between Egypt and Türkiye, relations between
Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, which supported Sisi, also deteriorated. Although
relations between Türkiye and Israel had been strained due to the Mavi Marmara incident
in 2010, diplomatic ties were restored in 2016. However, following the U.S. decision to
relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and the Israeli army’s brutal response
to Palestinian protests, Türkiye withdrew its ambassador from Israel in 2018. Türkiye’s
process of diplomatic isolation in the Middle East accelerated as disputes with regional
countries over the Eastern Mediterranean deepened, leading to Türkiye’s gradual
exclusion from regional cooperation initiatives (Yönten and Denemark, 2023: 834-835).
This trajectory indicates that Türkiye’s foreign policy has, to a considerable extent, been
shaped by immediate security concerns and responses to regional crises, which at times
limited the scope for pursuing long-term cooperative frameworks. As a result, Ankara
faced certain constraints in its diplomatic manoeuvrability and in building multilateral
partnerships, which contributed to perceptions of Türkiye as relying more on short-term
reactive strategies rather than consistently proactive ones.
This transformation is not only a historical background but also reveals the causal
mechanisms that explain Türkiye’s differentiated strategies across the OIC and the
Astana Process. While the pre-Arab Spring era enabled Türkiye to rely on economic
interdependence and soft power tools, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the
subsequent rise of security threats -ranging from refugee flows to the activities of
PKK/PYD-affiliated groups- pushed Ankara toward a security-oriented and militarised
foreign policy. These dual pressures account for why Türkiye emphasises normative
legitimacy and multilateral cooperation in the OIC, whereas in the Astana Process it
privileges hard power and pragmatic crisis management. In this way, the historical
trajectory outlined above directly connects to the central hypothesis of this article:
Türkiye’s foreign policy demonstrates a dual orientation, combining value-based
diplomacy with security-driven imperatives.
The OIC and Türkiye’s Role
The OIC was established under the name of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
on 25 September 1969, in Rabat, Morocco, following the arson attack on the Al-Aqsa
Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969. The OIC currently has 57 member states, the
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
237
majority of which are Muslim-majority countries. However, several countries, such as
Uganda, Benin, Mozambique, Suriname, and Côte d’Ivoire, where Muslims do not form
the majority, are also members of the organisation. In addition, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Russian
Federation, and Thailand hold observer status within the OIC.
According to Joshua S. Goldstein, the use of geography by a state as a power element
indicates the concept of geopolitics. Amstutz, on the other hand, argues that the
geopolitical factor arises from the relationship between geography, national power, and
foreign policy. As a result, geographical location is a fundamental factor in determining
the international role of a state or alliance. In this context, an examination of the
geographic locations of the OIC member states reveals that they occupy significant
geostrategic positions. The OIC represents approximately 2 billion Muslims worldwide
and includes member states that host strategic waterways such as the Dardanelles, the
Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz.
Furthermore, many member states possess sovereignty over hydrocarbon energy
resources as well as other key energy sources (Hossain, 2012: 293-294; Hashmat, 2011:
110).
The aims and principles of the OIC are set out in detail in Article 1 of its founding charter,
which emphasizes the strengthening of bonds of brotherhood and cooperation among
states, the establishment of peaceful and just interstate relations in line with the principle
of good neighbourliness, the recognition of the Palestinian people’s right to self-
determination and support for the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as
its capital, as well as the creation of an Islamic common market with the goal of
enhancing the collective economic power of Muslim countries (Charter of the Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation, 1974: 4-5). The OIC has actively pursued diplomatic and political
efforts on various platforms to support the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state. In this context, it has encouraged cooperation among its member states
(Kulaklıkaya, 2025: 40).
The announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump on 6 December 2017, recognising
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, sparked strong reactions across the Muslim world.
During this period, Türkiye assumed a leading role by bringing the issue of Jerusalem to
the agenda of the OIC, the EU, and global public opinion. Thanks to these efforts, the
OIC member states collectively issued strong responses, and the decision was debated
at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. At Türkiye’s request, the OIC convened an
extraordinary summit in Istanbul on 13 December 2017, attended by leaders, foreign
ministers, or high-level representatives from all member countries. During this summit,
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Jerusalem is a red line for Muslims.
The final communiqué of the summit condemned the U.S. decision to move its embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and emphasised that Israel is an occupying power in the
region (Kireçci, 2018: 67-71).
The OIC is a prominent organisation within the international community and has pursued
an active policy as a mediator in resolving conflicts in the Muslim world since its
establishment. Although it has achieved success in ending certain conflicts, its efforts
have often failed to produce desired results. Since its foundation, the OIC has taken
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
238
decisions on almost every issue affecting the Muslim world with the aim of alleviating the
region’s troubles. However, the organisation has faced significant challenges in
implementing these decisions. For instance, the Kashmir conflict, which has remained a
major issue between India and Pakistan for decades, has been addressed by the OIC. A
special working committee was established within the organisation to deal with this issue.
Nevertheless, the desired outcome was not achieved. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war
(1980-1988), the OIC attempted to act as a mediator and bring the two countries to the
negotiating table, but these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The OIC has also
provided financial assistance to the persecuted Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and
directly engaged with the Myanmar government to address their grievances. Following
the 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S., Muslims living in Western countries faced a
growing threat of Islamophobia. In this period, Muslims were frequently blamed for acts
of terrorism. In response, the OIC began actively combating Islamophobia in Western
countries and advocating for the rights of its victims. Additionally, through official
channels, the organisation has launched initiatives to counter disinformation campaigns
targeting Islam and Muslims under the guise of Islamophobia (Ali and Sultan, 2023: 1-
2).
While labelling the OIC as an ineffective international organisation would be an unfair
criticism, it can be argued that it has fallen short in conducting Islamic policies in a
collective manner (Sheikh, 2017: 120). Often referred to as the “UN of Islamic countries,”
the OIC, as seen above, unfortunately shares the same fate as the UN when it comes to
preventing international conflicts. In the case of the UN, the Security Council’s veto power
is cited as a major obstacle to resolving global issues; in the OIC’s case, however, the
absence of such a mechanism also hampers effectiveness, albeit for different reasons.
Since all member states have equal voting rights and decisions are generally taken by
consensus, the organisation struggles to adopt binding and enforceable resolutions. This
consensus-based system often dilutes decisions to the lowest common denominator,
preventing the OIC from taking strong collective action in times of crisis. Moreover, many
OIC member states face not only border disputes but also ethnic and sectarian conflicts.
As a result, some OIC countries perceive each other as threats and seek alliances with
external powers outside the framework of the organisation (Birdişli and Atawula, 2019:
98-99).
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and Türkiye’s subsequent recognition of
it negatively affected relations between Türkiye and the Arab countries in the Middle East.
However, following the emergence of the Cyprus issue, Türkiye sought to revise its Middle
East policy to avoid becoming isolated in the UN. During the conflicts between Arabs and
Israel, Türkiye pursued a policy of balance. In 1969, after the arson attack on Al-Aqsa
Mosque, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that the Turkish people were
deeply saddened by the tragic incident and that Türkiye would support the other Muslim
states. Türkiye was represented at the first OIC summit meeting by Foreign Minister
İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil.
In the early years of the OIC, Türkiye adopted a cautious approach in its participation
due to its relations with Western allies (İhsanoğlu, 1997: 101-102). However, between
1976 and 1990, Türkiye’s trade volume with Islamic countries increased significantly.
After the end of the Cold War, Türkiye adopted a more active policy toward the Muslim
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
239
world, and in this context, its activities within the OIC expanded. Türkiye used the OIC
platform to bring attention to the rights of Turkish minorities living in Cyprus, Greece,
and Bulgaria, as well as the challenges faced by Muslims in Bosnia. Moreover, Türkiye
played a leading role in the accession of Muslim states in Central Asia to the OIC. Türkiye
plays an active role in the educational and cultural commissions within the OIC. In
addition, it became a member of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (ISESCO), affiliated with the OIC, in 2017. Following the election of
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu as Secretary-General in 2005, Türkiye made significant
contributions to the development of new principles for the OIC (Koç, 2019: 274-275;
Ataman, 2009: 49). Strengthening cooperation with Islamic countries is one of Türkiye’s
key foreign policy priorities. The OIC is regarded as an important international body for
promoting regional development. It also holds considerable potential for economic
growth (Fidan, 2023: 21). As can be seen, the global uncertainties that followed the end
of the Cold War led Türkiye to establish closer ties with the OIC (Aykan, 1993: 129).
From the 2000s onward, relations between Türkiye and the OIC have significantly
improved. Türkiye’s active mediating roles in the cases of Afghanistan, Libya, and the
Rohingya issue demonstrate its commitment to promoting peace in the Muslim world.
Türkiye has provided aid to Rohingya Muslim refugees who were forced to flee
persecution in Myanmar. In this context, Türkiye and the OIC have carried out joint
initiatives to defend the rights of Rohingya Muslims on international platforms. Through
institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and the
Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Türkiye has participated in
multi-stakeholder cooperation models with the OIC (Kulaklıkaya, 2025: 48-50).
These initiatives highlight that Türkiye’s role within the OIC goes beyond symbolic
participation and has, at times, translated into agenda-setting power. For example,
Türkiye’s leadership during the extraordinary summit on Jerusalem in December 2017
mobilised a broad consensus against the U.S. decision to recognise the city as Israel’s
capital, demonstrating Ankara’s ability to rally member states around its position.
Similarly, Türkiye’s humanitarian diplomacy regarding the Rohingya crisis has increased
its moral authority within the organisation, even though structural limitations of the OIC
often constrain collective action. Taken together, such cases reveal that Türkiye’s
effectiveness within the OIC is not uniform but issue-specific: it is more influential when
combining normative legitimacy with practical humanitarian initiatives, which supports
the article’s central hypothesis regarding the coexistence of value-based diplomacy and
pragmatic foreign policy objectives.
At this point, it is useful to evaluate TİKA’s humanitarian activities in Africa and Türkiye’s
broader Africa initiative. TİKA, the institution responsible for coordinating Türkiye’s
foreign aid, began its operations on the continent by opening a coordination office in
Ethiopia in 2005. Despite being a relatively new actor in Africa, TİKA has carried out
extensive aid programs in the region. These activities are conducted with a human-
centred approach and are tailored to the needs and priorities of partner countries. For
instance, the hospitals built in Sudan and Somalia are jointly administered by personnel
from the Turkish Ministry of Health and local partners, with the aim of providing rapid
and on-site solutions to emerging problems (Arpa and Bayar, 2022: 6-8).
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
240
In 2005, Türkiye launched a new foreign policy approach toward Africa, declaring that
year as the “Year of Africa.” In previous decades, Türkiye had largely neglected the
continent, and its relations with African states remained unstable. Earlier periods of
engagement were mostly shaped by short-term objectives such as easing international
isolation or securing diplomatic support from certain African countries. However, in the
early 2000s, the AKP government, bolstered by the support of conservative business
circles, began to pursue substantive economic policies to strengthen ties with African
states. In doing so, Türkiye gradually incorporated soft power instruments into its Africa
policy. Within this framework, humanitarian aid, religious and cultural activities,
scholarships, and commercial relations elevated Türkiye’s standing on the continent
(Tepeciklioğlu, Vreÿ & Baser, 2024: 289-290).
Following the declaration of 2005 as the “Year of Africa,” the First Türkiye-Africa
Partnership Summit was held in Istanbul on 18-21 August 2008, after which the African
Union recognised Türkiye as a strategic partner (Öztürk and Duman, 2023: 224). Parallel
to the deepening of Türkiye-Africa relations, numerous diplomatic missions were opened,
and bilateral trade volumes steadily increased. For example, Türkiye’s major investments
in Ethiopia have provided employment opportunities for thousands of Ethiopians.
Furthermore, Türkiye’s launch of post-conflict development programs in countries such
as Sudan and Somalia, along with the active engagement of Turkish-origin aid
associations, stand out as significant developments that resonate with then-Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement: “Africa belongs to Africans; we are not here
for your gold” (Süsler and Alden, 2022: 598).
By emphasising its cultural and religious elements, as well as its technological
capabilities, Türkiye can further strengthen its economic relations with Islamic countries.
Additionally, leveraging its advantageous geopolitical position, Türkiye should enhance
its role as a strategic energy bridge between energy-exporting countries in the East and
energy-importing countries in the West. Moreover, cooperation between Türkiye and OIC
member states should be increased in areas such as trade, education, science, finance,
and technology (Bağış and Yurtseven, 2017: 64-69). By prioritising cooperation with OIC
countries, Türkiye can play a vital role among regional states.
Astana Process and Türkiye’s Crisis Diplomacy
Following the outbreak of a civilian uprising in Syria in March 2011, triggered by the Arab
Spring and subsequently turning into an internal conflict, the Geneva Process -initiated
under the leadership of the UN- aimed to end the hostilities and re-establish peace in the
region, but ultimately failed. The intensification of the conflict led to humanitarian crises,
and the armed struggle between the Syrian regime and the opposition rendered
diplomacy ineffective, resulting in a military stalemate. Due to its access to the
Mediterranean, Syria held strategic importance for Russia as a key ally. By 2015, in
response to the possibility of U.S. intervention in the region and the growing military
strength of the opposition, Russia launched a large-scale military intervention in Syria in
September 2015. As a result of this intervention, the military capacity of the opposition
was significantly weakened. Subsequently, political negotiations to address the conflict
in Syria were initiated in January 2017 in Kazakhstan, under the leadership of Russia,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
241
Iran, and Türkiye. This initiative came to be known in the international community as the
“Astana Process.” At this point, the Geneva Process was not entirely sidelined but
continued in parallel with the Astana Process. The UN attempted to end the conflict
through a power-sharing negotiation model between the warring parties, but this effort
failed, as both sides entered the process with the goal of achieving a decisive victory
(Abboud, 2021: 326-332; Vogel, 2023: 85). Since the beginning of the uprisings in Syria,
Türkiye had adopted a foreign policy aimed at the overthrow of the Assad regime. On the
other hand, actors like Iran and Russia provided both military and political support to
ensure the unwavering continuation of the Syrian regime. Russia supported the
progression of the process without regime change or international intervention, favouring
negotiated settlements (Nabiev and Nafikov, 2021: 208).
While Türkiye opposed the Assad regime, the activities of PKK/PYD-affiliated groups along
the Syrian border posed a serious threat to Türkiye’s national security. In response to
attacks by the PKK/PYD, Türkiye carried out military operations in northern Syria. During
this period, Türkiye also continued its diplomatic efforts as a politically influential actor
within the Astana Process (Philips, 2022: 375). Throughout the Astana Process, the
guarantor states established four different “de-escalation zones” in Syria. The first zone
included the city of Idlib, the northeastern part of Latakia, the western areas of Aleppo,
and the northern settlements in Hama. The second zone consisted of the Rastan and
Talbiseh areas north of the city of Homs. The third zone referred to Eastern Ghouta,
located north of Damascus. Finally, the fourth zone covered the southern areas along the
Jordanian border, including the cities of Daraa and Quneitra. Initially, there was a
noticeable decrease in violence in these designated zones (Talukdar and Anas, 2018).
However, in 2018 and 2019, the Syrian regime resumed hostilities in these regions,
undermining the de-escalation efforts. As a result of the regime’s actions, millions of
Syrian refugees fled toward the Turkish border. In the face of these developments, both
the Moscow and Tehran administrations continued to provide all forms of support to the
Assad regime (Mohamad, 2023). Within this context, Türkiye played a significant role in
ensuring border security and managing the humanitarian burden. Violations committed
by the regime in the de-escalation zones further complicated Türkiye’s military and
diplomatic policy toward the region. Moreover, through its role as a guarantor in the
Astana Process, Türkiye continued its efforts not only as a military actor but also as a
diplomatic player in the search for a resolution.
Türkiye opposed the de facto situation that the PKK/PYD was attempting to establish in
Syria. In this context, the negotiations in Astana intensified (Michiels and Kizilkaya, 2022:
17). Moreover, Russia refused to recognise the PKK/PYD as a terrorist organisation, and
the relations between Russia and the PKK/PYD continued within this framework.
However, this relationship appeared to come to an end when Türkiye captured Afrin in
January 2018. Additionally, although forces affiliated with the Syrian regime attempted
to enter Afrin in February 2018, they were repelled by Turkish artillery following an
agreement reached with Iranian and Russian officials (Hale, 2019: 31-32). Iran had
successfully established a presence in the Syrian army and other security structures
through its militias. After achieving military success, Iran shifted its focus to economic
and socio-cultural issues (Vogel, 2023: 81). In the Astana talks, since Russian, Turkish,
and Iranian forces were present on the ground in Syria, they had the capacity to limit
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
242
the use of force by the conflicting parties (Michiels and Kizilkaya, 2022: 3). While Türkiye,
Iran, and Russia carried out military interventions in Syria, they also conducted
diplomatic negotiations as guarantor states. While Russia and Iran sought to gain military
and political advantages in the region, Türkiye acted with the aim of neutralising elements
that posed a threat to its national security.
Unlike Iran and Russia, Türkiye was more affected economically and in terms of security
by the conflicts in Syria due to both the influx of refugees and the terrorist attacks carried
out by the PKK/PYD. As seen, one of the main reasons for Türkiye’s involvement in the
Astana Process was to protect its national security and minimise the negative material
impacts caused by the conflict in Syria. Türkiye’s initial approach to the political crisis in
Syria was shaped around the overthrow of Assad. However, the Astana talks revealed
that Türkiye’s priorities were to emphasise humanitarian issues, resolve the refugee
problem, and bring an end to violence as soon as possible. While Russia fought politically
to keep the regime in power during the Astana talks, Türkiye acted as a guarantor for
the participation of opposition groups in the negotiations. Iran, on the other hand, was
to assume a mediator role if the talks were interrupted. Thanks to the Astana talks, the
conflicting parties in Syria came to the negotiation table. At this point, all parties made
significant contributions to the process (Cengiz, 2020: 10-11). Thanks to this process,
Türkiye was able to intervene directly in developments that threatened its border
security, while maintaining its military presence on the ground within the framework of
international legitimacy.
Since Türkiye’s first intervention into Syrian territory in August 2016, it has been included
in the Astana Process because it was responsible for the political and military organisation
of the Syrian opposition. Türkiye’s presence at the negotiation table in Astana was
welcomed by both the Syrian regime and various opposition groups involved in the
process. These groups included Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam. The guarantor states
did not consider including DEASH or al-Nusra in the Astana Process a topic for discussion.
However, the situation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which has close ties with al-Nusra,
was critical. At this point, Türkiye took on the responsibility of reducing the influence of
radical elements within HTS who did not want to participate in the Astana talks. The
positive aspect of Astana was that three countries with different objectives in Syria came
together at the negotiation table. The Astana Process has shown that mediation efforts,
even if not entirely successful, can lead to positive outcomes (Michiels and Kizilkaya,
2022: 17-29). In this context, the most striking feature of the Astana talks is that actors
on different fronts in the conflict zone were able to find common ground through
diplomatic channels. Türkiye’s influence over the Syrian opposition increased Ankara’s
role on the Astana platform.
This development illustrates Türkiye’s shift toward a more flexible and context-specific
foreign policy. In contrast to its participation in the OIC -where Ankara sought to build
legitimacy through multilateral diplomacy, symbolic leadership, and humanitarian
initiatives- its involvement in the Astana Process was shaped by urgent security
imperatives, such as border protection, refugee management, and direct military
engagement. The difference between these two platforms demonstrates that Türkiye no
longer relies solely on normative and cooperative instruments but rather pursues a dual-
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
243
track strategy in which value-based diplomacy coexists with pragmatic, security-oriented
action.
Comparative Analysis: Türkiye’s Engagement in the OIC and the Astana
Process
A direct comparison of Türkiye’s involvement in the OIC and the Astana Process allows
for a clearer evaluation of the central argument. Within the OIC, Ankara’s influence
became evident during critical turning points such as the extraordinary summit on
Jerusalem in December 2017, when it succeeded in rallying member states against
Washington’s recognition of the city as Israel’s capital. Türkiye’s humanitarian
engagement in the Rohingya issue likewise enhanced its credibility and normative
standing, illustrating how Ankara leveraged soft power, coalition-building, and symbolic
authority in multilateral settings.
By contrast, Türkiye’s involvement in the Astana Process was largely driven by urgent
security concerns, primarily the proximity of PKK/PYD groups to its border and the
significant influx of refugees from Syria. Rather than relying on consensus politics, Ankara
asserted its position through its military deployments, its capacity to shape the stance of
Syrian opposition groups, and its tactical bargaining with Russia and Iran. In this arena,
diplomacy was more transactional and directly tied to hard power instruments.
Viewed together, the two cases underscore both convergence and divergence. In both
contexts, Türkiye aimed to portray itself as an indispensable regional actor: in the OIC
through normative advocacy and humanitarian diplomacy, and in Astana through
security-oriented negotiations and on-the-ground involvement. The key distinction lies
in the nature of the tools and outcomes: while participation in the OIC bolstered Türkiye’s
international legitimacy and visibility, involvement in Astana produced more concrete
security advantages and strategic leverage in the Syrian conflict. This comparison
substantiates the article’s central claim that Türkiye’s foreign policy blends value-based
approaches with pragmatic, security-driven strategies, adapting its instruments to the
institutional framework at hand.
Conclusion
The political transformations in the Middle East over the past twenty years have led to
significant changes in Türkiye’s foreign policy stance, and during this process, Türkiye
has taken serious steps toward becoming a more active and multifaceted regional actor.
In this context, Türkiye’s roles in the OIC and the Astana Process reflect the country’s
effort to simultaneously manage both its diplomatic priorities and security concerns. By
employing a comparative case study method, this article has demonstrated how Türkiye
adapts its strategies to two distinct diplomatic frameworks -one grounded in
institutionalised multilateralism and the other in crisis diplomacy- thus providing
analytical leverage for testing the central hypothesis.
Within the OIC, Türkiye pursues a multilateral foreign policy based on normative values,
aiming at cultural and political rapprochement in the Muslim world. Concrete cases such
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
244
as the extraordinary summit on Jerusalem in 2017 and Türkiye’s leadership on the
Rohingya issue illustrate its capacity to set the agenda and enhance its normative
legitimacy. At the same time, the consensus-based decision-making procedures and lack
of enforcement mechanisms within the OIC -documented in the literature as recurring
institutional limitations- have restricted the degree to which Türkiye’s initiatives could
translate into binding outcomes. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s leadership in symbolic and
humanitarian issues has increased its visibility and moral authority within the OIC.
In contrast, the Astana Process is significant as it demonstrates Türkiye’s development
of a more concrete and security-centred diplomatic approach that also involves hard
power elements. During this process, Türkiye has become a decisive actor thanks to both
its military presence on the ground and its influence over Syrian opposition groups.
Additionally, Türkiye has effectively used the Astana platform to address national security
priorities such as neutralising threats along its Syrian border and controlling refugee
flows.
The comparative analysis highlights that Türkiye’s impact varies depending on the issue
and setting: within the OIC, its effectiveness stems from blending normative leadership
with humanitarian engagement, whereas in the Astana framework, it derives influence
through direct security involvement and tactical bargaining. This supports the argument
that Türkiye’s foreign policy follows a dual-track orientation rather than a single, uniform
approach.
In conclusion, Türkiye’s position in the OIC and Astana platforms confirms the hypothesis
of a dual orientation in its foreign policy: while pursuing normative, multilateral, and soft
power tools in the OIC, Türkiye simultaneously adopts a more security-driven and
pragmatic stance in the Astana Process. Taken together, these findings validate the
comparative framework of this study and highlight that Türkiye’s evolution toward a
multidimensional and multi-actor strategy can only be fully understood by analysing both
its normative ambitions and its security imperatives within distinct institutional settings.
References
Abboud, S. (2021). Making peace to sustain war: the Astana Process and Syria’s illiberal
peace. Peacebuilding, 9 (3), 326-343. doi: 10.1080/21647259.2021.1895609
Ali, T., & Sultan, H. (2023). Emerging role of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in
global governance since 1969. Cogent Arts & Humanities, 10 (1), 1-18. doi:
10.1080/23311983.2023.2202052
Arı, T., & Pirinççi, F. (2010). Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And
The Perceptions In Syria And Lebanon. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 4 (7), 1-16. Available at:
https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/gav/issue/6524/86496
Arpa, E., & Bayar, M. (2022). Türk Dış Yardım Modeli: Afrika Örneği. Bölge Çalışmaları
Dergisi, 1 (2): 1-17. Available at:
https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ajas/issue/74560/1226729
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
245
Ataman, M. (2009). Interdependence and Diversification: A New Framework for Turkish
Foreign Policy. Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, (1), 38-57. Available at:
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/bilgi%20/v11i1/index.html
Aykan, M. B. (1993). Turkey and the OIC: 1984-1992. The Turkish Yearbook of
International Relations, (23), 101-131. doi: 10.1501/Intrel_0000000179
Bağış, B., & Yurtseven, Ç. (2017). Turkey and the OIC: Greater Economic Cooperation,
Opportunities and Challenges. Centre for Strategic Research (SAM), No: 13. Available at:
https://www.sam.gov.tr/en/papers/turkey-and-the-oic-greater-economic-cooperation-
opportunities-and-challenges
Bengio, O. (2012). Are Iraq and Turkey models for democratisation?. Middle East
Quarterly, 19 (3), 53-62. Available at: https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-
quarterly/iraq-turkey-democratization
Birdişli, F., & Atawula, M. (2019). İslam İşbirliği Teşkilatı (İİT)’nin Önemi ve Bölgesel
Güvenlik Sorunlarının Çözümünde İşlevsizliğinin Nedenleri. Türk & İslam Dünyası Sosyal
Araştırmalar Dergisi, 20, 77-101. doi: 10.16989/TIDSAD.1668
Cengiz, S. (2020). Assessing the Astana Peace Process for Syria: Actors, Approaches,
and Differences. Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 7 (2), 1-15. doi:
10.1177/2347798920901876
Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (1974). Available at:
https://www.oic-oci.org/upload/documents/charter/en/oic_charter_2018_en.pdf
Cornell, S. E. (2012). What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?. Middle East Quarterly, 19 (1),
13-24. Available at: https://www.meforum.org/middle-east-quarterly/turkish-foreign-
policy
Coşkun, B.B. (2015). Neighbourhood Narratives From “Zero Problems With Neighbours”
to “Precious Loneliness”: Turkey’s Resecuritized Middle East Policy After the Arab Spring.
Monier, E. (Eds.), Regional Insecurity After the Arab Uprisings (pp. 187-203). London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Dalacoura, K. (2012). The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political change and
geopolitical implications. International Affairs, 88 (1), 63-79. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2346.2012.01057.x
D’Alema, F. (2024). Turkey’s approach to the Arab spring revisited: political field and
foreign policy in the AKP era. Turkish Studies, 25 (5), 806-834. doi:
10.1080/14683849.2024.2365849
Dede, A. Y. (2011). The Arab uprisings: Debating the “Turkish Model”. Insight Turkey,
13 (2), 23-32.
Ehteshami, A., & Elik, S. (2011). Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and the Arab
Middle East. Turkish Studies, 12 (4), 643-662. doi: 10.1080/14683849.2011.624322
Ennis, C. A., & Momani, B. (2013). Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab
Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies. Third World Quarterly, 34 (6),
1127-1144. doi: 10.1080/01436597.2013.802503
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
246
Fidan, H. (2023). Turkish Foreign Policy at the Turn of the ‘Century of Türkiye’:
Challenges, Vision, Objectives, and Transformation. Insight Turkey, 25 (3), 11-25. doi:
10.25253/99.2023253.1
Göksel, O. (2018). Eurocentrism Awakened: The Arab Uprisings and the Search for a
“Modern” Middle East. H. Işıksal, & O. Göksel (Eds.), Turkey’s Relations with the Middle
East: Political Encounters after the Arab Spring (pp. 33-51). Switzerland: Springer.
Hale, W. (2019). Turkey, the U.S., Russia, and the Syrian Civil War. Insight Turkey, 21
(4), 25-40. doi: 10.25253/99.2019214.02
Hashmat, S. A. (2011). The OIC’s potential, capabilities and constraints for International
Conflict Resolution. Strategic Studies, 31 (1-2), 107-135. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48529349
Hossain, I. (2012). The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC): Nature, Role, and the
Issues. Journal of Third World Studies, 29 (1), 287-314. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194863
İhsanoğlu, E. (1997). Turkey in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference: An Overview.
Insight Turkey, (7), 93-112. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26726869?seq=10
Khan, M. S. (2015). The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle
East. Policy Perspectives: The Journal of the Institute of Policy Studies, 12 (1), 31-50.
doi: 10.13169/polipers.12.1.0031
Kireçci, M. A. (2018). Turkey’s Leadership in the Jerusalem Crisis. Insight Turkey, 20 (2),
67-78. doi: 10.25253/99.2018202.05
Kirişçi, K. (2011). Turkey’s “Demonstrative Effect” and the Transformation of the Middle
East. Insight Turkey, 13 (2), 33-55. Available at:
https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/turkeys-demonstrative-effect-and-the-
transformation-of-the-middle-east
Koç, N. (2019). İslâm Dünyasında Birlik Arayışları: İslâm Konferansı -İslâm İşbirliği
Teşkilatı ve Türkiye. Türk- İslam Medeniyeti Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 14 (28), 261-
286.
http://ktpmakale.isam.org.tr/detayilhmklzt.php?navdil=..ar&midno=138388125&Dergi
valkod=0617&YayinTarihi=2019&Cilt=XIV&Sayi=28
Kulaklıkaya, M. (2025). Türkiye and the OIC: Navigating Challenges and Strengthening
Alliances. Insight Turkey, 27 (1), 37-52. doi: 10.25253/99.2025271.3
Michiels, M., & Kizilkaya, Z. (2022). Mediation in Syria: A Comparative Analysis of the
Astana and the Geneva Processes. Syria Studies, 14 (1), 1-40. Available at:
https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/2486
Mohamad, F. A. (2023). The Astana Process Six Years On: Peace or Deadlock in Syria?.
Retrieved May 17, 2025, from Carnegie Endowment:
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/08/the-astana-process-six-years-on-peace-
or-deadlock-in-syria?lang=en
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 230-247
Türkiye’s Role in Shaping Regional Politics in the Middle East Through the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Astana Process
Yusuf Dinçel
247
Nabiev, R., & Nafikov, I. (2021). The Astana Process as an International Platform for
Middle Eastern Regional Security: the Russian Mission. İ. Topsakal, & A. Askerov (Eds.),
Contemporary Turkish - Russian Relations From Past to Future (pp. 197-212). Istanbul:
Istanbul University Press.
Öniş, Z. (2012). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between ethics and self-interest. Insight
Turkey, 14 (3), 45-63. Available at: https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/turkey-and-
the-arab-spring-between-ethics-and-self-interest
Öniş, Z. (2014). Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power
Influence in a Turbulent Middle East. Mediterranean Politics, 19 (2), 203-219. doi:
10.1080/13629395.2013.868392
Özdemir, E. (2010). Turkey’s Middle East Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. History Studies
International Journal of History, 2, 271-285. doi: 10.9737/hist_150
Öztürk, M., & Duman, M. (2023). A Founding Role in Türkiye’s Africa Policy: The Action
Plan for Opening to Africa. Insight Turkey, 25 (3): 223-240. doi:
10.25253/99.2023253.12
Philips, C. (2022). The international system and the Syrian civil war. International
Relations, 36 (3), 358-381. doi: 10.1177/00471178221097908
Sheikh, F. (2017). Who Speaks for the Islamic World? Religion, Identity and the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Politics, Religion & Ideology, 18 (1), 117-121. doi:
10.1080/21567689.2017.1298296
Süsler, B., & Alden, C. (2022). Turkey and African agency: the role of Islam and
commercialism in Turkey’s Africa policy. Journal of Modern African Studies, 60 (4): 597-
617. doi: 10.1017/S0022278X22000349
Talukdar, I., & Anas, O. (2018). The Astana Process and the Future of Peaceful
Settlement of the Syrian Crisis: A Status Note. Nova Deli: Indian Council of World Affairs.
Tepeciklioğlu, E. E., Vreÿ, F., & Baser, B. (2024). Introduction: Turkey and Africa:
Motivations, Challenges and Future Prospects. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern
Studies, 26(3): 289-294. doi: 10.1080/19448953.2023.2236514
Vogel, A. (2023). Russian- Iranian- Turkish Trilateral Relations in the Syrian Civil War.
Pathways to Peace and Security, 1, 76-110. doi: 10.20542/2307-1494-2023-1-76-110
Yönten, H., & Denemark, R. A. (2023). Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and North
Africa under the AKP: an empirical analysis. Turkish Studies, 24 (5): 832-852. doi:
10.1080/14683849.2023.2222525
