Treaty and then had supported the expansion of NATO. Despite opposition to these
policies, Vladimir Putin had ultimately decided not to react strongly and eventually
acquiesced to these policy changes. Following this trend, he had balanced a mix of
pragmatism and principle. Therefore, these policymakers were convinced that Putin
would not act very differently with respect to Iraq. The second reason was that, in late
January, Putin had not ruled out the possibility of using force if Iraq did not cooperate
with UN inspectors. In this regard, the assumption was that Russia would act
pragmatically to save its close energy relations with Iraq (Slevin, 2003). However, the
fall of Saddam’s regime could disrupt Moscow’s business dealings in this country and
could also create an unclear perspective in the post-war processes. As stated previously,
the question of Iraq’s debt to Russia was still relevant. Moreover, if the future Iraqi
regime were to quickly pump large quantities of oil into the global energy market to
rebuild its war-torn economy, the price of oil could fall below $18 a barrel, which the
Russians needed to remain solvent (Slevin, 2003). Simply put, the Iraq War could
seriously reduce oil revenues for Russia. It was clear to the Russians that, with Saddam’s
fall, Washington would dominate the decision-making in the country for a long time. For
this reason, there were reports that Russian officials were actively seeking assurances
from the United States that their interests would be respected in the future. In fact, some
analysts stressed this aspect of Russian diplomacy at the time. A case in point was Fiona
Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution who later served as an intelligence
analyst in the Bush and Obama administrations. With regard to this argument, she
argued that the Russians simply wanted “an advantageous position” in which Russia
would not be excluded from the equations in Iraq and the United States would not
“dominate the postwar Iraqi oil industry” (Slevin, 2003). On this account, the Bush
administration assumed that Russia would not use its veto right to block the American
initiative in the Security Council. They also assumed that, under certain conditions, Russia
would not seriously oppose the Iraq War. Therefore, Washington officials were lobbying
to create those favorable conditions. But, in hindsight, these assumptions were perhaps
not entirely accurate. In fact, one may argue that the Washington lobbyists had
underestimated the roots of Russian-Iraqi relations and the role that they had played in
the nature of Russian foreign policy.
However, the Bush administration’s simplistic view that their resolution could move
forward smoothly in the Security Council soon evaporated. This was due to the opposition
from France and Russia against an unreasonable attack on Iraq. In this regard, France
and Germany had put forward a proposal to remove the crisis, the backbone of which
was strengthening the UN weapons inspections. Historically, the French diplomatic
initiative was crucial in preventing the United States from obtaining the nine votes for
the passage of its long-planned resolution. Speaking on France’s TF1 television, while
supporting the French plan, Vladimir Putin called unilateral military action without UN
approval a “grave error” and warned that “if today a proposition was made that we felt
would lead to an unreasonable use of force, we would act with France or alone”
(Associated Press, 2003). Of course, this involved the use of veto right by Russia.
Nonetheless, the Russian president was cautious and stated that the aim of these
diplomatic efforts was not creating a bloc against the United States, but finding a peaceful
solution to end the Iraqi crisis. In fact, as Bush had said earlier, the United States could
(and later did) go to war with “a coalition of the willing” which mainly included Britain,
Australia and Poland. However, by formulating this opposition, it seemed that Russia,