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RUSSIA'S TURN TO THE EAST: ANALYSING THE DRIVERS OF MOSCOW'S
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION SINCE 1991
MÓNICA ROMÁN GONZÁLEZ
monroman@ucm.es
Mónica Román González is a PhD student at Complutense University of Madrid (Spain), where
she received a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations (2017-2021) and a Master’s degree in
International Politics: Sectorial and Area Studies (2021-2022). Her primary work is in the field of
International Relations, with a specialization in Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. She
has published articles for the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE) and Logos Guardia
Civil magazine, which are affiliated with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish
Ministry of the Interior, respectively. Aside from this, she was granted the Extraordinary Award
by the Faculty of Political Science & Sociology at Complutense University of Madrid for her Master
dissertation.
Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War and the consequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Russia has made the recovery of a relevant status in the international system one of the main
objectives of its foreign policy. To achieve this aim, it is of great interest for Moscow to play
an important role in the world’s fastest growing region in recent decades: the Asia-Pacific
region. Although the Kremlin’s involvement has been more visible in other areas such as the
post-Soviet space or Europe, a gradual process of reorientation of Russian foreign policy
towards its Eastern neighbourhood has begun since the beginning of the 21st century. Hence,
this article presents the results of a mixed method research design related to the main internal
and systemic factors that have turned Asia-Pacific region into a priority area for the Russian
Federation since its independence in 1991.
Keywords
Russian Federation, Foreign Policy, Asia-Pacific, International Relations.
Resumo
Desde o fim da Guerra Fria e a consequente dissolução da União Soviética em 1991, a Rússia
fez da recuperação de um estatuto relevante no sistema internacional um dos principais
objetivos da sua política externa. Para alcançar esse objetivo, é de grande interesse para
Moscovo desempenhar um papel importante na região com o crescimento mais rápido nas
últimas décadas: a região Ásia-Pacífico. Embora o envolvimento do Kremlin tenha sido mais
visível noutras áreas, como o espaço pós-soviético ou a Europa, desde o início do século XXI
iniciou-se um processo gradual de reorientação da Política Externa Russa em direção à sua
vizinhança oriental. Assim, este artigo apresenta os resultados de uma investigação com um
desenho metodológico misto, relacionada com os principais fatores internos e sistémicos que
transformaram a região Ásia-Pacífico numa área prioritária para a Federação Russa desde a
sua independência em 1991.
Palavras-chave
Federação Russa, Política Externa, Ásia-Pacífico, Relações Internacionais.
How to cite this article
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2
November 2025-April 2026, pp. 180-201
Russia's turn to the East: analysing the Drivers of Moscow's Foreign Policy Towards the Asia-
Pacific Region since 1991
Mónica Román González
181
González, Mónica Román (2025). Russia's turn to the East: analysing the Drivers of Moscow's
Foreign Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region since 1991. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. VOL. 16, Nº. 2, November 2025-April 2026, pp. 180-201.
DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.16.2.10
Article submitted on 1st December 2023 and accepted for publicaton on 4th of August
2025.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL. 16, Nº. 2
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Russia's turn to the East: analysing the Drivers of Moscow's Foreign Policy Towards the Asia-
Pacific Region since 1991
Mónica Román González
182
RUSSIA'S TURN TO THE EAST: ANALYSING THE DRIVERS OF
MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION SINCE 1991
1
MÓNICA ROMÁN GONZÁLEZ
Introduction
Since its emergence as an independent state in 1991, the Russian Federation has
maintained a constant interest in the Asia-Pacific region. This interest has sometimes
gone unnoticed due to the priority given to its so-called “Near Abroad” (bližneye
zarubežye Ближнее Зарубежье)
2
, and, to a lesser extent, to other areas. Although the
Kremlin's efforts in the Asia-Pacific have evolved over time and intensified in recent
years, Moscow’s interest in the area is often seen as a reaction to the deterioration in
Russian-Western relations following the country’s decision to invade Ukraine. However,
the reality is that Russian engagement in Southeast Asia dates back several decades and
is the result of various factors influencing the foreign policy decision-making process.
In the first place, Russia’s interest in its Asian neighbourhood is rooted in the expansionist
periods of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. While the primary external threats
perceived by Russia have historically come from the West, its interactions with Pacific
powers have been a consistent feature of its diplomatic history, even under pro-Western
leaders such as Peter the Great. Furthermore, the Russian territories that border the
Asia-Pacific region —known collectively as the Russian Far East— are part of the Tsarist
and Communist legacy
3
.
On the other hand, due to the ongoing consolidation of the so-called “vertical of power”
or “power vertical” (vertikal vlasti Вертикаль власти)
4
, the President of Russia plays a
dominant role in the foreign policy decision-making process, as stated in the Russian
Constitution adopted in 1993 (Chapter 4: Art. 80-93) and the amendments of 2020.
1
ACP – The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States / AIIB – Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank /
APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation / APR – Asia-Pacific Region / ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian
Nations / BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa / CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States /
EAS – East Asia Summit / EEF – Eastern Economic Forum / EDM – Eastern Military District / EFTA – European
Free Trade Association / EU – European Union / G20 – Group of 20 / NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
/ OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / OECD-EC – Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development-European Commission / OSK – Operational-Strategic Command
(Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovanie Объединенное стратегическое командование) / QUAD –
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue / SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization / SIPRI – Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute / U.S.A / U.S – United States of America / UN Comtrade – United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics Database / USD – US dollar.
2
. “Near Abroad” is a concept used by the Russian Federation to refer to the countries of the former Soviet
Union, with the purpose of asserting its perceived “right” to expand influence in this part of the world - see
William Safire, “On Language: Near Abroad”, New York Times, May 22, 1994,
https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html
3
. For an overview of Russia’s historical engagement in East Asia, see: Chris Miller, We Shall Be Masters:
Russian Pivots to East Asia from Peter the Great to Putin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2021).
4
. For further explanation of the concept, see: Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 7.
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Pacific Region since 1991
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that Moscow’s international strategies are also
shaped by the existence of differing schools of thought, namely the Westernizers, the
Eurasianists, the Nationalists or the Slavophiles (Kotz and Weir 2007, 285-86).
All these aspects should therefore be considered when analysing the evolution of Russian
Foreign Policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. This background information is essential
for understanding why the Kremlin initially displayed indifference towards the area during
the first half of the 1990s under the pro-Western Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, before
Yevgeny Primakov relaunched Russia-Asia relations. Similarly, throughout the 21st
century, Vladimir Putin has made strengthening ties with Southeast Asian countries a
foreign policy priority. This was part of an effort to re-establish derzhavnost
(Державность)
5
. This term refers to regaining the great power status and influence lost
after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
At the same time, this evolution has been shaped by a range of factors, whose relative
importance has shifted due to changes in the international system and in response to
specific events. The fact that researchers have often analysed these factors in isolation
has limited previous evaluations of Russian strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
Considering the current state of research, this article seeks to analyse Russian foreign
policy towards the region to explain why enhancing its presence there has become a key
priority within Moscow’s current multi-vector foreign policy.
Accordingly, this article is structured in three main sections. It begins by tracing the
evolution of the Russian Federation’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region since 1991. The
second section explores Russia’s economic interests in the region, focusing on trade,
foreign direct investment, and the development of the Russian Far East. The final section
addresses Russia’s security concerns in the area, from ongoing territorial disputes with
regional nations, such as Japan, to contemporary regional tensions. Each section is
supported by contextual background information reflecting how global dynamics have
influenced the development of these policies. The conclusion will examine the interaction
between domestic and systemic factors that have shaped Russian foreign policy towards
the Asia-Pacific region. These systemic factors emerge from the international system
itself.
2. Methodology
To analyse Russian foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and highlighting the
main elements that have shaped its evolution, a mixed-methods approach has been
adopted. Mixed methods research is an approach in the social sciences. It involves
collecting both quantitative and qualitative data. By combining the strengths of both, the
researcher can draw more robust conclusions and gain a comprehensive understanding
of the research problem (Creswell 2015, 2). Given the nature of the phenomenon
5
The concept “derzhavnost”, which refers to Russia’s sense of ‘Greatpowerness’, is considered the major
component of the predominant geopolitical worldview in the country despite the existing debate. For a
balanced discussion of the meaning of the concept, see: Bobo Lo, “Recasting the ideological debate”, in
Russian Foreign Policy Making in the Post-Soviet Era – Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, ed. by Bobo Lo
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 2002), 52-56.
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analysed in this article, this approach offers deeper insights than either form of data
alone.
Qualitative data were gathered through an extensive literature and documentary review.
On the one hand, the literature review was based on books written, as well as academic
articles published by institutions specializing in Russian foreign policy and Asia-Pacific
studies. On the other hand, the documentary review analysed official sources such as
legislation or government documents (e.g., Foreign Policy Concepts, Energy Strategies
or National Security Strategies of the Russian Federation), speeches relevant to the study
(e.g., speeches of Presidents or Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation),
and official reports from relevant organizations.
To determine whether relationships between variables exist, quantitative data (e.g.,
investment and trade data) were compiled and analysed. These data were obtained from
national datasets (e.g., data from the Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State
Statistics Service, also known as Rosstat), regional datasets from the Asia-Pacific region
(e.g., data from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and international datasets
(e.g., data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database also known as UN Comtrade).
To integrate these two strands, this research employed a sequential explanatory design.
The analysis was conducted in two main phases. The process began with the qualitative
analysis of documentary sources and academic literature. This initial phase was crucial
for building a theoretical framework and identifying key historical turning points, strategic
concepts, and the dominant narratives within Russian foreign policy discourse over time.
The insights gained from this qualitative review then guided the quantitative data
collection phase. For instance, the qualitative identification of the post-2014 “Russia’s
Turn to the East” as a critical juncture prompted a targeted collection of trade and
investment statistics from that specific period to measure the economic dimension of this
strategic shift. This sequential process ensured that the quantitative data was not
collected in a vacuum but was instead used to explore and verify the patterns identified
in the initial qualitative stage.
Finally, the two types of data were synthesized through triangulation to cross-validate
the findings. Quantitative data, such as the increase in arms sales to Asian nations or the
growth in trade with APEC, were used to substantiate and provide empirical weight to
the qualitative arguments derived from official policy documents and academic literature.
This approach ensures that the article’s conclusions are not only supported by policy
discourse but are also reflected in measurable trends, thereby enhancing the overall
validity of the analysis.
To clearly present the findings of this mixed methods research and the various forms of
data used, the results of the information analysed are also presented in charts (e.g., bar
charts, line charts or pie charts), tables, and illustrative quotations where appropriate.
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3. The Evolution of the Asia-Pacific Region’s Importance to the Russian
Federation
The volatility of the international environment, along with the wide variety of policies
implemented by the different governments that have led the country since 1991, has
influenced not only the evolution of Russian foreign policy, but also Moscow’s attitude
towards the Asia-Pacific region. For an efficient identification of the most relevant
changes in the Kremlin’s behaviour towards Southeast Asia, an examination of the
Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation approved to date is required. These
official documents outline Russia’s regional and thematic priorities, providing brief
explanations of the key milestones that justified the formulation and intended
implementation of each strategy.
Since the 'vertical of power' and the multidimensionality of Russian foreign policy
discourse also play a crucial role, this section includes this section includes relevant
background information beyond what is stated in the official documents. This context is
essential for understanding the development of Russia’s foreign policy decision-making
during the administrations of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), Vladimir Putin (2000-2008),
Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012), and Putin’s current government since his re-election in
2012.
3.1 Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Boris Yeltsin’s Government
(1991-1999)
Following its emergence as an independent state in 1991, the Russian Federation entered
a period of crisis as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent
loss of its status as a global superpower. In such a fragile and transitional context,
Moscow's main priority was to stabilise the country's situation in order to avoid economic
collapse and maintain its privileged position over the former Soviet republics (Amirov
1999, 275).
To address this situation, the Kremlin adopted the so-called “Kozyrev Doctrine”, named
after its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev. This new policy aimed at achieving
full integration with the West, with the goal of restoring the desired social and economic
stability. For this purpose, the strategy implied the recognition of a unipolar order of the
international system under the hegemony of the United States, since obtaining
international support was an essential condition for the survival of the country (Kozyrev
2005, 196-97).
Consequently, Russian interest in the Asia-Pacific region was limited during those years.
As stated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved during this
period in 1993 —where only three Asian countries were considered important (China,
India, and Japan)— Russia merely perceived the region as a partner in its transformation,
which was required across all levels:
Acquiring a firm position in the Asia-Pacific Region, which has been rapidly transforming
itself into a center of world politics and economy, comparable to the Atlantic region,
would promote Russia’s domestic reforms, enhance Russia’s influence over the general
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political and economic developments in the world, and help fulfill its unique Euro-Asian
potential (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993).
The pro-Western orientation of this foreign policy provoked fierce opposition from
Nationalist and Eurasianist sectors, ultimately leading to Kozyrev's dismissal in 1996.
Unlike his predecessor, the new Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, would radically shift Russian
foreign policy with the introduction of the so-called “Primakov Doctrine”. This new
strategy advocated for a more active foreign policy across multiple geographic areas. Its
goal was to counterbalance American hegemony. Primakov perceived this hegemony as
a threat to Russia’s security, believing Washington intended to prevent Moscow from
playing a significant role in the emerging multipolar order (Primakov 1996, 3-13).
Hence, there are two key elements of this doctrine that remain embedded in
contemporary Russian Foreign Policy: multivectoralism and multipolarity. On the one
hand, multivectorialism provides Moscow a strategical diversification of partnerships with
the post-Soviet space as the main regional priority. On the other hand, aware of its
limitations in directly confronting the United States, Russia advocates the creation of a
multipolar world in which it can reassert itself as a major global actor. This explains
Russia's interest in forging strategic alliances with emerging powers in the international
system such as China or India. This is what Primakov referred to as the creation of a
“Strategic Triangle” to counterbalance Western powers, which would provide Russia with
the necessary partners to regain influence (Leichtova 2016, 23) (Mankoff 2009, 201). As
an example of this, the signing of the Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar
World and the Establishment of a New World Order in 1997 can be highlighted
6
.
At the same time, Russian participation in regional integration processes in Asia-Pacific
started during Primakov’s presence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1991, Russia
established formal relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
becoming a dialogue partner five years later. Regarded by the Kremlin as a useful
mechanism for balancing power dynamics in the international system, ASEAN has
increasingly been used by Moscow to revitalise its engagement with regional countries
(Trenin 2014, 122).
Also in 1996, Russia co-founded the Shanghai Five alongside China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Shanghai Five was later renamed the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) following its membership expansion in 2001. Although
regional security cooperation has remained the institution’s primary strength since its
inception, its agenda has expanded to include other areas —such as the energy sector—
demonstrating the SCO’s crucial role in Moscow’s progress towards its goal of becoming
a key regional player (Alonso Marcos and Nurimbetov 2021, 1-13).
To achieve fuller integration in such a developed region, Russia also joined its principal
financial institution by becoming a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) in 1998. Beyond trade and investment openness, Russia’s participation in APEC
reflects both its economic needs and its desire to position itself as a fully integrated actor
within the global economy (Dueñas Pulido 2003, 28-29).
6
. For more information about the Joint Declaration, see the full document: “Russian-Chinese Joint
Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”, United Nations Digital
Library, April 23, 1997, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234074?ln=es
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3.2 Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Vladimir Putin and Dmitry
Medvedev
Although both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev encouraged cooperation with the
West in combating shared threats during their presidencies, they consistently showed
reluctance to build a partnership based on shared values and institutions with Western
countries (Stent 2005, 272) (Trenin 2006, 87-96). As a result, the legacy of Primakov’s
multivector foreign policy —and the accompanying interest in the Asia-Pacific region—
was preserved and even strengthened following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000.
During the early years of his presidency, Putin pursued a pragmatic foreign policy focused
primarily on economic growth and national security, given the backdrop of domestic
instability and the growing threat of terrorism. In this context, securing cooperation with
as many international partners as possible was essential (Donaldson, Nogee, and
Nadkarni 2014, 369-70) (Tsygankov 2016, 138-39). Regarding the eastern vector, the
Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2000 stated that Russian foreign policy was “aimed at
building up the positive dynamism of relations with the states of South East Asia”.
Achieving this objective required active Russian participation in the main regional
integration institutions mentioned above, as well as the strengthening of bilateral ties
with countries such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation 2000).
However, Russian Foreign Policy became increasingly assertive during the second half of
the decade, especially as a consequence of Western support to the “Colour Revolutions”
7
that took place in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005 (Donaldson,
Nogee and Nadkarni 2014, 283-84) (Tsygankov 2016, 177-78). As Putin's speech at the
2007 Munich Conference demonstrates, Moscow began openly accusing the United States
of unilateralism and reclaiming its role as a global power in the emerging international
order. At the same time, China’s rise led to a further intensification of Russian efforts
towards the Asia-Pacific region, which steadily gained importance in both political and
economic terms (Molchanov 2015, 52-53) (Sergunin 2016, 157).
In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev assumed the presidency and approved a new Foreign Policy
Concept. In this updated document, alongside the continued emphasis on strengthening
bilateral ties with key regional states such as China, Japan, and India, additional
Southeast Asian countries —including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
Singapore— were identified as strategic partners. As it was established:
In the context of the Russian Federation's multi-vector foreign policy, the Asia–Pacific
Region has important and ever-increasing significance, which is due to Russia's belonging
to this dynamically developing region of the world, its interest in tapping its potential for
the realization of programs aimed at economic development of Siberia and the Far East,
the need for strengthening regional cooperation in the field of countering terrorism,
7
. The concept “Colour Revolutions” is used to refer to the protests occurred in some former Soviet Union
states to topple its authoritarian regimes during the 2000s like Georgia in 2003 with the Rose Revolution,
Ukraine in 2004 with the Orange Revolution, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 with the Tulip Revolution – For a further
explanation, see Lincoln A. Mitchell, The Color Revolutions, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2012).
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ensuring security and maintaining a dialogue between civilizations (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation 2008)
During the 2008-2012 term, Medvedev faced an international context marked by growing
rivalry between Moscow and Washington which was fuelled by Russian invasion of
Georgia, the Kremlin rejection of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, and NATO’s
proposal to eventually admit Kyiv and Tbilisi into the alliance (Donaldson, Nogee and
Nadkarni 2014, 395-96). Several factors led Russia to increasingly view the Asia-Pacific
as the new centre of global power. These included the severity of the global financial
crisis, known as “The Great Recession,” and the relative strength of Southeast Asian
economies. This stood in contrast to the signs of weakness shown by Western economies
(Østevik and Kuhrt 2018, 78). This situation was reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept
approved by Putin in 2013, one year after his return to office:
The ability of the West to dominate world economy and politics continues to diminish.
The global power and development potential is now more dispersed and is shifting to the
East, primarily to the Asia-Pacific region. The emergence of new global economic and
political actors with Western countries trying to preserve their traditional positions
enhances global competition, which is manifested in growing instability in international
relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013)
This shift formed an integral part of Russia’s renewed global strategy, which aimed to
position the country as a Eurasian power through closer cooperation with Asia:
Strengthening Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is becoming increasingly
important since Russia is an integral part of this fastest-developing geopolitical zone,
toward which the center of world economy and politics is gradually shifting. Russia is
interested in participating actively in APR integration processes, using the possibilities
offered by the APR to implement programs meant to boost Siberian and Far Eastern
economy, creating a transparent and equitable security architecture in the APR and
cooperation on a collective basis (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
2013)
Examples of this shift include Russia’s initiative to establish financial institutions such as
the BRICS New Development Bank in 2014, the national creation of the Eastern Economic
Forum (EEF), and the country’s accession to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) in 2015 (Korolev 2016, 59). As a result of the new strategy adopted in this context,
Moscow sought to reassert its derzhavnost —the notion of great power status— and
reclaim what the Kremlin perceives as “its deserved place in the world”, regardless of
potential consequences. In line with this ambition, the Russian Federation annexed
Crimea in 2014 and intervened militarily in the Syrian Civil War in 2015, citing the need
to counterbalance what it viewed as the dominance imposed by the United States and its
Western allies in global affairs (Tsygankov 2018, 241-43) (Forsberg 2018, 329). This
assertiveness was complemented by a narrative aimed at Southeast Asian nations,
framing Russia’s pivot not merely as a pragmatic choice but as the embrace of a Eurasian
identity that offered an alternative to the Western-led global order (Tsvetov 2016, 55-
56).
As stated in the Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, the “new world” was defined as a world
where a multipolar international structure was emerging and where “global power was
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shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region eroding the global economic and political
dominance of the traditional western powers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation 2016). In this context, Russia opted to maintain its strategy and intensify its
engagement with the Asian region:
Russia views strengthening its positions in the Asia-Pacific Region and stepping up
relations with its States as a foreign policy area of strategic importance, which is
attributable to Russia belonging to this vibrant geopolitical region. Russia is interested in
participating proactively in the integration processes in Asia-Pacific, using the possibilities
it offers to implement socioeconomic development programmes in Russia’s Siberia and
Far East, and creating an inclusive, open, transparent and equitable collective security
and cooperation architecture in Asia-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation 2016)
As an illustration of the implementation of this policy, it is noteworthy that President
Putin attended the 13th East Asia Summit, held in Singapore in 2018. This marked the
first time a President of the Russian Federation personally participated in the plenary
session of the regional forum since Russia’s accession in 2005
8
.
Currently, Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine despite foreseeable
consequences makes clearer that the Kremlin’s implementation of the mentioned
strategy has continued so far. In fact, expanding its presence in the Asia-Pacific region
and strengthening ties with regional states is not only of paramount importance to
Russia, but it can now be also considered a strategic necessity. Following the adoption of
the new Foreign Policy Concept in March 2023, it is likely that Moscow will continue to
intensify its efforts in the region as part of a broader attempt to pivot away from Europe
and contribute to shaping a new world order:
A comprehensive deepening of ties and enhancement of coordination with friendly
sovereign global centres of power and development, which are located on the Eurasian
continent and committed to approaches which coincide in principle with the Russian
approaches to a future world order and solutions for key problems of the world politics,
is particularly important for achieving strategic goals and major objectives of the foreign
policy of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
2023)
4. Russian Economic Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region
As previously mentioned, the firm economic growth experienced by Southeast Asian
states in recent years is one of the most significant events that have influenced
international relations in the 21st century. Therefore, Moscow has several interests at
stake in such an attractive economic market. Considering the available data, it can be
observed that both Russian exports to Asia-Pacific countries and imports from such
nations have progressively increased, contrasting with the declining trade trend observed
8
About Putin’s attendance to the East Asia Summit, see “East Asia Summit: Vladimir Putin attended the
plenary session of the 13th East Asia Summit (EAS)”, President of Russia, November 15, 2018,
http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/SG/events/59128
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Russia's turn to the East: analysing the Drivers of Moscow's Foreign Policy Towards the Asia-
Pacific Region since 1991
Mónica Román González
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with Western partners. In addition, data reveal that China, Japan, and Korea are Russia’s
most important trading partners in the region (see Table 4.1).
Table 1. Share of the Russian Federation’s Exports and Imports by Main Partners in the Asia-
Pacific Region and the West (%)
Russian exports
Russian imports
2000
2010
2020
2000
2010
2015
2020
China
5,1
5,1
14,6
2,8
17,0
19,1
23,7
Korea
0,9
2,6
3,7
1,1
3,2
2,5
3,1
Japan
2,7
3,2
2,7
1,7
4,5
3,7
3,1
Germany
9,0
6,3
5,5
11,5
11,7
11,2
10,1
Italy
7,0
6,9
3,0
3,6
4,4
4,5
4,4
The Netherlands
4,2
13,6
7,4
2,2
1,9
1,7
1,6
APEC
15,1
16,9
27,9
16,1
34,1
37,9
42,4
Eurozone
35,8
53,5
33,7
32,9
41,7
41,3
34,0
Sources:
Data from Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2017
[Russian Statistical Yearbook], (Moscow: Federal State Statistics Service - Rosstat, 2017), 223-
224, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/torg17.pdf
Data from Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik 2022
[Russian Statistical Yearbook], (Moscow: Federal State Statistics Service - Rosstat, 2022), 587,
https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Ejegodnik_2022.pdf
At the multilateral level, Russian trade with APEC experienced significant growth in the
early 2010s, largely as a consequence of the aforementioned “Great Recession” (see
Chart 4.1). In contrast, trade between Russia and ASEAN peaked in 2014, coinciding with
the deterioration of Moscow’s relations with Western countries after the annexation of
Crimea and the military intervention in territories of Eastern Ukraine (see Chart 4.2).
However, despite this growth, experts note that Russia's overall economic footprint in
the region remains modest, limiting its ability to build influence through trade and
investment when compared to established economic powers like China, Japan, or the
United States (Rangsimaporn 2012, 326).
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Chart 1. Evolution of Russian trade with APEC (in USD millions)
Sources: Data from Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, “StatsAPEC: Bilateral Linkages Database”.
Accessed October 15, 2023, http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/bilateral_linkage/bld_result/37
Chart 2. Evolution of Russian trade with ASEAN (2010-2020) (in USD millions)
Sources: Data from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, “Free access to
detailed global trade data”. Accessed October 15, 2023, https://comtradeplus.un.org/
On the other hand, Moscow has a keen interest in promoting its arms sales in a region
where military modernization efforts currently predominate. Considering the data
provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia has
been by far Southeast Asia’s largest arms supplier over the past 20 years, with several
states in the region heavily reliant on Russian weaponry (see Table 4.2). At the same
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Russian exports to APEC countries Russian imports from APEC countries
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time, alongside Egypt and Algeria, three Asian countries rank among the top foreign
customers of Russian weapons: India, China, and Vietnam (see Chart 4.3).
Table 2. Arms Imports from Russia by Southeast Asian Countries (2000-2022) (in USD millions)
Total arm imports in
millions (2000–2022)
Arm imports from
Russia (2000–2022)
% imports from
Russia
North Korea
93
93
100%
Vietnam
8168
6607
81%
China
40827
32487
80%
India
61304
39479
64%
Laos
269
130
48%
Myanmar
4529
1962
43%
Malaysia
4401
1274
29%
Indonesia
7906
1147
15%
Sources: Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database”. Accessed October 15, 2023, https://doi.org/10.55163/SAFC1241
Chart 3. Main Destinations of Russian Arms Exports in the 21st Century (2000-2022) (in USD
millions)
Sources: Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “SIPRI Arms Transfers
Database”. Accessed October 15, 2023, https://doi.org/10.55163/SAFC1241
Nevertheless, the main opportunity for Russia to project itself as a major player in the
region lies in the energy field. As one of the largest energy suppliers in the world, Moscow
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000
India (1º)
China (2º)
Algeria (3º)
Vietnam (4º)
Egypt (5º)
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finds in the Asia-Pacific region a key market, especially following the measures adopted
by the European Union (EU) to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas. In 2009, the
Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030 set the objective of increasing oil
and gas exports to Southeast Asia to 25% and 20%, respectively (Ministry of Energy of
the Russian Federation 2010). Currently, the goal set by the existing Energy Strategy of
the Russian Federation for the period up to 2035, approved in 2020, has raised that
target to 50% for both resources (Government of the Russian Federation 2020).
To achieve these aims, Russia has launched several projects such as the Eastern Siberia-
Pacific Ocean oil pipeline —which exports crude oil to the Asian Pacific markets of China,
Japan, and Korea—, the Sakhalin I and II projects —to export oil and liquefied gas to a
wide range of countries— and the Power of Siberia pipeline —which allows Russia to
deliver gas to China—. Regarding the latter, although negotiations between Moscow and
Beijing had taken place for years, it was not until 2014 that both parties signed the
agreement for the construction of the pipeline. Moscow’s willingness to meet Beijing’s
terms was largely due to the deterioration of its relations with the West, combined with
other factors such as the shale gas revolution, the EU’s Third Energy Package, and the
emergence of liquefied natural gas producers (Ruiz González 2014, 16).
To develop these projects, major structural reforms are required in eastern parts of the
Russian Federation. In 2013, Putin declared the modernization of the Russian Far East—
a region bordering the Asia-Pacific whose underdevelopment poses a severe threat to
Moscow—a national priority. Due to the urgency of the matter, attracting investment
from Southeast Asian states is viewed as the fastest solution (Mankoff 2009, 67-71). For
this reason, the Kremlin’s main efforts have focused on promoting cooperation between
the Russian Far East and the Asia-Pacific region, as it is shown by the continuous launch
of “Development of the Far East and Baikal Region” plans and funding mechanisms, the
creation of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East, and the annual celebration
of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok—a Russian city that hosted the APEC
summit in 2012— (Korolev 2016, 53-63).
Chart 4. Foreign Direct Investment Flows into the Russian Federation by Regional and Global
Institutions (2011-2021) (in USD millions)
Sources: Data from Bank of Russia, “Statistics: Flows by Geographical and Economic Areas”,
2023. Accessed October 15, 2023, https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
OECD
EU
G20
APEC
ASEAN
ACP
EFTA
CIS
OECD-EC
BRICS
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Chart 5. Foreign Direct Investment Flows into the Russian Federation from Asia, by Country
(2011-2021) (in USD millions)
Sources: Data from Bank of Russia, “Statistics: Flows by Geographical and Economic Areas”,
2023. Accessed October 15, 2023, https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/
5. Russian Security Concerns in the Asia-Pacific Region
In its early years as an independent state, the Russian Federation identified in the Asia-
Pacific region some elements of relevance in terms of security: territorial disputes with
Japan, the persistent presence of the United States in the area, the rise of China, the
nuclearization of South Asia, India’s intransigence on nuclear non-proliferation and arms
control issues, and the importance of the region in the fight against terrorism and drug
trafficking (Baranovsky 1999, 25-31) (Azizian 2007, 25-26). Many of these concerns
remain relevant today.
Disputes over the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands—known in Japan as the Northern
Territories—continue despite ongoing peace talks and dialogue mechanisms between
Moscow and Tokyo. For the Kremlin, these territories have gained strategic significance
due to shifting power dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region. Beyond Russia’s distrust of one
of the United States key regional allies, these enclaves secure Russian access to the Sea
of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka Peninsula, where several military bases are located
(Hamzah, Esmael and Abbas 2020, 294-99). The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine
has further complicated prospects for any agreement.
As reflected in nearly every Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation to date, one
of the permanent security concerns for the Kremlin in the region is the Korean issue.
Beyond the importance of avoiding a conventional conflict and instability in the region,
the situation provides Moscow with an opportunity to position itself as a constructive
player in regional security-building and enhance its international standing (Lo 2019, 11-
12). However, Russia’s role as mediator is constrained by its lack of impartiality, owing
to historical ties with Pyongyang dating back to the Soviet era, recently strengthened
relations amid shared international isolation, and the Seoul-Washington alliance.
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Another significant Russian security concern is Washington’s presence in the region,
particularly following the prioritization of the Indo-Pacific strategy in U.S. foreign policy
as a response to China’s rise as both a regional and global power. A clear illustration of
this is Russia's rejection of the Indo-Pacific concept, described by Moscow as a Western
containment strategy against China in an attempt to divide the Asia-Pacific region into
opposing blocs reminiscent of those during the Cold War (Melvin 2021, 3-4). As pointed
out by current Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in 2020 at the Raisina Dialogue:
A new concept was coined: Indo-Pacific strategies. Not Asia-Pacific but Indo-Pacific
strategies. Initiated and promoted first of all by the United States, Australia, Japan,
Republic of Korea. When we asked the initiators about the difference between Indo-Pacific
strategies, and Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation, they said, “Well, Indo-Pacific is more
open, more democratic.” If you look at it closely, I wouldn’t go into the details, it is not
at all the case. It’s an attempt, I think, to reconfigure the existing structures in Asia-
Pacific region. And to move from ASEAN-centred consensus seeking forms of interaction,
to something which would be divisive” (Lavrov, 2020)
Consequently, the Indo-Pacific concept and the resulting Quad security format would not
only divert Asia’s future away from Eurasia—where Moscow plays a central role—but
would also lead to a regional order centred around Washington and its allies, thereby
weakening Russia’s ambitions to pivot to a region where its influence would likely be
marginal (Melvin 2021, 11-12).
Apart from safeguarding its interests and countering U.S. power, Russia's negative
perception of the Indo-Pacific concept is also a result of its growing dependence on China.
Indeed, Moscow’s partnership with Beijing is crucial for its foreign policy as it enhances
Russia’s status on the global stage, making its Asia-Pacific policy almost an extension of
its relationship with its neighbour. Consequently, Russia follows China's lead on key
issues where Beijing's interests are at stake, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the
South China Sea dispute, and tensions surrounding Taiwan (Lo 2019, 6-7).
However, Sino-Russian relations have experienced alternating periods of harmony and
conflict, including the Sino-Soviet split during the second half of the last century, which
has left a legacy of mistrust between the two countries due to the wide common border
and their geostrategic ambitions. In this respect, there are several Russian concerns like
Chinese demographic pressure on the Russian Far East or the growing rivalry between
both states in areas like the Arctic and Central Asia (Pardo de Santayana 2020, 159).
Despite these challenges, both sides decided to set aside their differences to achieve
their common goal of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the international arena. Thus,
the strategic partnership between China and Russia would be better described as a
momentary axis of convenience rather than a formal alliance.
For all these reasons, in 2010 the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
established the Joint Strategic Command OSK East —also known as the Eastern Military
District (EMD)— by merging the Siberian Military District and the Far Eastern Military
District with the Pacific Fleet. Following this decision, the number of large-scale military
drills conducted by Moscow in the region has increased significantly (Weitz 2019, 917-
19). To maintain strategic deterrence in the area, this permanent military presence is
tasked with guarding the disputed Kuril Islands and securing the land borders critical to
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the Kremlin’s desired control over the Russian Far East (Rumer, Sokolsky and Vladicic
2020, 15-19).
Conclusion
In conclusion, a confluence of several factors has turned the Asia-Pacific region into a
key vector within the multi-vector foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin
views the region as a strategic enclave as it offers a wide array of political, economic,
and security-related advantages that have grown in significance as a result of various
international developments.
At the political level, the Asia-Pacific region is extremely important for Russia in achieving
its ultimate foreign policy objective: regaining a prominent role in the international
system at the expense of the West in general, and the United States in particular. For
this purpose, aware of its inability to confront US hegemony directly, Moscow considers
the establishment of a multipolar world order essential to restoring Russian derzhavnost.
The rise of Southeast Asian countries and the resulting reconfiguration of the
international order present a clear opportunity for this objective to be pursued.
Furthermore, Russia's strategy in the region could be summed up by its rejection of the
Indo-Pacific concept due to its perception as a Western containment strategy against
China. Beijing is Moscow's main partner. However, historical mistrust between the two
neighbours remains. Consequently, the Kremlin views the Asia-Pacific region as an
opportunity to retain strategic flexibility. This flexibility is essential for Russia to promote
itself as a major player, even as cooperation with China continues to be the foundation
of its regional policy.
To achieve diversification, Russia faces several disadvantages such as its limited historical
presence in the region in comparison with China or the United States. This is also
aggravated by the hostility of the latter two countries towards Moscow’s presence in the
region and their capacity to influence local countries. Therefore, Russian participation in
the Asia-Pacific multilateral framework could strengthen its position not only in a region
that is widely accepted as the centre of geopolitical shift, but also on the international
stage. While APEC and ASEAN may be more helpful for Moscow to develop ties with Asia-
Pacific nations due to the importance of the economic factor, the SCO is also essential to
promote its interests. Hence, a multilateral approach in Russian Foreign Policy towards
the region is expected to continue.
At the economic level, beyond the importance of the region as a source of investment for
the needed development of the Russian Far East, the Asia-Pacific region represents a
major market at a time when it is essential for Moscow to diversify its customer base.
Regarding arms trade, although the war in Ukraine has undermined Russia’s reputation
as a reliable supplier, Russia still retains opportunities to maintain key clients like
Vietnam—a country where Western states are reluctant to sell arms and where China is
not perceived as an acceptable supplier. It may also find opportunities with India, whose
preference for strategic partnerships over formal alliances also offers Moscow a chance
to achieve the diversification and try to counterbalance Beijing’s influence. On the other
hand, regarding energy trade, the significance of the Asia-Pacific has grown substantially
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for Russia considering its increasing international isolation and the pressing need to find
alternatives to Western markets. The region offers a viable solution to offset the decline
in energy exports to Europe, particularly in oil and natural gas.
Regarding security and defence, aside from the importance of maintaining stability in one
of its immediate neighbourhoods, the Asia-Pacific region is of particular interest to Russia
due to territorial disputes with Japan over the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands, as well as the
threat posed to Russian national security by the deteriorating situation in the Russian Far
East. These concerns are further heightened by two major geopolitical dynamics: the rise
of China and the persistent military presence of the United States in the region. Other
minor but significant security concerns of the Russian Federation in the Asia-Pacific region
that have persisted during these decades are the Korean issue and the South Asia’s
nuclear challenges, both of which have consistently influenced the formulation of Russia’s
defence policy in the region over the past decades.
To conclude, although Russia's interest in the region is the result of a gradual process, it
is evident that this interest has intensified because of some developments at the
international level. While at the economic level the importance of the region increased in
the 2010s due to the effects of “The Great Recession” and the deterioration of Russian-
Western relations as a result of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, at the security level it
has gained significant importance since the adoption of Indo-Pacific strategies and the
fact that many powerful international actors like China and the U.S.A are increasing their
presence in the region.
In a prospective analysis, considering Moscow’s isolation because of the large-scale
invasion of Ukraine started in 2022 and the enduring strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific,
a region from which no global power can afford to be absent, it is foreseeable that Russian
efforts towards the region will be increased in the short and medium term. The Kremlin’s
pivot to the East may thus be expected to continue, as part of a broader attempt to
redefine Russia’s role within an evolving international order.
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