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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between
Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025
63
HYDRO-DIPLOMACY AS A STRATEGIC LEVER: COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS FROM
INDIA AND CHINA IN REGIONAL COOPERATION AND GLOBAL WATER
GOVERNANCE
PINTU KUMAR MAHLA
pin2choudhary.official@gmail.com
Research Associate, Water Resources Research Centre, University of Arizona, Tucson
(USA). ORCID- https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8338-406X
Abstract
Hydro-diplomacy has become a strategic tool for rising powers to balance regional cooperation
and have an impact on global water governance. This paper compares India and China to see
how they can use their shared water resources to improve their global standing and
strengthen their regional alliances. India and China both have several concerns to deal with
when it comes to the Brahmaputra River Basin, which is very important for stability and
growth in the region. India uses hydro-diplomacy to build cooperative structures in South
Asia, with a focus on fair water sharing and ways to settle disputes. On the other hand, China
uses its position as an upstream riparian state to influence regional policies, often making its
water strategies fit with its larger geopolitical goals. The use of the water events intensity
scale and long-term water conflict forecast helps us better understand hydro-diplomacy as an
important part of the foreign policy of rising powers. It also gives us ideas about how it could
change regional dynamics and the way the world is governed.
Keywords
Multi-Track Hydro-Diplomacy, Transboundary Water Management, Regional Cooperation,
Water Governance, Geo-politics.
Resumo
A hidrodiplomacia tornou-se uma ferramenta estratégica para as potências emergentes
equilibrarem a cooperação regional e exercerem influência na governança global da água.
Este artigo compara a Índia e a China para compreender como podem usar os seus recursos
hídricos compartilhados, melhorar a sua posição global e fortalecer as suas alianças regionais.
A Índia e a China têm várias preocupações quando se trata da bacia do rio Brahmaputra, que
é muito importante para a estabilidade e o crescimento da região. A Índia utiliza a
hidrodiplomacia para construir estruturas cooperativas no sul da Ásia com foco na partilha
justa da água e meio de resolução de conflitos. Por outro lado, a China utiliza a sua posição
como Estado ribeirinho a montante para influenciar as políticas regionais, muitas vezes
fazendo com que as suas estratégias hídricas se coadunem com os seus objetivos geopolíticos
mais amplos. O uso da escala de intensidade de eventos hídricos e da previsão de conflitos
hídricos de longo prazo ajuda-nos a compreender melhor a hidrodiplomacia como uma parte
importante da política externa das potências emergentes. Também oferece ideias sobre como
poderia mudar a dinâmica regional e a forma como o mundo é governado.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 63-83
Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
64
Palavras-chave
Hidrodiplomacia Multifacetada, Gestão Transfronteiriça da Água, Cooperação Regional,
Governança da Água, Geopolítica.
How to cite this article
Mahla, Pintu Kumar (2025). Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from
India and China in Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance. Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations. Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional
Organizations, VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1, December 2025, pp. 63-83. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-
7251.DT0525.4
Article submitted on 12th May 2025 and accepted for publication on 06th September
2025.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 63-83
Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
65
HYDRO-DIPLOMACY AS A STRATEGIC LEVER: COMPARATIVE
INSIGHTS FROM INDIA AND CHINA IN REGIONAL COOPERATION
AND GLOBAL WATER GOVERNANCE
PINTU KUMAR MAHLA
Introduction
The cooperation over transboundary hydro resources prevails in most instances. There
has been a minor increase in water conflicts since 2000. These conflicts that do occur are
of limited intensity and hardly ever involve violence (Transboundary Freshwater
Diplomacy Database Project, n.d.). However, they are often related to their uneven
distribution, upstream-downstream dynamics, competition, and securitisation. This
context can lead to disagreements and conflicts while negatively impacting sustainable
water resources management and the relations, peace and stability of any region.
Water conflicts invite several upstream and downstream nations to come together for
cooperation. However, some countries do not find cooperation over hydro resources a
suitable step concerning their national interests. China’s unilateral actions over the
Brahmaputra River basin are a great example among us. While the benefits of
cooperation typically outweigh those of unilateral action, there might be various
incentives to not engage in cooperation/pursue unilateral or conflictive behaviour. This
behaviour can have long-term negative consequences on all riparians involved.
Consequently, hydro-diplomacy addresses these conflict risks to prevent or limit negative
repercussions and ensure cooperation and peace.
People often call water ‘blue gold’ because it is so important for life. It is also called a
common resource, which means that it is meant for everyone to use and manage. Water
is very versatile, which means it can be used in many different ways. But it also has a
lot of potential to cause bad things to happen, both at the domestic and global levels.
Water has been a source of conflict throughout history, causing fights at the local,
regional, and international levels. The Brahmaputra water dispute between India and
China is a prime example.
In the world of Himalayan hydro-politics, China and India are both important players.
India, as a lower-middle riparian, is more vulnerable to water insecurity because it is
more dependent on the Tibetan plateau's headwaters to keep rivers like the Indus, Sutlej,
and Brahmaputra flowing. China, with its advantageous hydrological position, holds
greater power to determine broader political relationships with its riparian neighbours.
The lack of proper institutionalisation exacerbates existing challenges in the basin, which
runs across a disputed border between two nuclear-armed countries engaged in tense
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December 2025, pp. 63-83
Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
66
border interactions. China’s focus on strategic infrastructure dominance is a bugbear for
regional and global water governance. It can deteriorate the downstream nations’ water
scenario.
Both countries, India and China, have a limited ‘Track 1’ stance within the hydro
diplomacy track mechanism. Track 1 is a form of formal inter-state diplomacy conducted
by government officials in predefined settings. In the case of India and China, it involves
only a few agreements and limited discussions about the Brahmaputra River basin.
Neither country trusts the other because there are no effective ways to resolve disputes,
prevent their occurrence, or collaborate more closely. This lack of trust hampers
cooperation, making the region less stable and affecting the people living there. This
study examines the effectiveness of India's collaborative approach versus China's
assertive stance in managing transboundary waters through hydro-diplomatic strategies.
This approach is generally less visible in the existing research. It also assesses how these
approaches will give rise to water tensions in mitigating cross-border water issues. To
assess the effectiveness of these approaches, the Basin at Risk Scale (Water Event
Intensity Scale) framework has been employed. This framework places this study in
another context, which is barely researched in contemporary transboundary water
research. The findings deepen understanding of hydro-diplomacy as a key element of the
foreign policy of emerging powers, offering insights into its ability to influence regional
dynamics and shape global governance.
Research Methodology
The study adopts the mixed-method approach, which consists of both qualitative and
quantitative methods. The qualitative data relies on secondary data, which consists of
rich literature on transboundary river cooperation. The quantitative data accompany the
secondary data to examine or give legitimacy to the qualitative data. Quantitative data
will be referred from the transboundary freshwater diplomacy database by Oregon State
University, the water conflict chronology database by Pacific Institute, global tools by the
Water, Peace and Security (WPS) partnership, government reports, policy documents,
and international agreements (See the reference section for further exploration of
databases). This research examines a comparative analysis of the hydro-diplomacy
strategies of India and China on transboundary river basin conflicts and the cooperation
framework. The comparative case study will be used to explore the roots of water
conflicts, including geopolitical, economic, and environmental factors.
Moreover, this research has also employed the Basin at Risk Scale (Water Event Intensity
Scale), a part of The Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy Database developed by the
Oregon State University, to identify historical indicators of international freshwater
conflict and cooperation between India and China and, from them, create a framework
to identify and evaluate international river basins at potential risk for future freshwater
conflict (See Fig.1.). To do that, there are some indicators, population density, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), overall relations, water development projects, treaties or
agreements, based on the qualitative judgement of statistical and empirical analyses in
Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy Database (Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy
Database). The purpose of using this scale was to identify these indicators of international
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December 2025, pp. 63-83
Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
67
freshwater conflict and cooperation between India and China and, from them, create a
framework to identify and evaluate transboundary river basins at potential risk for future
freshwater conflict. Through this comprehensive approach, a nuanced understanding of
the hydro-diplomacy framework as a critical aspect of emerging powers’ foreign policy
offers insights into its potential to reshape regional dynamics and influence the global
governance landscape.
Fig. 1. Basin at Risk Scale (Water Event Intensity Scale)
Source: The Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy Database, Oregon State University, USA
Theoretical Framework of Hydro-Diplomacy
Hydro-diplomacy is the process of discussing and resolving political issues that arise
when countries have disagreements over water resources that cross borders. It involves
establishing collaborative water governance frameworks using foreign policy tools
integrated within bilateral and multilateral relations, which operate at various levels and
through different channels. It also involves several diplomatic tracks to enhance
transboundary river cooperation. These tracks highlight the diverse approaches used to
manage and resolve conflicts. Track I diplomacy refers to formal, government-led
negotiations that occur in official, pre-established settings, often representing the
primary channel for state-to-state interactions. In contrast, Track II diplomacy involves
informal and unofficial dialogues where state representatives or other adversarial groups
engage in discussions without the constraints of formal negotiations, fostering open
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Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
68
communication and mutual understanding. Track I and a Half diplomacy bridges the gap
between Tracks I and II, offering a semi-official platform where government officials
interact with non-state actors such as scientists, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), or mediators, often facilitated by a third party. This track is particularly effective
in generating innovative solutions and building trust. Lastly, Track III diplomacy is
characterised by citizen-led initiatives and grassroots efforts, where NGOs, civil society
organisations, and individuals engage in cross-border dialogues to promote peace,
understanding, and collaboration. The synergy among these tracks, i.e., multi-track
hydro-diplomacy, is very necessary to support the overall diplomatic process. It provides
several platforms for conflict resolution and cooperative engagements.
While formulating robust hydro-diplomacy, it is worth adopting several hydro-diplomacy
tools and approaches such as dispute prevention, dispute resolution, reconciliation of
interests, agreements, negotiation and an enlarging basket of benefits. Besides these
approaches, the geopolitical significance of water invites the first and foremost
consideration of the policy framework. Most scholars have traditionally understood
geopolitics within the context of territorial disputes. Imperialist geopolitics is linked to
scholars like Alfred Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, and
Nicholas Spykman, who stressed the importance of controlling land and sea power
strategically. During the Cold War, scholars like George Kennan and leaders from both
the West and the Soviet Union used the language of containment, First/Second/Third
World hierarchies, and the binary of Western vs. Eastern blocs to shape geopolitics.
During this time, there was competition between ideas and strategic alignment. After the
Cold War ended, a new kind of geopolitics called the New World Order began. It was led
by scholars like Mikhail Gorbachev, Francis Fukuyama, Edward Luttwak, George Bush,
and groups like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). Some of the most important ideas were new ways of thinking
about politics, the end of history, neo-liberalism, rogue states, and Huntington’s Clash of
Civilisations. Finally, Environmental Geopolitics puts global ecological issues at the centre
of its work, with contributions from Al Gore, Robert Kaplan, Thomas Homer-Dixon, and
Michael Renner. The lexicon has begun to conceptualise geopolitics within an
environmental framework. Gore has been particularly active in advocating for
environmental initiatives, while Homer-Dixon and Renner have focused on the concept
of environmental scarcity (See Table 1). This highlights the fact that environmental
issues, especially water issues, can play a central role in geopolitics. In this context, there
is a direct correlation between hydro-political and geopolitical conflicts, as excessive
water resource consumption leads to scarcity and impacts the environment, ultimately
giving rise to geopolitical tensions. By conceptualising water as both an environmental
and developmental resource, as well as a strategic and security asset, the geopolitical
lens shows how countries use water as a tool for diplomacy, coercion, or leverage, and
how water conflicts can either cause bigger problems or bring people together.
Geopolitics deals with hydro-politics by looking at water as a way to get power, a security
issue, and a way to talk to other countries. It sees the risks (ecological crisis) and chances
(cooperation, treaties, shared infrastructure) that come from having water resources that
everyone can use.
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VOL. 16, Nº. 2, TD1
Thematic Dossier - Emerging Powers In-between Global and Regional Organizations
December 2025, pp. 63-83
Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
69
Table 1. The Discourse on Geopolitics
Discourse
Key Intellectuals
Dominant Lexicon
Imperialist
geopolitics
Alfred Mahan
Friedrich Ratzel
Halford Mackinder
Karl Haushofer
Nicholas Spykman
Seapower
Lebensraum
Landpower/Heartland
Landpower/Heartland
Rimlands
Cold War
geopolitics
George Kennan
Soviet and Western political and
military leaders
Containment First/Second/Third World
countries as satellites and dominoes
Western vs. Eastern bloc
New world order
geopolitics
Mikhail Gorbachev
Francis Fukuyama
Edward Luttwak
George Bush
Leaders of G7, IMF, WTO
Strategic planners in the Pentagon and
NATO
Samuel Huntington
New Political Thinking
The end of history
Statist geo- economics
US-led new world order, Transnational
liberalism/Neo-liberalism
Rogue states, nuclear outlaws and
terrorists
Clash of Civilisations
Environmental
geopolitics
World Commission on Environment and
Development
Al Gore
Robert Kaplan
Thomas Homer-Dixon
Michael Renner
Sustainable development
Strategic environmental initiative
Coming Anarchy
Environmental scarcity
Environmental scarcity
Source: O’Tuathail (1998)
Water is an environmental resource that has gained significant geopolitical importance
due to its scarcity and commonality across international borders. It can be inferred from
the words of Lao-Tsu, a 6th-century Chinese philosopher and founder of Taoism, that “in
the world, there is nothing more submissive and weaker than water. Yet for attacking
that which is hard and strong, nothing can surpass it” (Sinha, 2005).
Disputes regarding water resources have evolved into a progressively challenging issue
to address, especially in a multipolar world where water is regarded as a source of
economic and political influence. The inequitable allocation of water resources, in
conjunction with population growth and development, may result in water scarcity,
potentially inciting violent conflict (Burgess et al., 2016). To deal with and settle these
water disputes, there have been many bilateral and multilateral efforts, such as
dialogues, treaties, and joint commissions.
In South Asia, groups like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
and the Indus Basin Initiative have given people a place to talk and work together on
water issues. These groups have made it easier for South Asian countries to work
together. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is also actively engaged in enhancing water
security and resilience in the Himalayan region through its support for inclusive, resilient,
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Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
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sustainable, and well-governed service delivery and resource management. ADB extends
its assistance to its developing member countries in attaining water-related Sustainable
Development Goals, which encompass climate change resilience, access to fundamental
water and sanitation services, heightened food security, rural revitalisation, gender
equality, improved health, and a healthier environment (Asian Development Bank, N.d.).
Moreover, the Himalayan University Consortium (HUC) Thematic Working Group on
Water (Water Group), a thematic working group within the HUC, serves as an illustrative
instance of a regional initiative endeavouring to foster enhanced collaboration and
cooperation between research institutes and practice-based organisations (Himalayan
University Consortium, N.d.). The primary objective of this initiative is to promote
evidence-informed water resources management within the Himalayan region.
However, no transboundary water cooperation institution has materialised thus far. In
October 2020, representatives from all eight countries within the Hindu Kush Himalayan
(HKH) region signed a declaration during the Ministerial Mountain Summit (Sprouse,
2022). The declaration called for increased deliberation on emerging issues in the HKH,
a unified regional representation in global forums, the establishment of a science-policy
forum concentrating on mountain environments, and the formation of a Task Force to
evaluate the feasibility of establishing a regional institutional mechanism. The impetus
behind the summit arose from a 2019 evaluation that projected a complete collapse in
water availability to downstream regions of the Tibetan Plateau by the end of this century
under a 'business as usual' scenario (Ibid.). Moreover, Glaciers in the HKH region are
vanishing rapidly, “with a 65% increase in the melting rate from 2011 to 2020 compared
to the previous decade. Their melt rate surpasses the global average, with the eastern
HKH experiencing the most substantial losses. Projections suggest that if global
temperatures rise by 1.5–2°C, the region’s glacier volume could decline by 30–50% by
2100. In scenarios where warming exceeds 2°C, glacier volume may decrease to 20–
45% of its 2020 level” (UNESCO, 2025). With escalating atmospheric temperatures
causing the ongoing melting of glaciers and other frozen water sources across the HKH,
which directly sustain the lives of nearly two billion individuals, the window of opportunity
for creating an effective water resource management system in South Asia is rapidly
closing.
South Asia, especially the Himalayan region, is known around the world for having a lot
of resources and is home to more than a million people. Most people in the area live in
rural areas and get most of their food from farming and small-scale subsistence farming.
The Himalayan region is one of the most vulnerable places to climate change because of
several factors, including a growing population, the depletion of natural resources, and
climate change caused by humans. The rise in temperatures and the growing carbon
footprints are two clear signs of climate change in this area. Both of these things are
good signs of how the climate is changing in the Himalayan region. It is easy to see how
climate change is affecting the region’s water resources around the world. This
phenomenon has had a significant negative impact on the region’s main river basins,
especially the Indus and Brahmaputra basins.
The region, South Asia, is known for its water-related disputes. For example, the 1960
Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan. In addition to the competition over the
Indus Basin, China's strategic hydrological involvement in South Asian hydro-politics
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Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
Pintu Kumar Mahla
71
regarding the Brahmaputra is also concerning. In this context, the hydro-politics of South
Asia calls for an examination of the hydro-diplomacy strategies employed by both India
and China.
India’s Approach to Hydro-Diplomacy
India’s hydro-political interests in South Asia have undergone significant changes and
become increasingly complex over the years. India's water management plans,
hydroelectric power generation, and efforts to collaborate in the region are all
significantly influenced by the Himalayas, which have extensive large river systems. The
Indus River Basin, the Brahmaputra River Basin, and the Ganges River are all important
sources of water for India’s agriculture, industry, and homes. India has made building
dams and reservoirs a top priority so that it can control the flow of water, provide
irrigation, and generate hydroelectric power. India is trying to use its water resources for
sustainable growth through projects like the Kisenganga hydroelectric dam on the Jhelum
River, the Nathpa Jhakri Dam on the Sutlej River, and the proposed Dibang Multipurpose
Project on the Brahmaputra River (NHPC, N.d).
However, India’s hydro-diplomacy in South Asia faces challenges. The transboundary
water disputes are a major concern, especially with China and Pakistan. To address these
issues, India manages its transboundary waters through the IWT and Expert-level
Mechanism (ELM) in the case of China (Department of Water Resources, River
Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, n.d.). India’s hydro-political growth in the region
has also raised awareness of environmental issues and the impact of large infrastructure
projects on river ecosystems. Building dams and reservoirs alters river flow, damages
aquatic biodiversity, and disrupts downstream ecosystems (He et al., 2024). Hydropower
development also involves problems such as sedimentation, water pollution, and
displacement of people (Liu et al., 2013). India recognises the need to balance energy
requirements with environmental sustainability to tackle these challenges. It has taken
measures to reduce the negative effects of dams through environmental impact
assessments, the construction of fish migration systems, and afforestation.
Table 2. The Case of Hydro-diplomacy over the Indus Basin and Brahmaputra Basin
Aspect & Approaches
Indus River Basin
Brahmaputra River Basin
Riparian Countries
India, Pakistan
India, China, Bangladesh,
Bhutan
Main Agreement
Indus Waters Treaty (1960)
No formal treaty; bilateral
agreements with China
Mediator
World Bank
No third-party mediation
Water Sharing
India controls 3 eastern rivers
(Sutlej, Beas, Ravi); Pakistan
controls 3 western rivers
(Indus, Jhelum, Chenab)
No comprehensive water-sharing
agreement, but data-sharing
mechanisms exist.
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Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
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Conflict Management
Permanent Indus Commission
(PIC) and Neutral Expert for
dispute resolution
Periodic bilateral talks and
technical exchanges
Infrastructure
Projects
India constructs hydro projects
within treaty guidelines
China’s dam constructions on the
upper Brahmaputra raise
concerns in India
Legal Framework
Legally binding treaty with
robust dispute resolution
mechanisms
Bilateral agreements and
diplomatic engagement, like the
Expert-Level Mechanism, but no
enforceable treaty
Recent Developments
Periodic disputes over Indian
dam projects (e.g.,
Kishanganga, Ratle)
Concerns over China’s proposed
dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo
(upper Brahmaputra)
Diplomatic Leverage
The treaty provides a limited
scope for renegotiation,
maintaining stability.
India relies on diplomatic
channels and regional influence.
Environmental
Concerns
Focuses on water allocation,
with limited environmental
considerations
Growing concerns over the
ecological impact of Chinese
projects
Future Outlook
Pressure to renegotiate due to
changing hydrological patterns
Need for comprehensive
multilateral dialogue on water
management
Source: The Table prepared by the Author
Moreover, India and China’s hydro-diplomatic approach to the Indus and Brahmaputra
River basins reflects their strategic and geopolitical concerns, respectively (See Table 2).
Even though there are political tensions, the IWT has mostly held up. India has followed
treaty rules and used its legitimate water share. On the other hand, the Brahmaputra
River Basin does not have a full-fledged treaty. India’s hydro-diplomatic efforts in the
Brahmaputra basin depend on bilateral talks and cooperation in the region because of
the lack of a binding legal framework. The Brahmaputra basin needs more multilateral
cooperation to deal with new problems. Environmental issues and climate change make
both river basins even more difficult to deal with.
Consequently, India's hydro-diplomacy in the area is a complex and changing situation.
To deal with the problems and opportunities that the Himalayan rivers bring, as well as
to make sure that everyone has equitable use of water and to build good relationships
with neighbouring countries in the name of shared prosperity, regional cooperation, and
sustainable development, will continue to be very important.
China’s Approach to Hydro-Diplomacy
China's interest in the Himalayan region (especially the Tibet Autonomous Region) stems
from several factors. First and foremost, the Tibetan Plateau, commonly referred to as
the ‘Third Pole,’ harbours a significant amount of freshwater. Numerous major rivers in
Asia, such as the Yangtze, Indus, Brahmaputra, and Sutlej, originate from this plateau.
It is estimated that “Tibet contributes approximately 627 Cubic kilometres of hydrological
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Hydro-Diplomacy as a Strategic Lever: Comparative Insights from India and China in
Regional Cooperation and Global Water Governance
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73
flows annually, accounting for approximately 6 per cent of Asia's total runoff. The
availability of freshwater in Tibet is approximately 104,500 Cubic meters per year,
positioning Tibet as the world's fourth-largest reservoir of freshwater after Iceland, New
Zealand, and Canada, which makes it the water tower of Asia” (Sinha, 2016). The
watersheds of these rivers, which have their sources in Tibet, play a crucial role in
providing water resources to South Asia. It plays a crucial role in sustaining the
livelihoods of millions of people downstream. Recognising the economic and geopolitical
advantages of controlling water resources, China has pursued hydropower projects in the
region to meet its growing energy demands and enhance its national security.
In China, water resources are characterised by seasonal and regional imbalances, with
floods common in summer and droughts in winter. The South experiences water
abundance, while the North faces shortages. This uneven distribution leads to frequent
flooding and drought disasters. It has been noted that “despite hosting 46% of the
national population, 63% of the arable land, and generating 39% of the GDP, North China
has only 18% of the country’s water resources and 40% of the national per capita water
availability” (Ministry of Water Resources China, 2023). This disparity between resource
availability and demand has long posed challenges to sustainable development and
regional stability. Moreover, China’s limited water resources are further underscored by
its “per capita water availability of 2,000 m³, merely 35% of the global average” (Ministry
of Water Resources China, 2023). Regions such as the Yellow River basin, the Hai River
basin, and Northwest China face particularly acute water scarcity (Ministry of Water
Resources China, 2023). With economic growth and social progress driving increased
water demands, the country’s modernisation efforts are confronted with significant water
resource constraints.
To address these challenges, China has pursued large-scale hydropower and water
management projects, reflecting its hydro-political strategy (Ministry of Water Resources,
China, n.d.). Significant investments have been made in constructing massive dams,
including the Three Gorges Dam and the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, as well
as several projects on the Brahmaputra River (International Commission on Large Dams,
n.d.). These initiatives aim to balance water distribution across regions through extensive
inter-basin and cross-regional water transfers. Currently, there are “129 major water
diversion projects operational, effectively redistributing water to align with population
centres and economic zones. The South-to-North Water Diversion Project stands as a
prime example of this effort (See Fig.2). Its first phase on the Eastern and Middle routes
has transferred 65.4 billion m³ of water, benefitting 176 million people. Between 2012
and 2022, China’s total water supply capacity increased from 700 billion m³ to nearly
900 billion m³” (Ministry of Water Resources China, 2023).
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Fig. 2. Roadmap of the South-To-North Water Diversion Project
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, China (2019, March 20)
Furthermore, rural water supply projects have provided “870 million rural residents with
access to clean water, achieving 87% tap water coverage in rural areas” (Ibid.). These
water management efforts grant China greater control over water flow, enhancing its
influence over downstream regions. By regulating river systems, China strengthens its
hydro-political presence in the region, impacting neighbouring riparian states like India.
This combination of domestic water management and strategic resource control
underscores the critical role of water in China’s long-term economic and geopolitical
objectives.
In addition, China’s hydro-political development in the region is closely tied to its
involvement in regional infrastructure initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
encompasses numerous hydropower and water infrastructure projects, including the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which involves the construction of hydropower
plants in the Indus River Basin. These efforts enhance China’s economic presence and
influence in the region.
President Xi Jinping has emphasised the importance of prioritising water conservation,
advocating for a comprehensive approach that includes raising awareness, implementing
conservation measures, and promoting water-efficient practices across agriculture,
industry, and urban areas. In line with this vision, China has pursued a national water-
saving strategy, enforced the National Action Plan for Water Conservation and improved
policies and systems to encourage responsible water use. As a result, from 2013 to 2022,
“the country’s GDP expanded by 69.7%, while its total water consumption remained
stable at around 610 billion cubic meters. Water use per 10,000 yuan of GDP and
industrial-added value decreased by 42.8% and 58.2%, respectively. Additionally, the
effective irrigation water use coefficient rose from 0.523 to 0.572” (Ministry of Water
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Resources China, 2023). These efforts have transformed China’s water management
from an inefficient model to one that is intensive and efficient. It is worth to note here
“despite possessing only 6% of the world’s freshwater resources, China provides water
for nearly 20% of the global population and contributes over 18% to the world’s
economy” (Ministry of Water Resources China, 2023). To enhance water governance, the
Chinese government has introduced comprehensive plans like the Program of Action for
the Construction of the National Water Network and the 14th Five-Year Plan for
Safeguarding Water Security. Digital technologies are also being integrated into water
management, with developments in digital twin basins, water networks, and projects.
Advanced monitoring systems using meteorological satellites, rain-measuring radars,
and hydrological stations further bolster China’s water management capabilities (Ibid.).
Recognising the global challenges posed by water security, including water hazards,
resource scarcity, ecological degradation, and pollution, China is advocating for
international collaboration. This vision aims to support the achievement of the water-
related goals outlined in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(Ministry of Water Resources China, 2023).
Comparative Analysis: India vs China in Hydro-Diplomacy
In the case of China and India, water plays a significant role as a catalyst for territorial
disputes, as abundant water resources within a contested territory often escalate
tensions between the nations involved in the dispute. India's border dispute with China
is a hydro-political. These disputes also include the concern of Tibet. Although China has
full political control over Tibet, the headwaters of the region are transboundary. The
competition over hydro resources leads to issues that can never be settled because Water
relations cannot be permanent because stream flows are not constant. As argued by
Uttam Sinha, “Political relations can easily be impacted by changes in the quantitative
and qualitative nature of the river. Varied interpretations of the use of river water have
resulted in claims and counter-claims” (Sinha, 2014). The hydro relations between India
and China are currently in a nascent stage, presenting a wider opportunity for
establishing cooperation and fostering the exchange of hydro resources at the scientific
and societal levels. The history of water treaties, agreements, and institutions between
the two nations spans a considerable period. In the case of the Brahmaputra River, there
is no formal treaty per se, but concerning sharing and utilisation, both countries are
committed to exchanging information for flood control purposes, data sharing, and
transmission through the Expert-Level Mechanism (ELM).
Regarding the Indo-China River basins, an expert-level mechanism, consisting of
representatives from both sides, was established in 2006 to discuss cooperation on
various matters such as the provision of hydrological data during the flood season,
emergency management, and other pertinent issues on an annual basis. The inaugural
meeting took place in 2007. In terms of sharing and utilisation, both countries have
agreed to exchange data for flood control, emergency management, and other related
concerns.
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However, comprehensive assessments regarding the extent of cooperation are still
pending. Given their hydrological position and dependence on the Himalayan streams,
China and India are important players in the hydro-politics of the region. It is clearly
evident that “the leadership in both countries has, from time to time, acknowledged the
water problem as an existential threat. Back in 1998, Deputy Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
expressed concern that the 'very survival of the Chinese nation' is threatened by the
looming water shortage. In his first Independence Day address in 2004, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh highlighted the issue of water and raised it as one of the ‘Saat Sutras’
(seven sectors) needing attention” (Sinha, 2016).
Consequently, China, as a complete Upper-riparian, is an important player in the hydro-
politics of South Asia. However, India, a significant participant in the realm of hydro-
politics, assumes the role of a lower riparian in the case of the Brahmaputra basin. India's
position as a lower riparian increases its reliance on the upstream sources of rivers,
including the Brahmaputra, which originates from the Tibetan plateau (See Fig.). This
dependency amplifies India's water insecurity, as its access to water resources is directly
linked to the origins of these rivers. On the other hand, China's insecurity stems from
the uneven distribution of hydro resources within its territory rather than external
dependencies. Consequently, “China’s hydrological position gives it a higher advantage
in dealing with larger political equations with its riparian neighbours. India, on the other
hand, given its middle riparian position and its longstanding commitment to bilateral river
treaties, has to assiduously balance the anxiety and concerns of its lower riparians
without compromising its water requirements” (Sinha, 2016). Several key concerns,
including dam construction, flood control, joint management, and water quantity issues,
emphasise the need for cooperation. The Basin at Risk Scale indicates an increasing
conflict intensity, forecasting an emerging long-term conflict in the Brahmaputra basin.
Based on the Basin at Risk Scale, certain indicators (see methodology section) need to
be considered to identify waters at risk for future conflicts over hydro resources. Firstly,
basin countries with greater differences in their population densities tend to cooperate
more over shared freshwater resources. India, with 492 people per square kilometre,
and China, with 151 people per square kilometre, show a significant difference in
population density (Worldometer, 2025). Basins between both countries, in particular,
have a high population density, such as 18 inhabitants/km2 in China and 432
inhabitants/km2 in India (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2011), which is an indicator
of a basin at high risk of conflict. However, this challenge will be a common point of
cooperation on the proper utilisation of water resources amid a growing population.
Secondly, while the difference in their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) appears large and
seems risky at the current stage (WorldData.info, N.d.), their overall relations are more
conflictual. Globally, countries with generally friendly relations tend to cooperate over
hydro resources. However, regionally, there is a weaker correlation. In South Asia, India
and China have not maintained amicable hydro relations because of some past upheavals
on certain national border issues (Mahla, 2024).
Lastly, on an infrastructure level, basins with a high dam density and treaties
demonstrate significantly higher levels of cooperation than those without treaties.
However, this is not the case with India and China, which do not have a strong agreement
to address concerns related to water infrastructure in the Brahmaputra basin, which is a
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high-dam-density basin. Therefore, considering all these factors, it is probable that there
will be a risk in the basin shared between India and China. Moreover, there are a lot of
instances where water conflicts or triggers have been the cause and result of the border
skirmishes between India and China (Ibid.) In addition, according to the Basin at Risk
Scale (Water Event Intensity Scale), water events related to conflict between India and
China cover the scale from -2 to 3 (see Fig.1, Fig.3, Transboundary Freshwater Diplomacy
Database, and Water Conflicts Database). This result shows the growing water conflict
issues between the two countries. The risk scale showcases the more conflictive nature
between India and China.
China may employ water as a means to exert pressure or as a political bargaining chip
against India to secure concessions on the boundary issue. Given the backdrop of Sino-
Indian relations, marked by territorial disputes, entrenched mistrust, border tensions,
and geopolitical rivalry, water emerges as a crucial factor that will significantly influence
the prospects of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and competition between the two
countries regarding the utilisation of the vital rivers originating from the Tibetan region,
which are essential for sustaining life.
Fig. 3. Long-Term Conflict Forecast (The Brahmaputra River Basin)
Source: The Figure was prepared by the Author by retrieving data from the International
Commission on Large Dams, the transboundary freshwater diplomacy database by Oregon State
University, the water conflict chronology database by the Pacific Institute, and global tools by the
Water, Peace, and Security (WPS) partnership.
Given its status as an Upper-riparian state, China may potentially seek to coordinate and
challenge the water-related discussions between Pakistan and Bangladesh in conjunction
with India, while refraining from explicitly disclosing its hydroelectric projects on the
Water Conflicts
1994
1996
2006
2008 (2 Times)
2016
2025
•Basin: Brahmaputra
•Treaties: 0
•River Basin Organisations: 0
•Area: 580,000 sq. km
•Riparian Countries: India and China
•Number of Dams (China): 24,207
•Number of Dams (India): 4,488
Basin at Risk Scale
(Water Event
Intensity Scale) -->
From -2 to 3
&
Long-Term Conflict
Forcast - Emerging
Conflict
MoUs & ELM
2008
2013
2018
2016
2019
2022
Water Conflict & Management Concerns
• Dam Construction
• Joint Management
• Flood Control/Relief
• Technical Cooperation/Assistance
• Water Quantity
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Indus Basin and Brahmaputra Basin. The growing nexus between China and Pakistan is
also a significant cause for concern for India. “Pakistan had been under the strategic and
economic tutelage of the United States for more than fifty years, enjoying an
unprecedented economic boom in the form of free aid from the United States, which had
been interrupted after the notorious Al-Qaeda leader bin Laden’s killing by US
commandos. Pakistan quite cleverly opened up to China once the era of bonhomie was
over with the United States. The surrogate, Pakistan, of the United States has now turned
to step up being a surrogate of China” (Panigrahi, 2018).
Hydro-political Nexus between China and Pakistan
China's engagement in Pakistan's hydropower sector commenced in 2006 with the
initiation of the first Pakistan-China Energy Forum in Islamabad. The forum focused on
discussions about energy security and explored various energy sources, including hydro,
thermal, and nuclear power. It also delved into the exploration of potential avenues for
public-private partnerships and Chinese investments in Pakistan's energy sector (Kumar,
2007).
During President Hu Jintao's visit to Islamabad in November 2006, a joint statement was
signed, reaffirming the shared commitment of both countries' leadership to strengthen
their cooperation. The agreement encompassed the implementation of projects in the
energy sector, encompassing hydropower, nuclear power, renewable energy sources, as
well as the mining and resources sector (Pakistan Embassy Beijing, 2006). President Hu
Jintao specifically emphasised the achievement of a consensus on collaborative efforts in
hydroelectric power and the pursuit of “new sources of energy” (Kumar, 2007). As China
rises, its axis with Pakistan will have a greater reach in the Himalayan region. It makes
India’s water vulnerable to two hostile regional neighbours: Pakistan and China.
Moreover, the Increasing nexus between China and Pakistan, in the future, can hamper
the hydro-diplomacy between India and China (Mahla, 2025).
Policy Recommendations and Future Directions
With mounting environmental pressures and political tensions in the Himalayan region,
the urgency of achieving tangible advancements in multilateral water-sharing
cooperation cannot be overstated. As competition for water access intensifies in the
coming decades, the risk of mass migration, civil conflicts, and potentially violent
confrontations between state actors may rise. In light of the current momentum,
Himalayan countries must expedite the development of joint action or institutional
arrangements that facilitate cooperation, thereby addressing the collective action
challenges and diverse interests they face. Using Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) methods can help make water management more sustainable and
collaborative. IWRM encourages cooperation among different groups by recognising how
social, economic, and environmental factors are all connected. It also promotes fair
distribution, efficient use, and conservation of water resources. As more and more
mechanisms and initiatives come up to deal with shared water resources and related
issues in South Asia, these efforts must promote inclusion and responsiveness to water
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79
demand and access (Patra, 2018). These kinds of efforts should be based on strong
evidence that includes an understanding of why they are needed, what they involve, and
what the risks are. This evidence-based foundation is essential for mobilising sustained
political commitment from various stakeholders, like non-state actors, over the long
term. Presenting potential synergies, trade-offs, and a compelling business case is of
utmost importance to empower stakeholders with the necessary information to make
informed decisions regarding cooperation.
Cooperation initiatives often falter or have short lifespans when rushed or approached
with a one-size-fits-all mentality that fails to adequately grasp the motives, priorities,
and interests of stakeholders. Partnerships should be at the heart of shared water
projects, making sure that important stakeholders and actors are involved in a
meaningful way. There is a range of cooperation that goes from unilateral action
(independent, non-transparent national plans) to coordination (communication and
information about national plans) to collaboration (changing national plans for the benefit
of both sides) to joint action (joint plans, management, or investment) (See Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Types of Cooperation- The Cooperative Continuum
Source: Sadoff and Grey (2005)
In this context, the case of the Brahmaputra Basin showcases China’s unilateral assertive
actions over the Brahmaputra River. Taking unilateral action within a river basin implies
a complete absence of collaboration. There is no sharing of information, communication,
or joint planning regarding the use and management of the shared water resources. This
lack of cooperation not only eliminates the potential for mutual benefits but also creates
a risk that the development and investment plans of neighbouring countries may interfere
with or harm one another. Over time, these uncoordinated efforts can collectively reduce
water availability or deteriorate water quality to such an extent that they jeopardise all
ongoing and future initiatives. Therefore, the cooperation continuum between India and
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China should reach the joint action stage. Joint action takes place when countries sharing
a river work collaboratively as partners in planning, funding, and carrying out projects
related to the development of international rivers. Such a high degree of cooperation
typically requires formal agreements, such as treaties, to be established. However, China
has no formal treaty over the Brahmaputra River with India. It is the contemporary
demand of the South Asian region to have a formal treaty over the Brahmaputra River.
Multiple factors give rise to geopolitical concerns between India and China (Huntjens et.
al., 2016). These factors have a great impact on the transboundary river cooperation
between India and China. Water has played a significant role in geopolitical tensions,
especially in the context of India-China border conflicts. Following the 73-day military
standoff at Doklam in 2017, reports emerged suggesting that China had suspended the
sharing of crucial hydrological information regarding the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers.
This move was seen as a breach of their existing bilateral agreement and was linked to
subsequent flooding in Assam and Uttar Pradesh (Mahla, 2024).
Hydropower is a crucial source of clean and renewable energy in the Himalayan region.
However, the development, management, and utilisation of hydro resources requires
extensive cooperation and coordination among nations. To fulfil this cooperative agenda,
multiple concerns need multi-track diplomacy. The dispute over the Brahmaputra River
needs multi-track water diplomacy, i.e., a multifaceted strategic leverage that involves
various levels of diplomatic tracks and actors to mitigate concerns over transboundary
river basins.
Conclusion
Transboundary water resources come with several challenges due to water transcending
national boundaries. These challenges can lead to disagreements over the use,
development or protection of water and lead to conflict. However, as per the Basin at
Risk scale, emerging water conflicts in South Asia are typically limited and mostly non-
violent. To always ensure the prevalence of cooperation and mitigate the possibility of
water conflicts, the cooperative hydro-diplomacy continuum between India and China is
very significant. Both countries face significant challenges in managing transboundary
rivers, such as the Brahmaputra and Indus, which are critical for regional stability and
development. India employs hydro-diplomacy to foster cooperative frameworks within
South Asia, focusing on equitable water sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms.
Conversely, China utilises its dominant position as an upstream riparian state to shape
regional policies, often aligning its water strategies with broader geopolitical objectives.
Regional and bilateral institutions, an omitted hydro-political strategy between India and
China, play a significant role in addressing the complex challenges associated with the
development, management, and utilisation of hydropower resources. By promoting
multi-track hydro-diplomacy, these institutions can pave the way for a more efficient,
equitable, and sustainable hydro sector development in the Himalayan region. The
establishment and strengthening of robust institutions, especially and solely focusing on
the hydro-politics in the Himalayan region, are imperative for harnessing the full potential
of hydropower and advancing the transition to a clean and renewable energy future.
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