OBSERVARE

Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL15, N.º 2, TD1

Thematic Dossier – Brazil-China relations:

The rise of modern International Order

December 2024

368

THE LUSOPHONE BRIDGE: MACAU'S ROLE IN CHINA-BRAZIL RELATIONS

(1999-2024)

HENOCH GABRIEL MANDELBAUM

henoch@alumni.usp.br

Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of São Paulo (Brazil). Researcher at the

International Relations Research Center at the University of São Paulo (NUPRI-USP), and at the

Center for International Studies and Analyses at São Paulo State University (NEAI-UNESP).

Member of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Midwest Political Science

Association (MPSA), the Second Cold War Observatory (SCWO), and the Society for Hong Kong

Studies (SHKS). His current research interests are Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, and

Political Regimes, with an emphasis on Brazil, Latin America, China (including Hong Kong, Macau,

and Taiwan), and the Indo-Pacific region.

Abstract

Since the handover in 1999, Beijing has strategically used Macau's Portuguese heritage and

thriving local economy to develop closer relations with Lusophone countries. Among these

nations, Brazil stands out as an emerging power and as China's most important trading

partner in Latin America. However, it is crucial to recognize that Macau is not merely a passive

entity in this dynamic. As a Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau possesses a distinct

"actorness", empowered by its Basic Law to engage autonomously in relevant external affairs.

This study aims to dissect and understand Macau's role in the evolving China-Brazil relations

over twenty-five years. To achieve this, I will employ qualitative research methods, primarily

online archival excavation, and document analysis, focusing on official documents, local media

articles, and academic literature. Applying soft power and paradiplomacy frameworks, I will

explore how China has utilized Macau as an instrument of attraction in its dealings with Brazil.

Furthermore, I will examine Macau's endeavors to establish itself as a critical paradiplomatic

player in these interactions. Lastly, I will delve into Brazil's reactions to China and Macau's

efforts to strengthen their ties with the country and how these responses have shaped their

triangular relations.

Keywords

Macau, China, Brazil, Soft Power, Paradiplomacy.

Resumo

Desde a transferência em 1999, Pequim tem utilizado estrategicamente a herança portuguesa

de Macau e a próspera economia local para desenvolver relações mais estreitas com os países

lusófonos. Entre estas nações, o Brasil destaca-se como potência emergente e como o mais

importante parceiro comercial da China na América Latina. No entanto, é crucial reconhecer

que Macau não é apenas uma entidade passiva nesta dinâmica. Enquanto Região

Administrativa Especial (RAE), Macau possui uma “actividade” distinta, habilitada pela sua Lei

Básica a envolver-se autonomamente em assuntos externos relevantes. Este estudo visa

dissecar e compreender o papel de Macau na evolução das relações China-Brasil ao longo de

vinte e cinco anos. Para o conseguir, empregarei métodos de investigação qualitativos,

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

369

principalmente consulta de arquivos online e análise de documentos oficiais, artigos dos media

locais e literatura académica. Aplicando estruturas de soft power e paradiplomacia, explorarei

a forma como a China utiliza Macau como instrumento de atracção nas suas relações com o

Brasil. Além disso, examinarei os esforços de Macau para se estabelecer como um actor

paradiplomático crítico nestas interacções. Por último, aprofundarei as reacções do Brasil aos

esforços da China e de Macau para reforçar os seus laços com o país e como estas respostas

moldaram as suas relações triangulares.

Palavras-chave

Macau, China, Brasil, Soft Power, Paradiplomacia.

How to cite this article

Mandelbaum, Henoch Gabriel (2024). The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil

Relations (1999-2024). Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL 15 N.º 2, TD1 –

Temathic Dossier – “Brazil - China Relations: The Rise Of Modern International Order”. December

2024, pp. 368-380. https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0324.18.

Article received on 15 July 2024 and accepted for publication on 10 September 2024.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

370

THE LUSOPHONE BRIDGE: MACAU'S ROLE IN CHINA-BRAZIL

RELATIONS (1999-2024)

HENOCH GABRIEL MANDELBAUM

1. Introduction

In recent years, the relationship between China and Brazil has grown significantly. This

growth is driven by expanding economic and political ties. At the heart of this evolving

partnership is the often-overlooked role of Macau, a Special Administrative Region (SAR)

of China. Since Macau was returned to China from Portugal in 1999, Beijing has aptly

utilized its unique Portuguese heritage and vibrant economy to strengthen ties with

Portuguese-speaking countries (PSC), particularly Brazil. Nonetheless, Macau is not just

a passive player in this strategy since its status as a SAR gives it a unique ability to act

independently in many external affairs. This autonomy allows Macau to bridge China and

the Lusophone world, promoting economic, cultural, and diplomatic exchanges (Matias

dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).

Brazil is the largest PSC and Latin American country, making it a crucial partner for China.

Their relationship is marked by significant trade, investment and intersectoral

cooperation (Oliveira, 2023). Yet, the place of Macau in this bilateral relationship has not

been thoroughly explored. This paper aims to fill that gap, examining Macau's role in

Beijing-Brasília relations over the last twenty-five years. The study will use qualitative

research methods to analyze official documents, local media articles, and academic

literature. By applying soft power and paradiplomacy concepts, the research will look at

how China has used Macau to attract and influence Brazil.

Additionally, it will investigate how Macau has actively worked to establish itself as a

critical player in these diplomatic efforts. The study will consider Brazil's reactions to

initiatives by China and the MSAR, exploring how these responses have shaped the

relationship between the three. Interactions between China, Macau, and Brazil offer a

complex and fascinating case study in contemporary international relations.

2. Soft Power and Paradiplomacy: Diplomatic Tools in an Interdependent

World

In the 1970s, new international players emerged, including non-state and subnational

actors, along with new forms of exerting power in world politics beyond military might.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

371

This shift was driven by advancements in transnational communication, finance, trade,

and travel, as well as the rise of global interdependence. This new scenario begged for

the development of concepts that allowed the understanding of these fast-paced

transformations, leading to the appearance of the terms soft power and paradiplomacy

in academic circles (Al-Malki et al., 2023; Oddone, 2023).

Nye (1990) coined the term soft power, which refers to a country's ability to influence

others and shape their preferences through attraction and persuasion rather than

coercion or payment. Nye (2004) also points out that a country's soft power lies mainly

in three primary resources: culture (in places where it is attractive to others), political

values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and foreign policy (when it is

perceived as legitimate and has moral authority).

Culture encompasses the values and practices that impart meaning to a society,

manifesting in various forms. It is often categorized into high culture, which includes

literature, art, and education appealing to elites; and popular culture, which centers on

mass entertainment. When a nation's culture embodies universal values and its policies

advocate for shared values and interests, it enhances the likelihood of achieving desired

outcomes due to the bonds of attraction and duty it fosters. Commerce is just one method

of cultural transmission. Culture is also shared through personal interactions, visits, and

exchanges (Nye, 2004).

Government policies, both domestic and international, can be significant sources of soft

power. Depending on the context, these policies can have varying impacts over the short

and long term. Effective policies can enhance a nation's soft power by reinforcing its

attractiveness and legitimacy. Meanwhile, the political values a government promotes in

its domestic actions, its participation in international institutions, and its foreign policy

significantly influence the preferences of others. Governments can either attract or repel

others through the power of their example. However, governments vie for control of soft

power against a wide array of opinion leaders, including news media, corporations, non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and

scientific networks (Nye, 2004).

At the same time, the most encompassing and widely accepted definition of

paradiplomacy has been advanced by Noé Cornago (1999: 40), who understands it as

“sub-state governments’ involvement in international relations through the

establishment of formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with foreign

public or private entities, to promote socio-economic, cultural or political issues, as well

as any other foreign dimension of their own constitutional competences.”

Paradiplomacy is governed by strong institutional conditions, including the necessity for

political legitimacy, defined competencies, professionalized infrastructures, and financial

resources for international operations. Furthermore, it is increasingly shaped by agreed-

upon rules and is a collection of practices. When subnational governments engage in

structured international activities, they do so under the influence of international norms,

rules, and practices. Subnational governments, in collaboration with international

organizations, transnational networks of subnational governments, and academics, have

been participating in an international socialization process. This process is facilitating the

establishment of a new international institution (Oddone, 2023).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

372

More importantly, paradiplomacy can render actorness to the subnational units that use

it. Tianyang Liu and Yao Song (2020) elaborated a four-dimensional analytical framework

of the essential dimensions of international actorness in paradiplomacy: 1) authority,

which refers to the powers that allow a subnational government to engage in international

relations, albeit with certain limitations; 2) opportunity, which refers to opportunities

arising from the external environment that directly or indirectly support the role of a

subnational government as an actor in international relations; 3) capability, which refers

to opportunities generated by the external environment that directly or indirectly

enhance the role of a subnational government as a participant in international relations;

and 4) presence, which pertains to the external and internal recognition of subnational

governments as international actors by third parties.

3. Macau in the Chinese Soft Power Toward Brazil: Attracting a

Portuguese-Speaking Strategic Partner (1999-2024)

China's post-Cold War strategy heavily relies on using the soft power approach in its

foreign policy. Since 2004, China has expanded its global influence through a network of

Confucius Institutes (CI) and Classrooms (CC), modernizing state media, enhancing

overseas aid, and investing in cultural promotion. Under Xi Jinping, China intensified

these efforts, launching the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, aiming to strengthen

global trade networks and investing nearly US$1 trillion by 2023. China also established

international financial institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

and the New Development Bank (NDB), to create alternatives to the US-led global order

(Kurlantzick, 2023; Leahy et al., 2023).

Meanwhile, Brazil has become more important in Beijing's foreign policy agenda since

1993, when it successfully elevated its cooperative relationship with China to a Strategic

Partnership (SP), being the first country to do so. In 2012, the Brazil-China partnership

advanced to a new level when it was elevated to a global SP as part of both countries'

response to the 2008 financial crisis. This elevation signified China's recognition of Brazil's

position within the international system (Oliveira, 2023).

Therefore, Brazil remains a highly valued strategic partner for Beijing for three primary

reasons: 1) it is a reliable supplier of essential commodities for industrial production and

capital formation, as well as foodstuffs to feed China's population of 1.41 billion while

boasting a US$ 157.4 billion bilateral trade (2023). Additionally, it serves as a significant

consumer market in Latin America for Chinese goods and services, especially in strategic

sectors such as energy, manufacturing, and information technology (Ellis, 2017; Reis,

2024); 2) it plays a pivotal role in South-South Cooperation (SSC) due to its status as a

rising power that shares China's aspiration of shifting the world order towards a

multipolar system. This includes amplifying the voice of the developing world in

international institutions and pushing for the de-dollarization of the global financial

system, a shift that both countries believe can be expedited through the joint diplomatic

efforts of BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Liu & Papa,

2022); and 3) as a regional power, it can help mitigate U.S. influence in Latin America

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

373

and compel Washington to refocus its strategic attention from the Indo-Pacific to the

Western Hemisphere (Liang, 2019; Pini, 2015).

Because of these reasons, China started to launch a soft power offensive towards Brazil

by using Macau as a major asset in this strategy, mainly in the cultural exchanges and

foreign policy initiatives. Designated as a platform between China and the Lusophone

world, due to the 442 years of Portuguese rule in the enclave (1557-1999) and the

acceptance of Portuguese as an official language alongside Chinese after the handover

to Beijing, Macau has unique characteristics to serve in this intermediary role effectively.

In addition, the increasing demand for Portuguese language courses has transformed

Macau into a prime location for linguistic and cultural training for Chinese diplomats,

interpreters, CI Mandarin teachers, and businesspeople before they begin working in

PSC, including Brazil (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).

Among Beijing's cultural initiatives, the most important one is the Cultural Week of China

and Portuguese-Speaking Countries, launched in 2008, annually held in Macau and

organized by the Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade

Cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau). The event is

also supported by the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Macau Special Administrative Region

(MSAR), the Civic and Municipal Affairs Bureau, the Macau Government Tourism Office,

the Oriental Foundation, and the Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange

between Asia-Pacific and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Mendes, 2014; Yu, 2018). For

five days, artists from Mainland China, Macau, and the PSC perform music, theatrical

presentations, dance shows, and exhibit photography, painting, and handicrafts. The

Permanent Secretariat describes the Cultural Week as "a brilliant symbol of Macau's

establishment as the center of cultural exchange between China and Portuguese-

speaking countries" (Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica

e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Macau), 2023).

In the foreign policy arena, the main initiative the Chinese government leads is the Macau

Forum. The Forum, created in 2003 by China's Central Government and coordinated by

the Ministry of Commerce (MoC), represented a groundbreaking development in

international relations. It connects China with nine Portuguese-speaking countries across

four continents: Brazil in South America, Portugal in Europe, East Timor in Asia, and six

African nations—Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and

Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea

. The Macau Forum’s ministerial conferences are always

held in Macau and feature a Permanent Secretariat based in the city. The Chinese MoC

nominates the Secretary-General. He is assisted by three deputy secretaries-general:

one appointed by China’s MoC, one by the MSAR, and one on a rotational basis in

alphabetical order among the PSC (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).

In 2003, the First Ministerial Conference, chaired by then-Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi,

reached an agreement to enhance Sino-Lusophone economic collaboration,

Equatorial Guinea joined the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 2014, and the Macau

Forum in 2022. Although Portuguese is one of the country's official languages, alongside Spanish and

French, it is not widely spoken. The only Portuguese-based creole language spoken in Equatorial Guinea

is Fa d'Ambô, which is used on the islands of Annobón and Bioko, and in the capital, Malabo. Cf. Agostinho,

2021.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

374

intergovernmental partnerships, trade, investment, entrepreneurship, fisheries,

agriculture, engineering, infrastructure development, natural resources, and human

resources. The 2010 conference aimed to elevate the Macau Forum to a higher level. The

establishment of the Training Center for PSC officials in 2010 also contributed to the

renewed momentum generated by the third Ministerial Conference (Matias dos Santos,

2020).

4. The Lusophone Bridge: Macau as a Paradiplomatic Actor in China-

Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

According to Liu and Song's (2020) framework, the MSAR has all the elements of

international actorness. Regarding authority, the Macau Basic Law (MBL) (1993), which

serves as the "mini-constitution" of the SAR and came into effect when Macau was

handed over to Beijing, stipulates that Macau "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy for

fifty years, except in foreign and defense affairs, which are the responsibilities of the

Central People's Government" (Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of

the People's Republic of China, 1993, Art. 12). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the

MBL presents a hybrid approach to Macau's autonomy since it highlights the binominal

approach: “foreign affairs” vis-à-vis “external relations”, in which the former is the sole

domain of the Central Government while the latter comprises an authorized external

space for the SAR (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014). The MBL stipulates that the

“Macao Special Administrative Region [sic] may on its own, using the name ‘Macao,

China,’ [sic] maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements

with states, regions and relevant international or regional organizations in the

appropriate fields, such as the economy, trade, finance, shipping, communications,

tourism, culture, science and technology and sports” (Basic Law of the Macao Special

Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1993, Art. 136).

About opportunity, the MSAR's push into an intense international engagement was mainly

prompted by China's skyrocketing real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the early

2000s, around 10.5% per year, due to the country's accession to the World Trade

Organization (WTO) in 2001. WTO membership committed China to further opening its

economy, reducing tariffs, and eliminating trade barriers. This created a more favorable

environment for foreign investment, leading to a surge in FDI inflows. Furthermore,

Chinese growth was favored by comprehensive economic reforms, successful State-

Owned Enterprises (SOE) restructuring, an export-led growth strategy, substantial

infrastructure investments, a favorable demographic profile, and stable governance (Yao,

2014).

This context transformed China into the second-largest consumer of energy resources

after the US, prompting Beijing to place energy security as one of its foremost priorities.

At the time, more than 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originated from the Middle

East, a dependency Beijing viewed as a strategic vulnerability due to the region's political

instability and the dominant US military presence. Consequently, China strived to

diversify its energy imports away from traditional sources in the Persian Gulf, turning to

PSC such as Angola, Brazil, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste. Additionally, Beijing aimed to

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

375

leverage the rich natural resources of PSC to sustain its rapid economic growth (Horta,

2006; Matias dos Santos, 2020).

Regarding capability, the MSAR has heavily invested in cultural and diplomatic initiatives

to increase its international influence over foreign partners. The Macanese government

has sponsored numerous academic exchanges and PSC cultural festivals, while also

providing scholarships to students from African PSC. The MSAR has also hosted many

meetings involving professionals, academics, government officials, and businesspeople

from China and PSC (Matias dos Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014; Yu, 2018).

Concerning presence, the MSAR now participates as a full or associate member in over

eighteen economic and cultural international institutions, including the WTO, the

International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Economic and Social Commission for

Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO). Macau has consular relations with fifty-seven countries and

maintains economic and trade offices in Lisbon and Brussels. Its representative in

Brussels, where the European Union headquarters is located, is also accredited in

Geneva, the seat of the WTO and many other international organizations. Brazil's

importance is evident for Macau: its GDP is 5.15 times larger than that of all the other

PSC combined, making it the primary focus for any strategy aimed at promoting a

"greater Lusophone" commercial network. This trade relationship could effectively

stimulate the international Lusophone community and provide a means to diversify

Macau's heavy reliance on Cantonese gamblers from South China. However, the bilateral

trade between the MSAR and Brazil continues to be very small: it amounted to around

US$ 3.15 million in 2023. Macau primarily exports plastics, clocks, watches, and

machinery to Brazil. Meanwhile, Brazil exports to Macau mainly agricultural and food

products (Spooner, 2016a, 2016b; Trading Economics, 2024a).

Therefore, Macau has launched several cultural initiatives to foster closer relations with

Brazil and the other PSC. The most notable one is the Lusophone Festival (Festival da

Lusofonia), established in 1998 and held annually every October to celebrate and

promote the culture of the PSC. It also honors the Lusophone communities living in Macau

for their contributions to the region's development. Organized by the Institute for Civic

and Municipal Affairs and the Tourist Office, this traditional event features a variety of

cultural activities, including food, handicrafts, exhibitions, and concerts (Matias dos

Santos, 2020; Mendes, 2014).

The MSAR also actively supports academic events that connect local universities and

those from the PSC countries. The University of Macau has hosted several meetings of

the Association of Universities of Portuguese Language (AULP). In 2011, its Department

of Portuguese hosted the World Symposium on Portuguese Language Studies and

annually organizes the Day of the Portuguese Language and the Summer Course on

Portuguese Language and Culture. This course includes visits and meetings with

Macanese officials, educating participants about Macau's role as a cultural crossroads and

a platform for relations between China and the PSC (Mendes, 2014).

Despite not being directly aimed at Brazil, the international sports tournaments hosted

in the SAR have fostered people-to-people and organization-to-organization links

between Macau and Brazil. Brazilians tend to have a prominent presence in Macau's

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

376

world-class Grand Prix. For instance, "Pipo" Derani secured third place in the 60th-

anniversary race in Fall 2013, and Lucas di Grassi won the 52nd Macau Grand Prix in

2005. The top-ranked Brazilian Women's Volleyball Team has also regularly competed in

major tournaments in Macau, facing teams from China, Russia, and the USA, including

the 2011 International Federation of Volleyball Championship (Spooner, 2016b).

One of the MSAR's main diplomatic initiatives towards Brazil is its support to the Macau

Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America

(MAPEAL), a non-profit organization that focuses on the promotion of exchanges and

connections between Macau, China, and Latin America, specifically in the areas of culture,

business, tourism, academic research, publication, information exchange, and training.

Among all the events and activities, two annual events are regularly organized between

October and November/December each year. The "Latin American Cultural Festival," held

from early October until the end of November, features 9 to 14 activities to foster cultural

exchange, along with some business matching activities. Another significant annual event

is the "Latin American Pavilion" and the associated seminars/forums, which take place in

mid-October at the "Macao International Trade and Investment Fair" to foster business

cooperation and exchange (Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange between

Asia-Pacific and Latin America, 2024; Mendes, 2014).

Despite its potential, the MSAR has not yet fully realized its role as a bridge between

China and the PSC. The local business community, except for Stanley Ho's group and a

few other entrepreneurs, has not placed enough emphasis on Lusophone markets.

Additionally, some local authorities, who often focus more on internal matters than global

engagement, have shown limited commitment, and the MSAR still needs to establish a

trade and economic delegation in Brazil, as the only existing one in a PSC is in Portugal

(Matias dos Santos, 2020).

5. Brazil's Responses to China's and Macau's Soft Power Initiatives

(1999-2024)

Brazil prizes its relationship with China primarily for economic and political reasons. China

has been the largest destination for Brazilian exports since 2009 (Oliveira, 2023). Since

2012, China has been Brazil's leading supplier of imported goods. In 2023, Brazil

exported US$ 104.32 billion worth of goods to China, especially soy, iron ore, and oil,

while the country imported US$ 74.19 billion worth of manufactured goods, especially

machines and equipment (Trading Economics, 2024b). Simultaneously, Brasília

welcomes diplomatic cooperation with China to maintain its economic and political

independence from US influence and interference, thereby enhancing its bargaining

power with Washington (Liang, 2019; Pini, 2015).

Brazil's participation in the Macau Forum has become more intense over the years.

Initially, Brazil was criticized for sending low-level officials to the Forum's ministerial

conferences. However, in 2013, Brasília sent Vice President Michel Temer to the 4th

Ministerial Conference. Brazil also values the Macau Forum since it allows the country to

engage annually with China and the PSC at the same event (Mendes, 2014; Veloso,

2015; Meneses, 2020).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

377

Some observers (Mendes, 2014; Meneses, 2020; Veloso, 2015) have raised concerns

that the Forum might enhance China's influence in the African PSC, which may undermine

Brazil’s strategic interests in the region. However, Brazilian diplomats have publicly

stated that they do not see the Macau Forum as damaging to Brasília’s interests. Paulo

Estivallet, the former Brazilian Ambassador to Beijing, emphasized that Brazil values and

recognizes China's efforts to promote rapprochement with the PSC through this

mechanism. He highlighted that Brazil accounts for over 80% of China-PSC trade and is

interested in participating in initiatives facilitating business and investments between

member countries (Meneses, 2020). Brazil has also steadily engaged in China's cultural

initiatives aimed at the PSC, sending diplomats, artists, scholars, chefs, and business

delegations to the events held in Macau (Matias dos Santos, 2020). According to

Ambassador Estivallet: "Since his [sic] creation and within the limits of its capabilities,

Brazil has been seeking to participate in the initiatives promoted by the Macau Forum,

both in the economic-commercial field and in the areas of cultural, educational and

linguistic promotion" (Meneses, 2020).

It is important to note that Brazil's participation in the Macau Forum fluctuates depending

on the strength of its bilateral relations with China. Given the extensive trade volume

between Brazil and China, Brazil prioritizes its direct bilateral channels with China over

the Forum. Moreover, Chinese soft power may not sufficiently enhance Brasília-Beijing

relations due to several challenges: 1) there is an imbalance in trade, with Brazil's exports

primarily consisting of soybeans and minerals, leading to the reprimarization of Brazilian

exports; 2) the Brazilian industry struggles to compete with Chinese imports, contributing

to the country's growing deindustrialization; 3) Brazil has not formally joined the BRI,

citing the initiative's ambiguous legal frameworks and a lack of strategic information for

Brazil's productive and political sectors; and 4) China remains ambivalent toward some

of Brazil's key foreign policy goals, such as securing a permanent seat on the United

Nations Security Council (Lopes, 2023; Oliveira, 2023).

Regarding the MSAR's cultural and diplomatic efforts towards Brazil, the South American

country has regularly participated in its initiatives, sending diplomats, business

delegations and artists. In addition, Macau, as a place with Portuguese as its official

language, remains an attractive place to Brazilian researchers and athletes who want to

work in China since it facilitates their lives there. Nevertheless, Brazil does not view the

MSAR with the same level of importance as its relations with Beijing. Since the handover,

Brazil has made only a couple of notable visits to the MSAR. Brazil's Vice President Michel

Temer visited in 2013 for the 10th anniversary of the Macau Forum, and almost a decade

earlier, in the fall of 2004, Brazil’s Minister of Culture and renowned musician, Gilberto

Gil, made a brief appearance. However, Gil's visit was primarily for the Hong Kong music

festival, not Macau. Until Temer's visit in 2013, Gilberto Gil was the highest-ranking

Brazilian official to have visited Macau. Another issue that limits its relations with the

MSAR is that, as Brazil has outlawed gambling casinos in its territory since 1946, the

country lacks companies that can invest in the MSAR's thriving gaming industry (Mendes,

2014; Spooner, 2016a, 2016b).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

378

Conclusion

Over the past twenty-five years, the evolving relationship between China and Brazil has

highlighted Macau's unique role as a bridge between the two countries. This study

demonstrates how Macau's Portuguese heritage and status as a Special Administrative

Region (SAR) of China have been leveraged to strengthen ties with Brazil, a Portuguese-

speaking rising power in Latin America.

Following Nye’s (2004) framework, China and Macau have focused on cultural and foreign

policy initiatives to foster deeper engagement with Brazil. Besides, the MSAR has all the

elements of actorness that were advanced by Liu and Song (2020). Macau has sought to

position itself as a cultural and economic intermediary, enhancing China's soft power in

Brazil through various initiatives and collaborations. Established in 2003, the Macau

Forum has been pivotal in promoting economic, cultural, and educational exchanges

between China and the PSC, including Brazil. Macau's efforts to host the Cultural Week

of China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries and provide a hub for Portuguese language

training for Chinese diplomats and businesspeople underscore its strategic importance.

Still, several challenges remain. Apart from a few notable exceptions, the Macanese

business community has not sufficiently prioritized the emphasis on Lusophone markets,

including Brazil. Establishing a trade and economic delegation in Brazil remains an

unfulfilled need, as currently, the only such delegation in a PSC is in Portugal. From

Brazil's perspective, the country remains cautious about deepening its engagement with

China, primarily due to the asymmetry in their bilateral trade relations, skepticism about

the benefits of the BRI, and the lack of support for some of Brazil's strategic goals in its

quest to become a great power. Concerning relations between Brasília and the MSAR,

Brazil has yet to accord more political and economic importance to the region.

In conclusion, while Macau has made significant strides in enhancing China-Brazil

relations, addressing these challenges is crucial to completely capitalize on its strategic

position. Macau's distinct actorness, facilitated by its autonomy under the Basic Law, has

enabled it to serve as a vital conduit for Chinese diplomatic efforts. As Beijing continues

to expand its global influence, overcoming these obstacles will be essential to further

solidifying Macau's role in international diplomacy involving the PSC.

References

Agostinho, Ana L. (2021). Fa d’Ambô (Equatorial Guinea): language snapshot. Language

Documentation and Description. Vol. 20, pp. 123-134.

Al-Malki, Fahad K., Safranchuk, Ivan A., & Chernov, Daniil N. (2023). Actorness of small

power: the case of Qatar. Journal of Globalization Studies. Vol. 14, pp.119–128.

Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People' s Republic of China.

(1993, March 31). Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Retrieved in August

2024, from https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/the-basic-law-of-the-

macao-macau-special-administrative-region-of-the-

prc#Chapter%20I%20General%20Principles.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

379

Cornago, Noé (1999). Diplomacy and paradiplomacy in the redefinition of international

security: dimensions of conflict and cooperation. Francisco Aldecoa, and Michael Keating

(eds), Paradiplomacy in action: the foreign relations of subnational governments.

London: Frank Cass, pp. 40–57.

Ellis, Robert E. (2017) The strategic context of China's advance in Latin America: an

update. Observatoire de la Chine, pp. 2-7.

Horta, Loro (2006, June 22). China’s Portuguese connection. Yale Global Online.

Retrieved in August 2024, from https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-

portuguese-connection.

Kurlantzick, Joshua (2023). Beijing's global media offensive: China's uneven campaign

to influence Asia and the world. New York: Oxford University Press.

Leahy, Joe, Kynge, James, and Parkin, Benjamin (2023, October 22). Ten years of China’s

Belt and Road: what has $1tn achieved? Financial Times. Retrieved in August 2024, from

https://www.ft.com/content/83501dd5-fe6d-4169-9d83-28a8cf46e681.

Liang, Wei (2019). Pulling the region into its orbit? China’s economic statecraft in Latin

America. Journal of Chinese Political Science. Vol. 24, pp. 433–449.

Liu, Tianyang, and Song, Yao (2020). Chinese paradiplomacy: a theoretical review. Sage

Open. Vol. 10, pp. 1-14.

Liu, Zongyuan Z., and Papa, Mihaela (2022). Can BRICS de-dollarize the global financial

system? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lopes, Dawisson B. (2023). De FHC a Bolsonaro: a emergência da política externa pós-

diplomática. José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (org), Alexandre Uehara (ed) 25 anos de

politica externa brasileira 1996-2021. São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, pp. 47-73.

Macau Association for the Promotion of Exchange between Asia-Pacific and Latin America

(2024). About us. Retrieved in August 2024, from https://www.mapeal.org/about-us.

Matias dos Santos, José C. (2020). Macau and China-Portuguese-speaking countries

relations: from nation (place) branding to soft power. Meng U Ieong (ed) Macau 20 years

after the handover: changes and challenges under “One Country, Two Systems”.

Abingdon: Routledge.

Mendes, Carmen A. (2014). Macau in China's relations with the Lusophone world. Revista

Brasileira de Política Internacional. Vol. 57, pp. 225-242.

Meneses, João P. (2020, May 21). Brazil. Harmful or “interested in participating”? Macau

News Network. Retrieved in August 2024, from https://www.macaubusiness.com/brazil-

harmful-or-interested-in-participating/.

Nye, Joseph S. (1990). Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power. New

York: Basic Books.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York:

Public Affairs.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL 15 N.º 2, TD 1

Thematic Dossier

Brazil-China relations: The rise of modern International Order

December 2024, pp. 368-380

The Lusophone Bridge: Macau's Role in China-Brazil Relations (1999-2024)

Henoch Gabriel Mandelbaum

380

Oddone, Nahuel. (2023, February 22). Paradiplomacy. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of

International Studies. Retrieved in August 2024, from

https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.

0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-797.

Oliveira, Henrique A. de (2023). Brasil e China: a institucionalização de um modelo de

parceria e cooperação. José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (org), Alexandre Uehara (ed)

25 anos de politica externa brasileira 1996-2021. São Paulo: Fonte Editorial, pp. 325-

354.

Pini, André M. (2015). A crescente presença chinesa na América Latina: desafios ao

Brasil. Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional, pp. 21-31.

Reis, Henrique (2024, January 9). Comércio entre Brasil e China: 2023, um ano de

recordes históricos. Comex do Brasil. Retrieved in August 2024, from

https://comexdobrasil.com/comercio-entre-brasil-e-china-2023-um-ano-de-recordes-

historicos/.

Secretariado Permanente do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a

China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa (Macau). Apresentação. 15a Semana Cultural da

China e dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. Retrieved in August 2024, from

https://semanacultural.forumchinaplp.org.mo/pt/home.

Spooner, Paul B. (2016a). Macau's trade with the Portuguese-speaking world. Journal of

Global Initiatives. Vol. 11, pp. 137-162.

Spooner, Paul B. (2016b). Macau and Brazil: from the World Trade Organization to a

major gaming city. Asian Education and Development Studies. Vol. 5, pp. 327-341.

Trading Economics (2024a). Brazil imports from Macau. Retrieved in July 2024, from

https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/imports/macau.

Trading Economics (2024b). China imports from Brazil. Retrieved in July 2024, from

https://tradingeconomics.com/china/imports/brazil.

Veloso, Isabel (2015). O Fórum Macau e a CPLP nas estratégias de cooperação sul-sul

da China e do Brasil na África. Perspectivas: Revista de Ciências Sociais. Vol. 45, pp. 41-

62.

Yao, Yang (2014). The Chinese growth miracle. Philippe Aghion, and Steven N. Durlauf

(eds), Handbook of economic growth. Oxford: North-Holland, pp. 943-1031.

Yu, Huichun (2018). Cultural exchanges between China and Portuguese-speaking

countries: Macao platform. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities

Research. Vol. 215, pp.198-201.