2. Theoretical framework of constraints for optimal choice in trade and
commercial policies under great power politics between China and US
The political economy of optimal choices in foreign trade policies can be analyzed from
two complementary perspectives. Academic discussion on how states interact within a
given international order, from either realist or liberal theoretical approaches, can provide
some basic understanding of policy making and strategic choices. This paper will assume
that specific economic considerations based on rational choices might pose conflicts with
hegemonic interests under conditions of great power politics between China and US.
Both realists and liberals do attach importance to the influence of great powers over a
given international order (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Even though realists have refused to
rule out international cooperation as a feasible option, it would never take place if actual
distribution of power is challenged (Grieco, 1990; Jervis, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001;
Snidal, 1991; Taliaferro, 2011). This is a reasonable assumption irrespective of recurrent
discussions about underlying reasons and different dimensions related to strategic
decision-making within countries (Buzan, 1995; Singer, 1961). Autonomy of a given
country within the international system will depend on geographical position, relative
power, resources endowment, foreign investments and technology transfers
dependence, among other variables (Lee & Thompson, 2022; Krasner, 1978). Therefore,
it can be deducted that not every country is free to pursue the materialization of its own
optimal choices, given external pressure and influence exerted from a superpower such
as US. In a nutshell, great powers can exert influence over other countries’ choices,
subordinating core interests of the latter to theirs (Beckley, 2018; Karen & William, 1994;
Taliaferro, 2004).
From an economic perspective, however, agents are expected to make optimal choices
based on rational considerations such as profit maximization. States are not an exception
and, among other spheres of action, will seek to remain competitive within the GVC. The
boom in international trade resulting from globalization has generated a gradual
geographic fragmentation of production processes. The GVC is based on “trade in tasks”
(Inomata, 2017; Xing & Detert, 2011; Xing, 2021). Since fragmentation of production
favors a drastic reduction in overall costs, increasing competitiveness has contributed to
greater trade volumes and economic growth rates (Baldwin & Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015,
Feenstra, 1998; Kwok, 2018). Several authors have also established a direct relationship
between domestic participation in the GVC and industrial development (Baldwin & Lopez-
Gonzalez, 2015; Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Vrh, 2017). Main logic behind this
assertion is that further integration onto the GVC, either through forward (DVX) or
backward linkages (FVA), contributes to increase overall productivity (Dauth et al., 2014;
Donoso et al, 2015; Iodice & Tomasi, 2016; Lurweg & Westermeier.A., 2010; Kreutzer &
Berger, 2018). Choi et al. (2019), for instance, have provided empirical evidence that
innovation enables certain countries to improve their position within the GVC. So
industrial upgrading, which stems from sustained increases in productivity, can boost
both domestic value added and export-related jobs (Montalbano et al., 2018; Shimbov
et al., 2019).