OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025

265

NAVIGATING CHINA’S GLOBAL FOREIGN SECURITY STRATEGY: ASSESSING

THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE BELT AND ROAD

INITIATIVE AFTER A DECADE OF IMPLEMENTATION

VU THI PHUONG LE

levtp@vinhuni.edu.vn.

Ph.D., she is Head of the Faculty of Politics and Journalism at College of Social Sciences and

Humanities, Vinh University (Vietnam). Her research focuses on international relations in Asia,

particularly political relations in East Asia and Southeast Asia. https://orcid.org/0009-0000-5883-

3951

LE HOANG KIET

kietlh.tg@yersin.edu.vn

Ph.D. candidate in International Relations. He is a scholar and lecturer currently working at

Yersin University (Vietnam). He has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and a Master’s degree

in Public Policy and has built an impressive academic portfolio in the field of social sciences. His

research interests are in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

https://orcid.org/0009-0002-9968-1952

TRAN XUAN HIEP

txhiep@ued.udn.vn

Associate Professor, Ph.D.. He is lecturer at The University of Da Nang, University of Science and

Education (Vietnam). His research interests include general political and international relations

issues, the Southeast Asian and Indo-Pacific regions, and Vietnam’s international integration.

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5236-993X

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as a central component of China’s foreign security

strategy under Xi Jinping, aimed at achieving the “two centenary goals” and realizing the

“Chinese Dream”. This study utilizes a document analysis approach to assess the objectives,

positive outcomes, and challenges that the BRI has encountered in the strategic repositioning

of China’s foreign security after a decade of global implementation (2013-2023). The research

focuses on three main aspects: (i) Analyzing China’s foreign security strategic objectives

through the BRI, including positioning China as a friendly major power, promoting economic

development, safeguarding strategic maritime routes, and shaping a geopolitical landscape

favorable to China’s interests; (ii) Evaluating the positive outcomes achieved, such as

enhancing influence through “policy connectivity”, expanding soft power, establishing financial

institutions, boosting overseas infrastructure investments, and fostering economic and

financial linkages; and (iii) Identifying the major challenges BRI faces, including strategic

competition from other major powers, concerns from participating countries about “debt-trap

diplomacy”, risks to Chinese enterprises investing abroad, and potential failure due to external

shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Based on this

analysis, the study concludes that overcoming these challenges will be crucial for China to

achieve its strategic objectives in foreign security through the BRI.

Keywords

BRI, China’s foreign security strategy, maritime security, geopolitical influence, infrastructure

investment.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

266

Resumo

A Iniciativa Uma Faixa, Uma Rota (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) serve como componente

central da estratégia de segurança externa da China sob Xi Jinping, visando alcançar as "duas

metas centenárias" e realizar o "Sonho Chinês". Este estudo utiliza uma abordagem de análise

documental para avaliar os objetivos, resultados positivos e desafios que a BRI encontrou no

reposicionamento estratégico da segurança externa da China após uma década de

implementação global (2013-2023). A pesquisa concentra-se em três aspetos principais: (i)

Análise dos objetivos estratégicos de segurança externa da China através da BRI, incluindo o

posicionamento da China como uma grande potência amigável, promoção do desenvolvimento

econômico, salvaguarda de rotas marítimas estratégicas e formação de uma paisagem

geopolítica favorável aos interesses chineses; (ii) Avaliação dos resultados positivos

alcançados, como o aumento da influência através da "conectividade política", expansão do

poder brando, estabelecimento de instituições financeiras, impulso aos investimentos em

infraestrutura no exterior e fomento de vínculos econômicos e financeiros; e (iii) Identificação

dos principais desafios que a BRI enfrenta, incluindo a competição estratégica de outras

grandes potências, preocupações dos países participantes sobre a "diplomacia da armadilha

da dívida", riscos para empresas chinesas que investem no exterior e potencial fracasso

devido a choques externos como a pandemia de COVID-19 e o conflito Rússia-Ucrânia. Com

base nesta análise, o estudo conclui que superar estes desafios será crucial para a China

alcançar seus objetivos estratégicos de segurança externa através da BRI.

Palavras-chave

BRI, estratégia de segurança externa da China, segurança marítima, influência geopolítica,

investimento em infraestrutura.

How to cite this article

Le, Vu Thi Phuong, Kiet, Le Hoang & Hiep, Tran Xuan (2025). Navigating China’s Global Foreign

Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative

After A Decade Of Implementation. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL. 16, Nº. 1.

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.16.1.13.

Article submitted on 30 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 20 September 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

267

NAVIGATING CHINA’S GLOBAL FOREIGN SECURITY STRATEGY:

ASSESSING THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE

BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AFTER A DECADE OF

IMPLEMENTATION

VU THI PHUONG LE

LE HOANG KIET

TRAN XUAN HIEP

Introduction

China’s economic reform and international integration process, initiated in 1978 under

the leadership of Deng Xiaoping—referred to as the “architect of reform and opening-up

policy” — has fundamentally transformed the country’s geopolitical position in the

contemporary international system. With a GDP reaching $14.72 trillion by 2024 (Global

PEO Services, 2024), China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy

amid a chaotic world order facing numerous complex geopolitical dynamics: (i) The

Russia-Ukraine War in Eastern Europe; (ii) The Israel-Palestine War; and (iii) The

potential reconfiguration of US foreign policy toward an “anti-China” orientation under

the “America First” doctrine with Donald Trump’s potential second-term election in 2025

- 2029. Through examining its historical development trajectory, China’s rise exhibits the

characteristics of an emerging power within the process of restructuring regional and

global power balances. In this progression, the role of Xi Jinping—the fifth-generation

leader—is considered pivotal in shaping China’s foundation and status as a superpower

both currently and in the future (Yang, 2017).

Foreign security strategy comprises a set of policies and actions designed to ensure a

nation’s security through managing relationships with other countries and maintaining

stability in the international environment (Michaels & Sus, 2025). For China, foreign

security strategy constitutes one of the two main pillars of its national security strategy,

aiming to protect China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interests, while

simultaneously creating favorable conditions for China’s economic development and

global influence (Cabestan, 2021). China’s foreign security strategy has undergone a

strategic transformation from the “keeping a low profile” principle—proposed by Deng

Xiaoping after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident amid tense relations with the West—

to an “active participation” strategy under Xi Jinping since 2013 (Yan, 2014). While the

previous strategy emphasized “cautious accumulation of internal strength and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

268

development of national potential” (Yan, 2014) the current period witnesses a China

“actively shaping a new international order through global geopolitical and economic

initiatives” (Yan, 2014). This is demonstrated through Beijing’s proactive proposal of

Chinese-led regional security mechanisms, while simultaneously asserting firm positions

on core sovereignty issues such as Taiwan and territorial disputes in the East Sea

(Cabestan, 2021). In the context of signs of declining US global influence, particularly

during Donald Trump’s first term which demonstrated inadequate responsibility and

global leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic, China is actively positioning itself as a

responsible power in addressing global challenges and restructuring the world order

(Thompson, 2020).

In the context of the restructuring of the contemporary world order, major powers are

repositioning their national security strategies, not only to protect core interests but also

to establish influential positions within the international system (Ahrari, 2011). Under Xi

Jinping’s leadership since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,

Beijing has demonstrated a transformation in its foreign security strategy from a passive

stance to “wolf warrior diplomacy”—a more assertive diplomatic approach in protecting

and promoting national interests (Sullivan & Wang, 2023). This shift in China’s foreign

security strategy reflects not only the internal dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party

but also creates widespread ripple effects, reshaping the geopolitical structure and

foreign policy environment in strategic subregions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia,

Central Asia, and South Asia. To realize the “two centenary goals” and the “Chinese

Dream”, Beijing has implemented a system of global strategic initiatives, including: (i)

the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); (ii) the Global Security Initiative (GSI); (iii) the

Maritime Power Strategy; and (iv) the Global Data Security Initiative (GDSI).

Xiao (2016) characterizes China’s foreign security strategy as a comprehensive

mechanism that not only addresses “existing” and “potential” challenges but also creates

a foundation for Beijing’s rise as a global power capable of balancing with Washington.

The central axis of this strategy is the BRI, announced by Xi Jinping in 2013 in Indonesia

and Kazakhstan as a strategic framework aimed at expanding China’s geopolitical

influence at regional and global levels (Beeson & Crawford, 2023). During its decade of

implementation, the Chinese Communist Party has flexibly adjusted the BRI to adapt to

the intensely fluctuating international dynamics. Although this initiative has achieved

significant accomplishments in expanding China’s global influence, the developmental

trajectory of the BRI faces increasingly complex geostrategic challenges. This is clearly

demonstrated through the formation of counterbalancing mechanisms such as the QUAD

led by the US and India, along with strategic adjustments by Western powers and allies

aimed at counterbalancing China’s growing influence in the region and globally (Yang,

2017). These developments reflect the multidimensional interaction between three

factors: (i) Global power competition; (ii) Regional geopolitical dynamics; and (iii) China’s

comprehensive development strategy in its journey to affirm its status as a global power.

This research aims to analyze and evaluate the achievements and challenges in the

implementation of China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI during the period

2013-2023. The urgency of this research is demonstrated through the key role of the BRI

in China’s great power diplomacy strategy in the context of a world order being

restructured by multiple impacts from the chaotic state of world politics. Through

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

269

analyzing the BRI—an important component in China’s foreign security strategic

framework—this research contributes to the academic understanding of key issues in

contemporary international relations, including global governance, regional security

dynamics, and strategic competition between major powers in the 21st century. To

achieve the research objectives, this paper focuses on addressing three core research

questions:

(i) What are China’s foreign security strategic objectives within the BRI framework?

(ii) What achievements has China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI

accomplished during the period 2013-2023?

(iii) What challenges has China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI encountered

during the period 2013-2023?

Methodology

This study employs a rigorous document analysis method to examine China’s foreign

security strategy through the BRI during the period 2013-2023. Document analysis is

selected as the primary research methodology due to its effectiveness in systematically

evaluating and interpreting documentary evidence to elicit meaning, gain understanding,

and develop empirical knowledge about complex geopolitical phenomena. The research

adopts a qualitative analytical approach centered on document analysis to investigate

the strategic objectives, achievements, and challenges of China’s foreign security

strategy through the BRI. This method is particularly appropriate given the complexity

of the subject matter, which encompasses multifaceted geopolitical dynamics across

diverse regions and involves numerous stakeholders with varying interests and

perspectives.

The documentary evidence was collected through a comprehensive search of multiple

sources to ensure triangulation and validity of findings:

(i) Official Chinese policy documents: including white papers, policy pronouncements,

and official statements from the Chinese Communist Party and government ministries

related to the BRI and foreign security strategy (2013-2023).

(ii) International organizational reports: documents from multilateral institutions such

as the World Bank (WB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and relevant

regional organizations that provide assessments of BRI projects and their impacts.

(iii) Academic research: scholarly articles, books, and research papers from reputable

academic journals focusing on China’s foreign policy, international relations theory,

geopolitics, and infrastructure development.

(iv) Think tank publications: reports and analyses from leading international and regional

think tanks specializing in Asian security affairs, economic development, and great power

competition.

(v) Media reports: selective integration of credible news sources providing factual

reporting on BRI developments, project implementations, and international responses.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

270

The collected documents were analyzed using a systematic approach, following a three-

phase analytical framework:

Phase 1: Identification and Classification of Content

The initial documents were meticulously screened, selected from reputable sources, and

classified based on their relevance to the three research questions outlined in the

introduction:

(i) Documents related to China’s foreign security strategy objectives within the BRI

framework.

(ii) Documents concerning the achievements of China’s foreign security strategy through

the BRI (2013-2023).

(iii) Documents addressing the challenges faced by China’s foreign security strategy

through the BRI (2013-2023).

Phase 2: Thematic Analysis

Within each category, the documents were analyzed thematically through an iterative

coding process. This process included:

(i) Open coding: identifying initial concepts and themes emerging from the documents.

(ii) Axial coding: establishing relationships between the identified themes.

(iii) Selective coding: integrating and refining the themes into coherent analytical

frameworks.

This thematic analysis aimed to identify recurring patterns, strategic narratives, key

policy initiatives, project implementations, and international responses, providing

insights into China’s foreign security objectives, achievements, and challenges through

the BRI.

Phase 3: Interpretive Analysis

The final phase of analysis involved interpretive examination of the identified themes to

develop a comprehensive understanding of:

(i) The strategic logic underlying China’s foreign security objectives in the new era under

Xi Jinping, through the BRI.

(ii) The achievements of China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI, realized over

a decade of global implementation.

(iii) The multidimensional challenges faced by the BRI as a tool for global geopolitical and

geoeconomic expansion.

In general, this study primarily adopts a traditional qualitative document analysis

method, allowing for this interpretive process to be structured within a multifaceted

system, encompassing various fields such as economics, politics, culture, society, and

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

271

environment. This approach is intended to reassess the achievements and challenges of

China’s decade-long shift in foreign security strategy from “keeping a low profile” to

“actively participating” under Xi Jinping through the BRI. In our view, evaluating an

international project of unprecedented scale in global trade history, such as the BRI,

requires a comprehensive perspective integrating multiple angles and fields to fully grasp

its magnitude, success, and limitations. Consequently, this study will contribute findings

on the achievements and challenges of China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI

during a decade of implementation to broader academic debates on the adjustment of

foreign security strategies by rising powers in the 21st century, and the transformation

of the new international order influenced by strategic competition among major powers,

especially the US-China rivalry.

1. What is the BRI?

“Around 140 BCE during China’s Han Dynasty, Zhang Qian, a royal envoy,

undertook a journey westward from Chang’an (now Xi’an in Shaanxi

Province), establishing a land route connecting East and West. Many centuries

later, during the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties, the Silk Road routes

flourished both on land and sea, facilitating trade between East and West. In

the early 15th century, Zheng He, the famous navigator of China’s Ming

Dynasty, made seven voyages to the Western Seas, promoting trade along

the maritime silk routes… These roads facilitated exchange and mutual

learning between Eastern and Western civilizations, promoted regional

development and prosperity, and shaped the Silk Road spirit characterized by

peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and

mutual benefit” (China’s State Council Information Office, 2023).

Beijing has skillfully utilized this historical heritage, constructing a cultural inheritance

argument to justify contemporary geopolitical strategy. By connecting the “One Belt, One

Road” (OBOR) Initiative with the ancient Silk Road, the Chinese state has created a

coherent narrative of historical continuity, in which the BRI is described as a natural

revival of traditional trade networks associated with the “greatness” of Chinese

civilization. This approach not only aims to consolidate the initiative’s legitimacy within

China but also seeks to build a positive interpretive framework internationally, mitigating

concerns about Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions. OBOR initially proposed by Xi Jinping in

2013 during visits to Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan) and spoke to the Indonesian

National Assembly after successfully consolidating power and assuming Chinese

leadership in 2012 (Ginsburg, 2021). During these diplomatic engagements, Xi Jinping

clearly articulated China’s new foreign security strategic vision through a modern OBOR,

marking the beginning of a transformation from the “keeping a low profile” strategy to

an “active participation” strategy, while also initiating what would later develop into the

BRI (Jingping, 2019: 702). Initially, the initiative only included the 21st Century Maritime

Silk Road (MSR) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), and subsequently the BRI

expanded its scope with the inclusion of the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015. The MSR

outlines an economic route from China’s eastern coastal ports, across the East Sea to the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

272

Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, ultimately converging with the SREB in Venice, Italy.

Additionally, the SREB delineates three strategic economic corridors: (i) A corridor

connecting China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean through Central Asia and

West Asia; (ii) A corridor connecting China with the Indian Ocean through Southeast Asia

and South Asia; and (iii) A corridor connecting China with the Baltic region in Europe

through Central Asia, Russia, and West Asia (Wang et al., 2024). Simultaneously, the

DSR plays a role in establishing a digital corridor facilitated by underwater fiber optic

cables, enhancing internet connectivity between Asia, Europe, and Africa, as Zhao (2021)

described “This digital infrastructure not only promotes technological advancement but

also lays the foundation for modern information technology systems, including broadband

networks, e-commerce centers, and smart cities, in countries participating in the BRI”.

Conceptually, the BRI resembles two expanding arcs encompassing the continents of

Asia, Europe, and Africa, leveraging established trade routes and coastal port cities as

focal points (Schulhof et al., 2022). This framework forms the basis for six major

economic corridors, including routes through Russia, Mongolia, West Asia, the East China

Sea and East Sea, the Indochina Peninsula, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, and Myanmar.

These corridors serve as regional connectivity channels, facilitated by a network of critical

infrastructure projects, thereby promoting interdependence and cooperation among

participating countries (Li et al., 2022). In 2014, China outlined a comprehensive three-

step roadmap for developing the BRI. This roadmap extends from the initiative’s inception

in 2013 until 2049, divided into strategic phases: (i) Momentum-building phase (2013-

2016); (ii) Planning phase (2016-2021); and (iii) Implementation phase (2021-2049).

Through this strategic framework, China aims to expand its geopolitical and geostrategic

influence in the region, enabling the country to rise to the status of a global power

comparable both economically and politically with the US. The significance of the BRI is

emphasized by its powerful economic impacts on the global economy, creating an

initiative of immense scale and funding with participation from numerous countries

worldwide. Countries directly or indirectly participating in the BRI collectively contribute

approximately 55% of global GDP, encompassing about 70% of the world’s population

and 75% of global resources. Within this scope, the BRI’s direct cooperation includes 64

countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people, representing 63% of the global

population and an estimated economic output of approximately $21 trillion, accounting

for 29% of global GDP (Chinese Communist Party, 2018: 102). As of 2023, a total of 150

countries (including China) have signed documents to participate in China’s BRI (see

Figure 1).

The institutionalization of the BRI within the CCP framework reflects the strategic

importance of this initiative in China’s national policy agenda under Xi Jinping. Initially

absent from official CCP documents, the BRI was formally recognized and confirmed in

the Report of the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017

(Chinese Communist Party, 2018: 117). This institutionalization emphasizes the key role

of the BRI in China’s vision for the new era, as well as affirming Beijing’s “active

participation” strategy in the global economy to directly counter containment measures

by the US and Western allies, as Xi Jinping clearly stated, who emphasized the global

importance of this initiative by declaring: “The BRI originates from China but benefits the

entire world” (Li et al., 2022). Commenting on the role of the BRI for China, Simonov

(2025) described “This initiative enhances China’s global influence, prompting other

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

273

major actors to take countermeasures. One such response is the policy of the US and the

Group of Seven (G7) countries that seeks to reorient China’s partners”.

Figure 1. Number of countries that have joined China’s BRI as of December 2023

Sources: Statista (2023).

Bharti (2023) emphasizes the role of the BRI in promoting cooperation across five key

areas: (i) Policy; (ii) Infrastructure; (iii) Trade relations; (iv) Finance; and (v) People-to-

people connectivity. Originating from the principle of “a community of shared destiny”

and guided by the spirit of “three togethers”, including (i) Joint discussion; (ii) Joint

development; and (iii) Joint benefits. The BRI represents one of the most ambitious

efforts in the annals of global trade history, and the country driving this project is China—

an emerging global power challenging a world order under American “hegemony”, as

Chaziza (2023) has recognized:

“The paramount importance of the BRI will shape success or failure for China’s

future, illuminating Xi Jinping’s unwavering commitment to implementing this

strategy. This belief highlights the strategic imperative placed on the BRI

within China’s comprehensive national strategy under Xi Jinping’s leadership

to counter the injustices that the Chinese believe the US is attempting to lead

Western allies in containing their rise”.

In general, the BRI is a strategy of unprecedented scale in global trade history, spanning

numerous countries and sectors, with the consolidation of China’s diplomatic strategy

emerging as a central objective to counter and challenge American “hegemony”. With its

Sub-Saharan Africa Europe and Central Asia East Asia and Pacific

Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and North Africa South East Asia

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

274

significance, the BRI holds the role of a foundational strategy in realizing the “two

centenary goals” and the “Chinese Dream”. Throughout its implementation, China has

transformed the BRI into vast spider-like networks connecting continents, from Asia to

Europe, from Asia to Africa, and from Asia to Oceania and the Americas. These networks

envision one endpoint as Europe’s highly developed economic region and the other

endpoint as the dynamic East Asian economic region. Within this framework, countries

situated between these endpoints are positioned to potentially develop into significant

economies in the near future.

2. China’s Foreign Security Strategic Objectives Through the BRI

In the context of an increasingly complex and challenging global security environment,

coupled with the process of repositioning its role and stature during its rise, China has

undertaken adjustments to its foreign security strategy aimed at adaptation and position

consolidation. Within this framework, the BRI emerges as a central element, playing a

key role in realizing China’s strategic objectives on the international stage. Through the

BRI, China’s foreign security strategy aims to achieve the following objectives:

First, the BRI is used by China as a strategic tool to build and strengthen its image as a

peaceful, friendly, and responsible power in the perception of the international

community (Li et al., 2022). China clearly recognizes that to be acknowledged as a true

global power, the country needs to be viewed by other nations as an entity rising

peacefully, committed to promoting values oriented toward the common prosperity of

humanity (Schulhof et al., 2022). Accordingly, through the BRI, China actively promotes

the concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny”, emphasizing harmony between national

interests and the principle of mutually beneficial cooperation. This is considered the

ideological foundation for creating a multipolar, peaceful world order where countries

share benefits and bear risks (Chaziza, 2023). China positions the BRI as an initiative

based on common interests, where the level of contribution exceeds the benefits

received, with the primary goal of promoting development and prosperity for participating

countries, especially those in the Global South. Moreover, the BRI is also an important

means to realize China’s long-term objectives, including the “two centenaries” and the

“Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation. These ambitions are linked to efforts to

overcome historical challenges, including more than a century of population control

policies, leading to a continuous decline in birth rates for 7 years from 2016 to 2023

(Moritsugu, 2024). Additionally, to strengthen the image of a friendly power, China

continuously promotes public welfare projects within the BRI framework and implements

a multi-channel communication strategy. The benefits of this initiative are widely

promoted through mass media, conferences, seminars, and high-level diplomatic events

globally. Notably, at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (2022),

China affirmed the pursuit of a proactive and expansive strategy, including:

“Establishing a comprehensive global network of high-quality free trade

zones, accelerating the development of pilot free trade zones, such as the

Hainan Free Trade Port, and jointly promoting the BRI initiative, which has

received significant recognition as a valuable international cooperation effort”.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

275

Therefore, the BRI is not merely an infrastructure or economic project but also a strategic

platform for China to assert its position as a friendly and responsible global power.

Through combining economic cooperation, public diplomacy, and ideological orientation,

China leverages the BRI to shape a positive national image while consolidating its

influence in the international system.

Second, the BRI is a strategic tool for China to consolidate its power and economic

networks that are increasingly under pressure from the US and Western allies, especially

since Donald Trump’s first term (2017-2021) when the trade war with China erupted.

From a security perspective, the BRI allows China to expand its sphere of influence and

promote comprehensive economic development with diverse supply networks worldwide,

avoiding excessive dependence on US and Western allied markets (Carmody &

Wainwright, 2022). With its extensive geographical scope, encompassing both land and

maritime routes, the BRI targets two main areas: (i) Infrastructure; and (ii) Energy.

Regarding infrastructure, the BRI addresses two challenges that China currently faces:

(i) Excess production capacity; and (ii) Large foreign exchange reserves. By creating

connectivity, the BRI provides China with a pathway to invest capital, technology, and

infrastructure, opening “new doors” for Chinese companies to access and penetrate

foreign markets, especially developing countries in the “Southern Hemisphere” to reduce

pressure on domestic production and business operations (Zhao, 2021). By establishing

infrastructure connections spanning across regions and continents, the BRI is poised to

unlock powerful opportunities for “Made in China” branded goods to saturate the entire

global market. This will be facilitated through the seamless integration of transportation

networks and economic connectivity, promoting enhanced trade and economic

cooperation on a global scale. Furthermore, with the 21st century celebrated as the

“century of seas and oceans”, the MSR aspect of the BRI emerges as a key instrument

for China to realize its maritime ambitions. Currently, the String of Pearls Strategy is

viewed as China’s major success in expanding its influence in the Indo-Pacific region

through investment in seaports from BRI funding, as assessed by Sparling (2020)

described:

“The ports along China’s ‘string of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean are designed to

be commercial trading posts to bolster China’s role in international trade.

However, they have increasingly come to play a potentially more menacing

role as dual-use ports that can give the strengthened Chinese navy a global

reach it lacked entirely just a few years ago”.

Therefore, the BRI serves as a platform for China to extend its influence, exploit maritime

resources, and engage in strategic commitments, particularly in the context of regional

security dynamics and competition with the US and Western allies.

Energy security is another crucial objective underpinning China’s BRI. As a power with a

population of 1.4 billion and on a trajectory of strong economic development, China has

enormous energy consumption needs to operate its national economy. “Oil, gas and coal

imports to China account for around 85 percent, 40 percent and 7 percent of the country’s

domestic consumption, respectively; and about 18 percent, 16 percent and 18 percent

of the global trade of these commodities” (Nakhle, 2023). To address this dependency,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

276

China has announced plans to enhance domestic energy production by 2030 with a vision

extending to 2035. This strategy includes prioritizing the expansion of domestic oil and

gas reserves, increasing production, and actively exploiting both onshore and offshore

resources.

Therefore, strengthening energy security is one of the primary objectives of the BRI.

Through this initiative, China aims to diversify its energy supply sources, thereby

reinforcing energy security in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, which

has disrupted global energy supply chains. Simultaneously, the BRI creates pathways for

cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, attracting energy-exporting countries to

collaborate with China. By establishing pipeline connections with Central Asian countries,

Russia, and others, China seeks to reduce energy import costs and strengthen national

energy security. Consequently, since the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted in 2022, China’s

energy sector supply has improved significantly, with Moscow enhancing comprehensive

cooperation with Beijing to redirect the European energy market toward China. This has

helped both powers address core needs in their national security strategies, as Down et

al. (2023) have demonstrated:

“In 2021-2023, Russia’s crude oil exports to China increased by one-third,

while coal and LNG exports nearly doubled. In 2023, Russia was China’s

largest crude oil supplier, second-largest coal supplier, and third-largest LNG

supplier. Russia is also an increasingly important pipeline gas exporter to

China. It has increased gas deliveries via the Power of Siberia 1 (PS-1)

pipeline from 10.4 bcm in 2021 to 22.7 bcm in 2023, accounting for 34

percent of China’s pipeline gas imports. Russia expects PS-1 to reach its

maximum capacity of 38 bcm/year by 2025. Additionally, China and Russia

signed an agreement in early February 2022 for another pipeline, the Far

Eastern Route, to supply 10 bcm/year by 2027”.

Third, the BRI serves as a means for China to protect its maritime security and advance

its sea power strategy. A core principle in China’s approach to foreign security, as

demonstrated through the BRI, is protecting its maritime interests and strengthening

security measures in the disputed “claimed” waters in the East Sea with Southeast Asian

nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Hung et al.,

2025). As coastal nations aim to develop maritime infrastructure and expand their reach

into the sea, China’s MSR initiative provides a convenient channel for financial and

security activities.

China has significantly increased investments with a primary focus on accessing and

controlling strategically important seaports for both military and semi-military purposes,

specifically efforts to invest in military bases and ports through the String of Pearls

strategy extending from Eastern China to Africa, including Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base,

Myanmar’s Coco Island and Kyaukpyu Port, Bangladesh’s Chittagong Port, Sri Lanka’s

Hambantota Port, the Maldives’s Male Port, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, Khartoum Port and

Port Sudan in Sudan, as well as Bagamoyo Port in Tanzania (Huang, 2018). This effort

allows China to effectively address what they consider maritime security challenges,

particularly the “Malacca dilemma” – a term denoting China’s strategic vulnerability

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

277

related to its dependence on these maritime chokepoints (Paszak, 2021). To achieve this

objective, China uses financial instruments such as the AIIB and other channels to

transfer money and influence other countries regionally and globally to garner support

for its “claims” and militarization activities in the East Sea (Carmody & Wainwright,

2022). According to the assessment of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2023)

has described it specifically as follows:

“China has substantially expanded its ability to monitor and project power

throughout the East Sea via the construction of dual civilian-military bases at

its outposts in the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. These include new

radar and communications arrays, airstrips and hangars to accommodate

combat aircraft, and deployments of mobile surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise

missile systems... Combat radii for fighter aircraft are shown based on China’s

J-11 fighters while bomber ranges are based on China’s H-6 bombers, both

of which have been deployed to Woody Island. SAM and cruise missile ranges

are based on the HQ-9, YJ-62, and YJ-12B systems that have been deployed

across Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef. Fighter

and bomber ranges at Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reefs represent

expected future deployments based on the hangars built to accommodate

those assets”.

The above assessment shows that China is increasingly militarizing islands that are under

Vietnam’s sovereignty but claimed by China to coercively monopolize the East Sea.

Furthermore, through politically calculated BRI investments in Southeast Asian countries,

Beijing has actively lobbied ASEAN nations to prevent a unified position on the East Sea

issue, thereby weakening the bloc’s ability to collectively counter China’s violations.

Cambodia (where China has access to the Ream naval base to enhance its influence in

the Gulf of Thailand and the East Sea) is a country “ready to block ASEAN policy-making

targeting China” (Epstein, 2024). WB (2023) conducted a study focusing on analyzing

Cambodia’s current economic situation, showing that Cambodia’s GDP growth now

depends primarily on the garment export industry; however, over 90% of the production

facilities are directly operated by Chinese owners. Additionally, China continues to be

Cambodia’s largest investor, having invested more than $3 billion USD in 2023, indicating

that the BRI plays a crucial role in implementing China’s ambitious maritime strategies

in the East Sea. Controlling critical port infrastructure will allow China to enhance power

projection capabilities and sustain naval operations offshore. Thus, the MSR strengthens

China’s ability to counter and control the region with the US, providing crucial strategic

depth for its naval forces. By shaping the security framework and strategic landscape

along critical maritime shipping routes, the MSR emerges as a key instrument for China

in pursuing its goal of achieving maritime supremacy. Ultimately, this initiative aims to

position China as a formidable maritime power capable of eclipsing the US to become the

dominant force in the Indo-Pacific region (Carmody & Wainwright, 2022).

Fourth, the BRI serves as a strategic tool for China to build a geopolitical landscape

favorable to its interests in the 21st century. Although China has repeatedly asserted

that “the BRI is not a geopolitical tool. It is a product of cooperation, aimed at economic

connectivity, promoting collaboration between countries and regions, not only in

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

278

economic fields but also in cultural and social aspects, benefiting all. The goal of the BRI

is to build partnerships, not alliances” (China’s State Council Information Office, 2023)).

However, the role of the BRI in expanding China’s influence has been affirmed by many

international scholars, despite China’s efforts to deny its geopolitical nature. According

to several current case studies on the BRI by global scholars, the BRI plays an important

role in shaping a geopolitical environment conducive to China’s interests through the

following mechanisms:

(i) Establishing infrastructure systems to enhance control over strategic transportation

routes: BRI road, rail, and port development projects allow China to control critical trade

routes and resource transportation channels. This increases China’s geopolitical access

and influence in strategic regions such as Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa

(Schulhof et al. 2022).

(ii) Creating economic leverage through trade and investment: Economic and financial

linkages formed through the BRI enable China to develop trade and investment

partnerships with countries along the routes. This allows China to strengthen its economic

influence and create geopolitical leverage over these nations (Yu, 2024).

(iii) Developing multilateral mechanisms to shape regional order: Multilateral financial

and trade initiatives under the BRI such as the AIIB and Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership (RCEP) aim to establish a new economic-trade structure, creating

a foundation for China to shape a regional order aligned with its interests (Oakes, 2021).

(iv) Penetrating soft power domains to increase sociocultural influence: Cultural

exchanges, student exchanges, and the establishment of Chinese cultural centers abroad

under the BRI aim to promote Chinese values and lifestyle and increase China’s

attractiveness, thereby consolidating long-term geopolitical influence (Kiet et al., 2024).

Through these mechanisms, the BRI serves as an important tool helping China gradually

transform its geopolitical sphere of influence into a multilateral regional order aligned

with the country’s strategic objectives and interests in the 21st century (Beeson &

Crawford, 2023). In a decade of implementation, the BRI has helped China enhance its

geopolitical influence, a development that has raised significant concerns among Western

powers, especially the US. Beyond economic benefits, the BRI is an essential tool for

China to employ in the geopolitical competition of the 21st century, particularly against

the US and Western allies. This initiative allows China to demonstrate its power and

influence across numerous countries, regions, and continents. Consequently, the

resulting regional connectivity is expected to shift the geopolitical balance toward Asia,

with China as the focal point. Beside, the successful deployment of the MSR will help

China leverage economic influence, drawing regional countries closer into its sphere of

influence. Furthermore, the MSR functions as a strategic counterbalance to US

rebalancing efforts and economic agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and

Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), designed to

attract allies and partners. Through the BRI, Chinese leaders aspire to gradually gain

greater control, counter, and shape ongoing geopolitical developments in the neighboring

region (Zhao, 2021).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

279

In general, China’s foreign security strategy through the BRI under Xi Jinping has

undergone significant adjustments to adapt to an increasingly complex and dangerous

external security environment, as well as China’s self-awareness and “repositioning” on

the international stage, marking qualitative changes. However, this period is still defined

as a “strategic opportunity” requiring the Chinese nation to seize opportunities and break

through barriers. The overarching goal of China’s national security strategy, including its

foreign security strategy, “is to realize the rejuvenation dream of the Chinese nation,

restore its former glory and emerge as a strong, prosperous, and respected global power,

transcending its current status as a rising regional force” (Morky, 2023).

3. BRI: Assessing a decade of achievements under Xi Jinping

Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership of China in 2012, with the goal of transforming China

into a global power and revitalizing the inherent greatness of the ancient Chinese

civilization, China has intensified its implementation of a “proactive engagement” foreign

security strategy through the BRI, achieving notable results after a decade of

deployment.

First, at the forefront of China’s strategy is the active promotion of the BRI through what

is termed “policy connectivity”. Through various platforms including the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Boao Forum for Asia (BFA),

Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), as well as events such as the Hangzhou Summit and the Belt

and Road Forum, China has diligently disseminated the BRI agenda. This effort over the

past decade has facilitated the establishment of trust and attracted participation from

numerous countries across the world. In particular, the BRI Forums serve as significant

occasions to advocate for the initiative and cultivate cooperation with BRI target

countries:

(i) The First Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF I) was held in May

2017 in Beijing with the theme “Belt and Road: Cooperation for Common Prosperity”,

attended by 28 national leaders and international organizations (Institute for Strategy

and Policy Research in Industry and Trade, 2023).

(ii) The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF II) with the

theme “Shaping a Brighter Shared Future” was convened in Beijing in April 2019, with

the participation of 5,000 delegates from 150 countries and 90 international

organizations (Institute for Strategy and Policy Research in Industry and Trade, 2023).

Just two years after the official renaming to BRI at the 19th Chinese Communist Party

Congress, this event was celebrated as evidence of the initiative’s success despite US

opposition due to concerns that Beijing’s BRI provides China with greater geopolitical

influence at Washington’s expense” and warnings that participating countries risked

falling into a “debt trap” according to US policymakers (Garcia & Guerreiro, 2024).

(iii) The Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF III) with the theme

“High-quality Belt and Road Cooperation: Together for Common Development and

Prosperity” was successfully held in October 2023 with the participation of over 4,000

delegates from 140 countries and 30 international organizations (Institute for Strategy

and Policy Research in Industry and Trade, 2023). Although throughout the 2019-2023

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

280

period, China’s image regarding BRI was significantly diminished due to the impact of

several failed BRI projects (the Khorgos dry port near the Kazakhstan border (Central

Asia), Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, and Malaysia’s incomplete East Coast Railway), the

achievements made throughout this process were numerous. The extensive participation

of 140 countries worldwide at the BRF III demonstrated the tangible benefits not only for

China but also for participating countries, further reinforcing the momentum of the BRI.

In a decade of implementation, the BRI has delivered remarkable results, bringing clear

advantages not only to China but also to countries actively participating in this initiative.

At the BRF III event, Xi Jinping declared:

“As of 2023, China has signed more than 200 cooperation documents within

the BRI framework with 150 countries and over 30 international

organizations, while launching more than 20 multilateral dialogue and

cooperation platforms in fields including railways, ports, finance, taxation,

energy, green development, green investment, disaster risk reduction, anti-

corruption, research groups, media, cultural exchanges,... generating nearly

1 trillion US dollars in investment” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s

Republic China, 2023).

The deep and global-scale participation of many countries around the world demonstrates

the success of the BRI throughout a decade of implementation. Particularly noteworthy

was Italy’s historic decision on March 23, 2019, to become the first G7 member to align

with the BRI—a significant achievement emphasizing China’s adeptness in attracting

international support and enhancing its global standing (Al Jazeera, 2019). Through

continuous advocacy via policy channels and influence on developments surrounding the

BRI, China seeks to consolidate the initiative’s credibility as a multilateral platform

dedicated to promoting global common interests. Simultaneously, the BRI also serves as

an effective geopolitical tool helping China expand its influence and shape the

international economic order in alignment with Beijing’s vision of global governance in

the 21st century.

Second, China has deployed a strategy to expand cultural influence through “people-to-

people connectivity” mechanisms. The policy document “Vision and Actions on Jointly

Building the SREB and 21st-Century MSR”, published in March 2015, identifies that

“people-to-people connectivity is the social foundation of the BRI” (Zhao, 2021). To

actualize this strategy, China has committed to enhancing academic exchanges,

promoting educational cooperation, and providing 10,000 scholarships for countries

along the BRI corridor (Woo, 2023). Although the BRI originated as a transcontinental

infrastructure development project, by 2016, the initiative had been expanded by China

to integrate education as a strategic component aimed at reinforcing and disseminating

Chinese cultural values globally, with higher education identified as a priority area (Woo,

2023).

The favorable results demonstrating the effectiveness of the educational strategy within

the BRI framework include a significant increase in international students in China. Prior

to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of international students had reached 492,185

in 2018 (Woo, 2023), with the highest growth rates from Africa and Central Asia. China

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

281

is now the world’s largest provider of higher education scholarships for African students,

with 12,000 scholarships awarded in 2020 (Woo, 2023). Through this strategy, China

aims to restructure the global higher education ecosystem that has been dominated by

Western models, while simultaneously elevating the status of leading educational

institutions such as Tsinghua University and Peking University as ideal academic

destinations for international students.

Additionally, China has developed a roadmap to enhance multidisciplinary cooperation

through the BRI, encompassing film, television, cultural heritage preservation, high-

quality human resource development, tourism, sports, healthcare, science and

technology, youth development, inter-party and inter-governmental dialogue, non-

governmental exchanges, and cultural-media cooperation. Notably, to mitigate public

debt risks and fiscal pressure on recipient countries of BRI project”, China has committed

to implementing social welfare projects and initiatives with direct impact on local

communities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic China, 2023). This strategy

has attracted the participation of many countries previously hesitant about potential

negative economic impacts from the BRI.

In the complex geopolitical context created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-

Ukraine conflict, and strategic competition between major powers, the “people-to-people

connectivity” model has become a key pillar in the BRI architecture. Recognizing this

importance, the Chinese administration and BRI partner countries have proactively

promoted cultural exchanges and social linkages. As of 2023, China has signed cultural

and tourism cooperation documents with 144 BRI partner countries (China’s State

Council Information Office, 2023). China has created cooperation platforms with

participating countries, including the Silk Road International Theatre Federation, the Silk

Road International Museum Alliance, the Silk Road Arts Festival Network, the Silk Road

International Library Alliance, and the Silk Road International Museum and Art Gallery

Alliance. These platforms have a total of 562 members, including 326 cultural institutions

from 72 partner countries (China’s State Council Information Office, 2023). Specific

initiatives include the establishment of 16 cultural centers in member countries,

organizing more than 1,600 cultural events since 2014, and signing film production

cooperation agreements with 21 countries and territories participating in the initiative

(Vietnam Institute of Finance, 2023). Expanding this strategy, China has added 37

cultural centers and organized over 2,000 additional cultural events in BRI partner

countries (Vietnam Institute of Finance, 2023). By prioritizing people-to-people

interactions, China not only strengthens its national image but also creates attractive

momentum for countries still cautious about participating in the BRI. Specific initiatives

include the establishment of 16 cultural centers in member countries, organizing more

than 1,600 cultural events since 2014, and signing film production cooperation

agreements with 21 countries and territories participating in the initiative (Vietnam

Institute of Finance, 2023). Expanding this strategy, China has added 37 cultural centers

and organized over 2,000 additional cultural events in BRI partner countries (Vietnam

Institute of Finance, 2023). By prioritizing people-to-people interactions, China not only

strengthens its national image but also creates attractive momentum for countries still

cautious about participating in the BRI.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

282

Third, China has implemented a strategy to strengthen its competitive position and

economic influence through multilateral financial mechanisms. Access to investment

capital is a key factor for countries participating in the BRI. To meet this need, China has

established a dedicated financial ecosystem within the BRI framework, including the Silk

Road Fund (SRF) with a registered capital of $40 billion USD, the AIIB with resources of

$100 billion USD, and the New Development Bank (NDB) with an initial capital of $100

billion USD. These institutions are structured as strategic financial pillars of the initiative

(Institute for Strategy and Policy Research in Industry and Trade, 2023). As of now, the

AIIB (2023) has 110 member countries, including 96 full members and 14 prospective

members, representing 65% of the global population and 81% of global GDP. Through

the AIIB (2023) platform, China has mobilized financial resources amounting to $59.17

billion for 306 projects across 37 countries, with the objective of developing strategic

infrastructure and enhancing competitive capacity in international markets. In 2022, the

AIIB established a Special Fund Window mechanism, designed to improve the repayment

capability of AIIB loans by less developed members through an interest subsidy

mechanism. This initiative has contributed to improving the credibility and transparency

of BRI projects, which have faced allegations that behind BRI investments lies China’s

“debt trap” diplomacy strategy, intended to place recipient countries in Beijing’s orbit of

influence and control. Overall, China’s decision to use foreign exchange reserves to invest

in infrastructure to support developing economies and promote international trade is

viewed as a form of providing global public goods. In the AIIB structure, China holds the

largest share at 26.75% and possesses preferential voting rights, thereby enhancing its

influence and shaping a China-led financial mechanism (Kim, 2020). This move elevates

China’s competitive position with traditional Western-dominated international financial

institutions such as the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while promoting

the internationalization of the Chinese Yuan (CNY).

Fourth, the BRI has played a crucial catalytic role in expanding cross-border

infrastructure investment by Chinese corporations. Connectivity through multimodal

transportation infrastructure (both land and sea routes) has been identified as a strategic

priority of the BRI, creating a foundation for China to deploy resources to international

markets. According to quantitative analyses, the total investment capital necessary to

realize the BRI is estimated at approximately $1.4 trillion, more than 12 times the scale

of the Marshall Plan implemented by the US after World War II (Hiep & Kiet, 2024).

Infrastructure investment accounts for the dominant proportion in the BRI capital

structure. Countries participating in the BRI have attracted FDI from China with a total

value of $80 billion (Vietnam Institute of Finance, 2023). Furthermore, China has

developed more than 50 economic and trade cooperation zones in approximately 20 BRI

participating countries, contributing $1.1 billion in tax revenue and creating 180,000 new

job opportunities (Vietnam Institute of Finance, 2023). Several BRI projects have

achieved significant progress, such as the China-Thailand railway project and the oil

pipeline project with the Russian Federation. The strategic investment markets of the BRI

are primarily concentrated in the regions of Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and West Asia,

with special attention to the Middle East and Africa.

In investment activities on both land and sea routes, China is simultaneously

implementing multiple large-scale infrastructure projects. In the railway sector, plans are

being promoted to develop a high-speed rail network spanning 81,000 kilometers

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

283

connecting BRI participating countries—exceeding the current total length of the entire

global high-speed rail system. In parallel, China has announced plans to allocate 35

trillion Yuan (equivalent to $503 billion USD) to strengthen and expand its domestic

railway network to more than 30,000 kilometers (Zhao, 2021). This expansion process

aims to establish connections between 80% of major cities within Chinese territory (Zhao,

2021). Regarding port infrastructure, China is focusing on building a network of

connection points with geostrategic value. As of 2023, China’s global presence in port

ownership and operation has expanded to nearly 100 ports in more than 50 countries

(Sly & Ledur, 2023). Notable strategic port projects include Djibouti, Piraeus, and

Gwadar. According to analysis by Nedopil (2023), the total value of construction contracts

related to the BRI has reached $573 billion since 2013. When including non-financial

investments, this total value approaches $1 trillion USD. Additionally, BRI projects with

significant valuations are being implemented on a global scale. Over the past decade,

this initiative has established partnerships with 32 international organizations and

attracted the participation of more than 150 countries and territories across continents—

Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa—with over 3,000 cooperation projects and a total

investment capital of approximately $1 trillion USD (China’s State Council Information

Office, 2023).

Fifth, China strategically positioned the BRI as an instrument to promote cross-national

trade and financial investment, thereby enhancing its comprehensive national power and

strategic competitive capacity with the US. Within the current global power structure,

China is identified as a competitor with the potential to surpass the US to become the

world’s leading economic power. Through the BRI mechanism, China has skillfully applied

“trade and financial leverage” in conjunction with the internationalization strategy of the

CNY, aiming to consolidate the foundation of national power sufficient to engage in

strategic competition with the US (Cabestan, 2021).

Regarding the trade aspect, leveraging its position as the “global manufacturing

workshop” and diverse network of trading partners, China has proactively led the process

of establishing regional and global trade mechanisms. When the BRI infrastructure

system becomes operational, China will enhance its ability to access and penetrate

markets along economic corridors. This initiative also creates opportunities for China to

shape, cooperate, and establish highly integrated bilateral, multilateral, and regional

economic agreements. In a decade of implementation, the BRI has played a dominant

role in mobilizing approximately $1 trillion USD in investment capital. Through the

deployment of more than 3,000 cooperation projects, China has facilitated the creation

of 420,000 job opportunities and made significant contributions to the process of lifting

nearly 40 million people out of poverty (Nedopil, 2023). The total trade volume between

China and countries along the BRI corridors in the five-year period from 2013 to 2018

exceeded $6 trillion. In 2017 alone, this index recorded a record growth of 14.2%, as

China imported goods valued at over $666 billion from these countries, accounting for

25% of the country’s total import value (Schulhof et al., 2022).

Beyond assuming a leadership role in the RCEP and supporting the process of joining the

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), China

actively promotes and utilizes multilateral mechanisms to diversify trade development.

This strategy includes promoting bilateral trade agreements and supporting the process

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

284

of participating in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). By fostering trade relations between

China and BRI countries, China not only contributes significantly to global economic

expansion but also creates momentum for domestic economic growth. This process

promotes mutually beneficial cooperative relationships and enhances the credibility of

the BRI, thereby attracting greater participation from more countries. In the financial

domain, a core component among the five pillars of the BRI, China has actively

participated in numerous multilateral financial cooperation initiatives with countries along

the BRI corridors. These efforts aim to integrate financial activities into the economic

structures of partner countries, creating political influence and establishing a foundation

for implementing BRI financial connectivity programs. Simultaneously, this approach

serves as the main channel promoting the internationalization of the CNY, aligning with

the increasingly evident trend of “de-dollarization” and China’s economic rise.

Overall, the BRI is positioned as a strategic tool helping Chinese corporations expand

their business operations and international influence, contributing to the realization of

China’s foreign security strategy. Through the BRI implementation process to date, China

has achieved concrete results in its foreign security strategy, creating a foundation to

respond to the significant challenges the country faces in the global geopolitical context.

4. BRI: Challenges on the Development Path under Xi Jinping

Despite achieving certain accomplishments in realizing foreign security objectives

through the BRI over the past decade, China still faces diverse geo-strategic risks and

challenges, particularly from geopolitical pressure exerted by the US and Western allies

in response to China’s rise. In the context of a transforming global security architecture,

the BRI faces the risk of stagnation, especially as some BRI projects become financially

unfeasible and numerous participating countries encounter public debt liquidity crises. In

response, China has implemented strategic adjustments aimed at maintaining

momentum for this initiative. Nevertheless, the BRI continues to confront several major

challenges:

First, the BRI is facing increasingly intense geo-strategic competition from major powers,

particularly the US and its Western bloc allies. Over the past decade, major powers have

actively positioned themselves to capture new development trends, establish

prerequisites, and endeavor to construct a global order aligned with their strategic

interests. The US, European Union, Russian Federation, India, Japan, and other nations

all aim to shape a world architecture favorable to their positions, and they perceive the

BRI as a strategic instrument for China to establish leadership and shape global security

structures (Thuan, 2021: 166). Consequently, powers with conflicting national interests

with China have undertaken strategic adjustments in their foreign security policies to

contain China’s rise. In this context, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia is identified as a multilateral mechanism

aimed at containing the expansion of China’s geopolitical influence and power in the Indo-

Pacific region (Hung et al., 2025). Accordingly, powers that counterbalance China

continuously pursue their own programs to establish suitable regional and global security

structures while asserting their roles in a transforming world order.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

285

The Trump administration in its first term (2017-2021) introduced the “Free and Open

Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy; strengthened multilateral cooperation within the QUAD

framework and initiated a trade war with China in 2018, as a strategic measure to contain

China’s rise in the region and establish a direct counterbalance to the BRI (Long & Yen,

2020). Although the US currently maintains advantages in economic and military

potential compared to China, this position is being strongly challenged due to China’s

superior economic development capacity, rapidly modernizing military capabilities

influenced by economic potential, and the development of domestic technical experts.

Accordingly, China is actively positioning itself to establish a strategic counterbalance

relationship with the US and aims to surpass the US in the future. The US-led QUAD has

established the “QUAD Infrastructure Partnership”, evaluated as a “strategic initiative”

aimed at counterbalancing China’s BRI through promoting infrastructure investment

according to Western international standards (Kiet et al., 2024).

India maintains a consistent position of non-participation in the BRI, clearly

demonstrated through its official stance at the SCO conference in July 2023. India’s

cautious stance stems from security concerns related to one of the largest and most

notable BRI projects, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015.

CPEC is a trade corridor connecting Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea with

Kashgar, a city in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, notably passing through

the disputed Kashmir territory between India and Pakistan. The project involves the

construction of airports, railways, highways, pipelines, along with other types of

commercial and energy infrastructure. China’s total investment in the project has

reached $60 billion USD (Gill, 2019), as a Bharti (2023) analyzes that “India’s position

of not supporting the BRI reflects this nation’s distinct strategic vision regarding regional

infrastructure development projects”.

China has also anticipated India’s non-supportive attitude in the context of serious border

conflicts between these two Asian powers in the Himalayan region (Atkins et al., 2023).

Notably, the increasing presence and influence of the BRI in South Asia has exacerbated

the strategic interest conflict between India and China, while India’s Indo-Pacific strategy

and Act East policy are being vigorously implemented, focusing on Southeast Asia – which

currently receives the largest total investment capital from the BRI at 44% (Hiep & Kiet,

2024). Currently, the prevailing view among Indian academic and policy-making circles

is that the BRI not only focuses on economic development but also aims at geopolitical

and strategic objectives, wherein the String of Pearls strategy is seen as a strategic

mechanism to encircle and limit India’s geopolitical space within its own territory, while

diminishing New Delhi’s strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region (Bharti, 2023).

Second, in the current international context, countries participating in the BRI are

exhibiting increasingly cautious and vigilant attitudes toward potential risks associated

with this initiative. The primary concern centers on the possibility of falling into so-called

“debt-trap diplomacy” through loans from Chinese-led financial institutions such as AIIB,

NDB, and SRF. Although the initial preferential terms offered to less developed countries

appear attractive, the operational mechanisms of these financial institutions have raised

serious concerns about transparency and governance, potentially pushing low and

middle-income countries into insolvency, which could pose risks to the national security

of developing countries participating in the BRI (Xiaojun, 2023). In global media, the

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

286

case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port is frequently cited as a typical example of a “debt

trap” (Moramudali & Panduwawala, 2024; Institute for Security and Development Policy,

2022). However, recent analyses have indicated that the reality is much more complex

and does not necessarily reflect a deliberate Chinese strategy (Himmer & Rod, 2022).

Many contemporary studies show no systematic pattern of China intentionally lending

beyond countries’ repayment capacity to gain control of strategic assets (Peng & Cheng,

2024). On the contrary, China has repeatedly restructured debts and, in some cases,

even implemented debt forgiveness for countries in difficulty, which is inconsistent with

the hypothesis of a deliberate “debt trap” strategy. Many researchers argue that the

concept of a “debt trap” is largely an interpretation from Western geopolitical

perspectives, particularly the US, stemming from concerns about China’s expanding

global influence (Jones & Hameri, 2022). To enhance the transparency of BRI projects,

in 2022, China implemented significant adjustments in debt management policies within

the BRI framework, a phenomenon referred to by Chinese researchers and internal

businesses as “BRI 2.0”. Accordingly, Chinese policy-making bodies have committed to

evaluating new projects (from 2023) with more stringent standards and allowing debt

renegotiations—a significant change from the previous rigid stance, when debt

repayment was considered a non-negotiable “red line” for BRI-participating countries

(Stanhope, 2023).

Within the BRI framework, China and Chinese state-owned enterprises directly invest in

and construct numerous large-scale infrastructure projects in strategically positioned

countries, including the CPEC (more than $60 billion USD), Bangladesh-China-India-

Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM) ($22 billion USD), Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan

Railway Project ($2,75 biliion USD) in South Asia, and multiple projects in Africa such as

the Kenya Railway Project ($5 billion USD), Djibouti Port ($590 million USD), Africa’s

longest suspension bridge ($786 million USD), and mineral exploitation projects in

Botswana ($1.9 billion USD). These projects are primarily financed through loans from

Chinese-backed financial institutions. Through the BRI, China has established a

mechanism that makes many developing countries increasingly dependent on Chinese

capital, enabling Beijing to leverage this dependency relationship to expand its

geopolitical influence. According to research by Himmer and Rod (2022), the BRI risks

creating unsustainable debt burdens for countries with vulnerable economies in Africa

and Asia. Specifically, Djibouti has debts to China amounting to $1.4 billion (equivalent

to approximately 45% of the country’s GDP), Kenya ($8 billion), Pakistan ($68.91 billion),

Laos (approximately $6 billion), Maldives ($1.37 billion, accounting for about 40% of

public debt), and Sri Lanka ($8.8 billion). Countries located along the BRI corridors face

significant challenges in managing these debts, especially in the context of the US and

Western allies continuously warning about China’s “debt trap strategy” and

recommending that BRI-participating countries carefully consider potential

consequences. Notably, credit risk is significantly increasing, with debt to China

exceeding 15% of GDP in many low and middle-income countries globally (Horn et al.,

2021).

Currently, according to the latest research data, 23 countries are in a state of “dangerous

debt” due to participation in infrastructure development projects under the BRI (Liu,

2023). Many infrastructure projects implemented by China in these countries have

revealed serious limitations, particularly a lack of transparency in financial management

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

287

and a tendency to use suboptimal technology. Consequently, recipient countries not only

bear the debt burden to China but also face the risk of partial infringement on national

sovereignty. A prominent characteristic of China’s lending policy is the absence of strict

conditions imposed on recipient countries; in many cases, even disregarding

environmental and social impact assessments or economic efficiency evaluations of

funded projects. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (2023) has issued warnings

about significant ecological impacts, indicating that development corridors planned under

the BRI will overlap with the habitats of 265 endangered species, including the saiga

antelope, tigers, and giant pandas. WWF (2023) research has also identified that these

routes encroach upon 1,739 protected important bird areas or key biodiversity areas,

along with 46 global biodiversity hotspots. Despite the potential negative impacts on the

ecosystems of BRI-participating countries, China’s policies primarily focus on securing

favorable financial terms, including: commercial interest rate commitments, debt

repayment mechanisms using natural resources, requirements for controlling equity

stakes in local enterprises, or guaranteed preferential access to recipient countries’

domestic markets for Chinese exports (Liu, 2023).

According to Brobbey’s analysis (2018), there are four main structural causes leading to

the increasing debt situation of BRI-participating countries:

(i) Lack of comprehensive assessment of debt repayment capacity: Many BRI projects

are implemented without thorough evaluations of the financial capacity and long-term

debt servicing ability of recipient countries. This issue is particularly serious for

developing economies with weak financial foundations, often leading to unsustainable

debt-to-GDP ratios.

(ii) Lack of transparency and competition in the bidding process: Many BRI contracts are

signed without following open, transparent, and competitive bidding processes between

contractors, facilitating cost inflation and increasing the risk of budget losses.

(iii) Project costs often far exceed initial estimates: Due to lack of experience in managing

and implementing large-scale infrastructure projects, actual costs are often significantly

higher than initial budgets, forcing countries to borrow more to complete projects.

(iv) Many BRI projects face significant environmental and social risks, causing opposition

from local communities due to negative impacts on living environments and issues

related to resettlement, resulting in implementation delays and increasing total project

costs.

To illustrate specifically, the Kaliwa Dam Project in the Philippines with a total investment

of $211 million USD has encountered strong opposition from many stakeholders. This

project plans to construct a 60-meter high concrete dam and a 25-kilometer water tunnel

in the border area between Rizal and Quezon provinces, causing serious environmental

and social risks. The dam construction not only threatens the natural ecosystem and

biodiversity in the area but also puts the Dumagats and Remontados ethnic communities

at risk of losing ancestral lands (Chavez, 2024). Notably, the Philippine administration

under President Duterte was accused of using fraudulent and coercive measures to force

indigenous communities to sign “Free, Prior, and Informed Consent” (FPIC) agreements.

The most serious case was recorded in May 2016, when village chief Alan Buenodicio

died after allegedly being forced by military personnel to drink alcohol every morning for

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

288

refusing to surrender community land rights. Additionally, other projects such as the

Chico River Pump Irrigation project ($88 million USD) and the Sangley Point International

Airport project ($10.2 billion USD) in the Philippines also faced strong opposition from

local communities and government members (Bharti & Kumari, 2024).

Similarly, the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) project in Malaysia has faced serious criticism

regarding environmental and social risks. This project was suspended after the Malaysian

Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) discovered abnormally inflated contract values and

approximately $700 million had been diverted to pay debts related to the 1MDB national

development fund. Prime Minister Mahathir decided to cancel the project, partly due to

the unstable financial condition of Malaysia’s economy and unfavorable terms in the BRI

contract. Additionally, the project posed potential negative environmental impacts due

to the large land area required for the railway. As a result, this project had to be

renegotiated, reducing the total cost from $19.9 billion to $10.7 billion in April 2019

(Bharti & Kumari, 2024).

In general, structural weaknesses in project governance, incomplete risk assessments,

and lack of transparency in BRI projects have led to increasingly heavy debt burdens for

many participating countries, posing serious challenges to long-term financial

sustainability.

Third, Chinese enterprises participating in the BRI face significant risks in cross-border

investment activities. Although the BRI is a large-scale international cooperation

initiative, its development and governance mechanisms are primarily unilaterally

designed and operated by China. The BRI currently faces stringent scrutiny from Western

economies, particularly the US and the European Union, entities that view the BRI as an

instrument for expanding China’s geopolitical influence. Consequently, Chinese

enterprises operating in BRI-participating countries often face unpredictable challenges,

while errors and risks in project implementation are closely monitored by international

oversight bodies and Western media and publicized globally. Factors such as cultural

disparities, differences in legal frameworks, political volatility, and ecological-

environmental conditions can create significant barriers to the economic interests of

Chinese enterprises (Weng et al., 2021). Additionally, non-traditional security threats,

especially terrorist activities in African and Central Asian regions, further exacerbate

these challenges. The consequences of these risks are evidenced by the suspension or

cancellation of numerous Chinese investment projects across various countries.

Specifically, Malaysia canceled projects worth $11.58 billion USD between 2013-2021,

while similar concerns led to the cancellation of projects valued at over $1 billion USD in

Bolivia and nearly $1.5 billion USD in Kazakhstan (Bharti & Kumari, 2024). The $2.7

billion USD Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project in Ecuador, with serious structural

quality issues, exemplifies the investment security challenges that Chinese enterprises

face (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2023).

Empirical studies, such as the report by AidData (2021), have published alarming figures:

35% of BRI projects face allegations of corruption, labor rights violations, negative

environmental impacts, and opposition from local communities. “BRI projects are

predicted to increase global warming by 3 degrees Celsius which could force over 100

million people in Asia into extreme poverty” (Felsen, 2024). Besdies, many BRI-

participating countries are facing financial risks due to investments from China, with 42

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

289

low and middle-income countries currently having debt to China exceeding 10% of annual

GDP (Aidata, 2021). Notably, researchers have identified $385 billion in loans from China

not recorded in official statistics (Aidata, 2021). This figure equals nearly 50% of the

total value of loans that China provides for transnational infrastructure projects being

concealed (Aidata, 2021). Uzbekistan continues to increase its debt to Beijing, while

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are among countries with particularly high hidden debts,

creating financial pressure on Chinese enterprises (Aidata, 2021). Therefore, the BRI,

under the strategic direction of President Xi Jinping, is implemented by Chinese

enterprises according to state policy orientation. However, in the context of volatile global

market conditions, influenced by both partner countries and China’s domestic policies,

these enterprises increasingly encounter obstacles in implementing international projects

within the BRI framework, risking insolvency and bankruptcy.

Fourth, a significant structural challenge facing the BRI is the risk of systemic financial

instability. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 created a serious

multidimensional shock to the BRI’s integration within the global economic architecture,

particularly affecting low and middle-income developing countries (Demiryol, 2022).

These countries faced project implementation stagnation and severe deterioration in the

financial viability of flagship projects, while still having to maintain debt payment

obligations to China. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict disrupted strategic supply

chains, leading to food security instability and volatility in food and energy prices, with

Africa being the most affected region due to serious dependence on food supplies from

Russia and Ukraine (Hassen & Bilali, 2024). This adds to the financial burden on BRI

participating countries in regions already repaying BRI loans to China.

Simultaneously, cases of systemic corruption and bribery during negotiations of bilateral

loan agreements with China have undermined the political-social stability of many

recipient countries, as evidenced through the multi-layered crisis in Sri Lanka

(Attanayake, 2023). Additionally, many BRI-funded infrastructures have begun revealing

technical deficiencies and serious premature deterioration, with the $2.7 billion USD Coca

Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project in Ecuador being a prime example (Business & Human

Rights Resource Centre, 2023). Thousands of structural cracks have appeared in the

plant built by Chinese companies. Considering this project’s strategic importance to

Ecuador’s national energy security, investing in remedying these technical deficiencies

risks pushing this South American nation into an even more serious public debt crisis.

These factors continuously challenge the sustainability and strategic resilience of the BRI.

Increasing questions about the BRI’s geo-strategic effectiveness continue to exist,

exemplified by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s official announcement of withdrawal

from the BRI initiative on December 9, 2023, before the official cooperation agreement

expired in March 2024. Despite numerous hypotheses suggesting the US implemented

diplomatic measures to influence Rome’s decision, Italy’s withdrawal—as the only G7

member participating in the BRI—has created a significant negative impact on the BRI’s

international image and legitimacy. Moreover, BRI projects have been criticized for being

prone to corruption while severely lacking economic sustainability, regulatory

transparency, and good governance. This has led to competing initiatives, such as the

EU’s Global Gateway and the US’ Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, aimed at

providing alternatives to the BRI. Additionally, direct geo-strategic competition models

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

290

between the BRI and counterbalancing initiatives such as the FOIP and the QUAD have

posed multidimensional challenges to the BRI’s development trajectory, as

counterbalancing powers increase strategic and economic pressure on BRI participating

countries, forcing them to reconsider or withdraw from strategic projects within the BRI

framework.

In general, the BRI’s $1 trillion USD cross-national infrastructure investment program

faces an alarming increase in non-recoverable debts: “As of 2023, just within the past

three years, $78 billion USD of the total value of loans under this initiative has become

non-performing or required restructuring through debt relief mechanisms” (Vietnam

Institute of International Finance 2023). This figure is four times higher than the total

value of debts China was forced to negotiate restructuring or cancellation during the

2017-2019 period ($17 billion USD) (Vietnam Institute of International Finance 2023).

According to analysis by economists Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph

Trebesch cited by the Wall Street Journal, BRI participating countries experiencing

financial instability currently hold nearly 60% of the total value of China’s foreign loans,

a significant increase compared to just 5% in 2010—the pre-BRI period (Whitehouse,

2022). Consequently, the escalation of non-repayable debts has made China the largest

bilateral creditor globally, creating a financial-budgetary burden not only for China but

also for emerging financial institutions within the BRI framework such as the SRF, NDB,

and AIIB—multilateral financial mechanisms led by China or with significant Chinese

investment.

Conclusion

A comprehensive analysis reveals that the BRI plays a vital role in China’s foreign security

strategic architecture over the past decade. Through the BRI, China has implemented

core strategic objectives such as: creating the image of a responsible and peace-oriented

power, promoting multilateral economic integration, ensuring maritime security along

strategic sea routes, and shaping the geo-strategic context in accordance with China’s

national interests. After a decade of implementation, the BRI has achieved many

noteworthy accomplishments. Beijing has focused on expanding its geopolitical sphere of

influence and enhancing propaganda surrounding the BRI through a multi-layered “policy

connectivity” strategy, strengthening cultural and people-to-people exchanges,

establishing competitive alternative financial mechanisms, accelerating cross-border

infrastructure investment, and promoting trade-financial cooperation with participating

countries. These strategic achievements have contributed significantly to elevating

China’s position and international influence within the global governance system.

However, the BRI also faces substantial structural challenges. Increasingly intense geo-

strategic competition from major powers, particularly the US and its allies; growing

concerns from partner countries about the risks of “debt traps” and strategic

dependency; difficulties in the operations of Chinese economic entities in cross-national

investment environments; and the potential for the BRI to lose momentum due to

geopolitical shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict—all

are creating significant pressure on this strategic initiative. Overcoming these structural

challenges will be the determining factor for China to successfully realize its foreign

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

291

security strategic objectives through the BRI and consolidate its position as a power with

global influence.

In the context of increasingly complex and multidimensional geopolitical competition

among major powers, the BRI plays a pivotal role in China’s strategy to expand its

regional and global spheres of influence. However, the strategic effectiveness of the BRI

will depend on China’s capacity to provide comprehensive and sustainable solutions to

the challenges mentioned, while maintaining strategic credibility and support from

participating countries. If successful, the BRI will not only help China realize its foreign

security strategic objectives but also has the potential to become one of the important

strategic foundations for China to establish its position as a global superpower in the 21st

century, challenging the Western-led international order and creating a multipolar world

order with China’s central role.

References

Ahrari, E.M. (2011). Conclusion: The Future Maneuvers of the Great Powers. In: The

Great Powers versus the Hegemon. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230348431_7

Aidata (2021). Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of

13,427 Chinese development projects. https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-

on-the-belt-and-road, accessed on April 25, 2024.

AIIB (2023). AIIB Grows to 110 Members Globally. Available at:

https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2023/AIIB-Grows-to-109-Members-

Globally.html (accessed on January 22, 2024).

Al Jazeera (2019). Italy joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/3/23/italy-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-

initiative, accessed on November 21, 2024.

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2023). Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in

the South China Sea. https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/, accessed on

December 23, 2024.

Atkins, E., & Fravel, M.T., & Wang, R., & Ackert, N., & Huang, S. (2023) Two Paths: Why

States Join or Avoid China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Global Studies Quarterly, 3(3).

https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksad049

Attanayake, C. (2023). Unveiling Sri Lanka’s agency: empowering infrastructural

transformation in China-Sri Lanka relations. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies,

1-28. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2280479

Beeson, M., & Crawford, C. (2023). Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony

and Geoeconomics. Chinese Political Science Review, 8, 45-62.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-022-00210-y

Bharti, M. S. (2023). China’s Belt and Road Initiatives in South Asia and Its Policy

Challenges to India in the Region. South Asian Survey, 30(2), 154-174.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09715231231218827

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

292

Bharti, M.S., & Kumari, S. (2024) China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and

its implications for ASEAN-China strategic partnership. Asian Review of Political

Economy 3(22). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44216-024-00042-4

Brobbey, T.A. (2018). The Belt and Road Initiative: Debt Trap and its Implication on

International Security. Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 1(2), 73-81.

https://asianjournals.org/online/index.php/ajms/article/view/30

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2023). WSJ report exposes serious

construction defects and potential corruption in multiple mega infrastructure projects

funded and built by China. https://www.business-humanrights.org/fr/latest-news/wsj-

report-exposes-serious-construction-defeats-and-potential-corruption-in-multiple-

mega-infrastructure-projects-funded-and-built-by-china/, accessed on April 22, 2024.

Cabestan, J.P. (2021). China’s foreign and security policy institutions and decision-

making under Xi Jinping. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 23(2),

319-336. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974881

Carmody, P., & Wainwright, J. (2022). Contradiction and restructuring in the Belt and

Road Initiative: reflections on China’s pause in the ‘Go world’. Third World

Quarterly, 43(12), 2830-2851. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2110058

Chavez, L. (2024). PH’s $211-M Kaliwa Dam may submerge half of homes in Sierra

Madre’s village. https://pcij.org/2024/12/28/kaliwa-dam-philippines-may-submerge-

half-homes-sierra-madre-village/, accessed on April 22, 2024.

Chaziza, M. (2023). The Non-interference Principle and the BRI Grand Strategy in the

GCC. China Report, 59(1), 40-57. https://doi.org/10.1177/00094455231155344

China’s State Council Information Office (2023). The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar

of the Global Community of Shared Future.

http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/zfbps_2279/202310/t20231010_773734.html, accessed

on June 4, 2024.

Chinese Communist Party (2018). Complete collection of documents of the 19th Congress

of the Communist Party of China (translation). Hanoi: Truth National Political Publishing

House.

Chinese Communist Party (2022). Full text of the report at the 20th Congress of the

Chinese Communist Party. Available at: http://hochiminhcity.china-

consulate.gov.cn/xwdt/202210/t20221026_10792286.html, accessed January 15, 2024.

Demiryol, T. (2022). Between Geopolitics and Development: The Belt and Road Initiative

and the Limits of Capital Accumulation in China. China Report, 58(4), 410-430.

https://doi.org/10.1177/00094455221080313

Downs, E., Losz, A., & Mitrova, T. (2024). The Future of the Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline.

https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/the-future-of-the-power-of-

siberia-2-pipeline/, accessed on February 11, 2025.

Epstein, A. K. (2024). ASEAN still torn over security challenges.

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/asean-issues/, accessed on October 28, 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

293

Felsen, S. (2024). Shortcomings of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

https://revolve.media/features/shortcomings-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative,

accessed on April 22, 2024.

Garcia, Z., & Guerreiro, P. (2024). What American Policymakers Misunderstand about

the Belt and Road Initiative.

https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789926/what-

american-policymakers-misunderstand-about-the-belt-and-road-initiative/, accessed on

October 23, 2024.

Gill, D.M. (2019). The Geopolitics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC) and its

Security Implications for India. The Korean Journal of International Studies, 17(3), 337-

354. https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2019.12.17.3.337

Ginsburg, T. (2021). The BRI, Non-Interference, And Democracy. Harvard International

Law Journal, 62, 40-66. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/wp-

content/uploads/sites/84/BRI-Non-interference-and-Democracy-Ginsburg.pdf

Global PEO Services, “Top 15 Countries by GDP in 2024”,

https://globalpeoservices.com/top-15-countries-by-gdp-in-2024/, accessed on January

11, 2025.

Hassen, T.B., & Bilali, E.H. (2024). Conflict in Ukraine and the unsettling ripples:

implications on food systems and development in North Africa. Agriculture & Food

Security, 3(16). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40066-024-00467-3

Hiep, T.X., & Kiet, L.H. (2024). India’s competitive strategy with China in Southeast Asia:

An analysis of the case of Vietnam. Journal of Chinese Studies, 2(270), pp. 68-80.

Himmer, M., & Rod, Z. (2022). Chinese debt trap diplomacy: reality or myth?. Journal of

the Indian Ocean Region, 18(3), 250-272.

https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2023.2195280

Horn, S., Reinhart, C.M., & Trebesch, C. (2021). China's overseas lending. Journal of

International Economics, 133, 103539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103539

Huang, M. C. Y. (2018). A New Game Started? China’s ‘Overseas Strategic Pivots’ in the

Indian Ocean Region. China Report, 54(3), 267-284.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0009445518779164

Hung, V. M., Kiet, L. H., Binh, N. T., Canh, L. T., & Hiep, T. X. (2024). The India-Vietnam-

China geopolitical triangle and Vietnam’s measures to navigate this relationship from a

two-level game theory perspective. Multidisciplinary Reviews, 8(3), 2025079.

https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2025079

Institute for Security and Development Policy (2022). Sri Lankan Crisis between Debt-

trap and Strategic-trap: The Chinese Stake. https://www.isdp.eu/sri-lankan-crisis-

between-debt-trap-and-strategic-trap-the-chinese-stake/, accessed on January 1, 2024.

Institute for Strategy and Policy Research in Industry and Trade (2023). Belt and Road:

a decade in review. https://vioit.org.vn/vn/chien-luoc-chinh-sach/vanh-dai-va-con-

duong---mot-thap-ky-nhi-n-lai-5705.4050.html, accessed on October 23, 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

294

Jinping, X. (2019). On the governance of China (translation). Hanoi: Truth National

Political Publishing House.

Jone, L., & Hameri, S. (2022). Debunking the Myth of "debt-trap Diplomacy": How

Recipient Countries Shape China's Belt and Road Initiative. London: Royal Institute of

International Affairs

Kiet, L.H., & Hiep, T.X., & Minh, N.A., & Phuc, N.H. (2024). The Soft Power Impact of

China in Strategic Competition With the US in Vietnam. In M. Zreik (Ed.), Soft Power and

Diplomatic Strategies in Asia and the Middle East, pp. 314-331. IGI Global.

https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-2444-8.ch018

Kim, S.Y. (2020). Gaining Ground, Gaining Influence? Available at:

https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/PEIO13_paper_100_1.pdf,

accessed on January 25, 2024).

Li, J., Van Assche, A., Fu, X., Li, L., & Qian, G. (2022). The Belt and Road Initiative and

international business policy: A kaleidoscopic perspective. Journal of International

Business Policy, 5(2), 135-151. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-022-00136-x

Liu, K. (2023). The Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy Narrative: An Empirical

Analysis. Statistics-Politics and Policy, 14(1), 19-44. https://doi.org/10.1515/spp-2022-

0017

Liu, T., & Zhou, N., & Wu, Q., & Wang, D., & Hu, X. (2022). Toward a sustainable energy

system in China: Status and influencing factors. Energy Exploration & Exploitation, 40(2),

580-598. doi:10.1177/01445987211054224

Long, T. H., & Yen, T. T. H. (2021). Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Vietnamese

Perspective. India Quarterly, 77(2), 159-171.

https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284211005037

Michaels, E., & Sus, M. (2025). Strategic Autonomy in Security and Defence as an

Impracticability? How the European Union’s Rhetoric Meets Reality. In: Costa, O., Soleri

Lecha, E., Vlaskamp, M.C. (eds) EU Foreign Policy in a Fragmenting International Order.

The European Union in International Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64060-5_3

Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic China (2023). Chair’s Statement of the

Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation.

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367501.html, accessed on

November 21, 2024.

Mokry, S. (2024). China’s foreign policy rhetoric between orchestration and

cacophony. The Pacific Review, 37(2), 360-387.

https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2175895

Moramudali, U., & Panduwawala, T. (2024). The political economy of Hambantota port:

unveiling the realities of debt trap diplomacy and BRI vision. Asian Journal of Political

Science, 32(3), 380–399. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2024.2424758

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 265-296

Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And

Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation

Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep

295

Moritsugu, K. (2024). China’s population falls for a 2nd straight year as births drop even

after end of one-child policy. https://apnews.com/article/china-population-births-

deaths-covid-b0ec148b3f8db6b2863aeca02078bd7a, accessed on January 11, 2025.

Nakhle, C. (2023). A rising China is reshaping global energy markets.

https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-energy-markets/, accessed on March 3,

2024.

Nedopil, C. (2023). China Belt and Road Initiative Investment Report 2022. Available at:

https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Nedopil-2023_China-Belt-and-Road-

Initiative-BRI-Investment-Report-2022.pdf, accessed on June 22, 2024.

Oakes, T. (2021). The Belt and Road as method: Geopolitics, technopolitics and power

through an infrastructure lens. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 62(3), 281-285.

https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12319

Paszak, P. (2021). The Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Sino-American

Competition in the Indo-Pacific. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 8(2),

174-194. https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970211017494

Peng, N., & Cheng, M.Y. (2024). The Reality and Myth of BRI’s Debt Trap Evidences from

Asia and Africa. Singapore: Springer Nature.

Schulhof, V., Vuuren, D.V., & Kirchherr, J. (2022). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):

What Will it Look Like in the Future? Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 175,

121306. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021.121306.

Simonov, M. (2025). The Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Global

Infrastructure and Investment: Comparison and current status. Asia and the Global

Economy, 5(1), 100106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aglobe.2025.100106

Sly, L., & Ledur, J. (2023). China has acquired a global network of strategically vital

ports. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-ports-trade-

military-navy/, accessed on October 24, 2024.

Stanhope, G. (2023). Belt and Road 2.0. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-

interpreter/belt-road-20, accessed on April 6, 2024.

Sparling, M. (2020). The BRI and the String of Pearls: A Challenge to the US-Led Global

Order. https://virginiapolitics.org/online/2020/3/23/the-bri-and-the-string-of-pearls-a-

challenge-to-the-us-led-global-order, accessed on April 12, 2024.

Sullivan, J., & Wang, W. (2023). China’s “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”: The Interaction of

Formal Diplomacy and Cyber-Nationalism. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 52(1), 68-

88. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681026221079841

Thompson, D. (2020) The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s New Era: Implications for the

US and Taiwan. Issues & Studies, 56(1). https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251120400044

Thuan, N.Q. (2021). China’s global strategy in the new context. Hanoi: Truth National

Political Publishing House.

Vietnam Institute of International Finance (2023). Belt and Road Initiative: Towards

balancing interests and enhancing the capacity of countries.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
VOL. 16, Nº. 1 
May-October 2025, pp. 265-296   
Navigating China’s Global Foreign Security Strategy: Assessing The Achievements And 
Challenges Of The Belt And Road Initiative After A Decade Of Implementation   
                                                               Vu Thi Phuong Le, Le Hoang Kiet, Tran Xuan Hiep 
 
 
 
296 
https://mof.gov.vn/webcenter/portal/vclvcstc/pages_r/l/chi-tiet-
tin?dDocName=MOFUCM156991, accessed on August 20, 2024. 
Wang, X., & Zhou, M., & Xia, Y., & Zhang, J., & Sun J., & Zhang, B. (2024). Evolution of 
China’s  Coastal Economy since  the Belt  and  Road Initiative  Based  on Nighttime Light 
Imagery. Sustainability, 16(3), 1255. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16031255 
Weng, L., Xue, L., Sayer, J., Riggs, R. A., Langston, J. D., & Boedhihartono, A. K. (2021). 
Challenges faced by Chinese firms implementing the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Evidence 
from  three  railway  projects.  Research  in  Globalization,  3,  100074. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resglo.2021.100074  
Whitehouse,  D.  (2022).  Asia:  Sri  Lanka  default  puts  China’s  Belt  and  Road  Initiative 
under  scrutiny.  https://funds-europe.com/asia-sri-lanka-default-china-belt-road-
initiative-scrutiny/, accessed on April 28, 2024. 
Woo, E. (2023). Narrating the Belt and Road Education Policy: A Critical Policy Discourse 
Analysis.  Higher  Education  Policy,  36,  677–699.  https://doi.org/10.1057/s41307-022-
00279-9  
World Bank (2023). Cambodia Economic Update - Post-COVID-19 Economic Recovery : 
Special  Focus  -  From  Spending  More  to  Spending  Better:  Toward  Improved  Human 
Development  Outcomes  (English). 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099051523221517821/P17734003f2bcf02
b0a89500f61b1f3ff7b, accessed on October 28, 2024. 
World  Wildlife  Fund  (2017).  WWF  and  Greening  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative. 
https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative, accessed on April 16, 2024. 
Xiao, X. (2016). China’s National Security: Strategic Challenges and Choices. China An 
International Journal, 14(1), 171-181. DOI:10.1353/chn.2016.0004 
Xiaojun,  K.Z.  (2023).  A  decade  of  the  Belt  and  Road  Initiative  (BRI)  and  its  impact. 
https://www.riskintelligence.eu/analyst-briefings/a-decade-of-the-belt-and-road-
initiative-bri-and-its-impact, accessed on January 1, 2024. 
Yan, X. (2014). From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement.  The  Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, 7(2), 153–184. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027 
Yang, J. (2017). China’s Foreign Policy Under President Xi Jinping. Monde chinois, 49(1), 
54-59. https://www.cairn.info/revue-monde-chinois-2017-1-page-54.htm 
Yu, H. (2024). China’s Push for the BRI in a Changing World: Origins and Motivations. 
In:  Understanding  China’s  Belt  and  Road  Initiative.  Asia  in  Transition,  26.  Springer, 
Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9633-9_1  
Zhao, M. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and China-US strategic competition. China 
International  Strategy  Review, 3(2),  248-260.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-
00087-7  
 