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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between

Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025

169

INSTITUTIONAL BALANCING AS DIPLOMACY: TÜRKİYE’S DUAL-TRACK

ENGAGEMENT IN A MULTIPOLAR ORDER

SAMI KIRAZ

samikiraz@hitit.edu.tr

Assoc. Prof., Hitit University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of

International Relations (Turkey). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6987-9856

NAIL ELHAN

nailelhan@hitit.edu.tr

Assoc. Prof., Hitit University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of

International Relations (Turkey). https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5058-0280

Abstract

This study analyses Türkiye’s foreign policy strategy within the framework of institutional

balancing theory, a period marked by the increasing prominence of multipolarity and

institutional pluralism in the post-Cold War international system. In the study, Türkiye’s

increasing interaction with regional institutional structures, such as the SCO and OTS, while

maintaining its relations with Western-centred institutions like NATO and the EU, is examined

in the context of its search for strategic autonomy. Türkiye’s dual-track foreign policy

approach is evaluated not only as an axis shift but as a multi-vector and multi-layered foreign

policy model. Theoretically, based on the institutional balancing approach developed by Kai

He, this study reveals that Türkiye employs both inclusive and exclusive institutional strategies

to limit the influence of great powers. In this context, Türkiye’s historical relations with NATO

and the EU, as well as its institutional orientations within the framework of the SCO and OTS,

are comparatively examined, and it is claimed that it is seeking balance at the military,

diplomatic, economic, and normative levels. Along with being a passive regional actor,

Türkiye’s strategy demonstrates its multifaceted foreign policy approach and its emergence

as a middle power that actively participates in the normative and structural processes of the

international system. In this context, Türkiye’s institutional balancing practices provide an

important example for understanding the new roles that medium-sized states can play in the

changing international order.

Keywords

Institutional Balancing, Turkish Foreign Policy, Multi-layered Diplomacy, Emerging Middle

Powers, Western and Regional Institutions.

Resumo

Este estudo analisa a estratégia de política externa da Turquia no âmbito da teoria do

equilíbrio institucional, um período marcado pelo aumento da proeminência da

multipolaridade e do pluralismo institucional no sistema internacional pós-Guerra Fria. No

estudo, a crescente interação da Turquia com estruturas institucionais regionais, como a SCO

e a OTS, mantendo as suas relações com instituições centradas no Ocidente, como a OTAN e

a UE, é examinada no contexto da sua busca por autonomia estratégica. A abordagem de

política externa de dupla via da Turquia é avaliada não apenas como uma mudança de eixo,

mas como um modelo de política externa multivetorial e multifacetado. Teoricamente, com

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

170

base na abordagem de equilíbrio institucional desenvolvida por Kai He, este estudo revela que

a Turquia emprega estratégias institucionais inclusivas e exclusivas para limitar a influência

das grandes potências. Neste contexto, as relações históricas da Turquia com a OTAN e a UE,

bem como as suas orientações institucionais no âmbito da SCO e da OTS, são examinadas

comparativamente, e afirma-se que ela procura o equilíbrio nos níveis militar, diplomático,

económico e normativo. Além de ser um ator regional passivo, a estratégia da Turquia

demonstra a sua abordagem multifacetada da política externa e a sua emergência como uma

potência média que participa ativamente nos processos normativos e estruturais do sistema

internacional. Neste contexto, as práticas de equilíbrio institucional da Turquia fornecem um

exemplo importante para compreender os novos papéis que os Estados de média dimensão

podem desempenhar na ordem internacional em mudança.

Palavras-chave

Equilíbrio institucional, política externa turca, diplomacia multifacetada, potências médias

emergentes, instituições ocidentais e regionais.

How to cite this article

Kiraz, Sami & Elhan, Nail (2025). Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track

Engagement in a Multipolar Order. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier

- Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December

2025, pp. 169-186. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0525.9

Article submitted on 29th May 2025 and accepted for publication on 29th September

2025.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

171

INSTITUTIONAL BALANCING AS DIPLOMACY: TÜRKİYE’S DUAL-

TRACK ENGAGEMENT IN A MULTIPOLAR ORDER

SAMI KIRAZ

NAIL ELHAN

Introduction

The international system has evolved into a multi-centred and dynamic structure in the

distribution of power and the functioning of institutions after the Cold War. The increasing

questioning of the unipolar order led by the U.S. has shifted towards new strategic

pursuits and alternative alliance structures at both regional and global levels. This

transformation heralds a period in which emerging and medium-sized powers, especially,

are turning to balancing great power influence with more flexible, multi-layered, and

institutional tools instead of direct military confrontation. This tendency is explained by

the concept of “institutional balancing” and refers to the strategies developed by states

through institutions to limit the influence of great powers.

This study examines the institutional balancing practices in the context of Türkiye’s multi-

level foreign policy strategy. Türkiye’s foreign policy orientation is evaluated not only as

an axis shift from the West to the East but as a multi-vector, flexible and strategic

autonomy-focused diplomacy to maximise its interests. While Türkiye continues its

relations with Western-centred institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU),

it also turns to alternative regional institutional structures such as the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and

increasingly develops engagement with these structures. This strategy allows Türkiye to

redefine its position in the international system and protect its security and economic

interests on multilateral platforms.

In this context, the study seeks answers to the following fundamental questions: Why

and how does Türkiye develop engagement with alternative regional institutions while

maintaining its position in Western-centred institutional structures? What forms of

institutional balancing theory do Türkiye’s relations with institutions such as the SCO and

OTS overlap with? How does Türkiye’s multi-level institutional strategy shape its status

in the international system, regional influence, and search for strategic autonomy?

The study’s theoretical framework, which aims to address these issues, is founded on Kai

He’s institutional balancing method. To minimise the impact of big powers or safeguard

their own interests, governments try to reform current institutions or lead the creation

of new regional structures. Türkiye’s continuation of its relations with NATO and the EU,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

172

while increasing its interaction with institutions such as the SCO and the OTS, can be

considered an empirical example of this theoretical approach.

The study evaluates Türkiye’s institutional engagements with NATO and the EU

historically and contextually. Then, it analyses its alternative regional institutional

orientations within the SCO and the OTS framework. This comparative analysis reveals

that Türkiye simultaneously adopts inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing forms

and has a strategic orientation to increase its autonomy within the multipolar system.

The findings reveal that Türkiye is trying to establish institutional balance not only in the

military but also at diplomatic, economic, and normative levels. Comparable strategies

are visible beyond Türkiye. India’s concurrent engagement with BRICS, Indonesia’s

ASEAN-centric multilateralism, and Brazil’s regional institutionalisation for status politics

each illustrate a wider pattern of dual-track institutional leverage. Framing Türkiye within

this global repertoire clarifies both its commonalities and its specific mix of instruments.

As a result, Türkiye’s institutional strategy reflects a multi-layered foreign policy model

that enables it to both maintain its engagement with traditional Western structures and

to take an active role in alternative institutionalisation processes at the regional level.

This model shows that Türkiye is positioned not only as a passive actor in the

international system but also as an “emerging middle power” that intervenes in

normative and structural transformation processes. Rather than depicting Türkiye as

merely defensive, this article shows that institutional balancing simultaneously constrains

great-power influence and enables game-setting behaviour. In the Turkish case,

NATO/EU function as channels of inclusive balancing, while SCO/OTS operate as exclusive

balancing; together, they yield not only constraint but also status enhancement and a

broader autonomy-producing policy space. The remainder of the study will discuss the

empirical implications of this strategy in detail.

Theoretical Framework and Its Relevance

The traditional balance of power theory claims that states try to balance against their

rivals by forming alliances or arming themselves to ensure security (Waltz, 1979: 127).

Although there is a general acceptance in the literature that states follow balancing

strategies, it is argued that balancing can be achieved for different reasons (threat

balancing) (Walt, 1985) or with various methods (Pape, 2005; David, 1991; Paul, 2005).

In the post-Cold War era, states favoured cost-effective and flexible strategies over direct

military balancing as the international economic system became more integrated. In this

context, institutional balancing emerged, describing how emerging powers use

international and regional institutions to enhance their standing and mitigate great

powers’ influence (He, 2008). This transition also underlines a theoretical shift: whereas

balance of power and balance of threat approaches in the realist tradition primarily

emphasise military capabilities and threat perceptions, institutional balancing—drawing

on a more liberal understanding—highlights the role of institutions in shaping state

behaviour. In today’s interconnected order, where direct military balancing is costly and

often counterproductive, institutional balancing provides a more convincing explanation

of how states seek influence and security through multilateral frameworks.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

173

Emerging powers in the international system develop strategies to gain more influence

and status and reflect their regional priorities within the dominant order without

completely rejecting the norms and institutions of the existing order. One of these

strategies is institutional balancing, which enables power competition within the system

to be conducted through softer institutional tools, thereby avoiding military conflict.

Theoretically, this approach is based on the institutional balancing theory developed by

Kai He. According to this theory, emerging powers aim to strengthen their positions

within the international system not by directly challenging the military dominance of

great powers but by engaging with multilateral international and regional institutions (He,

2008: 492). This approach seeks to ensure their security while also working towards

establishing a more equitable global order. It is argued that this balancing strategy is

used to achieve the following goals: Balancing global power asymmetries, seeking

international status, and establishing regional leadership. Emerging powers try to balance

the institutional advantages of great powers by turning to regional organisations to

overcome the limitations they face in Western-centred international institutions for

various reasons. Moreover, the gains achieved also bring symbolic gains such as

recognition and prestige to these states. Thus, the limitations and limited influence in the

system are increased through flexible and regional structures designed to suit their

positions (He, 2022: 1112).

Institutional balancing occurs in two forms: inclusive, where a targeted power’s influence

is limited through norms within institutions that include it, and exclusive, where a rival

is prevented from participation in new or alternative structures (He, 2008: 493).

Emerging powers favour these strategies for security, cost-effectiveness, and

sustainability. This approach gains legitimacy in contexts where military force is less

preferred (He and Feng, 2020: 493). Türkiye exemplifies this framework by maintaining

ties with Western institutions like NATO and the EU while also pursuing regional priorities

through organisations like OTS and SCO. Thus, Türkiye is not simply an emerging power

distancing itself from the West but rather balancing its interests through bilateral

engagement and a multi-level foreign policy strategy.

The international system after the Cold War and in the 21st century has significantly

impacted institutional balancing, becoming a widespread balancing strategy. As a result,

the US-led short-term liberal order has developed into a more intricate and multipolar

framework (Peters, 2023: 1653). This dynamic results from changes in the distribution

of material power and is also impacted by expanding debates on the validity and

operation of the existing institutional framework. As a result, not only the major powers

but also the emerging ones now possess the ability to shape the institutional framework

within this new multipolar system. The new multipolar environment shows that the

distribution of power is concentrated in multiple centres, and the hegemonic superiority

of a single actor has disappeared (Peters, 2023: 1661-62). This transition process has

required re-establishing the balance of power, redefining institutional arrangements, and

creating new norms and rules. This situation points to a phase in which the emerging

powers have mainly taken on new roles: demands for reform in existing institutions and

the search for an alternative order through new institutions. Based on the claim that the

current order is Western-centred and under the control of Western states, the emerging

powers’ demands for more active participation in decision-making processes and the

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

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desire to determine new norms are on the agenda of contemporary international politics

(Stephen, 2017: 490). On the other hand, situations where existing limitations cannot

be overcome lead emerging powers to turn to options such as building regional or

thematic institutions under their leadership or engaging with existing non-Western

institutions. Thus, the institutional basis of multipolarity is strengthened by creating

institutional pluralism.

In this context, it becomes clear that emerging powers’ basic strategy is institutional

balancing. This more complex strategy is now implemented to balance the hegemon and

shape cooperation or competition behaviours with other emerging powers. Therefore, the

general character of the new multipolar system is evolving not only into military or

economic but also into institutional competition and normative struggle.

Türkiye’s strategy, presented in the next section, provides a unique example of this

approach. Türkiye, which pursues a dual strategy, continues its NATO membership and

EU candidacy process on the one hand. On the other hand, it created new relationships

with SCO and led the way in the creation of regional organisations like OTS. This strategy

strengthens Türkiye’s economic and security interests while fostering a multifaceted

identity in a multipolar environment. By aiming to be a more active player in the

international order, Türkiye and other emerging powers seek to influence the system’s

normative and administrative structures through various institutional engagements.

The dual strategy and the inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing approaches

significantly impact emerging powers’ roles in international politics. According to the

general approach in the literature, it is claimed that the balancing strategy pursued

through Western-centred institutions and non-Western structures brings two different

roles to emerging powers: complementary and competitive roles (Roy, 2022: 5; Voeten,

2017; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2006). According to the complementary role approach,

while Western-centred international institutions aim to set norms and provide solutions

to global problem areas, regional institutions are motivated to respond to individual needs

through geographical, cultural and political goals. For this reason, a division of labour

emerges between the two types of institutional structures. When evaluating the

institutions with which Türkiye is engaged, NATO envisions a security architecture based

on collective security and deterrence. However, it cannot create flexibility for its

members’ different regional security perspectives. Similarly, the EU, while presenting an

economic and political integration model, may conflict with the individual economic and

political realities of its members. In this context, new regional institutions such as OTS

provide alternative multilateral platforms in terms of regional solidarity, soft power

practices, and the construction of a common identity; and the SCO provides alternative

multilateral platforms in areas such as regional security cooperation and energy

diplomacy with a Eurasia-centred perspective.

On the other hand, the competitive role approach claims that newly established or

institutionalised regional institutions are alternative structures developed for emerging

powers experiencing global representation crises or unable to find solutions to their

problems. In alternative ways, these organisations serve as hubs for regional influence

and institutional agendas. It is widely acknowledged that these two positions can live

peacefully. When viewed from the example of Türkiye, both being a permanent and active

member of NATO and maintaining its relations with the EU at a strategic level reflect

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

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Türkiye’s traditional approach. However, taking a leading position in the TDT and

developing institutional relations with the SCO provides the opportunity to produce new

solutions to the problems encountered and, simultaneously, flexibility, diversity, and

autonomy in its foreign policy strategy. Therefore, Türkiye’s institutional balance strategy

can be evaluated as combining complementary and competitive approaches.

In summary, the theory of institutional balancing offers a strong framework to explain

the strategies and choices of emerging powers within international and regional

organisations. For Türkiye, maintaining its position in existing institutions (such as NATO

and the EU) and deepening relations with alternative formations (such as the TDT and

the SCO) reflect a multi-layered and multifaceted strategy. The use of inclusive and

exclusive institutional balancing strategies together and assuming both complementary

and competitive roles at the same time shows that Türkiye is an active emerging power

that tries to shape the norms and functioning of the order of the changing international

system. In the next section, the foreign policy reflections of Türkiye’s different

institutional engagements and strategies will be examined empirically through this

theoretical framework.

Türkiye’s Engagement with Western Institutions

As an emerging middle power, Türkiye follows a dual foreign policy engaging both

Western and non-Western institutions. Institutional balancing suggests that states use

international organisations to offset great power influence through cooperation rather

than confrontation. Regionalisation similarly stresses collaboration among proximate

states within the global system (Held et al., 2004: 19). In today’s order, globalisation

and stronger regional dynamics push states toward multi-layered strategies.

This dual strategy is reflected in Türkiye’s EU candidacy and NATO membership. It

cultivates regional connections through the OTS and the SCO while simultaneously

pursuing security and legitimacy through Western institutions. This approach seeks to

advance national interests on several levels while striking a balance between big powers

and regional alternatives rather than indicating an “axis shift.” Through the prisms of

regionalisation and institutional balance, the following sections examine the tenets and

difficulties of Türkiye’s NATO membership and its EU accession path.

Türkiye’s NATO Membership

Amid post-World War II security concerns and a desire to connect with the West, Türkiye

joined NATO in 1952. Faced with Soviet pressure over the Straits and eastern borders,

Ankara turned decisively toward the Western bloc. U.S. support under the 1947 Truman

Doctrine reinforced Türkiye’s role as a key barrier to Soviet expansion (McGhee, 1990:

21). Having stayed neutral during most of the war, Türkiye abandoned this stance as

Cold War tensions grew. To meet Western expectations, it accelerated democratic

reforms and economic liberalisation. Despite doubts about its democratic maturity,

Türkiye’s dispatch of troops to Korea in 1950 and its heavy losses there were decisive in

gaining NATO’s approval (Zürcher, 2005: 235). It became a full member in February

1952, just three years after NATO’s creation.

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

176

Türkiye’s main strategic goal in joining NATO was to secure protection against the Soviet

Union under the Alliance’s collective defence, particularly through Article 5’s guarantee

of U.S. and European support (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019). Membership also affirmed Türkiye’s

political and identity-based alignment with the West, solidifying its role as a frontline

state (Oğuzlu, 2013: 3). This integration enhanced its international status and

accelerated military modernisation through aid, equipment, and training (Ünlühisarcıklı,

2019). As a full member, Türkiye also gained a platform to assert its security priorities

within NATO decision-making structures (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019).

Türkiye has played a key military and strategic role in NATO (Oğuzlu, 2013: 3). Its

geography made it a forward post on the Alliance’s southern flank during the Cold War.

With NATO’s second-largest army, Türkiye helped deter Soviet expansion from the 1950s

to the 1980s. Bases like İncirlik were central to NATO operations; the Jupiter missiles

deployed there, for example, were crucial in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Turkish

airspace and intelligence infrastructure also provided vital surveillance against Soviet

activities.

Since the Cold War’s end, Türkiye has supported NATO’s evolving missions. In the 1990s,

it contributed to UN-backed peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. Post-2001, Türkiye

twice led ISAF in Afghanistan and maintained troops there for years (Ünlühisarcıklı,

2019). It supported NATO’s 2011 Libya mission with logistics and naval assets and hosted

Patriot missiles against threats from Iraq and Syria. Türkiye also provided an early-

warning radar for NATO’s missile defence. These efforts reflect its continued commitment

as a contributor, not just a beneficiary, within the Alliance. Türkiye’s NATO role includes

key political engagement alongside its military contributions. Despite the 1974 Cyprus

intervention and ensuing U.S. arms embargo, Türkiye upheld alliance solidarity. Even

during the 1980s military coup, NATO membership remained central to its foreign policy,

reinforcing international legitimacy (Kınacıoğlu, 2017). Due to this stance, Türkiye’s

regional influence has grown, allowing it to manage disputes in the Middle East and the

Caucasus while preserving its reputation as a trustworthy Western ally.

Türkiye’s relations with NATO countries have become more strained in recent years. Its

security emphasis changed after the Cold War from the Soviet threat to Middle Eastern

instability and PKK terrorism (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019). NATO’s limited response to these

concerns led to doubts about its relevance. The 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, for

instance, created a power vacuum in northern Iraq exploited by the PKK, while U.S.

support fell short of Turkish expectations (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019). U.S. backing of the

PYD/YPG in Syria—groups Türkiye links to the PKK—further deepened mistrust. These

dynamics have pushed Türkiye to seek greater autonomy in addressing its security

needs.

A major recent crisis in Türkiye-NATO relations was Ankara’s 2017 purchase of Russia’s

S-400 air-defence system (Kibaroğlu, 2019). After unsuccessful efforts to acquire U.S.

Patriots on favourable terms, Türkiye turned to Moscow and received the first S-400 units

in 2019, which was the first deployment of such a system by a NATO member. This move

violated NATO protocols and raised concerns over interoperability and intelligence

security (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019). The U.S. claimed the S-400s jeopardised NATO systems,

especially the F-35, and responded by excluding Türkiye from the F-35 program and

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

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Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

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imposing sanctions. While some saw this as a pivot toward Russia, Ankara maintained its

NATO commitment, citing national defence needs as the sole motive.

Beyond the S-400 dispute, Türkiye has clashed with NATO allies over Syria policy, Eastern

Mediterranean issues, and democratic standards (Bardakçı, 2021). Tensions escalated

after the 2016 coup attempt, with Western criticism growing over Ankara’s cooperation

with Russia and Iran through the Astana process, further straining alliance trust (Armutlu,

2023: 5). Regarding their positions on PKK/PYD activity, Türkiye postponed Sweden’s

and Finland’s NATO bids in 2022 (Aslan, 2024: 750). Finland’s membership was only

accepted after certain security guarantees were obtained. This event confirmed Türkiye’s

ongoing strategic influence inside the Alliance and demonstrated how it uses the

consensus rule of NATO to further its objectives.

There are two strategies reflected in Türkiye’s present NATO stance. Ankara seeks

strategic autonomy through deeper connections with non-NATO countries like China and

Russia, even as it upholds Alliance unity and supports initiatives like NATO’s reaction to

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This reflects factors like Türkiye’s reliance on Russian

natural gas as well as geopolitical calculations. From an institutional-balancing view,

Türkiye engages with NATO for security and legitimacy while using platforms like the SCO

and BRICS to counterbalance Western influence. Erdoğan’s “the world is bigger than five”

rhetoric and participation in BRICS and SCO summits highlight Ankara’s goal of asserting

itself in a multipolar world.

A hybrid engagement paradigm that integrates both types of institutional balance is

demonstrated by Türkiye’s relationship with NATO. NATO membership served as a means

of achieving both political and normative integration with the West and security

assurances during the Cold War. It can be viewed as an illustration of inclusive

institutional balance in this regard. Nevertheless, as security threats have changed and

tensions with allies have increased in the post-Cold War era, Türkiye has begun looking

into non-Western institutional options. Its participation in SCO and BRICS is indicative of

an attempt to increase its strategic independence and is consistent with alternative or

exclusive institutional balancing tactics meant to thwart Western limitations. Thus,

Türkiye’s involvement within the NATO framework demonstrates that institutional

balancing is not limited to great powers but can also be flexibly employed by middle

powers, which is an empirical contribution to the theoretical framework.

Türkiye’s EU Accession Process

Türkiye’s relationship with the EU has been intermittent, focused on economic and

political integration rather than security. It began with Türkiye’s 1959 application for

associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), followed by the 1963

Ankara Agreement, which set a phased path toward full membership (Ünver Noi, 2025:

138–139). Article 28 of the Agreement proposed accession once relations had sufficiently

advanced. The 1970 Additional Protocol laid the groundwork for a customs union and

policy alignment. However, the 1971 military intervention and rising nationalist-leftist

opposition to the EEC stalled momentum. After the 1974 Cyprus intervention, ties

deteriorated further, and the process was suspended. Although relations improved in the

1980s, the 1980 coup and subsequent human rights concerns drew EU criticism (Akgül-

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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations

December 2025, pp. 169-186

Institutional Balancing as Diplomacy: Türkiye’s Dual-Track Engagement in a Multipolar Order

Sami Kiraz, Nail Elhan

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Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, 2012). In 1987, the Özal government applied for full

membership, but the 1989 Commission report rejected negotiations due to Türkiye’s

economic and democratic shortcomings. Still, by the early 1990s, relations had

normalised. The end of the Cold War and the expansion of European integration changed

the geopolitical positioning of Türkiye. Deep economic integration short of membership

was fostered in 1995 when the Customs Union agreement matched Türkiye’s external

tariffs with the EU and provided Turkish industrial goods tariff-free access (Hale & Avcı,

2001).

A turning point came at the 1997 Luxembourg summit, which excluded Türkiye from the

first wave of Eastern enlargements. This setback was reversed at the 1999 Helsinki

summit, where Türkiye was granted candidate status (Müftüler-Baç, 2017: 421) “on

equal footing” with other aspirants. Ankara responded with major reforms under the 2001

National Programme: abolishing the death penalty, expanding Kurdish-language

broadcasting, and reducing military influence to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Recognising these steps, the 2004 Brussels European Council agreed to begin accession

talks on 3 October 2005 (Öniş, 2003). Despite early momentum, negotiations stalled

after 2006, mainly due to the Cyprus issue. Türkiye refused to recognise the Republic of

Cyprus or open its ports until the EU lifted restrictions on Northern Cyprus (Tetik, 2021:

382). In response, the EU froze eight chapters. Subsequently, countries like France and

Germany imposed further political blocks, proposing alternatives such as “privileged

partnership.” By the 2010s, talks had effectively stalled: only 16 of 35 chapters were

opened, with no progress amid concerns over democratic backsliding and rule-of-law

violations.

The 2016 coup attempt and ensuing emergency measures severely strained Türkiye–EU

relations (Akçay & Deniş, 2022). The European Parliament recommended suspending

accession talks, and by 2018, the Commission declared them effectively frozen (European

Parliament, 2019). Although Türkiye remains a candidate, no meaningful progress has

occurred since. Nevertheless, there were significant benefits to the process: EU-led

reforms in the early 2000s improved both internal stability and international reputation.

By supporting “zero problems” diplomacy, strengthening relations with Greece, and

enabling Turkish support for the 2004 Cyprus referendum, these changes enhanced

Ankara’s reputation as a positive regional player (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009: 9–10).

Türkiye’s economic foreign policy has also been impacted by the EU process. By

increasing trade and EU foreign direct investment, the 1996 Customs Union improved

Türkiye’s soft power and regional economic attractiveness. While the prospect of

membership enhanced Türkiye’s reputation as a democratic, Western-oriented country,

conforming to EU criteria also helped relations with neighbours. This “model country”

perception in the 2000s enabled Türkiye to project soft power in the Middle East and

adopt a more confident foreign policy before the Arab Uprisings.

The EU process has given Türkiye diplomatic leverage. During the Syrian refugee crisis

in 2015, Ankara utilised its candidate status to negotiate an agreement with the EU that

includes negotiations on visa liberalisation, financial help, and an update to the Customs

Union. This demonstrated how influence over regional issues may result from EU

alignment. Additionally, perceptions of EU proximity improved Türkiye’s credibility in the

area of foreign policy. Frustration has been heightened by the slow admittance process,

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179

though. Long-term delays have made people and elites more sceptical of Europe; by the

2010s, support for EU membership had drastically decreased (Aydın-Düzgit, 2016: 4).

This change promoted a more independent, nationalist foreign policy and undermined

Türkiye’s Europe-focused diplomacy. Calls for “strategic autonomy” after 2010 reflect

growing disillusionment with the EU path (Waldman & Çalışkan, 2017), prompting Ankara

to focus more on its own regional agenda.

The EU accession process has also limited Türkiye’s foreign-policy autonomy. As a

candidate, Türkiye was expected to align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security

Policy, including sanctions on Iran and positions in the Middle East. Similarly, the 1996

Customs Union boosted trade but bound Türkiye to the EU trade policy. When the EU

signed free-trade agreements with countries like South Korea or Canada, Türkiye had to

open its market without gaining reciprocal access. Attempts to negotiate bilateral deals

often failed, as these countries already benefited from duty-free entry. Thus, deep

integration without membership came at a sovereignty cost: Türkiye followed rules it

could not influence.

The prolonged and uncertain EU accession process has, at times, enabled democratic

backsliding in Türkiye. While reform efforts were strong until 2005, stalled talks eroded

momentum. From the 2010s, authoritarian tendencies deepened despite EU criticism,

which lost influence as membership prospects dimmed. The weakening of the EU “anchor”

harmed Türkiye’s democratic image and raised concerns in the West. This uncertainty

has contributed to Türkiye’s turn toward more nationalist and isolationist policies.

With EU accession prospects fading, Türkiye has deepened ties with regional

organisations. Erdoğan’s 2013 remark, “Invite us into the Shanghai Five and we’ll bid the

EU farewell”, reflected this pivot (Daily Sabah, 2013). Türkiye became a dialogue partner

of the SCO in 2012 and has since engaged with BRICS, joining its 2022 BRICS+ meeting.

As an active member and former chair of the OTS, Ankara has also reinforced cooperation

with Turkic republics. These actions, which are occasionally viewed as EU alternatives,

show an institutional balancing strategy: By strengthening its regional power and

maintaining EU links, Türkiye positions itself as a major actor in a multipolar world.

Türkiye’s dual engagement with NATO and the EU exemplifies institutional balancing:

while NATO offers security and the EU provides normative and economic legitimacy,

Ankara also cultivates strategic autonomy through ties with the SCO, BRICS, and the

OTS. This approach reflects a flexible, multi-vector diplomacy suited to a middle power

navigating a multipolar world (He, 2008). By expanding its influence through regional

platforms and acting independently, Türkiye’s actions demonstrate its intention to not

only conform to Western ideals but also to widen institutional balancing beyond the

military to encompass diplomatic and economic aspects.

Türkiye’s Engagement with Non-Western Regional Institutions

Türkiye’s foreign policy seeks multidimensional ties with both global and regional actors.

Its involvement in the OTS and the SCO enhances regional influence while offsetting

great power dominance. From institutional balancing and regionalisation perspectives,

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such engagement expands Türkiye’s geopolitical space. Notably, a 2022 survey named

Türkiye the most trusted external actor in Central Asia (Purtaş, 2025: 115).

Türkiye’s Relations with the Organisation of Turkic States

The OTS, founded in 2009 and renamed in 2021, functions as a regional cooperation

platform. According to institutional-balancing theory, states use such bodies to counter

rival powers (He, 2009: 17), while regionalisation refers to growing integration within

specific geographies (Hurrell, 1995: 345). Led by Türkiye and framed by pan-Turkic

rhetoric, the OTS aims to expand Ankara’s strategic reach. Though Türkiye promotes

itself as the leader of the Turkic world, invoking slogans like “from the Adriatic to the

Great Wall,” its engagement remains pragmatic. Pan-Turkism serves as a legitimising

narrative, but cooperation is driven by political and economic interests (Krzyżanowska,

2024).

Pan-Turkist discourse provides the ideological foundation of the OTS, highlighting shared

language, culture, and history among Turkic peoples. In Türkiye, it has gained traction

in the 2020s, notably during support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict

(Krzyżanowska, 2024; Matveev, 2025). Its broad societal appeal gives legitimacy to

Türkiye’s regional initiatives and is embraced across the political spectrum

(Krzyżanowska, 2024). However, modern Pan-Turkism remains symbolic; Ankara avoids

irredentism and respects sovereignty (Matveev, 2025). Even while supporting Turkic

minorities such as Crimean Tatars and Uyghurs, Türkiye avoids taking any steps that

would sour relations with Russia or China. Rather, Pan-Turkism serves as a cultural and

public diplomacy instrument that strengthens Türkiye’s position as the world’s leading

nation.

The OTS prioritises economic cooperation and transport connectivity, aiming to ease

trade and develop transcontinental routes (Krzyżanowska, 2024). Following Russia’s

2022 invasion of Ukraine, which disrupted the Northern Corridor, the Middle Corridor via

Türkiye gained strategic significance. OTS members have advanced Caspian transit

projects to create a seamless Europe–Asia link, with Türkiye at the centre (Demir, 2022).

A €10 billion commitment from international institutions in 2024 highlights the corridor’s

geoeconomic promise (European Commission, 2024). These efforts not only boost

Türkiye’s regional influence but also offer Central Asian states an institutional alternative

to Russian dominance, reinforcing Türkiye’s institutional balancing strategy

(Krzyżanowska, 2024).

For Türkiye, the OTS functions as a geopolitical tool to strengthen its influence in Central

Asia and the Caucasus. Regionalisation through the OTS enables Ankara to expand its

institutional presence in Eurasia, alongside its Western ties. Granting observer status to

the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 2022 demonstrates how Türkiye integrates

its national interests into the organisation’s agenda (Krzyżanowska, 2024). Similarly,

naming Shusha the “cultural capital of the Turkic world” after Azerbaijan’s Karabakh

victory reflects how Türkiye and Azerbaijan advance shared goals within the OTS. These

moves reinforce Turkish leadership while accommodating diverse member priorities.

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While Türkiye leads the OTS, member states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan maintain

strategic balances with Russia, China, and the West. Türkiye’s early recognition of these

states in the 1990s did not translate into immediate regional influence. Kazakhstan

resisted deeper integration in favour of a multi-vector policy, and Uzbekistan remained

cautious of Türkiye’s ambitions (Matveev, 2025). As a result, Türkiye’s role is not

hegemonic but based on soft power and consent (Wilson, 2023). Through TİKA aid,

scholarships, and cultural diplomacy, Ankara has built influence and fostered long-term

ties since the early 1990s (Krzyżanowska, 2024). The OTS thus operates as a flexible

platform where pan-Turkic identity supports economic and diplomatic collaboration. In

institutional-balancing terms, Türkiye uses the OTS to counter major powers through

regional solidarity. From a regionalisation perspective, the OTS marks a new power

centre, positioning Türkiye and its allies in the shifting global order.

The OTS represents a key platform for Türkiye’s institutional balancing at the regional

level. Through the OTS, Ankara builds institutional influence in Eurasia while aligning

pan-Turkist discourse with its geopolitical and economic interests, reinforcing its multi-

vector foreign policy. The OTS complements Türkiye’s engagement with Western

alliances by offering a regional counterweight and greater autonomy in Central Asia amid

great-power competition. This scenario demonstrates that institutional balance is

applicable to intermediate powers like Türkiye’s attempts to establish regional order as

well as to great powers.

Türkiye’s Relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Türkiye’s involvement in the SCO is indicative of its multifaceted foreign strategy and

emphasis on Eurasia. As a “dialogue partner” since 2012 (Güpgüpoğlu, 2019), Ankara

has shown occasional interest in full membership. From an institutional balancing view,

this engagement expands Türkiye’s diplomatic space beyond Western alliances (He,

2009: 88). Regionally, it signals a strategy of embracing overlapping identities and

alliances beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

Post–Cold War Eurasianist ideology in Türkiye has fueled calls to pivot away from the

West (Aksu, 2022). Popular among nationalist circles, this discourse advocates exiting

NATO, abandoning EU aspirations, and aligning with an “anti-imperialist” bloc led by

Russia and China (Çolakoğlu, 2019). Figures like Doğu Perinçek argue that Türkiye is a

subordinate in the Atlantic but an equal partner in Eurasia, urging ties with Moscow and

Beijing. Eurasianists welcomed joint military exercises with China and the S-400 missile

deal with Russia as steps against Western dominance (Çolakoğlu, 2019). From the mid-

2010s, especially after the 2016 coup attempt and tensions with the West, the AK Party

adopted elements of this outlook. In late 2016, amid stalled EU talks, President Erdoğan

asked, “Why shouldn’t Türkiye be in the Shanghai Five?” (Reuters, 2016), prompting

concerns in the West. Being the first NATO member to join the SCO, full Turkish

participation might change the internal dynamics of the alliance (Falk, 2022). Such

discourse gave their stance some political validity by echoing Eurasianist demands for a

strategic rupture from the West.

There are more than simply ideological reasons for Türkiye’s involvement in the SCO.

First, the SCO provides a forum for regional security cooperation by focusing on

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counterterrorism, separatism, and extremism, which is in line with Türkiye’s worries

about the PKK and extremist organisations. Second, important motivators are energy

and economic links. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and related SCO projects

present Türkiye with new markets and investment opportunities, supporting its goal to

integrate into Eurasian infrastructure and energy networks. Third, frustration with the

West—stemming from stalled EU accession, tensions with European states, and U.S.

disputes over Syria and sanctions—has pushed Ankara to explore alternatives. According

to Erdoğan, SCO membership might provide political sovereignty without the EU’s

democratic and human rights conditions (Dalay, 2013). The SCO was a desirable

alternative, particularly after 2016, because of its adaptable rules and emphasis on

sovereignty, which matched Türkiye’s changing foreign policy objectives.

It is incorrect to see Türkiye’s participation in the SCO as a complete rupture with the

West. From an institutional balancing perspective, Ankara seeks equilibrium—remaining

in the Western alliance while building ties with Russia and China to navigate great-power

dynamics. This reflects a “soft balancing” or “multi-vector” strategy (Falk, 2022; Erşen,

2022). While Erdoğan’s support for full membership and participation at the 2022 SCO

summit demonstrated intent (Falk, 2022), he quickly reiterated NATO’s centrality to

Turkish strategy, asserting that the SCO and BRICS are not alternatives. Ankara’s

diplomacy is characterised by this two-pronged strategy, which uses both the East and

the West for strategic and financial gain.

NATO partners have expressed worry about Türkiye’s geopolitical course because of its

growing connections with the SCO. The U.S. sanctions that followed the 2017 acquisition

of S-400 missiles were interpreted as evidence of growing Eurasianist influence

(Çolakoğlu, 2019). However, Türkiye has avoided entirely distancing itself from NATO

and supplied drones to Ukraine and mediated between Moscow and Kyiv during the

Ukraine War, even while abstaining from Western sanctions. This reflects Türkiye’s

strategy of engaging multiple power centres to preserve flexibility. According to the

institutional balance theory, nations use this kind of activity to further their interests by

preserving their connections across rival blocs (He, 2009: 92). This dual-track strategy

is demonstrated by Türkiye’s membership in both NATO and the SCO, which allows it to

act independently within conflicting geopolitical frameworks.

The interaction between Türkiye and the SCO is a prime example of institutional balance.

Ankara uses other forums, including the SCO, to increase strategic adaptability and

pursue a multi-vector foreign strategy while preserving its place in the Western alliance.

The SCO increases Türkiye’s political clout by providing economic cooperation and

security without stringent normative requirements. This engagement reflects Ankara’s

effort to avoid full Western dependence and establish institutional pluralism in Eurasia to

operate more autonomously.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study analyses Türkiye’s foreign policy from an institutional balancing perspective,

evaluating its multi-level institutional engagements with both Western-centred

institutions (NATO, EU) and non-Western alternative structures (SCO, OTS) within their

strategic context. The findings indicate that Türkiye’s foreign policy preferences are

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shaped not by a mere change of direction or an axis shift but by a search for strategic

autonomy as an emerging power in an environment of increasing competition and

uncertainty within the multipolar international system.

At a theoretical level, Türkiye’s behaviour aligns with both inclusive and exclusive

strategies as defined by Kai He in the institutional balancing model. While relations with

NATO and the EU indicate a search for legitimacy, normative harmony and security

guarantees, ties developed with regional forums such as the SCO and OTS indicate

Türkiye’s efforts to create alternative institutional spaces to balance pressures and

limitations coming from the West. This situation reveals that Türkiye is not only an actor

trying to adapt to the current international order but also an emerging power that desires

to reshape regional and global norms.

Türkiye’s emerging power position is reinforced not only by its economic capacity but

also by its institutional initiative, multi-vector diplomacy and the mediation roles it has

developed in times of crisis. While the EU membership process provides Türkiye with

long-term strategic advantages through economic arrangements and reform processes,

such as the Customs Union, structures like the SCO and the OTS strengthen Türkiye’s

leadership position in Eurasia and the Turkic world at both symbolic and functional levels.

Through this diverse involvement, Türkiye can increase its adaptability and influence

within the global power structure.

As a result, Türkiye, an emerging middle power, is creating an institutional balancing

plan to safeguard its interests in multilateral institutions and reduce the dominance of

superpowers in the shifting global landscape. This approach reflects Ankara’s claim to be

an actor that not only adapts but also shapes. The Turkish example demonstrates that

institutional balancing provides a valid and meaningful strategic model not only for great

powers but also for emerging actors with regional influence.

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