nations, under the prominent figures of the US and the Soviets (Balci, 2023),
characterised by bipolarity. The Soviet Union was dissolved, and therefore, there were
no longer two superpowers; the US took the lead as the hegemonic power until its power
status was shaken by subsequent military, political, and economic crises. There was no
newly established international institution symbolising the US hegemony or any other
emerging great power, and that is why a decade-long unipolarity could not survive or
evolve into a well-embedded international system. Since the early years of the 21
st
century, it may be more accurate to include the so-called unipolarity period between
1990 and 2001. During this time, well-established international institutions have been
losing influence, while regional institutions led by emerging powers have been gaining
space in world politics. Whether international (global) or regional, the institutions’
functions are significant in order to “benefit from transaction costs” and “to facilitate the
negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement” (Keohane 1988, p. 387; Martin 1992, p. 789),
allowing states to maintain their national interests. In this sense, the loss of influence
and effectiveness of international (global) institutions, as well as the increasing
effectiveness of regional institutions, has been a significant part of international system
studies (Neuvonen, 2019, p. 230).
This study intersects with the literature on global governance and its ongoing debates,
arguing that rising global powers pursue their interests through regional
institutionalisation rather than through their own institutions (Tüfekçi and Dag 2022).
This paper is an initial part of a larger academic effort to explain the emerging
international system. As claimed by Barry Buzan, right after the end of bipolarity, “a
multipolar centre will be more complex and more fluid, and may well allow for the
development of militarily hesitant great powers (Buzan 1991, p. 435). Many studies
argue that an emerging international system and even a form of multipolarity are
developing. However, as current world politics do not fully align with this multipolarity,
the international relations literature seeks to determine the type of multipolarity we are
currently experiencing. Some started to seek to grasp a new kind of multipolarity in 2001
when 9/11 occurred, since it was the first time the USA was hit in its own land after
WWII. Others began to think about a new version of multipolarity right after the 2008
economic crisis, which had a significant global impact. However, the core point leading
to the search for understanding the new international system seems to be the dissolution
of the USSR, as Buzan perfectly substitutes his argument as follows;
“At the same time, the shift from two superpowers to several great powers
should mean both a reduction in the intensity of global political concerns and
a reduction in the resources available for sustained intervention. This, in turn,
points to the rise of regional politics. Because the great powers are spread
across several regions and do not include a dominating ideological or power
rivalry within their ranks, they will project their own conflicts into the
periphery much less forcefully and systematically than under the zero-sum
regime of the Cold War. Because regions are less constrained by the impact
of their conflicts on the global scorecard of two rival superpowers, local
rivalries and antagonisms will probably have more autonomy. Local great
powers such as India, China, and perhaps Brazil should also find their regional
influence increased” (Buzan 1991, p. 435).