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Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023)
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SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SYNGMAN RHEE AND PARK CHUNG
HEE: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES UNDER SIMILAR STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES
vrf@edu.ulusiada.pt
Assistant Professor, Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa, Research Member at CEJEA, Center for
Judicial, Economic and Environmental Studies (Portugal), and Member of Wolfson College,
University of Cambridge. PhD in International Relations, Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Master’s
degree in economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, and in Business Management, ISCTE-IUL;
First degree in Economics, Nova School of Business and Economics. Graduate of the National
Defense Course, National Defense Institute.
Abstract
International relations theory tends to be characterized by a dichotomy between those who
emphasize international constraints with regards to grand strategy and foreign policy
decisions, most often associated with realist theories of international relations, and those who
emphasize domestic factors, most notably liberal theories. These two approaches are often
framed as if they were incompatible. This article attempts to contribute to bridging the gap
by examining the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea.
A comparison between the two presidencies reveals very different political visions for the
Republic of Korea. However, it also shows very contrasting grand strategy and foreign policy
options under similar international constraints. This is consistent with neoclassical realist
theory and the idea that grand strategy and foreign policy are fundamentally determined by
international pressures but nevertheless are also influenced by domestic-level factors.
Keywords
Syngman Rhee; Park Chung Hee; Republic of Korea; United States of America; Neoclassical
Realist Theory.
Resumo
A teoria das relações internacionais tende a caracterizar-se por uma dicotomia entre aqueles
que enfatizam as condicionantes internacionais no que concerne a grande estratégia e as
decisões de política externa, que estão geralmente associadas às teorias realistas das relações
internacionais, e aqueles que enfatizam os fatores domésticos, mais particularmente, as
teorias liberais. As duas perspetivas são frequentemente consideradas como se fossem
incompatíveis. O presente artigo procura contribuir para se estabelecer uma ponte entre as
duas perspetivas através da análise das presidências de Syngman Rhee e de Park Chung Hee
da República da Coreia. A comparação entre ambas as presidências revela duas visões
políticas muito diferentes para a República da Coreia. No entanto, também revela que foram
adotadas duas estratégias bastante diferentes por parte dos dois presidentes apesar de
condicionantes estruturais semelhantes. Este resultado é coerente com a teoria realista
neoclássica e a noção de que a grande estratégia e a política externa são fundamentalmente
determinadas em função das pressões internacionais existentes, mas também são
influenciadas por fatores a nível doméstico
Palavras-chave
Syngman Rhee; Park Chung Hee; República da Coreia; Estados Unidos da América; Teoria
Realista Neoclássica
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023), pp. 125-141
South Korean foreign policy under Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee: contrasting strategies under
similar structural constraints
Vítor Ramon Fernandes
126
How to cite this article
Fernandes, Vítor Ramon (2023). South Korean foreign policy under Syngman Rhee and Park Chung
Hee: contrasting strategies under similar structural constraints, Janus.net, e-journal of
international relations, Vol14 N1, May-October 2023. Consulted [online] in date of last visit,
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.1.8
Article received on September, 15 2022, accepted for publication on March, 11 2023
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
Vol. 14, Nº. 1 (May-October 2023), pp. 125-141
South Korean foreign policy under Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee: contrasting strategies under
similar structural constraints
Vítor Ramon Fernandes
127
SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SYNGMAN RHEE AND
PARK CHUNG HEE: CONTRASTING STRATEGIES UNDER SIMILAR
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS
VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES
1
Introduction
International relations theory tends to be characterized by a dichotomy between those
who emphasize international constraints, most often associated with realist theories of
international relations, and those who emphasize domestic factors, notably liberal
theories. These two approaches are often framed as if they were incompatible. This article
attempts to somewhat bridge the gap by examining the presidencies of Syngman Rhee
and Park Chung Hee. Syngman Rhee was the first president of the Republic of Korea
2
,
between 1948 and 1960, after the division of the Korean Peninsula into two states, South
Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
3
, while Park Chung Hee was the
third president of South Korea, from 1961 to 1979.
A comparison between the two presidencies reveals very different political visions for
South Korea. Nevertheless, and most interestingly, it also shows contrasting foreign
policy options in spite of similar international constraints. This provides support to the
idea that grand strategy and foreign policy are fundamentally determined by structural
factors and international pressures but are also influenced by domestic agenda setting.
This is consistent with the neoclassical realist approach to international politics that
argues that grand strategy and foreign policy decisions are fundamentally determined by
changes in the structure of the international system but are also dependent on domestic
factors and allow states to pursue different policy options (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell,
2016; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009).
The article proceeds as follows: After a brief introduction, I present the context of the
first years of South Korea after the division of the Korean Peninsula, underlying the
regional setting and the main international pressures. Following that, I examine the
presidency of Syngman Rhee in terms of his policy options. After that, I lay out the
circumstances that allowed Park Chung Hee to gain power in South Korea, as well as his
political vision and strategy for South Korea. Next, I detail Park Chung Hee’s foreign
policy decisions relative to South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War. This is
1
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2
Hereafter, South Korea.
3
Henceforth, North Korea.
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followed by an analysis of the consequences of South Korea re-establishing relations with
Japan. The last section examines the motivations and the consequences of Park Chung
Hee’s implementation of the Yushin Constitution. The article concludes with a
presentation of the main conclusions.
The neoclassical realist framework
The main idea behind neoclassical realist theory is that in addition to structural effects
there are domestic-level factors that intervene in foreign policy decisions. It is a realist
theory of foreign policy that describes the structural effects of power in international
relations. Those structural effects act as a major constraint in the states’ foreign policy
decision-making process. Nevertheless, neoclassical realist theory also considers that
domestic-level factors intervene between the external drivers and the strategic response
by states.
According to structural realism, given the characteristics of the international system and
under the conditions of anarchy and self-help “the pressures of competition weight more
heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures.” (Waltz, 1986: 329).
What that means is that states cannot ignore the conditions of the international system
and the requirements of international competition because that may put their security at
risk. The structural elements are considered determinant in the sense that states that
choose to ignore them risk facing negative consequences within the international system.
However, structural realism does not tell us anything about the state’s domestic political
process of decision-making concerning foreign policy decisions as strategic responses.
Ignoring those domestic factors would mean that foreign policy decisions are only
determined by structural external constraints. As a theory of foreign policy, neoclassical
realism considers that the international structural constraints dominate but that there
are also intervening domestic factors between the international system and the strategic
response in terms of foreign policy decisions (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016). As
such, the structure is not considered to be the sole determinant of strategic outcomes
because states do not only respond to external conditions. In a certain sense, it is also
about understanding that “what is needed is an ideational component to realist theory
that explains why some states take advantage of systemic opportunities, while others do
not” (Schweller, 2009: 230). What that means is that under similar structural constraints
there is room for states to act differently up to a certain extent.
Neoclassical realist theory analyses how and why states respond to certain pressures in
particular ways, paying attention to the importance of the permissiveness of the external
environment in determining the impact of domestic level intervening variables on foreign
policy outcomes (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 52-56). The external
environment provides the starting point, but domestic variables play a significant role in
determining foreign policy outcomes. In order to try to refine the framework Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell (2016: 58-79) identify four categories that affect foreign policy
decisions to systemic stimuli given the external environment: leader images, strategic
culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions. These categories will not
always influence foreign policy decisions nor to the same degree. Understanding how
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they intervene in the state’s foreign policy decision-making process will also depend on
the nature of the countries’ political system, leadership, political institutions, and culture.
Concerning the foreign policy executive in the specific case of South Korean foreign policy
decision-making, the key domestic actors were both Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee
at the time of each presidency given the non-democratic nature of the political system in
each case. Therefore, although there may have been other actors who were involved in
the foreign policy executive their influence would have been negligible. These other
actors did not have a significant role in the decision-making process and as a result the
foreign policy executive is considered to have been limited to each president. Having said
that, even in democratic systems there may be members of the government that may
be interested in foreign policy affairs but their role and relevance in the state’s foreign
policy is not meaningful.
Noteworthy, neoclassical realist theory is not a very homogeneous theory. Back in 2009,
Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman (2009: 10) stated that there was not just one version of
neoclassical theory of foreign policy. And more recently, Onea (2012: 4) has argued in
his study—which tests the explanatory power of the main strands of neoclassical realism
in accounting for U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War—that there are three schools that
coexist and compete within neoclassical realism. One of them is considered the closest
to traditional neorealism while a second one tends towards classical realism, which is not
a structural theory. In addition, there is a third school that sits in between the former
two. These schools reflect different views concerning “how they weigh the contribution
of structural and non-structural variables in foreign policymaking, and according to their
emphasis on factors belonging to either domestic or international sphere”.
There have also been significant developments over time. Initially, neoclassical realism
attempted to explain why states did not behave as expected by neorealism. In these
circumstances, states were seen as responding to systemic forces but in inconsistent
ways, most notably in a way that has been named as “underbalancing” (Schweller, 2004;
2006). This has been named Type I Neoclassical Realism, which was followed by Type II
that attempts to develop a theoretical approach to explain foreign policy (Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 26-29). However, more recently the focus has been on
formulating a theory of international politics — Type III Neoclassical Realism (Ripsman,
Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016: 82-83). Beyond addressing states foreign policy, it attempts
to explain how those choices, particularly by great powers, can affect and change the
nature of the international system.
The first years following the division of the Korean Peninsula
Over the course of its long and fascinating history the Korean Peninsula has been the
stage for conflicts and wars, some of them internal and others due to invasions and
occupations by foreign countries, notably great powers. As noted by Oberdorfer and
Carlin (2014: 3), “Geography dealt Korea a particular difficult role. Located in a strategic
but dangerous neighborhood between the great powers of China, Japan, and Russia,
Korea has suffered nine hundred invasions, great and small, in its two thousand years of
recorded history”. More recently and following the end of the Second World War the
Korean Peninsula was divided into two states along the 38
th
parallel—South Korea and
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North Korea. The former under the influence and protection of the United States of
America
4
and the later under the influence of the Soviet Union. This decision was initially
taken for an unlimited period of time and without even consulting Koreans. Moreover, it
was taken before August 15, 1945, the date at which Hirohito, the 124
th
Emperor of
Japan, announced Japan’s surrender (Myers, 2010: 29).
The intentions of President Kim Il Sung of North Korea from the very beginning were to
reunite the Korean Peninsula under his leadership and the communist ideology. With that
objective, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, which sparked the Korean
War
5
that lasted until 1953 (Cumings, 2011; Haruki, 2017; Hastings, 2020; Sandler,
1999). The war transformed both Koreas into enemies with the war ending with an
armistice rather that a peace agreement. This is significant because it signals that the
war had not ended at the time. The situation remained as such for many years
6
.
The Korean War needs to be considered within the broader conflict between the two
superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—that is, the Cold War. This also
displays the security fragility of the region. Although from a geostrategic point of view
the division of the Korean Peninsula into two states was an acceptable solution for the
two superpowers—with both Koreas gaining legitimacy relative to their existence—the
actual situation never ceased to be a source of tensions and problems, both at the
political, security, and the economic level (Buzo, 2007: 84-85). Significantly, both South
Korea and North Korea became subject to the influence and support of the United States
and the Soviet Union for several years, respectively. In the case of South Korea, that
support is still significant today whereas in the case of North Korea the Soviet support
was replaced mainly by China since the end of the Cold War. Over time, South Korea has
become one of the most developed countries in the world whereas North Korea remains
a close authoritarian regime.
The Korean War also had a significant impact with long-lasting effects in the United
States, albeit not comparable to the Vietnam War (Cumings, 2011: 205-222). The most
significant is, in all probability, the approval and implementation of NSC-68 with very
important and lasting implications for the American military-industrial complex. The
change from the previous containment strategy that had been developed by George
Kennan to NSC-68 suggested that the military component should play an important role
in the containment doctrine, even at times when the United States was not at war, in
order to ensure the country’s preparedness to intervene militarily when deemed
necessary.
4
Henceforth, United States or U.S.
5
During this conflict, South Korea was supported by the United States while North Korea was essentially
supported by the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent by the Popular Republic of China, henceforth China.
6
It should be noted that an attempt to sign a formal peace treaty only occurred during the inter-Korean
summit on April 27, 2018, between Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae In, with the signing of the Panmunjom
Declaration under the auspices of the United States and China. This declaration involved an agreement
about mutual efforts and actions for transforming the 1953 armistice agreement into a formal peace treaty.
Later, during the 2018 Trump-Kim Jong Un summit a Joint Statement was also signed reaffirming the
Panmunjom Declaration.
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Syngman Rhee, the recurrent idea of reunification, and the North
American support
In addition to Kim Il Sung, Syngman Rhee also displayed intentions of reunification. In
fact, he pressured the U.S. authorities several times to prolong the war with that
objective, inclusively delivering speeches to that avail (Seth, 2011: 331). This was largely
due to fears of North Korea because he was aware of Kim Il Sung’s intentions.
Furthermore, since the end of the Korean War, and even after the signing of the
ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement in October of 1953
7
, he continued to struggle
between the need for U.S. support in economic and security terms—which he never
questioned—and the will to achieve reunification. In fact, the signing of the ROK/U.S.
Mutual Security Agreement resulted largely from Syngman Rhee’s pressuring President
Eisenhower to have security guaranties from the United States against external enemies,
in particular North Korea (Kim, 2012: 446). However, it often became a source of tension
between himself and Eisenhower, with the former having tried to convince the latter to
agree to an invasion of North Korea, albeit without success. Noteworthy, the sentiment
towards reunification at the time was shared by the majority of the South Korean
population (Seth, 2011: 480).
However, the United States did not share the same view and did not wish to get involved
in another war. According to Cha (2016: 4), the reason for the ROK/U.S. Mutual Security
Agreement at the time—as with the case of the similar agreement in 1954 with the
Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek—was not only to contain the spread of
communism, but also to avoid these countries engaging war with North Korea and China,
respectively. In the particular case of North and South Korea it was essentially to avoid
any attempt of reunification by force. The alternative would probably involve the United
States in a generalized war in the region, which was negatively viewed for several
reasons, in particular because the major concern of the United Sates at the time was
Western Europe.
At any event, the Korean War ended up strengthening Syngman Rhee with respect to his
presidency due to his popularity and in spite of the existence of a strong political domestic
opposition, particularly at the National Assembly. At the time, the South Korean
population was also focused on family issues attempting to survive in the aftermath of
the war and all of its impact in terms of the endured suffering (Buzo, 2007: 95). His
popularity may be somewhat puzzling given that the regime was quite authoritarian and
conservative. Nevertheless, Syngman Rhee was profoundly anti-communist and very
weary of North Korea, which was valued by a large proportion of the South Korean
population. This was because there were a number of occasions when North Korea
considered the possibility of reverting the situation of the Korean War and reunite the
whole Korean Peninsula under its communist regime (Buzo, 2007: 91). The domestic
support provided by the general population to Syngman Rhee in terms of his stance
7
The ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement was established in October 1953, although many sources
consider that it was only signed in the beginning of 1954.
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towards North Korea can be considered as an example of domestic factors influencing
foreign policy decisions.
Concerning foreign policy and economic development, Syngman Rhee was a very inward-
looking leader. He was very nationalist and never really revealed any serious intention
to internationalize South Korea. This is somewhat surprising given that he had been
educated in the United States and lived there for several years (Seth, 2010: 96).
8
Furthermore, because of his memories of the Japanese invasion, which occurred between
1910 and 1945, he always refused to re-establish diplomatic and commercial relations
with Japan and never attempted to establish external relations with other countries—
besides the United States—that could eventually lead to a stronger economic growth and
development, as well as a greater autonomy of the country. The re-establishment of
relations between South Korea and Japan would have strongly benefited South Korea in
terms of its economic development as later occurred under Park Chung Hee (Kim, 2012:
447-448). Syngman Rhee’s main concern was to maintain the United States’ support to
South Korea with respect to the economy and security.
Syngman Rhee’s regime was also quite corrupt, which generated great dissatisfaction
from a significant part of the South Korean population, particularly in light of the slow
economic recovery after the Korean War. Overtime, Syngman Rhee’s overall domestic
support fell, particularly as the rural population, which tended to support him the most,
started migrating to the cities. The urban population was significantly more critical of
corruption and of the slow economic recovery, and that clearly weakened the regime over
time (Seth, 2011: 374-375). As a result, South Koreans began to contest and challenge
the regime and several public demonstrations, notably by students, took place at the
time. Many were repressed but despite that they did not become less intense, quite the
opposite. Ultimately, Syngman Rhee resigned in 1960 (Buzo, 2007: 98). After his demise,
a parliamentary regime followed, the Second Republic under President Yun Posun—pro-
western and democratic. Nevertheless, Posun’s presidential term was a short one, from
August 13, 1960, to March 24, 1962, as public demonstrations and instability continued.
Syngman Rhee’s legacy is still very debated and disputed. To some, he was the founder
of South Korea and the president who saved the country from communism. With his
conservative stance, he was able to protect South Korea from negative foreign influence.
But to others, he was just a dictator, clinging to power, someone who opted for a “divide
and rule strategy” and who failed to develop the country (Kim, 2012: 428). Others
consider him a patriotic leader, always searching for an opportunity to reunite the Korean
Peninsula (Seth, 2011: 376).
The politics and strategy of Park Chung Hee
Park Chung Hee rose to power on May 16, 1961, through a military coup and following
the democratic attempt by President Yun Posun, and at a time when street
demonstrations were increasingly violent (Seth, 2011: 339). He remains a controversial
figure but one that played a very significant part in South Korea’s history (Podoler, 2016).
8
Syngman Rhee held a BA degree from George Washington University, a master’s degree from Harvard
University, and a Ph.D. from Princeton University.
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His background and education were very different from Syngman Rhee. He was born in
1917 to a poor rural family and he was the youngest of seven brothers. Early in his life
he showed academic ability, particularly at the Taegu Normal School, where he was
admitted in 1932 (Buzo, 2007: 106). Later, he gained access to the Manchukuo Military
Academy and served as a military officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. He
commissioned as a second lieutenant from 1944 until having been demobilised in 1946.
Following that, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1948, reprieved and dismissed
from the Army, after being implicated in the Yosu military rebellion. He was later rehired
as a civilian, then reinstated after the outbreak of the Korean War, and finished the war
as a Brigadier general. By May 1961, he had advanced to the rank of Major-general.
From a political point of view, although Park Chung Hee considered himself a democrat,
he was neither a liberal nor a democrat. In fact, he was favourable to an excessive
concentration of power at the presidential level and considered that the liberal and
democratic system led to social fragmentation (Moon and Jun, 2011: 125).
Park Chung Hee frequently compared the presidency of Syngman Rhee to a democratic
and corrupt system, very incompetent and divisive, and one that had been incapable of
addressing the external challenges facing South Korea, such as had occurred with the
Joseon Dynasty, which had not been able to prevent the Japanese invasion in 1910 (Park,
1970: 121). He considered Syngman Rhee a dictator who had worn down South Korea
during his twelve years of presidency (Hee, 1970b: 166). Differently, he aimed at
constructing a self-sufficient South Korea, independent of other countries. In his view
there was a need for South Korea to be more assertive in the international sphere and
to be able to be more autonomous and self-reliable. In one of his works he states, in
what seems to be a melancholic tone, that: “A deep regret is that despite all the
accumulated sufferings, we have never once undertaken a foreign excursion by turning
the tide” (Hee, 1970a: 166).
However, although Park Chung Hee would like to see South Korea as an autonomous
country the reality was that the dependency relative to the United States was almost
complete. As a result, any withdrawal of the United States from South Korea at the time
would have led in all probability to an annexation by North Korea. During the 1950s, U.S.
aid to South Korea amounted to more than fifty percent of the government national
yearly budget and about seventy-two percent of the defence budget (Baek, 1982: 118).
Support in terms of infrastructures included around five hundred economic consultants
responsible for controlling financial support. Because of this dependency, the United
States largely controlled the economic policy of the South Korean government (Kim and
Baik, 2011: 58). Notwithstanding, the capacity of the United States to enforce certain
policies and measures on the South Korean government in order to achieve certain
specific goals was somewhat limited due to the existing international pressures that also
gave the South Korean regime some leverage. In effect, the United States were
constantly confronted with somewhat conflicting priorities. On the one hand, there was
the need to defend South Korea against foreign threats as part of the strategy of
containment during the Cold War. On the other hand, the existing will to foster
democratic and liberal values that were associated with progress and development was
also paramount in terms of legitimising domestically U.S. support to South Korea (Dueck,
2006: 84).
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More importantly, there was always great difficulty in terms of accounting for, on the one
hand, the security concerns and, on the other, the development and cultural choices.
Much of that resulted from diverging views on each part concerning different priorities
relative to reforms and economic policy measures. Often, South Korean leaders were
primarily concerned with essentially obtaining as much support as possible from the
United States for as long as possible, as was the case of Syngman Rhee. These situations
tended to focus on security, and to somewhat neglect the creation of the necessary
conditions for South Korea to be able to gain more autonomy. However, the country’s
economic conditions also constrained the U.S. authorities to accommodate certain
positions on the part of those leaders because the costs of withdrawal for the United
States were also high (Kim and Baik, 2011: 59). What this all meant was that, until and
during the early 1960s, South Korea faced a complex dilemma given that the country
needed to withstand U.S. influence in order to obtain its support but did not achieve the
much-needed economic development. Nonetheless, the United States was also unable to
reap the expected benefits from the development of South Korea, which raised the costs
of a possible U.S. withdrawal given the fragility of South Korea relative to North Korea.
The South Korean support during the Vietnam War
There is evidence that supports the idea that Park Chung Hee feared a U.S. withdrawal
during the 1960s and 1970s. This is supported by the fact that there had been threats
from North Korea caused by incursions along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, with an
increase of around 200 incidents per year to 736 in 1961 alone (Lee, 2011b: 405).
Moreover, when Park Chung Hee took power in South Korea the North Korean economy
was stronger than South Korea due to strong existing alliances with the Soviet Union and
China. This was also reinforced by the reductions in annual U.S. support to South Korea,
from US$230 million in the period between 1959 and 1963 to US$110 million in the
period from 1964 to 1968, which is less than half (Lee, 2011b: 407).
Also providing support to this idea was his decision to send South Korean troops to assist
U.S. efforts in the Vietnam War in 1965, which was a controversial decision at the time
(Brazinsky, 2007: 132-133). It can be considered as resulting from Park Chung Hee’s
willingness to ensure the continuing support of the U.S but also due to significant U.S
pressures to see the adoption of a series of foreign policy initiatives by Park Chung Hee.
This was in order to see economic reforms and political liberalization implemented, which
were considered crucial. The decision to send combat troops to Vietnam was not without
risks given the political opposition and the occurring social unrest in South Korea.
Nevertheless, it proved to be a wise foreign policy decision given that South Korea was
also able to guarantee additional U.S financial support (Kim, 2011: 174). In the end,
although the decision resulted largely from U.S. pressures it enabled Park Chung Hee to
ensure economic assistance, to carry out reforms, and to secure continuing U.S. Military
support. It seems clear that Park Chung Hee viewed South Korean assistance to the
United States in the Vietnam War as critical, which is why he volunteered to send South
Korean troops to Vietnam if deemed necessary during a meeting in Washington in 1961.
That explains also why in August 1963 he reported that if the United States requested
that South Korea send military troops to Vietnam, then South Korea would be "Obliged
out of both economic and security considerations" (Lee, 2011b: 409). Therefore, when
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the American request arrived, he did not hesitate to send non-combatant personnel,
initially in May and December 1964, and later combat troops in July 1965 and June 1966.
That said, the South Korean contribution to the Vietnam War was at a reduced cost
because the annual cost of a South Korean soldier in Vietnam was about $5,000 while
that of an American soldier was approximately 13,000, that is, almost triple the amount,
which translated into a very satisfactory solution for the United States (Lee, 2011b: 416).
From a security point of view, Park Chung Hee got the assurance of a continued U.S.
presence in South Korea. But in addition, it facilitated the acquisition of some combat
experience and a modernization of the South Korean armed forces. Further to that, it
created opportunities for some South Korean companies to produce useful products to
support the war effort, which strengthened the South Korean economy. However, some
additional conditions were also agreed. For instance, when the first South Korean troops
were sent to Vietnam the agreement was that there would be no reductions in U.S.
military in South Korea without prior consultation with the South Korean government to
ensure that U.S. support would be maintained up to a certain level. Moreover, the United
States provided funding for the transport of South Korean troops to Vietnam (Lee, 2011b:
412-413). This is also how Park Chung Hee obtained assistance and support from the
United States to modernize the South Korean military forces in terms of equipment and
other defence capabilities. Furthermore, whenever possible, preference was also given
to South Korean producers to supply equipment and services to the United States
government. In return, the United States would provide technical support to South Korea
to improve its export capabilities (Lee, 2011b: 419). Lastly, Park Chung Hee gained
political support for his authoritarian way of governing.
The importance of restoring relations between South Korea and Japan
Park Chung Hee's decision to send South Korean troops to Vietnam also had the effect
of increasing the importance of South Korean and Japanese contributions to U.S. strategy
in Asia, particularly during the Vietnam War as the war got worse. In terms of foreign
policy orientation, although both Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee both adopted a
similar attitude relative to alliances, the latter was much more outward oriented than the
former (Snyder, 2018: 18). This is a relevant issue. Contrary to what had always been
the position of his predecessor, Syngman Rhee—who for decades strongly opposed to
the re-establishment of relations with Japan—Park Chung Hee decided to promote the
restoration of these relations. Following much debate within South Korea relations
between the two countries were re-established in 1965 (Kim, 2012: 448). According to
Park Chung Hee, South Korea should view the military system as a reference in terms of
an organization model and guide itself by Japan, particularly with its achievements in
terms of development during the 1930s and 1940s.
9
Inclusively, South Korea should copy
and emulate the Japanese procedures that were responsible for its success (Moon and
Jun, 2011: 120).
These ideas were the basis for the re-establishment of diplomatic and commercial
relations between South Korea and Japan in 1964 and 1965 under the auspices of the
9
Following the political, economic, and social developments during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) Japan
became one of the great powers.
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United States. In Park Chung Hee’s view, the re-establishment of these relations would
bring political and economic advantages to South Korea. In his own words: "Diplomatic
rapprochement between Korea and Japan has remained an unfinished task for the past
ten years" (Hee, 1970a: 156).
Some in Japan, notably its Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not necessarily most of
the population, also saw interest in these relations (Lee, 2011a: 438). In his view, the
fact that Park Chung Hee was an authoritarian leader also had the advantage of him
being able to control South Korea's internal politics, and to prevent anti-Japanese and
communist movements from developing, which would have had negative consequences
for Japan. Notwithstanding, the restoration of these relations also caused a great stir and
discontent in South Korea, particularly among students. This was fundamentally related
to the need to establish whether the Japanese colonial past in Korea was to be considered
legal or illegal. Following that, it was important to determine whether South Korea should
abandon its right to compensation from Japan (Lee, 2011a: 451). Nonetheless, when the
drafting of the treaty was completed in April 1965 the treaty was signed in late 1965.
Ultimately, the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan favoured Park
Chung Hee’s political situation, in large measure due to his demonstration of being able
to manage asymmetric relations between South Korea and the United States during the
1960s, with positive consequences for the South Korean economy (Lee, 2011a: 456).
Instead of systematically seeking to increase South Korean autonomy relative to the
United States and challenging some of the claims for stability and economic development
in favour of the reunification of the Koreas—as had happened with Syngman Rhee—Park
Chung Hee's strategy provided political and military support to the United States in its
strategy for Asia. This was done in exchange for political, economic, and military
assistance in the development of South Korea. The result of that strategy was that he
was able to bring the United States closer to South Korea. With this strategy, he also
managed to acquire a degree of autonomy that allowed him to govern without integrating
some of the fundamental democratic and liberal values promoted by the United States,
and to pursue a high degree of planning, directing and authoritarianism (Lee, 2011b:
428-9).
The Yushin Era: A turning point?
The presidency of Park Chung Hee was also marked by the implementation of the Yushin
Constitution
10
in 1971, following the electorate approval of a very substantial revision of
the Constitution on November 21 of the same year, and that lasted until October 26,
1979—the date of his assassination. The basic idea was to strengthen executive powers
in order to meet the demands and challenges posed by the economy and the possibility
of reunification brought about by a military initiative carried out by North Korea. This
granted almost absolute powers to Park Chung Hee on a wide range of subjects, including
appointing a third of the National Assembly and a virtually life-long presidency, with the
guarantee of six-year terms without any limit. This would occur through an indirect
election by an electoral college of about 2,300 directly elected delegates supported by
10
Frequently referred to as the Yushin System as well.
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security institutions such as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the Presidential
Security Service (Im, 2011: 234). The regime became even more totalitarian and
repressive than during the previous period. According to Brazinsky (2007: 160), "In
October 1972 Park suddenly ended what remained of South Korean democracy". Park
Chung Hee declared a state of martial law, dismissed the National Assembly, and even
shut down universities (Buzo, 2007: 122). The media also became under strict
censorship. The enactment of the new constitution demonstrated a growing lack of
tolerance on the part of Park Chung Hee for any demonstrations against the regime or
its leadership.
From an economic point of view, Park Chung Hee adopted more expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies from 1972 onwards, but also some totally contrary to the liberalization
previously occurred in the 1960s (Solingen, 2007: 89). A system of price controls was
implemented, including various subsidies and protection of national industries, namely
heavy industry and electronics, with a view to increase national autonomy and
independence. The well-known Chaebols
11
were great supporters of these policies, which
were quite successful in terms of economic development, particularly those export-
oriented, and generated results often significantly better that what had initially been
anticipated (Kim, 2004: 117).
Noteworthy, the expression Yushin in Japanese is pronounced Isshim, in reference to the
reforms conducted in Japan in the 19th century during the Meiji Era. Park Chung Hee's
intention was greatly influenced by the Meiji Restoration in Japan and his vision of making
South Korea go through a process similar to the one that had occurred in Japan. His
intention was to transform South Korea from a political, economic, and security point of
view to make the country richer and more powerful. Buzo (2007: 126) points out that,
despite all the negatives, this change had its positives. It allowed Park Chung Hee to
project the image and vision of a strong and rich South Korea, particularly from a
militarily point of view, which was, in some way, a feeling shared by many South Koreans
and much like what was happening in Japan at the time.
There is a debate as to whether these political changes should be considered as a
continuation of the third Republic or its end. For instance, Buzo (2007: 123) considers
that, after all, this period is part of a continuity of the third Republic while Seth (2011:
407) refers to the Yushin Era as the end of the third Republic. Im (2011) also raises this
issue. In effect, Park Chung Hee's political regime had shown, since its inception, a
centralising and totalitarian tendency. Thus, in this sense the Yushin Era was related to
promoting and ensuring Park Chung Hee’s way of governing (Im, 2011: 236-7). However,
the Yushin Era was, to a great extent, most likely caused by pressures stemming from
outside South Korea, particularly the changes that occurred in the international
environment and a response to structural constraints, albeit consistent with Park Chung
Hee’s wish to reinforce his power (Seth, 2011: 408-9). That is, the structural constraint
due to the international setting should probably be considered as the major policy
constraint, in addition to the factors related to the political domestic agenda associated
with Park Chung Hee's leadership (Im, 2011: 236-7).
11
Chaebols are the conglomerates of companies around a parent company, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and
LG.
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That is, changes at the international level probably deserve prominence in terms of their
ability to explain Park Chung Hee’s implementation of the Yushin Constitution. Several
events provide support to that idea. To begin with, there had been attempts of aggression
and other destabilising actions by North Korea not long before (Seth, 2011: 408;
Radchenko and Schaefer, 2017). In addition, it had also become clear that the United
States intended to withdraw from Vietnam as soon as possible, something that had been
discussed for some time, including in previous presidencies and notably that of Lyndon
Johnson. Inevitably, this raised fears on the part of Park Chung Hee of a U.S.
abandonment. This concern was also exacerbated by Nixon's announcement of the 'Guam
Doctrine'
12
in July 1969 in which the willingness to withdraw some 20,000 U.S. military
personnel from South Korea was enunciated (Seth, 2011: 407). Furthermore, in 1971
there was a rapprochement between the United States and China through President
Nixon with Mao Zedong. Kissinger's visit to Beijing prompted Park Chung Hee to ask in
front of Western media, "How long can we trust the United States?" (Oberdorfer and
Carlin, 2014: 11). Park Chung Hee sought at the time to obtain assurances that the U.S.
rapprochement with China would not affect U.S. relations with South Korea, but the
response was delaying, which led him to say that what was happening endangered the
survival of the South Korean people. Following the announcement of the 'Guam Doctrine'
and the rapprochement between the U.S. and China South Korea begun the development
of a nuclear program during the first half of the 1970s. However, it never reached nuclear
capabilities due to the efforts and pressures on the part of the United States against
proliferation by South Korea and all the support granted in terms of security (Siler, 1998).
Conclusion
The question whether grand strategy and foreign policy can essentially be explained by
structural factors, that is, essentially by international pressures, or by domestic factors
may seem blurred. The argument here is that it seems reasonable to start by analysing
the position of a specific country within the international system and consider that
structural factors play a determining role in grand strategy and foreign policy decisions.
However, structural factors alone are often not sufficient for a full explanation and agency
also needs to be taken into consideration. This is the approach underlying neoclassical
realist theory.
In essence, neoclassical theorizing considers that external constraints prevail when it
comes to foreign policy decisions, similar to what occurs with neorealism. In that sense,
it is a structural realist theory. Nevertheless, it also considers that there is a domestic
component to the formulation and decision-making of foreign policy, consisting of
intervening variables in the process. It considers crucial analysing the structural
constraints that condition and constrain grand strategy and foreign policy decisions at
the start of the foreign policy process, but it also views the processes through which
domestic factors influence the process, namely due to differences in threat perception.
The significance of the above is that it allows for strategic choice in terms of foreign policy
decisions and escapes the determination of neorealist theory. This may reduce the
12
The so-called 'Guam Doctrine' was intended to limit the U.S. military presence in Asia and make Asian
countries more accountable for their defence.
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parsimony of the analysis, but it allows for additional explanatory power in terms of
understanding foreign policy choices.
The analysis of the presidencies of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee provides support
to the idea that there is a domestic component to foreign policy. It reveals that, in spite
of similar international constraints, each president opted for different foreign policy
options. This supports the argument, associated with neoclassical realism, that the
structure of the international system plays a determinant role in constraining grand
strategy and foreign policy decisions but that it is important to complement—rather than
ignore—the influence of domestic factors that are specific to that country at a particular
moment in time.
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