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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025

CONFRONTING TRUMP’S POLICY TOWARDS IRAN WITH OBAMA’S:

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND STRATEGIC CHANGE

VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES

vrf@edu.ulusiada.pt

Assistant Professor, Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa (Portugal).

Integrated Researcher, CEJEIA, Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa.

Adjunct Professor, Sciences Po Aix..

Abstract

The article argues that President Trump’s policy change towards Iran—and the Middle East

more broadly—during his first term was motivated by a shift in external structural conditions

caused by his predecessor’s policy. More specifically, President Obama’s signature of the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—commonly known as the ‘Iran nuclear agreement’—

amid his Middle East policy led to a change in the external environment that was perceived

by President Trump as an external threat from a domestic point of view. The change in the

external environment led to a change in foreign policy with domestic-level factors intervening

between the external driver and the strategic response. From an international relations theory

perspective, the idea that great powers can induce shifts in the regional distribution of power

that create threats at a systemic level and that individual states adjust their foreign policy

behaviours to systemic outcomes is consistent with the neoclassical realist framework. The

article also confronts Trump’s Middle East policy with Obama’s arguing that, apart from

different styles, both presidents essentially adopted different tactics to pursue U.S. interests.

Keywords

U.S. Foreign Policy, Neoclassical Realism, Trump, Obama, Iran.

Resumo

O artigo argumenta que a decisão do Presidente Trump de alterar a política em relação ao

Irão, e ao Médio Oriente em geral, durante o seu primeiro mandato foi motivada por uma

alteração nas condições estruturais externas causada pela política seguida pelo seu

antecessor. Mais especificamente, a assinatura do Plano de Ação Conjunto Global (PACG) pelo

Presidente Obama — vulgarmente conhecido como o ‘Acordo nuclear iraniano’ — no âmbito

da sua política para o Médio Oriente provocou uma alteração no ambiente externo que foi

percecionada pelo Presidente Trump como uma ameaça externa do ponto de vista doméstico.

A alteração no ambiente externo levou a uma alteração de política externa em que fatores

domésticos interferiram entre o estímulo externo e a resposta estratégica. De um ponto de

vista da teoria das relações internacionais, a ideia de que as grandes potências podem

provocar mudanças regionais na distribuição de poder, criando ameaças ao nível sistémico, e

que os Estados ajustam a sua política externa face a ocorrências sistémicas é consistente com

o modelo realista neoclássico. O artigo compara também a política do Presidente Trump para

o Médio Oriente com a do Presidente Obama argumentando que, para além de estilos

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 20-37

Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

diferentes, ambos os presidentes adotaram essencialmente táticas diferentes na persecução

dos interesses norte-americanos.

Palavras-chave

Política Externa Norte-americana, Realismo Neoclássico, Trump, Obama, Irão.

How to cite this article

Fernandes, Vítor Ramon (2025). Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL.

16, Nº. 1. May-October 2025, pp. 20-37. DOI https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.16.1.2.

Article submitted on 22th July 2024 and accepted for publication on 24th September

2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 20-37

Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

CONFRONTING TRUMP’S POLICY TOWARDS IRAN WITH

OBAMA’S: NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND STRATEGIC CHANGE

VÍTOR RAMON FERNANDES

Introduction

Differently from previous periods relations between the U.S. and Iran have never been

good since the hostage crisis in the U.S. Embassy in Teheran at the time of the Islamic

Revolution in Iran back in 1979. Nevertheless, during the Obama presidency an

agreement was signed in an attempt to soften tensions between the two countries and

to counter Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. This agreement—known as the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (hereafter JCPOA) and also as the ‘Iran nuclear deal’—was

the result of a negotiation process that was signed in Vienna on July 14 2015 between

Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany,

and the European Union (EU). Following that, it was adopted in October 2015 and began

to be implemented by mid-January 2016.

Later, President Trump decided to withdraw

from the JCPOA considering it a very bad deal. In effect, the JCPOA was always a source

of great debate in the U.S. and never really generated consensus.

Against this background the article argues that the policy change by President Trump

relative to Obama was due to a perception of threat increase caused by a change in the

external environment resulting from the signature of the JCPOA under President Obama.

Indeed, great powers can provoke regional shifts in the distribution of power, which

create threats at a systemic level (Lobell, 2009: 49).

In this particular case the argument

is that the signature of the JCPOA is considered to have created a change in the

distribution of power between Iran and its neighbouring countries, notably Israel and

several Arab countries in addition to the U.S.. This created a new threat that was in itself

the main trigger for the change in U.S. policy in which domestic factors also intervened.

The article argues that this situation is consistent with the neoclassical realist framework

of strategic adjustment. Further to that the article analyses comparatively President

Obama and President Trump’s foreign policies towards Iran and the Middle East region

more broadly with respect to their expected objectives and argues that, apart from

I wish to thank Inderjeet Parmar, Professor of International Politics at City, University of London, and two

anonymous referees for helpful written comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

The full text of the document is available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/iran_joint-

comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.

On threats assessment within neoclassical realism, see Lobell (2009: 42-74).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL. 16, Nº. 1

May-October 2025, pp. 20-37

Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

different styles, both presidents essentially adopted different tactics to pursue U.S.

interests.

Overall, the article has four purposes. First, to argue that the policy change by Trump is

consistent with the neoclassical realist framework (hereafter NCR). Second, to challenge

the idea that President Trump’s foreign policy was just based on a will to reverse as much

of President Obama’s policies as possible—as with the “Obamacare”, the TPP, and the

Paris Agreement—to make up for a lack of strategy. Third, to argue that the main aim of

Trump’s foreign policy compared to Obama’s was to isolate Iran with the possible

objective of bringing about a regime change in this country, and to cause a rebalancing

of the Middle East region in favour of the U.S. other long-standing allies and of U.S.

interests. Fourth, that this was a tactical shift towards Iran in particular and the Middle

East more broadly that might belie a strategic shift in U.S. thinking towards the Middle

East. Overall, the argument is that both presidents basically wished to promote U.S.

goals in terms of U.S. grand strategy that may not be that different and that the most

significant difference between the two concerns their tactical approach and style.

The article is organized as follows. Following a short introduction, I survey and set up the

general theoretical framework that underlines the rest of the article. Following that I

outline the general contours of the terms of relations between the United States and Iran

since World War II. Then, I examine the Middle East foreign policy of President Obama

and in particular what that led to in terms of consequences for the U.S. in the region.

After that I assess President Trump’s policy towards the Middle East region and show

how it contrasted with his predecessor. This is followed by a more detailed comparison

between two different foreign policy options with respect to Iran and the Middle East

more broadly by these two very distinct U.S. presidents, Barak Obama and Donald

Trump, more specifically the 44th and the 45th Presidents of the United States of America,

although focusing the attention on the latter within the NCR framework. The article ends

with some final remarks.

The general theoretical framework

The analysis undertaken here is considered to be consistent with the NCR approach to

international politics. NCR seeks to provide a realist theory of foreign policy to explain

strategic choices of states instead of just considering the structural effects of power in

international relations and states’ relations. The fundamental and most important idea is

that domestic-level factors intervene between external drivers and strategic response,

but the framework also seeks to highlight the limits of political choice faced by the foreign

policy executive (hereafter FPE) when reacting to structural constraints.

This presents a change relative to structural realism, which argues that given the

characteristics of the international system and the conditions of anarchy and self-help

“the pressures of competition weight more heavily than ideological preferences or

internal political pressures” (Waltz, 1986: 329). As a theory of international politics that

is concerned with macro-outcomes at the structural level what that means is that in the

long run states that choose to ignore those structural constraints will risk losing out in

balance of power terms.

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

According to Waltz the fundamental idea is to highlight the major characteristics of the

international system independently of the units that exist in the system. This does not

mean, nor imply, that the foreign policy adopted by the units—in this particular case the

states—should be excluded. It only means that it is not an essential element for

establishing a theory of international relations (Waltz, 1996: 56). According to Waltz it is

necessary to distinguish foreign policy from general theory. Nevertheless, those foreign

policy variables are important and may be included in the analysis despite not being

essential for theory building (Waltz, 2008: 89). The main point here is that the behaviour

of states is strongly conditioned by structural factors and by a struggle for security and

survival independently of the nature of the political regime and its societal preferences

(Waltz, 1979).

However, structural realism in itself tells us nothing about how states go about processing

the pressures and the incentives in the short term or about how they choose to act or

react. Differently, NCR is a theory of foreign policy that seeks to fill that gap, that is, to

provide a means of analysing why and how states respond to specific pressures in

particular ways. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of the permissiveness of the

structural environment in determining the impact of domestic level intervening variables

on foreign policy outcomes (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). The basic idea behind

NCR is that the systemic environment provides the starting point but that domestic

intervening variables also play a significant role in determining foreign policy outcomes.

As an essential part of the model the NCR framework has four categories established that

affect the FPE’s response to systemic stimuli. Those are: leader images and beliefs,

strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions (Ripsman, Taliaferro,

& Lobell, 2016: 58-79). This article does not address the four categories of the model in

detail. Instead, it puts its attention on the first of these intervening variables, that is the

leader images and beliefs, which includes the individual decision makers in the FPE. These

individuals include the president and all those involved in the conduct of foreign policy.

The viewpoint that is adopted here is that in this particular case each of these two

presidents was the most important decision-maker and the ultimate responsible for

foreign policy choices within the FPE, albeit not the only one (Ripsman, Taliaferro, &

Lobell, 2016: 123). That is, other actors and policymakers’ viewpoints matter on what

concerns the formulation of foreign policy as is traditionally considered in the foreign

policy analysis literature (Alden & Aran 2017; Beasley et al, 2013; Hill, 2003; Mintz &

Derouen Jr, 2010; Neack, 2019; Ripsman, Taliaferro & Lobell, 2016; Smith, Hadfield, &

Dunne, 2016). As a result, in order to explain the policy change within the Trump

administration the policy stance of some of the most relevant members of that

administration is also taken into consideration with regards to the policy decisions bearing

in mind the perception of threat (Breuning, 2007).

The state of relations between the U.S. and Iran since World War II

After the end of World War II Iran was a close ally of the United States. The United States

always seemed willing to provide support inclusive military to Iran in its pursuit of

regional dominance. The reason for that was that for quite some time despite its wealth

it was not obvious that Saudi Arabia would be able to compete for regional dominance.

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

This was the case since the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 23

1932 but also even after the emergence of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)

in the early 1930s and the importance of oil for the U.S.. In essence, this idea resulted

from the size of the population of Iran and its military capabilities (Halliday, 1979: 248-

9). Nevertheless, in this competition and taking advantage of the importance of oil Riyadh

was also able to foster relations with Washington, which resulted in important military

ties (Al-Rasheed, 2002: 118-9). Indeed, at some stage the United States was able to

establish and maintain close ties both with Saudi Arabia and Iran. In addition to the oil

interests one of the U.S. Middle East policy concerns until the end of the Cold War “…was

to keep the Arab states away from Soviet influence.” (Ross & Makovsly, 2009: 38).

Relations with Iran suffered a blow when the United States and the United Kingdom put

together a coup in August 1953 through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the

British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), respectively. Both organized a coup to

overthrow Mohammed Mosaddeq—the prime minister of Iran at the time—who had been

democratically elected and was greatly appreciated by the people in general. The coup—

known under the code name of Operation Ajax—was a response to Mosaddeq’s decision

to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Britain had been unhappy with

Mosaddeq for quite some time and had attempted to bring down his government on

several occasions (Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004: 6). Given that the British had already

withdrawn from the country and seen their influence significantly reduced it was not

possible for them to change the political situation and replace Mosaddeq without external

assistance. In light of this they decided to request the support of the United States basing

their arguments on concerns related to the Cold War and arguing that there was a risk

of an expansion by the ex-Soviet Union in the region in general and Iran in particular.

After several attempts they were able to convince President Eisenhower and the United

States agreed to participate in the coup (Dueck, 2010: 103). Significantly, the Shah

accepted the coup taking place and was happy to get rid of Mosaddeq although he was

also very apprehensive if it were to fail (Rahnema, 2015: 14).

In the aftermath of the coup and with the support of the West Mohammad Reza Shah

Pahlavi turned the country into a fierce dictatorship. But all this was not without other

consequences. Until 1953 Britain was considered by Iranians in general as a colonial and

imperialist country while the United States was seen as anti-imperialist and a friend of

Iran. However, after the 1953 coup the United States generated an anti-American

sentiment among the general population and was considered a traitor. This occurred

despite the friendly relations with the Shah and the support to its regime. That sentiment

has never disappeared since.

Following the events of 1979 in Iran as the Islamic Revolution took place the situation

changed again, but this time much more dramatically. This time around it altered both

the terms of the relation between Washington and Tehran as well as the rivalry and

regional security conditions in the region. In effect, that event was the major turning

point in the relations between the United States and Iran that has since been considered

from a U.S. viewpoint a major security risk by U.S. governments and by Americans at

large. Iran became a security threat to the United States and since 1979 most U.S.

presidents have in some form voiced concerns over Iran. Interestingly, despite that in

regional terms and in spite of being suspicious of each other and of their rivalry both

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

Saudi Arabia and Iran have managed to coexist (Halliday, 2000:119). In fact, a deal

between Iran and Saudi Arabia was brokered by Beijing around mid-2023 with the

objective of rapprochement or at least of defining long-lasting peaceful terms of

engagement (Jash, 2023; Cafiero, 2024).

Obama’s foreign policy towards the Middle east

Oddly enough analysing President Obama’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and

Iran in particular helps understand President Trump’s foreign policy in the region.

Obama’s main priorities were more targeted towards domestic issues such as

transforming the United States into a more liberal and equitable society. As a result, the

focus concerning foreign policy evolved around changing the American policy stance in

the world to a more friendly and appeased image notably towards foreigners and Muslims

in particular.

This was also specially contrasting with the George W. Bush era (Kindsay,

2011). With respect to foreign policy the discourse seemed to be based on a need to

convey the image of a conciliatory president committed to diplomacy and multilateralism

directed at improving the United States’ image in the world and in particular with respect

to the Middle East. That included Iran as well (Indyk, Lieberthal, & O’Hanlon, 2012: 1;

Nasr, 2013: 2).

This was particularly noticeable during Obama’s first term, but it can also be traced

throughout his entire presidency. Obama’s attitude, which reflected his belief was that

by adopting a posture of retrenchment and disengagement from the international

geopolitical arena and by accepting other countries’ interests in a more generous manner

without harming U.S. national interests and security concerns that would lead to

reciprocal behaviour (Dueck, 2015: 36-37). However, and most significantly there also

seemed to be a sheer disbelief in the capabilities of American power in the world—

especially military power—and most notably compared to other Democrat predecessor’s

such as President Bill Clinton and in terms of the ability of the United States to maintain

its unrivalled position of dominant power in the world (Mann, 2012: 72). This was also a

major change in attitude compared to President George W. Bush’s exaggerations.

Nevertheless, as always occurs policy evolves, and presidents learn as they move along

their mandates. By 2011 Daniel Drezner argued that there was a policy attitude

adjustment in Obama’s foreign policy and grand strategy that was composed of two

elements and that was less accommodating: ‘multilateral retrenchment’ and

‘counterpunching’ (Drezner, 2011). The expression ‘multilateral retrenchment’ referred

to the reduction of U.S. commitments abroad and the attempt to shift part of the burden

to allies around the world while ‘counterpunching’ referred to Obama’s willingness to

assert American influence in the world at times when the United States was being

challenged.

Overall, the main idea that seemed to prevail was a will to disengage from the region

and to accommodate occurring events taking place at the time as much as possible or at

least to engage as little as possible. This became apparent during the so-called ‘Arab

Remarks by President Obama to the Muslim world, delivered on June 4 2009, at Cairo University. White House.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning.

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

Spring’, which began in Tunisia in 2010. At the time President Obama pretty much

sympathized with demonstrators in many of the Arab countries where protests and street

manifestations were taking place and accepted what seemed to be their claims for

democracy and human rights. One of the most striking signals of this posture was how

quick he was in pressuring a long-standing U.S. ally, President Hosni Mubarak from

Egypt, to step down from office in February 2011 and seemed to fully accept the rise of

the Muslim Brotherhood to power in that country, which reached its highest point with

the election of President Mohamed Morsi. This was somewhat surprising for many given

the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood had always had, and still has, an anti-western

discourse. He also called for an open dialogue with countries such as Iran (Trager, 2011).

On what concerned Iraq as was the case with Afghanistan the central preoccupation was

to end those two wars as soon as possible. In much of 2011 the focus of Obama’s

presidency remained very much to withdraw from Iraq as was also promised forcefully

on September 6 2012 during his re-election campaign. However, in the end Obama’s

strategy towards Iraq swung between U.S. engagement and retrenchment albeit with

engagement decreasing in 2011-12. Although President Obama had already declared a

formal end to U.S. combat operations in Iraq in August 2010 there were still U.S. forces

present in that country for security and stabilization purposes. These were part of a three-

year security agreement that had originally been negotiated by President George W. Bush

and Iraq’s Shi’a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in 2008 just before the end of his

presidency (Indyk, Lieberthal & O’Hanlon, 2012: 76). In 2011 it was also time to

renegotiate the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement—a new Status of Forced Agreement

(SOFA)—that would lead to maintaining some U.S. forces in the country and under certain

specific circumstances (Mason, 2012). However, that became a problem as Obama was

also preparing to run for re-election and that obviously came into collusion with his

election promises. Ultimately, only about 10,000 U.S. military were left in Iraq, a number

that was considered insufficient for the task at hand and a considerable risk for the

security of Iraq and to U.S. security interests (Nasr, 2013: 148-150).

The military intervention in Libya in 2011, albeit not just involving the United States, also

failed to take into consideration that those types of operations—particularly with a view

to regime change—cannot be undertaken lightly and with the least involvement possible

in the hope that locals are able to stabilize the situation in a peaceful and straightforward

manner following military intervention (Hehir & Murray, 2013). In fact, after defending

intervention in Libya in 2011 the state of confusion and chaos that ensued afterwards

was responsible for many of Obama’s hesitations concerning Syria, most notably with

regards to military action as he later admitted. Overall, the specific case of Syria is also

illustrative of Obama’s friendly and optimistic approach to foreign policy but also of his

sudden policy shifts. At the beginning of his presidency there was the hope of establishing

a working relation with President Bashar al-Assad believing that he could be helpful in

brokering peace negotiations with Israel, particularly related to the Palestinian problem.

However, this did not prove to be very fruitful or propitious (Indyk, Lieberthal & O’Hanlon,

2012: 167-168). Later, the situation swung to an idea of regime change and the need

for Assad to step down (Dueck, 2015: 85). Following that in August 2011 Obama

announced the famous “red line” that would lead to military intervention if chemical

weapons were to be used by the Assad regime against civilians. But that was as far as

he went on that matter. The failure to act based on what seemed to be the evidence at

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

the time was considered by many to have caused severe damage to U.S. credibility in

the region and possibly well beyond. In the meantime, Iran—Syria’s long-standing ally

at the time—continued to maintain if not even increase its presence in the country.

Assessing Trump’s Middle East foreign policy

The speech by President Trump at the 73rd United Nations General Assembly on

September 25 2018 and at the 8362nd Security Council meeting the following day—as

he chaired the Security Council meeting given that the presidency of the Council was

being held by the United States of America—placed particular emphasis on Iran. To a

large extent it also set the tone of his approach. According to President Trump Iran had

been and continued to be a promotor of international terrorism, to engage in illicit actions

promoting violence, and in developing its ballistic missile program. There were several

other items on President Trump’s speeches that were mentioned but Iran clearly took

centre stage and was one of the top priorities. In his own words at the United Nations

Security Council Briefing on Counterproliferation: “The regime is the world’s leading

sponsor of terror and fuels conflict across the region (referring to the Middle East) and

far beyond. A regime with such a track record must never be allowed to possess a nuclear

weapon”.

He also stated that these were the reasons why the U.S. decided to withdraw

earlier in the year from the JCPOA. Following that the United States decided to impose

sanctions on Iran, which went into full effect by early November. Further to that

additional sanctions were announced that should be even stronger and more dramatic to

prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities and to change its behaviour. This line of

reasoning came on top of a series of comments and actions directed against Iran since

President Trump took office on January 20 2017 that basically condemned the Iranian

regime. Overall, this was in sharp contrast to what was a more conciliatory approach

adopted by President Obama.

Indeed, Iran was the main focus of Trump’s policy towards the Middle East with the

country considered responsible for most of the existing problems in the region and for

funding terrorist activities (Nasr, 2018: 108). In this regard by focusing on Iran as a

threat President Trump was by no means an exception amongst U.S. Presidents, quite

the opposite as noted above. In addition, besides the fact that President Trump’s opinions

on Iran were well-known several other members if not most of his administration also

tended to hold a very hard-line on Iran. Vice-President Mike Pence, U.S. Secretary of

State Mike Pompeo, and National Security Advisor John Bolton, among many others were

all in favour of a hard line on Iran. Somewhat differently Secretary of Defence James

Mattis considered that the U.S. should stay in the JCPOA and often times took a softer

stance on Iran compared to other members of the Trump administration but overall was

also considered to be a hard-liner on Iran. At the same time there was also a will to

strengthen relations with the Arab countries in the region with a view to a future

normalisation of relations with Israel.

For some this policy change—among others above mentioned—was considered as a

means to make up for a lack of strategy (Zenko & Lissner, 2017). While it is true that

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-united-nations-

security-council-briefing-counterproliferation-new-york-ny/.

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Confronting Trump’s Policy Towards Iran with Obama’s:

Neoclassical Realism and Strategic Change

Vítor Ramon Fernandes

Trump reversed many of his predecessor’s decisions this is not uncommon between

presidents of the United States. In fact, nearly most of the presidents during the Cold

War repudiated their predecessor’s strategy and often considered it inadequate to deal

with the challenges at the time (Gaddis, 2005). In that respect much of the difference

between those previous occasions with their specific circumstances and this one, which

is significant, concerned to a large extent the style adopted.

Significantly, Trump’s foreign policy towards the Middle East began to take form shortly

after the beginning of his presidency with his first foreign visit, which was to Saudi Arabia

in April 2017. This visit was symbolic because it showed the Trump’s administration

commitment to strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia—with a total of $350 billion in

deals that were signed in Riyadh—but also in terms of military equipment given that $110

billion were in American-made weapons. The arms component was particularly significant

because it indicated that a military reinforcement of Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities

was a priority to the United States given the perceived threat posed by Iran.

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile noting that Saudi Arabia had been fighting the Houthis in

Yemen and so increasing its military capabilities was also a priority. Notwithstanding, the

overall stability of Saudi Arabia was very important to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. given

the existing economic and financial links between them. In fact, it was no less important

to the U.S. than to Saudi Arabia. Broadly speaking Trump´s foreign policy in the Middle

East was consistent with the notion of “calibrated strategies” attempting to balance the

necessity of growth and strategy with the environment’s reality and the necessary

pragmatism concerning implementation. Within that context, Trump’s Middle East foreign

policy would seem to follow a model of multilateral leadership accompanied by diplomatic

negotiations (Dombrowski & Reich, 2017: 1036).

President Trump also tried to generate enthusiasm within six Gulf Arab states (Bahrain,

Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) plus Egypt and Jordan for the creation of a

security and political alliance to counter Iran´s expansion known as Middle East Strategic

Alliance (MESA). The creation of MESA was somewhat of a further development of the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, this proved to be a difficult task given that the

latter had been in somewhat of a crisis since 2011 notably due to a number of events

related to political, religious, economic, and social divergences between many of its

members. And the situation if anything seemed to have gotten worse particularly due to

tensions related to Qatar. Indeed, “In the summer of 2017, the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC), widely regarded as one of the most stable regional organizations of the Middle

East and North Africa (MENA) region was hit by the gravest crisis since its formation”

(Bianco & Stansfield, 2018: 613).

Despite that President Trump announced in early August 2018 that a meeting about

MESA would take place on October 12-13 although the meeting was postponed due to

the Middle East disputes involving Qatar. Comments issued by Qatar, notably over Israel,

Iran, Hamas, and accusations of links to terrorism were not well received by several Gulf

States, particularly Saudi Arabia, and generated tensions with the Trump administration.

But other difficulties existed due to different security perceptions by many of the Gulf

Arab states. Be that as it may, irrespective of how events unfolded all seemed geared

towards the objective of trying to isolate Iran and reorganize the region through the

development of military partnerships. This was to be carried out through the increase in

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defence capabilities that would prevent threats on the part of Iran and would significantly

diminish its capacity to intervene in the region.

The U.S. support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen began in late March 2015 well before Trump

becoming the 45th President of the United Sates. Then, there were some unofficial

justifications connecting the U.S. participation to obtaining the Gulf monarchies’ leaders

support to the Iran deal. This was a time when the U.S. was working towards signing the

JCPOA and some sort of acceptance on the part of Saudi Arabia was needed to avoid

matters getting off-track. The U.S. support to Saudi Arabia was deemed necessary in

order to reconcile Saudi Arabia with the idea of the signing of the JCPOA given that Iran

was helping rebels in Yemen in an area that was strategically critical for Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, there was some scaling back towards the end of Obama’s mandate.

However, after Trump’s election U.S. support to Saudi Arabia increased again consisting

of arms sales and various types of technical and logistics support. And this happened

with the benefit of a majority vote by the U.S. Senate following a previous attempt to

put an end to that support by some U.S. Senators. Despite that there were some

warnings against Saudi Arabia by the international community when force was employed

against innocent civilians such as the strike at a school bus that killed forty children. All

in all, the main justification for the overall support of Saudi Arabia by the U.S. would

seem to have been to prevent Iran from gaining further influence in the region while

providing assistance and support to a traditional allied state.

On August 16 2018 there was also the announcement of the creation of the Iran Action

Group led by Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook with a view to address what the

current U.S. administration considered to be the security threat that the Iran regime

presented (Pompeo, 2018). The role of the Iran Action Group was essentially to

coordinate actions among various U.S. agencies on matters related to Iran and to

coordinate policy with the nations that shared the U.S. understanding of the threat that

Iran posed. It seems that there was a clear intention to stimulate and coordinate some

type of collective thinking on Iran that militated towards its isolation. This strategy was

not without risks given that it could push Iran even further towards Russia, India, and

China. In fact, that became evident with Iran’s participation as an observer state at the

18th meeting of the Council of Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

(SCO) Summit in Qingdao in June 2018 while the annual G7 Summit was also taking

place in Canada, more specifically in Charlevoix. Since then, in addition to Iran being a

member of the SCO “Today, Russia and China effectively shelter Iran from complete

isolation and provide it with political support, defence assistance, and economic ties that

it cannot receive elsewhere” (Esfandiary & Tabatabai, 2018: 2). Given those risks the

policy adopted provided further support to the idea that the strategy was to weaken Iran

as much as possible, and probably to lead to regime change. Finally, in order to try to

further stabilise and bring peace to the Middle East President Trump facilitated the

Abraham Accords in 2020 with the objective of normalising diplomatic relations between

Israel and several Arab states.

For some at a discourse level Iran has played a significant role within U.S. foreign policy

over time and often times that has even tended to amplify the security concern given

that Iran does not pose a direct danger to the U.S. that matches the level of attention

that it attracts (Villar, 2016). However, within the economic circumstances between the

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U.S. and Saudi Arabia then it is easy to understand the hype about Iran. Nevertheless,

the fact is that under President Biden the situation did not change much with respect to

Iran due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

Obama and Trump’s policy choices towards Iran: a comparison

The objective of signing the JCPOA was to counter Iran’s development of nuclear

infrastructures and capabilities that were considered a threat to international security

(Joyner, 2016). Previously, at the time of the George W. Bush Administration there had

been negotiations, but they were often at a standstill (Guldimann, 2007). At the time the

negotiations were frequently instrumentalised and led to misperceptions and

misunderstandings that could have led to confrontation (Jervis, 2013; Maleki & Tirman,

2014). However, this was neither the only nor the main reason for the failure of the

negotiations then. In fact, well before 2013 Iran attempted to diplomatically solve

disputes on several occasions. One such example occurred in March 2003 with Iran

offering a comprehensive deal—which later became known as the “Great Bargain”—in

order to try to have sanctions removed. However, that proposal was rejected by the U.S.

for reasons not yet fully understood (Leverett & Leverett, 2013: 122-124). Also, in 2005

Iran had again tried to have sanctions removed given their negative effects on its

economy and for that purpose even approached representatives of the European

countries namely France, Germany and the UK, which had joined the U.S. in the

negotiation process. But again, this was rejected and according to some European

officials it was the responsibility of the U.S. (Axworthy, 2013: 384; Parchami, 2014).

Obama’s approach to Iran followed a totally different path from President Bush. Coming

through the war in Iraq and the intervention in Libya he was in a position of weakness.

As a result, he decided to engage with the EU, Russia and China as a way to stabilize the

Middle East and contain Iran’s nuclear programme (Parsi, 2012). It was a way of

partnering to promote U.S. goals and interests. The approach was also welcome by U.S.

partners considering that Obama’s diplomatic approach was more likely to yield positive

results with Iran differently from Bush’s refusal to engage in diplomacy (Parsi, 2017: 10-

11). The agreement also fitted Iran’s foreign policy goals under President Rouhani (Zarif,

2014: 58). Ultimately, the agreement was signed and began to be implemented in

January 2016.

President Obama’s idea was to prevent or at least delay to a significant extent Iran’s

development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the end result became unacceptable to

many countries in the Middle East, most notably Israel and Saudi Arabia having been

weary of the JCPOA from the very beginning and having never accepted the decision to

negotiate with Iran (Rezaei, 2016; Kaye, 2016). Others in the U.S. considered the signing

of the JCPOA as an example of bad policy given that they considered that the U.S. had

made all the concessions at a time when Iran was heavily sanctioned but got all it wanted

(Singh, 2016: 24-25).

Trump adopted a different tactical approach, which was more forceful and based strongly

on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel. He considered the signing of the

JCPOA a threat to the U.S. and the Middle East region as a whole in terms of stability and

regional security. At the same time, he abandoned the previous multilateral approach

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involving the EU, Russia, and China, and also threatened Russia and China with sanctions

given that they were—and still are—strategic rivals of the U.S. (NSS 2017; NDS 2018).

Both countries were considered to be empowered under the whole negotiation process.

Trump worried that the JCPOA would not prevent Iran from acquiring the nuclear bomb,

which ultimately would force war between the U.S. and Iran, but he also worried about

the reaction of Iran’s neighbouring countries, in particular, Israel and Saudi Arabia

(Simon, 2023: 360-2). The latter had showed some interest in acquiring nuclear power

for economic purposes although not for military ones. That situation could change with

the existence of the JCPOA.

Seen in a broader perspective, hostility towards Iran also seems to be what provided the

cement that supported the relations between all the Gulf States and a country like Israel

that was not known to be one of their main allies or partners, particularly given the

Palestinian conflict. It is within that context that it can be understood that the JCPOA was

also considered by the Trump administration to be a terrible deal, in fact, “the worst deal

ever” (Nasr, 2018: 108). This was particularly the case with regards to the ‘Sunset

Clause’. This also explains why President Trump promised to dismantle it and made it his

top priority (Allin & Simon, 2017: 42).

It itself this marked a considerable shift from Obama’s policy in the region that is

considered as a strategic adjustment to a change in structural conditions and that is

consistent with NCR. From an international relations theory perspective, the signing of

the JCPOA caused a change in the external environment, which was considered a threat

that led to a policy response. Within this context it is worthwhile recalling some of the

other main differences between Obama’s foreign policy in the Middle East and Trump’s

that also provide support to this idea: 1) Obama pressured Israel on the Palestinian

conflict favouring a ‘two-state solution’ and causing significant anxiety and nervousness

among some Israelis. Nevertheless, he also generated some disappointment among

Palestinians given that, ultimately, his policy was heavily skewed towards Israel

(Ruebner, 2016). Differently, Trump appointed David Friedman as Ambassador to Israel,

someone who held very conservative positions on Israel and had always been opposed

to the ‘two-state solution’; 2) Obama was considered unfriendly towards Israel whereas

Trump had been extremely friendly and supportive of Israel as corroborated by his

relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; 3) Trump officially recognized

Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved there from Tel

Aviv. The relocation to Jerusalem occurred on May 14 2018 to coincide with the 70th

anniversary of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Obama delayed its

implementation on the basis of national security interests as had been the case with

several other previous U.S. presidents; 4) Obama was open to signing an agreement

with Iran while Trump rejected it and even told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in

Israel that Iran would never be allowed to have nuclear weapons. All these contrasting

policy decisions are above all a tactical shift that may belie a strategic shift in U.S.

thinking.

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Conclusion

This article has several purposes as was outlined at the outset. President Trump’s foreign

policy towards the Middle East was not simply a mere reversal of President Obama’s

policies as a way to make up for a lack of strategy. In fact, his policy reversal was a

response to a perceived threat generated by his predecessor, which is consistent with

neoclassical realism from an international relations theory perspective. Following his

policy decisions Trump had a well-established policy that intended to isolate Iran within

the region in order to preserve America’s interest and establish security in the region.

Obama adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Iran engaging the EU, China and

Russia. His main objective was to withdraw as quicky as possible from the region, sign

the JCPOA and allow for events to unfold, and for the region to somehow stabilize

considering that U.S. interests would be met.

Trump adopted a different tactical approach more forceful and based strongly on Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel. He intended to lead those allied states in

the Middle East in isolating and weakening Iran in order to safeguard U.S. interests and

somewhat control events in the region. Following the choice of a number of very hard-

liners on Iran belonging to his administration Trump was quick to strengthen U.S.

relations with Saudi Arabia and to display full support towards Israel. That included

recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the U.S. Embassy there while

making negative comments and remarks about the Iran’s regime. In addition, a number

of policy actions such as the creation of the Iran Action and the tentative set-up of MESA

all point in the same direction, which is to reinforce an alliance to rebalance against Iran

and reorganize the region. The support of Saudi Arabia in Yemen is just an addition to

the remaining policy actions. Other decisions and actions in relation to other policy areas

also provide support to the idea of an existing foreign policy strategy (Kroenig, 2017).

For some Trump’s foreign policy marked a distinct breakup from the postwar western

internationalist consensus (Stokes, 2018). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union

following the end of the Cold War we witnessed the emergence of a unipolar international

order with the U.S. surging as an unrivalled state in terms of preponderance and

capabilities (Ikenberry, 2003). With the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraq War

in 2003 the U.S. was called by some an empire (Cox, 2004; Rosen, 2003). And on several

occasions, particularly with the Bush doctrine, we saw unilateralism taking over.

However, there are distinct features associated with Trump’s unilateralist policy, a new

twist as it were, compared to other U.S. presidents with unilateralist tendencies. Many

of Trump’s policy decisions such as the withdrawal of the U.S. from the TPP, the rebuttal

of the Paris Agreement and most significantly the decision to refute the JCPOA marked a

unilateralism that seemed concerned with U.S. interests alone independently of any other

impact and consequence on other states, even allies and partners. It has always been

about U.S. interests, but not necessarily with a total disregard for other states’ interests.

It goes well beyond the decision-making process.

But beyond mere consequentialist concerns there was also a cost-benefit approach that

seemed new in U.S. foreign policy and to be a radical departure from the more general

internationalist approach that had informed U.S. foreign policy until Trump’s election.

Differently from others Trump’s foreign policy did not wish to deepen a rules-based order,

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but instead to pursue a self-centred and highly nationalist foreign policy. However,

ultimately it is probably more of a different tactic rather that a different strategy.

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