remains a “plain” human: non-persons are not full members of the social and political
community yet retain their human dignity. Hence, the Afro-communitarian moral-
performative idea of personhood does not suffice to understand the notion of humanness
underneath the Bissau-Guinean spirit-children.
The latter finds its rationale in local and culture-embedded ontology. Admittedly,
ontology speaks of a broad category which complete discernment is a complex
philosophical task. Aimed by the purpose to interpret the idea of humanness, my analysis
considers political subjecthood and temporality. These two elements intertwine to form
a threefold base, built upon the crisscross of subjects, time, and space.
As briefly mentioned above, Bissau-Guinean ontology extends political subjecthood to
body-less or semi-physical entities, such as spirits and dead ancestors. This same
criterium applies to define who constitutes the djorson (Kriol term for kindred, loosely
translated): the ties of the extended family are not limited to living members but include
also dead individuals who maintain capacity for agency in the physical world (Brown,
2004). Accordingly, the definition of political subject becomes an a-temporal notion,
comprising the realms of the physical and of the semi-physical.
The notion of temporality complements the a-temporality of the political community, as
it grants the past a central role in the temporal scale. In contrast to an almost non-
existent future (Rettová, 2016) – as the uncertain time that has yet to happen – the past
epitomises a constitutive and explicative moment (Nanque, 2017a, 2017b). What
occurred provides the foundations for what is today, in a literal and figurative way: the
present is the temporal station that grounds on what has been and preserves what was
through periodical reproduction. What is more, the past also is entitled central
topographical relevance. Whether one consider long gone or recent times, the past
represents the epoch in which the founding fathers conquered or settled in their people’s
land, in their tchon. The bonding of people, land and time not only originated the djorsons
(Nanque, 2017a) but also set in motion the wheel of time, the ignition of the a-temporal
community bonded in this threefold ontology.
The bond to the a-temporal community, sealed in the djorson’s related ideas of time and
space, determines one’s political humanness. While this seems to come as a given from
the argument above, the phenomenon of the criança-irân attests to the boundaries of
the political community. The spirit-children occupy a liminal space in such configuration
of the human and political order: their lack of bonds to the kindred inhibits their belonging
to the a-temporal community, insofar as their metaphysical nature detach them from the
spatial-temporal continuum. In turn, their liminality allows for their disposability; being
outcasted from the polity, the meninu di irân are not endowed with the human and
political dignity other individuals are.
The ontological grounds of the indigenous polity speak for a conception of the political
that foresees the presence of these liminal non-human as part of its normative order.
The exceptionality of the criança-irân, due to their hybrid nature which pulls them apart
from both humans and spirits, places them outsides the boundaries of the a-temporal
and semi-physical political community. Therefore, according to these tenets, the death
of these babies is generally accepted or tolerated, as it is no more than the disappearance
of a being void of any human or political weight.