and without waiting for interventions from Addis Ababa or New York. This did not mean
the non-involvement of the AU. Rather, the AU would be content with backstopping the
sub-regional effort and offer advanced legitimacy. In reality, this manifested in the AU
often co-chairing an International Contact Group (ICG) or ‘Friends’ arrangement, as was
done during the political dialogue and democratic transition process in Guinea from 2008-
2011. On rare occasions, when the impartiality or capability of a REC to respond to
threats and manifestations of conflict was in question, the AU would step in to coordinate
a joint AU-REC effort, as was done following the decision to constitute an AU High-level
Panel on the post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire between 2010-2011.
In terms of the capacity to respond to violent extremism, whether it be in Nigeria, the
Sahel, and in places such as Mozambique, the AU has been active through the application
of subsidiarity principles and, in the case of Somalia, the deployment of a peacekeeping
force with an expanded mandate to use force to repel non-state armed groups (NSAGs).
In response to the threat of violent extremism, the AU has worked with the Multinational
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area of the
continent. In Somalia however, the AU’s deployment of a continental force, the AU
Mission in Somalia, initially to stabilize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
implement a national security plan, and to train the TFG forces, and the subsequent
expansion of its mandate to support the Somali government efforts, has been the practice
since 2006. While the flexibility is commendable, it remains to be seen whether there is
any meaningful effort by the AU, RECs and the various ad-hoc arrangements such as the
MNJTF, to adopt an intervention that seeks to understand and tackle violent extremism
from its root cause. Gaps also exist in terms of the AU’s capacity to respond to conflicts
occurring or manifesting at the sub-state level but with repercussions for regional peace
and stability. Climate change-derived conflicts are often mixed with identity-based issues
and occurring through disputes over shared natural resources such as water sources,
land and farmer-herder disputes, and are limited to interventions by sub-state level
actors and NGOs. With the havoc that these conflicts may constitute for regional stability,
given the propensity for widespread violence across borders and various regions in Africa,
this constitutes another obvious gap that sub-regional and regional arrangements are
unable to deal with.
3.1. Progress & Setbacks in Peace Intervention Efforts
Beyond the aforementioned limitations of the AU to effectively prevent and respond to
conflict issues, additional obstacles to effective conflict management and resolution
efforts include the following:
3.1.1. Limited Supranationality of the AU
Expectations were that the principle of ‘non-indifference’, enshrined in the AU
Constitutive Act, would replace one of the cardinal principles of the defunct OAU’s
principle of non-interference. While ‘non-indifference exists in the normative instrument,
the reality is the frequent retention of the right to withdraw the AU’s right to intervene