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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between

Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025

187

FROM WEST TO THE REST: ANALYSING TURKEY’S BRICS MEMBERSHIP BID

THROUGH THE PRISM OF WESTERNISM

SEVEN ERDOĞAN

seven.erdogan@erdogan.edu.tr

Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (Turkey). Orcid: 0000-0001-9991-

2074

BURÇIN BEDEL

burcin.bedel@erdogan.edu.tr

Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (Turkey). Orcid: 0000-0002-7820-

3348

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy through the lens of its bid for

BRICS membership, contextualised within the country’s shifting approach to Westernism. The

study thus contributes to ongoing discussions about the shifting alignments of emerging

powers in a multipolar world. Drawing on historical process tracing, the study argues that

Turkey’s frustrations with Western institutions have prompted a strategic recalibration toward

alternative multilateral frameworks. However, the analysis reveals that Turkey’s overtures to

BRICS represent not a wholesale rejection of the West, but an attempt to balance East-West

allegiances in a multipolar world. The findings suggest that while BRICS appeals to Ankara’s

rhetoric of autonomy and multipolarity, its suitability as a strategic alternative remains

limited.

Keywords

Turkey, Westernism, BRICS, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey-West Relations.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a evolução da política externa da Turquia através da lente da sua

candidatura à adesão aos BRICS, contextualizada dentro da mudança de abordagem do país

em relação ao ocidentalismo. O estudo contribui, assim, para as discussões em curso sobre

as mudanças nas alianças das potências emergentes num mundo multipolar. Com base no

rastreamento do processo histórico, o estudo argumenta que as frustrações da Turquia com

as instituições ocidentais levaram a uma recalibração estratégica em direção a estruturas

multilaterais alternativas. No entanto, a análise revela que as aproximações da Turquia aos

BRICS não representam uma rejeição total do Ocidente, mas uma tentativa de equilibrar as

alianças entre o Oriente e o Ocidente num mundo multipolar. As conclusões sugerem que,

embora os BRICS apele à retórica de autonomia e multipolaridade de Ancara, a sua adequação

como alternativa estratégica continua a ser limitada.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

Seven Erdoğan, Burçin Bedel

188

Palavras-chave

Turquia, ocidentalismo, BRICS, política externa turca, relações Turquia-Ocidente.

How to cite this article

Erdoğan, Seven & Bedel, Burçin (2025). From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics

Membership Bid Through the Prism of Westernism. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations.

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº.

2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 187-204. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0525.10

Article submitted on 29th May 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th September

2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

Seven Erdoğan, Burçin Bedel

189

FROM WEST TO THE REST: ANALYSING TURKEY’S BRICS

MEMBERSHIP BID THROUGH THE PRISM OF WESTERNISM

SEVEN ERDOĞAN

BURÇİN BEDEL

Introduction

Over the past decade, the rise of emerging economies has reshaped the global political

landscape, particularly through the emergence of new international actors, such as the

BRICS (Christensen & Xing, 2016; Lissovolik & Vinokurov, 2019). This shift has even

been interpreted as the beginning of a post-Western world order that has expanded the

space for regional and middle powers to act autonomously (Kutlay & Öniş, 2021). In

parallel with these global dynamics, Turkey has exhibited traits that align with this shift

and has become more open to new and alternative foreign policy visions, bringing about

new partnerships and ad hoc alliances with non-Western actors. By adopting an almost

identical line to the BRICS countries with its weakening Westernism in foreign policy,

Turkey has promoted the idea of a multipolar international order and defended the rights

of the least developed countries. Turkey’s interest in joining BRICS gained prominence

as its emerging political orientation began to align with the rising global profile and

normative stance of the BRICS countries. The convergence between Turkey’s shifting

foreign policy priorities and the growing influence of this like-minded coalition brought

renewed attention to the prospect of deeper engagement with BRICS as an alternative

platform for international cooperation.

This study examines Turkey’s pursuit of BRICS membership within the broader context

of its evolving orientation toward the West in foreign policy. Over the past two decades,

Turkey’s traditional Westernist stance, characterised by an almost unquestioned

alignment with the West, has visibly shifted, giving way to growing scepticism toward

Western institutions and a search for alternative alignments, driven by a more selective,

pragmatic, and autonomy-oriented approach. By situating the BRICS bid within this shift,

the study seeks to uncover how changing perceptions of the West have influenced

Turkey’s strategic interest in engaging with non-Western platforms. The study addresses

the issue through two main research questions: first, how Turkey’s evolving approach to

Westernism has influenced its pivot toward non-Western platforms such as BRICS; and

second, to what extent Turkey’s interest in BRICS represents a rational strategy for

balancing its diminishing alignment with the West through alternative global

partnerships. By examining these questions, the article aims to contribute to broader

debates on multipolarity, middle power diplomacy, and the strategic recalibration of

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

Seven Erdoğan, Burçin Bedel

190

foreign policy in a shifting international order. The primary methodology of this research

is historical process tracing, aimed at uncovering two interconnected processes occurring

concurrently.

The paper is organised as follows: The first section offers a historical overview of

Westernism in Turkish foreign policy. The second section explores the evolving dynamics

of Turkey’s relationship with the West over the past two decades, with particular

emphasis on the crises that have shaped this trajectory. The final section examines

Turkey's pursuit of BRICS membership in the context of its shifting stance on Westernism.

Tracing Traditional Westernism in Turkish Foreign Policy

With its deeply embedded roots in the early Ottoman reform era of the 19th century,

aiming to modernise political, economic, and social structures by initially taking the

rapidly advancing West, solely Europe, as a role model, Westernism has consistently

served as a foundational element of Turkish foreign policy. With the establishment of the

Republic of Turkey in 1923, the ideal of Westernisation was further consolidated in the

hands of new ruling cadres who envisioned a modern and secular state that would achieve

Western levels of political and economic development by eradicating all traces of the

Ottoman legacy. After warring against some members of the West during the First World

War and waging a war of salvation against them, taking the West as a model, they

renamed it the attainment of a higher level of civilisation (Monceau, 2023). Over time,

this orientation evolved into a clear and consistent foreign policy stance, with Turkey

pursuing strong ties with the Western powers. However, the official approach to foreign

policy during the interwar period was characterised by neutrality, aiming to develop

friendly relations with both Western powers and the Soviet Union (SU) (Criss, 2017).

After the Second World War, Turkey, faced with the growing Soviet threat, sought

security guarantees from the West, especially from the US (Oğuzlu, 2003). This

motivated Turkey's membership in all post-war Western constructs, and Westernism

emerged as a stable tenet of Turkish foreign policy despite the changing ideological

orientation of the ruling parties (Ovalı & Özdikmenli, 2020). The signing of the North

Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and Turkey's subsequent membership of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO) in 1952 marked a clear political commitment to the Western bloc,

as the country strengthened its position in the face of the growing ideological and military

Cold War rivalry between the US and the SU. Turkey's acquisition of a place within the

Western security architecture became a fundamental shift from Turkey’s earlier policy of

neutrality to a more overtly Western-oriented foreign policy approach (Oğuzlu, 2019).

This change, mainly due to Turkey's geopolitical position as a buffer between the Western

powers and the SU was very much welcomed by the West (Müftüler-Baç, 1996). In return

for its loyalty, Turkey received economic and military aid from the West during this

period, which eventually led to a high degree of integration of the Turkish military into

NATO structures (Lippe, 2000). With a few exceptions, such as the Cyprus crisis (from

the early 1960s) or the opium crisis (late 1960s), Turkish foreign policy remained very

compatible with the West throughout the Cold War (Aydın, 2000). However, the memory

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

Seven Erdoğan, Burçin Bedel

191

of the past problems with the West has persisted because of the “Serves Syndrome”

1

,

which has been passed on to new generations (Şahin, 2025). Beyond the security

perspective, the westernisation of Turkish foreign policy intensified when the country

decided to develop closer ties with the European Economic Community by the late 1950s,

the predecessor of the European Union (EU), primarily to achieve its economic

modernisation (Bilgin & Bilgiç, 2012).

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the SU created a new geopolitical context in

which Turkey's relationship with the West faced significant challenges. Turkey continued

to value its relationship with the West. However, its place within the Western alliance

began to be questioned due to the changing geopolitical dynamics, lessening the

country’s strategic value. The rise of identity politics, which makes Turkey different and

less democratic, is a significant problem for the West (Şahin, 2020). During the 1990s,

the relative importance of Europe in Turkey's Western foreign policy line increased with

the country's formal application for EU membership in 1987, in fulfilment of its aspirations

for European integration (Erdoğan, 2019). This new positioning of Turkey also received

the support of the US (Tocci, 2012). Following the declaration of Turkey as a candidate

for membership in 1999, the EU accession process became the main rationale for

Turkey's continued commitment to Western political and economic norms in the post-

Cold War era (Müftüler-Baç, 2005).

This foreign policy line, primarily designed by the secular state elite, continued

uninterrupted after the rise of political Islam to power in 2003, when the country's new

ruling cadres opted for a foreign policy based on pragmatism and economic liberalisation

(Dinçşahin, 2012). These were the golden years in Turkey-EU relations. Turkey's Western

credentials were further strengthened as the country materialised an extensive list of

reforms to be eligible for the next round of EU enlargement (Kaliber, 2014). During this

period, as a Muslim country that embraced liberal democratic values, Turkey was

portrayed by the West as a role model (Çınar, 2018). However, this positive atmosphere

became short-lived when the EU formally decided not to conclude accession talks with

Turkey until the Cyprus problem had been resolved in 2006, following Turkey's refusal to

apply the customs union to the Greek side of Cyprus (Heinz, 2007).

Not only relations with the EU, but also with the US became more strained during this

period, especially after the US decision to intervene in Iraq for the second time in 2003.

At a time when the Turkish government was divided between being a reliable ally and

avoiding the security implications of an imminent war, the Turkish National Assembly

voted against the use of Turkish territory by American forces to reach Iraq from the north

(Yeşiltas, 2009). In this case, Turkey's position clashed with the American one. However,

it was not totally anti-Western, because Europe was also divided on this issue. The

leading countries of Europe, also known as old Europe, led by Germany and France, also

adopted a position against this intervention (Crowe, 2003). However, Turkey’s decision

was a big disappointment for the US. In the shadow of these frustrations in relations with

1

A traumatic syndrome based on the sense of failure and loss caused by the 1920 Treaty of Serves, which was

imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the victorious allies after its defeat in the First World War and which aimed

to divide the Ottoman territory between the major Western powers and the local groups supporting them. The

Sèvres Treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, following the Turkish War of Independence

victory.

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the West, dissatisfaction with the dominance of Westernism in Turkish foreign policy

began to grow, culminating in a process of distancing Turkey from the West in foreign

policy.

A New Era of Westernism in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Wake of Recent

Crises

In the past, temporary crises, such as the opium crisis in the 1960s, have been observed

in the relations between Turkey and the West. These past crises made Turkey see the

limits of its alliance with the West, but they never led it to rethink its relations with the

West radically. In the last two decades, however, a combination of shifting internal (i.e.,

the rise of conservative ruling elites or Turkey's strong economic performance when the

West was suffering from the 2008 crisis) and external (i.e., developments in the

neighbourhood or increasing multipolarity of the international system) dynamics has led

to a new set of crises that have allowed a profound questioning of the traditional Western

orientation of Turkish foreign policy by challenging the long-accepted idea of seeking

Western approval or guidance for every significant foreign policy action (Akkoyunlu,

2021). This new foreign policy line has been identified in the literature under various

banners, such as neo-Ottomanism (Trifković, 2011), Islamic realism (Yalvaç, 2016) and

Euro-Asianism (Erşen, 2019), zero problems with neighbours (Cornell, 2012), and has

resulted in discussions about the country's strategic autonomy (Oğuzlu, 2020), shifting

axis (Başer, 2015), paradigm shift (Sözen, 2010), twists and turns (Cop & Zihnioğlu,

2017), precious loneliness (Coşkun, 2015), de-Europeanization (Yılmaz, 2016) and

independence (Taşpınar, 2011) in foreign policy.

Anti-Westernism in Turkey has become prominent as the government follows more

nationalist and security-oriented policies, after consolidating its power by the 2010s

(Karaömeroğlu, 2022). In such a context, ruling cadres relied more on populist

discourses, including anti-Western elements, such as the West's siding with Turkey's

enemies or its double standards towards Turkey (Hazır, 2022). “One Minute Crisis” during

the 2009 World Economic Forum meeting, which ended Turkey’s balanced policy on the

Israeli-Palestine conflict and opened the way for its active engagement on the side of the

Palestinians (Cornell, 2012), was a historic moment that gave the first signals of the

reconfiguration of the West in Turkish foreign policy, as it also included a rejection of the

West’s unconditional support for Israel. In addition, Turkey, which is heavily dependent

on Iran for energy, showed its dissatisfaction with the sanctions against Iran by voting

against the fourth round of sanctions against Iran on 9 June 2010 during its temporary

membership of the United Nations Security Council, and this new policy line was viewed

as very alarming by the US (Arı, 2022).

Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy gained significant momentum since the Global

Financial Crisis of 2008 (Öniş & Uluyol, 2025), and it became so evident with the Arab

Spring, especially during the Syrian crisis, that the gap between Turkish and Western

foreign policies widened due to the differing approaches to regional stability (Aydın-

Düzgit, Kutlay & Keyman, 2025). While Turkey generally sided with the opposition forces,

the West stood for stability and did not favour the processes bringing actors associated

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

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with political Islam to power (Aliboni, 2011). The diverging positioning of Turkey and the

West gained a new dimension, when the West, notably the US, decided to provide political

and military support to the Kurds in Syria, who are seen by Turkey as a Syrian branch of

the internationally recognized terrorist organisation of PKK targeting Turkish state since

the 1980s, as a ground force in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

(ISIS) by 2014 (Outzen, 2025). This new US positioning was totally clashing with the

previous one, including active or passive support of Turkish actions against the PKK, by

sharing the country’s security concerns. These changing security concerns of the parties

resulted in the opposition of the West to Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria,

aiming to create safe zones in areas near the border (Atmaca & Torun, 2022). Turkey's

operations in northern Syria have been heavily condemned by the West and framed as a

process hampering the fight against ISIS (Orton, 2016). When Turkey chooses to act

independently at the regional level, it undermines the effectiveness of Western collective

efforts aimed at promoting regional stability. Besides, this new positioning also raised

doubts about Turkey’s long-standing commitments as a NATO member and EU

membership candidate, especially when coupled with its growing de-alignment from EU

norms, particularly in the areas of democratic governance, the rule of law, and foreign

policy. (Aydın-Düzgit & Keyman, 2014).

The Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and the failed coup attempt in 2016, culminated on top

of each other, resulting in a still ongoing trauma on the ruling cadres of Turkey. These

two events led to an increase in their tendency to use a securitisation perspective in the

making of foreign policy (Karakoç & Ersoy, 2024). From Turkey's point of view, the West's

exclusive expression of its concern about the erosion of democracy and rule of law was

a failure to understand the country's renewed sense of security (Özpek & Tanrıverdi-

Yaşar, 2017). The country’s disappointment with the West grew when the Russian

government, despite the ongoing influence of the crisis stemming from the downing of a

Russian jet by Turkey, sided strongly with the Turkish government (Oğuzlu, 2020). When

the coup plotters, who were clearly terrorists from the point of view of the Turkish

government, went to Western countries as safe havens, it is worth noting that the US

was hosting the leading cadres of the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organisation (FETO); the

matter was further complicated. This was seen as an unfriendly interference in the

internal affairs of the country and listed as support for terrorist organisations targeting

Turkey (Kaliber & Kaliber, 2019). The tension with the US reached a peak when Turkey

imprisoned US Pastor Brunson due to his so-called ties with the groups targeting the

government of Turkey. During this crisis, President Trump even sent a very unfriendly

letter to his counterpart and threatened Turkey with severe political and economic

sanctions. To show its sincerity about the economic pressure, in August 2018, the US

took some steps to show its ability to destabilise Turkey’s capital markets, and finally,

the pastor was freed after two years of detention (Strachota & Wilk, 2019).

Turkey’s changing perception of the West shapes not only its relations with the West but

also with the non-Western actors. When Turkey has had problems in its relations with

the West, it has tended to develop its economic and political ties, especially with the

West's competitors, such as Russia and Iran (Ovalı & Özdikmenli, 2020). Turkey has long

suffered from being unable to meet its military equipment needs from its leading

suppliers in the West, especially the US. The US refusal to sell the Patriot missile defence

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Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

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system led the country to buy the Russian S-400 defence system. Turkey's decision, an

explicit demonstration of its strategic autonomy, led to a further deterioration in relations

with the West by generating friction with key allies. As a reaction to the S-400 purchase,

the West adopted a punitive attitude, and Turkey's membership in the F-35 programme,

which aims to develop a new-generation fighter jet, was cancelled, and sanctions were

imposed on Turkey's Defence Procurement Agency under the CAATSA mechanism

(Martin, 2025). The country has even negotiated the sale of new F-16 fighter jets and

the modernisation of existing ones, linking them to its approval of Finland’s and Sweden's

NATO membership (Neset, 2023). Not only has the country been meeting its needs from

non-Western actors, but it has also been improving its self-sufficiency in this area through

heavy investment in its national defence industry because of being denied access to

Western weapons (Bağcı & Kurç, 2017). This process overall paved the way for a new

wave of anti-Western discourse in Turkish foreign policy (Hazır, 2022). As an offshoot of

this new dynamic, Turkey did not join the Western sanctions imposed on Russia after the

Ukraine crisis, but only the UN sanctions and maintained its economic, trade and energy

relations with Russia (Yanık, 2023).

Despite these challenges in the relations with the West, Turkey has continued to prioritise

its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership, highlighting the importance

of its security ties to the West (Ciddi, 2022). Turkey’s role in regional security, its

strategic location between Europe and the Middle East, and its position as a key member

of NATO ensure that it remains an important factor in Western foreign policy discussions

(Oğuzlu, 2020). As well as its membership of NATO, the country has also valued its

customs union with the EU, which has been in force since 1996. Putting aside the

dynamics of mutual resentment stemming from the problems of the accession aspect of

the relationship, Turkey and the EU, as two sides sharing the same neighbourhood and

facing similar challenges, have chosen to create a new balance in the relationship through

a kind of issue-based functional cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such as

migration, energy or climate change (Erdoğan, 2024). Despite Turkey’s willingness to

cooperate, a widely held perception persists in Europe that Turkey has deprioritised its

EU accession in favour of pursuing strategic pluralism, particularly in the realm of foreign

policy. As a result, Turkey’s reliability as a partner has been increasingly questioned, and

the tendency to view Turkey as a third country rather than a candidate country has grown

stronger (Turhan, 2025).

Turkey’s Claims for BRICS Membership

Turkey's interest in joining BRICS can be traced back to 2018, when the country was

invited to the 10th annual summit of the initiative in Johannesburg, as the head of the

rotating presidency of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. President Erdoğan

attended the meeting and interpreted the invitation as a significant opportunity for

Turkey’s potential inclusion in the group. In his address during this meeting, Erdoğan

emphasised the prospective trajectory of cooperation between Turkey and BRICS

members and even referred to Turkey’s membership by using the term BRICST (Daily

Sabah, 2018). Consequently, following this initial high-level engagement, discussions

surrounding Turkey’s aspiration to join BRICS gained greater momentum.

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From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

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Beyond its general desire to develop relations with key countries of the Global South,

Turkey's interest in BRICS, one of the key players in the non-Western camp, is driven by

a combination of economic, strategic, and ideological considerations. Among these,

economic motivations, particularly the vast market potential of BRICS member states,

play a pivotal role in informing Turkey’s engagement with the group, especially in the

context of ongoing economic challenges such as high inflation and the depreciation of the

Turkish lira (OECD, 2023). Illustrating this perspective, on November 14, 2024, Reuters

reported statements by President Erdoğan, noting that “Ankara sees the BRICS group as

an opportunity to further economic cooperation with member states, rather than as an

alternative to its Western ties and NATO membership” (Reuters, 2024a). However, the

weakness of BRICS as a well-developed financial framework and trade network (Helleiner

& Wang, 2018) makes Turkey’s economic expectations somewhat speculative compared

to its resilient economic ties with the West. From a strategic and political perspective, as

previously noted in this study, Turkey has become increasingly disillusioned with its

Western partners. The prolonged stagnation of its EU accession process and persistent

tensions with NATO allies have contributed to Ankara’s growing aspiration to operate as

an independent global actor engaging with others. Ideologically, the BRICS' emphasis on

sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity resonates with Turkey's own rhetorical

stance in international affairs, which calls for a more just world order and its broader

ambition to advocate for comprehensive system reform. Turkey is no longer content with

an ideological commitment that equates Westernisation with modernisation and

democratisation. This does not mean, however, that it rejects the liberal international

order entirely; instead, Turkey aims to engage with it on its own terms, especially with

a foreign policy vision that prioritises flexibility, diversification, and regional actorness.

President Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have made several public statements

indicating Turkey's interest in BRICS, including their expectation of an invitation. On

numerous occasions, this interest has been articulated in parallel with frustrations over

the stagnation of the country’s EU accession process. As such, discussions surrounding

BRICS membership within the Turkish context have often served as a vehicle for

expressing disillusionment with the trajectory of EU-Turkey relations (DW, 2024). This

suggests that within the mindset of Turkey’s ruling elites, there is a prevailing tendency

to view BRICS and the EU as alternative, and at times competing frameworks for

international engagement. In terms of population and economic capacity, BRICS holds

significant potential. However, from a political point of view, its record on democracy and

human rights remains unpromising (Bacık, 2013). Turkey's still enduring dream of

modernisation in the form of democratisation, which is very much in line with the ideal

of EU membership, does not fit comfortably into the BRICS framework. Moreover, the

growing geopolitical tensions between key actors of the West and the BRICS bloc risk

complicating Turkey’s efforts to maintain a calibrated balance in its foreign policy. As

Ankara seeks to diversify its strategic and economic partnerships beyond traditional

Western alliances, these rivalries may limit its room for manoeuvre, forcing difficult

choices between competing power centres and potentially undermining its pursuit of

strategic autonomy. Hence, Ankara needs to find an innovative way to leverage new

alliances without jeopardising the benefits of its existing partnerships.

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Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 187-204

From West to the Rest: Analysing Turkey’s Brics Membership Bid Through

the Prism of Westernism

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BRICS has issued several declarations referring to its expansion into various world

regions, such as Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, making its

intention to include countries from these areas as members (BRICS, 2024). However,

despite strengthened bilateral relations with individual BRICS members, Turkey was not

explicitly mentioned as a potential member in any of these declarations. In 2024,

Turkey's membership in the BRICS turned into a heated debate after Iran, Egypt,

Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates were accepted as BRICS members. Even the

earlier membership of South Africa, which is comparable to Turkey in terms of economic

size and relative proximity to the West, was a strong signal for Turkey (Lissovolik &

Vinokurov, 2019). During his official visit to China in June 2024, Turkish Minister of

Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan was asked whether Turkey would be interested in joining

BRICS. In response, he briefly stated, “We would like to, of course, why wouldn't we?”,

thereby refraining from providing a detailed explanation of the country’s official stance

(Reuters, 2024b). Minister Fidan gave another briefing the same month and made

Turkey's position on BRICS more precise: “When we look at the BRICS issue, we have to

follow very closely how alternative economic platforms are being formed in the world and

how markets are being formed... All these alternative platforms, in fact, we should see

them as complementary rather than alternative to each other, and we are making serious

efforts to evaluate these platforms in favour of our country” (Demir, 2024).

In the absence of a formal statement, media reports in September 2024 suggested that

Turkey had been invited to join the BRICS, a reflection of its efforts to increase its global

influence and forge new partnerships beyond traditional Western allies (Hacaoğlu &

Kozok, 2024). The media also reported that Turkey made an official application for

membership at the annual BRICS summit in Russia on 22-24 October 2024 (Waldman,

2024). This act is very much in line with President Erdoğan's official statement in early

September that "Turkey can become a strong, prosperous, respected and effective

country if it improves its relations with the East and the West at the same time" (Hacaoğlu

& Kozok, 2024). Turkey thus became the first NATO country to apply for BRICS

membership.

The absence of well-defined membership criteria compels the BRICS to evaluate each

membership application on a case-by-case basis (Lissovolik & Vinokurov, 2019). The

reaction of the existing BRICS members to Turkey's membership has been cautiously

receptive. However, there is clearly a lack of unanimity. Turkey's geographic position as

a Eurasian bridge and its NATO membership could lend BRICS additional geopolitical

weight, particularly regarding Euro-Atlantic institutions. China and Russia, key

proponents of BRICS enlargement, may view Turkey’s accession as a strategic gain.

President Putin also expressed his satisfaction with Turkey’s aspiration to align more

closely with BRICS, emphasising its desire for cooperation in addressing common

challenges and reaffirmed his support for Turkey’s bid for membership (PBS News, 2024).

In contrast to Russia, China maintained a somewhat ambiguous stance on this issue,

mainly due to the persistent tensions arising from the divergent sensitivities of both

countries regarding the Uyghur issue (Akın, 2024). In addition, reports have suggested

that India holds a negative stance toward Turkey’s potential BRICS membership,

primarily due to Turkey’s close ties with Pakistan and its support for Pakistan in the

Kashmir conflict (Bellut, 2024). India has not issued any formal statements or produced

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any official discourse regarding Turkey’s potential membership in BRICS. However, Prime

Minister Narendra Modi has offered insights into India’s general position on the admission

of new members, stating: “India is ready to welcome new countries as BRICS partner

countries. All decisions in this regard should be made unanimously, and the views of the

founding members of BRICS should be respected” (Times of India, 2024). Meanwhile,

South Africa and Brazil are likely to evaluate Turkey's bid based on its contributions to

global South agendas and development cooperation, wary of diluting BRICS’ cohesion

through overly rapid expansion (Stuenkel, 2015).

In response to reports suggesting that India is blocking Turkey’s accession to BRICS,

Turkish officials have come up with denials. The Turkish Minister of Trade Ömer Bolat

emphasized that “there is no question of India vetoing our membership” (Associated

Press, 2024), while former diplomat Sinan Ülgen noted that “there was ‘no need to veto’

Turkey’s membership, as the issue was not voted upon at the recent BRICS meet in

Kazan, Russia” (Varma, 2024).

Western governments have responded to Turkey’s BRICS overtures with a mixture of

concern and pragmatic recognition. Turkey’s potential BRICS membership is particularly

sensitive given its NATO status, raising fears of divided loyalties within the alliance

(Kirişci, 2020). Turkish officials have repeatedly said potential membership of BRICS

would not affect Turkey’s responsibilities to the Western military alliance (Reuters,

2024a). At the same time, some Western analysts interpret Turkey’s manoeuvre as a

strategic play rather than a definitive shift in allegiance (Öniş & Uluyol, 2025). Ankara

has a history of transactional diplomacy, leveraging its geostrategic location and political

relevance to extract concessions from both East and West (Gökay, 2024). In this sense,

Turkey's BRICS bid could be seen as a bargaining chip aimed at gaining greater

recognition and autonomy within existing Western-led institutions. This is

understandable, as Turkey is unlikely to leave its long-established position in Western

institutions.

According to Channel News Asia's coverage, Turkey's partner country status was

approved at the last BRICS meeting. The country listed among the 13 nations will be

waiting to join (Norman, 2024). By taking such a decision, the BRICS gained some time

to observe whether Turkey's rapprochement is a periodic change or not, as Turkey is still

institutionally, politically, economically and militarily cooperating with the West (Arı,

2022). But the partnership status seems to be falling short of Turkey’s expectation of

attaining full membership in BRICS, an outcome that would offer the country an

opportunity to maintain a more balanced relationship between the West and the East

(Reuters, 2024a). If this is indeed the case, there is the potential for Turkey to experience

a kind of disillusionment in its engagement with BRICS. Therefore, the issue has not

received much media coverage in Turkey, unless the top leadership mentions it.

Conclusion

This study has examined the recent transformation of Turkish foreign policy amid shifting

global and domestic dynamics, including the decline of unipolarity, the rise of new

powers, the enduring impact of the failed July 15 coup attempt, and the rise of populism.

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Within this framework, Turkey’s evolving approach to Westernism has been critically

analysed in relation to its bid for BRICS membership.

Historically anchored in a pro-Western orientation, Turkey’s foreign policy over the past

two decades has increasingly diverged due to growing frustration with the West and a

sense of marginalisation within the Western bloc. This has led to oscillations between

Westernism and anti-Westernism, culminating in a more pragmatic and self-reliant form

of Westernism. This new orientation seeks to balance traditional Western alliances with

alternative partnerships, such as those offered by BRICS, reflecting a strategic

recalibration rather than outright rejection.

Turkey's pivot toward non-Western platforms like BRICS is thus closely tied to its evolving

stance on Westernism. BRICS represents not only an economic opportunity but also a

geopolitical counterbalance to the West, with its emphasis on sovereignty, non-

interference, and multipolarity resonating with Turkey’s current foreign policy discourse.

Turkey’s renewed expressions of interest in BRICS, particularly during periods of

heightened tension with Western powers, underscore a calculated effort to diversify its

foreign policy options and enhance its autonomy.

In this light, Turkey’s engagement with BRICS is best understood as a rational strategy

aimed at balancing its diminishing alignment with Western institutions by cultivating

alternative global partnerships. Rather than signalling a definitive break from the West,

this strategy reflects Ankara’s desire to maximise its leverage in an increasingly

multipolar international order by pivoting between established and emerging power blocs,

through a more flexible engagement allowing it to safeguard its national interest.

Moving forward, Turkey’s evolving relationship with both Western institutions and

emerging platforms like BRICS will be a key indicator of its broader international

ambitions and strategic positioning. The interactions and reactions between BRICS

members and Turkey’s traditional Western allies highlight the complexities involved in

navigating divergent institutional loyalties and geopolitical commitments. As BRICS

broadens its influence and inclusiveness, Turkey’s possible membership could signal a

pivotal shift in global governance and a transformation of traditional alliances in the

twenty-first century.

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