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Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025
141
CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED INSTABILITY AND CONFLICTS: MALI, BURKINA
FASO AND NIGER
JOSÉ FRANCISCO LYNZE ZAGALO PAVIA
pavia.jose@gmail.com
Associate Professor with Aggregation in International Relations at Universidade Lusíada de Lisboa
(Portugal). Orcid: 0000-0001-9059-8795.
JOÃO CARLOS MARQUES SIMÕES
joaosimoes3939@gmail.com
Centro de Estudos Jurídicos, Económicos, Internacionais e Ambientais da Universidade Lusíada
(Portugal). Orcid: 0000-0002-7859-4668.
Abstract
The nexus between climate change, instability and conflicts finds Africa, and specifically the
Central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), a fertile field for its operationalisation. In this
sub-region where there is already a very high potential for instability and conflict, climate
change will intensify this situation by acting as a threat multiplier. This article tries to explore
this link, explaining that climate change is not a grassroots cause of this instability, but will
act as an exacerbator, causing an increase in the spread and appeal of radicalism, migratory
waves and social and political instability, embodied in coups d'état and a threat to the
traditional French and Western presence, which is being overtaken by new international
players such as Russia – Wagner Group (Africa Corps) or China.
Keywords
Climate change, Instability, Conflicts, Africa, Central Sahel.
Resumo
O nexo entre alterações climáticas, instabilidade e conflitos encontra em África, e
especificamente no Sahel Central (Mali, Burkina Faso e Níger), um campo fértil para a sua
operacionalização. Nesta sub-região, onde já existe um potencial muito elevado de
instabilidade e conflito, as alterações climáticas irão intensificar esta situação, actuando como
um multiplicador de ameaças. Este artigo procura explorar esta relação, explicando que as
alterações climáticas não são uma causa de fundo desta instabilidade, mas actuarão como
um exacerbador, provocando um aumento da propagação e da atração do radicalismo, das
vagas migratórias e da instabilidade social e política, consubstanciada em golpes de Estado e
numa ameaça à presença tradicional francesa e ocidental, que está a ser ultrapassada por
novos actores internacionais como a Rússia – Wagner Group (Africa Corps) ou a China.
Palavras-chave
Alterações climáticas, Instabilidade, Conflitos, África, Sahel Central.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
142
How to cite this article
Paiva, José Francisco Lynze Zagalo & Simões, João Carlos Marques (2025). Climate change induced
instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Janus.net, e-journal of international
relations. VOL15 N2, TD3 - Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security. April 2025, pp. 141-158. DOI
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0225.7.
Article submitted on February 17, 2025 and accepted for publication on March 19, 2025.
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
143
CLIMATE CHANGE INDUCED INSTABILITY AND CONFLICTS: MALI,
BURKINA FASO AND NIGER
JOSÉ FRANCISCO LYNZE ZAGALO PAVIA
JOÃO CARLOS MARQUES SIMÕES
Introduction
The idea that climate change can exacerbate instability and conflict is not necessarily
new. For decades, there has been research on "water wars", river flows, dam
construction, droughts and deforestation caused by climatic phenomena that could be
behind an increase in instability and even intra- and inter-State conflict. More recently,
however, an objective link has been established between the rising adverse effects of
climate change and an increase in regional instability and conflict. The Central Sahel sub-
region, in particular Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, is a paradigmatic example of this
phenomenon. The aim of this article is precisely to explore this link and to try to
determine to what extent it is, or is not, an important factor in the growing conflicts in
these countries and in the regime changes that have recently taken place there, calling
into question old alliances and agreements with the former colonial power, France, and
the European Union itself, and bringing to light the growing influence of extra-African
actors such as Russia, through the Wagner Group (Africa Corps) or the People's Republic
of China.
1 - Conceptualization on climate change, instability and conflicts:
Literature review
Climate change, along with its social and security implications, has given rise to a
multidimensional concern for various actors in the International System (IS), including
states, International Organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
social movements. Consequently, the intersection between climate change and human
communities has led to a significant increase in literature studying the relationships
between climate change, security, conflict, and instability.
Climate change being the “significant variation in temperature, precipitation, and wind
over a period of at least 30 years” (Swain, 2016: p.151), is often rightly seen as a global,
JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations
e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
144
intergenerational, and environmental challenge (Martins-Loução, 2021). The effects of
greenhouse gases have global consequences that extend beyond the emitters of the
gases. The deterioration of atmospheric conditions can have intergenerational impacts,
affecting multiple generations. Human activities, from daily life to economic strength,
depend on polluting sources, contributing to 'mortgaging' the future of generations to
come (Martins-Loução, 2021: p. 19).
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an overview of the main themes and
evidence in this scientific domain.
In 2021, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) addressed several risks
associated with climate change in its fourth assessment report. These risks have the
potential to cause global instability and insecurity (Scheffran & Battaglini, 2011). These
risks include a variety of issues associated with water resources, agriculture, forests,
human security, and the economy. It is important to understand the complex interactions
between environmental stress factors, their social impacts, and the responses adopted
in order to analyze the implications for security.
According to Gilman et al (2007) and the report 'National Security and the Threat of
Climate Change' published in 2007 by the CNA Corporation and the Military Advisory
Board, climate change is considered a catalyst for various challenges that threaten US
security and national interests (CNA, 2007 apud Scheffran & Battaglini, 2011: p.28). The
discussion of the potential multiplier effects that climate change can have on regions that
are already unstable is justified by the development of awareness of the climate-security
nexus, especially among international organizations, governments, and think tanks.
Several contributions have been made to understanding the relationship between
security, climate and conflict, like for instance, among others, the work of Homer-Dixon
(1999, 2007), Swain, (1996, 2004, 2016), Grover (2007), Tertrais (2011), Gleditsch
(2012), Meierding (2013), Baysal and Karakaş (2017), Freeman (2017), and Koubi
(2018, 2019).
The environment was identified as a source of security risk in the late 1980s, as the Cold
War came to an end.
1
The first studies on environmental security were based on a broad
range of threats related to environmental degradation. However, this security agenda
soon shifted its focus to the relationship between environment and conflict (Baysal &
Karakaş, 2017; Meierding, 2013). Against this background, two major research projects
1
Environmental concerns really began to appear on the international agenda in the mid-1960s and early 1970s.
This is not to say that there were no previous concerns, because there were. In fact, the period between the
beginning of the 20th century and the 1960s largely represents the discovery phase and a prehistoric phase
for international environmental law. In addition, the concerns regarding the environment that arose during this
period were more focused on its preservation from the point of view of economic profitability than from the
point of view of protection for the pure and mere protection of the environment (Gomes, 2018; Gomes et al.,
2021; Gomes & Leong, 2023). For this reason, we believe that it was from the mid-1960s and early 1970s that
the environment began to be integrated into international concerns. In reality, there are several factors that
help us understand why this process occurred. Firstly, there are changes at a political, social and economic
level, such as the development of greater awareness of the importance of the environment and its state of
global degradation, the proliferation of environmentally-oriented organizations and social movements, the
dissemination of the scientific work of personalities such as David Attenborough, Jane Goodall, Jacques
Cousteau, David Suziki and Rachel Carson, the impacts of the oil shocks, and the proliferation of international
conventions, summits and reports on the state of the environment (Gomes, 2018; Simões, 2024; Soromenho-
Marques, 2018).
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
145
stand out: Thomas Homer-Dixon's project on population, environment and security,
known as the Toronto Group, and the Swiss Environmental Conflict Project, also known
as ENCOP (Baechler, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Meierding, 2013). Both projects
examined different cases in which the degradation of renewable natural resources could
lead to internal conflicts, adopting a position based on a deprivation and Malthusian logic,
arguing that the poor distribution and decline in the quantity and quality of resources are
crucial factors in increasing the likelihood of internal conflict (Baechler, 1998; Homer-
Dixon, 1999; Meierding, 2013). These models are the first to contribute to the idea that
climate change has a "threat multiplier" effect
2
, as it contributes to accentuating pre-
existing factors in a given region, leading to a scenario of instability (Meierding, 2013;
Muggah, 2021; Swain, 2016)
3
.
The phase of a fast environmental degradation and scarcity of renewable natural
resources was followed by a focus on conflicts over the abundance of non-renewable
natural resources, such as oil and diamonds. The relationship between the extraction of
these resources and the tendency to increase internal conflicts, such as the civil war in
Sierra Leone, was then studied (Meierding, 2013; Ross, 2004). Following this timeline, it
is only in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century that we find a third phase in
which the focus shifts from the environment per se to environmental stress (Baysal &
Karakaş, 2017; Homer-Dixon, 2007; Meierding, 2013).
In short, in the face of growing anxieties, climate change is increasingly being analysed
from a security perspective. It is precisely in this sense that Brown and Crawford (2008)
and Brown and McLeman (2009) argue that we are now beginning to realise that the
speed and scale of climate change - from the way it threatens to affect where we can
live, where we can grow food and where we can find water, to the way it threatens
humanity's current sustainability - could undermine the economic and political stability
of large parts of the world in the coming years, plunging vast regions into intense conflict.
In doing so, climate change could become a threat multiplier, making existing problems
such as water scarcity and food insecurity more complex and intractable.
We believe that environmental stress is a key driver of insecurity and instability
4
. There
are various ways in which this insecurity and instability can manifest itself, including
degenerating into conflict. Examples of these manifestations include: resource scarcity
2
It was also in the 1990s that, to a large extent through the work of Homer-Dixon, the demystification of wars
over natural resources became operational, and a view was adopted based more on the perspective that these
are just another factor in a more complex situation of regional, national or local instability.
3
More recently, we have seen a transition in the discourse towards an orientation more focused on recovering
the narrative of environmental wars. This type of discourse clashes with the one that has prevailed since the
1990s and which is based on the idea of the threat multiplier effect.
4
It should also be noted that the way we view the potential for insecurity, instability and conflict associated
with the use of natural resources is closely linked to the theoretical paradigm we apply. For example,
perspectives based on realist assumptions tend to consider that relations between states are eminently
competitive, so there can hardly be cooperation in the management and use of natural resources. On the other
hand, perspectives based on liberal assumptions assume that not only is cooperation possible, but that states
tend to promote the institutionalization of regimes on the management of the natural resources they share, for
example by creating international river basin organizations, commissions or committees, agreements and
conventions. In all reality, this is rarely a situation in which there is either competition or cooperation, so inter-
state relations regarding the management of international natural resources are also rarely zero-sum
relationships (Simões, 2025). In fact, the most common scenario is one in which conflict, or if you prefer,
competition, coexists with cooperation.
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
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and competition; forced human migration and displacement; state fragility; crises; and
many others. Barnett (2010) identifies six main approaches to environmental security -
ecological security, common security, environmental security, national security, greening
defence and human security - of which we are interested in highlighting the relevance of
the environmental security perspective, the approach that studies environmental
violence in terms of the correlation between climate change and violent conflict.
For example, Barnett (2010) argues that the scarcity of available resources is directly
related to the propensity for violent conflict, especially when it comes to satisfying
individual needs. We therefore understand that resources are strategic assets and that
unequal access to resources can lead to tensions with the potential to degenerate into
violent conflict. Barnett (2010) also points to factors such as complex interdependence
and trade as mitigating factors in disputes over natural resources. For their part, Baysal
and Karakaş (2017) analyse the securitisation of the environment in a tripartite logic: (i)
climate change is (should be) a security issue; (ii) climate change is not (should not be)
a security issue; (iii) climatisation of security. We are particularly interested in analysing
the first perspective. As far as the first perspective is concerned, matters are divided
between those who defend climate change as a statocentric and therefore traditional
security issue and those who argue that climate change should be seen in the light of
human security (Baysal & Karakaş, 2017; Simões, 2024). This is a bifurcation between
those who prioritise the analysis of climate change as a threat multiplier, and those who
prioritise aspects related to human suffering.
In the context of climate change as a traditional security issue, we adopt the perspective
of analysing the securitisation of the environment through the discourse of climate
conflict, following Detraz and Betsill (2009). It should be noted that despite the impact
of climate change in the traditional security domain, with the exacerbation of pre-existing
tensions, climate change does not fail to generate impacts in the human security domain,
so we believe that a symbiotic relationship is forming between traditional security,
environmental security and human security (Baysal and Karakaş, 2017).
2 - Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: Drivers and sources of instability
All three countries are former French colonies and they became independent in 1960.
They are all in the Central Sahel region and they are landlocked countries. The dominant
religion is Sunni Islam. The population is ethnically very diverse. In the case of Mali and
Niger, there is a significant Tuareg population in the North of both countries and a more
Arabised Bantu population in the South. Burkina Faso is made up of a majority ethnic
Hausa population, but with a very significant mosaic of other minority ethnic groups
(Lugan, 2023). There has been much political instability in all three countries, with eleven
successful coups in Burkina Faso and five in Mali and Niger since independence (Lugan,
2023; Frequency of Coup Events From 1945 to 2022, by Country | Cline Center, n.d.).
They are all among the poorest countries in the world. In the following table (Table 1)
we can see some indicators of fragility, poverty and vulnerability:
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Table 1 - Indicators of fragility, poverty and vulnerability to climate change
Countries
Population
(2021)
Area
Km2
GDP
PPP
Per
capita
(2022)
Fragile
States
Index
(2023)
Vulnerability to impact of
climate change
(Notre Dame Global
Adaptation Initiative)
Mali
21,9 million
1240190
Km2
2639
USD
13th out
of 179
States
175th out of 185 States
Burkina
Faso
22,1 million
274220
Km2
2683
USD
21st out
of 179
States
157th out of 185 States
Niger
25,25 million
1267000
Km2
1579
USD
24th out
of 179
States
183rd out of 185 States
Source: Author´s own elaboration (2024)
Hence, Pavia (2021: p. 4), when analysing the specific case of the African continent, has
established a correlation between the situation of fragility and the tendency towards
greater conflict in the various States and the fulfilment of certain conditions, namely: (i)
the lack of overlap between the State and the nation; (ii) a non-democratic regime; and
(iii) the dominant presence of the State in civil society and the economy. A State is much
more likely to be in a situation of fragility, and therefore more prone to greater conflict,
if all three of the above conditions are met. This situation is unfortunately the most
common in Africa, and particularly in the three States mentioned.
Since the very start of the Libyan civil war and the subsequent total destabilisation of
that country, the flow of arms and the return of the Tuareg who trained and fought there
have had a spillover effect throughout the Sahel. These effects have been particularly
significant in Mali, even leading to an attempt at secession in the North of the country in
2012, with the short-lived creation of the State of Azawad. In both Mali and Niger, as
noted above, there is a significant divide between the North and South of the two
countries. There is also a latent conflict between pastoral nomads and more sedentary
farmers. The traditional transhumance of nomadic herders is often hampered by farmers
and by the borders between the three countries. Ethnic and linguistic divisions also
exacerbate the conflict. Existing corruption and glaring inequalities in access to scarce
resources also fuel conflict. The growing distance between the political and military elites,
who are mainly concentrated in their countries' capitals and other urban areas, and the
rest of the population (who live mainly in the informal sector), who feel abandoned by
the formal authorities, is also widening the gap between the two sectors of society
(Martinez, 2023).
This is why these marginalised populations, even those harassed by traditional powers,
often find a way-out from their situation in organisations such as AQMI
(Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and its affiliates or the Islamic State, as an escape
from their situation. These radical organisations end up replacing the formal power of the
State and take on this role in vast regions, as is the case with Hezbollah in Lebanon or
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
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April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
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Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Martinez, 2023). The central structures of the State are seen
as predatory, supported by international missions (French or Western), seen as a
perpetuation of neo-colonial rule, which only want to seize the country's natural
resources. The military coups that have recently taken place in these countries, and the
support they have had from significant parts of the population, are a reflection of this
situation (Rubicon, 2023). The acrimony against Western missions and presence is
embodied in the calls for intervention by Russia and the Wagner Group (Africa Corps),
seen as an alternative to the "exploitation" to which these countries are subjected. Of
course, this perhaps naïve view couldn't be further from reality, given the role that the
Wagner Group (Africa Corps) has played in the exploitation of natural resources in the
African countries where it operates (Rubicon, 2023).
There are, of course, specificities in each of these three countries. The case of Mali, which
has been the most affected, is explained by the spill-over effects of the civil war in Libya,
the return of Tuareg combatants in that conflict, the arms trafficking linked to that area,
the "abandonment" to which the populations in the vast North of Mali have been
subjected, the short-lived attempt to create the State of Azawad and the international
interventions that followed (Franco, 2021). Added to all this are the historical ethnic
rivalries between North and South, combined with climate change, which has a multiplier
effect on all this instability (Davidova, 2023).
Burkina Faso has been significantly affected by the instability in Mali, with a "domino
effect" that has created conditions of great instability and conflict. Ethnic and religious
divisions between the South and North, plus the significant presence of radical groups
taking advantage of clashes between communities over cattle theft and deteriorating
subsistence conditions (also due to climate change), plus the military coups of 2022,
have created the "perfect storm" that has made this country one of the world's most
needy in terms of international humanitarian aid. However, Burkina Faso also has very
specific endogenous causes that favour instability and conflict, exacerbated by adverse
climatic changes. Lugan (2023) refers specifically to the creation of protected wildlife
areas, which have created restrictions on transhumance activities, leading to conflicts
between the authorities and nomadic pastoralists; he also refers to the installation of rice
plantations - some owned by Chinese companies - which have driven out and prevented
traditional sedentary farmers from maintaining their ancestral way of subsistence; finally,
some laws on rural land ownership have expropriated some owners in favour of others,
from other ethnic groups, creating acrimony and conflicts. All these situations favour an
appeal to extremism as a last resort.
Niger, which was the last to be affected by this "domino effect", also has its own
specificities. Unlike the other two, there was a formal democracy and President Mohamed
Bazoum was elected in 2021. However, on 26 July 2023, a military coup overthrew
Bazoum and installed a military junta in power, as had happened in the neighbouring
States of Burkina Faso and Mali. Niger was home to significant contingents of French and
American troops. This country was considered the headquarters of the fight against
Islamic radicalism in the region. In Niger, in addition to Islamic State and AQIM and their
affiliates, Boko Haram is also active. As in neighbouring States, relations with the former
colonial power, France, have deteriorated significantly, with the military junta demanding
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e-ISSN: 1647-7251
VOL15 N2, DT3
Thematic Dossier – Climate and Security
April 2025, pp. 141-158
Climate change induced instability and conflicts: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
José Francisco Lynze Zagalo Pavia, João Carlos Marques Simões
149
the withdrawal of the French military contingent from the country. The same has not
happened, at least so far, with the US presence. Another specificity of Niger is that it is
one of France's main suppliers of uranium. France's dependence on this raw material to
feed its nuclear industry is well known (Glaser, 2017). A large part of Niger's uranium
exploration was handed over to French companies, with accusations of neo-colonial
exploitation. There are fears that this business could be handed over to companies linked
to the Wagner Group (Africa Corps)
5
or to other countries such as China.
As we have just seen, there are many common factors and some distinctive aspects. It
is clear, however, that in all cases climate change acts as an exacerbator and multiplier
of instability and conflicts, which in some cases have existed for a long time (in the case
of ethnic and religious divisions and also the asymmetries between North and South) and
in others are more recent, such as the rise of radicalism, the deterioration of economic
and subsistence conditions and acrimony towards the international presence, particularly
of the West. We should also add the total ineffectiveness of the regional organisation,
ECOWAS, in maintaining institutional normality and the growing influence of
disinformation and fake news campaigns, allegedly carried out by Russian or Chinese
interests, which encourage this destabilisation and anti-Western sentiment.
3 - External actors
International actors do of course play a role of varying intensity in the unfolding of events
in these three countries. The terrorist networks operating in the region exploit the
porosity of borders, the impact of the civil war in Libya, the dissatisfaction of large
sections of the population towards traditional authorities, the absence of the State and
security forces in large parts of these territories, religious affinities and support from
other forms of trafficking, such as drugs, arms and illegal migration networks. Groups
such as AQMI (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and its affiliates, the Islamic State or
Boko Haram, which is also active in Niger, are part of this Islamic radicalism that
threatens the security of the entire region (Martinez, 2023).
ECOWAS/CEDEAO (the Economic Community of West African States) is the regional
grouping established by the Treaty of Lagos, signed in 1975. This treaty was revised in
1993 with the aim of deepening the economic and political integration of its members. It
also includes a responsibility to prevent and resolve conflicts in the region, with sanctions
for any non-constitutional political changes. As a result, following coups in Mali in 2020
and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023, these countries were suspended from
the organisation and placed under severe economic and political sanctions. However, the
organisation's track record in maintaining constitutional normality in its members is not
positive, given the increasing number of coups or attempted coups that have taken place
in this sub-region of Africa in recent years. The corollary of this situation was the
5
From January 2024, the group formerly known as the Wagner Group (Africa Corps), began to call itself Africa
Corps. This also reflected an attempt to dispel reminiscences of the controversial death of its former leader in
August 2023. See Lechner and Eledinov (2024).
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withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso from ECOWAS in January 2025, with these
countries forming the “Alliance of Sahel States” in the meantime.
6
Through its various programmes, projects and missions, the European Union's main
objective is to promote development, combat extremism and control illegal immigration
aid networks, thus helping to prevent huge flows of people from reaching the shores of
the Mediterranean in the hope of reaching Europe. Its influence is exerted primarily
through the various development aid programmes and also by sending missions under
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Following the coups d'état in Mali and
Niger, these missions were forced to withdraw by the new military juntas in power and,
in the case of Mali, were replaced by mercenaries from the Afrika Korps (Binnie, 2022).
The European Union's concerns are also focused on combating the growing Chinese
influence in Africa. To this end, an ambitious program was presented, the Global Gateway
Investment Package,
7
with a total value of 150 billion euros, which aims to be a possible
European alternative to the Chinese BRI (Belt and Road Initiative).
Russia's presence on the African continent had fallen sharply following the collapse of the
Soviet Union. It is important to note that the former Soviet Union had been one of the
main supporters of liberation movements in Africa as part of the ideological agenda
pursued during the Cold War. Even today, many of Africa's current leaders, who in some
cases lived and studied in the former Soviet Union, have close ties - even family ties -
with Russian citizens or citizens of other former republics, such as Belarus, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan or Georgia (Pavia, 2023).
In this sense, following Russia's isolation since 2014 and, above all, since the invasion of
Ukraine in 2022, Russia's interest in the African continent is explained by economic
reasons (access to the rare natural resources that African countries possess, including
mineral and energy resources) and expanding Russia's export capacities in military
equipment. The other dimension has to do with geopolitical issues; for example, using
the influence of African States in the United Nations General Assembly to prove Russia's
ability to overcome its isolation on the world stage (Davidova, 2023).
In recent years, several connections have been made between Russia and the so-called
Wagner Group (Africa Corps). Classified as a semi-State group, private security company
and/or para-military, the Wagner Group (Africa Corps) has been the subject of study by
various researchers and specialists (Russia’s military, mercenary and criminal
engagement in Africa, 2023), especially since 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, when
the group began operating, and later with the expansion of its presence to other war
scenarios, namely in Syria and Libya (Davidova, 2023). Its operations are geared towards
strategic and operational interests defined in coordination with Moscow, constituting a
fundamental element of its irregular warfare strategy and an extension of its foreign
policy at State level (Davidova, 2023).
Thus, the Wagner Group (Africa Corps) has been Moscow's armed arm: concluding
agreements that will allow Russia to establish itself in a given country in order to access
the natural resources present there, in exchange for providing military support. At the
6
See Le Monde (2025).
7
See European Commission (2023).
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same time, it manages to create difficulties for the former colonial powers (specifically
France) and the West in general, which are being replaced in their historical and
traditional role (Pavia, 2023). This situation is exactly what is going on in Mali, Burkina
Faso and more recently in Niger.
According to Pavia (Pavia, 2023), China's presence in Africa is growing in importance
compared to its Western presence, as it seeks to consolidate its role on the continent
with a view to pursuing certain objectives, for which economic and political-diplomatic
factors contribute. China's economic interest in the African continent stems essentially
from the supply of essential raw materials, such as oil, which sustain the country's
economic growth and the industries that leverage it. Furthermore, Pavia suggests that
"the very weakness of the social, administrative and economic structures of most African
countries facilitates commercial and financial exchange without legal, environmental,
social or other constraints that could hinder Beijing's efforts" (Pavia, 2023).
The political-diplomatic dimension, based above all on the prevalence of diplomatic
relations with China, to the detriment of Taiwan, and the voting position within the United
Nations; the consolidation of the "Beijing consensus" in Africa is also becoming
increasingly important, in other words, the promotion of an "uncomplicated and
uncompromising policy" that promotes the principle of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of states, which is strongly defended by African countries (Pavia, 2023).
This trend thus demonstrates the entrenchment of Chinese soft power in Africa
(Davidova, 2023), which could extend to mirroring China's authoritarian political model
implemented on the African continent, in contrast to the liberal democratic Western
model (Pavia, 2023). For Beijing, Africa represents a source of political support and,
increasingly, an expanding economic market (Davidova, 2023). From the African point
of view, China's presence represents an alternative partnership that offers important
opportunities for economic development (Pavia, 2023).
France, as a former colonial power, is one of the most influential external actors in these
three countries. This is, in fact, one of its assets and also one of its vulnerabilities.
France's post-colonial relationship with its former colonies, especially in Africa, has
acquired very complex characteristics, which have led to it being labelled France-Afrique.
France-Afrique is a controversial neo-colonial relationship in which the former coloniser
continues to dominate - now indirectly - economic, financial, military and even political
issues in its former colonies (Glaser, 2017). The new African nomemklaturas, as long as
they are subservient to the dictates of Paris, thus find protection, even if their regimes
are clearly dictatorial and kleptocratic, as has happened several times, one of the most
paradigmatic examples being the Bokassa regime in the Central African Republic.
Successive French leaders have tried to justify this situation - while distancing
themselves from the most controversial aspects of this peculiar relationship - with an
alleged special purpose of France in Africa, with some going so far as to say that: "La
France sans l'Afrique, c'est un petit pays dans le monde" (CNEWS, 2023).
In this context, France has often taken on the role of "Gendarme d'Afrique", setting up
military bases in some of these countries, sponsoring military education and training
projects and carrying out large-scale security operations, the last of which took place
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precisely in these three Central Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger), among
others in the sub-region. These operations were discontinued following military coups
that installed new actors in power who were unfavourable to the continuation of these
operations. In turn, the United Nations and European Union missions also ended up
suffering the consequences of this new political shift, ceasing their operations in these
countries. It should be noted that a significant number of these operations and missions
have not had the desired success in their fight against the radical movements operating
in this region, and in some cases have even been embroiled in controversy, affecting
citizens who may have had nothing to do with terrorism. A common factor in the rhetoric
of these new military juntas is their anti-French and, in some cases, anti-Western
inspiration, calling for new extra-African actors to take their place. In particular, there
are calls for Russia and the Wagner Group (Africa Corps), which are already operating in
some of these countries.
This whole situation has "shocked" the French leadership, which is observing a growing
anti-French rhetoric in Africa and, more importantly, a real decline in Quai d’Orsay’s
traditional presence and influence on that part of the continent.
4 - Climate change exacerbation of instability and conflicts
Social scientists describe climate change as a “threat multiplier” because it does
exacerbate the risk factors that already give rise to instability (Muggah, 2021).
Therefore, empirical results support the assumption that climate change acts as a threat
multiplier in these countries since it triggers, accelerates, and deepens the current
instabilities (Sofuoğlu, 2020). According to Evans & Munslow (2021): “These three
Sahelian countries - Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger - have become the epicentre of a Jihadi
upsurge since 2012 with climate change acting as a powerful compounding factor:
weakening livelihoods place pressure on economic and social systems with radicalising
political ramifications”. And they conclude the following: “Climate change is exerting a
multiplier impact on health challenges and conflict in the Sahel region”.
As was mentioned earlier, the sources and drivers of instability and conflict (either
internal or external) are already there; what the effects of climate change do is multiply
and accentuate their negative consequences. One of the sub-regions of Africa that is
most affected by this vicious cycle is precisely the Central Sahel region; a region that is
highly vulnerable to climate change and has a legacy of political instability. In the Central
Sahel, temperatures are rising 1.5 times faster than the rest of the world and are
projected to increase by 35.6 to 39.7 degrees Fahrenheit (2°C - 4.3°C) by 2080 (The
central sahel: How conflict and climate change drive crisis, 2023). Niger loses between
100,000 and 120,000 hectares of arable land to soil erosion and desertification annually.
Parts of central Niger experience temperatures of 95 degrees Fahrenheit (35 °C) and
above for more than 300 days a year. This strongly reduces the number of areas available
to farmers and herders and has contributed to increased conflict in the country. Similar
patterns across the region have fueled an unprecedented food insecurity crisis. In Burkina
Faso alone, 2.2 million people are facing crisis levels of food insecurity. More than 20,000
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people in the country's northeast face daily risk of death from starvation and disease
(The central sahel: How conflict and climate change drive crisis, 2023).
This pattern of linking climate change to instability and conflict is also noted in the findings
of this Initiative: “As global temperatures rise, conflicts stemming from drought,
desertification, land degradation and food insecurity are increasing. People leaving their
homes to flee these crises often compete with local populations for scarce resources,
exacerbating inter-communal tensions. The loss of arable land and livelihoods leaves
youth more vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by armed groups or victimization
by organized criminals, while fewer socioeconomic opportunities lead to more exploitation
of natural resources” (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019).
It's not just in the Sahel that this phenomenon occurs. It has already been noted in the
Horn of Africa, the Mekong Delta, Central Asia, in Small Developed Insular States (SDIS)
and some regions of Latin America. These are precisely the region’s most vulnerable to
the damaging effects of climate change, combined with situations of fragility,
vulnerability and stress, which are precisely what induce tensions, instability and
conflicts. This phenomenon also affects the Arctic region particularly acutely, albeit in a
different dimension. The States concerned (in this case those directly concerned are the
Arctic coastal States - USA, Canada, Russia, Denmark and Norway - and in a second line
those that complement the Arctic Council, the five aforementioned plus Sweden, Finland
and Iceland) are not in a situation of fragility. However, the consequences of climate
change - in this case melting ice - will create new oceanic routes linking Europe, America
and Asia and provide opportunities for exploiting resources that until now have not been
possible. This new reality is already exacerbating conflicts, particularly over the
delimitation of maritime borders, control and access to natural resources and the
geopolitics of the new potential maritime routes.
Another highly worrying situation is water stress in the Horn of Africa. The entire sub-
region has suffered the effects of climate change, particularly persistent drought and
rising temperatures, as well as related erratic phenomena such as locust plagues or the
increased intensity of diseases such as malaria and cholera, among others. This whole
situation has a devastating effect on agriculture and livestock, leading to widespread
famines, the total destabilization of ancestral ways of life, growing population movements
and the resulting instability and conflicts. Attempts to mitigate this situation often end
up exacerbating the instability even further, as is the case with the construction of the
great Renaissance dam in Ethiopia. Downstream countries have protested vehemently,
with Egypt being the most vocal. This concern is understandable since Egypt, as
Herodotus, an ancient Greek historian said, almost 2500 years ago, "is a gift of the Nile".
A significant reduction in the flow of the Nile waters would jeopardise tens of millions of
Egyptians who live right on its banks and, to a large extent, derive their livelihoods from
it, whether through fishing, livestock farming, agriculture or even tourism. It's a situation
in which climate change will end up exacerbating latent instability, which could escalate
into large-scale international conflicts.
In the Small Developed Insular States (SDIS) the situation is particularly acute. Some of
them could literally disappear due to rising sea levels. Especially in the Pacific, many of
these archipelagos, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Fiji, among others, due to their low
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altitude in relation to sea level, have seen vast coastal areas literally disappear, due to
the combined effect of erosion, poor planning and, in particular, the rise in sea level due
to the melting of ice caps that is happening especially in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
This situation has led to increased instability and conflicts, which also stem from the fact
that these countries are poorly prepared for these phenomena and their level of resilience
is very low.
In short, we have seen that the correlation between climate change and the exacerbation
of instability and conflicts indeed has a global reach. This aforementioned "multiplier
effect" ends up exacerbating pre-existing situations and being a catalyst for grievances,
injustices, bad governance, corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, violence, radicalism,
inequities and discrimination, which lead to insecurity and destabilization. The sub-region
we have taken as an example, the Central Sahel, is the prototype of this situation. Some
of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso),
located in an area that is one of the most affected by climate change and with all the
instability and conflict triggers mentioned above. The conditions are in place for the
"multiplier effect" of conflicts created by climate change to thrive here. If we add to this
situation several external actors who also contribute significantly to this outcome, the
result is that, unfortunately, these three countries are perhaps some of the most perfect
examples of the phenomenon we have been describing.
Conclusions
According to the literature and the reports from various sources and organisations, that
were mentioned above, there seems to be no doubt that climate change is very likely to
have a multiplier effect on instability and conflict in societies where it already exists.
Among the regions of the world where these effects appear to be most visible is the
Central Sahel sub-region and the three countries mentioned above: Mali, Burkina Faso
and Niger. The low resilience of these countries to the combined effects of prolonged
droughts, sometimes interspersed with torrential rains that cause devastating floods,
land degradation, loss of biodiversity, global warming and the emergence of agricultural
pests and zoonoses, precisely as a result of the secondary effects of climate change,
make the Central Sahel one of the world's hotspots in terms of its adverse effects.
Of course, it is not climate change that directly increases terrorism or political instability
that can lead to coups, or the growing influence of Russia and the Wagner Group (Africa
Corps), or the mistakes made by post-colonial France in its relations with its former
colonies; but, it has a multiplier effect on pre-existing drivers of instability and grievances
significantly increasing the likelihood of conflict. For example, drought destabilises the
livelihoods of farmers and herders, putting their subsistence at risk; if they don't find
support from the formal structures of the State, they may turn against it and join radical
groups that promise to change things for the better. Or they may support alternatives,
such as military juntas or the Wagner Group (Africa Corps), to the detriment of French
military operations, because these have apparently been ineffective in solving their
problems and unfortunately, in some cases, they have become even worse.
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However, we should not be tempted to think, as many of the reports mentioned have
stressed, that there will be no quick response to the eventual resolution of these conflicts,
since climate change and its effects will last for decades. As has been pointed out, climate
change reinforces the drivers of these conflicts, it does not cause them; therefore, we
should not give up trying to break the vicious cycle of
insecurity/underdevelopment/conflict, which should be one of the potential solutions for
this sub-region.
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