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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between
Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025
106
INDONESIA’S STRATEGIC USE OF ASEAN IN BALANCING REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL POWER DYNAMICS
HARSH MAHASETH
Hmahaseth@jgu.edu.in / Harshmahaseth95@gmail.com
Associate Professor, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat (India)
Associate Director, Nehginpao Kipgen Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, O.P. Jindal Global
University. ORCID: 0000-0001-7752-5110
FATIMA ZAINAB
fatimazainab92003@gmail.com
Law Student, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (India)
Abstract
Indonesia, a prominent emerging power in Southeast Asia, occupies a strategically vital
position in the Indo-Pacific region. Under former President Joko Widodo, Indonesia embraced
the vision of becoming a "Global Maritime Fulcrum" while striving to assert itself as a global
political and economic force. This ambition unfolds amidst the evolving and polarised global
order, where the Indo-Pacific emerges as a hotspot for geopolitical rivalries, notably between
the United States and China. Strategic initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), India’s Act East Policy, Russia’s Turn to the East, and the United States’ Pivot to Asia
present both opportunities and challenges to Indonesia’s pursuit of its national interests.
ASEAN serves as Indonesia’s diplomatic instrument to navigate these rivalries. By advocating
for ASEAN centrality, Indonesia works to prevent member states from aligning exclusively
with rival powers, thereby safeguarding regional stability and protecting its national interests.
However, the very principle of ASEAN centrality can also limit Indonesia’s ability to prioritise
its own strategic objectives independently. This paper examines how Indonesia leverages its
leadership role in ASEAN to create a regional sphere of influence while simultaneously
engaging with global institutions such as the UN, WTO, G-20, and BRICS. Special attention is
given to initiatives like the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) that expand ASEAN’s
strategic reach. The analysis further explores Indonesia’s evolving foreign policy under its
newly elected leadership in 2024, which signals a more proactive global engagement while
maintaining ASEAN at the forefront of its regional strategy. The paper argues that Indonesia’s
dual commitment to regional and global organisations reveals both opportunities and
constraints in its journey to achieving great power status.
Keywords
Indonesia; ASEAN; Indo-Pacific; Emerging Powers; ASEAN Centrality; Regional Influence.
Resumo
A Indonésia, uma potência emergente proeminente no Sudeste Asiático, ocupa uma posição
estrategicamente vital na região Indo-Pacífico. Sob o comando do ex-presidente Joko Widodo,
a Indonésia abraçou a visão de se tornar um «Pivô Marítimo Global», enquanto se esforçava
para se afirmar como uma força política e económica global. Esta ambição desenrola-se no
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
107
meio de uma ordem global em evolução e polarizada, onde o Indo-Pacífico surge como um
ponto nevrálgico para rivalidades geopolíticas, nomeadamente entre os Estados Unidos e a
China. Iniciativas estratégicas como a Iniciativa Cinturão e Rota (BRI) da China, a Política Act
East da Índia, a Virada para o Leste da Rússia e a Virada para a Ásia dos Estados Unidos
apresentam oportunidades e desafios para a Indonésia na busca de seus interesses nacionais.
A ASEAN serve como instrumento diplomático da Indonésia para navegar por essas
rivalidades. Ao defender a centralidade da ASEAN, a Indonésia trabalha para impedir que os
Estados-membros se alinhem exclusivamente com potências rivais, salvaguardando assim a
estabilidade regional e protegendo os seus interesses nacionais. No entanto, o próprio
princípio da centralidade da ASEAN também pode limitar a capacidade da Indonésia de
priorizar seus próprios objetivos estratégicos de forma independente. Este artigo examina
como a Indonésia aproveita seu papel de liderança na ASEAN para criar uma esfera de
influência regional e, ao mesmo tempo, se envolver com instituições globais como a ONU, a
OMC, o G-20 e o BRICS. É dada especial atenção a iniciativas como a Visão da ASEAN sobre
o Indo-Pacífico (AOIP), que ampliam o alcance estratégico da ASEAN. A análise explora ainda
mais a evolução da política externa da Indonésia sob a sua liderança recém-eleita em 2024,
que sinaliza um envolvimento global mais proativo, mantendo a ASEAN na vanguarda da sua
estratégia regional. O artigo argumenta que o duplo compromisso da Indonésia com
organizações regionais e globais revela tanto oportunidades quanto restrições em sua jornada
para alcançar o status de grande potência.
Palavras-chave
Indonésia; ASEAN; Indo-Pacífico; Potências Emergentes; Centralidade da ASEAN; Influência
Regional.
How to cite this article
Mahaseth, Harsh & Zainab, Fatima (2025). Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional
and Global Power Dynamics. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. Thematic Dossier -
Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December
2025, pp. 106-126. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0525.6
Article submitted on 31st May 2025 and accepted for publication on 19th September
2025.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
108
INDONESIA’S STRATEGIC USE OF ASEAN IN BALANCING
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL POWER DYNAMICS
HARSH MAHASETH
FATIMA ZAINAB
Introduction
Indonesia, an archipelagic state, is an emerging middle power in an increasingly
multipolar world. As the largest country in Southeast Asia and strategically located
between the Indian and Pacific oceans, Indonesia occupies a geostrategic position. Being
among the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a
regional economic and security grouping of ten Southeast Asian states, Indonesia has
established itself as the natural leader of the bloc by consistently playing the role of the
“mediator” and “norm-entrepreneur”. ASEAN Centrality, a practice to keep ASEAN and
its principles at the forefront in deciding the collective interest of the region by the ASEAN
member states, has long been a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Furthermore,
the bloc's commitment to the ASEAN principle of “non-alignment” has played a crucial
role in maintaining peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region.
Acharya (2014) argues that neo-realism and liberal theories fail to take into account
“perceptual, ideational and cultural factors” in the study of international relations and
only focus on material factors like power and wealth. Drawing on constructivism, he
states that the interplay of these non-material factors influences the formulation of
foreign policies of security communities like ASEAN. This paper illustrates the
constructivist perspective by examining the impact of religio-cultural factors in
Indonesia’s domestic politics on its foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Rohingya
issue and its relations with the US and China. Similar to Acharya, Goh (2013) emphasises
the intrinsic social nature of the international system. However, unlike Acharya, who
views the regional order in Southeast Asia on the basis of common norms, interests and
culture, Goh stresses that the East Asian regional order is shaped by the broader US-led
liberal order. Viewing the increasing challenge posed by China and Russia to the US’s
global hegemony through Goh’s lens, the power shift will be framed as “order transition”
rather than “power transition”. While a power transition implies a forceful attempt by a
challenger state to change the global order, potentially through violence, an order
transition reflects a more constructive process in which the challenger, hegemon, and
other key actors negotiate and adjust without disrupting the overall global framework.
Goh’s theory is supported by the fact that, to date, no significant power redistribution
has occurred, a point that is also acknowledged by Breslin (2013). Breslin states that in
the process of re-distribution of power, China will shape its strategy around its identity
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
109
as an “emerging power” and will seek “‘alliances of the dissatisfied’ with other
distributive-minded states” like the BRICS members, which include Indonesia (Breslin,
2013, p. 617). Hence, in the context of intensifying US-China and US-Russia rivalry,
Goh’s theory manifests through initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
the imposition of coercive tariffs, efforts to secure new markets, and the increasing
significance of multilateral forums like ASEAN and BRICS.
Within this complex environment, Indonesia’s behaviour within ASEAN is typical of middle
powers, particularly through its focus on mediating and norm-setting. Middle powers
have been defined on the basis of multiple factors like role, capability, function and norms
or any or all of them. The “role theory” by Thies and Sari (2018) emphasises the “role”
of a middle power, which they define as “ ‘positions’ in an organised group and any
socially recognised category of actors, i.e., the kinds of people it is possible to be in a
society”(p. 402). Thies and Sari (2018) are of the view that the primary functions of a
middle power include backing multilateralism, preserving the established international
order, and embodying the qualities of a good international citizen. Anwar (2020) states
that Indonesia is a “Kantian middle power,” which is one of the three categories
introduced by De Swielande. He explains that middle powers aligned with Kantian
principles are defined by their propensity for bridge-building, cooperation, and mediation.
They share the "Hobbesian" understanding of an anarchic global arena, yet they interpret
this state positively, concentrating on matters of low politics, unlike "Hobbesian" powers,
who interpret it negatively and prioritise high politics. Anwar substantiates his argument
by emphasising that Indonesia’s promotion of the AOIP is based on the spirit of
cooperation rather than competition, reflecting its positive outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Carr (as cited in Abbondanza & Wilkins, 2022) puts forward the idea of middle powers as
“norm entrepreneurs,” which means the ability of the state to introduce norms and
maintain them in global affairs.
This paper posits that Indonesia's role as a Kantian middle power and a norm
entrepreneur has been critical in the Indo-Pacific, contributing significantly to dispute
resolution among ASEAN states and the introduction of regional norms, ultimately
establishing a strong sphere of influence in the region. This includes drafting and proposal
of ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which “provides a guide for ASEAN’s
engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” (ASEAN, 2019, para 21). The
paper further argues that while leading regional politics, Indonesia simultaneously
interacts with global institutions like the United Nations (UN), G-20, and recently with
BRICS. The paper further supports the shift in foreign policy under the newly elected
Indonesian President, Mr Prabowo Subianto, highlighting his proactive approach to global
engagement and multi-alignment strategy while countering allegations that he is
sidelining ASEAN.
The paper concludes that Subianto’s approach to foreign policy can fuel Indonesia’s
aspiration to achieve global power status with the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific.
Indonesia’s dual commitment to regional and global organisations reveals both
opportunities and constraints in its journey to achieving great power status. Subianto’s
greatest challenge remains strengthening multilateral ties beyond ASEAN without letting
ASEAN fall into irrelevance. A careless zeal to establish a global presence can compromise
ASEAN centrality, which has long been a cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy and is
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
110
crucial amid geopolitical tensions to maintain regional stability and security. Indonesia’s
strategy should not be pursuing multi-alignment independently, but as a regional leader,
supporting a collective shift within ASEAN from non-alignment to a more coordinated
multi-alignment.
Methodology
This paper adopts a qualitative-descriptive approach. The primary sources consist of
ASEAN Chair statements, summit communiqués, UN treaties, and G20 declarations.
Secondary sources include news reports, academic journal articles, policy papers, and
surveys. Specific cases have been selected as representative moments to trace
Indonesia’s evolving regional and global posture. Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship has
been examined to evaluate the country’s actions and efforts when it is in a position to
directly shape ASEAN’s agenda. Particular emphasis is placed on the formulation and
implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which serves as the
key document promoting a collective ASEAN stance in the Indo-Pacific, testing
Indonesia’s ability to retain regional control amid competing global strategies.
Additionally, Indonesia’s entry into the BRICS grouping and its participation in China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been analysed to assess how the country navigates
the principle of non-alignment in the context of the intensifying US-China rivalry.
Competing Economic and Security Agendas in the Indo-Pacific
Since the end of World War II, a strategic trend among post-colonial developing nations
has been to adopt ‘non-alignment’ in their foreign policies and regional groupings. ASEAN
stands by this principle amid the intensifying US-Russia rivalry and US-China rivalry. The
Indo-Pacific region has become a subject of various overlapping and conflicting strategic
initiatives of powerful states. The ‘Pivot to Asia’, initiated under the Obama administration
in 2011, shifted the focus of the United States (US) administration to Asia from Europe
with the goals of establishing influence in the Indo-Pacific. A major consideration of this
policy was to deal with the challenge posed by the emerging power – China. However,
the policy yielded little success due to the US’s political distractions in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Trump, in his first term, failed to have a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy, and
his second term has been marked by coercive reciprocal tariffs towards all its trade
partners. In contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping continues to pursue his highly
ambitious infrastructural initiative called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or New Silk
Road, initiated in 2013. The indlatter has two components: Firstly, ‘The Silk Road
Economic Belt', which aims to connect China with Europe and secondly, ‘Maritime Silk
Road’, which seeks to connect China with Southeast Asia. As of 2023, over 150 countries
have joined the initiative, demonstrating widespread confidence in China’s economic
vision (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2023).
Similarly, India’s ‘Act East’ policy, launched in 2014 by the Modi government, focused on
the larger Indo-Pacific region than its ancestor ‘Look East’ Policy launched in 1991 by PM
Narasimha Rao. Act East Policy remains ASEAN-centric and has been involved specifically
in political and security competition under the ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations. In
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
111
addition to strategic objectives, India has increasingly employed cultural diplomacy, such
as temple restoration and Buddhist linkages, as a tool of soft power to strengthen ties
with Southeast Asian states, reinforcing civilizational connections and enhancing its
regional presence (Mahaseth et al., 2023). Russia’s “Turn to East” emerged after the
commencement of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014. In an attempt to move away from
the adversarial West, Russia turned to the East to strengthen political and economic
cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries and African and Latin American countries.
Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific is crowded with overlapping security arrangements. This
includes the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (US, India, Australia, Japan) and AUKUS
(US, UK, Australia), which undermine the authority of ASEAN by creating parallel
strategic frameworks.
While the growing global interest in the Indo-Pacific offers new economic and political
opportunities to Southeast Asian states, it also places them in a highly precarious
position. In an endeavour to advance individual national interests, ASEAN member states
risk aligning with rival global powers, which could place them at odds with each other. In
a polarised world, ASEAN Centrality means avoiding exclusive ties with China, the US, or
Russia, favouring a unified approach instead.
Indonesia’s influence in Southeast Asia and ASEAN
In the context of rising tensions among global powers, ASEAN Centrality serves as a
mechanism to prevent the region from being swept up in global rivalries. By mediating
between disputing member states and shaping ASEAN’s policies, Indonesia fosters a
regional sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. While the former characteristic is reflective
of Indonesia’s existence as a “good international citizen”, given by Thies and Sari’s
theory, and as a “mediator” by Anwar’s application of Kantian middle power theory, the
latter highlights Indonesia’s role as a “norm entrepreneur” as proposed by Carr.
In June 2008, armed conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over the disputed area
surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear prompted Indonesia to intervene in efforts to
restore peace in the region. In compliance with the United Nations Security Council’s
orders, Indonesia, under its ASEAN Chairmanship, hosted an ASEAN Foreign Ministerial
Meeting in Jakarta, which was attended by all foreign ministers of ASEAN members on
February 22, 2011 (ASEAN, 2011). Regardless of the fact that the meeting ultimately
failed to bear fruit and the matter was referred to the International Court of Justice, the
event reflected Indonesia’s readiness to lead the Indo-Pacific region and also play the
role of a mediator to ensure peace between ASEAN members.
In 2023, during its Chairmanship of ASEAN, Indonesia had focused on two major
problems in the Indo-Pacific: The Myanmar Crisis and the South China Sea Dispute. Apart
from the Rohingya refugee crisis, the takeover of Myanmar by the military junta in 2021
further added to the regional instability in Southeast Asia. In 2021, the ASEAN Leaders’
Meeting was hosted by Indonesia, which resulted in the 5-Point Consensus (PC). The
latter was a strategic peace plan which aimed to restore stability in Myanmar. The plan
included the appointment of a special envoy to the Myanmar military junta and also its
engagement with all stakeholders, enabling humanitarian aid, dialogue among parties
and calls for putting an immediate end to the violence. While the success of the 5-PC is
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
112
debatable, Indonesia’s proactive initiatives to address regional problems reflect its
capacity to effectively lead the region. Under the Chairmanship of Indonesia in 2023, the
5-PC were reviewed and additional decisions were taken including urging “Myanmar
Armed Forces in particular, and all related parties concerned in Myanmar to de-escalate
violence and stop targeted attacks on civilians, houses and public facilities, such as
schools, hospitals, markets, churches and monasteries” and mobilising “further support
from External Partners and the International Community to ASEAN efforts on
humanitarian assistance” (ASEAN, 2023a, para. 11& 17).
However, to properly weigh the extent of influence Indonesia possesses within ASEAN, it
is important to look into the effect of internal fragmentation of the organisation. For
instance, only Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam hold bilateral ties with Myanmar,
while the rest of the ASEAN members do not. The varying individual interests have the
potential to weaken the regional cohesion. In June 2021, divisions within ASEAN became
apparent when several members abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly
resolution concerning the deteriorating political atmosphere of Myanmar. The resolution
appreciated ASEAN’s adoption of the 5-PC and urged its swift implementation while
condemning the violence inflicted upon the peaceful demonstrators and calling for an end
to the same. Although six ASEAN members voted in favour, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand abstained from voting. Samet (2021) observes that the draft resolution was
strongly worded and included a call for a global arms embargo, which has been omitted
in the final resolution. It was the Southeast Asian states that had requested, through a
letter, to soften the language in order “to make the text acceptable”. Hence, the
divergence in positions reflects how national economic interests outweigh collective
action. As a result, ASEAN is bound to adopt diluted measures to ensure consensus,
avoiding harsher steps such as an arms embargo. While this makes the outcome
acceptable to all members, it hurts the effectiveness of the action plans.
Another major concern for Southeast Asia is the South China dispute, which dates back
to the 1970s. Article 47 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
states that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. As
per Article 56 of UNCLOS (1982), the coastal state has sovereign right of exploring,
exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural marine resources located within the
exclusive economic zone, among other rights. China, drawing on its historical territories,
claims beyond this internationally set limit. The area claimed by China in the South China
Sea overlaps with the EEZ of several ASEAN member states and is termed the “Nine-
dash Line”. In the 1970s, China militarily seized 3 islands beyond its EEZ (Putra, 2015).
This military activity was a direct encroachment on the international maritime rights of
the neighbouring Southeast Asian Countries, including Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia and also Indonesia, with respect to the Natuna Islands. Subsequently, the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed between
ASEAN members and the government of the People’s Republic of China on 4th November
2002. The declaration reaffirmed the commitment to principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, the UNCLOS, and other universally accepted principles of international
law. The declaration also emphasised resolving their territorial and jurisdictional disputes
by peaceful means and not through threat or use of force (ASEAN, 2012).
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
113
Regardless, the geopolitical tensions subsist in the South China Sea. China’s illegal fishing
in Natuna waters has been fiercely retaliated against by Indonesia through military
actions in the past. Indonesia, in consonance with its zero-tolerance policy, went as far
as renaming its EEZ as the “North Natuna Sea” in 2017, apart from imposing stricter
penalties for illegal fishing (Wisnugroho, 2024). In October 2024, after President
Subianto came to power, Chinese coast guard vessels were driven out of Indonesian
waters twice ("Indonesia says Chinese", 2024). Both President Subianto and former
president Joko Widodo (also known as ‘Jokowi’) share an assertive stance on
safeguarding the territorial integrity of Indonesia along with the ASIAN member states
against a major power in the region.
Post the DOC, an agreement to implement the DOC was decided upon in 2011. However,
almost two decades of negotiations between ASEAN and China have not yielded much.
During its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023, Indonesia called for the acceleration of
negotiations under the Code of Conduct (COC), which will be a legally binding document
to establish rules around maritime interactions in the South China Sea (“ASEAN Chair
Indonesia”, 2023) and subsequently, an agreement was reached. The Asean Post
Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Sessions With The Dialogue Partners, ASEAN and
China “reaffirmed the aspiration to work towards the early conclusion of an effective and
substantive COC …and adopted the Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an
Effective and Substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” (ASEAN, 2023c, para.
70). However, materialisation of the COC remains a distant dream for ASEAN. The lack
of an effective action plan once again exposes the fragmentation within ASEAN. Firstly,
not all ASEAN states are equally affected by the tensions in the South China Sea. The
Philippines and Vietnam have more extensive territorial claims in the disputed waters
than Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. Others remain directly unaffected by the dispute.
Secondly, many ASEAN states, particularly those that do not have much at stake, remain
reluctant to jeopardise the significant economic opportunities that China provides. In
2012, for instance, despite the clash between a Philippine navy vessel and Chinese fishing
vessels at Scarborough Shoal, Cambodia, the then ASEAN chair refused to include the
issue in the communique, prompting the Philippines' Foreign Minister to walk out of the
summit (York, 2015). More recently, US warships were deployed in support of its ally,
the Philippines, following a deadly clash that cost the lives of two Chinese coastal guards
(Heydarian, 2025). However, while the progress on the South China Sea issue is slow, it
is not completely unachievable, especially through the mediation of relatively stronger
economies like Indonesia and Malaysia. Although Indonesia’s interest in the South China
Sea is confined to the area surrounding the Natuna Islands, its active efforts to address
the broader dispute and the trust it has earned from other affected ASEAN members
reflect its effective regional leadership. Thies and Sari state that the role of “peacekeeper
or intermediary in international conflicts or regional-subsystem collaborator” is an
indicator of a “good international citizen”. Indonesia’s involvement in the Cambodian-
Thailand temple dispute, Myanmar crisis and South China dispute reflects this criterion,
affirming its role as a good international citizen.
Similarly, Indonesia’s efforts to formulate a collective strategy in the Indo-Pacific made
the adoption of the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) possible. In terms of timing,
AOIP can be viewed as a response to the Western strategic vision put forward by the
then US president Donald Trump, who launched Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 106-126
Indonesia’s Strategic use of Asean in Balancing Regional and Global Power Dynamics
Harsh Mahaseth, Fatima Zainab
114
2017. The need for AOIP arises due to the conflicting interests of the global powers in
the region, which could destabilise the region and also risk undermining Indonesia’s
regional influence. This is reflected by Jokowi’s vision of Indonesia as a Global Maritime
Fulcrum, which, beyond its emphasis on maritime development, also serves as a
reassertion of the nation’s presence and power in the region. AOIP had initially faced
persistent reluctance by the ASEAN members, and it was only after vigorous lobbying by
Indonesia that AOIP was realised on 23rd June, 2019, at the 34th summit of ASEAN in
Bangkok. This reflects that while Indonesia holds sufficient influence to introduce new
norms in the region, it often finds itself as the sole driver of such norms, as initiatives
like AOIP have struggled to garner similar enthusiasm from other member states. There
could be two reasons for the latter. Firstly, the growing global interest in the Indo-Pacific
might appear as an opportunity to further individual national goals of the particular
ASEAN members. Crystallising the AOIP can limit their individual aspirations. Secondly,
expanding ASEAN’s domain from the narrower Asia-Pacific to wider Indo-Pacific is a slight
deviation from the existing status quo, if not the introduction of an entirely new norm.
Any such effort is bound to face hindrance as explained by Finnemore and Sikkink (1996)
in their ‘Norm Life Cycle theory’. ASEAN acknowledged that “economic growth of the
region opens up possibilities of cooperation to alleviate poverty and elevate living
standards of millions of people,” while also in the face of rise of economic and military
powers “requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of
behaviour based on a zero-sum game”(ASEAN, 2019, para. 1). The key elements of the
AOIP are as follows:
A perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as
contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected
region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role; An Indo-Pacific
region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry; An Indo-Pacific region
of development and prosperity for all; The importance of the maritime
domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture (ASEAN, 2019,
para. 10-12).
AOIP cleverly avoids naming any particular major power as the object of concern which
is in line with its policy of non-alignment. A key aim, highlighted as one of four, within
the AOIP is to enhance the ASEAN Community building process and to fortify current
ASEAN-led frameworks like the East Asia Summit. The specific mention of East Asia
Summit is significant as it is the only forum that brings the heads of state of global rival
powers i.e., China, the US, and Russia on a negotiating plane. Hence, strengthening of
EAS can help ease tensions in the Indo-Pacific and avoid potential military or politico-
economic confrontations in the region. AOIP, thus, reflects a collective effort of ASEAN
to foster Indo-Pacific cooperation and diffuse regional tensions.
Under Indonesia’s chairmanship 2023, concrete steps were taken for implementation of
the AOIP in contrast with the limited attention it received in previous and subsequent
chairmanships (ASEAN, 2023b, para. 38, 28, 29 & 57). The chairman’s statement of the
43rd ASEAN Summit welcomed the convening of “ASEAN-Indo Pacific Forum:
Implementation of AOIP” in Jakarta, Indonesia and specifically mentioned it as
“Indonesia’s Initiative” (ASEAN, 2023b, para. 38). Another achievement for AOIP was
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the adoption of the ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Statement on Cooperation on the AOIP.
The Chairman’s statement encouraged adoption of similar Joint Statements with the
United States, the Republic of Korea, and China. Furthermore, “ASEAN-Indo-Pacific
Workshop on Marine Plastic Debris” was co-hosted by Indonesia and New Zealand in June
2023 and the “EAS Workshop on Developing Coastal Economy” in August 2023 in Bali,
Indonesia (ASEAN, 2023b, para. 29). A similar Indo-Pacific Workshop was co-hosted by
Indonesia and Australia on the “Use of Technology for Sustainable Aquaculture” in
October 2023 in Bali. There was also conversations on the “development of the Concept
Paper on the Implementation of the AOIP from a Defence Perspective” (ASEAN, 2023b,
para. 57).
Laos further carried Indonesia’s spirit regarding AOIP under its Chairmanship in 2024.
ASEAN adopted ‘ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’
which focussed on improving connectivity specifically through implementation of Master
Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC), ensuring sustainable development goals and
deepening economic partnerships (ASEAN, 2024a; ASEAN, 2024b). While the AOIP is
gradually getting internalised as a norm within ASEAN and has attracted positive
engagement by the non-ASEAN partners, its implementation has been limited to areas
such as technology, sustainable development and physical connectivity. Little progress
has been made with regard to regional security concerns. AOIP neither articulates
concrete strategies for managing security concerns with regard to the threat posed by
AUKUS and QUAD, nor has ASEAN carried out any substantive action in this regard.
Perhaps, over time, with collective and consistent efforts of the ASEAN members,
Indonesia’s Indo-pacific vision can be accomplished through effective implementation of
the AOIP. If Indonesia manages to continue winning the confidence of non-ASEAN global
powers with respect to the AOIP specially on the regional security front, it will not only
increase its regional influence, but also bring Indonesia closer to its aspiration of
becoming a global power.
Indonesia’s Expanding Global Engagement and Representation of
ASEAN’s Interests
Indonesia has actively been engaged in world affairs through various institutions of global
importance like the UN, G-20 and recently BRICS. In the 21st century, global
intergovernmental institutions occupy a fundamental role in shaping international policy-
making and facilitating both bilateral and multilateral ties between global actors.
Indonesia has not only projected its own national interests in the global platforms but
also frequently acted as a representative of ASEAN, voicing the region’s collective
concerns and priorities.
The G-20, a global forum created in 1999, gathers major industrial and developing
economies to foster discussions on global economic and financial stability. The G-20
currently consists of 19 member countries and two regional associations which includes
China, Russia, United States and the European Union. the European Union. This
intergovernmental organisation includes the world’s leading economies, accounting for
up to 85% of the world's Gross Domestic Product, and is devoted to solving global
economic and financial issues (Overview, n.d.).Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian
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nation that has a membership in the G20, giving it the capacity to use the platform not
only to forward its interest but also the region’s collective interest.
In 2022, under the Indonesian presidency, the G20 Summit focused on three aspects:
global health care, sustainable energy transition and digital transformation. The resulting
Bali Declaration (G20, 2022) focused on many subjects of interest to the developing
South. The declaration reiterated their commitment to supporting the developing
countries in responding to global challenges and implementing the Sustainable
Development Goals. Moreover, the declaration addressed several key areas, such as food
security, climate finance for developing countries to support UN climate objectives,
strengthening developing nations' ability to manage future pandemics with support from
the World Bank's Financial Intermediary Fund, and ensuring equitable access to medical
countermeasures like vaccines, particularly in developing regions.
On July 8, 2022, in Bali, Retno L.P. Marsudi, Indonesia's former foreign Minister,
addressed the opening session of the second day of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting,
emphasising the importance of multilateral cooperation, trust, and bridge-building.
Addressing concerns over the Russia-Ukraine war, she brings attention to the unequal
impact the developing and low-income states will suffer. She stated that “The voices of
all countries – big and small, North and South, developed and developing – must be
heard” and proudly announced about the historic first-time invitation extended to
representatives of small island developing countries, namely, the Pacific Island Forum
(PIF) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), along with the African Union (“G20
FMM”, 2022, para. 12) . By offering the opportunity to be heard to the globally neglected
island states in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia not only stands as the champion of the Global
South but also attempts to gain more influence in the region and further strengthen
Indonesia's vision of the Indo-Pacific.
Marsudi has made a similar appeal at the general debate of the 77th session of the UN
General Assembly. Observing that “violation of international law has become a norm in
pursuit of narrow self-interest”, she brings attention to global problems of climate
change, inflation, food, and energy shortages (United Nations, 2022, p. 2). Marsudi
stated that geopolitical interests should not be given precedence over global recovery,
emphasising the vulnerability of developing states to fall into a potential food & energy
crisis. She also expressed her concerns about “mini-lateral groupings”, which become
instruments of proxy wars between global powers. The term appears to be referring to
AUKUS, hence condemning its involvement in the Indo-Pacific, which challenges ASEAN’s
authority. Marsudi reiterates Indonesia’s commitment to “reinforce ASEAN’s centrality in
shaping regional order in the Indo-Pacific; to forge unity as a locomotive for peace,
stability, and prosperity in the region; and to ensure ASEAN matters for our peoples, for
the region, and for the world” (United Nations, 2022, p. 6).
In 2008, Indonesia’s proposal on the General Expenditure Support Fund aided
infrastructural development in the underdeveloped countries through the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Gultom, 2024, p. 119). Furthermore, the
reconstruction of the IMF through the Seoul Consensus was supported by Indonesia,
which gave equal voting power to developing nations.
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Indonesia’s recently granted membership in BRICS reflects the growing influence and
economic power Indonesia holds in the region. BRICS is an intergovernmental
partnership between ten states- Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Recently, BRICS has been in
the limelight, especially following the controversial and arbitrary tariffs imposed by US
President Donald Trump. BRICS challenges the Western-dominated global order as it
protects and advances the interests of the Global South, which puts ASEAN’s policy of
non-alignment and Indonesia’s relationship with Western Nations into jeopardy. Trump
threatened the BRICS member countries with an additional 10% tariffs if they aligned
with “anti-American policies” after the bloc had criticised the tariff war and military
attacks on Iran (“Donald Trump threatens”, 2025). On the economic front, the largest
benefit of this strategic move is access to the New Development Bank, which started with
the authorised capital of $ 100 billion and has a paid-up capital of $ 50 billion. The Bank
holds the capacity to fund large-scale infrastructural projects within Indonesia and could
potentially lead to technology transfer. Furthermore, the BRICS Contingent Reserve
Arrangement offers financial assistance to member nations in the face of global liquidity
challenges. Membership in BRICS offers Indonesia opportunities to engage more closely
with other developing economies, such as India, while expanding access to the Chinese
and Russian markets. However, critics argue that Indonesia’s participation is largely
symbolic (Sulaiman, 2025). In the multilateral institution where strong voices already
exist, like that of China and Russia, they claim Indonesia is unlikely to wield significant
influence. They argue that the move stems from Subianto’s personal ambition of
international recognition and does not serve the national interest of Indonesia in any
substantive way. It will ultimately be Subianto’s test to prove that joining BRICS was
worth earning the US’s wrath.
Indonesia’s deepening friendship with China and the former decision to participate in the
BRI along with other Southeast Asian States has also been a subject of concern for
ASEAN. Under Jokowi, Indonesia became part of this ambitious initiative to fund the
infrastructural development, such as roadways, railways, ports, etc., within Indonesia.
China has invested over a trillion dollars in various countries through the BRI, and
Indonesia has been among its largest trading partners. There has been an increasing
concern regarding the BRI loans being predatory towards developing countries, as the
BRI offers loans at significantly higher interest rates compared to those provided by the
World Bank. The financial assistance provided by both the World Bank and China can be
categorised into aid-financed and debt-financed. The World Bank offers aid financed
through the International Development Association (IDA) to countries that are below the
annually updated threshold calculated through Gross National Income (GNI) per capita
on more concessional interest rates. Relatively richer countries are debt-financed through
the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) with
near-market interest rates. Cheong (2022), in his study, categorises China’s
development finance flows into similar categories as provided by the World Bank.
Drawing on AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance (GCDF) dataset, he finds that
aid-financed loans from China carry interest rates that are 1.5% higher, while debt-
financed loans have interest rates that are approximately 0.8% higher. Some accuse
China of “debt-trap diplomacy,” where it will seize the collateral assets of poorer nations
unable to pay back, while others believe that China may not use coercive strategies but
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aims at subduing the sovereignty of poorer nations (Clark, 2023). The latter accusation
is based on the leasing of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port for 99 years to China due to the
latter’s inability to repay the loan. The absence of transparency in the financial
transactions between China and its debtors leaves room for doubt on the credibility and
viability of the debt-trap theory.
As of December 2023, there were around seventy-one BRI projects with a combined
valuation of $20.3 billion (Busbarat et al., 2023). The Jakarta-Bandung high-speed
railway is an example of a highly successful BRI project costing $7.3 billion, of which
approximately 75% was covered through a loan by China Development Bank ("Indonesia
Launches",2023). In September 2023, Jokowi invited Chinese firms to invest in the
building of $32 billion new capital, Nusantara (“Indonesia China Discuss”, 2023). The
growing dependency on China risks compromising Indonesia’s previously held firm stance
on the contentious South China Sea issue. A diminished voice on such a critical matter
can also weaken Indonesia’s image as a strong and independent regional leader.
The Way Forward: Jokowi’s passive ‘Non-alignment’ or Subianto’s active
‘Multi-alignment’
Non-alignment has been a successful political strategy for many post-colonial states
during the bipolar Cold War era. After the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1900s, the
US-led liberal world order came to dominate global politics. However, with the recent rise
of China and resurgence of Russia, the global sphere is transitioning into a multipolar
world order. In light of these geopolitical changes, traditional non-alignment seems
increasingly inefficient, giving way to an evolved approach known as the “multi-
alignment” strategy, which has attracted significant attention from policymakers. While
the line that separates the two strategies is quite thin, the primary difference between
the two appears to be simultaneously aligning with all rival global powers on economic,
political and military fronts in case of multi-alignment. The multi-alignment strategy
relies on both bilateral and multilateral relationships, with multilateral platforms playing
a key role by facilitating collaboration between rival powers and pacifying hostilities.
Prabowo Subianto seems to adopt a multi-alignment strategy, in contrast to Jokowi’s
approach of strict non-alignment.
It is also important to note that Indonesia’s foreign policy has never been completely
independent of its domestic politics. The domestic political dynamics not only shapes
what happens within Indonesia but also influences how the country interacts with the
world. Hence, the public perception of the Global powers like China and US matters for
the ruling parties to frame domestically acceptable foreign policies. “Economic growth”
has consistently remained a key focus of Indonesia’s domestic agenda, creating a sense
of continuity between both Jokowi’s and Subianto’s domestic policy. Furthermore, as the
largest Muslim majority democracy, Indonesia’s foreign policy is also influenced by the
Islamic values and a sense of global Muslim solidarity. For example, the Pew Global
Attitudes survey found that Indonesian public hostility toward the U.S. increased after
the Iraq invasion but decreased when U.S. aid arrived following the devastating 2004
tsunami (Wike, 2006). Similarly, Indonesia’s strong stance against Myanmar’s military
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rule reflects a deep sense of brotherhood with the persecuted Rohingya Muslim
community.
Jokowi’s tenure is characterised by “pro-people diplomacy” where domestic interests are
placed at the centre of foreign policy decisions. This means that goal of the foreign policy
should be to advance domestic interests. The populist leader, in his first term, focussed
on three aspects with respect to its foreign policy: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty,
enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy
(Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). Aligning foreign policy closely with economic
development objectives, the then Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi argued that Indonesia
would favour bilateral mechanisms over multilateral approaches as a diplomatic
instrument (Andika, 2016). This approach is reflected in Jokowi’s lack of active
participation in the UN General Assembly and actions such as sinking illegal fishing
vessels from fellow ASEAN members.
Jokowi’s ambitious goal of making Indonesia as a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) found
no mention in his second term. GMF stood on five pillars which are to “rebuild maritime
culture, manage marine resources, develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity,
advance maritime diplomacy, and boost maritime defense forces” (Laksmana, 2017,
para. 2). The reason for the GMF falling into irrelevance is attributed to poorly-designed
vision to bureaucratic hurdles in its implementation (Laksmana, 2019). In his second
term, Jokowi has focused more on his domestic policy and entrusted the foreign policy
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jokowi in his foreign policy, stood by Indonesia’s
longstanding principle of passive non-alignment and neutrally between global power
rivals. He focussed less on the multilateral fora, if not completely abandoned them,
despite its potential to serve as a concrete platform for pursuing multi-alignment foreign
policy. His limited engagement in multilateral settings, along with a preference for
bilateral ties with global powers, was largely driven by Indonesia’s domestic priorities.
For example, Priamarizki (2024) observes that Indonesia’s participation in the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), launched by President Biden in 2022
with 13 partner countries, was primarily motivated by the desire to “increase trade and
investment opportunities, especially for Indonesia’s raw materials industries” (p. 29).
However, despite fostering closer economic ties with the U.S., Jokowi remained distant
from Western-led security arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, as they did not
align with domestic interests.
Similarly, he notes that Jokowi’s participation in China’s BRI was motivated by his
domestic goal of improving infrastructural development within Indonesia. However, BRI
projects have generated significant public grievances, which risk reigniting longstanding
anti-Chinese sentiment. BRI projects largely employed Chinese workers, limiting
opportunities for local employment and skill transfer. Public frustration was further
exacerbated when, during the COVID-19 pandemic, mass layoffs of Indonesian workers
occurred while Chinese workers retained their jobs in Chinese firms, prompting the
administration to delay some Chinese work permits (Suryadinata, 2020). This discontent
is reflected in a Pew Research Center survey, which showed a drop in favorable views
toward China from 66% in 2014 to 53% in 2018 (Tamir & Budiman, 2019). Although
Jokowi’s administration did not witness this discontent materialize into acts of violence,
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it now poses a challenge for his successor, Prabowo Subianto, in navigating Sino-
Indonesian relations amid growing public disapproval.
Prabowo Subianto came into power in October 2024. Unlike Jokowi, Subianto has a strong
background in both business and the military. His domestic policy includes increasing
economic growth from 5% to 8%, 28 billion dollar “Free Nutritious Meal” Programme,
improving revenue to GDP ratio and continuing the $ 32 billion capital city relocation
project (“What policies to expect”, 2024). Unlike Jokowi, Subianto’s administration has
not clearly linked domestic policy with foreign policy, suggesting that his approach may
allow for greater flexibility in foreign affairs, rather than being largely driven by domestic
politics.
Subianto has utilised both bilateral and multilateral forums. Indonesia under Subianto
has taken a more proactive approach towards world politics, evidenced by his visits to
13 countries, including both China and the United States. The trip to Beijing brought
home deals worth 10 billion dollars and also invited controversy over the Joint Statement
issued between China and Indonesia on ‘Advancing the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership and the China-Indonesia Community with a Shared Future’. The Joint
Statement stated that the “two sides reached an important common understanding on
joint development in areas of overlapping claims” and mentioned the establishment of
the “Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee” to explore and advance cooperation
("Joint Statement Between", 2024, p. 10). Subianto was thus criticised for potentially
undermining Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty by setting a drastic shift to the former
unyielding position of Indonesia with regards to the South China Sea. Indonesia, shortly
thereafter, issued a clarification of its position, declaring its non-recognition of China's
claims in the South China Sea.(Widianto, 2024). The inconsistency in Indonesia’s
statement can affect its credibility as the regional leader and bring distrust from
Southeast Asian states, specifically those who has an interest in the South China Sea.
However, on the positive note, both the countries reaffirmed their commitment to
implementation of the DOC, and “early conclusion” of COC ("Join Statement Between",
2024, p. 10-11).
Post-China visit Subianto directly flew to Washington DC to meet President Joe Biden,
attempting to uphold the Indonesian foreign policy of non-alignment. The globally active
President plans to visit Russia in June 2025 to strike a free trade agreement with the
Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Shofa, 2025). The Union, in addition to
Russia, consists of 4 post-Soviet states - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan.
This could enable Indonesia to access alternative markets to US in response to increased
tariffs imposed under Trumps Administration. Russia and Indonesia have also held Naval
drills in the Indonesian waters – an action which could be unsettling for ASEAN members,
given Russia’s has continuously undermined of international law in the context of
Russian-Ukrainian war (“Russia, ASEAN hold first”, 2021). Indonesia followed up with
naval military drills with Australia and had earlier hosted its annual ‘Super Garuda
Shield’ drill with the United States (Mahdi, 2025). This, once again, appears to reflect
Indonesia’s adherence to its long-standing policy of non-alignment. It is under Subianto’s
leadership that Indonesia has become a member of BRICS and aspires to be part of two
transnational economic groupings: the “Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)” and the “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
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Pacific Partnership” (“Indonesia Formally Requests,” 2024, para 2; "Ministers welcome
Roadmap" , 2024).
Subianto has been criticised for alleged sidelining of ASEAN Centrality, with critics
contending that his administration’s actions reflect a departure from this longstanding
principle. This is evidenced by his initial foreign trips to South Asia, the Middle East, North
America and South America rather than to neighbouring ASEAN members states. This
symbolically sends an indication that Subianto’s preference of pursue national interests
over upholding ASEAN unity. Furthermore, the absence of the Foreign Minister Sugiono
from the meeting hosted by Thailand to discuss the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-
Point Consensus on Myanmar – attended by 5 other ASEAN founder states – has been
cited as further evidence of disregard towards ASEAN. However, while there are certain
shortcomings in Subianto’s administration, the claim that the latter is sidelining ASEAN
appears premature and somewhat overstated.
Subianto’s intention to keep ASEAN at the forefront is clearly reflected in his
engagements on the global stage. The Joint Statement by President Biden and President
Prabowo Subianto of Indonesia affirmed that they were committed to an “open,
transparent, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific regional architecture with ASEAN at
the center” ("Joint Statement by President", 2024, para. 3). The Joint Statement between
China and the Indonesia, previously referred to, support “strengthening the ASEAN-led
cooperation mechanisms in order to build an open, transparent and inclusive regional
architecture with ASEAN at its center” and promotion of mutually beneficial BRI and AOIP
("Joint Statement Between", 2024, p. 13). Similarly, after the State visit to India, the
India-Indonesia joint Statement promised “to strengthen efforts towards implementation
of the ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Cooperation on the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-
Pacific for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity” and “support for ASEAN Centrality” in the
evolving regional architecture (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2025, paras. 44- 47).
Furthermore, the carefully calculated strategizing of foreign trips and joint military drills
indicates that Subianto does not intend to exclusively align with any single global power.
Subianto’s proactive approach to world affairs is a shift to a more effective model of
“multi-alignment,” and it does not contradict ASEAN’s non-alignment policy.
Perhaps, the best way forward for Subianto is guide ASEAN into adopting a multi-
alignment framework. This would involve transitioning ASEAN’s traditional non-alignment
stance into a more dynamic multi-alignment approach through ASEAN’s institutional
mechanisms. In practice, this will require the Southeast Asian states to collectively define
the principles and other specifics of a coordinated multi-alignment policy, with Indonesia
playing the lead in the process. Surely, a significant challenge will be to aligning varying
national interests of different members, however, it is not unfeasible with Indonesia’s
regional influence and leadership capacity. This move will also help dispel allegations on
Indonesia that it is deviating from principle of ASEAN Centrality.
Conclusion
Indonesia, an archipelagic Kantian middle power and norm entrepreneur, endeavours to
carve out a prominent role among global powers in an increasingly multi-polar world
order. Its geostrategic placement, nestled between the Indian and Pacific oceans, means
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it faces a convergence of frequently opposing geopolitical strategies, offering both
potential benefits and significant challenges. Having created a region of influence in the
Indo-Pacific and projecting itself as the founding leader of ASEAN on the global stage,
Indonesia’s ongoing challenge is to sustain this influence and leadership. By participating
in international platforms like UN, G-20, and BRICS, Indonesia invites economic and
political opportunities not only for itself but for the region as a whole.
With the ascent of Subianto to power, Indonesia’s foreign policy deviates from Jokowi’s
more reserved stance on global affairs. Under Subianto’s leadership, Indonesia aims to
strengthen bilateral ties with all the major global powers. The increasing global
engagements will help attract much-needed investments into Indonesia. BRI has
successfully financed numerous infrastructure projects within Indonesia. However,
overreliance on foreign loans can jeopardise Indonesia’s independence. Therefore, such
financial engagements must be approached with caution.
Under Subianto, Indonesia is shifting its from passive non-alignment to active multi-
alignment. A well-calibrated multi-alignment strategy will enable Indonesia to maximise
its national interests without losing its bargaining power. In the multi-polarising world,
there is a need for Southeast Asian states must move beyond post-World War non-
alignment movement and to engage with all major global actors. Through the
implementation of AOIP, Indonesia can embed a multi-alignment policy within the
framework of ASEAN itself. ASEAN should not be seen as a barrier to Indonesia’s
aspiration of becoming a global power. Instead, if leveraged correctly, it can become a
vehicle to realize those ambitions.
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